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Abstract

PyeongChang had been a low-profile city of the Republic of Korea until the city was elected to host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games after experiencing two-time failures of its bid for the 2010 and 2014 Olympics. Taking the PyeongChang’s three-time bids for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games as case studies, this study, thus, will explore the main reasons of the failures and success of bids of PyeongChang.

Preuss (2000) develops “a Multidimensional Decision” which discusses seven factors influencing the decision of the IOC member’s votes for an Olympic host city. The concept of Sports Diplomacy is also considered as an important factor in the Korean context. In light of Preuss’s model, one of the factors ‘Lobbing and Corruption’ may be replaced with the concept of Sports Diplomacy in the Korean context and, thus, this study applies the concept of Sports Diplomacy to the Preuss model in order to analyze the case of PyeongChang bids for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games.

The main reasons of the failures of the 2010 and 2014 PyeongChang bids for the Winter Olympic Games was that the quality of the bid was less qualified than the counterparts with a low international recognition and a weak performance in winter sports games. Also these bid campaigns lacked representative figures who were able to influence IOC members and lead the campaign with unity. In particular, the strong engagement and influence of the political power of Russia and the strong leadership presence of President Putin may have influenced the IOC members’ decisions for the 2014 bid. Moreover, the 2008 Beijing Olympics were hosted just two years before the 2010 Winter Olympics and in the same year of the 2014 bid, Korea was perceived to monopolize the major sports events by hosting 2014 Asian Games as well as 2011 IAAF World Championship. Just like the bid for the 2010 games, the 2014 PyeongChang Bid Committee simply emphasized the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula through Olympic Movement.

For the successes of the 2018 bid, a more upgraded compact venue plan and improvement of Korean’s performance in winter sports were main elements. The Bid
Committee also decided to have a strategic and efficient approach to the IOC members in support of the Korean central government’s active involvement. Fortunately, the 2018 votes seemed to have less intervention in terms of past location. Furthermore, the 2018 Bid Committee created key supporting messages and created a new brand for PyeongChang, the “New Horizons”, with a clear purpose to distance themselves from the two previous losing bids and to carve out a clear and distant difference from Munich and Annecy. New Horizons is about potential and growth and giving people access to winter sports for the first time in their lives – as well as creating a sustainable winter sports hub in Asia.

Key words: bid, a multidimensional decision, sports diplomacy, failures and successes of PyeongChang bid for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games
Acknowledgements

For the past several months, I have experienced most precious and hard time in my life writing this master’s thesis. Many times, I was not very confident whether I could finish this thesis as I had to hold down my thesis, my job as well as a baby’s mom. I completed it now and I would like to express my sincere thanks to the number of people who helped me who made my thesis to come true.

With this process of writing a thesis, I could broadened my knowledge on the Olympic Studies, which relates to my current carrier at KOC, providing a strong motivation to devote for the Olympic Movement as well as successful hosting of PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Susan Brownell, who guided and supported to write this thesis as a supervisor. I also would like appreciate Prof. Kostas Mountakis and Axel Horn who broadened my knowledge in Olympia and also took part in my thesis as advisors. I extend my sincere appreciation to IOA Master Program family, professors and classmates to provide my unique and special experience in Olympia and Sparta.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

PyeongChang, a small city located in the Mountainous area of Gangwon Province of South Korea, had attempted three consecutive times to host the Winter Olympics Games for the first time in the history of the IOC. It lasted over a decade until the city won the election of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. The historic journey of the PyeongChang bids started on 28 August 2002 when the city submitted an application to Korean Olympic Committee to host the Winter Olympic Games. From then on, PyeongChang became the first city which had tried three consecutive times to host the Winter Olympic Games and it finally became the hosting city of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. PyeongChang’s victory was recorded as the second biggest first-round margin in Olympic voting (63-25), according to the IOC (2011).

Despite the experiences of hosting mega sports events in Korea like the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games and the 2002 Korea Japan FIFA World Cup Games, hosting the Winter Olympic Games was a big challenge. First, South Korea is located in Far East Asia, which has been considered as a wasteland for winter sports events. In fact, most winter sports events had been held in Europe and Japan was the only country which had hosted Winter Olympic Games on the Asian continent. Also, PyeongChang has been a low-profile city in comparison to its competing cities which have been internationally highly recognized.

After experiencing two-time failures, PyeongChang has finally won to host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. This study, thus, will explore main reasons of the failures and successes of bid of PyeongChang. It takes the PyeongChang’s three-time bids for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games as a case study.

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives

The purpose of this study is to analyze the failures and successes of PyeongChang’s attempt to be a host city of the Winter Sports Games in order to provide valid information for those countries with a lack of experience in hosting mega sports events. This study, thus, inquires the four following questions:
• What are the objectives of the bid? And why did PyeongChang attempt to bid for three consecutive times in the history of the Winter Olympics?
• What developments have occurred after the two lost bid campaigns and how did they influence the success of bid?
• Are there any possible legacies from the failed bid campaigns?
• What are the major factors influencing the success of the bid campaign of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games?

The process of research was carried out on the following order. First, this study on the relevant literature was carried out on the various aspects of bid. Second, Preuss’s theory on the factors influencing the decision of IOC member is modified in the Korean context. Third, this modified model is applied to investigate the factors of failures and successes of the PyeongChang’s case.

1.3 Thesis structure
The introduction sets the background for a discussion of the PyeongChang bids campaigns for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games. The four questions are provided and thesis structure is introduced.

In Chapter Two, the literature review is conducted and it covers the history of the IOC and the PyeongChang bid. It also includes the general information on bid including types, objectives and procedure of bid.

Chapter Three deals with the model called ‘factors influencing the decision of IOC members’ which is developed by Preuss (2000). Sports Diplomacy is applied to this model in order to understand the ‘factors influencing the decision of IOC members’ in the Korean context. This study applies this model to analyze the three-time bid attempts of PyeongChang in terms of its failures and successes.

Chapter Four focuses on methodology which is divided into two main sections: Philosophical considerations and methods such as a documentary analysis and a qualitative method.
Chapter Five undertakes a process of analysis of Preuss’s model which aims to develop its analysis of the main influential factors to decision-making of selection of the host city of the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games in terms of failures and successes.

The Conclusion includes with a brief overview of the study and draws together the strengths of the analysis.
2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will briefly review and provide basic understanding of the Winter Olympic Games and bid. The section of bid covers its definition, types and objectives and IOC’s bid procedure. The overview of PyeongChang is also provided.

2.2 History of the Winter Olympic Games

The Winter Olympic Games were firstly held in Chamonix-Mont Blanc, France in 1924. The 24th IOC Session was held in Prague on 27 May, 1925 and resolved to stage the Winter Olympic Games on a regular basis. Accordingly, both summer and winter editions of the Olympic Games were held in the same year. However, in 1986 when the 91st IOC Session was held in Lausanne, the IOC decided that the Summer and Winter Olympic Games should be organized alternately every two years. Thus, Winter Olympic Games have been organized in a separate year from the Summer Olympic Games since 1994.

It is interesting to identify that South Korea won its first medal in the Winter Olympic Games just 21 years ago in 1992 but it became one of powerful winter sports nation since then. South Korea ranked in 5th place in the medal table of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games. Even more interesting fact is that the medals were won from the various sports. Before the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, the medals mainly came from short track speed skating in Korea. Therefore, the result of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics was significant, in that it expanded the fields of Winter Sports to Speed Skating and Figure Single, even though there still seems to need a bigger effort to raise competitiveness in snow sports.

2.3 Definition of bid

According to the Oxford Online Dictionary, bid is referred to as “to make an effort or attempt to achieve”. Also bid can be defined as “a politico-economic competition in which the objective is to win the right to organize a sports event” (Clivaz et al., 2005: 19). The expression of politico-economic competition is used here as the bid must fulfil its primary aim while satisfying different expectations and the stakeholders must be brought together so that each one profits from the event.
2.4 Types of bid

To understand the general flow and background information of bid, it is helpful to have understanding on the goal of bid from the prospective of the stakeholders of the due event. The bid can be classified into five categories although there is a certain degree of overlap between categories (Clivaz et al., 2005: 20):

2.4.1 Real bid

The most desirable events are naturally those for which competition is the most intense. There may even be a competition between several cities within the same country. The requirements laid down in the event owner’s specification are complex. Important factors in favor of a bid include the intrinsic quality of the site, popular support for the bid and interregional cooperation.

2.4.2 Alibi bid

Bid for a major sports event focuses a certain amount of media attention onto the bidder. These bids have no realistic chance of winning, but they provide a way to advertise the dynamism of the city and its surrounding area.

2.4.3 Warm-up bid

This category includes bids aimed at obtaining the organisation of a minor event with the objective of hosting a major competition at a later date. These bids are generally used to assess popular support and to demonstrate the host site’s organizational skills.

2.4.4 Tacit bid

This situation occurs when an event does not attract many bids. The owner still requires bids to be filed, but, in general, one edition of the event is attributed to each of the candidates.

2.4.5 Replacement bid

When an event cannot take place at its allocated venue it may be attributed to another venue without that venue having to go through the whole bid procedure. The beneficiaries of this type of bid are most frequently established sites that have already won their spurs organizing similar events.
2.4.6 The case of PyeongChang bid for the 2010, 2014 and 2018

Among these five types of bid above, the three cases of PyeongChang bid were real bid overall. At first the city had to compete with the city within the same country to be elected as an applicant city with the endorsement of the Korean Olympic Committee and finally become a candidate city after meeting various criteria to be eligible as a candidate city. Also, during the bid process, the PyeongChang Bid Committee strategically applied the warm-up bid to host single winter sporting events with the objective of hosting the Winter Olympic Games. As a host city of winter sports, this low-profile city demonstrated its organizational skills to the world.

2.5 Objectives of bid

This study analyzes the objectives of bid in order to understand the three consecutive trials of PyeongChang. It is, however, hard to define the crucial factor that led to the continued bid. However, an overview of the international tendency to bid for the games will help to get a general idea of the PyeongChang’s bid attempts.

Since the 1980s, more and more regions have become interested in attracting major sports events as they are seen as effective vectors of economic and tourism development. Many regions now regard the hosting of sports events as a way of ensuring their sustainable development in that the organization of events brings ecological and social benefits as well as economic benefits. The sports event “market” has developed particularly rapidly over the last twenty years. This development has had repercussions on the offer as well as on the demand for sports events. It has led to:

Growing demand for spectator sport and for mass-participation sport: the ever-increasing popularity of certain events has led to limits being placed on the number of participants allowed to register. Development of the offer: shown by the constant increase in the number and the diversity of the events on offer. Every year, several thousand sports events, covering 142 disciplines, take place around the world. These events cater for both the sporting elite and sport for all (Clivaz et al., 2005: 7).
Other motivations of bidding for a city can be in top down hierarchy as follows: make an effort or attempt to achieve a sustainable development of the region, regional economic development, promotion of tourism, use of sports facilities, promotion of sport, personal promotion (e.g. politicians) (Clivaz et al., 2005: 7).

2.6 Bid procedure of Winter Olympic Games

Clivaz et al. (2005: 20) illustrates a bid procedure for an event in general.

Figure 2-1 Bid procedure for an event

![Bid procedure diagram](image)

Source: Clivaz et al., 2005: 20

Apart from Clivaz et al. ’s model, the IOC introduces the three stage processes, which are applicant city, candidate city and host city phases (IOC). This study, however, mainly discuss the first two phases as the bid process is mainly composed of two phases: Application and candidate phases. The duration of the bid process for the Winter Olympics is 3 years.

**Phase 1: The Application phase**

This phase is conducted under the authority of the IOC Executive Board. No city is considered a “Candidate City” until it has been accepted as such by the IOC Executive Board. During this entire phase, therefore, all cities will be considered as Applicant Cities are required to submit a written Application File to the IOC, based on the questionnaire provided in Part 2. Application Files will be assessed by the IOC administration and
experts, under the authority of the Executive Board. There may or may not be visits to the Applicant Cities by experts for the performance of their duties but there will be no formal presentations by Applicant Cities to the Executive Board. In concluding the Candidature Acceptance Procedure, the IOC Executive Board will determine which cities are to be accepted as “Candidate Cities”.

**Phase 2: Candidate Phase**

Those cities accepted as “Candidate Cities” by the IOC Executive Board will go through to a second phase, during which they will be required to submit a Candidature File to the IOC. An Evaluation Commission, which is composed of, inter alia, IOC members, members representing the International Federations (IFs), members representing the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), representatives of the Athletes’ commission and the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) and other experts, will then examine the cities’ candidatures, visit the Candidate Cities and prepare an evaluation report, based on which the IOC Executive Board will draw up the list of Candidate Cities to be submitted to the IOC Session for election.

Following the change of cycle between the Games of the Olympiad and the Winter Olympic Games, the yearly alternating pattern of celebrating and electing a future host city during an IOC Session (usually seven years in advance of future games) has become a major event in the history of the Olympic Movement.

According to the IOC Working Group Report (2010: 6), an assessment was made of each Applicant City's potential to stage high-level, international, multi-sports events and their potential to organize successfully the 2018 Winter Olympic Games against a set of 11 technical criteria given below:

1. Government support, legal issues and public opinion
2. General infrastructure
3. Sports venues
4. Olympic Village(s)
5. Environmental conditions and impact
6. Accommodation
7. Transport concept
8. Safety and security
9. Experience from past sports events
10. Finance
11. Overall concept

Voting Regulations
The eligible IOC members are asked to vote. In each round each participating IOC member may vote for only one city. As per the voting regulations, only those IOC members who are not nationals of countries for which there is a candidate city in a round are permitted to vote. The votes of members not taking part in a round of voting or who abstain, as well as invalid electronic voting entries, are not taken into account in the calculation of the required majority. After the first round of voting, if no city obtains the absolute majority of the votes cast, as many rounds are held as necessary for a city to obtain such majority. The city receiving the least number of votes leaves the competition. The name of this city is made public straight away and the vote continues. If only two cities remain in contention, the one that obtains the greatest number of votes is elected. The winning city is then announced by the IOC President at the Announcement Ceremony, following which the newly elected NOC and city will sign the Host City Contract.

Host city election
The election of the Host City takes place after the Session has considered the report by the Evaluation Commission.

2.7 Overview of PyeongChang
Korea was the second nation in Asia to host the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games which allowed Korea to experience the powerful impact of the Olympic Movement, which brings the world together regardless of race, creed or ideology.

PyeongChang is the birthplace of skiing in Korea, as well as a key winter sports area in
Northeast Asia. The city attracts 150,000 tourists from around the world and 3.6 million Korean skiers every year. After its successful hosting of the 1999 Gangwon Asian Winter Games, PyeongChang set its sights on bringing the Winter Olympic Games to the region.

One billion people live within a two-hour flight from PyeongChang and three billion live within five hours. The winter sports market in Asia is young and rapidly growing while in more traditional winter sports nations the marketplace has reached maturity and saturation. The emerging Asian economy has increased the number of winter sports tourists from China, Japan, Chinese Taipei and Southeast Asian countries who visit PyeongChang by more than 5% annually, and skiers from Korea by 10%. The Winter Games would boost even more interest in winter sports, especially among the youth, of which Asia has the largest population. Indeed, PyeongChang is eager to tap into this new, young market and help winter sports realize its full potential in the Asian region.

PyeongChang is a year-round tourist destination in Korea, surrounded by breathtaking mountains and the beautiful sea. The national and provincial governments aspire to develop the area into a Sports and Tourism Belt equipped with recreational sports facilities, resorts, residential buildings and industries.

The city expands the Olympic movement and creates new Olympic legacies by offering the Olympic Family a unique winter Games experience in an area of the world that is relatively new to winter sports. The new possibilities that abound in PyeongChang will sprout amazing Olympic legacies in winter sports and proud reminders of the positive impact of the Winter Games on the region.

PyeongChang’s bid deepens our knowledge of the Olympic Movement and ignites our passion for developing winter sports in Asia. The Korean people share this desire, unwavering in their support of bringing the Olympic Winter Games to PyeongChang and dedicated to their interest in winter sports. PyeongChang aspires to share Korea’s passion for winter sports with the world.
3 The Olympic Bid: Theory and Practice

3.1 Factors influencing the decision of IOC members

Preuss (2000) develops “A Multidimensional Decision” which discusses factors influencing the decision of IOC member’s votes for an Olympic host city. It was adopted from a sociological model approach in order to understand the motives and purposes lying behind apparent ‘irrational’ (rather emotional) actions of the IOC members. He suggests seven factors influencing the votes of IOC members and these factors are placed in the three super ordinate fields of decision making based on the rational choice models as shown in Figure 3-1 below. All factors end in an individual aggregation mechanism, which is displayed as the “Black Box”. The three fields are explained in details below:

Figure 3-1 Factors influencing the decision of IOC members

![Diagram showing factors influencing decision]

Source: Preuss (2000: 91)

3.1.1 Hierarchy of Preferences

The first field is Hierarchy of Preferences. It is influenced by factors like Quality of bid and Past Critiques of the bid cities.
Quality of the Bid

Thoma and Chalip (1996: 79) suggest that “due to the complexity of the Olympic Games it is impossible for an IOC member to collect all the relevant information which will then allow him/her to vote for the ‘best’ city. In order to address this matter better the IOC finally drew together bid instructions previously scattered amongst versions of the Olympic Charter, IOC circular letters, and personal correspondence into a single ‘Manual for Cities Bid for the Olympic Games’, which came into force in 1992” (Preuss, 2000: 92). The IOC should study the bid documents and assigns an “Evaluation Commission” to visit each candidate city. The Evaluation Commission should then provide a report in which contains a vast amount and a wide range of data about a candidate city to the IOC members. For instance, “today the Commission’s rote of systematically collecting and presenting the pertinent data from each candidate city provides IOC members with a straightforward source of information, such as the 269 pages of data on the 2004 bid candidates” (Preuss, 2000: 92-3).

However, Preuss (2000: 93) argues that “this strategy can potentially lead to information overkill and make much of the data useless [...] The complexity of the topics, as they are reflected in the differing preferences of a group of 115 individuals, still serves to hinder the group from reaching an agreement about which of the candidates would be the ‘best’ Olympic city”.

Past critiques

According to Preuss (2000: 93), “past critiques of the Olympic Games might very well have an effect on the IOC members’ vote for the next Olympic Games host city”. In case of voting Atlanta 1996, a chance to gain the highest revenues were from television, sponsoring and ticket sales. The voting took place at a time when the Olympic Movement was still financially dependent on the host city. As for the 2004 Athens voting, a high budget for cultural elements and an emphasis on the athletes was featured. The voting for the 2004 Athens’s victory took place right after the critiques about Atlanta’s over-commercialization.

Preuss (2000: 93) notes that, thus, “the fast pace of life places pressure on IOC members
to focus their attention on the critiques. The IOC is leading the Olympic Movement through its decisions regarding where the next location of the Olympic Games will take place”.

3.1.2 Opportunity Costs
The second field is regarding the Opportunity Costs and it is affected by lobbying and corruption where fuzzy line exists to distinguish them.

- Lobbying and Corruption
As a complexity of information has increased, the IOC members tend to acquire the advice in order to find a rational decision. Friedmann and Hechter (1988: 211) explain logically why lobbying has become ever more important and say that “under conditions of objective uncertainty, however, actors are robbed of the implements necessary to make a rational decision [...] and they are thereby motivated to seek the advice and counsel of their fellows” (Preuss, 2000: 94). Preuss (2000: 94) adds that “discussions with other IOC members as well as with city and the Bid Committee representatives can have an influence on the hierarchy of preferences by both giving an IOC member new information or appealing to their moral and ethical attitudes. Additionally, emotions can also be aroused merely through conversation”.

As he (2000: 94) also notes, “when the fine line that exists between the acceptable action of providing information and arguments and the unacceptable action of providing gifts, hospital visits, scholarships or other benefits to IOC members and their families is crossed, the act of lobbying is transformed into the act of corruption. The dilemma of the IOC can be seen in the fuzzy line existing between lobbying and corruption that is defined by “allowed influence” and “forbidden influence.”

3.1.3 Institutional and Social Constraints
The third field is the Social and Institutional Constraints which consists of Outside Constraints, Past Location and Election Rules.

- Outside Constraints
As the IOC members are elected from countries all around the world with different political, cultural, religious and social structures. In contrast to the “inner constraints” which is included in the Black Box, the “outside constraints” are derived from the environment (Preuss, 2000: 96). For example, “an IOC member living in a specific political system (e.g. communist country) or religion (e. g. Islam) has an ‘outside’ pressure to support a candidate embedded in his/her system or not to support a bid city belonging to another system” (Preuss, 2000: 96). The Calgary Winter Olympics is a good example. It gives a clearer sense of political factors that might go into a political risk consideration of an IOC member. Thoma and Chaplin (1996: 14-15) describe seven political risk factors that IOC analysts may include in their appraisal, including the fact that the voting for Calgary 1988 took place right after the boycott of the Games in Moscow 1980 (Preuss, 2000: 96).

- Past Location

“In 1894, when the IOC founding congress was staged in Paris, Coubertin already mentioned the idea of adopting a system of rotating the Olympic Games all around the world” (Muller, 1994: 34 cited in Preuss, 2000: 96). Preuss (2000: 244) notes that “the number of cities bid for the Olympic Games has constantly been growing since 1978”. In addition, “the IOC revenues from the sales of television rights are increasing worldwide” (Preuss, 2000: 110). Both of these facts can be regarded as indicators of an increasing interest in the Olympic Games. “This, in turn, creates ‘outside constraints’ for IOC members to keep the Games rotating around the world. Before World War II in the IOC there was a ‘priority rule’ for the country hosting the Olympic Games to stage the Winter Games as well” (Muller, 1994: 108 cited in Preuss, 2000:96-7). This seems to become an unwritten law not to give the Olympic Games and Winter Games of one Olympiad to the same country.

- Election rules

Preuss (2000: 97) argues that “the election rule itself is a factor that can strongly influence the final decision to vote for a city”. Of course, Preuss’s model shows that the individual ranking of the cities is based on the “Quality of the Bid,” “Past Critiques,” “Lobbying/Corruption,” “Outside Constraints” and “Past Location.” However, strategic
voting can change these rankings and therefore is mentioned here as an influencing factor. The current voting system is based on the “Hare rule,” which supports strategic votes (Preuss, 2000: 97; see also Schauenberg, 1992; Eichner et al., 1996).

“The advantage of the Hare rule is that the winner is elected by the most “first preference” votes, if a majority is reached. Without a majority gradually the second, third, and other preferences are considered” (Preuss, 2000: 98). Therefore, the Hare rule helps cities with wide support among the IOC members to win, whereas candidate cities with polarized rankings have little chance of winning.

3.1.4 The Black Box: Inner Constraints, Emotions and Personality

According to Preuss (2000: 99), the Black Box “is dedicated to human feelings. These create constraints both by all the factors explained above as well as by ethical or moral values based on culture and religion. Additionally, there is an incalculable moment of emotions and personality”. The pressure and high complexity of “inner constraints” mixed with emotions can result in irrational behaviour. “Thus, rational choice models see human action primarily in economic terms and are not concerned with the ethics or values that lead to rational decisions” (Zey, 1998: 11; Preuss, 2000: 99).

However, there would be more “light” in the black box if the inner structure of the IOC were better known. Therefore, it is natural that candidate cities collect as much information on the preferences of IOC members as possible. “When the list of the personal preferences, such as that kept by the Berlin 2000 bid group, were published, the IOC members were shocked and probably did, as a result, lower their preference towards voting for Berlin” (Preuss, 2000: 99). There seems a tendency that many of these lists have, and probably still are written by the candidates themselves as well as by the agencies that offer their advisory services to bid cities.

Concluding his work, Preuss (2000: 99) mentions that his paper shows the multidimensional factors an IOC member has to consider when deciding upon a ranking for the candidate cities. Additionally, problems of collective action have been discussed. The election of a host city happens by individual votes that are aggregated. The votes are
based on subjective strategies that consider at a minimum the seven factors aiming at the maximization of individual utilization, but without reference to other social facts or emotions. The weakness of rational choice models is that power, trust, communication and solidarity of the IOC members cannot be adequately addressed. However, this formal, rigid paper helps to explain why favorite cities such as Falun for 1992, Athens for 1996, Rome for 2004, or Sion for 2006 lost the race – or were never, in reality, the favorite candidates at all.

3.2 Other factors to be considered in the Korean context

3.2.1 Sports Diplomacy

The term ‘sports diplomacy’ has been widely used in the Korean context since the bid for PyeongChang had begun, however, there is no single agreed definition of the term of Sports Diplomacy. The former IOC Vice-President Un Yong KIM also mentions this term in his speech.

In modern era, sports diplomacy is playing a bigger role in uniting the world as one than any other field. If we compare the period of 1970s-1980s to era of transplanting the seed named ‘Sports Diplomacy’ on the unproductive soil, now it is the time to see it to that we give it water and nutrition to let grow and bear fruits (Yoon, 2007: 16).

Prof. Kang-Ro Yoon (2009: 103), who was involved in the three bids as an international advisor for 2018 bid as well as President of International Sports Cooperation Institute, defines the objectives of sport diplomacy as “promotion of national prestige, international goodwill/friendship and international cooperation.”

In this sense, Sports Diplomacy can be considered as a type of public diplomacy. Sharp (2005: 106) defines public diplomacy as “the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented, appears to be an idea whose time has come”. In addition, “public diplomacy that traditionally represents actions of governments to influence overseas publics within the foreign policy process has expanded today - by accident and design -
beyond the realm of governments to include the media (Snow, 2005), multinational corporations, NGO's and faith-based organizations as active participants in the field” (Snow Jr., 2005). From the expressions of the definitions of public diplomacy like “advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” and “actions of governments to influence overseas publics within the foreign policy” can be inferred that Sport Diplomacy is a concept under the umbrella of Public Diplomacy.

The Olympics is often used for diplomatic means. Although the importance of Sports Diplomacy has been emphasised throughout the three-time bids, there is limitation to provide a scientific data or analysis as it is part of human relations, where the subjective or emotional factor domains. However, its evidence can be found partially in the strategy for Sports Diplomacy of the PyeongChang Bid Committee.

**Factors in Sports Diplomacy**

This section identifies the actors of sports diplomacy. As a diplomat represents one’s country to a target or counterpart, the same concept will be applied to the sports diplomacy. In case of the bid of Olympic Games, there is a hierarchy of the diplomats who perform the sports diplomacy as well as their targets. On the top of the hierarchy places the IOC members who are the decision makers of the city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomats</th>
<th>Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IOC members from the bid Country</td>
<td>The IOC members who are non-members from bid country, those who possess the right to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bid Committee, NOC, NF and IF members of bid countries</td>
<td>IOC, NOCs and IFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Personality</td>
<td>IOC, NOCs and IFs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

As shown in Table 3-1 above, it can be said that those who are actively involved in the bid process as diplomats are followings: the actors who are the IOC members from the bid country and who are involved in the Bid Committee and are members in the NOC,
NF and IF from the bid country. Personal diplomats are categorized into indirect diplomats who will perform a role of representing the image of the hosting countries not only with their competitiveness where the ranking of the athletes shows the power of the country but also their attitude in regards to solving dispute of manners that the public will perceive through watching their competition

3.2.2 Western-centred Winter Sports Games

He Zhenliang, a Chinese IOC member delivered his speech to the IOC 2000 Reform Commission mentioned that:

The IOC was born in Europe and when it was first established only part of the European countries and very few American countries participated. We are indebted to their creator Coubertin, and the other pioneers. However, today’s world is not the same as in those years. We have local Olympic Committees in 200 countries and territories, reaching out every corner of the world. […] Our goal should be to work hard to make universality take shape and express itself with all the brilliant glory of the five Olympic circles. […] In fact universality requires there to be cultural plurality, something which can be achieved only when all cultures receive the same respect’’ (IOC)

As stated above, the Olympic Program is mainly based on Western Sports as they have spread out to the world due to the colonialist and imperialist expansion. Although the time has changed but in the Olympic Program only a few non-Western sports have been adopted onto the official Olympic Program. In case of the Asian Sports, just two sports are recognized as the Olympic sports, which are Judo (Japan) and Taekwondo (Korea), which are from countries where Summer Olympics were hosted in 1964 and 1988, respectively.

Also among the current 204 Olympic Committee, not less than 40% of the NOCs take part in the Winter Olympic Games. Moreover, in the history of the Olympic Movement from the beginning to the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, 16 hosting countries are located in Europe (64%) and 6 times in America (24%), while only three
times were held in Asia (8%) (see Table 3-2 below).

Table 3-2 Host countries and a number of participating NOCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Games</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Chamonix, France</td>
<td>25 January – 5 February</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>St. Moritz, Switzerland</td>
<td>11–19 February</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Lake Placid, United States</td>
<td>4–15 February</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany</td>
<td>6–16 February</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>St. Moritz, Switzerland</td>
<td>30 January – 8 February</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>14–25 February</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy</td>
<td>26 January – 5 February</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Squaw Valley, United States</td>
<td>18–28 February</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Innsbruck, Austria</td>
<td>29 January – 9 February</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Grenoble, France</td>
<td>6–18 February</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Sapporo, Japan</td>
<td>3–13 February</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Innsbruck, Austria</td>
<td>4–15 February</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lake Placid, United States</td>
<td>13–24 February</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Sarajevo, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>8–19 February</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Calgary, Canada</td>
<td>13–28 February</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Albertville, France</td>
<td>8–23 February</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lillehammer, Norway</td>
<td>12–27 February</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nagano, Japan</td>
<td>7–22 February</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Salt Lake City, United States</td>
<td>8–24 February</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Turin, Italy</td>
<td>10–26 February</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Vancouver, Canada</td>
<td>12–28 February</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Sochi, Russia</td>
<td>7–23 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Pyeongchang, South Korea</td>
<td>9–25 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The IOC
Table 3-3 A number of participating countries in terms of continent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Torino</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The IOC

Table 3-3 reinforces that, therefore, it can be regarded that the Olympic Program does not properly reveal its universality in selecting its sports especially on the Winter Olympics. This reveals that those countries outside of Europe and some North American countries which have the privilege of practicing winter sport; Asia is one of the wastelands of winter sports.

As this study employs the overall view on the factors influencing the host of Winter Olympics of PyeongChang’s success and failure, it is important to take into a consideration that sports diplomacy and Euro-centric tendency should be applied to the Korean case. The fact that Europe has been centred in the Olympic Movement brings the concept of sports diplomacy to the Korean Bid Committee as an important factor.

3.2.3 Application Preuss’s model to the three cases of PyeongChang bid

In the light of Preuss’s model of the factors influencing the decision of IOC members, Sports Diplomacy may be seen to be equivalent to the factor of ‘Lobbying and Corruption’ in the Korean context although the basic understanding of Sports Diplomacy and Lobbying and Corruption have different point of view. This study applies the concept of Sports Diplomacy to the Preuss model instead of Lobbying and Corruption in order to analyze the PyeongChang’s cases as shown in Figure 3-2 below.
Furthermore, there are different point of views between the Pyeongchang Bid Committee and Preuss. According to Preuss (2000: 94),

Lobbying is the allowed influence of IOC members which attempts persuasion without buying a vote while maintaining the result coincidental. On the other hand, corruption is forbidden influence of IOC members. Corruption is based on the differentiation of public and private moral, which is defined as the behaviour that differs from formal duties in order to gain private oriented benefits. The lobbying is forming an important part as discussions with other IOC members as well as with city and Bid Committee representatives can have an influence on the hierarchy of preferences by both giving an IOC member new information or appealing their moral and ethical attitudes. Additionally emotions can also be aroused merely through conversation.

Preuss (2000: 94) adds that “corruption is interpreted differently […] It is also important to remember that the IOC membership is composed of group of international, multicultural individuals from different societies all around the world […] Due to varying
cultural, political, and religious backgrounds of each IOC member, the line between lobbying and corruption is also different from each of these individuals.”

On the other hand the PyeongChang Bid Committee and the Korean Government call this process as a public diplomacy. The concept of ‘Lobbying’ gives a negative connotation as there is an uncertain line between ‘Lobbying and Corruption’. From the PyeongChang Bid Committee’s perspective, in the field of Opportunity Costs the factor is called ‘Sports Diplomacy.’

The biggest difference between ‘Lobbying’ and ‘Sports Diplomacy’ is that lobbying, as already mentioned, is closely related with the corruption. On the other hand, ‘Sports Diplomacy’ is an official promotional activity to the IOC members and the influential people in decision making with its representative diplomats in the field of sports, and the uncertain line between Sports Diplomacy and Corruption is not considered as this factor is based on whether a host city fundamentally abides by the rules set by the IOC’s Ethics Commission. Therefore, hereinafter, I will adopt the concept of “Sports Diplomacy” as the factor in the opportunity costs field of Preuss, in order to support and analyse the PyeongChang Bid Committee’s plans more effectively.
4 Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This study seeks to highlight and justify ontological and epistemological assumptions and outline practical implications for research methods.

4.2 Philosophical considerations

This section discusses ontology and epistemology which involve a wide range of approaches. As Blaikie (1993: 6) states, “ontology refers to the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about the nature of social reality” and “epistemology is the claims or assumptions made about the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is understood to be”. The major ontological assumptions are realism and constructivism. The realist “assume that social phenomena exist independently of both the observer and social actors” (Blaikie, 2000: 119) while the constructivist paradigm “entails the assumption that social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors and it is a pre-interpreted, inter-subjective world of cultural objects, meanings and social institutions” (Blaikie, 1993: 203).

There are two main approaches in epistemology: positivism and interpretivism. A positivist approach aims to explain observable and measurable social phenomena by means of establishing universal generalisations. An interpretivist approach seeks to explain social phenomena by means of social actors’ explanations. Blaikie (2000: 115) suggests that “interpretivists are concerned with understanding the social world people have produced and which they reproduce through their continuing activities”.

Critical realist accepts a realist ontological and an interpretivist epistemological assumptions.

As Blaikie (2000: 108) states, “the aim of realist science is to explain observable phenomena with references to underlying structures and mechanisms”. Critical realist adds one more aim to find conclusion about unobservable structures of social relations. The success and failure of PyeongChang bid are observable phenomena while the factors of successes and failures can be unobservable and differently constructed in the different
context.

4.3 Methods

This study is mainly conducted by means of two research methods which are document analysis and qualitative method, specifically, semi-structured interviews. Through document analysis and interviews, this study discovers the main factors of the failures and the success of PyeongChang’s bid for the Winter Olympic Games. In particular, it also tries to identify the element which can be applied to the Korean context.

4.3.1 Documentary Analysis

By covering documents published by a wide range of organisations, this study seeks to avoid potential biased information. First of all, it includes reports from the PyeongChang Bid and Organizing Committee and electronic journals were the main sources used to search and analyze the factors of the success and failure of PyeongChang’s campaign. For the governmental documents, it also includes reports from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. Also, the data available on the IOC Website, newspaper articles and electronic encyclopaedia as well as journals in the respective field were used for reference to uncover the information on the three cases of PyeongChang’s bids. Due to the lack of resources in this field, the study is limited to the available findings from the literature.

4.3.2 Qualitative methods (semi-structured interview)

The interview focuses on identifying the participants’ thoughts and beliefs regarding the failures and success of the PyeongChang’s bids within the Korean cultural and social context. In order to facilitate this, the semi-structured interview is conducted. The interview question is given: In your point of view, what are the major factors to be considered for the failure and success of PyeongChang’s bid in 2014 and 2018?

Table 4-1 A list of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Venue of interview</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director of International Relations in the KOC</td>
<td>The KOC’s bid team during 2014 bid</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
<td>The KOC</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Gold Medalist in the 3000m relay for women in Short Track Speed Skating (Lillhammer, 1994)</td>
<td>Member of the PyeongChang Bid Committee of 2014 and 2018</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
<td>The KOC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

Both interviews were conducted in Oct 2012. The first interviewee is Director of International Relations in the KOC and had been the working-level head of the KOC’s bid team during the 2014 PyeongChang Bid. The other interviewee is a member of the PyeongChang Bid Committee of 2014 and 2018, the Gold Medalist in the 3000m relay for women in Short Track Speed Skating (Lillhammer, 1994), a former member of the IOC Athletes Commission and Presenter of the Venue Plan for the IOC’s Evaluation Commission’s visit during 2014 and 2018. She also played an important role in joining the preparation of the bid book of PyeongChang.

4.4 Limitations

The scarcity of the sources may have not offered proper evidence of the factors, and additionally, the factors which applied to PyeongChang’s model involve different approaches toward defining the factors of the same phenomena.
5 Findings: PyeongChang bids for the Winter Olympic Games 2010-2018

5.1 Introduction

This chapter employs Preuss’s IOC model in relation to the three times of PyeongChang bids that took place in 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games. To begin with the overview of each bid, the study examines the reasons of the failures and successes of the bid campaigns that lasted more than a decade by applying Preuss’s model which was explained in Chapter Three. It also adds a review on the legacies of the two lost bids which had served as the platform to successfully host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in the long term and had provided the preparatory steps that the PyeongChang took as a long term strategy.

From the theoretical point of view, the first two attempts of PyeongChang seemed to be complete failures as a bid for major sports is expensive and not winning is clearly considered a risk. According to Masterman (2008: 171),

A bid city that does not win, loses its investment in making the bid and may only see that as a longer-term investment if a future bid is made that is then successful […] the cost of bid is also escalating and from the IOC’s perspective this should also be of long-term concern because if bid becomes unattractive due to embedded costs being too high, it might reasonably be assumed that fewer cities will be prepared to bid.

Regarding the IOC’s concerns, PyeongChang bid activities and the legacies of the two lost bids will be regarded as a reference for other cities that might need more than one trial to win a bid. This study, thus, analyze the possible legacies that may promote the good of the country.

5.2 The failures of the bids for 2010 and 2014

5.2.1 The 2010 Bid

The 115th IOC Session was held in Prague, Czech Republic in 2003. The finalists
shortlisted for the election were PyeongChang, South Korea; Vancouver, Canada; and Salzburg, Austria, respectively. PyeongChang won the most votes of the three cities in the first round in which Salzburg was eliminated. In the run-off, most IOC members who voted for Salzburg in the first round supported Vancouver and PyeongChang lost it in the end.

Before the vote, Salzburg and Vancouver were perceived as the possible winner and PyeongChang was believed to be further behind. After the vote, “an even bigger surprise was PyeongChang’s strong showing, winning the first ballot and only three votes short of clinching it” (Gamesbids). In fact, Salzburg fell off the first ballot after getting only 16 votes. It was alleged that voters did not want the Games in Europe in 2010 but they wanted a summer European Games in 2012 instead. However Vancouver picked up most of Salzburg’s votes and narrowly won by three votes in the final round. PyeongChang had been lobbying very aggressively in the closing days of the campaign.

5.2.2 The 2014 Bid

The election took place in Guatemala City on July 4, 2007 during the 119th IOC Session. Three candidate cities were PyeongChang, Sochi and Salzburg. As a result, Sochi beat out PyeongChang by four votes in the second round to win the rights to host after Salzburg had been eliminated in the first round. PyeongChang remained a strong contender throughout the race by leveraging the goodwill gained by favorable results in the 2010 bid election narrowly lost to Vancouver and by fulfilling many of the promises made during its bid campaign in order to gain the trust of the IOC members. The concept of spectacular venues was already under construction, which was the marquee element of the bid.

While Salzburg and PyeongChang were developing their second consecutive bids, a relatively newcomer Sochi was mounting its first campaign and pulled out every stop by proposing a spectacular venue concept in a sub-tropical Black Sea setting. Just like in the 2010 bid, PyeongChang won the first ballot but could hold on and was narrowly defeated by Sochi in the second ballot by only 4 votes (Gamesbid).
5.2.3 Factors influencing the failures of the bids for 2010 and 2014

In this study, the Preuss’s model on the factors influencing the decision of the IOC members is applied. However, it is important to consider that all factors including quality of bid, past critiques, Sports Diplomacy, outside constraints, past location, election rules and black box may not entirely applied to analyze the reasons of failures of the bids for the 2010 and 2014 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. The scarcity of the source, partially may have not offered a proper evidence of the factors and also the factors which were applied for PyeongChang’s model has some different approaches in defining the factors on the same phenomena.

The reasons of the 2010 and 2014 bids failures were investigated from three resources: the report from the PyeongChang Bid Committee; the interviews from the relevant informants; and the analysis of both bids by Han (2011). There are parts that overlap from the three investigations and all those parts were introduced as some of them provide different details on the same topic.

- Quality of Bid

Following the 2010 and 2014 IOC Working Group Reports PyeongChang received relatively lower marks than its counterparts. This can be one of reasons of losing its bid. This shows that the 2010 PyeongChang Bid Committee did not provide high quality of bid. However, Table 5-1 shows that PyeongChang received as a good mark as Salzburg did in 2014 and tells that PyeongChang improved greatly in 2014 in terms of Quality of Bid.

Table 5-1 The summary of the 2010 IOC Working Group Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>PyeongChang</th>
<th>Salzburg</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Public Opinion</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Infrastructure</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Venues</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Village</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Conditions</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-2 The summary of the 2014 IOC Working Group Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>PyeongChang</th>
<th>Sochi</th>
<th>Salzburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government, legal issues and Public Opinion</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Infrastructure</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Venues</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Village</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Conditions and Impact</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Concept</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Security</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from Past Sport Events</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Project and Legacy</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOC, 2006

According to Han (2011: 32), the 2010 and 2014 bid campaigns were not professional enough to win the bid.

It is qualified that the two lost bids had critical problems to set the strategy for
planning the campaign as a lack of information and the promotion of the campaign following the intuition of the local government. For example, it ignored the strong bond existing between the international sports journalists. Also, the Bid Committee was optimistic as Korea had previously hosted the Seoul 1988 Olympic Games as well as Korea Japan 2002 FIFA World cup. But these facts did not really have much influence.

As supporting Han’s opinion, two interviewees also expressed their concern on the quality of bid. The Director of International Relations of the KOC also said about ‘lack of cooperation for bid promotion’.

The structural problem of the Bid Committee led to the lack of cooperation and information sharing between the leading organizations of the campaign. The Bid Committee, the KOC, the governmental bodies and the IOC members of the Republic of Korea had different approaches on the promotion of the bid campaign which own plan. As a result, it provoked confusion among the IOC members.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

The other interviewee also raised another issue, poor management of international media.

The PyeongChang Bid Committee paid little attention to the fostering and managing of relationship with the major international media, which is an essential source of information for the IOC members who are the key decision makers. I believe that it was one of the biggest mistakes that the Bid Committee made

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

- Past critiques

The Yunhap News (2003) analyzes the major reasons of the failure of the bid of 2010. The most fundamental reason lies on the city’s low recognition in comparison to Canada. Before the bid attempt, PyeongChang had almost no recognition internationally and often was misunderstood as ‘Pyeongyang’, the capital city of North Korea which surprised many people.
However, there is a positive aspect after the first bid attempt. The Ministry of Culture and Sports reports that the PyeongChang’s bid effort to host 2010 Olympic Winter Games and its progress made during the bid process can be evaluated as half success as it proved its potential to become the future host city of Winter Olympic Games. Despite PyeongChang-a city with low international recognition- had to compete with Salzburg and Vancouver which archived global fame for their winter sports attraction, the voting result showed that the preference of the PyeongChang for the decision makers was far ahead from the city of Salzburg and defeated to Vancouver for mere three votes.

Another fact is about Russia’s strong bid campaign as mentioned the interviewee from the KOC.

The key factors of the Russian bid campaign were on the rich Winter Sport resources of Sochi, high performances of the Russian athletes in Winter Olympics and the support for the betterment of Winter Sports around the world. Sochi’s Bid Committee made an impressive final presentation, which was held just before the host city election vote. Russia showed that they have produced over 290 medalists in this field, which was compared to the fact that Korea’s medals come mainly from short track speed skating. Also, the presence of President Putin drew the world’ attention. Furthermore, Russia’s commitment to invest 20 billion for the development of winter sports around the world is regarded to have attracted the developing countries that need support to promote their winter sports.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

Han (2011: 33) also pointed out the performance of the Korean Team in Winter Sports.

The fact that the Korean team does not have an extended span of sports gave an impression that Korea is not a country for winter sports. Also, unlike the competitive countries where winter sport is as a part of sport for all and widely spread to the public, Korea has very limited number of winter sports fans.
With respect to past critiques, Russia has showed a better performance in a wider range of sports fields that the Republic of Korea has done. This can be evident in the bid for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games.

- Sports Diplomacy

In 2010 bid campaign, the major reasons of the failures points out the lack of the Sports Diplomacy, in a sense that there were no figures that represent the Republic of Korea in terms of diplomat in sports. Consequently, the bid campaign could not efficiently delivered influence to the IOC members in the final selection of the city. The voting result of the election city for the Olympic Winter Games in 2010, during the 115th Session in Prague resulted in failure due to only three votes difference between PyeongChang and Vancouver.

Table 5-3 Matrix of votes for the host city of 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round 1</th>
<th>Round 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PyeongChang</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.gamesbid.com

According to the report released by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (2004, 602) also noted that the main cause of the failure is on the weak sports diplomacy in a sense that by the time of the bid campaign there were few Korean figures that can represent the country and lead the bid team efficiently to influence the decision makers.

Yoon (2009: 201) also added the reason for the failure of the 2014 bid was the lack of diplomatic aspects. He states that Sports Diplomacy could be represented by status of a country in international society and a powerful person such as an IOC member or Executive board member in an International Federation (cited in Yu, 2009: 5).

By the 2010 bid campaign, there were two IOC members representing Korea. However, for the 2014 bid campaign, with the resignation of the Mr. Un Yong KIM, who was the IOC member, there was only Gun-Hee LEE, the Chairman of Samsung Electronics and
one of the richest people selected by Forbes. Also, Samsung is one of the worldwide sponsors of the IOC. While proceeding 2018 bid campaign however, As of April 21, 2008, due to the Samsung Slush funds scandal, the IOC imposed sanctions, including a reprimand and a suspension of the rights to sit on an IOC Commission for five years as such crisis violates the ethical principles set out in Olympic Charter and IOC code of ethics. Therefore, the only remaining IOC member that could act as a diplomat was Dae Sung MOON, the newly elected member from the Athlete’s Commission during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

Of course a country’s influence in sports diplomacy cannot be defined by its number of IOC members and their influence. However, revealing the fact that for both the 2010 and 2014 bids, PyeongChang failed by three votes on the second round in the 2010 bid and 4 votes in the 2014 bid. In this case, the presence of an influential IOC member as a key representative of the Bid Committee might have changed the final result.

In the case of the 2014 bid campaign, the election for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games was held during the 119th IOC session in Guatemala City. Just like the 2010 Games host city election, PyeongChang was the most favourable city in the first round. However, this city was defeated by Sochi in the second round which recorded 51 to 47 votes (see Table 5-4).

Table 5-4 Matrix of votes for the host city of 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round 1</th>
<th>Round 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sochi</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PyeongChang</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.gamesbids.com

This is evident that unlike Russia, PyeongChang showed a lack of interpersonal relationships with the IOC members with no famous or influential personalities in the field of sports which is being expressed as ‘Lack of ability to perform sports diplomacy’ (The PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011)
The following Interview agreed with a lack of sport diplomacy.

There is a lack of Korean IOC members as the key representatives of bid campaign. After the resignation of Un Yong KIM, the former Vice-President of IOC in 2005, it became difficult for the Bid Committee to know trends of the IOC members and also on information gathering. Furthermore there was only one IOC member left in Korea, while Sochi was promoting their campaign with three IOC members. The failure of taking complementary measures on the representative figures became one of the crucial factors of the failure.

(Director of International Relations from the KOC)

Overall, Sports Diplomacy was taken as an interesting and essential field of the Winter Olympic Games bid, since the majority of investigations regarding the biggest reason of the failure concluded that it was due to a weak campaign in Sport diplomacy, specifically a lack of influential representative figures and proper strategies in comparison to other bidding cities. Also, many IOC members advised that South Korea’s bid campaign lacked representative figures who could influence IOC members and lead the campaign with unity. During the previous failed bids, the strategy for human relationships was not highly valued and each organization, bid such as the Bid Committee, the Korean Olympic Committee and the Government, had approached the IOC members without previous consent within the organizations. This caused confusion as the same IOC members had to receive the visits of several teams from South Korea with different approaches.

- Outside Constraints

Regarding Outside Constraints, the 2014 Pyeongchang Bid Committee argued that due to the political influence headed by the Russian President Putin along with the interpersonal relationship with the IOC members of surrounding countries, changed their first priority from PyeongChang to Sochi. Moreover, even though it’s high competitiveness in winter sports, the fact that Russia was never a host city seems to have strongly appealed and convinced to the IOC members.
According to Han (2011), the reasons of the failure of both 2010 and 2014 failures are mainly resulted from the national power of Russia.

The strong engagement and influence of the political power of Russia may influence the IOC members’ decisions although these IOC members are favourable for PyeongChang, especially from the Asian and African IOC members. Also it is said that the European IOC members were influenced by the connections that existed on their backgrounds. Furthermore, the fact that Russia had never hosted the Winter Olympics despite its high competitiveness was a compelling reason to select Sochi as a host city (Han, 2011: 33).

He (2011: 32) also argued that one more reason is the political and outside constraints on the selection of bid city.

It is reportedly that the IOC members do not choose according to the quality of the bid. It has to do with the political influence of the hosting country and the IOC member’s background as well as other factors in that regards.

The interviewee of the PyeongChang Bid Committee showed the same opinion as Han given above. She mainly mentioned National Power of Russia and the Strong Leadership Presence of President Putin.

It is also remarkable the national Power of Russia and the Strong Leadership Presence of President Putin. It is hard to measure Russia’s national power and the strong leadership presence of Putin, which appeared to have captivated its audience during the final bid campaign in Guatemala City during the 119th IOC Session. Also, as President Putin conducted his presentation in English, his presence and words attracted the listeners. On the other hand, President Roh of Korea made his speech entirely in Korean, which could have attributed to his comparative lack of influence. I was present at the site as a member of the PeyongChang Bid Committee. What I had perceived was that Sochi’s overall
performance gave the impression that the committee had made a determined effort, based on their careful and detailed presentation in every aspect. Also, the presenters used both English and French, which are the official languages used in the IOC. These are small part of their effort but one can feel that the Sochi is working hard even in the small details. Before the election of the host city took place, it was already predicted that the host city would be Sochi. What with the effective presentation made by the Bid Committee of Sochi, it seemed that success was definite for them.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

- Past location

Another main factor is past location where hosts Olympic Games. The Yunhap News (2003), which raised three main reasons of the failure of the bid for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, said that one is that the influence of previously hosted country that belongs to Asia might have influenced negatively in the second round of vote. Beijing hosted 2008 Olympic Games, which is just two years ahead of 2010 Winter Olympics. It is highly probable that this fact have brought a negative perception that the Games are being hosted for two consecutive times in Asian continent. The voting result shows that the IOC members who chose Salzburg in the first round of vote seem to be inclined towards to Vancouver (See Table 5-3).

In 1984, when the IOC founding congress was staged in Paris, Coubertin already mentioned the idea of adopting a system of rotating the Olympic Games around the world (Muller, 1994: 34) and even though this rule is not officially adopted it is part of the indicators influencing the IOC members.

In the case of the 2014 bid campaigns, there was another issue came up. The PyeongChang Bid Committee (2011) analyzes the most crucial reasons that affected the failure on three factors. First, South Korea gave an impression of monopolizing the international sports events. The election of 2014 host city of the Olympic Winter Games took place in the year 2007. In March and April of very same year, months before the election of host city of Olympics took place, two South Korean cities succeeded to host
the 2014 Asian Games and 2011 IAAF World Championships Daegu 2011. In spite of Korean Government and PyeongChang Bid Committee’s great concern on the negative influence on the election of the Winter Olympics which is on the utmost importance in Korea’s political agenda, the two cities did not give up or postpone the bid of Asian Games and IAAF World Championships. As a result of hosting two mega events influenced some IOC members to make change on their choice, especially from Asian continent who are strong supporters of PyeongChang. Furthermore, hosting many events in a year might have provoked the financial capacity of the South Korean government.

This issue was raised by the interview below.

In the very year that the host city selection of 2014 Olympic Winter Games took place, other two Korean cities already succeeded to host both Asian Games and IAAF Athletics Championships. It is hard to measure how much this fact affected on the vote. However, in the field, many IOC members who favored Korea were concerned that this fact could give a negative effect due to a perception of monopolization of sports.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

He also added that past and future bid attempts in Asia should be considered.

Due to the previous hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics as well as Japan’s bid for the Summer Olympic Games, the votes from Asian countries dispersed. This is because PyeongChang’s success could imply negative influence to those countries by allowing the IOC members a potential to prefer a country outside of Asia as the consecutive hosting in the same continent might not be beneficial for the Olympic Movement

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

The other interviewee was also worried about the perception on monopolization of Mega Sports Events in the same year.
As Korea succeeded in gaining both the right to host the 2014 Asian Games and the IAAF World Championships 2011 in the same year before the election for the 2018 Winter Olympics took place, there was somewhat of a negative public opinion of Korea present amongst the IOC members.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

Han (2011: 32) also said that hosting of other mega sports events can be a major obstacle to host the Olympics.

As Korea hosted two mega sports events in the same year, there was an understanding of ‘too many games for Korea’ between the IOC members as well as the international sports community. The influence of India was considerable on the Asian IOC members, because it had a candidate city for the 2014 Asian Games which lost to Incheon of the Republic of Korea.

- Election Rules
  The 2010 and 2014 Winter Olympic Games followed the same election rules called ‘Hare Rule’ and thus, there is no difference between them.

- The Black Box
  According to the Yunhap News (2003), the final presentation was not effective and persuasive enough. The presentation team addressed on PyeongChang’s operational ability acquired through hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the FIFA 2002 Korea Japan Word Cup and its plan to promote the world peace as it is the only divided country in the world.

The interviewee also said that the 2014 PyeongChang Bid Committee did not provide the right persuasive points of the bid campaign.

Just like the bid for the 2010 games, the 2014 PyeongChang Bid Committee emphasized the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula through Olympic Movement. In the view of the Bid Committee, the fact that Korea is the only
divided country in the world was regarded to be a persuasive point to the IOC members. But this fact raised awareness on the safety of the games that there could be kind of tension between the two nations and probably endanger the Olympic Movement with the possibility that might arise depending on the political relationships between South and North Korea. Moreover, it was revealed that the promotion of peace is not an appealing issue as many IOC members were not interested in the political situation of Korea.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

Han (2011: 33) also said the similar point on the final presentation at the election of host city.

Although the presentations did not appeal to the IOC members, the IOC members agreed that all the presenters did their best. The Chairman of the 2014 PyeongChang Bid Committee Seung Soo HAN and one of presenters, Ms. Ahn, and the rest made their presentations well.

His another point was that the quality of preparation for the second round of the election was not good enough.

The mistakes that were made during the 2010 vote re-emerged in the 2014 vote. A thorough investigation should have been made to avoid the same mistakes which will have led to a totally different result (Han, 2011: 33).

As one factor of Black Box, the interviewee argued that optimistic view of victory was prevailed across the country as Inside Constraints.

The PyeongChang Bid Committee estimated that the host country would be decided in the first round. They were optimistic that there would be a high number of IOC members who would choose PyeongChang as the city of their first preference in the first round of host city election vote for 2014 Olympic Winter Games. Therefore, the Bid Committee was not ready for the second round
of the vote, which needed to focus on the IOC members who had a second preference after the deletion of the first preference. This result seemed to be greatly affected by overlooking Sochi as their competitor. The PyeongChang Bid Committee was too dependent on data provided by the IOC official report and the media coverage, which qualified Sochi as a weak team. On the other hand it turned out that Sochi was a strong team in terms of possession of 3 Russian IOC members, the presence and active involvement of the Russian President, the promotional activities composed of external experts, the very first Winter Olympic bid attempt from a country of high winter sports competitiveness, as well as its commitment to the promotion of winter Sports.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

5.2.4 Legacies of failed bids for the 2010 and the 2014

PyeongChang’s effort to become the host city of Winter Olympics lasted more than a decade from its start at national level in 2000 August until it finally became elected as the host city in June 2011 in the 123th IOC General Assembly session in Durban, South Africa. With the vision and desire to become the host city, PyeongChang accumulated and promoted the city and all those efforts became part of the legacy of the lost bids. Among them, sports legacies like sports venues, operational capability and management of sports capability contributed to good evaluations from the IOC Evaluation Commission. Furthermore, as a part of the bid preparation, PyeongChang leveraged its image through organizing continuously the Dream Program, which aimed to expand the Olympic Movement as well as the high competitiveness of Korean Athletes, who ranked 5th place in the 2014 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games. Therefore, the effect of the legacies of the lost bids should be taken into consideration as an important factor that leads to the successful bid.

According to Masterman (2008: 171), it is essential to consider the bid legacies in case the city fails to host the mega sports events. He comments that “Whilst the concept of bid for major sports events, and subsequently losing, but still achieving physical legacies to then use as a catalyst for the achievement of socio-cultural legacies, in other words aiming to strategically benefit just by bid, is new, it has arisen because of the escalating
costs it takes simply to enter the bid race. When only one bid city can win and yet all have to spend heavily in order to promote their candidature, the risks are clearly high. […] when the risk might prove to be too much to bear for cities that consider Olympic hosting, clearly the future threat is fewer bid cities. Aiming for winning legacies from losing bids might provide a solution”.

In this point of view, the two consecutive failures of PyeongChang might not literally considered as just failures as the bid itself left both tangible and intangible winter sport legacies which benefit PyeongChang and its surrounding areas even though it seems that the legacies were implanted as a preparatory platform to prepare the next Winter Olympics bid rather than strategically achieving legacies from the lost bids.

During the bid campaign, PyeongChang has renewed existing sports facilities and attracted major international sporting events as well as promotional programs the winter sports and Olympic Movement worldwide which resulted to be a valuable platform and contributed greatly to the success of 2018 Winter Games giving an impression of prepared city to invite the Olympic Family to the world’s largest winter festival.

According to IOC, the Olympic legacies generally fall into five categories-sporting, social, environmental, urban and economic-and can be in tangible or intangible form. Tangible Olympic legacies can include new sporting or transport infrastructure or urban regeneration and beautification which enhance a city's appeal and improve the living standards of local residents. Intangible legacies, while not as visible, are not less important. For instance and increased sense of national pride, new and enhanced workforce skills, a "feel good" spirit among the host country's population or the rediscovery of national culture and heritage and an increased environmental awareness and consciousness. (IOC Olympic Legacy, 2012: 9).

In applying to host the Olympic Winter Games, the bid cities are seeking to host the largest and the most complex winter sports event in the world as the Olympic Winter Games effectively constitute organizing approximately 15 World Championships simultaneously in multiple locations over 16 days.
### a. Sports Venues legacy

According to the bid files of 2018 Winter Olympic Games- PyeongChang, Munich and Annecy- suggested to run 13 sports venues for the competition. All three candidate cities presents that they have 7 existing venues and 6 are to be planned-currently under construction or planned to be constructed irrespective of Olympic Games- or additionally constructed. According to the XXIII Olympic Winter Games 2018 Working Group Report, the maximum grade of the bid cities, PyeongChang scored 9 points which is the highest grade in comparison to Munich with 8.5 and Annecy with 8.6. This result was possible due to PyeongChang’s legacies from the lost bid from 2010 and 2014. From the Year 2005 to 2009 as can be seen in the table number 1, freestyle skiing and ski jumping venues were newly constructed. Facilities for cross country and biathlon were originally constructed in 1998. However, in order to meet the current international standards of the due sports, they were upgraded in the year 2009.

The competition venues for PyeongChang are shown on the table number 1. During the bid period which started from August 2000 at national level and finally became the official candidate city on 28 of August 2002 and continued its efforts until 6 of June 2011, The PyeongChang Bid Committee built two newly two snow games venues and adding to this, the city has upgraded two old facilities to meet the international standard.

Therefore, four additional venues were ready when PyeongChang submitted bid file for 2018 Winter Olympics. In comparison to the Snow Sports, it is notable that none of the ice venues were constructed during the due period (Among 6 ice sports venues, 5 venues will be constructed by 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Sports / Disciplines</th>
<th>Venues</th>
<th>Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ski Jumping</td>
<td>Alpensia Jumping Park</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-5 Winter Sports Venues (including newly-built and reconstructed venues)
b. Operational capability

Among multiple factors of a city’s capability to host successful Winter Olympic Games, the ability to deliver organization, planning and operational performances would be among the utmost priority. In order to meet these criteria, the overall Olympic experience for all client groups in particular, the most important client of the games, the athletes might be considered.

To acquire such Olympic experience, as equals organizing approximately 15 World Championships, the best way would be to run the World Championships in site.

As Table 5-2 shows below, PyeongChang has hosted numerous events and congresses with the aims to accumulate experiences on planning and operation of the games. The smooth management of the games which is the key to successfully run the games became a part of the legacy.

Table 5-6 International Winter Sports Events held in PyeongChang and surrounding areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IFs</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISU (3)</td>
<td>2005 ISU Four Continents Figure Championships</td>
<td>Gangneung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005 Short Track Team World Championships</td>
<td>Chuncheon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007 ISU Short Tract World Championships</td>
<td>Gangneung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS (11)</td>
<td>2003 FIS Alpine Ski World Cup</td>
<td>Yongpyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005 FIS Snowboard World Cup</td>
<td>Sungwoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005 International Technical Ski Contest</td>
<td>Yongpyong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides the legacies, the hosting of the games brought benefits on hosting the 2018 Winter Olympic Games as the events held during the bid period made strong ties between the organizing committee and the winter sports IFs. This fact had positive impact as it was kind of rehearsal of Olympics within the management and stakeholders.

Moreover, the host of winter sports allowed the IF president to visit Korea and allowed to access to the VIP and some IOC members who are involved in winter sports, especially from Europe, the continent that has the majority number of the IOC members. The good organization of the games and the hospitality of the people might have influence on their decision when deciding the priority of the candidate city not violating the IOC rule of conduct article 12, “there shall be no visits by IOC members to the cities or by the cities to IOC members.” As the IOC members are visiting as representative of relevant IFs and not as IOC members.

c. Korean athletes’ competitiveness in Winter Sports

In competitiveness of the athletes in Olympic Games seems to be little to do with the hosting of the games. But in a view that the high ranking in the Olympics has to do with
the interest of the government, sponsors and the public, the ranking and the variety of the events that a country can have an excellent performance could matter.

The Team Korea ranked 5\textsuperscript{th} place in the 2008 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games. It is the highest score in the history of the team Korea after its first participation in the Winter Olympics in 1948 held in St. Moritz, Switzerland. Korean team started to have medals in 1992, Albertville, France. However, most of the medals were from Short track speed skating. Therefore, it was a surprise for the Koreans to see the result of the Vancouver 2014 Olympic Games not only for its high ranking but also the variety of sports that the athletes had great performance. This has to do with the bid of Winter Olympic Games. In order to have competitiveness in various events, the Korean Government increased the investment to the winter sports and consequently this worked out. The high competitiveness raised national pride among Koreans and resulted in a great support of the people to bid the Winter Olympic Games for third consecutive times, which is the first time in the history of Winter Olympics.

d. Legacy on leverage of national brand image

PyeongChang had little international recognition before bid for the Winter Olympic Games. This small mountainous area could leverage its image as touristic place thanks to the bid efforts which benefited from the bid process itself. As it hosted numerous winter sporting events, naturally attracted athletes, officials and other stakeholders like most influential international media, sponsors, sports fans from all over the world and important figures in the world of sports. At the beginning of the bid campaign, because of its low recognition of the city, many people misunderstood PyeongChang as PyungYang, the capital of North Korea. This confusion negatively affected the image of the bid city as it connects with the hostile image of the country. But gradually, throughout its campaign and perseverance in preparing and applying for the Winter Olympics for three consecutive times, PyeongChang became considered as one of best places of in Asia where winter sports can be hosted and also as touristic place, which nowadays attract many foreign tourists from Asian region.

e. Legacy on the promotion of Olympic Movement and winter sports
**Dream Program**

The Dream Programme is an initiative to introduce winter sports to youths who otherwise would not have the opportunity to experience winter and winter sports. It was launched by PyeongChang in 2004 as part of its bid for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. Since then, 1,083 youths (of which 43 have disabilities) from 52 countries have participated in this programme, in particular, youths who have limited access to winter or winter sports, or those who have good potential to excel in sports, are invited to PyeongChang.

In terms of Olympic Movement, the programme has also helped foster closer ties among nations and enriched the participants through cultural exchange. Key stakeholders such as the IOC, the International Federations such as FIS and ISU, the foreign media and NOCs have hailed the Dream Programme as an excellent initiative that has contributed to the Olympic Movement, through expanding winter sports, promoting friendship among youths, and contributing to peace around the world.

Since 2011, the second phase of the Dream Programme, called ‘New Dream Programme’, has been in operation. Under the New Dream Programme, there will be an increase in opportunities for the youths, including those with disabilities, to experience winter sports in PyeongChang. In 2012, the Dream Programme was also expanded to serve as an academy for winter sports.

**Table 5-7 Number of participants in the Dream Programme between 2004 and 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From more</td>
<td>from 18</td>
<td>from 9</td>
<td>from 9</td>
<td>from 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>than 50</td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The PyeongChang 2018 Bid Committee)

**Table 5-8 Dream Programme participants who have gone on to represent their countries in the Winter Olympic Games and other major international sports events - 12 athletes from eight countries.**
Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Vancouver Olympic Winter Games : Cross Country Skiing(Kenya), Alpine Skiing(Iran), Snowboard(Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>World Junior Championships : Short Track Speed Skating, Figure Skating(Mexico, Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4Continental Championships Figure Skating : Figure Skating(Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>World Junior Championships : Short Track Speed Skating(Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Torino Olympic Winter Games : Cross Country Skiing (Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005~2006</td>
<td>Short Track Speed Skating World Cup (India, Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: The PyeongChang2018 Bid Committee)

- **Tangible and intangible legacies**

Bid is an expensive process with costs escalating year on year and as there is only one winner, the risks are high. The potential threat for the future is fewer bid cities. Despite this the concept of bid, losing and then still achieving physical legacies is somewhat new. It is nevertheless a critical one and for the future of the Olympics and many other sports events the answer may lie in an approach that sees bid as a means to an end. Nevertheless, bid is not an end in itself. The fact that a city can benefit from a bid campaign even though it does not win the right to host is also an important issue to be discussed (Masterman, 2008: 177).

Cashman (2006) collected a variety of evidence about legacies. He identified six fields of legacies: economics; infrastructure; information and education; public life, politics and culture; sport; symbols; memory and history (2006 cited in Preuss, 2006: 3). In this sense, it can be said that the PyeongChang Bid Committee had accomplished both tangible and intangible Olympic Legacies.

The argument for having strategies for the achievement of physical legacies is two-fold. Masterman (2008: 172) argues that if an event can make an unacceptable financial loss, a decision to bid and then to host an event may need a longer-term perspective in order to make tangible physical legacies and other legacies like development of the economy and other less tangible benefit to society, culture and sport. Secondly, if an event is used as a catalyst for the development of the economy and other less tangible benefits to society, culture and sport then the inclusion of physical legacies widens the potential for a return
on investment.

Around The Rings has long been the most influential internet presence on the Olympics. It analyzed the factors in the success of the 2018 PyeongChang Bid Committee as follows: (Around the Rings, 2011) “PyeongChang promises a compact Winter Olympics come 2018, a factor commended by the IOC Evaluation Commission during its May report and reiterated Wednesday by bid chairman and CEO Yang Ho Cho”.

With just two villages and venues generally 10 to 20 minutes apart, the Games should be easy to get around, even with the gateway airport of Incheon two-plus hours away. That travel time will be cut in half with construction of a high-speed rail line linking the Olympic venues to Seoul. Around the Rings

Recognizing the need to boost ambiance and charm in rural PyeongChang, $80 million is budgeted to create a “world of Korea experience” during the Games. Though tangible legacies include a sliding center, new ski runs and a skating oval, bid leaders say the real impact will be sizeable growth for winter sport, both within South Korea and throughout Asia. With public support long touted in excess of 90 percent, the people of PyeongChang wanted these Games.

Around the Rings stressed on most notable objective data mostly from the IOC Evaluation Commission report, which might have called attention of some IOC members. It is hard to examine the emotional part as the vote is completely blind.

5.3 The success of the bid for 2018

5.3.1 The 2018 Bid

As for the election of the Host city for the XXIII Winter Olympic Games, a total of three cities endorsed by their National Olympic Committees (NOC) submitted their applications to host the XXIII Olympic Winter Games in 2018 which are PyeongChang (KOR), Munich (GER) and Annecy (FRA).
The bid from South Korea beat out rival candidates Annecy and Munich in a single round of the election on Wednesday at the IOC Session in 2011 in Durban, South Africa. PyeongChang tallied 63 votes while Munich mustered 25 and Annecy only 7 after PyeongChang lost out the 2010 Olympic Games by a mere three votes and then suffered from a similar fate at the next election when only four more votes sent the 2014 Olympics to Sochi instead of South Korea.

Table 5-9 Matrix of votes for the host city of 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Round 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PyeongChang</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annecy</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.gamesbids.com

From the lessons learned from the previous failed bids and with the legacies accumulated, PyeongChang City adopted a new strategy under the leadership of the Central Government with a strongly unified team taking control and monitoring the campaign of the Bid Committee and its related governmental bodies.

5.3.2 Motives of the bid for the 2018 Olympic Winter Games

After the two consecutive failures, the PyeongChang 2018 Bid Committee conducted surveys in order to decide whether to continue or not. The governmental organizations including the local assembly and national sport organization were in favor of hosting the next Olympic Winter Games, as there was careful analysis that PyeongChang had a good possibility to win in the next round from the international experts and sports organizations. The overall perception of the IOC and international sports organization is reflected in the 2018 IOC Evaluation Commission report.

The 2018 bid and its vision build on the considerable infrastructure and sports development that has resulted from pledges made in bids for the 2010 and 2014 Olympic Winter Games demonstrating an on-going commitment to host the Games. These include new competition venues and the development of the
“Dream Programme” which provides winter sports opportunities to youth from countries with limited access to winter sports (IOC, 2012: 77)

Above all, the ambition and fervor of the PyeongChang citizens and surrounding areas to host the Olympic Winter Games played a crucial role on the decision of the Bid Committee (PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 34). According to the surveys made by local newspaper Ganwon-ilbo, 71.3% were in favor. Also the SBS-one of the biggest broadcasting company in Korea-made a survey national wide and 87.7% of the public were positive.(PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 34).

5.3.3 Factors influencing the success of the bid for the 2018

According to the IOC’s 2018 Candidature Acceptance Procedure, there are two phases for the bid cities. In the first phase all the cities which submitted a written application file to IOC are nominated as “Applicant City”. After the assessment of the application files conducted by the IOC Executive board, visits to those eligible Applicant Cities will be made. In concluding the Candidature Acceptance Procedure, the IOC Executive Board will determine which cities are to be accepted as “Candidate Cities”. Therefore, it can be assumed that all those cities which are qualified to be as Candidate Cities were assessed to be possible city to become the host of the Olympics by IOC. Considering such procedure of the IOC, those cities that are in the phase of Candidate City will need to focus on the strategies to influence to the IOC members who are the decision makers of the hosting city.

In this view, the indicators of the success of the third trial for the 2018 Olympics will apply Preuss’s theory of ‘Factors influencing the decision of IOC members’ - which are all seven factors - will be applied in order to assess the bid campaign of PyeongChang. There is no certainty that all the relevant factors are considered in his theory. Other possible factors will be discussed in order to explain the success model of PyeongChang. Furthermore the concept of Sports Diplomacy will be adopted to explain the activities and the strategies that the Bid Committee has taken into consideration.

- Quality of bid
According to Preuss’s model (2000) on determining factors influencing the votes, the first factor ‘Quality of the bid’ is that the PyeongChang Bid Committee were apt to organize winter Olympic games for the third time and this time, even more upgraded with the compact venue plan which allows the participants to go everywhere in 30 min inside the venue, strong supports from the government and the public. Also the second factor Past Critiques would have given a positive impact considering the city is attempting to host for third time being ready gives a good reason for the voters.

Table 5-10 The summary of the 2018 IOC Working Group Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>PyeongChang</th>
<th>Sochi</th>
<th>Salzburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government, legal issues and Public Opinion</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Infrastructure</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Venues</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Village</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Conditions and Impact</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Concept</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Security</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from Past Sport Events</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Project and Legacy</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The IOC

Table 5-10 illustrates that the IOC also evaluated the PyeongChang as the best candidate city. In particular, the interviewee from the KOC said that the compact venue plan was very effective.
The city of PyeongChang presented an effective venue plan, where all the venues were accessible within 30m, and this was the most compact plan among the candidate cities.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

The other interviewee also supported the interviewee from the KOC.

During the visit of the IOC Evaluation Commission, I made presentation on the Olympic Facilities. By that time the construction of the Alpensia Resort, which is the main facility of the Alpensia Zone where the main Olympic Facilities are to be placed was already constructed. I could feel the big surprise and the excitement among the members of the IOC Evaluation Commission as they could witness the big change and improvement of the venue in comparison to that of 2014. I believe that the personal thought on the venue of the IOC Evaluation Commission as they can strongly influence to the IOC members if they are in favor of certain city. In this perspective, I think the preparation of the venue was an important factor of success.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

This informant added one more reason of the success, which was effective management of public relations.

By gathering information from various consultants who are experts in the field of bidding, analysis on the general trends and tendencies of the target group were made. This was used as a valid source for the strategic planning of the PR for the Bid Committee.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

The PyeongChang Bid Committee (2011) also listed several main factors of its success below:

Unlike the Bid Committees of 2010 and 2014 where the local government authorized as
the Bid Committee served as a foundation and led the bid, in the last trial, the Central government took control of the Bid Committee and also the central government authorized Bid Committee as a foundation. Under the leadership, it was hard and unifies the Bid Committee and interagency relations as it lacked a strong tie that can hold the organization. Also there was a voice that for the hosting mega sports events, a local government is limited in handling international issues. Therefore, the transition of power of the Bid Committee was made from local to central government as it was an essential part of the bid success. With the changes made as already mentioned, in the third attempt of the PyeongChang, there was full support of the Government. As revealed by the IOC Evaluation Commission report, during their visit, the President of Korea and the Prime Minister expressed their full support for the Games and re-affirmed that the government regarded hosting the 2018 Games as a national priority. The support was also applied during the last bid effort which differentiates its campaign from the two previous campaigns.

In the bid activities for 2018 Winter Olympics, it was required to manage and share information systematically, because the government and the interagency jointly participated in the bid process unlike the two previous bid activities. Accordingly, in order to support the PyeongChang Bid Committee, the Korean government and its key governmental bodies the President of the Nation, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence and Korean Olympic Committee actively participated strengthen the bid campaign. Each organization appointed a key person to share the information in order to effectively run the bid. Hereinafter, the Bid Committee, the Government and the interagency will expressed using the term ‘Joint Team’. The activities that that the Joint Team has organized are to manage meeting with high-level strategy meeting and to investigate and set up the strategies on the international trends gathered from the appointed consultants who are experts in this field having experiences of contributing successful bid in previous Olympics. The description of the activities by the Joint Team is in detail as follows: the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism

In accordance with IOC’s code of ethics, the Bid Committee drew up the guidelines for
diplomatic missions and expanded exchanges through the various support project. Indirect bid activities were preceded by Korea International Cooperation Agency, overseas branch offices, and important figures working in the international organizations. Diplomatic establishments abroad cooperated to support PyeongChang’s bid activities as a bridge when there was sports exchange as well as providing support in the field of support on the developing countries. Furthermore, diplomatic missions displayed the promotional materials published by the Bid Committee at all times and distributed them at official events of the country of sojourn and contributed to creating positive public opinion through the press interviews and publishing feature articles.

It was important above all to quickly and precisely understand information on major issues regarding the bid for 2018 Winter Olympics, reaction to candidate cities' activity, and rival cities' trends. Thus, on the basis of information and know-how accumulated through previous two bid activities, the Bid Committee distributed the international trends to all departments and consultants in the Bid Committee, KOC, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and other organizations. In this process, the Bid Committee could accumulate and manage information, analyze major issues and trends, and supplement the bid strategy preparing counter measures.

The Bid Committee was aware of the importance of international consultants from the previous bid activities, so the Bid Committee selected them stage by stage with recommendations from the related organizations considering the IOC's procedure and the budget. International consultants participated in the overall bid process such as participating in major international events, filing information on candidate cities, making and supervising presentation scripts.

However, due to the confusion arisen from the false move of consultants and miscommunications, there were several problems such as delay in decision making and insufficient communication with IOC members. To improve these situations, the Bid Committee unified the business process for a quick decision making, implemented the pre-assigning system to reinforce the function of consultants on a monthly bases on the bid activities. To reinforce the systematic International Relations as well as Sports
Diplomacy activity, the Bid Committee improved the understanding of international sports communities' trends and the communication functions such as the conference call and the joint session.

- **Past critiques**
  The defining moment of the PyeongChang's 10-year quest for the Games came during the presentation when Ambassador Jin-Sun Kim, the leader of the first two campaigns said "I believe it is my destiny to stand before you for the third time" (Gamesbids, 2011). The IOC Members who took part in the vote were well aware that PyeongChang’s effort that lasted more than a decade. This might have raised sympathy among the voters on their third attempt and support PyeongChang as the absolute number of the votes reveals.

- **Sport Diplomacy**
  The two previous failed bids led to the conclusion that “Sports Diplomacy” was the most important reason that they have never been successful. The IOC members who take part in the election of the Olympic Host City receive objective data about the candidate city from the IOC Evaluation Commission that helps them to make right choice on the host city selection. The problem lies in that the candidate cities are selected from the bid cities which are capable of organizing the Olympics. In other words, the candidate cities are all qualified with respect to infrastructure, operational experiences, the support of governments and other critical categories needed to continue the Olympic Movement. Consequently, with the objective data, it is hard for IOC members to define and make their choice. Therefore, in this field of ‘Opportunity Costs” where “Sports Diplomacy” is applied as factor was most significant for the PyeongChang Bid Committee.

Jacques Rogge, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in an interview which was conducted just days before the election of 2014 hosting city took place, mentioned the key factors of the hosting city decision as follows: "What really makes the difference is the confidence they (IOC members) have in the people. The human factor will make the difference in the bids." (Around the Rings, 2007)

According to the coverage from the media, it can be said that the decisions of the IOC
members do not agree with the scores made by the IOC Evaluation Commission. Therefore it can be concluded that without the presence of a critical factor that avoids a candidate city to be the host city, the objective data made by the IOC Working Group and Evaluation Commission does not have much meaning.

Morley Myers, a journalist and also the secretary general of European Sport’s Writers Organization, who during in his extensive career covered more than 10 Summer and 10 Winter Olympic Games and other major sporting events as well over 40 years, commented from an interview conducted by one of Korean Journal called JoongAng Ilbo (2007) that:

The report made by the IOC evaluation commission does not have an significant influence to the IOC members. Of course it is better than a low qualification but not many IOC members pay much attention to their report. For example, during the bid process of 2012 Summer Olympiad, it was Paris which had the highest qualification by the due commission. However, regardless of the qualification, the 2012 Games was rewarded to London. This is because on the processes of making decision, each IOC member set their priority according their personal understanding and interest. Also, he has pointed out that the composition of Evaluation Commission provides good reason not to fully trust what their report says as the members are mostly composed of non-professional ones.

The IOC Evaluation Commission forms the objective data for the IOC members to qualify if the city is apt to host the Olympics. However, this seems to be a part of reference as there are other qualified cities which have the ability to host the games as well. The PyeongChang’s qualification from the IOC’s commission can be resulted from the two lost bids; Korea keeps improving its legacy of the lost bids by developing the infrastructure of the Winter Sports and promoting the Olympic Movement. Moreover, the Korean President gave the word that hosting 2018 Olympic Winter games is a national priority and finally the public supports and welcomes the Games. Therefore, after the praise and highly recognized-qualification from IOC Evaluation Commission, the time came to focus on the decision makers individually as key actors of the bid.
Preuss describes that the dynamic by which an IOC member perform is clearly same as that for prisoner’s dilemma: the individual strategy of not giving up personal benefits dominates the strategy of voting for which city best might strengthen the Movement.

However, the great uncertainty over which city will increase the Movement’s power the most makes decision even more difficult. […] Fiedman/Hetcher(1988,211) Under conditions of objective uncertainly, however, actors are robed of the implements necessary to make a rational decision […] and they are thereby motivated to seek the advice and counsel of their fellows. Discussion with other IOC members as well as with city Bid Committee representatives can have an influence on the hierarchy of preferences… (Preuss, 2000: 92-4)

As Preuss mentioned in his paper, the human relationships through the representatives like the IOC members of the respective bid country and the Bid Committee representatives’ strategy greatly affect those IOC members who are facing trouble to make the best city that can promote the Olympic Movement within the range of their interests or background. Therefore, it was time for PyeongChang to have a different approach to directly influence to actors of the election, namely the IOC members.

From the previous experiences, the Bid Committee decided to have a strategic approach with a limited number the representatives who had access to the IOC members and shared the information within the team in order to have a uniformity of the strategy and efficiently approach to the IOC members, except for those from the bid countries. The representatives were the chairman of the Bid Committee Yang Ho CHO; the Chairman and CEO of Korean Air, Y.S Park; President of Korean Olympic Committee and former IOC member and IJF president, Gun Hee Lee; the president of Samsung electronics; and some special diplomats. This special team applied target casting strategy, which means that they had been assigned a number of IOC members to persuade until the host city was decided (The PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 274).
As a result, the PyeongChang Bid Committee had the individual meeting with 98 IOC members at 81 international events, as far as IOC ethics commission allowed. The Bid Committee received a favorable evaluation that the process became systematic compared to the previous activities and were also advised to continue the balanced lobbying activity by some of the IOC members. In particular, the Bid Committee realized that IOC members who had not decided where to vote increased compared to the previous activity and continued the target strategy for the all IOC members (The PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 275).

After their decision to host the 2018 Winter Olympic Games, careful analysis of the influence of the sanctioned member was made and the South Korea’s National Assembly granted a special pardon to former Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-Hee on December 29 of 2009. The National Assembly took on huge political risks to clear the name of former Chairman Lee as pardoning and restoring the rights of a convicted entrepreneur can be seen as special treatment since the people of Gangwon Province (where PyeongChang city is located) and the PyeongChang Bid Committee had been submitting countless petitions asking for the pardon of the former chairman. There is no actual way to measure the impact of return of Lee but this time the bid ended in success (The Government News, 2009)

In the case of the Pyeong Chang’s bid team the key representative as diplomats are as described in the table below:

Table 5-11 Key representatives of the 2018 bid campaign of PyeongChang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>IOC members</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun Hee LEE</td>
<td>President of Samsung Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dae Sung MOON</td>
<td>IOC member from Athletes Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Non-IOC members</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myung Bak LEE</td>
<td>The State President of the Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ho CHO</td>
<td>Chairman of 2018 PyeongChang Bid Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong Sung PARK</td>
<td>The former IOC member IF President, Incumbent President of the Korean Olympic Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two interviewees stated main reasons of the success below:

Fortunately I was invited to be member of the PyeongChang Bid Committee for the 2018 Winter Olympics again. This time, the Bid Committee had different leadership from the previous one. Unlike the 2010 and 2014 bids which were led by the Gangwon Province and the PyeongChang Bid Committee, the Central Government led the bid in 2018. Under its presence, the regional government, Bid Committee, KOC and other governmental bodies actively supported each other. I think that this composition of the Bid Committee became the platform for the success of the bid as it resulted in the cooperation and unity amongst the relevant organizations. Previously, each organization had their own strategies to influence the IOC members. They met the same IOC members repeatedly but with different approaches each time. On the last bid attempt, the campaign was led in unity and some influential people who led the bid campaign personally approached the IOC members.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

I also would like to stress on the contribution of the Mr. Y.S Park, President of the Korean Olympic Committee. During the 2018 bid, Yong Sung PARK’s displayed significant influence, when he became the president of the KOC in 2009. As the former President of International Judo Federation as well as a member of the IOC, he influenced the other IOC members to bid in favor of PyeongChang. Furthermore, the Gangwon Province and the PyeongChang Bid Committee made a strategic approach with accumulated know-how acquired from their previous experiences.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)
Unlike the other previous two bids, the collaboration amongst the PyeongChang Bid Committee, the NOC and the Government was notable.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

It has been made known that more than 90% of the Korean public supported the hosting of the Winter Olympics despite experiencing two consecutive failures. Also, this time the Korean Government led the Bid Committee, which proved to be of great support.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

The PyeongChang Bid Committee (2011: 277-8) also noted the similar opinion to the informants above. High-level strategy meetings on Sports Diplomacy were held regularly between the Government officials and the leaders of the Bid Committee. The main goal of the meetings was to prepare, modify, and supplement the bid strategy in order to win the bid at election of host city. Meetings were held focusing on sharing information about individual IR activities, analyzing tendencies of each IOC member, discussing IR activity plan in terms of main international competitions, analyzing and complementing weaknesses of PyeongChang's IR activity, and establishing the strategy for VIP's IR activity at the Durban IOC General assembly.

Concerning the IOC 2018 Evaluation Commission in relation with Sports Diplomacy, during its visit, the Commission met the State President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea who guaranteed their full support for the Games and re-affirmed that the government regarded hosting the 2018 Games as a national priority. Ministers responsible for Games-related functions participated in each briefing session.

National, regional and local support for the 2018 Games is high and there is no apparent opposition to the Games. The public opinion poll commissioned by the IOC shows the following levels of support for hosting the 2018 Olympic Winter Games: 92% support in PyeongChang, 87% in Gangwon Province and 87% nationally (2018 IOC Evaluation Commission, 2011).
It clearly mentioned the betterment of the infrastructure as well as the demonstration of the on-going commitment of the PyeongChang. Also the report refers to the full support of the Korean government, which will consider the Games as national priority, and the strong support of the citizens.

From the two previous experiences of lost bid attempts the Bid Committee was very well aware of the key factor of the success of bid which is the human relationship. From the 2018 IOC evaluation report, PyeongChang was qualified to be able to host the Winter Olympic Games which forms the platform as a candidate city and also praised for its progress made from the two lost bids. The IOC Evaluation Committee emphasized the following in their third and final visit to PyeongChang.

Table 5-12 Analysis of IOC Evaluation Commission Report of the Candidate Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>PyeongChang</th>
<th>Munich</th>
<th>Annecy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Games period</td>
<td>• Olympic Games Feb 9-25, 2018</td>
<td>• Average temperature : 0℃</td>
<td>• Average temperature : -1℃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Paralympic Games Mar 9-18, 2018</td>
<td>• Average snow depth : 28.7cm</td>
<td>• Average snow depth : 97-150cm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Environmental conditions          | • Average temperature : -4℃  
• Average snow depth : 37.1cm | • Average temperature : 0℃  
• Average snow depth : 28.7cm |                                                                           |
| Motivation, Vision and Slogans    | • Slogan : New Horizons  
• Motives:  
  1. Expand the Olympic Movement and create new Olympic legacies.  
  2. Develop winter sports in Asia.  
  3. Share our passion for winter sports.  
  4. Boost regional development.  | • Slogan : Spiele im Herzen (The games at heart)  
• Vision: a world united in friendship and peace through sport.  
• Mission: to make friends through sport.  
• Legacy: a global event that delivers sustainable benefits for generations to come  | Main motivation and vision  
• Shaped by tradition and inspired by athletes and Olympism.  
• Reunite the rich Alpine heritage of the Haute-Savoie region with the power of the Olympic and Paralympic Games  
• Help to secure their future for the next generation |
| Government support                | • All three cities have strong government support                           |                                                                           |                                                                           |
### Public opinion poll (Support)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Support Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PyeongChang and surrounding areas</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich and surrounding areas</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annecy and surrounding areas</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sports Venues (existing and additional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Venues Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PyeongChang</td>
<td>7 existing venues, 2 planned, 3 additional permanent, 1 temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>7 existing venues, 2 additional permanent, 4 additional temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annecy</td>
<td>7 existing venues, 2 planned, 4 additional permanent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sports Venues, General Concept

- **Main Clusters**: Two
- **Travel Time between clusters and stand alone venues**: 30 min
- **Travel Time from sports venue to the village**: 5 to 25 min
- **Travel Time within sports venue**: 5 to 25 min
- **Travel Time between stand alone venue to main cluster**: 2 hours

### Source

- adapted from Han (2011) and the IOC

### Outside Constraints

This field reveals the different background of the IOC members. Each IOC member comes from different political, cultural, religious and social backgrounds. From those differences, it could be assumed that the IOC members might support a candidate city which belongs to the continent where respective IOC members belong to, as the geographical similarity might influence familiarity and therefore, the hierarchy of preference seems to head to the city which belongs to the same group or continent, except for the cases where the bid city of the next edition of Olympics is from the same continent. From this assumption, it can be said that the continent where the majority of the IOC members live will be likely to be more powerful.
Table 5-13 A number of IOC members in terms of the continent where they are from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia (21.24%)</td>
<td>South Korea (2), China (2), Japan (2), Taiwan, Thailand, Kuwait, Pakistan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines, Lebanon, North Korea, Singapore, Syria, India, Hong Kong,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21 Countries,</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Oman,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 members)</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania (4.42%)</td>
<td>Fiji, New Zealand, Australia (3),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3 Countries, 5</td>
<td>members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (41.59%)</td>
<td>Switzerland(5), Belgium, Spain (2), Greece, Finland (2), Italy (4),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26 Countries, 47</td>
<td>Germany (2), France (2), Luxembourg, Sweden (3), Russia (3), Norway,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members)</td>
<td>Austria, Hungary, Monaco, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands (2), United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom (4), Ukraine (2), Israel, Ireland (2), Croatia, Turkey, Denmark,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland, Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America (16.81%)</td>
<td>Brazil (2), Mexico (2), Canada (2), Peru, Guatemala, Barbados, Puerto Rico,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13 Countries, 19</td>
<td>United States (3), Cuba (2), Uruguay, Panama, Aruba, Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (15.92%)</td>
<td>Senegal, Uganda, Guinea, South Africa, Morocco (2), Egypt (2), Kenya,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16 Countries, 18</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Zambia, Namibia, Gambia, St Lucia, Nigeria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members)</td>
<td>Burundi, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The KOC (2012)

Therefore, the influence of European IOC members would take a decisive role. The European IOC members seem to be quite influenced by the past location, which will further be described in the next section.

- Past Location

Among the three bid attempts of PyeongChang, Vancouver became the host city of 2010 Winter Olympics and Sochi became the host city of 2014 Games. The past location, more precisely, the past hosting continent seems to be an objective reason of the preference of the IOC members. As already pointed out the success of hosting of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games might have provoked negative image as two consecutive editions of Winter Olympic Games are being hosted in Asian Continent. Furthermore, the reason for the
failure of the bid for the 2014 Games is related with Korea’s success in hosting two mega sports events in the year of election for 2014 Olympics and this seemed to cause the IOC members from Asian Continent to turn their back to PyeongChang. Thus, in terms of the past location, the third attempt of PyeongChang was persuasive enough to gain a majority of votes.

- The Election Rules

It seems that the voting results for 2018 PyeongChang were not affected by the strategic voting as PyeongChang obtained the required majority of votes in its first round which are 63 (66%) votes from 95 voters.

- The Back Box: Inner Constraints, Emotions and Personality

From an interview after the election result was announced, IOC Vice President Thomas Bach, a senior figure in Munich's bid, suggested the Koreans had sought excessive sympathy from their previous failures. "I think that was obvious in the Pyeongchang presentations," he said. "They were playing on this sympathy and compassion minute after minute. Rio was different. Rio did not play on previous defeats or sympathy or even compassion." (SportsBeat, 2011)

This factor is dedicated to human feelings. In order to successfully influence in this field, it is indispensable to gather information on the IOC member’s preferences. This field was very successfully developed on the third trial of the PyeongChang city. By leading a strong team under the guidance of the Central Government, the Bid Committee was able to make right decisions with the support of the governmental bodies. And this time the Bid Committee worked with numerous experienced consultants in the field of Olympic bids, which supported the city with the information gathering on the IOC members. In order to influence the IOC members, the Bid Committee created key supporting messages and created a new brand for PyeongChang, the “New Horizons”, with a clear purpose to distance themselves from the two previous losing bids and to carve out a clear and distant difference from Munich and Annecy. New Horizons is about potential and growth and giving people access to winter sports for the first time in their lives – as well as creating a sustainable winter sports hub in Asia.
The most striking feature in the black box field in PyeongChang’s bid attempts was the final presentation just before the vote which took place on 6 of July 2011 in Durban South Africa. Unlike the other two failed bids which were neither interesting nor influential, the team made a very emotional presentation.

The presentation team composed of 8 speakers, including personalities like Lee MyungBak, the president of Korea, Yuna Kim, the famous figure skater and also gold medalist from the Vancouver Olympics took part of the presentation.

They stressed on what Korea can do for Olympic Movement, especially on the Asian continent. Also, President Lee showed appreciation of what the Olympic Movement granted to Korea through hosting 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Also he promised full support from the government, which would make proud the IOC members. JinSun KIM, the Special Ambassador stressed the 10 years of bid campaigns and showed the Gangwon region’s strong hope of hosting the Olympics. DaeSung Moon introduced the athlete-centered program, which is one of the IOC’s major concerns. KOC President pointed out Prince Albert and made a personal approach referring to the fact that he was on his honeymoon. Dowson spoke about the opportunities that the athletes might have by choosing PyeongChang and Rah spoke about the general concept again.

Table 5-14 Summary of PyeongChang 2018 Final Presentation to the IOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presenter</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Key messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theresa Rah</td>
<td>Communication Director</td>
<td>New Horizons is also about hope. To earn your support here today we know PyeongChang 2018 needs to have a clear benefit for the Olympics, not just Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong Ho Cho</td>
<td>PyeongChang Chairman</td>
<td>Wished competitor Luck = just not too much of it. Three goals to be delivered on - what is best for Winter Sport; what is best for Olympic Athlete; and what is best for the Olympic Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee MyungBak</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>The Olympics is one of the post powerful created by mankind. He spoke out about Korea's first Olympic in St. Moritz-a poor country with only three skaters competing. Then 40 years later the Olympics Games were hosted in Seoul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Jin Sun KIM** | Special Ambassador | "I appreciate than anyone what the IOC and Olympics have given to our nation"
"I guarantee you the full and unconditional support from Korean Government"
"We will work hard, we will make you proud"
"I ask for your support today so you can finally make our Olympic and Paralympics dream come true"

"For more than 10 years the people of Gangwon province and I have worked hard to realize our Olympic Dreams"
"We never gave up, and tried again"
"We listened to your advice and improved our plans"
"We honored our promised to you"
“Our passion to host the Olympic Games has not changed over 10 year, it has only gotten stronger.”
“I believe it is my destiny to stand before you for the third time.”
“I humbly ask for your support to host the Games for the first time in our country.” |
| **Yuna Kim** | Figure Skate, Gold medalist | “You are making history today and I get to be a small part of it.”
“I am a living legacy of our government’s efforts to improve the standard of winter sport.” |
| **Dae Sung Moon** | IOC Member | He described the concept of the athlete centered plan.
“We did our homework.”
“We want PyeongChang to be another revolutionary step for the Paralympics.”
“We’ll be ready and waiting for you.” |
| **Yong Sung Park** | President of the Korean Olympic Committee | “[To Prince Albert] Your serene highness, I’m sorry that you are spending your honeymoon listening to PyeongChang’s bid for the third time but I promise to make it up to you in PyeongChang in seven years time.”
“I hope you give us the chance to prove that PyeongChang Is ready.” |
| **Toby Dawson** | American Olympic medalist | He spoke about the opportunities that South Korea is offering athletes now and how it can improve in the future.
“Your support today for PyeongChang 2018 will truly change the lives of young athletes.”
Rah took the podium again, speaking in French and English |
| **Theresa Rah** | Communication Director | “It’s about expanding Olympic sport in underserved markets.”
“Of the 21 Winter Games held so far, 19 have been held in traditional market – only 2 in Asia and none in Korea.”
“It is a race about dreams.”
“Our will be a legacy beyond brick and mortar.”
“The memory will be a lot sweeter if you choose PyeongChang.”
“We know whatever decision today you make today will be an historic one.” |

Source: [www.gamesbids.com](http://www.gamesbids.com) (2011)
Two interviewees all admitted that the PyeongChang 2018 Bid Committee made good presentations.

I would like to point out that there was great improvement on the PyeongChang’s presentation. In the last bid attempt, the presentation of PyeongChang focused on what the IOC members would want to hear. The two previous presentations focused on the promotion of peace in the Korean Peninsula and it was now well understood that this was not the right approach. Therefore, the Bid Committee focused on the promotion of the Olympic Movement through winter sports.

(A member of the PyeongChang 2014 & 2018 Bid Committees)

During the 123rd IOC Session held in Durban, PyeongChang’s presenters delivered messages based on the theme “New Horizons”, which focuses on PyeongChang’s plan for further development, and this might have sounded persuasive to the IOC members who participated in the voting.

(Director of International Relations of the KOC)

5.3.4 Economic impact of 2018 Olympic Winter Games

According to an investigation made by the PyeongChang Organizing Committee, the economic impact of hosting games is estimated to be 20.4 trillion KRW (Korean Won) which is equivalent to approximately 18.5 billion in USD. This is an impact mainly from the fields of inducement in gross regional product, added-value industry and generation of employment nationwide (PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 15).

Furthermore, the bid can further be used to trigger the development of permanent tourism at an international level, industrial settlements by leveraging the image of the region with new economic relations with other regions. Also the games will be an instrument to archive rapid urban re-development providing rapid transportation networks from major airports and metropolitan cities as well as new infrastructures (PyeongChang Bid Committee, 2011: 16).
5.4 The summary between failures and successes of the bids

The factors influencing the failures and success of the bid can be summarized below:

- Quality of bid
  The 2010 and 2014 PyeongChang bids for the Winter Olympic Games were less qualified than its counterparts. The quality of the bid preparation qualified by IOC Evaluation commission, however, has improved each time they have visited the city. For the 2018 bid two main successful elements are followings: even more upgraded compact venue plan which allows the participants to get around the venue within 30 min and strong support from the government and the public.

- Past Critiques
  PyeongChang used to have a low international recognition and had to compete with Salzburg and Vancouver which archived global fame for their winter sports attraction. Also, the key factors of the Russia or Canada bid campaigns were on the basis of the rich Winter Sport resources and their high performances in Winter Olympics. In the case of the 2018 bid campaign, Korea has improved its performance in Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, which shows that Korea is one of powerful winter sports nations. Besides, PyeongChang Bid Committee had appealed to the IOC members that Korea still tried to host the Winter Olympic Games on their third attempt.

- Sports Diplomacy
  In the 2010 and 2014 bids, it was often said that the major reasons of the failures points out the lack of the Sports Diplomacy. The IOC members advised that South Korea’s bid campaign lacked representative figures who could influence IOC members and lead the campaign with unity. However, the 2018 Bid Committee decided to have a strategic approach with a limited number the representatives who had access to the IOC members and shared the information within the team in order to have a uniformity of the strategy and efficiently approach to the IOC members.

- Outside Constraints
  In 2014, the strong engagement and influence of the political power of Russia and the
strong leadership presence of President Putin may have influenced the IOC members’ decisions. In the 2018 bid, the Korean central government became actively involved by showing strong sport during the IOC Evaluation Commission’s visit as well as in the final presentation by having the President of the Nation Lee, who had the role to convince the voters by promising full support of the government which is an essential point to prepare and operate such an event.

Also, each IOC member comes from different political, cultural, religious and social backgrounds. Against this backdrop, it could be assumed that the IOC members might support a candidate city which belongs to the continent where respective IOC members belong to, as the geographical similarity might influence familiarity and therefore, the hierarchy of preference seems to head to the city which belongs to the same group or continent, except for the cases where the bid city of the next edition of Olympics is from the same continent. As a majority of IOC members are from Europe or western countries, Vancouver and Sochi might have been more favourable.

- Past Location
The Beijing 2008 Olympics which were hosted just two years before the 2010 Winter Olympics might not been favourable as both Summer and Winter Olympics were hosted in the same continent consecutively. In the same year of the 2014 bid, Korea was perceived as monopolizing the major sports events by hosting the 2014 Asian Games as well as the 2011 IAAF World Championship. Fortunately, the 2018 votes seem to have less intervention which could be provoked from the factor of past location.

- Election rules
The 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympic Games followed the same election rules called ‘Hare Rule’ and thus, there is no difference between them. Unlike the 2010 and 2014 bids when PyeongChang won in the first round and lost in the second round, the voting results for 2018 PyeongChang were not affected by the strategic voting as PyeongChang obtained the required majority of votes in its first round which are 63 (66%) votes from 95 voters.
The Black Box

Just like the bid for the 2010 games, the 2014 PyeongChang Bid Committee emphasized the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula through Olympic Movement. In the view of the Bid Committee, the fact that Korea is the only divided country in the world was regarded to be a persuasive point to the IOC members. However, a strong leadership of the Central Government, the PyeongChang 2018 Bid Committee was able to work with numerous experienced consultants in the field of Olympic bids. In order to influence the IOC members, the 2018 Bid Committee created key supporting messages and created a new brand for PyeongChang, the “New Horizons”, with a clear purpose to distance themselves from the two previous losing bids and to carve out a clear and distant difference from Munich and Annecy. New Horizons is about potential and growth and giving people access to winter sports for the first time in their lives – as well as creating a sustainable winter sports hub in Asia.

Overall, all these factors are important for the success of the bid, not only the improvement made by the PyeongChang 2018 Bid Committee but also the given situation worked favorably to PyeongChang to win the 2018 bid.
6 Conclusion

Hosting mega sports events like Winter Olympics is a complex process which requires a multidimensional approach. This paper analyzed the case of PyeongChang City’s bid successes and failures. In view of the uniqueness of the case of PyeongChang, sports diplomacy is replaced in the model of Preuss (2000). As the votes for the election of the host city made by IOC is a totally blind process, it is hard to prove the crucial factor that changed the minds of the IOC members who did not prefer the city on their first and second bid attempts. However, from the repetition that can be found from various sources on its success and failure, the IOC’s system of vote, which is totally dependent on the IOC members vote, the human factors seems to be most influential, namely that there was strong support of the government, public and sponsors which guaranteed the continuation of the Olympic Movement and would do their best to successfully host the games. The bid success of PyeongChang was born as a result of the successful connection of the Bid Committee’s commitments and the confidence of the IOC members on PyeongChang. Now it is time for the PyeongChang 2018 Organizing Committee to make a commitment to the Winter Olympic Games to live up to the Olympic Movement.
References


JoongAng Ilbo. (2007), The high qualification of the IOC evaluation report doesn't promise success on the election vote. JoongAng Ilbo,


