

University of Peloponnese
Faculty of Social and Political Relations

Department of Political Science and International Relations

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**Reconsidering Aid Effectiveness: An Assessment of
NGOs peacebuilding projects**

Orestis Vathis

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Διδακτορική Διατριβή

**Επανεξετάζοντας την Αποτελεσματικότητα της
Διεθνούς Αναπτυξιακής Βοήθειας: Αξιολόγηση
προγραμμάτων Μη-Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων στο
πεδίο οικοδόμησης της ειρήνης**

Ορέστης Βάθης

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Reconsidering Aid Effectiveness: An Assessment of NGOs peacebuilding projects

Abstract

In the post Cold War era, the role of the NGOs in the peacebuilding sector has been enhanced considerably. While NGOs have the ability to work in the field and be flexible to respond to emerging conflicts and threats to peace and stability, they can only have a supportive role in the peacebuilding process which is, by its nature, a collaborative process. This thesis attempts to shed light on this issue, focusing on the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities implemented by non-governmental organizations in post-conflict environments. Through empirical research conducted in Uganda and FYROM, it is argued that the results and the impact of NGOs peacebuilding projects are related to the wider context of intervention. To enhance their effectiveness, the active participation of the international community is required so as to implement a holistic approach; however, for such an engagement, the political will of powerful actors - at international and local level - is a prerequisite.

Keywords: aid effectiveness, peacebuilding, assessment, evaluation, political will, conflict, Uganda, FYROM, NGOs, civil society

Επανεξετάζοντας την Αποτελεσματικότητα της Διεθνούς Αναπτυξιακής Βοήθειας: Αξιολόγηση προγραμμάτων Μη-Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων στο πεδίο οικοδόμησης της ειρήνης

Περίληψη

Στην μεταψυχροπολεμική περίοδο, ο ρόλος των μη-κυβερνητικών οργανώσεων στον τομέα της οικοδόμησης της ειρήνης (peacebuilding) αναβαθμίστηκε σημαντικά. Όμως, ενώ οι ΜΚΟ έχουν την δυνατότητα να δουλέψουν στο πεδίο με ευελιξία και να ανταποκριθούν στις απαιτήσεις των νεοεμφανιζόμενων συγκρούσεων και απειλών για την ειρήνη και στην σταθερότητα, μπορούν να έχουν μόνο ένα υποστηρικτικό ρόλο στην διαδικασία οικοδόμησης της ειρήνευσης, η οποία - εκ φύσεως - είναι μια συμμετοχική διαδικασία. Η παρούσα έρευνα έχει ως αντικείμενο το θέμα αυτό, εστιάζοντας στην αποτελεσματικότητα προγραμμάτων οικοδόμησης της ειρήνης που υλοποιούνται από ΜΚΟ. Μέσα από εμπειρική έρευνα που έλαβε χώρα στην Ουγκάντα και στην ΠΓΔΜ, υποστηρίζεται ότι τα αποτελέσματα και ο αντίκτυπος προγραμμάτων ΜΚΟ στο πεδίο οικοδόμησης της ειρήνης εξαρτώνται άμεσα από το ευρύτερο πλαίσιο παρέμβασης. Για την βελτίωση της αποτελεσματικότητάς των, είναι απαραίτητη η ενεργή συμμετοχή της διεθνούς κοινότητας ώστε να εφαρμοσθεί ένα συνολικό στρατηγικό σχέδιο. Όμως, για μία τέτοια συμμετοχή, η πολιτική βούληση ισχυρών δρώντων - σε παγκόσμιο αλλά και τοπικό επίπεδο - είναι ζωτικής σημασίας.

Σημαντικοί Όροι: Αποτελεσματικότητα, βοήθεια, αξιολόγηση, συγκρούσεις, Κοινωνία των Πολιτών, πολιτική βούληση, ειρήνευση, Ουγκάντα, ΠΓΔΜ, Μη-κυβερνητικές οργανώσεις

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Abbreviations

English

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADF - Allied Democratic Forces
AEL - Aid Effectiveness Literature
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina
CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization
CBO - Community Based Organizations
CFA - Communauté française d'Afrique (French Community of Africa)
CPPB - Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
CSDP - Common Security and Defense Policy
CSO - Civil Society Organizations
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
DFID- Department for International Development
DPA - Democratic Party of Albanians
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EAR - European Agency for Reconstruction
EC - European Community
EDF - European Development Fund
ESS - European Security Strategy
EU - European Union
FDC - Forum for Democratic Change
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GNP - Gross National Product
GoU - Government of Uganda
HSM - Holy Spirit Movement
ICC - International Criminal Court
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP - Internally Displaced People
IFI - International Financial Institutions
IfS - Instrument for Stability
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IMG - International Management Group
INGO -International Non-Governmental Organizations
JNA - Yugoslav People's Army
KFOR - Kosovo Force
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës—UÇK)
KY - Kabaka Yekka
LRA - Lord's Resistance Army
MDG - Millenium Development Goals
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NLA -National Liberation Army
NRA - National Resistance Army
NRM - National Resistance Movement
ODA - Official Development Assistance

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFA - Ohrid Framework Agreement
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBF - Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO - Peacebuilding Support Office
PCIA - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PRDP - Peace Recovery and Development Plan
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs
PSMEC - Project Steering Management and Evaluation Committee
RER - Real Exchange Rate
RPA - Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPP - Reflecting on Peace Practice
RRM - Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SAA - Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP - Stabilization and Association Process
SFRY - Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN - United Nations
UNC - Uganda National Congress
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNLA - Uganda National Liberation Army
UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UPA - Uganda People's Army
UPC - Uganda People's Congress
UPDA - Uganda People's Democratic Army
UPDF - Uganda People's Defence Force

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Historically, one of the first implementation forms of foreign aid was the so-called *Marshall Plan*, a US strategic intervention for the reconstruction and the economic development of the war-torn Europe, just after the Second World War. Gradually, as European - mainly - countries moved on a path of economic growth, they left behind the status of aid recipient and became themselves donors, supporting underdeveloped countries. It was thought back then that through foreign aid poor countries could catch up. However, although trillions of dollars were offered in development assistance over the next decades, still - in current era - billions of people live in poverty, casting doubts on whether foreign aid can be an effective tool for the achievement of development goals. This issue has attracted the attention of scholars who have been trying for decades to investigate the role of foreign aid and to examine whether a link between growth and aid can be established. In this context, there is a vast literature focusing on various aspects of aid effectiveness, analyzing the effects of the different types of aid, investigating diverse hypotheses and using a variety of methods and approaches. However, despite the extensive research, no consensus exists among experts on the effects of development assistance and the debate is open. Still, while the controversy on aid effectiveness continues, there is little doubt that the provision of aid is bound by political factors. Significant changes in the political conditions - at local and global level - affect considerably the way aid is conceptualized and implemented. Such a change took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the political advancements in Eastern Europe led to the end of the Cold War: in relation to the provision of aid, a sector that drew attention and went through significant transformation was that of human security, especially in the context of conflict. The end of the Cold War - during which

proxy wars were kept alive by the USA and USSR¹ - was an opportunity for the United Nations (UN) to focus on its initial goals. Thus, the UN moved from peacekeeping interventions towards more sustainable approaches.² In 1992, Secretary-General of UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the *An Agenda for Peace* report emphasizing on international peace and security.³ Over the next years, more significant steps towards the establishment of security were made. Initially, humanitarian interventions were the response to emergencies for relief; soon after, the necessity for permanent solutions through the establishment of peace was highlighted⁴ and thus topics such as peacebuilding, conflict prevention were introduced in the agenda of donors. However, engagement in this new field proved to be a difficult and non-straightforward process: the disastrous failure of UN operation in Somalia in 1993⁵ and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994⁶ were indicative of the difficulties the international community was to face. In addition to these, the outcomes from other UN peace operations that were made in 11 countries in Africa (among others Angola, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Sierra Leone) were also poor: out of these only in two cases (Namibia and Mozambique) operations could be characterized as a success; and in these two cases, there were strong preconditions for peace, whereas in cases that peace operations had to face more complicated conflicts with strong foreign interests (Angola, Sierra Leone) results were disastrous.⁷

¹ John Abbink, "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 21, no.3 (2003)

² Alberto Cutillo, "Reviewing Fifteen Years of Peacebuilding. Past, Present and Future of International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflicts and Italy's Contribution," Italy: University of Trento, School of International Studies, WP 01/2007 (2007)

³ Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, June 17, 1992)

⁴ Shepard Forman and Steward Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post conflict Recovery*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 2

⁵ Ramesh Thakur, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no.3 (1994)

⁶ Ernest Harsch, "The world reflects on Rwanda genocide," *Africa Recovery* 18, no.1 (1994)

⁷ Assis Malaquias, "Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?," *Journal of International Affairs* 55, no.2 (2002): 418

The complex character of peacebuilding opened the space for the participation of new actors: over the next years, many diverse actors - civil society organizations, international institutions - were engaged in peacebuilding. Out of these, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO) has been significantly enhanced over the last two decades; in contrast to their role during the pre-Cold War era, these are now active actors in the field, substituting in some cases governments and international organizations.⁸ However, as the range of peacebuilding activities was expanding, the necessity for their evaluation became imperative; soon after, it became evident that the existing tools for the evaluation of development assistance were inadequate for the assessment of peacebuilding interventions: the significantly complex process of peacebuilding required a specialized framework and knowledge so as to assess tangible and intangible results of interventions in a conflict environment where various factors have a critical role. In this context, researchers drew their attention to the assessment process, creating new paths in the evaluation of peacebuilding activities. However, despite the engagement of multiple actors and the various steps that have been made in the sector, the international community lacks a well established evaluation framework for peacebuilding: in a UN report published in 2010, it is stated that "The field of peace consolidation is not yet at the point where any consensus exists regarding key measures across very different contexts."⁹ As such, the assessment of peacebuilding activities remains an open case.

This thesis is attempting to contribute to the existing literature of aid effectiveness. But rather than concentrating on the well-researched relation between aid and economic growth, it focuses on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects

⁸Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Virginia Haufler, *Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security*, American Institute of Contemporary German Studies, Policy Report 33 (2008); Cheyanne Church, and Mari Fitzduff, "Stepping Up to the Table: NGO Strategies for Influencing Policy on Conflict Issues," in *NGOs at the Table. Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict*, ed. Mari Rowman and Cheyanne Church (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Joanna Macrae, "NGOs: Has the 'N' gone missing?," *Magazine of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement* 3 (1996); Mark Duffield, "Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no.2 (2008): 159

⁹ UN, *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (New York : United Nations, 2010), 15

implemented by NGOs in post-conflict environments. The literature on the effectiveness of NGOs peacebuilding activities is not extended; while some well-cited documents and reports exist, most evaluation reports are being prepared by the implementing NGOs themselves, a fact that raises accountability questions. On the other hand, independent evaluations remain scarce. Moreover, while peacebuilding and growth are two distinct issues, there are closely related, as peace is a prerequisite for economic development. And data shows that conflict is not a fact of the past: in 2003, one third of countries that had low levels of human development were in conflict, while half of low human development countries were seriously affected by conflict in the past.¹⁰ In 2006, there were 36 active cases of violent conflict in 23 different areas.¹¹

For the assessment of peacebuilding projects' effectiveness implemented by NGOs, two cases studies were conducted in two different countries that faced conflict in the past. However, rather than introducing a new evaluation framework for peacebuilding, the analysis is based on existing evaluation methodologies. Through the investigation of these case studies, factors that affect the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities will be highlighted. Furthermore, the conditions in a wider - local and international - political context will be under scrutiny, the examination of which can offer an insight into mechanisms that - although not directly related to the NGOs activities - can severely affect the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. Out of these, changes at policy and strategic level can be proposed, a fact that could enhance effectiveness of interventions.

The investigation of such topics is not a straight-forward process; rather, as various issues should be tackled and analyzed, this study will cover a range of subjects that offer a deep understanding of peacebuilding effectiveness. The subjects that will be

¹⁰ Frances Stewart, "Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals," *Journal of Human Development: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for People-Centered Development* 4, no.3 (2003): 325

¹¹ Lotta Harbom, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2006," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no.5 (2007): 623

analyzed and the structure of this thesis will be as follows: in the second chapter the methodology of the thesis is being presented, in addition to a brief analysis of the evaluation framework for the peacebuilding projects. Chapter three offers a literature review of aid effectiveness. In the fourth chapter, an insight in the evolution of the peacebuilding sector is presented; in addition, the main peacebuilding evaluation methodologies are reported. In chapter 5 and 6, the case studies conducted in Uganda and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are presented respectively, including a historical approach for the two cases. In the seventh section, conclusions are reached and recommendations are made.

CHAPTER 2

Methodology

2.1 Thesis structure and case studies selection

This study focuses on the effectiveness of NGOs peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict areas. This thesis will attempt to investigate to what extent and in what ways ownership - by donors and aid recipients - of peacebuilding projects, implemented by NGOs, affects the effectiveness and the impact of these interventions. Analytically, the thesis will attempt to shed light on the role that the main actors - donors, recipient governments, powerful groups - have in a post-conflict environment and how their interests affect the implementation of peacebuilding projects in a wider context. The research hypothesis is that successful peacebuilding projects in post-conflict situations, require a holistic approach of synergy building where key actors are actively engaged at different (micro-meso-macro) levels. Further to that, it will be examined the hypothesis that the attitudes of donors and of key actors - such as economic and political elites, the local government itself with its relevant agencies at national and regional level - can determine the success of a peacebuilding project. This analysis is divided in two distinct parts: the theoretical background and the empirical research. The theoretical background - being the basis for the empirical analysis - consists of two sections: the first section offers an overview of the aid effectiveness literature, analyzing methodological advancements that have taken place over the last decades and highlighting major issues that researchers face in the assessment of development projects' results. Furthermore, the role of major actors in the field is being investigated and other main issues - such as ownership, aid fungibility - that may have an effect on aid effectiveness are examined. The introduction, examination and understanding of these issues will

provide an analysis framework that will be used - in addition to findings from the other theoretical and empirical sections - so as to reach conclusions and recommendations for peacebuilding. The second section continues on the issue of aid effectiveness but its focal point is the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities and the evaluation methods that are being used for the assessment of interventions implemented by NGOs. The findings of this section will be used in the empirical analysis. The empirical research includes the examination of three peacebuilding projects implemented in two countries, in Uganda and in FYROM. In Uganda, an early warning project was to be implemented in the war-torn northern areas of the country in September 2009. On the other hand, the second case study focuses on the Balkans and more specifically on FYROM where conflict ignited in 2001. This case study includes two interventions - a housing reconstruction project implemented just a few months after the Ohrid peace agreement that ended conflict in 2001 - and an inter-ethnic reconciliation project launched in 2003; both projects in FYROM were implemented in Arachinovo, one of the most conflict-affected regions of FYROM. However, prior to the analysis and evaluation of the three projects, a detailed overview of the historical and political evolution in Uganda and in former Yugoslavia will be presented. While these historical sections might seem to be over-extended, they provide valuable information for the assessment of the projects' effectiveness. Campbell *et al.* underline the necessity for context analysis for peacebuilding interventions: they argue that comprehension of the wider environment - people and cultures, institutions, capacities, needs - is of utmost importance to implement effective interventions and changes.¹² Furthermore, Goodhand argues that NGOs should analyze the historical and conflict context so as to understand the dynamics and provide more efficient services.¹³ Moreover, the historical and political outlines contribute to the understanding of significant factors that affect the effectiveness of NGOs peacebuilding projects. In addition, the role of the international community - which is of utmost significance for the establishment of peace - is highlighted through the historical review.

¹² Susanna Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," Peacebuilding Fund (2010): 25

¹³ Jonathan Goodhand, "Sri Lanka: NGOs and peace-building in complex political emergencies," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1999)

It should be clarified that it is not in the scope of this thesis to scrutinize what initiatives, activities and interactions NGOs develop themselves in a conflict environment. Rather, this thesis focuses on peacebuilding projects that while being implemented by NGOs, they are initiated, funded and monitored by donors, in a wider context of donors' intervention in post-conflict environments. NGOs are one of donors' favorite choices for channeling ODA;¹⁴ however, there are two forms of ODA for NGOs:¹⁵

"Aid channelled *through* NGOs: funds channelled through NGOs and other private bodies to implement donor-initiated projects (earmarked funding)

Aid *to* NGOs: core contributions and pooled programmes and funds. These aid funds are programmed by the NGOs and include contributions to finance the NGO's projects (core support)"

On average, more funds are allocated by DAC members *through* NGOs in comparison to funds allocated *to* NGOs.¹⁶ Clearly, this thesis approach focuses on the "aid channelled *through* NGOs" category, excluding interventions based on "aid *to* NGOs" or NGOs self-funded activities. This research path is appropriate as donor-initiated and funded peacebuilding projects constitute the majority of interventions in the field. Thus, NGOs get a role of sub-contractors for donors' policies and strategies, having no options of launching their own initiatives – except from cases where NGOs have developed their own mechanisms for fundraising.

The selected case studies, although bound by various limitations, offer a fine overview of the issues that affect the effectiveness of similar interventions. The case studies focus on three peacebuilding projects implemented in two countries - situated in two continents – that have completely different economic, political and social conditions. These projects have been implemented by the same organization,

¹⁴ Peter Nunnenkamp, "Aid effectiveness: the myth of NGO Superiority," *Development and Cooperation*, May, No. 5 (2008)

¹⁵ Olivier Bouret, Saemi Lee, and Ida McDonnell, *Aid at a glance: flows of official development assistance to and through civil society organisations in 2011* (Paris: OECD, 2013), 2

¹⁶ Jenny Hedman and Ida Mc Donnell, *How DAC members work with civil society organisations* (Paris: OECD, 2011), 21

a well-known Greek development NGO that was established in 1993 and had participated and implemented various development projects. Out of the selected projects, one of them was fully funded by the European Commission while the other two were co-funded by the European Commission and the implementing organization, a selection that offers the chance for a comparative analysis.

In the case of Uganda, as it will be presented analytically in the next section, the peacebuilding project failed to complete and achieve its aims. Although a final evaluation for the outputs and the impact of the project is not possible, this case highlights factors that although not related to the peacebuilding project itself, affected significantly its progress. Furthermore, the analysis of the peacebuilding projects in FYROM offers a unique opportunity to understand the holistic character of peacebuilding and how such projects - rather than designing, implementing and evaluating them independently - need to be inter-related to other interventions so as to be effective.

For the two projects in FYROM the researcher moved to the city of Skopje where he stayed for about a week in July 2012. During that period, research was conducted through interviews with people that had worked in the projects. Also the researcher visited the city of Arachinovo where a discussion was held with the Mayor of Arachinovo. Moreover, interviews were conducted with former staff of the implementing NGO that had participated in the two projects. However, research constraints - lack of sufficient budget for a analytic meta-evaluation of the two projects in addition to the time factor - almost ten years have passed since the end of the projects - did not permit to conduct interviews with beneficiaries and other local participants of the projects or politicians, Slav-macedonians or ethnic Albanians, apart from the Mayor of Arachinovo. For the Ugandan case study, the writer of this report participated in the implementation of the project as a volunteer in the Greek NGO team that went to Uganda for the establishment of the project, and stayed in Uganda for three months, from September 2009 till early December 2009. During this time, the early warning project team - consisting of the Greek

project coordinator, a member of the staff of the local partner and the writer-traveled twice in various areas of northern Uganda, having meetings with multiple actors such as civil society organizations, local authorities for the needs of the program. Moreover, the team had extensive discussions with members of the government of Uganda, members of the Ugandan Parliament and officials of the Ugandan army and the police in Kampala and other cities.

2.2 Framework for analysis and evaluation

Evaluating peacebuilding activities is a complex and daunting task. According to Gurkaynak *et al.*¹⁷ there are four categories of peacebuilding evaluation studies which share elements such as research questions, methodologies, aims: a) the *lessons learned* approach, b) research based case studies, c) studies that base evaluation on specific questions and d) evaluations that are based on general frameworks with defined methodologies, using specific criteria and indicators. As far as the peacebuilding project in Uganda is concerned, since the project was terminated early, the analysis will concentrate on a wider political and historical context, being related to the implementation of the project. For the assessment of the two projects in FYROM a two-stage process will be followed. The first part of evaluation will be based on the log framework where results - related to the proposed goals - will be presented. In the second part, for the projects' impact assessment in FYROM guidance and recommendations from the *Reflecting on Peace Practice* (RPP) project will be used. However, it should be noted that in the second phase a *research* path - rather than a formal evaluation path - will be followed. Church¹⁸ presents the differences between evaluation and research over various factors such as the structure and the purpose, the analysis, the emphasis. In

¹⁷ Esra, Cuhadar-Gurkaynak, Bruce Dayton, and Thania Paffenholz, "Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding," in *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, ed. Sean Byrne, Dennis J.D. Sandole, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, and Jessica Senehi (London: Routledge, 2008): 289

¹⁸ Cheyanne Scharbatke Church, "The Use of Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) in Peacebuilding Evaluation: Review & Recommendations," Final Report, CDA, Collaborative Learning Projects (2011): 5

comparison to the evaluation path, the research approach offers flexibility - for example not having well defined *terms of references* for the evaluation framework - and is much more suitable in the context of the present study, which as far as the two case studies are concerned, are bound by limitations - such as the time factor, the financial resources. Moreover, evaluation and research should be closely related before, during and after projects' implementation. In this context, Fischer - citing Lederach *et al.* - argues that

"any evaluation of peacebuilding activities that is geared towards social learning should be located in the space between short-term evaluation and an ambitious multi-annual research project, should always accompany the process and be participatory in design."¹⁹

Furthermore, the necessity for a *critical peace research* has become evident so that the peacebuilding sector can move forward, beyond the present "phase of institutionalisation", through innovative methodologies.²⁰ These pioneering steps can only be made when experts move outside the confined lines of project evaluation, following a broader - research - approach that can contribute in the building of "theories of change" in peacebuilding.²¹

As it is being described in the findings of the RPP project,²² effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions is related with two distinct - but linked - levels: first, at a micro level - concerning the program or project itself - and secondly at a macro level or at *Peace Writ Large* level. In the first case, the focal point of the evaluation are the activities of the selected interventions, examining whether the initial

¹⁹ Martina Fischer, "Participatory Evaluation and Critical Peace Research: A Precondition for Peacebuilding," in *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation*, ed. Beatrix Schmelzle and Martina Fischer, Berghof Handbook Dialogue 7 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center, 2009), 93

²⁰ Matti Jutila, Samu Pehkonen, and Tarja Vayrynen, "Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 36, no.3 (2008): 639

²¹ Andrew Blum, and Melanie Kawano-Chiu, " 'Proof of Concept' - Learning from Nine Examples of Peacebuilding Evaluation," Washington, DC: USIP - AfP (2012): 10

²² Mary B. Anderson, and Lara Olson, *Confronting War, Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge: Collaborative for Development Action, 2003): 14

objectives were met, investigating the evolution of the projects and the various issues and problems that the project team met and assessing the outputs and the results. On the other hand, at the Peace Writ Large level, it should be investigated whether the intervention had any contribution at a higher – societal - level. In this context, evaluation should examine projects' impact. In general, it has become evident that during the assessment process while practitioners do focus on the achievement of the defined goals - although not with strong commitment - they miss the opportunity to assess the impact of their projects on the Peace Writ Large level which refers to the establishment of peace at a broader - societal - level;²³ however, as the link between interventions and peace is blurred and even if goals are achieved, the impact might be insignificant, the RPP uses various tools to define the effectiveness of the projects.

²³ ibid

CHAPTER 3

Aid Effectiveness: A Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

During the last decades there is a great controversy among various actors involved in the aid sector on whether aid given to developing countries is effective. Supporters of aid argue for the continuation of this process and for an increase of aid flows to poor countries, while actors that follow a critical approach underline the negative aspects of aid. Two popular supporters of these distinct views are Professor Jeffrey Sachs and ex-research economist in World Bank, William Easterly. Professor Sachs,²⁴ a great defender of the aid process, in his book *The End of Poverty* argues that many poor countries are caught in a *poverty trap* supporting that rich countries should increase aid flows and work closely with aid recipients so as to achieve the Millennium Development Goals until 2015 and eradicate extreme poverty until 2025. On the other hand, Easterly²⁵ in *The White Man's Burden* follows a completely opposite approach, arguing against the way aid is being implemented and naming it *the aid industry*, rejecting the concept of central planning.

In this thesis, a review of the aid effectiveness literature will be presented. Before proceeding to the analysis, the *effectiveness* term should be defined. For this research attempt the concept of effectiveness as given in Cassen *et al.*²⁶ is used, concentrating on *developmental effectiveness* and mainly focusing on the impact of aid in the reduction of poverty, not taking into consideration "other motives that

²⁴ Jeffrey Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time* (London: Penguin, 2005)

²⁵ William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden* (London: Penguin, 2006), 11

²⁶ Robert Cassen, *Does Aid Work?* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 6

donors or recipients may have." Such motives could include commercial interests, prospects of political gains or foreign policy issues.

The aid effectiveness analysis is being performed through evaluation studies; this kind of evaluation is of utmost importance as based on that, answers can be given to vital issues such as whether aid has any positive or negative results, what changes should be made in policies, which way is the most efficient in delivering aid. The concept of effectiveness and evaluation becomes even more significant if we take into consideration the data: as J. Brian Atwood - Chair of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - mentioned in a speech in 2012, over the last 50 years about \$3.5 trillion was given to poor countries as development assistance.²⁷ On the other hand, 12.5 percent of world population - about 850 million people - is undernourished,²⁸ 1.2 billion people live in extreme poverty consuming only 1 percent of total consumption at global level,²⁹ and 19.000 children under the age of five die each day from diseases that could be treated.³⁰ But still humanity follows the same path: new plans at global level, such as the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) have been introduced in order to fight poverty and hundreds of billions will be spent in this quest over the next decades.

3.2 Aid and Results

Historically, the provision of aid has gone through various stages; the same applies also to the evaluation of its effectiveness which is bound, among others, by the

²⁷ Brian J. Atwood, [ODA and Beyond: Setting the Framework. Society for International Development,] (Speech, Amsterdam, OECD, September 25, 2012)

²⁸ FAO, WFP and IFAD. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012. Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition (Rome: FAO, 2012), 8

²⁹ UN High Level Panel. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development*. The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (United Nations: New York, 2013), 4

³⁰ UNICEF, *Committing to Child Survival: A Promise Renewed, Progress Report 2012* (New York, NY: United Nations Children's Fund, 2012), 9

underlying theory, the objectives, the development models and the data and equipment that are available across the years.³¹ Despite the progress that has been achieved in the field, there is no doubt that even with advanced methods, it is rather difficult to analyze the complicated process of growth and development. In the following section, a brief review of the literature will be presented. It should be noted that the issue of aid effectiveness is a rather complicated research question where various approaches can be used. In this review, we follow the approach of Hansen and Tarp³² who identify three generations of aid evaluation studies: the first one refers to the 1960s and early 1970s where research was based on the assumption that there was strong causality between savings, investment and growth. In the second generation researchers drew their attention to the investigation of the direct relation between aid and growth while in the third generation, researchers followed an innovative approach including new data and methodologies, taking into consideration factors such as institutions and policy. Despite the unique characteristics of each generation, an absolute classification of these studies is not always possible and, as it will be evident in the next section, studies from different generations might share common methodologies, research questions, data.

3.2.1 First and second generation aid effectiveness studies

Back in the 1960s, the main concept for explaining poor economic results was based on the lack of savings, a factor that was leading to the stagnation of the economies of underdeveloped countries, since these were not a favorite destination for private foreign capital.³³ The underlying theoretical background for this concept was based on the Harrod-Domar model which relates savings with investment and

³¹ Erik Thorbecke, "The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and The Role of Aid, 1950-2000", in *Foreign Aid and Development*, ed. Finn Tarp (London: Routledge, 2000), 17-18

³² Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed", in *Foreign Aid and Development*, 104

³³ Peter Hjertholm, Jytte Laursen, and Howard White, "Foreign aid and the macroeconomy", in *Foreign Aid and Development*, 351

consequently growth:³⁴ underdeveloped countries lacked the necessary capital to retain the required investment rate so as to achieve the planned growth rate and aid was assumed that can fill this savings-investments *gap*.³⁵ However, back then it was mistakenly assumed that aid flows increased the capital stock of underdeveloped countries in a one-to-one relation, without any part of it to be directed to consumption.³⁶ Apart from the savings gap, a second growth constraint was introduced, the *trade gap*³⁷ which was based on the assumption that since not all the needed capital goods can be produced locally, imports were necessary; however, exports are not usually at the necessary level in order to supply the required foreign exchange and foreign exchange could become a constraint on growth.³⁸

While aid was initially considered to have a favorable role for growth, it was soon argued that aid flows might have an adverse result and harm the economies of poor countries. Friedman³⁹ and Bauer⁴⁰ were among the earliest scholars to underline the negative effects of aid on development. Focusing on the components of development theory of the 1960s, historically the first one who reported that foreign capital inflows might displace domestic savings was Haavelmo in 1963.⁴¹ Griffin and Enos⁴² argued that there were three possible ways through which aid flows can reduce domestic savings: first, local governments might change their policy over public expenditure or taxation. Secondly, easier access to credit for entrepreneurs might hurt their motive to save and third, aid flows might increase consumption.

³⁴ James M. Cypher and James L. Dietz, *The Process of Economic Development* (London: Routledge, 1997), 128

³⁵ William Easterly. *The Ghost of Financing Gap: How the Harrod-Domar Growth Model Still Haunts Development Economics* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 7

³⁶ Hansen and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed," 105

³⁷ Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," *The American Economic Review*, vol. 56 (1966)

³⁸ Henry J. Bruton, *The two gap approach to aid and development*, Center for Development Economics (Williams College, 1968), 2

³⁹ Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid," *Yale Review* 47, 4 (1958)

⁴⁰ Peter Bauer, *Dissent on Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972)

⁴¹ Jacques Morisset, (1989) "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Savings Reexamined: The Case of Argentina," *World Development* 17, No.11, (1989): 1710

⁴² Keith Griffin and John Enos, "Foreign capital, domestic savings and economics development," *Oxford Bull Econ Statist* 32 (1970) quoted in Bazoumana Ouattara, (2008) "A re-examination of the savings displacement hypothesis," *Empirical Economics* 36, no.3 (2008): 672-673

Weisskopf also underlined the last two possible causes.⁴³ Over the years, these issues have been under extended scrutiny by various researchers, however results - some of which are presented below- are ambiguous.

Hansen and Tarp⁴⁴ in their survey of evaluation studies of first generation found that almost two thirds of the studies that support the negative effect of aid on savings suffer from methodology flaws, arguing that aid is not negatively related to growth. Earlier, Papanek,⁴⁵ Mosley⁴⁶ had found negative effects of aid on domestic savings, a finding confirmed by Taslim and Weliwita,⁴⁷ examining the case of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Snyder⁴⁸ found no negative effect of aid on savings although he reported that a substitution of domestic savings by aid could be the case, while Morisset⁴⁹ analyzing Argentina, found that foreign capital inflows did not have a significant effect on savings. Ouattara⁵⁰ followed a different part in analyzing the savings displacement hypothesis through econometric methodology: author disaggregated aid flows into 4 different categories: project aid, financial programme aid, technical assistance grants and food aid and examines their impact on savings. Results support tailor-made solutions for each case: different forms of aid do have a different effect on domestic savings when implemented in various countries. Gyimah-Brempong⁵¹ investigating Sub-Saharan Africa found a weak positive impact of aid through increased domestic savings and investment. Shields⁵² also found that

⁴³ Thomas Weisskopf , "Impact of foreign capital inflows on domestic savings in underdeveloped countries," *Journal of International Economics* 2, no.1 (1972)

⁴⁴ Hansen and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed"

⁴⁵ Gustav F. Papanek, "Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Political Economy* 81, no.1 (1973)

⁴⁶ Paul Mosley, "Aid, savings and growth revisited," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 42, no. 2 (1980)

⁴⁷ Mohammad A. Taslim and Ananda Weliwita, "The Inverse Relation between Saving and Aid: An Alternative Explanation," *Journal of Economic Development* 25, no.1 (2000)

⁴⁸ Donald Snyder , "Foreign aid and domestic Savings: a spurious correlation?," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 39, no.1 (2000)

⁴⁹ Morisset, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Savings Reexamined: The Case of Argentina"

⁵⁰ Ouattara, "A re-examination of the savings displacement hypothesis"

⁵¹ Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, "Aid and economic growth in LDCs: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Review of Black Political Economy* 20, no.3 (1992)

⁵² Michael P. Shields, "Foreign aid and domestic savings: The crowding out effect," Discussion Paper No. 35, Department of Economics, Monash University (2007)

aid inflows have a beneficial effect on savings and supports that even if the hypothesis that aid flows might displace domestic savings holds true, it could be argued that in the short-term, growth would be increased by aid flows; this can lead to increased domestic savings, a fact that later on may lead to more investment and growth. Following the concept of savings-investment gap and of trade gap, researchers have gone one step further, arguing that there is another factor interconnected with aid and growth: the *fiscal gap*.⁵³ This gap refers to the difference between public income and expenditures.⁵⁴ Governments of poor countries cannot maintain a rate of public expenditures and aid inflows are supposed to fill this gap.

As stated earlier, the second generation of studies focuses on the direct relation between aid and growth. The first two generations do have common characteristics, such as the underlying growth models and the contribution of capital accumulation. These studies either focus on investment as a factor that leads to growth or other analysis models are used.⁵⁵ As in the first generation studies, no consensus exists among researchers about results. Hansen and Tarp reviewed various studies and concluded that aid improves investment; while, only half of the studies found that aid contributes in the growth process, authors argued that a large number of these studies suffer from analysis issues.⁵⁶

Other researchers such as Mbaku⁵⁷ analyzing aid in Cameroon found no impact on growth and underlined the development process through domestic resources

⁵³ Edmar L. Bacha, "A three-gap model of foreign transfers and the GDP growth rate in developing countries," *Journal of Development Economics* 32 (1990); Lance Taylor, "Gap models," *Journal of Development Economics* 45 (1994)

⁵⁴ Zafar Iqbal, "Foreign Aid and the Public Sector: A Model of Fiscal Behaviour in Pakistan," *The Pakistan Development Review* 36 (1997): 116

⁵⁵ Hansen and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed"

⁵⁶ *ibid*, 112

⁵⁷ John M. Mbaku, "Foreign aid and economic growth in Cameroon," *Applied Economics* 25, no.10 (1993); John M. Mbaku, "Foreign aid and economic growth in Cameroon: a reply," *Applied Economics Letters* 1, (1994)

instead of relying on aid flows. Vasudeva *et al.*⁵⁸ revisited the case of Cameroon, using different econometric methods that, according to authors, overcome methodology problems of previous analyses. Focusing on the same time period authors found contradictory results: foreign aid contributed to growth, confirming the important role of domestic savings for development. Khan and Hoshimo⁵⁹ focusing on least developed countries in South and Southeast Asia, found that for investment purposes, aid in the form of loans is more efficient as "ceteris paribus, 85 cents out of a dollar of loan received goes to investment as opposed to 32 cents of grants." Mosley *et al.*⁶⁰ found no significant result investigating aid and growth.

3.2.2 Third generation aid effectiveness studies - Part A

Hansen and Tarp⁶¹ described the four areas where these new generations studies innovate: in the data set used for analysis, in the analytical toolkit so as to include factors such as economic policy and institutions in relation to the new growth theory, in the way the *endogeneity of aid* is analyzed and last, in the non-linearity of the relation of aid-growth relation. This new generation starts with the work of Boone⁶² who focuses on the relation between politics and aid effectiveness and argues that aid does not contribute to growth; rather, he concludes that it increases the size of the government and consumption – but not consumption from poor people. In 1997 Burnside and Dollar⁶³ contributed significantly in the aid effectiveness literature underlining that aid indeed affects growth positively if

⁵⁸ Vasudeva Murthy, Victor Ukpolo, and Mbaku John, "Foreign aid and economic growth in Cameroon: evidence from cointegration tests," *Applied Economics Letters* 1, no.10 (1994)

⁵⁹ Khaider A. Khan, and Eiichi Hoshino, "Impact of Foreign Aid on the Fiscal Behavior of LDC Governments," *World Development* 20, no.10 (1992): 1486

⁶⁰ Paul Mosley, John Hudson, and Sara Horrell, "Aid, the Public Sector and The Market in Less Developed Countries," *Economic Journal* 97 (1987)

⁶¹ Hansen and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed", 385

⁶² Peter Boone, *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth* (London: London School of Economics, 1994); Peter Boone, "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," *European Economic Review* 40, no.2 (1996)

⁶³ Craig A. Burnside, and David Dollar, *Aid, Policies and Growth*, Policy Research Working Papers 1777 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997)

implemented in a *good policy environment*, concerning fiscal, monetary and trade policies; however, even in this case, aid has diminishing returns. Thus, they conclude that for an efficient use of aid, flows should be directed to poor countries that follow good policies. A well-known example of the good policy concept is the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe after the Second World War where institutional quality, administrative and judicial structures of European countries were among the vital components for the success of the intervention.⁶⁴ Its effectiveness highlighted the link between growth and the political environment.⁶⁵

Results from the Burnside and Dollar study had a considerable effect: the 1998 World Bank report, *Assessing Aid* was based on the study and various institutions, such as the British Department for International Development or the Canadian International Development Agency drew their attention to their work.⁶⁶ Apart from the interest of organizations, this study has attracted a lot of attention from an academic aspect and various scholars have contributed to the discussion. In this context, similar findings has also been confirmed by other researchers such as Isham and Kaufmann,⁶⁷ Durbarry *et al.*⁶⁸ Furthermore, Collier and Dollar⁶⁹ argue that aid is not distributed in an efficient way, assuming that poverty reduction is the ultimate target, and propose that aid should be allocated after taking into consideration the *good policies* that poor candidate recipient countries follow. Following that, McGillivray⁷⁰ argues that the Collier-Dollar concept of good policies should be

⁶⁴ John Degenbol-Martinussen, and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, *Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation* (London: Zed Books, 2003)

⁶⁵ John Agnew and Nicholas J. Entrikin, eds. *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor* (London: Routledge, 2004), 211

⁶⁶ William Easterly, "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no.3 (2003): 24

⁶⁷ Jonathan Isham, and Daniel Kaufmann, "The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114, no.1 (1999)

⁶⁸ Ramesh Durbarry, Norman Gemmell, and David Greenaway, *New Evidence on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth*, CREDIT Research Paper, University of Nottingham (1998)

⁶⁹ Paul Collier, and David Dollar, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," *European Economic Review* 46, no.8 (2002)

⁷⁰ Mark McGillivray, *Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations*, WIDER DP 71 (2003): 7-8

expanded so as to increase effectiveness. Ruhashyankiko⁷¹ underlines the positive role of government quality and size and finds a positive relation between aid and growth – without diminishing returns; moreover, author argues in favor of private and commercial participation and proposes that aid should be given to countries that are not aid dependent as they can use aid in a more effective way.

On the other hand, the Burnside and Dollar study has triggered a series of articles that are critical on the main conclusion about the good policy environment. Its methodology was one of the first points of criticism. Easterly⁷² argues that even by changing the definition of variables used as *aid* or *good policy*, results change and important variables become insignificant. Easterly, Levine and Roodman⁷³ re-analyze the Burnside and Dollar study and find that there is no significant effect of aid in a good policy environment. Similar results have been found by various researchers such as Hansen and Tarp⁷⁴ who argue that aid is positively related to growth (through investment) but not conditional to domestic policies. Burke and Ahmadi-Esfahani⁷⁵ focusing on the development of four Asian countries that have augmented their economies significantly during the last decades find no support for the famous Burnside and Dollar proposition, highlighting that the impact of aid on growth is insignificant.

Karras⁷⁶ finds a positive effect of aid on economic growth specifying that by increasing receiving aid by \$20 per person, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capital increases by 0.14 to 0.20 percent, a result that is reached even without

⁷¹ Jean Ruhashyankiko, "Why Do Some Countries Manage to Extract Growth from Foreign Aid?," IMF WP 05/53, Washington, DC: IMF (2005)

⁷² Easterly, "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?"

⁷³ William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, "New data, new doubts: a comment on Burnside and Dollar's 'Aid, Policies and Growth' (2000)," *American Economic Review* 94, no.3 (2004)

⁷⁴ Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp, "Aid and growth regressions," *Journal of Development Economics* 64, no.2 (2001)

⁷⁵ Paul Burke and Fredoun Ahmadi-Esfahani, "Aid and growth: A study of South East Asia," *Journal of Asian Economics* 17, no.2 (2006)

⁷⁶ Georgios Karras, "Foreign aid and long-run economic growth: empirical evidence for a panel of developing countries," *Journal of International Development* 18, no. 1 (2006)

controlling for good policies. Gomanee *et al.*⁷⁷ find a positive relation between aid and growth, mainly through the investment factor, arguing that aid is effective independently of good policies. Moreover, authors find that there is a minimum level of aid - about 2 percent of recipient country's Gross National Product (GNP) - that is required until aid can be effective; however too much aid does not have a negative result. Burhop⁷⁸ also finds no relation between aid and economic development and reports ambiguous results concerning the relation between aid impact and policy, concluding that there is no significant relation. Guillaumont and Chauvet's⁷⁹ findings are also in contrast to some of the Burnside and Dollar's arguments: they argue that the effectiveness of aid is not so dependent on policy of recipient countries; rather, they support that "the better the macro policy, the lower aid's effectiveness." Still, they find that growth is closely related to policy. Dalgaard and Hansen⁸⁰ argue that "good policy is likely to reduce the growth effect of aid because they act as substitutes in the growth process", finding a positive relation between aid and growth irrespectively of the policy environment. In the same line, Fischer⁸¹ concludes that "the statement that macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustainable growth is too strong, but that the statement that macroeconomic stability is conducive to sustained growth remains accurate" while Hadjimichael *et al.*⁸² underline the role of good policies as a necessary background for fostering growth. Roodman⁸³ concludes that factors such as domestic savings and good institutions are more important for development than aid inflows – a big proportion of which is used in bad ways - and argues that research for effectiveness should

⁷⁷ Karuna Gomanee, Sourafel Girma, Oliver Morrissey, "Aid and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Accounting for transmission mechanisms," *Journal of International Development* 17, no.8, (2005)

⁷⁸ Carsten Burhop, "Foreign assistance and economic development: a re-evaluation," *Economic Letters* 86, no.1 (2005): 60

⁷⁹ Patrick Guillaumont, and Lisa Chauvet, "Aid and Performance: A Reassessment," *Journal of Development Studies* 37, no.6 (2001):77

⁸⁰ Carl-Johan Dalgaard, and Henrik Hansen, "On Aid, Growth and Good Policies," *Journal of Development Studies* 37, no.6 (2001): 37-38

⁸¹ Stanley Fischer, "The role of macroeconomic factors in growth," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 32, no.3 (1993): 486

⁸² Dhaneshwar Ghura and Michael T. Hadjimichael, "Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* 43 (1996)

⁸³ David Roodman, "The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics," *The World Bank Economic Review* 21, no.2 (2007)

follow a different path. Chauvet and Guillaumont⁸⁴ focus on the Burnside and Dollar model examining its elements, but on a dynamic way, concluding that aid can indeed affect policy, especially when policy level - before the intervention - is poor. Furthermore, they find political instability in aid recipient countries to be harmful for aid effectiveness.

While there is a controversy whether aid effectiveness is related to the policy environment, another relevant issue that has drawn the interest of researchers is the behavior of governments in aid recipient countries. What makes this important is the fact that mainly aid flows are given to the public sector, thus it is vital to examine how local governments act after the receipt of aid⁸⁵ as the way that local governments use aid flows is decisive for effectiveness of aid.⁸⁶ Policy makers in aid recipient countries can choose to allocate public resources between consumption and investment and for financing such activities, between taxes and borrowing⁸⁷ affecting considerably the growth process. In many cases, aid inflows lead to increased government spending, a phenomenon that has been named as the *flypaper* effect, meaning that revenues coming from grants induce public expenditures, while revenues coming from taxes are associated with less public expenditures.⁸⁸ Remmer⁸⁹ finds that aid increases the size of the government and government spending and reduces tax revenues, a result that is in contrast with market-oriented plans that many donors try to implement for the development of poor countries. Author concludes that aid might induce corruption, since it weakens

⁸⁴ Chauvet, Lisa and Patrick Guillaumont, "Aid and growth revisited: policy, economic vulnerability and political instability," in *Toward Pro-poor Policies - Aid, Institutions and Globalization*, ed. B. Tungodden, N. Stern & I. Kolstad (Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2004)

⁸⁵ Mark McGillivray, "The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Fiscal Behavior of Asian LDC Governments: A Comment on Khan and Hoshino (1992)," *World Development* 22, no.12 (1994): 2015

⁸⁶ Simon Feeny, "Foreign Aid and Fiscal Governance in Melanesia," *World Development* 35, no.3 (2007): 439

⁸⁷ Ira N. Gang, and Haider A. Khan, "Foreign aid, taxes and public investment," *Journal of Development Economics* 34, no.1 (1990)

⁸⁸ Shantayanan Devarajan and Vinaya Swaroop, "The Implications of Foreign Aid Fungibility for Development Assistance," *Development Research Group*, Washington, DC: World Bank (1999): 7

⁸⁹ Karen L. Remmer, "Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no.1 (2004)

incentives of politicians to follow good policies. On the other hand, Schwalberg⁹⁰ argues that foreign aid does not induce corruption and the adoption of bad economic policies in recipient countries. McGillivray and Ouattara⁹¹ investigate the relation between aid and fiscal behavior in the case of Cote d'Ivoire finding that more than 60 percent of aid flows are used for debt servicing⁹² instead of government consumption. Authors argue that this might be a reason that many aid effectiveness analyses cannot establish a significant relation between aid and growth. Moreover, authors find that aid reduces government's "revealed taxation effort." The negative impact on tax revenues can foster aid dependence as expenditures are found to increase, while borrowing decreases.⁹³ This is also a finding by Franco-Rodriguez *et al.*⁹⁴ who study the case of Pakistan, finding that about 50 percent of aid was used for government consumption. Decline of tax revenues is found to be bigger in aid recipient countries with high corruption levels.⁹⁵ In other cases, aid recipient governments may hinder efforts to reduce poverty in anticipation of more aid.⁹⁶ Kasper⁹⁷ argues that when aid is given to corrupted governments and kleptocratic elites, a "corruption-poverty spiral" is being created, hindering economic growth. High aid levels may reduce institutional quality and administrative capacity, induce rent seeking behavior in recipient countries, creating a *Zairean disease*.⁹⁸ As recipient countries become more aid dependent, powerful elites intensify fight over increasing aid resources and corruption levels are

⁹⁰ Henry M. Schwalbenberg, "Does Foreign Aid Cause the Adoption of Harmful Economic Policies?", *Journal of Policy Modeling* 20, no.5 (1998)

⁹¹ Mark McGillivray, and Bazoumana Ouattara, "Aid, Debt Burden and Government Fiscal Behaviour in Cote d'Ivoire," *Journal of African Economies* 14, no.2 (2005)

⁹² Another finding is that 29% of tax revenues are also used for the same purpose

⁹³ Feeny, "Foreign Aid and Fiscal Governance in Melanesia"

⁹⁴ Susana Franco-Rodriguez, Oliver Morrissey, and Mark McGillivray, "Aid and the Public Sector in Pakistan: Evidence with Endogenous Aid," *World Development* 26, no.7 (1998)

⁹⁵ Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clemens, Alexander Pivovarsky, and Erwin R. Tiongson, "Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does the Composition of Aid Matter?" IMF, WP 03/176, Washington, DC: IMF (2003)

⁹⁶ Rolf K. Pedersen, "The Samaritan's Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid," *International Tax and Public Finance* 8, no.5-6 (2001)

⁹⁷ Wolfgang Kasper, "Make Poverty History: Tackle Corruption," *Issue Analysis*, The Centre for Independent Studies no.67, (2006): 9-10

⁹⁸ Stephen Knack, "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: cross-country empirical tests," *Southern Economic Journal* 68, no.2 (2001)

augmented.⁹⁹ Brautigam and Knack¹⁰⁰ present an excellent brief review of the literature on the aid and governance relation and present empirical results showing that in Sub-Saharan countries, higher levels of aid are related with deteriorating levels of governance.

Moreover, in the developing world corruption is a major factor that hinders economic development. Political power - and aid in most cases - has been abused by corrupted leaders and dictators for decades. Mohammed Suharto in Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire looted up to \$50bn from their countries.¹⁰¹ Mobutu, during his 32-year rule, was renting hypersonic Concorde so his family members could travel to Disneyland, while millions of people in Zaire were living in extreme poverty.¹⁰² In a research that focused on thirty aid recipient countries in Africa examining *capital flight*, it is found that for every dollar of loan inflows to African countries, up to 80 cents are returning back during the same year and a high proportion of this capital flight is *debt fueled*; a debt that while it is owned by citizens of poor countries, the *capital owners* are few individuals.¹⁰³

The issues of policy, good governance and corruption are of utmost importance for aid effectiveness. As it was highlighted in a 1989 World Bank report, "underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance."¹⁰⁴ However, not all donors focus on corruption issues: rather, on bilateral level, the more corrupt a

⁹⁹ Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?" *The American Economic Review* 92, no.4 (2002): 1126

¹⁰⁰ Deborah A. Brautigam, and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no.2 (2004)

¹⁰¹ Charlotte Denny, "Suharto, Marcos and Mobutu head corruption table with \$50bn scams," *The Guardian*, March 26, 2004

¹⁰² Michela Wrong, *In the footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the brink of disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001)

¹⁰³ Leonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce, *Africa's Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled the Continent* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2011): 9

¹⁰⁴ World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989) quoted in Brautigam and Knack "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa", 255

state donor is, the more aid it allocates towards corrupted recipients, a fact that can be attributed to securing strategic interests, rather than fostering economic growth in recipient countries.¹⁰⁵

3.2.3 Third generation aid effectiveness studies - Part B

Doucouliaagos and Paldam¹⁰⁶ in a series of articles focus on aid effectiveness literature using meta-regression analysis; their surveys show that aid has a positive but insignificant effect on growth. Similarly, Herbertsson and Paldam¹⁰⁷ reviewing related literature distinguish two categories of studies, the convergence literature - based on growth theory - and the aid effectiveness literature. Among others, they argue that aid does not help poor countries in the long-run. Rather, trade is found to have a much better effect on growth in comparison to aid. Amavilah¹⁰⁸ while finds a positive but weak effect of trade with Germany on Namibia's growth highlights the impact of capital - both domestic and external - which have a greater effect than aid inflows. On the other hand, Addison *et al.*¹⁰⁹ in their literature review on the macroeconomic impact of aid find that studies published in the last few years support a positive link between aid and growth concluding that poverty in developing countries would have increased if it was not for the aid flows. Based on that, they argue that the declines in aid flows in the early 1990s had a considerable negative impact on growth in the Sub-Saharan Africa, a finding also supported by

¹⁰⁵ Carl Jan Willem Schudel, "Corruption and Bilateral Aid: A Dyadic Approach", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no.4 (2008)

¹⁰⁶ Hristos Doucouliagos, and Martin Paldam, "Aid Effectiveness on Accumulation," *Kyklos* 59, no.2 (2006); Hristos Doucouliagos, and Martin Paldam, "Aid effectiveness on growth: A meta study," *European Journal of Political Economy* 24, no.1 (2008); Hristos Doucouliagos, and Martin Paldam, "The aid effectiveness literature: the sad results of 40 years of research," *Journal of Economic Surveys* 23, no.3 (2009)

¹⁰⁷ Tryggvi Herbertsson and Martin Paldam, "Does development aid help poor countries catch up? An analysis of the basic relations," *Nationalokonomisk Tidsskrift/Danish Economic Journal* 145 (2007)

¹⁰⁸ Heinrich, Voxi Amavilah, "German aid and trade versus Namibian GDP and labour productivity," *Applied Economics* 30, no.5 (1998)

¹⁰⁹ Tony, Addison, George Mavrotas and Mark McGillivray, "Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals," *Journal of International Affairs* 58, no.1 (2005)

McGillivray.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, Asteriou¹¹¹ focuses on five South Asian countries finds a positive relation between aid and growth and argues that an "1% increase in foreign aid as per cent of GDP results in a 0.09% increase in GDP growth, while the corresponding effect from domestic resources is found to be only 0.05%." Economides et al.¹¹² build a model to investigate whether aid flows can be harmful to growth using data from 75 countries, between 1975 and 1995. They find that while aid fosters growth, it can also induce *rent-seeking activities*¹¹³ that distort individual incentives and can lead to a decrease of the positive effect. This is consistent with the *good policy context*. Moreover, the size of aid and government and public sector seem to trigger rent-seeking activities.¹¹⁴ Contributing in the discussion on aid effectiveness, Mallik¹¹⁵ distinguishes short-term and long-term results of aid. Results show that in the short-term only in one case aid has a positive significant effect, while in long-term results are negative in all cases. On the other hand, Moreira¹¹⁶ finds that aid induces growth and that in the long-run, aid has a more significant effect on growth. Arellano *et al.*¹¹⁷ in their model find that aid mainly funds consumption instead of investment, although this might increase the welfare of poor people.

¹¹⁰ Mark McGillivray, "Is Aid Effective?", Helsinki: WIDER (draft)(2005)

¹¹¹ Dimitris, Asteriou, "Foreign aid and economic growth: New evidence from a panel data approach for five South Asian countries," *Journal of Policy Modeling* 31, no.1 (2009): 159

¹¹² George Economides, Sarantis Kalyvitis, and Apostolis Philippopoulos, "Do foreign aid transfers distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries," Athens: Athens University of Economics and Business, Mimeo (2004)

¹¹³ *Rent-seeking activities* are defined as "in the broad sense as referring to the socially costly pursuit of income and wealth transfers" defined in Drazen, Allan, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000): 35

¹¹⁴ The larger the amount of aid and the size of the government, the most probable to have rent-seeking activities; on the other hand, when the size of government and aid is small, rent-seeking activities are independent.

¹¹⁵ Girijasankar, Mallik, "Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Cointegration Analysis of the Six Poorest African Countries," *Economic Analysis & Policy* 38, no.2 (2008)

¹¹⁶ Sandrina, Berthault Moreira, "Evaluating the impact of foreign aid on economic growth: a cross-country study," *Journal of Economic Development* 30, no.2 (2005)

¹¹⁷ Cristina, Arellano, Ales Bulir, Timothy Lane, and Leslie Lipschitz, "The Dynamic Implications of Foreign Aid and Its Variability," *Journal of Development Economics* 88, no.1 (2009)

While scholars analyze whether aid has a positive or a negative impact, Durbarry *et al.*¹¹⁸ argue that there is an *optimal* level of aid; while small aid allocations may have no considerable effect on growth, too much aid might have negative effect. In the same line, Lensink and White¹¹⁹ investigate whether an aid *Laffer curve* exists, thus whether aid flows, after passing a threshold, do harm the recipient countries, inverting the positive effect of initial inflows. They find that indeed too much aid can have negative effects, arguing that "there is a limit to how much aid a country can absorb." The issue of *absorptive capacity* of recipient countries and the necessary steps that should be made so as to "remove bottlenecks to aid effectiveness" are of high importance as aid flows are expected to be increased for the achievement of the MDG.¹²⁰ Dalgaard *et al.*¹²¹ follow a different approach, investigating aid and effectiveness: they try to answer the question why aid is effective in some countries while in others it has an insignificant impact on growth. Thus, they introduce the geographical factor, focusing on the fraction of countries' land that belongs to the tropics. The fundamental basis for this concept is the work of Acemoglu *et al.*¹²², Easterly and Levine¹²³ that introduce different factors that affect growth - such as institutions, economic policies or other geographic factors. Dalgaard *et al.*¹²⁴ find that aid was less effective in the tropics, suggesting that these areas might need special ways in delivering aid.

¹¹⁸ Durbarry, *et al.*, *New Evidence on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth*

¹¹⁹ Robert, Lensink, and Howard White, "Are There Negative Returns to Aid?," *Journal of Development Studies* 37, no.6 (2001)

¹²⁰ Addison, "Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals", 5

¹²¹ Carl Johan, Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp, "On the empirics of foreign aid and growth," *The Economic Journal* 114, no.496 (2004)

¹²² Daron, Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation," *American Economic Review* 91, no.5 (2001)

¹²³ William, Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Politics and Ethnic Divisions," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no.4 (1997)

¹²⁴ Dalgaard *et al.*, "On the empirics of foreign aid and growth", 192

3.3 The micro-macro paradox

The term *micro-macro paradox* has been introduced by Mosley¹²⁵ and it refers to one of the most controversial issues of aid: while no significant relation - positive or negative - can be established between aid inflows and growth of GNP for aid recipient countries, on the other hand, through evaluations of projects implemented, a positive rate of return is found for the majority of them. Cassen *et al.*¹²⁶ find – citing World Bank Annual reports - that on average, about 70 percent of all projects are evaluated as "satisfactory or highly satisfactory". Newer data of World Bank Annual reports¹²⁷ show that percentage of satisfactory outcomes was 76 percent in 2007, 83 percent in 2006, 81 percent in 2005 and 77 percent in 2004. Mosley¹²⁸ indicated that the macro-micro paradox can be explained by the following three reasons: first, he raised the issue of *inaccurate measurement*. Secondly, Mosley discussed *fungibility of aid* by local governments and thirdly the *backwash effects* of aid; this refers to a hypothetical negative impact that aid may have on private sector. Expanding these, White¹²⁹ added two possible causes: the first is a problem of scale analysis or *over-aggregation* - meaning that research should be more geographically focused. The second is an issue of data comparison between micro and macro studies: the former, uses socio-economic data whereas the latter uses financial data.

Cassen *et al.*¹³⁰ in their well-cited publication *Does aid work?* are investigating, among others, the impact of project aid, sector, program lending, technical co-operation and food aid, thus focusing on a micro-level. Thus, for project aid, authors

¹²⁵ Paul Mosley, "Aid effectiveness: the micro–macro paradox," *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 17, no.2

¹²⁶ Cassen, *Does Aid Work?*, 90

¹²⁷ World Bank, *The World Bank Annual Report 2008* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), 62

¹²⁸ Paul Mosley, *Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 139

¹²⁹ Howard White, "The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey," *The Journal of Development Studies* 28, no.2 (1992): 164

¹³⁰ Cassen, *Does Aid Work?*

found that on average this form of aid is effective, although some evaluation problems come up, such as the fact that many times evaluations are being performed by the agencies that have implemented the projects; or the factor of time – usually years after completion - that is needed until the full impact of a project can be measured. For program lending, results raise doubts about its effectiveness, mainly because of co-ordination, financing level and policy issues. Food aid, an aid form that has failed repeatedly in the past - especially in war torn areas¹³¹ is being distinguished in two categories, programme food aid and project food aid. Concerns about the former come from the negative impact that food aid may have on food prices, discouraging domestic agriculture production. On the other hand, Hansen and Tarp¹³² conclude that "the micro-macro paradox is non-existent", a finding that is supported by McGillivray¹³³ who concludes that "the well-known macro-micro paradox of aid is dead and buried."

3.4 Aid disaggregation and evaluation

Studies that have been presented earlier mainly present results of aid interventions at an aggregate level. However, this method might not reveal valuable information about the impact of different categories of aid, an approach that has been adopted by various researchers. Disaggregation can be applied to unique sectors or focus on specific forms of aid - food aid, project or program aid.

Such an example is technical assistance, a form of aid that while has received a lot of criticism¹³⁴ - for example, Collier¹³⁵ argues that "technical assistance is supply-driven than demand-driven" - results from successful technical assistance interventions can

¹³¹ Michael, Maren, *The Road to Hell* (New York: The Free Press, 1997)

¹³² Hansen and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed", 123

¹³³ McGillivray, *Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations*, 1

¹³⁴ William Easterly, "Are aid agencies improving?," *Economic Policy* 22, no. 52 (2007)

¹³⁵ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 115

be extremely cost-effective, achieving returns of up to 1000 times of their cost.¹³⁶ Evaluation of technical co-operation is a rather difficult task as its implementation covers a variety of fields; for example, from experts advising on the construction of small projects to building capacity at a higher level. Necessity for evaluation of technical assistance becomes evident as technical assistance constitutes about one third of total aid flows.¹³⁷

In a wider context, focusing on empirical results of research attempts that use disaggregate data and analyze specific sectors, the benefits of this methodology are highlighted. Thus, Clemens *et al.*¹³⁸ disaggregate aid distinguishing humanitarian aid, aid flows that would have a long-term result and last, aid flows that are supposed to have an effect within a four-year period and focus mainly on this last category. They conclude that indeed short-impact¹³⁹ aid is positively related to growth with diminishing returns in almost all countries, but with a variance on the impact and calculate that "an additional one percentage of GDP in short impact aid produces an additional 0.58 percentage points of annual growth over the four year period."¹⁴⁰ In addition, they find that this effect is valid regardless of the factors such as institutions, policies although it seems that under good institutions, the effect is larger. Mavrotas¹⁴¹ argues that the different forms of aid do have a different effect when implemented on different countries and under different conditions, underlining that aid composition changes over time. Following this concept, Feeny¹⁴² analyzing the case of Papua New Guinea disaggregates aid and finds that while total aid does not seem to have any effect on the growth of the country, project aid had a significant positive effect while budget support, aid loans and grants have

¹³⁶ Harry Jones, "Technical assistance: how to get value for money," *The Guardian*, January 29, 2013, available on line at <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jan/29/development-technical-assistance-value>

¹³⁷ Anna, Thomas, Iacopo Viciani, Jonathan Tench, Rachel Sharpe, Melissa Hall, Matthew Martin and Richard Watts, *Real Aid 3* (London: Action Aid, 2011), 45

¹³⁸ Michael, Clemens, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, "Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth," *Center for Global Development*, WP 44 (2004)

¹³⁹ Short-impact aid is defined as "an aid disbursement funding an intervention that can plausibly raise GDP per capital within roughly four years to a permanently higher level", *ibid*, 12

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*, 37

¹⁴¹ George, Mavrotas, "Aid and Growth in India: Some Evidence from Disaggregated Aid Data," *South Asia Economic Journal* 3, no.1, (2002): 20

¹⁴² Simon, Feeny, "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth in Papua New Guinea," *World Development* 41, no.6 (2005)

insignificant effects. Similarly, Ouattara and Strobl¹⁴³ disaggregate aid into project and programme aid finding that project aid affects growth positively while programme aid has a negative role. Moreover, Gounder¹⁴⁴ examines the case of Fiji islands and finds a positive impact of aid on growth; however, author in accordance with other researchers, argues that some forms of aid had a significant effect while others did not contribute – supporting the issue of disaggregated analysis. Islam¹⁴⁵ studying the case of Bangladesh (1972-1988) finds a positive - but rather weak - relation between aid and growth. However, Islam argues that some specific forms of aid (loans and food aid) are found to be more effective in comparison to other forms; finally, Islam argues that domestic policy should mobilize domestic resources instead of government relying on the aid inflows, based on his finding that domestic resources have a stronger effect on growth. Cordella and Dell’Ariccia¹⁴⁶ disaggregate aid into project aid and budget support and examine their impact on growth. They find that the policy environment in which they are implemented is important; specifically, budget support’s sensitivity to policy is higher in comparison to project aid, which is less dependent to policy. In a good policy environment, budget support is found to be more effective to project aid. Moreover, policy has a less important role in the effectiveness of project aid when recipient governments do not have a significant participation in the funding of the project.

3.5 Fungibility, Dutch Disease, Aid Volatility

While research on the aid effectiveness mainly focuses on the analysis of the direct impact of aid on growth, there are also other research paths investigating various

¹⁴³ Bazoumana, Ouattara, and Eric Strobl, "Do Aid Inflows Cause Dutch Disease? A Case Study of the CFA Franc Countries," Economic Department Working Paper, University of Manchester, Manchester (2003)

¹⁴⁴ Rukmani Gounder, "Aid-growth nexus: empirical evidence from Fiji," *Applied Economics* 33, no.8, (2001)

¹⁴⁵ Anisul Islam, "Foreign aid and economic growth: an econometric study of Bangladesh," *Applied Economics* 24, no.5, (1992)

¹⁴⁶ Tito, Cordella, and Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, "Budget Support Versus Project Aid: a theoretical appraisal," IMF WP 03/88, Washington, DC: IMF (2003)

factors that affect indirectly the efficacy of aid, such as the fungibility of aid, the so-called *Dutch Disease* and aid volatility.

3.5.1 Fungibility

Fungibility incurs when aid inflows are directed to different uses than initially planned by donors and recipient governments.¹⁴⁷ In addition, fungibility can occur when aid recipient governments, because of aid inflows targeting a sector, divert own funds that would have been invested in that specific sector to another.¹⁴⁸ Research has shown that aid flows are highly fungible¹⁴⁹ and that the level of fungibility can define the impact of aid on recipients' growth rate.¹⁵⁰ Various methods are being used in order to estimate the structure of expenditures if there was not aid. Still there are considerable difficulties, such as the fluctuations in expenditures from year to year, the variability and availability of different donors in the same country without effective co-ordination and finally the fact that not all aid flows are allocated through government's budget.¹⁵¹ Petterson¹⁵² focusing on sector aid and studying 57 aid recipient countries, finds that this form of aid is fungible - 65 percent of aid flows have different uses as the ones planned for - but supports that fungible sectoral aid is not less effective than non-fungible aid. The issue of fungibility raises also problems in the measurement of aid effectiveness.¹⁵³ For example, if a school that would have been built by domestic resources is funded by

¹⁴⁷ Mark, McGillivray, and Oliver Morrissey, "Aid Fungibility in Assessing Aid: Red Herring or True Concern?" *Journal of International Development* 12, no.3 (2000)

¹⁴⁸ Peter, Cashel-Cordo, and Steven Craig, "The public sector impact of international resource transfers," *Journal of Development Economics* 32, no.1 (1990): 21

¹⁴⁹ Nasir, M. Khilji, and Ernest M. Zampelli, "The fungibility of US military and non-military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients," *Journal of Development Economics* 43, no.2 (1994)

¹⁵⁰ Cashel-Cordo and Craig, "The public sector impact of international resource transfers," 21

¹⁵¹ Tarhan Feyzioglu, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu, "A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid," *The World Bank Economic Review* 12, no.1 (1998): 32

¹⁵² Jan, Petterson, "Foreign sectoral aid fungibility, growth and poverty reduction," *Journal of International Development* 19, no.8 (2007)

¹⁵³ Clemens *et al.*, "Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth"

aid, then the economic rate of return for this project should also include an estimate for the other activities that were funded with the diverted funds. A crucial factor that can induce fungibility is when donors and recipients do have different approaches on how money should be allocated.¹⁵⁴ Conditionality and close monitoring by donors of aid flows allocation are some methods that might restrict the different use of funds. In cases where aid flows are high, thus monitoring capabilities are increased, level of fungibility should be negatively related to aid flows; however, fungibility should not always be defined as a negative fact argues, as a recipient *trusted* government that follows good policies may be given the opportunity to make alterations in aid allocations.¹⁵⁵

3.5.2 Aid Volatility

The issue of uncertainty and volatility of aid inflows becomes important if we take into consideration the fact that foreign aid is the most important source of capital for poor countries, especially in Africa where it constitutes, on average, about 12.5 percent of gross domestic product.¹⁵⁶ Developing countries are more sensitive to external shocks and have less instruments and resources to overcome them.¹⁵⁷ Volatility and the lack of predictability can negatively affect medium and long-term developing plans of aid recipients countries.¹⁵⁸ Expanding this, aid volatility is found to be higher in difficult partnership countries in comparison to low income countries and also that the former receive less aid comparing to countries that perform

¹⁵⁴ Devarajan and Swaroop, "The Implications of Foreign Aid Fungibility for Development Assistance", 5

¹⁵⁵ Petterson, "Foreign sectoral aid fungibility, growth and poverty reduction"

¹⁵⁶ Stephane Pallage, and Michael A. Robe, "Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle," *Review of International Economics* 9, no. 4 (2001): 641

¹⁵⁷ Ales Bulir, and Javier A. Hamann, "How volatile and Unpredictable Are Aid Flows and What Are the Policy Implications?," IMF WP 01/167, Washington, DC: IMF (2001)

¹⁵⁸ Pierre-Richard Agenor, and Joshua Aizenman, "Aid volatility and poverty traps," *Journal of Development Economics* 91, no.1 (2010): 2

better.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, fiscal policies can also be affected as in the aftermath of a reduction in aid flows, developing countries may cut government spending and increase taxes¹⁶⁰ or interrupt investment programmes¹⁶¹ hindering growth. In this context, Lensink and Morrissey¹⁶² analyzing the issue of *uncertainty* of aid inflows argue "that aid, controlling for uncertainty, has a robust effect on economic growth via the level of investment." While aid flows are found to be highly volatile,¹⁶³ much higher in comparison to fiscal revenues,¹⁶⁴ there is a debate as whether aid is pro-cyclical - meaning that aid levels are positively correlated with fiscal revenues and growth - or if is counter-cyclical.¹⁶⁵ For a better analysis of the volatility issues, as in other cases of research of aid effectiveness, Fielding and Mavrotas¹⁶⁶ make a step forward by disaggregating aid flows in two categories, sector and programme aid, arguing in favor of reducing aid volatility. Similarly, Hudson¹⁶⁷ focuses on individual sectors arguing that this level of analysis should be followed so as to reach robust results.

¹⁵⁹ Levin and Dollar define the group of 'difficult partnership countries' as consisting of very poor countries that have a low level of institutional quality and follow bad policies, Victoria Levin, and David Dollar, "The forgotten states: aid volumes and volatility in difficult partnerships countries (1992-2002)," paper prepared for the DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnership Countries Senior Level Forum, 13th-14th January, London (2005)

¹⁶⁰ Norman Gemmell, and Mark McGillivray, *Aid and Tax Instability and the Government Budget Constraints in Developing Countries*, CREDIT, University of Nottingham (1998)

¹⁶¹ Paul Mosley, and Abrar Suleiman, "Aid, Agriculture and Poverty in developing countries," *Review of Development Economics* 11, no.1 (2007)

¹⁶² Robert Lensink, and Oliver Morrissey, "Aid instability as a measure of uncertainty and the positive impact of aid on growth," *Journal of Development Studies* 36, no.3 (2000): 45

¹⁶³ Benn Eifert, and Alan Gelb, "Coping with Aid Volatility," *Finance and Development* 42, no.3 (2005)

¹⁶⁴ Anil Markandya and Vladimir Ponczek, "What Are the Links between Aid Volatility and Growth?," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 44, no.2 (2011)

¹⁶⁵ Lisa Chauvet and Patrick Guillaumont, "Aid, Volatility, and Growth Again: When Aid Volatility Matters and When it Does Not," *Review of Development Economics* 13, no.3 (2009); Paul Collier, "Aid 'Dependency': A Critique," *Journal of African Economies* 8, no.4 (1999)

¹⁶⁶ David Fielding and George Mavrotas, "The Volatility of Aid," WIDER DP 2005/06 (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 2005)

¹⁶⁷ John Hudson, "Consequences of Aid Volatility for Macroeconomic Management and Aid Effectiveness," WIDER, WP 2012/35, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER (2012)

3.5.3 Dutch disease

In the aid effectiveness literature, the analysis of macroeconomic effects of aid in recipient countries has a prominent role. Among these, the issue of real exchange rate (RER) appreciation - or the so called *Dutch Disease* - has been under scrutiny by various researchers. This effect has been named after by the decline in the manufacturing sector the Dutch economy faced after the discovery of natural gas in the country.¹⁶⁸ This phenomenon is also met as the *resource curse* or as the *transfer problem*¹⁶⁹ and it is related to a rapidly expanding sector that has a considerable contribution to GNP that creates a sharp increase in foreign exchange earnings.

The Dutch disease can be divided in two phases:¹⁷⁰ first, the *resource movement effect* and secondly the *spending effect*. During the first phase, the expanding sector - in this case the aid industry - increases demand for more productive factors, thus increasing wages and prices, making production of tradable goods less attractive. In the next phase, as a part of aid inflows is directed to non-tradable goods, demand and prices for these goods also increase. Thus, inflation could also be a side-effect of these *windfall* revenues. Since RER equals the price of non-tradable goods to that of tradable goods, it is concluded that when prices of non-tradable goods increase, the RER appreciates.¹⁷¹ As a consequence, tradable goods from developing countries become less competitive in international markets. Moreover, since most of the times aid flows are distributed through governments, the private sector can be hurt

¹⁶⁸ Mwanza Nkusu, "Aid and the Dutch Disease in Low-Income Countries: Informed Diagnoses for Prudent Prognoses," IMF WP 04/49, Washington, DC: IMF (2005): 6

¹⁶⁹ Doucouliagos and Paldam, "The aid effectiveness literature: the sad results of 40 years of research", 455

¹⁷⁰ Martin Godfrey, Chan Sophal, Toshiyasu Kato, Long Vou Piseth, Pon Dorina, Tep Saravy, Tia Savora, and So Sovannarith, "Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia," *World Development* 30, no.3 (2002): 357

¹⁷¹ Ouattara and Strobl, "Do Aid Inflows Cause Dutch Disease? A Case Study of the CFA Franc Countries"

through increased government spending and by monetary policies affecting domestic credit and investment.¹⁷²

As in other cases of aid effectiveness literature, empirical results on this issue are ambiguous. Rajan and Subramanian¹⁷³ underline the fact that in the majority of countries that have faced considerable economic development in the post-war decades, the manufacturing sector and thus exports have increased their shares in the country's economic activity. Thus, their main research question is whether aid reduces competitiveness in manufacturing sector. Results show that aid inflows have a negative impact on expansion of labor intensive and export sectors through currency overvaluation. Prati and Tressel¹⁷⁴ find evidence that aid flows affect negatively trade balance, arguing that aid put pressure on exports during periods where no conflicts or shocks take place. Thus, in these "normal" years, they calculate that a one percent increase of aid to GDP ratio leads to a reduction of exports up to a level of 0.57 percent of GDP. Elbadawi¹⁷⁵ finds that when aid increase beyond a threshold, exports are hurt. Van Wijnbergen¹⁷⁶ also argues that temporary inflows will cause a short-term appreciation of RER and will reduce exports. Ouattara and Strobl¹⁷⁷ focus on 12 countries that belong to the *Communauté française d'Afrique* (CFA) zone. In this case, researchers find no relation between aid inflows and currency appreciation; on the contrary, their results show that depreciation has taken place. In the same context Nwachukwu¹⁷⁸ examines RER appreciation in twenty four Sub-Saharan African countries concluding that a relation between aid

¹⁷² Stephen D. Younger, "Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves You," *World Development* 20, no.11 (1992)

¹⁷³ Raghuram G. Rajan and Arvind Subramanian, "Aid, Dutch Disease, and Manufacturing Growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 94, no.1 (2011)

¹⁷⁴ Alessandro Prati and Thierry Tressel, "Aid Volatility and Dutch Disease: Is There a Role for Macroeconomic Policies?," IMF WP 06/145, Washington, DC: IMF (2006)

¹⁷⁵ Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, "External Aid: Help or Hindrance to Export Orientation in Africa?," *Journal of African Economies* 8, no.4 (1999)

¹⁷⁶ Sweder van Wijnbergen, "Macroeconomic aspects of the effectiveness of foreign aid: On the two-gap model, home goods and disequilibrium and real exchange rate misalignment", *Journal of International Economics* 21, no.1 (1986)

¹⁷⁷ Ouattara and Strobl, "Do Aid Inflows Cause Dutch Disease? A Case Study of the CFA Franc Countries"

¹⁷⁸ Jacinta Nwachukwu, "Foreign Capital Inflows, Economic Policies and the Real Exchange Rate in Sub Saharan Africa: Is There an Interaction Effect?," Brooks World Poverty Institute WP 25 (2008)

inflows and RER exist; however this relation is not strong and author underlines that structural reforms and monetary policies that were followed during the under examination period had an impact on the exchange rate. Kang *et al.*¹⁷⁹ using a sample of 37 countries find that the Dutch disease is evident in about 50 percent of all cases. Authors conclude that in the rest of the sample, aid has a positive impact on exports. White and Wignaraja¹⁸⁰ find evidence that in Sri Lanka aid indeed contributed to the appreciation of RER, hurting exports and hindering growth process while Bandara¹⁸¹ finds controversial results investigating the same issue in Sri Lanka. Nyoni¹⁸² studies Tanzania, a country that has also received considerable amounts of aid inflows over the last decades, and finds no contribution of aid in RER appreciation. Ghura and Grennes¹⁸³ studying a sample of 22 SSH countries find that non efficient policies concerning RER can "act as an implicit tax on exports", reducing profitability for exports. This can lead to an increase of the deficit account and governments might restrict imports. Younger¹⁸⁴ investigating the case of Ghana - a country that has received large amounts of aid - concludes that some of the negative results of aid inflows indeed appeared in the country. On the other hand, Sackey¹⁸⁵ - analysing the same case - finds controversial results concluding that aid inflows contributed to the depreciation of RER. Nkusu¹⁸⁶ concludes that the use of aid inflows is more complicated than a Dutch disease issue and that depreciation of RER might not be a solution in case export infrastructure is inadequate; rather, as Nkusu

¹⁷⁹ Shik Joong Kang, Alessandro Prati and Alessandro Rebucci, "Aid, Export and growth: A time-series perspective on the Dutch Disease hypothesis," IDB WP 114, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank (2010)

¹⁸⁰ Howard White, Ganeshan Wignaraja, "Exchange Rates, Trade Liberalization and Aid: The Sri Lankan Experience," *World Development* 20, no.10 (1992)

¹⁸¹ Jayatilleke S. Bandara, "Dutch' Disease in a Developing Country: The Case of Foreign Capital Inflows to Sri Lanka," *Seoul Journal of Economics* 8 (1995)

¹⁸² Timothy S. Nyoni, "Foreign Aid and Economic Performance in Tanzania," *World Development* 26, no.7 (1998)

¹⁸³ Dhaneshwar Ghura and Thomas J. Grennes, "The real exchange rate and macroeconomic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Development Economics* 42, no.1 (1993): 171

¹⁸⁴ Younger, "Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves You"

¹⁸⁵ Harry A. Sackey, "External aid inflows and the real exchange rate in Ghana," AERC Research Paper 110 (Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium, 2001)

¹⁸⁶ Nkusu, "Aid and the Dutch Disease in Low-Income Countries: Informed Diagnoses for Prudent Prognoses"

reports - quoting Corden¹⁸⁷ - "Incidentally, it might be argued that the true Dutch disease in the Netherlands was not the adverse effects on manufacturing of real appreciation but rather the use of Booming Sector revenues for social services levels which are not sustainable, but which it has been politically difficult to reduce." From this proposition, it could be argued that concerns which have been raised for RER appreciation or other macroeconomic issues can be eased through the implementation of proper monetary and fiscal policies, a conclusion that has been reached by various researchers.

3.6 Harmonization and Ownership

During the 1980s conditionality was the donors' path for supporting mainly macroeconomic changes in aid recipient countries, using a *carrot and stick* approach.¹⁸⁸ But this created a problem of ownership as in many cases these interventions were not the will of aid recipients governments,¹⁸⁹ a fact that refers to interventions at macro and micro level. In both cases, the lack of ownership and motivation to implement the intervention "with enthusiasm and determination" hindered results.¹⁹⁰ In practice, conditionality did not bring the expected results: for example, a 2001 study that examined International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs implemented over a six-year period (1992-1998) found that almost half of them were not completed.¹⁹¹ Similarly, Dollar and Svensson examining 220 World Bank's

¹⁸⁷ Max Corden, "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," *Oxford Economic Papers* 36 (1984) quoted in Nkusu, "Aid and the Dutch Disease in Low-Income Countries: Informed Diagnoses for Prudent Prognoses", 15

¹⁸⁸ Clark C. Gibson, Krister Andersson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar, *The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 113

¹⁸⁹ Paul Collier, "The Failure of Conditionality," in *Perspectives on Aid and Development*, ed. Catherine Gwin and Joan M. Nelson (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1997): 60

¹⁹⁰ John Williamson, *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics, 1994): 566 quoted in Tony Killick, Ramani Gunatilaka, and Ana Marr, *Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change* (London: Routledge, 1998): 89

¹⁹¹ Anna Ivanova, Wolfgang Mayer, Alex Mourmouras, and George Anayiotos, "What determines the success or failure of fund-supported programs," IMF WP series, Washington, DC: IMF (2001)

adjustment projects, find a 33 percent rate of failure.¹⁹² At the core of the problem is the unwillingness of political and powerful economic groups in fragile countries to support the building of state institutions and their lack of interest in enhancing a "constructive engagement with their own citizens."¹⁹³ A significant factor for an effective intervention is whether powerful elites, government staff and opposition gain or not from its implementation.¹⁹⁴ Political actors in aid recipient countries are far more important than external actors.¹⁹⁵ But responsibility lies also with donors: in the past, in cases of non-compliance with the defined aims, financing continued as it was in the interest of donors not to cease funding as that could mean that the debt servicing could be interrupted.¹⁹⁶ In 1978, the then representative of IMF in Zaire's central bank advised that because of corruption there was "no (repeat, no) prospect for Zaire's creditors to get their money back"; however, this warning did not stop the IMF from giving to Zaire "the largest loan it had ever given an African nation."¹⁹⁷ Such incidents are clear evidences that it is questionable whether even major international organization such as the World Bank and the IMF can act independently¹⁹⁸ as usually the allocation of such programs is based on the interests of its important stakeholders.¹⁹⁹ In this context, it could be argued that effectiveness of aid was not always a priority: as it is reported in World Bank's well-cited report *Assessing Aid*, based on evaluation reports of well-known institutions (such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank) "securing loan approvals was a more powerful motivator for staff than working to ensure project success or larger development

¹⁹² David Dollar and Jacob Svensson, "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs," *The Economic Journal* 110, no.466 (2000)

¹⁹³ Sue Unsworth, *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity* (Paris: OECD, 2010): 10

¹⁹⁴ Geske A. Dijkstra, "The Effectiveness of Policy Conditionality: Eight Country Experiences," *Development and Change* 33, no.2 (2002)

¹⁹⁵ Carlos Santiso, "Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality," *The Georgetown Public Policy Review* 7, no.1, (2001): 9

¹⁹⁶ Ravi Kanbur, "Conditionality and Debt in Africa," in *Foreign Aid and Development*, 415-416

¹⁹⁷ Dambisa Moyo, "Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 March, 2009, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html>

¹⁹⁸ Kaushik Basu, "Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict," *The Journal of Economic Literature* 41, no.3 (2003)

¹⁹⁹ Axel Dreher, "A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality," *Public Choice* 119 (2004): 446; Alex Dreher and Nathan M. Jensen, "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions," *Journal of Law and Economics* 50, no.1 (2007)

goals. Institutional factors critical for sustainable development impact had been neglected."²⁰⁰

Moreover the lack of ownership has another side effect: as recipient countries do not want to turn down opportunities for funding, they accept initiatives that donors want to set up, a fact that creates excessive burden for the state mechanisms, drawing attention and capacities from plans that recipient governments would have as a priority in other cases.²⁰¹ In Tanzania, such excessive was the pressure from donors, that the government established a "quiet time" each year - lasting from April to August - where donors were requested not to engage civil services so as they had time for the preparation of annual budget.²⁰² Furthermore, the burden on aid recipient's state structures is further increased by the fragmentation of aid, a fact that reduces bureaucratic quality.²⁰³ Focusing on fragmentation and co-ordination issues, Easterly and Pfütze calculate that "the probability that two randomly selected dollars in the international aid effort will be from the same donor to the same country for the same sector is 1 in 2658."²⁰⁴ At the world summits in Rome (2003), in Paris (2005) and in Accra (2008) harmonization and ownership were highlighted as key steps for the enhancement of aid effectiveness. These steps were made as past approaches - such as conditionality - proved to be ineffective and highlighted the necessity for recipient countries to be in control of development plans and interventions.²⁰⁵ However, despite the guidelines for ownership and alignment from the three world summits, recent data show that more steps have to be made in this

²⁰⁰ David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why* (New York: Oxford University, 1998), 118

²⁰¹ Brautigam and Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa", 261-263

²⁰² Steven Radelet and Ruth Levine, "Can We Build a Better Mousetrap? Three New Institutions Designed to Improve Aid Effectiveness," in *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, ed. William Easterly (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008): 436

²⁰³ Stephen Knack, and Aminur Rahman, "Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients," *Journal of Development Economics* 83, no.1 (2007)

²⁰⁴ William Easterly and Tobias Pfütze, "Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22, no.2 (2008): 39

²⁰⁵ Ravi Kanbur and Todd Sandler with Kevin M. Morrison, "A Radical Approach to Development Assistance," *Development Outreach* 1, no.2 (1998) quoted in Jens Martens, "Rethinking ODA: Towards a renewal of Official Development Assistance", *Global Policy Forum* (2001): 11

direction.²⁰⁶ These issues become ever more significant if we take into consideration the proliferation of donors and of the different channels for the provision of aid that have taken place in recent years²⁰⁷ and the fact that a portion of these new donors, having not participated in the past aid effectiveness world summit forums, are not aligned with the agreed principles and have set up their own agenda and priorities.²⁰⁸

3.7 The IMF and the World Bank

Two very important actors in the field of aid - at a global level - are the IMF and the World Bank. The World Bank is an organization specialized on the planning of long-term development and poverty reduction. Since its foundation after the Bretton Wood conference, the World Bank has gone through various phases, being a major participant in the evolution of the development doctrine.²⁰⁹ A turning point took place in 1990s when discussions on a new approach for development started - walking away from programs mainly focusing on macroeconomic indexes.²¹⁰ In this context, it was in 1999 when the then president of World Bank James Wolfestohn, identifying the significance of knowledge in the development process, announced the transformation of the World Bank into a *Knowledge Bank*.²¹¹ On the other hand, while the IMF cannot be considered as a development agency, it does affect developing countries through adjustment advice, financial assistance and setting up

²⁰⁶ OECD, *Aid Effectiveness 2005–10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration* (Paris: OECD, 2011)

²⁰⁷ Arnab Acharya, Ana Terreza Fuzzo de Lima, and Mick Moore, "Proliferation and fragmentation: Transactions costs and the value of aid," *The Journal of Development Studies* 42, no.1 (2006)

²⁰⁸ UNDP, *Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty* (New York: UNDP, 2011): 176

²⁰⁹ Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines, *The World Bank: Structures and Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

²¹⁰ Kenneth King, Simon A. McGrath, *Knowledge for Development?: Comparing British, Japanese, Swedish and World Bank aid* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2004): 25

²¹¹ Jonathan Morduch, "The Knowledge Bank," in *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, 377

conditionality regulations,²¹² although its role has changed considerably over the last decades.²¹³ These two organizations work together and it is almost a precondition for a country that seeks help from World Bank to have previously agreed to follow an IMF adjustment program.²¹⁴ Apart from World Bank, many other development banks and private institutions might relate implementation of their plans to IMF supported programs.²¹⁵ The importance of the role of the IMF is evident if we take into consideration the fact that from 1970, the vast majority of developing countries have received support from IMF at least one time.²¹⁶

In late 1999 the World Bank in co-operation with the IMF initiated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PRSP)²¹⁷ that focused on principles such as ownership, comprehensive strategies, results-based, partnership-oriented and long-term approaches.²¹⁸ The PRSPs were to focus on four sectors: governance, macroeconomic and structural policies, improved sectoral policies and securing cost-effective funding.²¹⁹ Evaluation attempts have showed that results from the PRSPs vary²²⁰ and further research is needed. However, a critical point is that although ownership is a priority, in various countries - such as Malawi, Kenya, Senegal, Benin and Mali - participation of the members of official state bodies is not always the

²¹² Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands, "The IMF and the mobilization of foreign aid," Discussion Papers in Economics, 11, University of Surrey (2005): 2

²¹³ Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IMF," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no.2 (1998); Graham Bird, "The International Monetary Fund and developing countries: a review of the evidence and policy options," *International Organization* 50, no.3 (1996)

²¹⁴ Cassen, *Does Aid Work?*, 62

²¹⁵ Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) *Evaluation of prolonged use of IMF resources* (Washington, DC: IMF, 2002): 68-69

²¹⁶ Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52, no.7 (2005): 1246

²¹⁷ Caroline M. Robb, *Can the Poor Influence Policy?: Participatory Poverty Assessments in the Developing World* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002)

²¹⁸ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Factsheet - New York: IMF, 2013 available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/prsp.pdf>

²¹⁹ Jim Levinsohn, *World's Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach: Good Marketing or Good Policy*, G-24 Discussion Paper Series (2003): 4

²²⁰ William G. Battaile and Steve Kayizzi-Gugerwa, *The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: Findings From 10 Country Case Studies of World Bank and IMF Support* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005)

case.²²¹ On the other hand, evaluation of IMF programs is a complicated task and various methods have been proposed.²²² While some success stories are reported – especially in East Asia, there is also a lot of criticism concerning the efficacy of such programs²²³ and suggestions that IMF policies should be reconsidered have been made.²²⁴ The failures of IMF programs in Argentina and Russia are also two good examples that give ground to criticism for IMF.²²⁵ In the same line, it is argued that the time an aid-recipient remains under IMF programs in order to overcome a crisis is negatively correlated to the probabilities of getting out of the crisis.²²⁶

3.8 Conclusion

There is no question that over the years, development assistance has some great results to demonstrate: in the health sector for example, development assistance has contributed significantly to the increase of life expectancy in the developing world from 40 to 65 years, to the eradication of diseases such as smallpox and to reducing infant mortality.²²⁷ Asian countries such as Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are considered to have gained considerably from aid and achieved high rates of economic growth.²²⁸ On the other hand, despite billions of dollars poured into Low

²²¹ Frances Stewart and Michael Wang, "Do PRSPs Empower Countries and Disempower the World Bank or Is It the Other Way Around?," Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Series 108, Oxford University (2003): 10

²²² Nadeem UI Haque and Mohsin S. Khan, "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF WP 98/169, Washington, DC: IMF (1998)

²²³ Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland, "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 62, no.2 (2000); William Easterly, "What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," *Journal of Development Economics* 76, no.1 (2005)

²²⁴ Graham Bird, "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," *World Development* 29, no.11 (2001)

²²⁵ Silvia Marchesi and Laura Sabani, "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics," *Journal of Development Economics* 84 (2007)

²²⁶ Patrick Conway, "IMF Programs and Economic Crisis: An Empirical Study of Transition," Mimeo, University of North Carolina (2000)

²²⁷ Ruth Levine, *Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004)

²²⁸ Jeffrey Sachs, "Poverty: Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty? Yes," in *Controversies in Globalization*, ed. Peter M. Haas, Jogh A. Hird, Beth McBratney, (CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009): 75

Income Countries, in 2010, 44 percent of people in low income countries were living in extreme poverty.²²⁹ So, is foreign aid a reliable path? Or Dambisa Moyo, arguing in her book *Dead Aid* - a work that has attracted a lot of attention - against foreign aid, proposing that growth and poverty reduction should be achieved through the engagement of the private sector, based on investments and free-market principles, is right?²³⁰ Empirically, scholars have been trying for years to shed light on the impact that aid flows have over developing countries. Still, no consensus exists about the aid effectiveness. A question that arises is why do researchers get so diverse results. As it has been presented, the vast majority of these studies uses econometrics and aggregate data and tries to establish a solid relation between various diverse and difficult to define factors such as growth, aid, policy; all these are implemented in a variety of countries, using different econometric methods, thus making comparison difficult.

This *over-aggregation* creates analysis problems²³¹ as valuable information that is country-specific is omitted.²³² Moreover, in many cases, researchers run regressions with four-year observations, an approach that carries the short-coming of the time period not being long enough for some of the effects of aid to take place; even by extending the under examination period does not offer a solution, as results could include *uncontrolled noise*.²³³ Similar analysis problems arise with the reliability of data, although many researchers use data from the World Bank²³⁴ or when applying different definitions for aid, growth, policy.²³⁵ In some cases fragility of results is so high that just one minor change in variables is enough to get contradictory results.²³⁶ Doubts about methodology in the analysis have been reported by various

²²⁹ Pedro Olinto, Kathleen Beegle, Carlos Sobrado and Hiroki Uematsu, "The State of the Poor: Where are the Poor and Where are the Poorest?," *World Bank Economic Premise* 125 (2013): 2

²³⁰ Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and There Is Another Way for Africa* (London: Penguin Books, 2009)

²³¹ White, "The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey", 164

²³² Feeny, "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth in Papua New Guinea"

²³³ Clemens *et al.*, "Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth"

²³⁴ Burhop, "Foreign assistance and economic development: a re-evaluation"

²³⁵ Easterly, "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?"

²³⁶ Roodman, "The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics"

researchers (for example Hansen and Tarp,²³⁷ McGillivray,²³⁸ Burnside and Dollar,²³⁹ Chauvet and Guillaumont,²⁴⁰ Bring,²⁴¹ Moreira,²⁴² Mosley.²⁴³) Thus it could be argued that it is questionable whether econometrics – despite the advancements that have taken place in this field - can be used for the analysis of the relation between aid, policy and growth.²⁴⁴ Apart from the flaws in the econometric analysis, the theoretical growth models on which econometric methods are used are poorly defined. Durbarry *et al.*²⁴⁵ argue that "If aid is to be reliably identified as a growth determinant it is important that it is included within a robustly specified empirical growth model." Similarly Cerra *et al.*²⁴⁶ argue that "most of the empirical studies lack firm theoretical underpinnings." Another issue that could possibly hinder aid effectiveness analysis is a *reluctancy bias* in the aid effectiveness literature (AEL); Doucouliagos and Paldam²⁴⁷ conclude that

"If the typical AEL researcher finds a handful of significant results he/she will normally choose to present one of the most positive ones as the key result of the study. Considering the issues, this is not surprising, but it is a problem for truth finding/revelation."

This approach becomes more significant if we take into consideration the fact that a high percentage of researchers – about 35 percent - is professionally associated with the aid industry.²⁴⁸ In any case, aid effectiveness analysis - at both macro and micro

²³⁷ Hansen, and Tarp, "Aid effectiveness disputed"

²³⁸ McGillivray, *Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations*

²³⁹ Burnside and Dollar, *Aid, Policies and Growth*

²⁴⁰ Chauvet and Guillaumont, "Aid and growth revisited: policy, economic vulnerability and political instability"

²⁴¹ Johan Bring, "How not to find the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth," *Applied Economic Letters* 1, no.2 (1994)

²⁴² Moreira, "Evaluating the impact of foreign aid on economic growth: a cross-country study"

²⁴³ Mosley, *Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform*

²⁴⁴ Addison *et al.*, "Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals", 3

²⁴⁵ Durbarry *et al.*, *New Evidence on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth*, 1

²⁴⁶ Valerie Cerra, Serpil Tekin, and Stephen Turnovsky, "Foreign Aid and Real Exchange Rate Adjustments in a Financially Constrained Dependent Economy," IMF WP 08/204, Washington, DC: IMF (2008): 4

²⁴⁷ Doucouliagos and Paldam, "Aid Effectiveness on Accumulation", 26

²⁴⁸ Herbertsson and Paldam, "Does development aid help poor countries catch up? An analysis of the basic relations"

level - is a challenging task; finding what works - and why - is not always possible.²⁴⁹
Still, more research is needed.

²⁴⁹ Francois Bourguignon and Mark Sundberg, "Aid Effectiveness: Opening the Black Box," *The American Economic Review* 97, no.2 (2007)

CHAPTER 4

EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEBUILDING

4.1 Introduction

In the previous section, an analytic overview of the aid effectiveness literature has been presented. As it has been argued, despite the new analysis tools and techniques, still no consensus exists on the effectiveness of aid. Moreover, other related issues that may affect the effectiveness of aid have been tackled. One important finding is the necessity for analysis of results at a *disaggregate level*. Thus, sector or even case study analysis can reveal valuable information, and provide an insight in mechanisms that affect the impact of aid.

Based on this findings, this section continues the analysis of aid effectiveness but follows a more specialized path, focusing on the issue of peacebuilding, analyzing in a historical and political context the evolution of the sector over the last two decades. Moreover, the fundamentals of a conceptual evaluation framework for peacebuilding are investigated, on the analysis of which the evaluation methodology for the assessment of the three peacebuilding projects is built. In addition, through the study of these issues, the necessity for a holistic approach in peacebuilding is highlighted.

4.2 Peacebuilding: Historical approach

As it has been argued, in the early '90s the end of the Cold War brought about considerable changes in the way development aid was conceptualized and implemented. Gradually, after the introduction of the *An Agenda for Peace* report by the UN, the agenda of peacebuilding started to expand. In this context, the UN introduced - in 1995 - the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, underlining that "It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out."²⁵⁰ Earlier, the UN had introduced the *Agenda for Development* (1994), which was followed by the *Agenda for Democratization* (1996).²⁵¹ During this period, funds for humanitarian assistance increased considerably with a peak in 1994 when spending for humanitarian assistance reached a 10 percent rate of total official development assistance (ODA).²⁵² The new approach of the UN could combine military action with humanitarian intervention so as to address needs in the field during the various phases, from cease fire to reconstruction. The notions of development and security came closer, as western governments were concerned about future conflicts in fragile states that might be used by criminal or terrorists organizations.²⁵³ In this context, the prevailed peacebuilding path that international community followed was based on a liberal approach where democratization and market liberalization had prominent roles.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ UN, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995): 26

²⁵¹ Daniele Archibugi, Sveva Balduini, and Marco Donati, "The UN as an agency of global democracy," in *Global Democracy: Key Debates*, ed. Barry Holden (London: Routledge, 2013), 128-129

²⁵² Judith Randel, and Tony German, *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000* (New York: Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2000)

²⁵³ Richard Fanthorpe, "On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone," *African Affairs* 105, no.418 (2006): 27-28

²⁵⁴ Ronald Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* 22, no.2 (1997): 56

4.3 The Liberal Peace Approach: Towards Statebuilding

The liberal peace, including the rule of law, civil society and human rights - aims at establishing a

"self-sustained peace [...] in which both overt and structural forms of violence are removed, and social, economic, and political models conform to a mixture of liberal and neoliberal international expectations in a globalized and transnational, setting."²⁵⁵

Major international organizations and actors - such as the World Bank, the UN, the UK and US governments - consider the strengthening of governance and capacity improvements in fragile states of utmost importance for fighting poverty and for security issues.²⁵⁶ In 2007, the DAC published ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations:²⁵⁷ state-building is considered to be one of the fundamental aims of interventions. The process of statebuilding becomes even more important as, according to estimates, worldwide in 2015, half of the poor are expected to live in states that are characterized as *fragile*.²⁵⁸ On the other hand, the liberal peace approach has been under criticism for promoting western interests and supporting strategies without taking into consideration local conditions.²⁵⁹ In this context, Paris - investigating 14 major peacebuilding operations undertaken by UN between 1989 and 1999 - finds that despite the diverse conditions that were met in these cases, the international community

²⁵⁵ Oliver P. Richmond, and Jason Franks, "Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no.2 (2008): 186-187

²⁵⁶ David C. Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006): 1-3

²⁵⁷ OECD DAC, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (Paris: OECD, 2007)

²⁵⁸ OECD, *Building blocks to prosperity: The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)*, DAC High Level Meeting (Paris: OECD, 2012)

²⁵⁹ Roland Paris, "Saving liberal peacebuilding," *Review of International Studies* 36, no.2, (2010); Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011)

followed a common - liberal - strategy in all cases.²⁶⁰ This comes in contrast to the required knowledge of local conditions over political, social, economic and historical issues and adaptation of policies by the international community, factors that are of utmost importance for effective peacebuilding interventions.²⁶¹ As Pugh argues, the liberal concept not only overlooks the special social and economic issues of post-conflict environments, it may also exacerbate poverty and worsen conditions for weak groups²⁶² as it happened in the war-torn countries of Central America - such as Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala - where the approach of liberal peace reinforced the position of existing elites; similarly, in Guatemala, redistribution of wealth and of land "were dismissed as 'left-wing, communist' experiments by US policy makers and International Financial Institutions (IFI) staff."²⁶³ However, the dominance of elites and of powerful groups can transform the liberal approach to an *illiberal peacebuilding*: as de Oliveira argues,²⁶⁴ such a case is met in Angola where these groups instead of implementing the principles of liberal approach, built "a hegemonic order and an elite stranglehold over the political economy." Moreover, the unification of societies through political institutions can take place only when these institutions are established on "social forces" where different actors - such as political parties and individuals - actively participate;²⁶⁵ if institutions are neglected, that could have negative long-term effects.²⁶⁶ Another side-effect of the implementation of liberal peace is that it leaves little space for indigenous and traditional methods of peacebuilding, practices that improve community participation at local level.²⁶⁷ These issues are directly related to the

²⁶⁰ Ronald Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

²⁶¹ Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetah and Karin Wermester, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 15

²⁶² Michael Pugh, "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no.2 (2005):25

²⁶³ Tobias Denskus, "Peacebuilding does not build peace," *Development in Practice* 17, no.4 (2007): 658

²⁶⁴ Ricard Soares de Oliveira, "Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49, no.2 (2011): 288

²⁶⁵ Samuel Huntington, *Political order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) quoted in David Chandler, "Peace without Politics?," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no.3 (2005): 309

²⁶⁶ Ashraf Ghani, and Clare Lockhart, "Writing the History of the Future: Securing Stability through Peace Agreements," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no.3 (2007)

²⁶⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no.2 (2008)

concept of *ownership*. In the 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* the issue of ownership - at local and national level - of peacebuilding activities is highlighted as a critical factor for a peace process.²⁶⁸ It is assumed that ownership secures legitimacy and supports sustainability and democratization, thus contributing to the establishment of peace.²⁶⁹ However, while the discussion²⁷⁰ on the concepts of local, national and international ownership of policies and strategies for peacebuilding and statebuilding is gaining momentum - focusing on *local participation* rather than the simple rhetoric inclusion of *ownership* - the harsh conditions met in war-torn and post-conflict conditions - which limit the options for intervention - should be taken into consideration. Thus, in political terms, often the organization of elections is a priority for donors; but rather than rushing to hold elections in post-conflict environments, the priority should be on the building and empowerment of institutions and the improvement of governance and justice mechanisms. This is what Ronald Paris in his well-cited book *At War's End* supports, in favor of an *institutionalisation before liberalisation* approach in peacebuilding.²⁷¹ Elections just after the signing of a peace accord may "legitimize extremist nationalist elements, enabling them to consolidate power and further entrench divisions in society"²⁷² as it happened in cases such as in Angola and in Rwanda. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the international community put extreme pressure on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to hold elections just a few months after the Dayton agreement; despite efforts, this premature process exaggerated ethnic divisions,²⁷³ hindering the reconciliation process. The conduct of elections requires an adequate institutional environment, otherwise it can become a threat

²⁶⁸ UN DPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008)

²⁶⁹ Sarah B.K. von Billerbeck, "Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding," special issue, *The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, University of Westminster (2011)

²⁷⁰ Oliver P. Richmond, "Beyond Local Ownership in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding," *Ethnopolitics* 11, no.4 (2012); Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building: a critical agenda for peace," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no.5 (2013)

²⁷¹ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*

²⁷² von Billerbeck, Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding, 332

²⁷³ George Bruce and Anthony McGee, "The OSCE approach to conflict prevention," in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies. Sustaining the peace*, ed. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (London: Routledge 2006), 98-99

to stability.²⁷⁴ Furthermore, in such cases, legitimacy is questioned as ownership is attributed to the same people that are responsible for the emergence of the violent conflict; in addition, legitimacy and ownership are problematic; for example, in many cases the UN has to choose with which of "all potential owners" will cooperate.²⁷⁵ In the case of Afghanistan, despite the political settlement and the subsequent election process, the reform development is being owned only by the donors and a powerful group of Afghans, facing a "regime ownership" instead of a "national ownership."²⁷⁶ Similarly, as Pugh argues, in Bosnia while the international community supported democratization and local ownership, most of the decisions over critical issues were taken by international actors.²⁷⁷ Similarly, Krause and Jutersonke argue that peacebuilding efforts "follow a donor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that conjures into existence a social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of society and social change."²⁷⁸

4.4 The role of NGOs

Over the last two decades, the international system moves from a Westphalian state-system - where the state is responsible for security issues and other actors may have little or no contribution - towards a post-Westphalian model where a variety of actors - among which NGOs have a prominent role - are engaged in issues such as

²⁷⁴ David Charles-Philippe, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process," *Security Dialogue* 30, no.1 (1999)

²⁷⁵ von Billerbeck, Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding, 342

²⁷⁶ Jonathan Goodhand, and Mark Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction, and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," *Disasters* 34, Issue Supplement s1 (2010): 97

²⁷⁷ Michael Pugh, "Protectorate Democracy in Southeastern Europe," Working Paper (2000) quoted in Timothy Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes," *Peace & Change* 34, no.1 (2009): 4

²⁷⁸ Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, "Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments," *Security Dialogue* 36, vol.4 (2005): 459 quoted in Donais, *ibid*, 8

human security and peacebuilding.²⁷⁹ NGOs working in a conflict environment do have significant advantages as they can operate away from the official imperatives, a fact that offers flexibility and credibility, in addition to knowledge of local conditions and the ability to work at a grass-root level; but on other hand as NGOs face serious funding limitations, they are significantly affected by political constraints.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, minorities, groups that lack social power or groups that have not been engaged in the warfare - and thus they do not have an *official* role so as to participate in the negotiation process - can be represented by civil society actors.²⁸¹ NGOs are active in various fields: In Afghanistan, the NGOs provided humanitarian assistance to more than three million refugees - a task that even international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the governments of Pakistan and of the US had difficulty to address - while after the genocide in Rwanda, more than 250 NGOs were participating in the emergency situation.²⁸² On the other hand, the participation of NGOs can also have negative results: the engagement of NGOs may hinder the statebuilding process, as it happened in Cambodia where, after the withdrawal of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission in early 1990s, international NGOs entered the scene; corruption and bureaucracy forced donors to directly support the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO), a fact that further weakened the capacity building of local actors - state institutions, indigenous NGOs.²⁸³ In this context, the necessity for investigation of effectiveness of NGOs peacebuilding activities becomes an urgent necessity.

²⁷⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, "Post-Westphalian" peace-building: the role of NGOs", Department of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, UK

²⁸⁰ Bronwyn Evans-Kent, and Roland Bleiker, "Peace beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 10, no.1 (2003): 103-104

²⁸¹ Mathijs van Leeuwen, "The politics of peacebuilding through strengthening civil society," in *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crises Response*, ed. Dorothea Hilhorst (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 206

²⁸² Francis Kofi Abiew, and Tom Keating, "NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations: Strange bedfellows," *International Peacekeeping* 6, no.2 (1999): 92

²⁸³ Oliver P. Richmond, and Jason Franks, "Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia," *Security Dialogue* 38, no.1 (2007)

4.5 Evaluation of peacebuilding activities

In mid 1990s, soon after the initialization of peacebuilding activities, it became evident that evaluation was a critical issue. This move was initiated primarily by the donor community - mainly western governments - that strongly demanded assessment of results.²⁸⁴ But before evaluating, it was necessary first to define what would be evaluated and this posed the first challenge as there was - and still is - not an exact definition of peacebuilding;²⁸⁵ while the UN defines peacebuilding as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict",²⁸⁶ in reality, after almost two decades of research and involvement in peacebuilding²⁸⁷ there is no consensus on its definition.²⁸⁸ But the issue of defining and understanding peacebuilding goes far deeper as there are different approaches over what activities are to be included under the concept of peacebuilding. In the *Agenda for Peace*, reference is being made to various diverse processes such as disarming, repatriating refugees, monitoring of elections, political participation, human rights protection, destruction of weapons.²⁸⁹ In this context, rather than giving a restrictive definition of peacebuilding, it is used as an *umbrella term* whereas activities such as

²⁸⁴ Cheyenne, Church Scharbatke, "Evaluating Peacebuilding: Not Yet All It Could Be," in *Advancing Conflict Transformation*, The Berghof Handbook II, ed. B. Austin, M. Fischer, and H.J. Giessmann (Opladen/Framington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011): 464

²⁸⁵ In the context of this study, rather than using a confined definition of peacebuilding, a holistic approach is being followed where interventions aiming at diverse goals such as conflict prevention, reconciliation, repatriation, improving human security, early warning are included. While that might initially bring some confusion, the process of peacebuilding requires an extensive use of tools that come from various fields, engaging different organizations and actors from various levels

²⁸⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, para.21

²⁸⁷ There is a variety of definitions of peacebuilding; for example, Lederach's notion of peacebuilding "is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct." John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20

²⁸⁸ Jennifer M. Hazen, "Can Peacekeepers Be Peacebuilders?," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no.3 (2007): 324

²⁸⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*

democratization, re-integration, conflict prevention and conflict resolution are all included; however confusion is intensified as due to the different definitions used, similar activities might be categorized into different concepts.²⁹⁰ This is closely related to the notion of *conflict sensitivity*.²⁹¹ aid interventions in areas at risk are highly related to the conflict and cannot be assumed as *neutral* and may have a diverse effect: either intensify conflict dynamics, prolonging the conflict or contribute into reducing tension and offer opportunities for a peaceful solution of the crisis; in some cases, interventions can have both of these results simultaneously.²⁹² A tragic example of such a case is the Rwanda genocide where donors' interventions in the years prior to the massacre had a considerable effect in empowering Hutu's elite, a fact that went unnoticed by the donors' community.²⁹³ Furthermore, while in some cases programs might be *conflict sensitive* it is mistakenly assumed that such activities should be included in the peacebuilding or conflict prevention fields.²⁹⁴ Although initially the issue of defining terms might seem to be trivial and of minor importance, in reality this can cause confusion and hinder coherence of peacebuilding.²⁹⁵ Moreover, apart from the different approaches over the activities, there is lack of consensus among diverse actors over the "operationalization of peacebuilding"; as Barnett *et al.* argue, "when the Bush administration thinks of peacebuilding it imagines building market-oriented democracies, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) imagines creating economic development and strong civil societies committed to a culture of

²⁹⁰ Lisa Schirch, "Strategic Peacebuilding - State of the Field." *South Asian Journal Of Peacebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2008)

²⁹¹ Conflict sensitivity can be defined as "the ability of an organization to: understand the context in which it operates, understand the interaction between its intervention and the context and to act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts." Resource Pack: *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding*. Nairobi, 2004, Forum and Early Warning and Early Response, Safeworld, International Alert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Africa Peace Forum and the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies

²⁹² Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1999)

²⁹³ Peter Uvin, *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, CT : Kumarian Press, 1998)

²⁹⁴ Mary Anderson, Diana Chigas, and Peter Woodrow, *Encouraging effective evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: towards DAC guidance* (Paris: OECD / DAC, 2007)

²⁹⁵ *ibid*

nonviolent dispute resolution."²⁹⁶ Moreover, as peacebuilding interventions are associated with politics,²⁹⁷ the conduct of evaluation brings about more issues: as Buth and Duggan argue²⁹⁸ evaluation might be biased so as to secure interests of donors or of specific groups; similarly, other questions come up, such as who and how will use the evaluation and what will be its focus, affecting - and probably hindering - findings.

Furthermore, another issue that should be clarified is the framework used for the evaluation of peacebuilding. In the 1990s, the concept of development assistance evaluation drew the attention of the donor community and gained considerable momentum towards the formation of a common path. In this context, DAC laid the foundations through the introduction of basic evaluation principles in 1991. Over the next years, this initiative became more solid as five criteria for the evaluation of development assistance were introduced: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.²⁹⁹ But as interest for humanitarian assistance programs was increasing and considerable experience was gained in the field, it became evident that the existing framework was not adequate for the assessment of such activities; thus, additional and more appropriate criteria such as coverage, connectedness, coherence were included so as to acquire a better overview of human security interventions.³⁰⁰ In this context, one of the most important tools for evaluation was the *log framework*. But while the log framework used in development programs could be an efficient instrument for planning, managing and evaluating development project,³⁰¹ it was soon understood that it could not fit in all

²⁹⁶ Michael Barnett, Kim Hunjoon, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?," *Global Governance* 13, no.1 (2007): 44

²⁹⁷ Buth and Duggan define 'politics' as "competition for power in all of its forms from micro to macro levels", Kenneth Bush, and Colleen Duggan, "Evaluation in Conflict Zones: Methodological and Ethical Challenges," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 8, no.2 (2013): 10

²⁹⁸ *ibid*

²⁹⁹ OECD - DAC, *Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance*, available at : <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/21/39119068.pdf>

³⁰⁰ OECD - DAC, *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*, (Paris: OECD, 1999): 22-23

³⁰¹ European Commission, *Aid Delivery Methods. Project Cycle Management Guidelines*, Vol. 1, (Brussels, 2004), 57

cases.³⁰² In the context of conflict, it misses its dynamics and by this way "a useful planning tool gets turned into a mechanism whereby each issue is treated separately, and risks losing its meaning in the evolving picture of a conflict."³⁰³ For example, in a program of resettling families in war-torn Sri-Lanka the implementing NGO did not consider going beyond the program's proposal so as to establish linkages with nearby communities of different religious identity, thus missing the opportunity to have a bigger impact toward peace, despite the possible negative effect of such a move.³⁰⁴

Practice has shown that the assessment of peacebuilding activities is a much more complicated task than just filling in forms and columns of log framework. Over the years, practitioners in the field and research have revealed various issues that underline the special character of peacebuilding evaluation. For example, they argue that the timeframe of a project is too short to assess results of an intervention; indeed, recent research reveals that the outcomes of peacebuilding interventions should be assessed at a time scale considerably more than the context of years.³⁰⁵ This poses a fundamental difficulty when trying to evaluate a peacebuilding project just after its completion. In addition, the different approaches preferred by donors and organizations also have effect on results: while donors favor the implementation of long-term projects, such initiatives miss flexibility in treating issues that come up through the peacebuilding process.³⁰⁶ Moreover, measurements of intangible effects - such as reconciliation, establishing linkages over different ethnic communities - are extremely difficult to be conducted and expressed as quantified results;³⁰⁷

³⁰² Des Gasper, "Evaluating the 'logical framework approach' towards learning-oriented development evaluation," *Public Administration and Development* 20, no.1 (2000)

³⁰³ Simon Fisher, and Lada Zimina, "Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative *Howevers* for Peacebuilders," in *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation*, 24

³⁰⁴ David Hulme, and Jonathan Goodhand, "NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies," Working Paper No 12, IDPM, University of Manchester (2000): 15

³⁰⁵ Eloho Ejeviome Otobo, "A UN Architecture to Build Peace in Post-Conflict Situations," *Development Outreach* 11, no.2 (2009): 47

³⁰⁶ Jon Bennett, Sara Pantuliano, Wendy Fenton, Anthony Vaux, Chris Barnet, and Emery Brusset, *Aiding the peace: A multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan, 2005-2010*, (The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010)

³⁰⁷ Anderson and Olson, *Confronting War, Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*

furthermore, the socio-economic and the political environment affect conditions in their own way, making difficult the impact assessment of peacebuilding programs.³⁰⁸ Misconceptions on defined aims have also another side-effect on projects' success: the *over-claiming* of goals. Agencies, often under pressure from donors, set target that are unlikely to be achieved; thus, even small and short-term projects are expected to have a considerable impact at a wide level, instead of making realistically small steps towards sustainable peace.³⁰⁹

Moreover, as with other forms of aid, co-ordination and co-operation have a major role for peacebuilding effectiveness. The special character of peacebuilding requires a multi-dimensional level of engagement with multiple approaches and various actors, thus co-operation and co-ordination become vital components for effectiveness. However practice has shown that co-operation, at both vertical and horizontal level, is missing and linkages between interventions do not exist, even when working in the same area.³¹⁰ Differences in the organizational proximity - organizational characteristics, capacities, cultures - of NGOs in comparison to other major international actors make coordination between such diverse entities a challenging task.³¹¹ Moreover, apart from the multiple different actors that are engaged in the process, the volatile and unpredictable nature of a conflict is another major reason which constitutes co-ordination of vital importance, as no single agency can cope alone with the requirements for the establishment of peace.³¹² However, co-ordination process is hindered in many cases by the unwillingness of main actors to work together so as to protect their interests.³¹³

³⁰⁸ Larissa Fast, and Reina Neufeldt, "Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Peace-Building Impact Evaluation," *Journal of PeaceBuilding and Development* 2, no.2 (2005)

³⁰⁹ Melanie Kawano-Chiu, *Starting on the Same Page: A Lessons Report from the Peacebuilding Evaluation Project* (Washington, DC: Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2011)

³¹⁰ Fisher and Zimina, "Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative *Howevers* for Peacebuilders", 25-26

³¹¹ Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza* (Washington, DC: USIP, 2000), 12-13

³¹² Antonio Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda* (Providence: The Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996), 122

³¹³ Robert Ricigliano, "Networks of Effective Action," *Security Dialogue* 34, no.4, (2003): 457

Church and Shouldice³¹⁴ add various other issues in the discussion: one of these is the unit of analysis: while practitioners focus on the evaluation results of discrete projects, funders are more interested in "cluster evaluations." Practitioners involved in project do expect comments on the implemented project, while funders usually make recommendations based on results from various interventions. Another issue that was found to hinder evaluation was the lack of resources; in many cases evaluation was not always considered of significant importance and funds were not attributed. Lack of true commitment to the project's results from all parts - funders, practitioners, evaluators - is also highlighted as factor that affects evaluation in a negative way.

In the Utstein report,³¹⁵ a well-cited document, 336 peacebuilding interventions in various countries are analyzed. In this, the necessity for a change in the impact assessment level and the move from the evaluation at a project level towards a strategic review of the whole process is highlighted. A similar finding - "no strategic coherence between project within each sector and little effort to achieve an aggregate complementary impact" - is reported in the evaluation of 18 peacebuilding projects in Burundi.³¹⁶ Moreover, in the Utstein report it is argued that while outcomes should be measured, the impact assessment should be distinct from project's evaluation and an approach that analyzes holistic strategy for the intervention should be followed. In this context, a peacebuilding palette is introduced that contains four distinct topics that should be taken under consideration: security, political framework, socio-economic foundations and reconciliation-justice. In Haiti, after the military intervention of the international community in 1994, demobilization of Haitian army forces became a necessity for security reasons; more than 4500 ex-combatants went through vocational education - trained in computers or as auto mechanics - and the project was evaluated as

³¹⁴ Cheyanne Church, and Julie Shouldice, *The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions: Framing the state of play* (Londonberry, Northern Ireland: INCORE, 2002), 12

³¹⁵ Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, Overview Report of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004)

³¹⁶ Campbell *et al.*, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," 8

successful.³¹⁷ However, although the project achieved its aims, at a wider context its impact was limited by constraints in economic activity and growth in Haiti, as only a small portion of the former soldiers managed to find employment; nevertheless, the project contributed considerably to the improvement of security.³¹⁸

4.6 The notion of *Impact*

In general, it can be argued that such issues should be expected as the peacebuilding sector is a rather new field of intervention, having emerged and developed in 1980s and mainly in 1990s, thus the tools for the assessment were rather new and in a "test phase."³¹⁹ However, such problems in the evaluation methodology of peacebuilding activities led researchers into the introduction of alternative approaches for their assessment. In this context, the term *impact*³²⁰ has been introduced to capture the effect of such activities at a much broader level, instead of the confined level of a project. As in post-conflict environments there is a variety of interventions - covering divergent sectors - isolating the effects of a specific project is extremely difficult.³²¹ This inability to define causality is described as an "attribution gap"; thus, *contribution* rather than *attribution* is often used in the evaluation studies.³²² One of the first approaches that moved away from the log framework was the *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)* concept. The PCIA

³¹⁷ Ian Smillie, *Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy*, Occasional Paper No 33, Providence, The Watson Institute for International Studies (1998): 9-10

³¹⁸ *ibid*

³¹⁹ Beatrix Schmelzle, *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Introduction*. Berghof-handbook Dialogue Series 4, *New Trends in PCIA* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), 2

³²⁰ In the DAC guidelines, 'impact' in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is defined as "the results or effects of any conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention that lie beyond its immediate programme activities or sphere and constitute broader changes related to the conflict", Anderson *et al.*, *Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance*, 23

³²¹ Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no.4 (2007)

³²² Vincenza Scherrer, *Measuring the Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions*, SSR Paper 6 (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012), 8

refers to a process of impact analysis that development interventions in conflict sensitive areas might have.³²³ Bush defines PCIA as

"a means of evaluating (ex post facto) and anticipating (ex ante, as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on: 1) those structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict, and; 2) those structures and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means."³²⁴

The concept of PCIA has major differences in comparison to conventional evaluation methods: rather than using quantified and qualified measures (output, objectives) it aims to highlight the impact of the intervention in relation to issue of conflicts.³²⁵ In this context, a project might be evaluated as a failure based on development criteria but have a positive impact based on peacebuilding criteria; an educational project might be evaluated as a failure based on the grades and the success rate of students but on the other hand the project might have contributed considerably into bringing together people from different - ethnic or social - groups, reducing tension, enhancing opportunities for further cooperation between these groups.³²⁶ In practice, there are various examples from the field that highlight this effect, such as a 2009 evaluation report from Sri Lanka, where it is found that long-term interventions on social and economic fields - such as education - can be similar effective in establishing peace as peacebuilding actions³²⁷ or an 2011 evaluation report of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) activities implemented in Congo, where it is concluded that in reality only few of the projects that were

³²³ Shahab Zahid Ahmed, "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA): Lessons from Pakistan," *Peace & Conflict Review* 5, no.2 (2011)

³²⁴ Kenneth Bush, "A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of Development Projects in Conflict Zones," Working Paper 1 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998): 7

³²⁵ *ibid*, 7

³²⁶ *ibid*

³²⁷ Nick Chapman, Debi Duncan, David Timberman, and Kanaka Abeygunawardana, "Evaluation of Donor-Supported Activities in Conflict-Sensitive Development and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka," Main Evaluation Report (Paris: OECD, 2009)

supposed to focus on CPPB activities had a direct effect on peace and conflict issues.³²⁸

Expanding the level of analysis of a peacebuilding intervention, it is vital to examine not only the results of projects on the issues of conflicts but also at a wider level. Focusing on that, Chigas and Woodrow argue that what should be under analysis is whether the projects establish any linkages towards the major factors - at a societal level - that build the conflict, thus contributing to the establishment of peace at a wider level.³²⁹ In a report examining multi-donors interventions in Southern Sudan it is found that the most efficient programs were those that had linked objectives with other programs, even in diverse sectors.³³⁰ This constitutes the basis for another concept that has been introduced for the evaluation of peace activities, the *Reflecting on Peace Practice* (RPP). This initiative refers to a learning process which is based on the knowledge and experiences that agencies or individuals gather on the field while implementing activities closely related to the establishment of peace.³³¹ The RPP consist of various tools and methods for planning and assessing peacebuilding interventions - such as the *matrix*, analyzing linkages, criteria for effectiveness. Focusing on the criteria, the RPP use five criteria to define the effectiveness of the projects: a) whether the intervention takes action successfully on major causes of the conflict, b) whether, as a result of the project, people develop their own initiatives towards change and reconciliation, a fact that highlights the "ownership" of interventions, c) whether peace activities have a positive impact on political institutions so as to fight the root causes of the conflict, d) whether through peace projects locals oppose to manipulation and renounce violent retaliation when provoked and e) whether there is a real improvement in security issues. Also, in this

³²⁸ Emery Brusset, Maria Bak, Cecile Collin, Abigail Hansen, Nynke Douma, Justine Elakano, Ralf Otto, Rachel Perks, Sylvie Ngalimbaya, Augustin Ngendakuriyo, Laurent de Valensart, Koen Vlassenroot, Claudine Voyadzis, *Joint Evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Belgium: Channel Research, 2011), 39-40

³²⁹ Diana Chigas, and Peter Woodrow, "Demystifying Impacts in Evaluation Practice," *New Routes* 13, no. 3 (2008)

³³⁰ Bennett *et al.*, *Aiding the peace: A multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan, 2005-2010*, xviii

³³¹ Collaborative Learning Projects, *Reflecting on Peace Practice Project* (Cambridge, MA: CDA, 2004)

analysis, issues that hinder the effectiveness of the projects are investigated.³³² In the Utstein report, it is found that for the majority of the projects there are no connections towards a broad strategy at a country level; in other cases, even if such a strategy exists, interventions are not related to it.³³³ However, the notion of analyzing the impact of interventions at a *peace writ large* level is often met with skepticism by practitioners.³³⁴ The conclusions of Utstein report are in accordance with the meta-evaluation review of peacebuilding activities that was undertaken by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies:³³⁵ programs and projects evaluations are limited to their own context without linkages towards the wider dynamic environment. Moreover, the review highlights various issues for the formation of a broad framework for peacebuilding evaluation. However, experience has shown that a *universally-applicable* framework with no flexibility - as far as the criteria used are concerned - will not be an effective evaluation tool. Moreover, results from interventions can also be measured through the use of indicators - such as Global Peace Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation index; however, while such a practice can be applied for comparisons between countries, this measurement of the effects of peacebuilding interventions is problematic as it misses the context of local conditions.³³⁶

Apart from the reported models, researchers have introduced various other approaches for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities. For example, Rothman, focusing on the effectiveness of conflict resolution methods and trainings, introduced the concept of *Action Evaluation*. In this, evaluation is not considered as a practice applied at the end of the program; rather evaluation is being embedded in

³³² *ibid*

³³³ Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*

³³⁴ Peter Woodrow, and Diana Chigas, "Connecting the Dots: Evaluating Whether and How Programmes Address Conflict Systems," in *The Non-Linearity of Peace Processes – Theory and Practice of Systemic Conflict Transformation*, ed. D. Korppen, N. Ropers & Hans J. Giessmann (Opladen / Farmington Hill: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011)

³³⁵ FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies, "Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Activities," A Report Prepared for OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation and the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2006

³³⁶ Svein Erik Stave, "Measuring peacebuilding: challenges, tools, actions," *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Policy Brief*, no.2 (2011)

each step of a program.³³⁷ Moreover, evaluation should be perceived as an on-going *formative* process that contributes into forming goals that are acceptable by all shareholders.³³⁸ In this context the conflict resolution intervention and the evaluation process get a dynamic feature, as exactly the conflict itself. Furthermore, in Spurk's approach results of interventions are separated in three stages (outputs, outcomes and impact), each referring to specific changes in different levels - from outputs in micro level to impact at a societal level - that can be attributed to a project. In this context, evaluation - especially for results in the first and possibly in the second level - can be promising, producing knowledge that can be incorporated in evaluation techniques.³³⁹ Another approach is the *Conflict Impact Assessment System*³⁴⁰ which focuses on the effects - positive or negative - of interventions on the conflict dynamics and at a macro level, on various policy issues. Another evaluation path is the *Aid for Peace* approach³⁴¹ which highlights the learning process of peacebuilding. In this, a tailor-made path for a specific conflict environment is made through a deep analysis of the conditions; needs are identified and objectives are set so as to design an effective plan of action. Its methodology facilitates monitoring and evaluation processes through the development of suitable tools and indicators. Another initiative is the *Search for a Common Ground* that follows an innovative approach focusing on conflict transformation; in this evaluation tools that draw attention on learning and understanding processes have been developed.³⁴² Finally, *Local Capacities for Peace Project* - a collaborative

³³⁷ Jay Rothman, and Antonia Atlas Dosik, "Action Evaluation: A New Method of Goal Setting, Planning and Defining Success for Community Development Initiatives," available at <http://www.academia.edu/download/30283964/action-evaluation-a-new-method.pdf>

³³⁸ Jay Rothman, "Action Evaluation and Conflict Resolution Training: Theory, Method and Case Study," *International Negotiation* 2, no.3 (1997)

³³⁹ Christoph Spurk, "Forget impact: concentrate on measuring outcomes," *New Routes* 13 (2008)

³⁴⁰ Luc Reyhler, "Proactive Conflict Prevention: Impact Assessment," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no.2 (1998)

³⁴¹ Tonia Paffenholz, and Luc Reyhler, *Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007)

³⁴² Cheyanne Church, and Mark Rogers, *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs* (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, USIP, Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2006)

initiative among NGOs and aid practitioners - was set up for the better understanding of interventions in conflict area.³⁴³

In addition to the various methodologies and approaches that are being used by different actors for evaluation purposes, there are also institutional initiatives at top level such as the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on evaluation of peacebuilding where several recommendations are made covering all phases of a project - from designing project's framework based on a conflict analysis to evaluation – in which different actors are engaged; this report concludes that research on the field should continue so as new evaluation theories and indicators emerge.³⁴⁴ Moreover, in the context of an on-going process of re-assessing the existing evaluation framework and the publishing of new manuals that contain up-to-date knowledge, the DAC *Guidance For Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*³⁴⁵ or the OECD-DAC *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*³⁴⁶ were published so as to enhance the capacities of organizations to assess the impact of peacebuilding activities. In this context, the 2008 OECD *Guidance* manual was published underlining the necessity for a holistic policy framework where linkages should be established among all strategies and interventions, including actors from all levels.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ Mary B. Anderson, "Experiences with Impact Assessment: Can we know what Good we Do?," in *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Hand book*, ed. Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Ropers Norbert. (Wiesbaden: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004)

³⁴⁴ Anderson, *et al.*, *Encouraging effective evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: towards DAC*

³⁴⁵ *ibid*

³⁴⁶ OECD - DAC, *Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management* (Paris: OECD, 2002) available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf>

³⁴⁷ OECD - DAC, *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (Paris: OECD, 2002)

4.7 Peacebuilding: From theory to practice

As it has been presented, over the last years there is an on-going debate over the implementation and the evaluation processes of peacebuilding. Results from interventions are mixed and lessons taken from the field are slow to become embedded in tomorrow's practice. One of the most recent and well analyzed cases is the intervention in Kosovo which depicts a fine example of the difficulties that peacebuilding faces. In March 2004 ethnic violence burst in Kosovo; as a result of the riots, 19 people died, 900 were injured, 700 houses were destroyed and around 4500 Kosovo Serbs were displaced.³⁴⁸ This incident came as a shock for the international community as in the past years there has been a huge inflow of interventions, covering economic, cultural and social sectors towards the building of links among the different ethnic groups.³⁴⁹ But despite the significance and the spread of the riots, in some communities where interventions by international NGOs had been made, the consequences were not so severe; that gave the opportunity to organizations to analyze the impact of their peacebuilding work and assess whether their contribution had any effect on the peace process.³⁵⁰ In this context, the INGO CARE tried to evaluate its programs; however, it was soon understood that evaluation process should be more inclusive, taking into consideration interventions implemented by other organizations - NGOs and municipal actors. Throughout this process, the following conclusions were made:³⁵¹ firstly, initial observations that progress was made over inter-ethnic violence among

³⁴⁸ Mytaher Haskuka, Leon Malazogu, Nita Luci, and Ilir Dugolli, *Human Development Report Kosovo 2004. The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and Choices* (Pristina: United Nations Development Programme, 2004), 43

³⁴⁹ Dragana Dulic, "Peace Building and Human Security: Kosovo Case," *HUMSEC Journal* 3, (2009): 11, see also ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation. Evaluations of humanitarian aid in response to the 1999 Kosovo Crisis: Synthesis and meta-evaluation*, Ch. 3 (London: ANLAP, 2001) available at <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-chapter3-review-2001.pdf>

³⁵⁰ Joseph G. Bock, and Huy Pham, "Ethnic Riots in Kosovo: What Went Right?," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19, no.1, (2006); Diana Chigas, Cheyanne Church, Jos De La Haye, Monica Llamazares, Olivera Markovic, Vasiliki Neophotistos, and Artan Venhari, *Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A study of the effectiveness of peacebuilding in preventing violence: Lessons learned from the March 2004 Riots in Kosovo* (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2006)

³⁵¹ Chigas et al., *ibid*

the communities proved to be false; rather, inter-ethnic violence was following more indirect patterns, related to property crimes and theft. However, the significance of such changes went unnoticed. Secondly, it became evident that inter-ethnic interactions did not manage to create a wide network among the communities; rather, such contacts were focused at an individual level. Thirdly, it was concluded that intra-ethnic social networks were of utmost importance for conflict prevention, acting as a mechanism for dissemination of information and for collective decision among the community; but on the other hand, if used in a negative way, such networks could be used for retaining tension and obscure cooperation. Moreover, peace interventions were found not to go deep into the core of conflict's causes and in some cases even to worsen divisions among ethnicities. In another report for the Kosovo crisis it was concluded that so diverse were the interpretations and the approaches followed by various actors for the rising humanitarian issues that a researcher of a meta-evaluation process wondered whether interventions were planned for the same conflict.³⁵² As Tzifakis and Huliaras argue, in Kosovo - but also in BiH - international donors' interests defined priority sectors for interventions, without critically taking into consideration INGOs experience; INGOs - rather than objecting to donors' strategy - continued to participate and implement donors' plans.³⁵³ Similarly, in Bosnia, successful projects could not be extended or repeated as donors' priorities and plans were changing.³⁵⁴

In all, the Kosovo case highlighted the necessity for further deep analysis of peacebuilding interventions. In general, through the assessment of humanitarian aid impact, two different but inter-related aims can be achieved: the enhancing of knowledge on the field and the accountability process.³⁵⁵ In the evaluation of

³⁵² ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation. Evaluations of humanitarian aid in response to the 1999 Kosovo Crisis: Synthesis and meta-evaluation*, 55

³⁵³ Nikolaos Tzifakis and Asteris Huliaras, "Hegemonic Relationships: Donor countries and NGOs in Western Balkan post-conflict reconstruction," *Southeastern Europe* 37 (2013): 334-335

³⁵⁴ Evans-Kent and Bleiker, "Peace beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 108-109

³⁵⁵ Charles-Antoine Hofmann, Les Roberts, Jeremy Shoham, and Paul Harvey, *Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid: A review of current practice*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 17 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004), 10

peacebuilding activities, the focus should be mainly on the learning process that takes place in all phases of an intervention, even after its end. As "peacebuilding is fundamentally experimental", constant monitoring is required so as to examine whether the intervention addresses the needs that come out of a dynamic conflict.³⁵⁶ The impact assessment should be a participatory process where all engaged actors - donors, local and implementing actors evaluators - should contribute, establishing a learning process.³⁵⁷ Thus, it could be argued that - among other factors - the effectiveness of a peacebuilding intervention is based on the ability to follow an information strategy, that is an on-going and *cyclical* process of collecting, analyzing information and re-designing strategies, constantly evaluating project.³⁵⁸ But dissemination of information is not an easy task. For example, back in late 1990s, while there were few evaluations of peacebuilding interventions, access to the available reports was even more problematic; as Spencer³⁵⁹ argues in her synthesis of evaluations of peacebuilding activities, organizations run the risk of losing funds and support if they were presenting publicly interventions with meaningless - or negative - effects, preferring to show only success stories. Thus, organizations were keeping such reports in secrecy, a fact that had a direct effect on knowledge dissemination and learning process.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, knowledge exchange is not problematic only among NGOs; rather loose connections among researchers, academics, decision makers, politicians, practitioners, agencies and people exist, further weakening learning process.³⁶¹ In reality it seems that for many

³⁵⁶ Campbell *et al.*, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," 25

³⁵⁷ Mark Hoffman, "Peace and conflict impact assessment methodology," in *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Hand book*, ed. Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, and Ropers Norbert (Wiesbaden: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004)

³⁵⁸ Jos De la Haye, "Civil Society: Assessing the impact of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities," in *Assessing Progress on the road to peace: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, ed. Goele Scheers (Dan Haag: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2008), 19

³⁵⁹ Tanya Spencer, *A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organizations* (London: ODI, 1998)

³⁶⁰ Susan S. Raines, "Is Peace Education Changing the World? A Meta-Evaluation of Peace-Building Programs in High Conflict Regions," *Peace Research* 36, no.1 (2004): 103–118 quoted in Julie Cencula Olberding, and Douglas J. Olberding, "'Ripple Effects' in Youth Peacebuilding and Exchange Programs: Measuring Impacts Beyond Direct Participants," *International Studies Perspectives* 11, (2010): 76

³⁶¹ Luc Reyhler, "Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Building," in *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Research: A View from Europe*, ed. Francisco Ferrandiz and Antonius C.G.M. Robben (Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2007), 155

actors organizational learning is not a priority;³⁶² rather, often evaluation is being primary regarded as just a necessary process for extending funding from donors.³⁶³ This constitutes a learning paradox in the peacebuilding sector, as Church *et al.* highlight: while one of the main aims of peacebuilders is to expand knowledge of the engaged actors, enhance their understanding over various issues and boost learning process, in reality peacebuilders do not focus on the development of their own skills and knowledge as professionals.³⁶⁴ Thus, as Reyhler³⁶⁵ argues, there is a gap between theory and practice; and one of the main causes for this gap is the incentives that different actors have.

4.8 Political Will

As far as incentives and motives of the different actors are concerned, aid - in relation to the dynamics of a violent conflict - "is often weak when weighed against the range of pressures and interests emanating from international, national, regional and local actors, both public and private."³⁶⁶ Hartzell³⁶⁷ argues that one of the main issues in civil wars is the security fears that main opponents do have in the aftermath of a peace agreement; the possibility that a rival group may be empowered significantly and subsequently use "the power of the state" against the other opponents may hinder the peace process. Hartzell argument is vital for the assessment of the strategies that should be followed by third actors so as to bring

³⁶² Ulrike Hopp, and Barbara Unger, "Time to Learn. Expanding Organisational Capacities

in Conflict Settings," in *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation*

³⁶³ Church and Shouldice, *The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions: Framing the state of play*, 9

³⁶⁴ Church and Rogers, *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*, 5

³⁶⁵ Reyhler, "Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Building," 156

³⁶⁶ Peter Uvin, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict*, A synthesis and a commentary on the lessons learned from case studies on the limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations, Paper for the Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Paris: OECD - DAC, 1999), 4

³⁶⁷ Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, 3 (1999)

all parties to the negotiation table. State elites and powerful groups' priority in a peace process is to retain their privileges or even to improve their position, in political and economic terms.³⁶⁸ As it is described in a UK's Department for International Development (DFID) report, the exclusion of powerful elites from political agreements can, over time, impede the processes of state-building and peacebuilding; on the other hand, in the long run, political settlements become more inclusive embracing the majority of the population and securing peace.³⁶⁹ In the aftermath of Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement in 1987, an Indian peace force was sent to Sri-Lanka; however, as the Tamil Tigers - a major actor of the Sri Lankan civil war - had not participated in the negotiation process, they refused to disarm and soon fighting - that was escalated to a full-scale war that lasted for two years - between the Indian peace force and the Tamil Tigers erupted.³⁷⁰ In the context of conflict, national governments do have the most important role and NGO efforts can only have a complementary role to official negotiations in the peacebuilding process.³⁷¹ Since funding mainly comes from governments, such interventions are closely related to their foreign policy³⁷² and implementing actors (NGOs, agencies) in order to secure funding do have to follow directions and guidelines posed by governmental bodies. However, this can limit partnerships, hindering the potential effectiveness of interventions. The relation between effectiveness of operations with the political will of major actors in conflict areas has been even recognised by the UN through its Peacebuilding Commission that has been recently established.³⁷³ During 1997 and 2000, the Center for International Cooperation of Stanford University and the International Peace Academy joined forces in a research attempt

³⁶⁸ Michael Barnett, and Christoph Zurcher, "The peacebuilder's contract: how external statebuilding reinforces weak statehood," in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, ed. Paris Ronald and Timothy D. Sisk (New York: Routledge, 2009)

³⁶⁹ DFID, *The politics of poverty: Elites, citizens and states: Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on governance and fragile states 2001- 2010* (London, U.K.: DFID, 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67679/plcy-pltcs-dfid-rsch-synth-ppr.pdf

³⁷⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Process and Peace Accords* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 160-161

³⁷¹ Hulme and Goodhand, "NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies," 11

³⁷² James K. Boyce, "Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints," *Development Change* 33, no. 5 (2002)

³⁷³ Thomas Biersteker, "Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission," *Disarmament Forum* 2, no. 2 (2007)

to shed light on the major factors that hinder or contribute to the establishment of peace after an agreement.³⁷⁴ In this project - which focused on 13 cases – among others Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia - it is argued that the motivation of powerful groups and the incentives of neighboring states are key factors for the establishment of peace; moreover, while in "least difficult [conflict] environments" the presence of UN might be sufficient, in major and complex conflicts active participation of important international actors is required. In addition, the approaches and strategies that are necessary for peace might be in contrast to the national interests of these actors. Similarly, in Somalia in 1993, the lack of coherent strategy from the international community in addition to a "collapse of political will" when violence erupted, were the major reasons for the continuation of the conflict.³⁷⁵ A joint evaluation report for the emergency assistance to Rwanda after the genocide finds that key international actors' minor political interests for Rwanda and the absence of a coherent strategy led to the withdrawal of UN's peace forces, creating a vacuum that the humanitarian agencies had to fill - a task that proved to be unfeasible and subsequently led to the genocide; highlighting the necessity for political intervention, the report concludes that "Humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action."³⁷⁶ In Cambodia, regional and international actors (China, USSR, Vietnam and western governments) stopped the provision of military equipment to the opposing groups that they were supporting, making continuation of war more difficult for the warring parties; this created a momentum towards peace negotiations.³⁷⁷ Tschirgi also argues that

"International peacebuilding, despite its lofty aspirations, is a political undertaking which is ultimately dependent upon the political will and

³⁷⁴ John Stephen Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymaker* (New York: IPA, 2001)

³⁷⁵ Chester A. Croker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995)

³⁷⁶ John Eriksson, Howard Adelman, John Borton, Hanne Christensen, Krishna Kumar, Astri Suhrke, David Tardif-Douglin, Stein Villumstad, and Lennart Wohlgemuth, *The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience, Synthesis report* (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), 46-47, available at <http://www.oecd.org/derec/50189495.pdf>

³⁷⁷ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science* 94, no.4 (2000): 781

commitment of national governments. Thus, the first determining factor is inevitably the level and nature of support provided by member states."³⁷⁸

Thus, it could be argued that the effectiveness of civil societies' activities is affected significantly by the overall conditions in the field: continuation or eruption of fighting and hostility leave little breathing space for the civil society actors to take steps; similarly, funding and local institutions' behavior towards civil society's interventions is of significant importance.³⁷⁹ The limited impact of peacebuilding is also mentioned in a meta-evaluation report of eight peacebuilding interventions conducted on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; in this report it is concluded that, although programmes and projects were evaluated as successful, managing to contribute to stability at local level, on the other hand such interventions have no impact at a national level; rather, the importance of the political environment in the recipient countries is highlighted.³⁸⁰ Expanding this, Eriksen argues that in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) one of the main reasons for the failure of UN's intervention was the low funding of the mission, a fact that is related to the interests - economic or geopolitical - of donors.³⁸¹ Humanitarian interventions implemented by agencies and small actors cannot be so effective when having to respond to powerful elites that have economic and political interests in the continuation of a conflict.³⁸² Similar findings

³⁷⁸ Necla Tschirgi, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, Paper prepared for the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, October 7, 2004, New York, 13

³⁷⁹ Tanya Paffenholz, *Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding*, CCDP Working Paper 4, The Graduate Institute, Development and Peacebuilding (Geneva, 2009), 14

³⁸⁰ GIZ, *Results: good, but too local: Summary of the cross-section evaluation Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding* (Bonn: GIZ, 2012), available at <https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2012-en-brochure-synthesis-report-kpfe.pdf>

³⁸¹ Sundstol, Stein Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no.5 (2009): 660

³⁸² Dylan Hendrickson, *Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New Relief 'Agenda' and Its Limits* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1998)

are being reported by Goodhand and Lewer³⁸³ who analyze NGOs activities in war-torn communities in Sri-Lanka.

In the context of interventions while the "military component is politicized, relying on the consent of the parties involved", the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions is defined - among other factors - by their impartiality, neutrality and independence.³⁸⁴ According to the UN, impartiality and neutrality are key principles for the provision of humanitarian assistance; in this context, if assistance provision is not based on real needs but is due to political priorities, it cannot be assumed as humanitarian assistance.³⁸⁵ However, while neutrality is a major characteristic of peacekeeping, it is questionable whether impartiality enhances effectiveness of intervention.³⁸⁶ This is closely related to the continuation of warfare in war-torn areas after initialization of a peace intervention: when a war ends through military means but without a clear winner, peace is more difficult to be preserved as warring parties - having not fulfilled their aims and being unsatisfied by the agreements - have motives to return to fight; on the other hand, in case where a warring party is defeated, probabilities for peace are higher.³⁸⁷ Thus, for international actors, impartiality and the non-support of a dominant group might lead to the continuation of conflict.

³⁸³ Goodhand, "Sri Lanka: NGOs and peace-building in complex political emergencies"

³⁸⁴ Volker Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no.2 (2006): 17

³⁸⁵ OCHA, *Peacebuilding and Linkages with Humanitarian Action: Key Emerging Trends and Challenges*, OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing Series 7 (2011)

³⁸⁶ Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no.6 (1994)

³⁸⁷ Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no.2 (2004): 273

4.9 Towards a holistic approach

Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wolf,³⁸⁸ examining 34 UN peace operations and 44 non-UN peace operations, find - through empirical analysis - that UN peacekeeping interventions have a higher rate of success in comparison to operations conducted by other organizations; although authors cannot define causality for this difference, they argue that lack of impartiality and of resources - two features that theoretically are related to non-UN missions - might offer explanation. Moreover, Sambanis³⁸⁹ finds that while UN missions have positive results in the short-term, in the long-term success is fading; a vital component of this advancement is the lack of UN strategies that promote "self-sustaining economic growth" in the war-torn countries. As Collier *et al.* argue, for countries that come out of a civil war, there is a 44 percent probability that conflict will re-ignite within five years; a main reason for this is that the causes that led to conflict were not settled after cease-fire.³⁹⁰ As Collier and Hoeffler find, economic factor and specifically low *per capita* income can be a decisive factor for the eruption of civil war;³⁹¹ similar findings have also been reported by Fearon and Laitin.³⁹² However, economic development *per se* is not a panacea: experience from the field shows that inequalities increase when "development dollars aimed at poverty reduction have been distributed in a distorted manner", thus causing tension.³⁹³ Rather "equity, fairness and inclusion"

³⁸⁸ Nicholas Sambanis, and Johan Schulhofer-Wolf, "Evaluating multilateral interventions in civil wars: A comparison of UN and non-UN peace operations," in *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization*, ed. Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayiotis Tsakonas (New York: Routledge, 2008)

³⁸⁹ Nicholas Sambanis, "Short- and Long- Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations," *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no.1 (2008)

³⁹⁰ Paul Collier, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynol-Querol, Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 83

³⁹¹ Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, "On economic causes of civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no.4 (1998)

³⁹² James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no.1 (2003)

³⁹³ Peter Woodrow, and Diana Chigas, "A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding," *Reflecting on Peace Practice Project*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2009), 8

are the main factors that should be taken under consideration.³⁹⁴ For Doyle and Sambanis, effective peacebuilding is closely related to sustainable peace; an effective intervention to civil wars should be based on the notion that "the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace."³⁹⁵ In this context, authors present a *peacebuilding triangle* which includes three factors for effective peacebuilding: international capacity, local capacities for peace and the level of hostilities; strong presence of a factor can substitute the absence of the other factor. As de Soto and del Castillo argue,³⁹⁶ the implementation of the peace agreement in the early 1990s in El Salvador underlined the need for a multi-dimensional intervention and the necessity for co-ordination of external assistance: the steps - including rehabilitation and political and social reforms - that had to be taken in order to address the issues that led to conflict had a significant financial cost for the government budget. In this context, the local government had the option to either abandon the IMF stabilization plan or not implement part of the required steps, steps that could jeopardize the peace process. Such issues were exaggerated by the lack of co-ordination between the main actors - UN, IMF, World Bank. As Meernik and Mason underline, for the US-led missions against the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Talibans in Afghanistan, it took only a short-time to win in military terms, while securing peace in that regions proved to be an intricate and hard task;³⁹⁷ in Afghanistan as a *holy war* transformed to a civil war, a war economy has been developed and powerful groups seeked its continuation to protect their interests and position.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁴ *ibid*, 8

³⁹⁵ Michael Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making war and building peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4

³⁹⁶ Alvaro de Soto, and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy* 94 (1994)

³⁹⁷ T. David Meernik, and James D. Mason, "Introduction: sustaining the peace in the aftermath of conflict," in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies. Sustaining the peace*, 1

³⁹⁸ Jonathan Goodhand, "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North-eastern Afghanistan," *Disasters* 24, no.2 (2000)

The highly political environment of the peacebuilding sector has led to the use of another tool, peace conditionality. This can be defined as "the use of aid as a lever to persuade conflicting parties to make peace, to implement peace accords, and to consolidate peace."³⁹⁹ Conditionality for peacebuilding follows the concept of conditionality in other fields of interventions. Freks argues that peace conditionality is the third generation of conditionalities: firstly, in early 1990s was conditionality about economic reforms, secondly about political issues, the third and fourth generations were about conflict resolution, peacebuilding and peace enforcement and the fifth, from 2005 till present time, is a post-conditionality era.⁴⁰⁰ In practice, peace conditionality did not have the expected results, as it happened with other forms of aid; for example, in the cases of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka it is concluded that international interventions for peace weakened domestic support for peace while strengthened local political elites as significant economic and justice issues were neglected in favor of short term stability.⁴⁰¹ Similarly, peace conditionality failed in the Israel-Palestinian case due to contradictory political interests among different actors.⁴⁰² For peace conditionality, if it is to be efficient, major actors should have peace as a first priority; and this can happen only if the policies they follow are defined "in a manner that is consistent with long-term peacebuilding."⁴⁰³ Peace conditionality is closely related to the concept of national sovereignty.⁴⁰⁴ Over the last years, the policies followed by the UN changed considerably: from a *neutral* approach of intervention - where external interventions are limited by the principle of state sovereignty⁴⁰⁵ - towards a more active involvement in the internal affairs of

³⁹⁹ George Freks, *The use of peace conditionalities in conflict and post-conflict settings: A Conceptual Framework and Checklists* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006), 1

⁴⁰⁰ *ibid*, 7-9

⁴⁰¹ Jonathan Goodhand, *Conditioning Peace? The scope and limitations of Peace Conditionalities in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006), 21

⁴⁰² Rex Brynen, "Aid as carrot, aid as stick: The politics of aid conditionality in the Palestinian Territories," in *Powers of Persuasion: Incentives, Sanctions and Conditionality in Peacemaking*, ed. Aaron Griffiths and Catherine Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2008)

⁴⁰³ Jonathan Goodhand, and Mark Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," *International Peace Keeping* 14, no.1 (2007): 57

⁴⁰⁴ James K. Boyce, "Post-Conflict Recovery, Resource Mobilization and Reconstruction," Paper prepared for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Expert Group Meeting on Post-Conflict Recovery and Economic Insecurity, New York, November 30, 2007, 11, available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_bg_papers/bp_wess2008_boyce.pdf

⁴⁰⁵ Albrecht Schnabel, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Second-Generation Preventive Action," *International Peacekeeping* 9, no.2 (2002)

fragile states.⁴⁰⁶ In this context, Boyce⁴⁰⁷ argues that national sovereignty should match the sovereignty of individuals, meaning that the state should respect human rights and freedom of citizens. If this is not the case, then it is up to donors to decide whether aid should be given to authoritarian regimes, according to their interests.

4.10 Conclusion

Over the last two decades global community has drawn its attention over humanitarian assistance with the peacebuilding sector to be a focal point. However after years of engagement results are mixed: in the 1990s there was a significant increase in the number of wars ended through negotiations in comparison to wars that ended through military victory the previous decades;⁴⁰⁸ from 1940 till 1989, the majority - more than 75 percent - of civil wars ended with a military victory and few ended through negotiations; on the other hand, since the 1990s, the percentage of civil wars ended through a peace agreement rose to 41 percent.⁴⁰⁹ Furthermore, between 2002 and 2005, the number of conflicts was reduced from 66 to 56 cases.⁴¹⁰ However, while the number of conflict is decreasing, another issue comes up: complexity. This refers to various factors such as the high number of nearby countries that are engaged in a conflict or the increase in the number of international actors involved since the end of the Cold War.⁴¹¹ Moreover,

⁴⁰⁶ Carlos Santiso, "Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peace-Building," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34, no.3 (2002)

⁴⁰⁷ James K. Boyce, "Obstacles to peace conditionality," special issue 'Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars,' *The Adelphi Papers* 42, no.351 (2002)

⁴⁰⁸ Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 153

⁴⁰⁹ Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6

⁴¹⁰ Martina Fischer, "Participatory Evaluation and Critical Peace Research: A Precondition for Peacebuilding," in *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation*

⁴¹¹ Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no.5 (2001): 634

complexity can be seen through linkages of a conflict with another conflict in neighboring countries.⁴¹²

On the other hand, considerable failures have claimed the lives of millions of people. In half of the countries where peace interventions have been made, conflict resurged within a five-year period, whereas in most cases such interventions when terminated had not contributed to the establishment of a democratic state in recipient countries;⁴¹³ or even worse, the tragic incidents in Angola's civil war and the genocide in Rwanda that both took place soon after the signing of peace accords.⁴¹⁴ Such incidents made evident that reforms should take place so as peace operations are able to respond to the dynamics of the conflicts. These changes took place gradually, at all levels. One of the major steps was made in 2000 through the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the *Brahimi* report, named after the chairman of the panel)⁴¹⁵ where several recommendations were made for more efficient UN peacekeeping interventions. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the 2001 report *Prevention of Armed Conflict*⁴¹⁶ highlighted the lack of consensus among members on conflict prevention and sustainability of peace. This deficiency also included the absence of a well-accepted framework for evaluation of peacebuilding which has been characterized as a "methodological anarchy"⁴¹⁷ despite the fact that there was a vast literature on evaluation methods for development activities and humanitarian assistance.⁴¹⁸ As a response to the call of UN Secretary-General, various initiatives were launched. One of these was the

⁴¹² Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict and Regional Complexes, 1989-97," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no.5 (1998) : 624-625

⁴¹³ Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?," 35

⁴¹⁴ Gareth Evans, [Conflict Prevention: Ten Lessons We Have Learned] (Speech at *Peace and Conflict Society Conference Before the Crisis Breaks: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Preventive Diplomacy in the 21st Century* February 2007, University of Toronto, Toronto February 4, 2007)

⁴¹⁵ Lakhdar Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) A/55/305, S/2000/809

⁴¹⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, 2001. *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/55/985- S/2001/574, 7 June 2001

⁴¹⁷ John Borton, and Joanna Macrae, *Evaluation Synthesis of Emergency Aid* (London: Department for International Development 1997) quoted in Spencer, *A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organizations*, 7

⁴¹⁸ Church and Shouldice, *The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions: Framing the state of play*

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict that was founded in 2003 and is an international civil society network that focuses on building linkages for peace and security between civil society and various actors - governments, organizations, agencies - aiming at the laying of foundations for consensus on peacebuilding issues. Earlier, another major step was made in September 2000, when the Security Council recognized for first time as root causes of conflict socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian factors.⁴¹⁹ In this context, in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) donors expressed their commitment in enhancing the impact of their support, especially in fragile states. Despite these advancements, peacebuilding until 2005, at top level could be characterized as "an institutional orphan" since peacebuilding was included in a wider umbrella of actors' activities.⁴²⁰ However, in that year a major step was made towards the institutionalization of the sector as the UN established the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in an attempt to contribute to a sustainable peace in war-torn countries.⁴²¹ Subsequently, in 2006 the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was introduced to support activities for the establishment of peace in post-conflict cases.⁴²² In 2005, the *Report on Integrated Missions* - commissioned by the UN - was published referring to a crisis management framework towards the establishment of peace, where political, humanitarian, rule of law, security sectors are included in a holistic strategy in the context of UN.⁴²³ Soon after, guidelines for the *Integrated Missions Planning Process* were published by the UN.⁴²⁴ These steps sealed the institutionalization of the peacebuilding process.⁴²⁵ But despite these advancements,

⁴¹⁹ Renata Dwan, "Consensus: A Challenge for Conflict Prevention?" in *Preventing Violent Conflict, The Search for Political Will, Strategies and Effective Tools* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2000)

⁴²⁰ Necla Tschirgi, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, 5

⁴²¹ UN, "About PBSO," UN.org. <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/about.shtml> (accessed December 10, 2013)

⁴²² UNPBF, "Who we are," UNPBF.org. <http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/> (accessed December 10, 2013)

⁴²³ Espen, Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005)

⁴²⁴ Kathleen M. Jennings, and Anja T. Kaspersen, "Introduction: Integration Revisited," special issue 'Integrated Missions Revisited: Policy and Practitioner Perspectives', *International Peacekeeping* 15, no.4 (2008): 445

⁴²⁵ Erin McCandless, *In Pursuit of Peacebuilding for Perpetual Peace*, WP (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010)

the peacebuilding actors had a long way until they could meet the requirements of such a complex sector. Thus, in 2008, Church⁴²⁶ argued that

"the field of peacebuilding evaluation matured from its infancy into an awkward, sometimes confused, at moments precious and other times disappointing teenager. Like any teenager, it is full of untapped potential that needs to be supported and nurtured if it is to develop."

In the same context, in the evaluation report for the assessment of the contribution of European Commission in CPPB activities over the period of 2001-2010, it is concluded that overall, the Commission's strategy in CPPB missed coherence and systematic tools and that such policies should be revised.⁴²⁷ On the other hand, it is now understood by all actors engaged in the sector that enhancing peacebuilding processes and their evaluation are not distinct topics that face simple research and methodological issues; rather a holistic approach that addresses structural and institutional factors in a wider context should be followed.⁴²⁸ The complex conditions met in war affected countries and in post-conflict environments and the requirements for peace need the active participation of multiple actors-donors as no single donor can alone tackle such intricate situations and afford the cost for establishing peace and recovery processes. As Brahimi and Ahmed argue:⁴²⁹

"The current geo-political landscape is far more fragmented than in the immediate post-Cold War "honeymoon" period when the international community brokered political solutions to the problems that had plagued Namibia, Lebanon, South Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. The international consensus required for political solutions to several

⁴²⁶ Cheyanne Church, "Peacebuilding Evaluation: From Infancy to Teenager," *New Routes* 13, no.3 (2008): 4

⁴²⁷ ADE, Thematic evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, Final Report, Vol.1 (Brussels: Evaluation for the European Commission, 2011). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol1_en.pdf

⁴²⁸ Andrew Blum, *Improving Peacebuilding Evaluation: A Whole-of-Field Approach* (Washington, DC: USIP, 2011)

⁴²⁹ Lakhdar Brahimi, and Salman Ahmed, *In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation*, Center on International Cooperation (New York: New York University, 2008)

current crises is not remotely as strong today. As a result, recent operations have deployed not only without the benefit of a comprehensive peace agreement in place, but also without the necessary leverage in hand to overcome political dead-lock during the implementation phase."

However, as such cases of war and conflict are extremely diverse intervention policies and activities should be tailor-made to the necessities of every case. But as with other forms of aid, results of peace building efforts rely firstly on whether peace is a genuine priority for the main actors, mainly donors and aid recipients.⁴³⁰

⁴³⁰ Boyce, "Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints"

CHAPTER 5

Evaluating NGOs Peacebuilding Activities: A Case Study in Uganda

5.1 Introduction

In the previous section, the sector of peacebuilding was under examination. Initially, the development of peacebuilding since the early 1990s was presented in a historical and political context. It was argued that for the assessment of peacebuilding activities, special evaluation methodology is needed; instead of just measuring outcomes at the confined project level, through specialized tools the *impact* of interventions should be assessed at a greater - societal - level. Despite steps that have been made, evaluation of peacebuilding activities remains an open case where further research is needed. In addition, one of the main conclusions of the previous chapter is that a holistic approach should be followed in peacebuilding; the complex conditions of a conflict environment is a huge burden that none organization can overcome by itself. Rather, interventions should have a complementary character, covering various sectors - economic, social and political. However, for the implementation of such a cohesive strategy, the political will for peace of those engaged is a prerequisite. The political will - especially of donors - is a decisive factor as in many cases, apart from the devastating effects of the conflict, elites and powerful groups - and even international actors - may desire its continuation as that serves their interests.

In this section, the Ugandan case study is scrutinized. This analysis, which is based on the theoretical framework that has been established in the two previous sections, will take place in two parts: first a historical overview of Uganda will be offered,

focusing on the social, economic and political conditions in which conflict erupted. As it has been argued in the first section of this thesis, the analysis of the historical and political context is vital for the implementation of peacebuilding activities so as to understand the environment and the dynamics of the conflict and plan a well-organized approach. In this section, the investigation of Uganda covers briefly the period before independence and thereafter becomes more analytic, focusing on the role of the Ugandan government, the evolution of the conflict and the guerrilla group and the current conditions in northern Uganda. Through the analysis, it is argued, among others, that the current government of Uganda used the war in the northern part of the country so as to establish itself in power for decades. Although warfare has stopped since 2008, government's approaches and policies raise questions about the ownership of peacebuilding interventions and their effectiveness. In the second part of the case study, the peacebuilding project is analyzed; that section starts with a brief overview of the EU security policy framework and the importance of civil society's role. Then the peacebuilding project is presented and an assessment is attempted. Although a complete evaluation of the project is not possible since its operation was interrupted due to financial constraints, its implementation - in relation to the external factors and existing social and political conditions - offers valuable information about issues that can affect significantly the effectiveness of a well designed peacebuilding project implemented by a NGO.

5.2 Historical context

Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa. Neighboring countries are Sudan in the North, Kenya at the East, DRC at the West, Rwanda and Tanzania in the South. The tropical climate with frequent rainfalls, the numerous lakes and rivers all contribute to the making of a magnificent environment. Because of its beautiful scenery, the variety of wild life and the friendliness of the people, Winston Churchill named

Uganda as the *Pearl of Africa*.⁴³¹ What makes former's British Prime Minister description historically significant is the fact that Uganda was a British colony till 1962, when it became independent.⁴³² Back then, while advancements in the political arena were severe, prospects for economic growth were good with high rates of development and an administration system that was built during the colonial age.⁴³³ But despite the suitable conditions for development and prosperity, Uganda followed a bloody path. As a result, in 2003, Jan Egeland, then UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Humanitarian Relief Coordinator described the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda as "the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world."⁴³⁴ This crisis was the result of a prolonged violent and dynamic conflict that started in mid 1960s and continued until the first decade of the new millennium. A conflict that had no single cause and where various actors - such as foreign governments, military personnel, ambitious and selfish political leaders, insurgent groups, political and religious parties and different tribes - all participated in an on-going war that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, displaced millions of people from their ancestors' land and led the local economy to a collapse, making Uganda one of the poorest countries in the world.

In order to better understand the issue of conflict in Uganda, a brief overview of the recent history of the country will be presented, going back to the 18th century. The history of Uganda can be divided in 5 periods: The pre-colonial era (from the last decades of the 1800s till independence), the first independent government under Obote – from 1963 until 1971, the Idi Amin Dada reign - 1971 to 1979 – the second era of Obote, from 1980 to 1985 and lastly the current era, from 1986 till present day with president Museveni in power.

⁴³¹ Fional McWilliam, "Pearl of Africa," *Geographical* 71, no.1 (1999): 30

⁴³² Tim Judah, "Child Soldiers, Sex Slaves, and Cannibalism at Gunpoint: The Horrors of Uganda's North," *The Independent*, October 23, 2004

⁴³³ William Muhumuza, "The Paradox of Pursuing Anti-Poverty Strategies under Structural Adjustment Reforms in Uganda," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 27, no.3 (2002)

⁴³⁴ "War in Uganda World's Worst Forgotten Crisis: UN", Agence France-Presse, November 11, 2003, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/war-northern-uganda-worlds-worst-forgotten-crisis-un>

5.2.1 Pre-colonial era

Historically, the first foreigners to arrive in the area that is named today Uganda were the Arabs, around 1850; from thereafter, their presence grew stronger making alliances with local kingdoms, being interested in slave raiding and ivory.⁴³⁵ The next act in the colonial era took place in 1862 when the famous British explorer John Hanning Speke arrived in the Buganda region⁴³⁶ and then missionaries followed.⁴³⁷ Over the next years, other European countries such Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal invaded the African continent. So fierce was the competition among these powers that in 1884-1885, the Berlin West African Conference was organized where European countries divided the African continent according to their political and economic interests, creating spheres of control.⁴³⁸ Out of the whole African continent, only two countries managed to remain independent: Ethiopia and Liberia.⁴³⁹ This fragmentation had a considerable impact on local societies all across Africa as the new borders were drawn according to colonists' interests, not taking into consideration factors such as ethnicity, language.⁴⁴⁰ As Mandami⁴⁴¹ argues "brought within the fold of one country peoples at different levels of social development and without historical contacts, while splitting nationalities and tribes into, or among, several countries." In the area that is called today Uganda, before colonization, different kingdoms - such as the Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, Toro and Ankole - existed, in addition to various communities and tribes such as Lango, Acholi, Madi, West Nile, Bukedi, Bugisi with a variety of customs, different social and

⁴³⁵ Zoe Marsh, and William Kingsnorth, *An introduction to the History of east Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 122

⁴³⁶ "Uganda-Pearl of Africa with Long History," *Korea Times (Seoul, Korea)*, October 9, 2000

⁴³⁷ "Today in Uganda History", *The New Vision*, available at:

<http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=634199&CatID=417>

⁴³⁸ Tibamanya Mwene Mushanga, "Social and Political Aspects of Violence in Africa," in *Social Problems in Africa: New Visions*, ed. Apollo Rwomire (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 157

⁴³⁹ John Rennie Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 14

⁴⁴⁰ Gosbert Byamungu, "Construing Newer 'Window' of Ecumenism for Africa: A Catholic Perspective," *The Ecumenical Review* 53, no.3, (2001): 341

⁴⁴¹ Mahmood Mamdani, quoted in Phares Mutibwa, *Uganda since independence* (London: Hurst & Co., 1992), 4

economic structures.⁴⁴² Moreover, two main linguistic groups could be distinguished, the Bantu in the South and the Nilotic in the North; people in the north were usually pastoralists while in the south agriculture was the main source of livelihood.⁴⁴³ In pre-colonial Uganda two kinds of societies could be distinguished:⁴⁴⁴ the stratified and the non-stratified; the stratified had a well structured system with defined hierarchy, chiefs and laws. Such groups were the Baganda, Banyankore, Batoro, Banyoro and Basoga. On the other hand, non-stratified societies had a lower level of organization.⁴⁴⁵ Non-stratified societies include various ethnics groups such as the Acholi, Karamajong, Iteso, Kawka, Samia in the North and Bakiga, Bakonjo in the South. Even long before the arrival of colonists in Uganda, conflicts and wars between local kingdoms and tribes were frequent.⁴⁴⁶ However, the arrival of imperial forces had a considerable impact on these traditional structures and soon, colonists started establishing their own formations; alliances between different kingdoms and colonists were made and foreigners were competing to strengthen their influence over the local kingdoms.⁴⁴⁷ The presence of foreigners and the establishment of religious parties - Roman Catholics, Anglican Protestant and Muslims - initiated a cycle of violence where all parties were aiming at gaining control over local society. It is estimated that in Buganda there were more victims due to this religious war in comparison to violent incidents that had taken place the last five centuries in Buganda.⁴⁴⁸ These religious divisions among the locals augmented the social fragmentation.

⁴⁴² Joy Moncrieffe, *Uganda's Political Economy: A synthesis of major howevert,* " Report for DFID Uganda (London: ODI, 2004), 12, available at <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/DOC44.pdf>

⁴⁴³ *ibid*

⁴⁴⁴ A.B.K. Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press 1994)

⁴⁴⁵ Mutibwa, *Uganda since independence*, 1

⁴⁴⁶ For a brief description of early historical ages of Uganda see Thomas Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999)

⁴⁴⁷ Michael Twaddle, *Kakungulu & the Creation of Uganda, 1868-1928* (London: James Currey, 1993)

⁴⁴⁸ Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985*, 27

5.2.2 Colonial era

In late 1880s, the German representative Carl Peters signed a treaty with the King of Buganda⁴⁴⁹ whose kingdom was one of the most powerful in the region. In the beginning, Britain was not much interested in the region of Uganda or East Africa.⁴⁵⁰ However, what forced them to change their position was the treaty that Karl Peters signed with the king of Buganda;⁴⁵¹ the expansion of the German influence in that area could become a significant problem for the British plans to establish free trade conditions with open markets in the newly colonized areas. The British had the vision of creating a route from Cape to Cairo that would be of utmost importance, connecting all the colonies and facilitating trade and administration of this huge area.⁴⁵² The British officials were identifying the protective tariffs that other colonial powers were imposing as a threat to their interests.⁴⁵³ The German initiative constituted a threat to the British interests in the African continent and was a major reason for the signing of the Heligoland Treaty in 1890 between Britain and German, which settled territorial issues in Africa and in Europe among the two countries: one of these was the withdrawal of Germany from the region that would later be unified and named Uganda.⁴⁵⁴ As a result of the political advancements, Buganda was declared a British protectorate in 1894.⁴⁵⁵ While Buganda was not the only powerful kingdom in the region, its defined structural hierarchy⁴⁵⁶ and the various chiefs that were in control of small communities constituted an administration system that was the most effective way to control the protectorate. This form of administration by the

⁴⁴⁹ Assa Okoth, *A History of Africa: African Societies and the Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1800-1915*, vol.1 (Nairobi: East African Education Publishers, 2006), 130

⁴⁵⁰ Frederick Kisekka-Ntale, "Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 32, no.4 (2007)

⁴⁵¹ Arne Perras, *Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856-1918: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 166

⁴⁵² Lodewijk Hendrik Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 157-158

⁴⁵³ Anthony Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 188

⁴⁵⁴ *ibid*, 159

⁴⁵⁵ Walter Elkan, *Migrants and Proletarians: Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 8

⁴⁵⁶ Ursula K. Hicks, *Development from Below: Local Government and Finance in Developing Countries of the Commonwealth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 115

British through traditional authorities was described as *indirect rule*.⁴⁵⁷ Apart from Buganda, the colonial ruler was seeking to expand its sphere of influence also to the other kingdoms. This was a process that was implemented through the Baganda who had a role of *sub-imperialists* over the other kingdoms.⁴⁵⁸ Soon after 1894, the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga became part of the protectorate, after the signing of a series of treaties.⁴⁵⁹ Thus, in the protectorate, the Kiganda administration system was introduced, where chiefs from Buganda were sent in the different districts to set up the required structures.⁴⁶⁰

However, despite the unification process, in reality so extended were the differences between the people in the north and in south Uganda that a colonial administrator proposed that the northern area should be a part of Sudan and the new state of Uganda should include only the southerners.⁴⁶¹ These differences were to be augmented by the fact that the Buganda kingdom had a special relation with the colonists, in comparison to the other kingdoms; this relation was sealed through the Agreement of 1900, when Buganda kingdom was given a self-governed status concerning native administration issues.⁴⁶² On the other hand, despite the agreements, various issues among the kingdoms had not been resolved. Such a major problem was about the so-called *Lost Counties*, an area that initially belonged to Bunyoro kingdom but during a short war was conquered by British and Buganda forces.⁴⁶³ This issue remained open until after independence. Moreover, colonial rule and the new administration system had another devastating effect on the population and on the environment. Changes in the traditional productive sectors imposed by

⁴⁵⁷ Audrey I. Richards, "Introduction" in *East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes*, ed. Audrey I. Richards (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), 14

⁴⁵⁸ A. D. Low, "The Dislocated Polity," in *Uganda Now: Between Decay & Development*, ed. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (London: James Currey, 1988), 40

⁴⁵⁹ Kenneth Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 66

⁴⁶⁰ David E. Apter, *The political kingdom in Uganda: A study of Bureaucratic Nationalism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 159

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid*, 4

⁴⁶² Audrey I. Richards, "The nature of the problem - Methods of work," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. Audrey I. Richards (Cambridge: Unknown, 1952), 1

⁴⁶³ Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*

the new economic order created the appropriate conditions for an epidemic of sleeping sickness.⁴⁶⁴ It is estimated that 200.000 people in the Busoga region and 400.000 Baganda died from sleeping sickness from 1895 to 1906.⁴⁶⁵ In the beginning of the century the economy of Uganda was based mainly on subsistence agricultural production.⁴⁶⁶ Soon the approach that was followed by colonial authorities encouraged the production of cash crops - such as cotton and later coffee - but as a result of the policy these highly profitable cash crops were under the control of non-Africans, especially Indians, as it was also the case with the trade sector.⁴⁶⁷

The Baganda administration system was used for the next three decades in the new country of Uganda. It was in 1920s when the old establishment - and subsequently the influence of Buganda over the rest of the country - was challenged by the new generation officials; in 1921, the British established the Legislative Council but locals were not allowed to participate.⁴⁶⁸ The introduction of Swahili as an alternative official language took place in 1927.⁴⁶⁹ Colonial policy over political and administrative issues in the coming years did not favor the creation of a national unity feeling and inter-tribal institutions were not allowed by colonists, with the tribe to be the highest level at which institutions were to be built. Mamdani⁴⁷⁰ argues that "every institution touched by the hand of the colonial state was given a pronounced regional or nationality character. It became a truism that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant a southerner and a merchant an Asian". Moreover, the fact that "Uganda had little real existence save as an administrative unit, and that

⁴⁶⁴ T. Koerner, P. de Raadt, and I. Maudlin, I., "The 1901 Uganda sleeping sickness epidemic revisited: A case of mistaken identity?," *Parasitology Today* 11, no.8 (1995)

⁴⁶⁵ Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985*, 28

⁴⁶⁶ Audrey, I. Richards, Ford Gibson Sturrock, and Jean M. Fortt, *Subsistence to commercial farming in present-day Buganda: An economic and Anthropological Survey* (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1973)

⁴⁶⁷ Vali Jamal, "Asians in Uganda, 1880-1972: Inequality and Expulsion," *The Economic History Review* 29, no.4 (1976)

⁴⁶⁸ Allison Butler Herrick, Baron Saone Crocker, Sidney A. Harrison, Howard J. John, Susan R. MacKnight, and Richard F. Nyrop, *Area Handbook for Uganda* (Washington: DC, 1969), 32

⁴⁶⁹ A. D. Roberts, "The sub-imperialism of the Baganda," *Journal of African History* 3, no.3, (1962):450

⁴⁷⁰ Mahmood Mamdani, *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda* (London: Heinemann) quoted in Juma Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda* (Uppsala: Nordic African Institute, 2002), 12

the tribe rather than the nation was the largest genuine community" was not recognized by British authorities as a real issue.⁴⁷¹ On the contrary, the British followed a divide and rule strategy;⁴⁷² while they tried to create a state, they encouraged different ethnic groups to be specialized in specific economic sectors and tasks. One of the results was the creation of a tribal-based fragmented society where political, social and economic status was pre-defined. During the colonial era, the Acholi region in northern Uganda was used by the British as a source for the recruitment of security forces; however, this pattern of army composition was only to change according to the will and fears of the people who were in power.

Political activity in the protectorate through the creation of parties or movements had begun in late 1930s - with the exception of the Bataka Association in 1921 - despite the opposition by the official protectorate government over participation of Africans in parties as that could undermine the traditional institutions.⁴⁷³ However, through this policy it was impossible for nationalist movements to develop, a fact that could contribute to the unification of the population. Discontent over the old traditional rules and the British administration was growing; young, well educated people, mainly from Baganda, were questioning the old establishment, requesting better representation in the *Lukiko*.⁴⁷⁴ In mid 1940s, legislative changes took place: the *Katikkiro* - an administrative official position similar to that of a prime minister⁴⁷⁵ - of Buganda in addition to two other officials participated in the Legislative Council; the next step was the expansion of participation with the presence of representatives from other provinces.⁴⁷⁶ However, this on-going process of democratization put pressure on the Buganda kingdom and had an adverse effect: the Baganda were feeling that they were losing the special status that they had

⁴⁷¹ Anthony Donald Low, and Robert C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955: Two Studies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 260

⁴⁷² Kisekka-Ntale, "Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda"

⁴⁷³ Kevin Shillington, *Encyclopedia of African history*, vol.1 (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 1622

⁴⁷⁴ Okoth, *A History of Africa: African nationalism and the de-colonisation process*, vol.2 (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2006), 64

⁴⁷⁵ Henri J.M. Claessen, "Aspects of Law and Order in Early State Societies," in *The Law's Beginnings*, ed. Ferdinand Joseph Maria Feldbrugge (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), 168

⁴⁷⁶ Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955: Two Studies*

according to the 1900 Agreement, becoming equal with the other provinces of the protectorate.⁴⁷⁷ In 1945 and subsequently in 1949 violent riots erupted in numerous cities in Uganda with political, economic and social motives.⁴⁷⁸ Among others, protesters in 1949 were demanding more control of the economy by Africans and democratization of institutions, a movement that was against the British colonists but also against the *Kabaka*⁴⁷⁹ who was accused of being a colonists' *puppet*; however, the British reaction was to increase the presence of foreigners in vital functions of the economy, such as the banking system and the trading of commodities.⁴⁸⁰ Moreover, among others, traders and farmers were organizing themselves through the creation of political institutions such as the *Sons of Kintu*, the *Bataka* party. Similarly, the *Uganda African Farmers' Union*⁴⁸¹ was founded which was the predecessor of the *Uganda National Congress (UNC)* - founded in 1952 by Ignatius Musazi - the first political party that could be described as an *Uganda-wide*, nationalist and inter-racial institution with a self-governance demand.⁴⁸² The UNC had drawn the interest of chiefs and elders not only from Baganda, but also from the other tribes such as Lango, Teso, Toro.⁴⁸³ Despite the political unrest, substantial economic development was taken place and minerals such as copper, cobalt, wolfram and various others had been discovered, cultivations were growing and prospects were good; had it not been for this prosperity, clashes and riots would have been worse.⁴⁸⁴ Earlier, the British had created the East African High Commission where governors of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika were participating; the plan was to create an economic and political union among these three colonies with one Legislative Council, controlled by a European majority.⁴⁸⁵ The fear of entering into a federation and thus losing the semi-autonomous status triggered a sharp reaction in

⁴⁷⁷ Paul Knaplund, *Britain: Commonwealth and Empire, 1901-1955* (London: H. Hamilton, 1956), 463

⁴⁷⁸ Gardner Thompson, "Colonialism in crisis: the Uganda disturbances of 1945," *African Affairs* 91, no.365 (1992)

⁴⁷⁹ King of the Buganda Kingdom

⁴⁸⁰ Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985*, 33

⁴⁸¹ George W. Shepherd, "Modernization in Uganda: the Struggle for Unity," in *The Transformation of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology*, ed. Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 326

⁴⁸² Shillington, *Encyclopedia of African History*, 1622

⁴⁸³ George W. Shepherd, *They Wait in Darkness* (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), 171

⁴⁸⁴ Harold Ingrams, *Uganda: A Crisis of Nationhood* (London: HM Stationery Office, 1960), 30

⁴⁸⁵ Philip N. Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1995), 47

the Buganda kingdom. These incidents led to the 1953 crisis. The Kabaka king demanded independence for his kingdom separately from the rest of the protectorate.⁴⁸⁶ According to the Agreement of 1900, the Kabaka had to comply with the British policies and even though a series of meetings followed between the Kabaka and the Governor, no solution was found. These facts led to the deportation of the Kabaka king to London in November 1953.⁴⁸⁷

A year before, a new governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen, had been appointed.⁴⁸⁸ The new governor had a belief that the old political establishment should be abandoned and a new form of governance should be built, being in favor of "a unitary form of central Government on parliamentary." He believed that all different kingdoms should have an equal status and all should work for the progress of the whole country.⁴⁸⁹ Indeed, Sir Andrew Cohen followed policies that favored political, social and economic changes, empowering locals.⁴⁹⁰ On the other hand, while Cohen was envisioning an independent and self-governed Uganda, the policy of the British government over its East African colonies was not clear; political leaders in Britain had not decided whether the solution of independent states or a form of federation for the colonies would be followed.⁴⁹¹ The British tried through the deportation of Kabaka to weaken the status of Buganda; but this move did not bring the expected result. The Kabaka returned after two years of exile and subsequently in Buganda there was an up rise of nationalism.⁴⁹² Support for the deported Kabaka was increased and society and power were consolidated around him.⁴⁹³ The deportation of Kabaka put relations between Buganda and Britain under extreme tension, while

486 John C. Hatch, *Africa Today And Tomorrow: An Outline of Basic Facts and Major Problems* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 59

487 Kevin Ward, "Ugandan Christian Communities in Britain," *International Review of Mission* 89, no. 354 (2000): 320

488 Inghams, *Uganda: A Crisis of Nationhood*

489 Anthony D. Low, *Buganda in modern History* (California: University of California Press, 1971), 105

490 Robert C. Pratt, "The Anatomy of a crisis: Uganda, 1953-55," *International Journal* 10, no.4 (1955)

491 Christopher Wrigley, "Four Steps towards disaster," in *Uganda Now: Between Decay & Development*, 30

492 David E. Apter, "Democracy for Uganda: A Case for Comparison," *Daedalus* 124, no.3 (1995)

493 Donald S. Rothchild, *Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960), 82

anti-British sentiments were rising. The Buganda crisis ended in 1955, after Britain appointed Sir Keith Hancock to analyze the situation and negotiate with Buganda authorities; the solution that was finally accepted proposed - apart from the return of the deported king - that Buganda would still remain a part of the protectorate and the Kabaka would become a constitutional king, while the importance of the Lukiko would be upgraded.⁴⁹⁴ UNC's support of Kabaka over his deportation issue had a severe effect on the integrity of the new nationalist movement that lost momentum and was weakened politically.⁴⁹⁵ Although at first sight the position of the Kabaka and Buganda were weakened after the agreement of 1955, in reality the status of traditional king of Buganda was strengthened. As Okoth argues, an uprising of neo-traditionalism followed, a move that led to the creation of the Kabaka-Yekka political party in 1961; in this context, Musazi's nationalist party was further weakened.⁴⁹⁶ According to Fallers, "[the Baganda] have also remained intensely chauvinistic and reluctant to merge themselves into a wider Uganda nationalism."⁴⁹⁷ Another indication of the powerful position of Buganda was evident by the participation of Baganda people in Uganda's Higher Public Service: in 1959, although Baganda were 16 percent of the total population, their participation in the high levels of administration was about 40 percent.⁴⁹⁸ In the aftermath of the Second World War, colonization in Africa was coming to an end: one by one, African nations started demanding to be in command of over their own state of affairs and future.⁴⁹⁹ Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Zaire, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Somalia were among the first nations that were free of colonization. Uganda soon followed the same path and became independent on the 9th of October 1962.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁴ Marsh and Kingsnorth, *An Introduction to the History of East Africa*, 215

⁴⁹⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *Pan-Africanism and East African integration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 106

⁴⁹⁶ Okoth, *A History of Africa: African nationalism and the de-colonisation process*, p. 67

⁴⁹⁷ Lloyd A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," *American Anthropologists* 63, no.4 (1961): 685

⁴⁹⁸ Crawford Young, *The politics of cultural pluralism* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 239

⁴⁹⁹ Norman R. Bennett, *Africa and Europe: From Roman Times to National Independence* (New York: Africana, 1984)

⁵⁰⁰ James S. Olson, and Robert Shadle, *Historical Dictionary of European Imperialism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 643

5.2.3 After independence

This important political change was accompanied with great expectations for prosperity by Ugandans as economic conditions seemed to be adequate for growth.⁵⁰¹ macro-economic indicators provided a picture of a healthy economic environment; the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and services had positive prospects for further development. In the first years after independence people were benefiting for economic prosperity; the real GDP was increasing at a rate of 4 to 6 percent.⁵⁰² The first government that took power after independence was a coalition between two political parties: the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) a party founded in 1955 by the influential politician Milton Obote, and the Kabaka Yekka (KY), a political party from the Buganda.⁵⁰³ Earlier in 1961, the federal status of Buganda was accepted by Obote,⁵⁰⁴ a step forward for the alliance of UPC and KY. However this special status was hindering the process of unification; other ethnic groups were identifying the Buganda administrative chiefs as the main enemy, instead of the British colonists.⁵⁰⁵ In the next two years, there was a seemingly stable political scene and a widespread perception that the two political parties were collaborating harmoniously. But in reality, severe political internal processes were developing. In this context, new political parties were created such as the Democratic Party which was founded in 1956 and had support in the Catholic community.⁵⁰⁶ At that era, various actors involved were seeking personal opportunistic interests⁵⁰⁷ instead of

⁵⁰¹ Alcira Kreimer, Paul Collier, Colin S. Scott, and Margaret Arnold, *Uganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 17

⁵⁰² John A. Okidi, Sarah Ssewanyana, Lawewnce Bategeka, and Fred Muhumuza, "Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth" - A Country Case Study on Uganda, Project funded and managed jointly by AFD, DFID, GTZ, KfW and World Bank (Kampala: Economic Policy Research Centre, 2005), 14

⁵⁰³ Ali A. Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda," *International Journal* 25, no.3 (1970)

⁵⁰⁴ John E. Jessup, *An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 542

⁵⁰⁵ Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda*, 9

⁵⁰⁶ Ronald Segal, Catherine Hoskyns, and Rosalynde Ainslie, *Political Africa: A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 463

⁵⁰⁷ Kasozi argues that "most of those who crossed the floor realized that it was violence, not votes, that decided who controlled the distribution of resources in Uganda at that material time; since Obote had the means to satisfy their greed, it was ultimately Obote who benefited from their shift in party alliance." Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985*, 71

having as a common aim the unification of the country and subsequently the economic development.⁵⁰⁸ The Buganda, the dominant *state-in-a state* was the most prosperous and developed and Baganda aimed at retaining this status; on the other hand, Obote tried to make a turn towards developmental socialism, a move that could be partly interpreted as an action against the rule of Buganda.⁵⁰⁹ A series of incidents took place between 1963 and 1965 when parliament members of the opposition party defected to the UPC. The opposition leader, Basil Bataringaya, defected in December 1964 and became a minister in the Obote's government; more members of KY followed later making the government powerful.⁵¹⁰ Obote, having increased his parliamentary power, was in no need of Kabaka's support. These incidents, in addition to the suppression of the opposition in Obote's party, contributed to the establishment of an autocratic way of ruling things in Uganda. Discontent about Obote was growing and opposition inside the ruling party was rising; in 1965 some of the ministers led by Grace Ibingira – UPC's secretary general and senior cabinet minister - were secretly preparing to remove Obote from power.⁵¹¹ It was clear that Obote's government was not supported from the Ugandan people; rather it was military forces that kept government in power.⁵¹² As a result, it was highly unlikely that Obote's party could win the next elections.⁵¹³ Tension peaked in 1966 when a civil conflict surfaced where Obote and Amin Dada were accused for smuggling gold.⁵¹⁴ The Kabaka ordered a parliamentary investigation and subsequently these incidents led to the 1966 crisis. Obote was informed that a military move could be initiated against him from the Kabaka.⁵¹⁵ For one more time, ethnic divisions were augmented. Obote's fear of the Buganda kingdom resulted in an attack against the Kabaka's palace - government army was led by Colonel Amin

⁵⁰⁸ For a detailed description see Kasozi, *ibid*, 59-103

⁵⁰⁹ Apter, "Democracy for Uganda: A Case for Comparison"

⁵¹⁰ G. F. Engholm, and Ali A. Mazrui, "Crossing the floor and the tensions of representation in East Africa," *Parliamentary Affairs* 27 (1967)

⁵¹¹ Edward Kannyo, "Uganda," in *International Handbook of Human Rights*, ed. Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 389

⁵¹² Henry Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana Pub. 1978), 155

⁵¹³ E.A. Brett, "Responding to Poverty in Uganda: Structures, Policies and Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs* 52, no.1 (1998): 313

⁵¹⁴ "Obote: From a village boy to a president", *The New Vision*, July 10, 2008, available at <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/662/638284>

⁵¹⁵ Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 144

Dada - and subsequently the King of Buganda fled to London.⁵¹⁶ The whole region was in a state of emergency and politicians from the South were detained without trial.⁵¹⁷ One of the results of the attack on the palace by the army forces was the creation of "an entirely new kind of militarized ethnicity in Uganda."⁵¹⁸ In Buganda, the presence of the army - whose composition was mainly from the northern areas - was followed by reports for numerous violent incidents where Baganda people were the victims.⁵¹⁹ Through the weakening of the political entities and the strengthening of the army forces and their use, Obote had given the army a political role.⁵²⁰ In this context, gradually "a predatory class had emerged which could hold the country to ransom with a vested interest in retaining political power and destroying democratic accountability."⁵²¹ Political tension continued to increase as despite the new constitution that was voted in 1967, two years later opposition parties were banned, establishing a one-party state; tension peaked in 1969 after an assassination attempt against Obote.⁵²²

Ethnicity and selfishness were two factors that continued to have a decisive role in the relations of Obote and Amin Dada, who in the meanwhile had been assigned as chief of armed forces. The ambitiousness of Amin Dada, who promoted in the army staff from his region - the West Nile - drew the attention of Obote, whose political insecurity made him to trust and appoint military personnel from his own tribe.⁵²³ Such was the suspiciousness of Obote that he trusted only family members and few people from his tribe; as Dickson argues "under Obote, the government of Uganda

⁵¹⁶ Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Uganda: A Nation in Transition: Post-colonial Analysis* (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2012), 363

⁵¹⁷ Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda*, 16

⁵¹⁸ Ali A. Mazrui, "Privatization versus the market: cultural contradictions in structural adjustment," in *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary Change*, ed. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (London: James Currey, 1991), 374

⁵¹⁹ Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa*, 176

⁵²⁰ Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 army mutinies and the making of modern East Africa* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 178

⁵²¹ E.A. Brett, "Neutralising the use of force in Uganda: the Role of the Military in Politics," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no.1 (1995): 136

⁵²² Dan Landis, and Rosita D. Albert, eds., *Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives* (New York: Springer, 2012), 16

⁵²³ Kannyo, "Uganda" in *International Handbook of Human Rights*, 393

had become a family affair, a private business designed to benefit only the inner circle."⁵²⁴ In 1970 Obote was planning to replace Amin Dada on allegations of army funds misuse and extensive recruitment of army personnel from his tribe.⁵²⁵ Amin Dada, having been informed about Obote's intentions, took advantage of Obote's trip to Singapore for a Commonwealth meeting and seized power in January 1971, after a successful coup-d'état.⁵²⁶ According to Amin Dada, the military act in 1971 against the government was made for establishing democracy.⁵²⁷ Initially, Amin Dada not only had he the widespread support from the Baganda people,⁵²⁸ but he had become a *folk hero*.⁵²⁹ While some of the first moves of Amin Dada gave credit to beliefs for a positive change in Uganda - such as the re-installation of a less powerful Kabaka and promises for multiparty elections - soon these expectations were transformed to fear:⁵³⁰ military personnel from the Langi and the Acholi tribes were the first targets and soon, other ethnic groups - even from West Nile region - became the victims; it is estimated that during the eight years that Amin Dada was in power, the number of those killed or disappeared is between 100.000 and 500.000.⁵³¹ Such was the brutality of Amin Dada that he was named as *the butcher of Uganda*.⁵³² Moreover, foreign actors had an active role in the internal affairs of Uganda. Initially, Amin

⁵²⁴ Dickson, A. Mungazi, *The Mind of Black Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), 222

⁵²⁵ Chuka Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 42

⁵²⁶ Kristen E. Cheney, *Pillars of the Nation: Child Citizens and Ugandan National Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 5

⁵²⁷ Justus Mugaju, "An Historical background to Uganda's No-party democracy," in *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*, ed. Justus Mugaju and J. Oloka-Onyango (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2000)

⁵²⁸ James Minahan, *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 89

⁵²⁹ Mungazi, *The Mind of Black Africa*, 223

⁵³⁰ As it is being reported, "within three months after he took power ... Amin suspended all democratic rights, gave the army dictatorial powers of arrest and punishment, and set up a military tribunal to try political offenders. A period of terror administered by the Army (now dominated by Kakwa and Nubian ethnic groups from Amin's West Nile region) and the security services followed." James, Busuttill, Robin L. Dahlbergin, Sheldon Oliensis, and Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, "Uganda at the Crossroads-A Report on Current Human Rights Conditions," *The Record*, October (1991) quoted in Peter Bouckaert, *Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and political Repression in Uganda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 32

⁵³¹ Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda*, 21

⁵³² Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 52

Dada's move was supported by the government of Israel,⁵³³ Britain and the US; however, soon after Britain and Israel changed their position over the new regime, imposing an economic embargo, while the US and the USSR continued commercial and military co-operation.⁵³⁴ As far as social cohesion is concerned, under Amin's rule, tribalism was reinforced through the empowerment of tribal leadership and further fragmentation of administrative structure.⁵³⁵

The dictatorship of Amin Dada had a severe impact on the economic output of Uganda. Under Obote's leadership, from 1964 till 1971 Uganda's economy was expanding at high rates; from 1972 to 1979 the economy entered a downward spiral that peaked in 1978 and 1979 when it declined by 4.6 percent and 11.9 percent respectively.⁵³⁶ In this context, in 1972 Asian professionals - around 60,000, most of which were Ugandans with Asian origin⁵³⁷ - who had long expertise in trading were expelled, a move that resulted in a severe loss of human capital.⁵³⁸ During Amin Dada's dictatorship, relations with neighboring Tanzania were tense as Amin Dada identified Tanzania as a potential threat, based on the close bonds between Obote and Tanzania's president, Nyerere.⁵³⁹ During the last months of Amin Dada's reign relations with Tanzania further deteriorated and after an invasion of the Ugandan army in Tanzania, local President Julius Nyerere in co-operation with Ugandan exiles counter-attacked; in April 1979, after ruling the country for eight years, Amin Dada was overthrown.⁵⁴⁰ Yusuf Lule, member of Uganda National Liberation Front came into power as an interim president.⁵⁴¹ Soon after, Lule was substituted by Godfrey

⁵³³ Richard Dowden, "How Israel Helped Idi Amin Take Power," *The Independent*, August 17, 2003, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/revealed-how-israel-helped-amin-to-take-power-536162.html>

⁵³⁴ "Fall of Idi Amin," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 14, no.21 (1979): 907-910

⁵³⁵ Andrew Mambo, and Julian Schofield, "Military Diversion in the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 35, no.2 (2007)

⁵³⁶ Keith Edmonds, "Crisis management: the lessons for Africa from Obote's second term," in *Uganda Now: Between Decay & Development*, 97

⁵³⁷ Sarah Coleman, "Uganda: A Tyrant's Legacy," *World Press Review* 50, 10 (2003)

⁵³⁸ Brett, "Responding to Poverty in Uganda: Structures, Policies and Prospects," 313

⁵³⁹ Valeriano Brandon, and Douglas M. Gibler, "The Steps to Interstate War in Africa," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California (2006)

⁵⁴⁰ Ralph Nurnberger, "Why sanctions (almost) never work," *International Economy* 17, no.4 (2003)

⁵⁴¹ Onwumehili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 54

Binaisa but again, due to an intervention from the Military Commission he was also relieved.⁵⁴² Both Lule and Binaisa were later accused by Tanzania's president for extensive corruption.⁵⁴³ In December 1980, the first multi party elections after 1962 took place and the former president Milton Obote - who had returned from exile - won the elections. However, there were severe allegations about the validity of the elections.⁵⁴⁴ Despite the social and political unrest, the opposition - mainly the Democratic Party - accepted the results; on the other hand, Yoweri Museveni - Vice President of the Military Commission and founder and leader of Uganda Patriotic Movement - which had won only one seat in the parliament - rejected the results on the basis of elections infringements and initiated a guerilla war - founding the National Resistance Army (NRA) against the newly elected government.⁵⁴⁵ Obote started setting up a new army, recruiting mainly from Acholi and Langi tribes, just as he had done in late 1960s.⁵⁴⁶ In the beginning, the NRA had only a handful of fighters;⁵⁴⁷ recruitment for the guerrillas was not easy. While the NRA claimed that civilians had joined the guerrillas at their will, Schubert in his research for the war in Luwero Triangle, argues against this approach:⁵⁴⁸ civilians, instead of fighting for political reasons, had chosen to fight with the NRA as a *survival strategy*, since they had to follow the least violent side. Sometimes fear of retaliation in case they denied the recruitment was the motive to join the war. Moreover, while allegations for the use of children as soldiers were officially refuted by the NRA, in reality many children were recruited as fighters.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴² Sylvia Tamale, *When Hens Begin to Crow: Gender and Parliamentary Politics in Uganda* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 38

⁵⁴³ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Uganda's Domestic and Regional Security since the 1970s'," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no.2 (1993): 240

⁵⁴⁴ Raymond W. Copson, *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 47

⁵⁴⁵ Francis M. Deng, and William Zartman, *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), 110

⁵⁴⁶ Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe, and Power in the Heart of Africa* (New York: Perseus Books, 2001), 230

⁵⁴⁷ David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, "Firearms Possession by "non-state Actors": the Question of Sovereignty," *Texas Review of Law & Politics* 8, no.2 (2004): 417

⁵⁴⁸ Frank Schubert, "'Guerrillas don't die easily': Everyday life in wartime and the guerrilla myth in the national resistance army in Uganda, 1981-1986," *International Review of social history* 51, no.1 (2006)

⁵⁴⁹ Cole P. Dodge, and Magne Raundalen *Reaching children in war: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1991), 51-54

The main theatre of war in that period was the so-called Luwero Triangle. An area in the north of Kampala - but in some places less than 20km from the capital, situated in the districts of Mpigi, Luwero and Mubende,⁵⁵⁰ where the majority of the population - about one million people - belonged to the Baganda tribe. The Luwero Triangle was a rather important area for the Obote's government, because of the economic and political significance of the Buganda region. Thus it was a priority for the government army to control the whole area. The strategy that was followed included the massive displacement of population to *protected camps*; by that way rebels could not find support in the area.⁵⁵¹ It is estimated that 120.000 people were transferred in 36 camps in Luwero, Mpigi, Mukono and Mubende districts.⁵⁵² While displaced were moved to the camps for their own safety, conditions in most of these camps were harsh and refugees were frequently victims of violent acts by the soldiers that were supposed to protect them.⁵⁵³ Concerning the abuses by government forces, Crisp⁵⁵⁴ argues that this task force could not cope with the requirements: manned by untrained and without discipline staff, unpaid and without the proper equipment and communication with higher levels of command, the military was given extensive freedom to fight the guerrillas, leading to indiscriminate violence with numerous incidents of murdering and looting. Thousands of civilians were brutally murdered, without constituting a threat to the government forces⁵⁵⁵ and many more were evicted from their homelands, sent to live in camps. It is

⁵⁵⁰ Karuti Kanyinga, Andrew S.Z. Kiondo, and Per Tidemand, "The New Local Level Politics," in *East Africa: Studies on Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya*, ed. Peter Gibbon (Uppsala: Nordic African Institute, 1994), 21

⁵⁵¹ David P. Forsythe, eds, *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*, vol.1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 111

⁵⁵² Jeff Crisp, "National security, human rights and population displacements Luwero districts, Uganda, January-December 1983," *Review of African Political Economy* 10, no.27-28 (1983)

⁵⁵³ Patrick Bracken, Joan E. Giller, and Stella Kabaganda, "Helping Victims of Violence in Uganda," *Medicine and War* 8, no.3 (1992)

⁵⁵⁴ Crisp, "National security, human rights and population displacements Luwero districts, Uganda, January-December 1983"

⁵⁵⁵ As Winter reports "At Kaaya Farm, Kiwoko, Nakaseke, Kapeka and at dozens of other crossroads villages, thousands of human skulls and bones could be seen, tossed away never buried. I saw the skeletons of babies; others with hands still tied behind their backs. One could drive for dozens of miles and never see a person, a habitable building, a crop, a dog or a chicken - a completely dead part of Uganda. And the graffiti read 'UNLA' and 'You will never forget...'", Roger P. Winter, "The Armies of Uganda and Human Rights - A Personal Observation," *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 11.4 (1987), available at: <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/the-armies-uganda-and-human-rights-a-personal-observation>

estimated that the number of victims killed by the government army during this period in the Luwero Triangle could be up to 300.000,⁵⁵⁶ while thousands were slaughtered in northern Uganda.⁵⁵⁷ In the West Nile, region of Amin Dada, government troops sought to retaliate for the killings of Acholi and Langi. Severe battles took place in the region between government army and a military group made by ex-members of Amin Dada's army that resulted at a loss of 5.000 to 30.000 lives and a massive movement of displaced people; in 1983 there were about 60.000 refugees from West Nile in Zaire and more than 200.000 in Sudan.⁵⁵⁸ Another community, the Banyarwanda - who were supporters of Amin Dada in the past and during the Obote administration joined the NRA - suffered a loss of over 45.000 people.⁵⁵⁹ In total, it is estimated that in 1985, refugees or displaced people constituted about 7 percent of the population.⁵⁶⁰ Obote government tried to restore the economy from the devastating era of Amin Dada. Initially, there was some kind of success, especially concerning the *parallel* or *black market* economy; but soon the failure of the implemented policies became evident.⁵⁶¹ From 1981 to 1985 war and political instability co-existed. GDP was falling, industrial production was minimal, public administration was collapsing.⁵⁶² However, commenting on the critical approach of President Museveni about the failure of Obote's economic policy,⁵⁶³ it should be taken into consideration the waste of valuable and scarce resources diverted to military sector in order to fight the insurgent movement led by Museveni himself. In 1985, President Obote was overthrown by Tito Okello - a high rank official in the government army.⁵⁶⁴ Although negotiations started, the NRA left the peace

⁵⁵⁶ Alex Vines, "African Dictatorships: No Place to Hide," *The World Today* 59, no.10 (2003)

⁵⁵⁷ B. Berkeley, "Uganda: An African Success Story?", *The Atlantic Monthly*, September (1994)

⁵⁵⁸ Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 68

⁵⁵⁹ Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*, 55

⁵⁶⁰ Paul Collier and Sanjay Pradhan, "Two economic aspects of the transition from civil war," in *Developing Uganda*, ed. Holger Bernt Hansen, and Michael Twaddle (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 20

⁵⁶¹ Deryke Belshaw, "Agriculture-led recovery in post-Amin Uganda: the causes of failure and the bases for success," in *Uganda Now: Between Decay & Development*, 111

⁵⁶² Kreimer *et al.*, *Uganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 18

⁵⁶³ Yoweri Museveni, *What Is Africa's Problem?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 27

⁵⁶⁴ Christian P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 50

process and soon after attacked Kampala, managing to seize power.⁵⁶⁵ Museveni became the next president of Uganda and presented the *Ten Points Programme* which constituted the backbone of the new government plan.⁵⁶⁶ While it could be assumed that the new government would implement a plan to improve democracy and good governance, one of the first measures was the suspension of the political parties.⁵⁶⁷ The main argument for such a move was that the then existing parties were augmenting divisions since their agenda was based on religious and ethnicity issues, without any ideological platform, serving "urban elites."⁵⁶⁸ Thus, a *no-party system* election system was introduced that was based on individuals being candidates,⁵⁶⁹ rather than belonging to parties with different political orientations. However, as Jubrin and Pereira⁵⁷⁰ argue, the "one party rule in general, is a major impetus for the promotion of ethnicity as it is a means of protection from the threat posed or perceived as posed to the given ethnic group by the party in power which is usually exclusive."

5.2.4 NRA rule

In the early years of Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) governance a *broad-based* approach - concerning the composition of the government- was followed; thus, the majority of cabinet members were not from NRM, contrary to their deputy ministers who were members of NRM, a fact that leaves space for

⁵⁶⁵ Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, 104

⁵⁶⁶ Museveni, *What Is Africa's Problem?*

⁵⁶⁷ Giovanni M. Carbone, "Political Parties in a No-Party Democracy: Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda," *Party Politics* 9, no.4 (2003): 486

⁵⁶⁸ John Ssenkumba, "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralising Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM," in *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*, ed. A.O. Olukoshi (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika institutet, 2000), 241

⁵⁶⁹ Aaron Griffiths and James Katalikawe, "The Reformation of Ugandan Democracy," in *Can Democracy Be Designed?*, ed. Sunil Bastian, Robin Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003), 93

⁵⁷⁰ Ibrahim Jibrin and Charmaine Pereira, "On Dividing and Uniting: Ethnicity, Racism and Nationalism in Africa," CODICE (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1993): 13 quoted in Okuku, *Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda*, 17

questions about the real power ministers had.⁵⁷¹ However, soon after, this approach was abandoned and became more exclusionary.⁵⁷² At that time, there were serious concerns from Northerners that Museveni's army - which was manned by Southerners - will seek for revenge for the atrocities that had taken place during the Obote era.⁵⁷³ Initially a process of pacification and of securing peace in the northern areas began; military forces, controlled by the new government, moved into. In the beginning, it seemed to be a smooth process but soon security concerns became a reality as a new act of violence started: some groups that belonged to the NRA army – such as the FEDEMO - committed severe atrocities against population, especially in the Acholi region.⁵⁷⁴ From a political point of view the Acholi feared to be marginalized, after the loss of the government and their subsequent replacement from army positions.⁵⁷⁵ In addition, at a national level representation of Acholi people in the new official institutions was minimal, while at local level the new government followed a strategy that did not serve the interests of local population.⁵⁷⁶

Branch⁵⁷⁷ offers a comprehensive analysis on the escalation of tension in Acholi region that subsequently led to the birth of numerous rebel movements, arguing that the Acholi society faced a double political crisis which can be defined in ethnic terms: the first was an *internal* crisis while the second refers at a *national* level. Under Amin Dada the traditional social and political structures⁵⁷⁸ of the Acholi were replaced by security forces, constituted mainly by personnel from West Nile and Sudan. During

⁵⁷¹ Nelson Kasfir, "'Movement' democracy, legitimacy and power in Uganda," in *No-party democracy in Uganda. Myths and realities*, 67

⁵⁷² Elliot D. Green, "Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central Uganda," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 44, no.3 (2006): 380

⁵⁷³ Zachary Lomo, and Lucy Hovil, *Behind the violence: The war in Northern Uganda* (Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 12

⁵⁷⁴ Paul Jackson, "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no.3 (2002): 37

⁵⁷⁵ Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: a new *koine*? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs*, 98, no.390 (1999): 13

⁵⁷⁶ Adam Branch, "Exploring the roots of LRA violence: political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, ed. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010)

⁵⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid*, 25

this period, Acholi's established political leadership and the middle class were either killed or forced to exile. As a consequence, the vital link between the Acholi and the official state was cut. When Obote returned to power in 1980, there was no political reinstatement of the Acholi middle class; rather, the Acholi people mainly manned the new national army, Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). When the NRA went into power, thousands of soldiers of the national army fled back to their Acholi region, and locals - mainly elders - considered them "alienated" from the Acholi tradition - especially because returnee soldiers had not gone through a spiritual process of impurity and cleaning the blood⁵⁷⁹ - and identified their presence as a threat;⁵⁸⁰ an issue that was not understood by the new political authorities in Kampala who "had cast its enemy in ethnic terms [...] presumed that there would be an automatic, natural bond between the Acholi troops and the rural Acholi population."⁵⁸¹ Furthermore, government forces did nothing to offer any protection to attacks by armed groups from Karamoja region to cattle herds - a vital source of income and of social recognition for the Acholi.⁵⁸² In other cases, government army was looting cattle from the Acholis "to make the Acholi poor, to be able to control the Acholi."⁵⁸³ Another incident that had a considerable impact on the violent reaction of the Acholi population was when the NRA ordered Acholi ex-soldiers to report to Mbuya army barracks; that reminded them a similar order by Amin Dada which resulted in the massacre of Acholi soldiers.⁵⁸⁴ The appropriate conditions in Northern Uganda for the rising of rebellion movements soon led to the regrouping of the UNLA under the

⁵⁷⁹ Heike Benhend, "Is Alice Lakwena a Witch? The Holy Spirit Movement and its Fight against Evil in the North?," in *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of structural Adjustment & revolutionary change*, 165

⁵⁸⁰ For a detailed analysis see Branch, "Exploring the roots of LRA violence: political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland," 32-33

⁵⁸¹ *ibid*, 33

⁵⁸² Amnesty International, "Uganda: Breaking the Circle: protecting human rights in the northern war zone," AFR59/01/99 (1999), 15

⁵⁸³ Sverker Finnstrom, *Living with bad surroundings* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 72

⁵⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, *The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda* (New York: HRW, 1997), 74

name Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), led initially by Brig. Justin Odong Latek.⁵⁸⁵ A new era of violence was just about to begin.

5.3 Conflict in northern Uganda

From a historical aspect, the conflict in Northern Uganda can be divided in eight distinct phases.⁵⁸⁶ The first phase is from 1986 to 1988 when minor military movements - such as the UPDA - were defeated by government army and their remnants formed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Then, second phase is from 1988 to 1994, when the LRA made its presence felt and consolidates power, peace talks failed and the LRA was empowered substantially with support of the Sudanese government. In phase three, from 1994 to 1999, the LRA activity was tense and thousands of people moved to internally displaced people (IDP) camps. In the next phase, from 2000 to 2002 the Amnesty Act for rebels was enabled by Uganda government, leading to a de-escalation of violent incidents. A military operation by government forces against the LRA, named *Operation Iron Fist* designated the fifth phase, from 2002 to 2003. Phase sixth is from 2003 till mid 2006 when international attention was drawn on the humanitarian crisis after the visit of a UN high rank official. Also, in this period the International Criminal Court (ICC) was engaged. The next phase is from 2006 to 2008 when peace talks in Juba took place and a long process of negotiations began. Last phase is from 2008 till 2010 with the final collapse of the peace process and the launch of another military operation from Uganda government, *Operation Lightning Thunder*.

⁵⁸⁵ Herman R. Butime, "Examining the relevance of the theories of guerilla warfare in explaining the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in Northern Uganda," PhD Thesis. University of Wollongong (2012), 19

⁵⁸⁶ Dolan and Hovil in their report about humanitarian aid and conflict in Uganda distinguish six phases, covering the period from 1986 till 2006, when their report was published. In this research, their structure is being followed, updated with political and historical facts till present era. Chris Dolan and Lucy Hovil, "Humanitarian protection in Uganda: a Trojan Horse?," Humanitarian Policy Group, London: ODI (2006), 5

5.3.1 An era of violence

As it has been described, in late 1980s conditions were suitable for the rising of rebellion groups. Soon after the establishment of UPDA, other armed groups, such as the *Holy Spirit Movement* (HSM) led by Severino Lukoya and *Uganda People's Army* (UPA) in Teso region emerged.⁵⁸⁷ In another case, a woman named Alice Auma, who claimed to be a spirit medium of a dead Italian army officer called *Lakwena*, founded in 1986 the HSM.⁵⁸⁸ The HSM had a brief participation in the war and it was defeated in 1987.⁵⁸⁹ However it is considered as the predecessor of LRA, as after being defeated, some of its members in addition to soldiers and officers that had left UPDA declining the Pece peace agreement⁵⁹⁰ - signed in 1988 but undermined by various incidents – such as the killing of a respected Acholi or prosecutions and the failure of the government to fulfill its commitments⁵⁹¹ - formed the LRA. In command of the LRA is still another person that claims to be a medium of supernatural powers. Kony - who is a cousin of Alice Auma - also claims that "God can confirm that I am an embodiment and the personification of the Holy Spirit' and that he can communicate with spirits."⁵⁹²

⁵⁸⁷ Heike Behrend, *Alice Lakwena & the holy spirits: war in Northern Uganda, 1985-97* (London: James Currey, 1999), 173-176

⁵⁸⁸ Cheney, *Pillars of the Nation: Child Citizens and Ugandan National Development*, 171

⁵⁸⁹ "Sudanese Peace Pressures Uganda," *The Washington Times*, January 27, 2005

⁵⁹⁰ David Mwaniki, Manasseh Wepundi, and Harriet Morolong, "The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments," Institute for Security Studies (2009), available at <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31015/1/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.pdf?1>

⁵⁹¹ Caroline Lamwaka, "The peace process in northern Uganda 1986-1990," in *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda*, ed. Okello Lucima (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002)

⁵⁹² Stuart Price, "Uganda: A Huge Dilemma; the emergence of video footage showing one of the world's most wanted men, Joseph Kony, has Led to the belief that the 20-year-old LRA insurgency in Northern Uganda could finally be about to enter its endgame. But which deal would Kampala strike? And would Kony take it, when international arrest warrants are hanging over his head?," *New African*, July 2006

In late 1980s, most of the rebels groups in the north had been defeated by the government army⁵⁹³ or had signed a peace agreement; President Museveni considered that the war in northern Uganda was over.⁵⁹⁴ However, despite Museveni's confidence, in early 1990s rebel activity was still present in northern Uganda and the LRA was one of the strongest opponents for the government army. In addition, during the first years of its existence, the LRA had gain a level of support from the Acholi people.⁵⁹⁵ In reality, in many cases, Acholi people joined the rebel movement due to the extensive use of violence from the NRA.⁵⁹⁶ Thus, as Branch argues, the insurgency that initially did not exist, was slowly establishing, fueled by the government strategies and the military approach of the NRA towards the Acholi population.⁵⁹⁷ The continuation of the war led to a military approach: in 1991, a campaign named *Operation North* was launched by the government against rebel activities. That would be the first campaign in a series of military efforts to eliminate the LRA rebels over the next two decades. The main objectives of *Operation North* were to cut support of the LRA in northern regions and to give the opportunity to locals to defend themselves from the LRA's attacks by arming them.⁵⁹⁸ Thus, villagers – especially youths - in northern areas such as Gulu and Kitgum were given arms – spears, machetes, arrows - in order to fight the LRA's forces; these groups were named as *Arrow Groups*.⁵⁹⁹ During the operation, the country was cut in two and the north part was under siege. Soon after, reports for severe atrocities – such as extrajudicial executions - and violations of human rights from the government army, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) surfaced.⁶⁰⁰ From a military point of view, the government campaign seemed to have a severe impact against the LRA

⁵⁹³ Phillip Kasaija Apuuli, "Amnesty and International Law: The case of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgents in Northern Uganda," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 5, no.2 (2007): 34-38

⁵⁹⁴ Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot, "Introduction," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 11

⁵⁹⁵ Anneke van Woudenberg, Ida Sawyer, Maria Burnett, Elise Keppler, and Rona Peligal, *Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo* (New York: HRW, 2010), 13

⁵⁹⁶ Brett, "Neutralising the use of force in Uganda"

⁵⁹⁷ Adam Branch, "Exploring the roots of LRA violence: political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*

⁵⁹⁸ Ted Dagne, "Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (2011): 6-7

⁵⁹⁹ Billie O'Kadameri, "LRA / Government negotiations 1993-94," in *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda*

⁶⁰⁰ Amnesty International, "Uganda: Breaking the Circle: protecting human rights in the northern war zone," 15

forces; but this raises the question why government army did not try to annihilate the LRA when its ability to fight had been minimized.⁶⁰¹ Another critical point is the fact that after arming the local population, government forces moved to other areas leaving locals without any protection, at the mercy of the LRA, who identified locals as enemies and collaborators of the government forces; as a result rebel forces attacked and committed massacres over the Acholi people.⁶⁰² During the next months, the LRA's insurgency raised. The LRA continued its operations attacking villages, showing that government was not able - or was not willing - to protect them; thus, Acholi people broke up the *Arrow Groups* and subsequently rebels cut down their attacks on civilians.⁶⁰³ In 1993 conditions were suitable so that talks could start between a government delegation and the LRA in order to find a peaceful solution; during the negotiations, there was a sort of cease fire but that came to an end when Museveni issued a seven-day ultimatum for rebels to surrender.⁶⁰⁴ According to Jackson⁶⁰⁵ this move from Museveni was made when Kony, having felt betrayed by the Acholi elders - who seem to had secret negotiations with the government - asked for a six-month extension; in addition, it is argued that some of the army staff, were hostile towards a peace agreement with the LRA. In 1994, the course of hostilities changed considerably. Sudanese government started supporting the LRA, providing military equipment and shelter as retaliation for the support that Uganda offered to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)⁶⁰⁶ which was fighting the Government of Sudan.⁶⁰⁷ During this period, the LRA forces increased from 300 fighters to over 2000, giving them the opportunity to extend their warfare range.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰¹ Robert Gersony, *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a field-based assessment of the civil conflicts in Northern Uganda*, Report submitted to US Embassy (Kampala, 1997), 32

⁶⁰² Samuel Olara, "The 'Lost Children' of Northern Uganda," *Acholi Times*, July 11, 2012 available at: <http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php/news/feature/463-the-lost-children-of-northern-uganda>

⁶⁰³ Adam Branch, "Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998," *African Studies Quarterly* 8, no.2 (2005): 17

⁶⁰⁴ Human Right Focus, *Between two fires: The Plight of IDPs in Northern Uganda* (Gulu: HURIFO, 2002), 8, available at: <http://friendsforpeaceinafrica.org/documents/hurifo.pdf>

⁶⁰⁵ Jackson, "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda", 41

⁶⁰⁶ Michael Wilkerson, "Why can't anyone stop the LRA?," *Foreign Policy*, April 19, 2010, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/19/why_can_t_anyone_stop_the_lra

⁶⁰⁷ Alison J. Ayers, "Sudan's uncivil war: the global-historical constitution of political violence," *Review of African Political Economy* 37, no.124 (2010); John Young, *Sudan People's Liberation Army: Disarmament in Jonglei and its implications*, *Institute for Securities Studies*, no.137

⁶⁰⁸ Gerard Prunier, "Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)," *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (2004): 366-367

With the backup of Sudan's government, the LRA violent attacks in Northern Uganda were increased over the next years;⁶⁰⁹ rebel forces committed numerous massacres with extreme brutality over local population,⁶¹⁰ such as the massacre in Atiak in April 1995, where over 300 civilians were murdered in cold blood;⁶¹¹ or the abduction of 139 girls from St. Mary's College in Aboke that drew considerable attention.⁶¹² From 1996, the government, unable or unwilling to protect dispersed villages in northern region, initiated large scale displacement, introducing the policy of *protected villages*, founding IDP camps and forcing population to move in.⁶¹³ The Acholi population was in the middle of a fight: UPDF was considering anyone living outside of the camps as a rebel collaborator and performed numerous attacks using helicopters over villages, in addition to the killings of civilians even in areas where government army was in control.⁶¹⁴ On the other hand, these camps were not properly protected by UPDF, making them frequent targets of attacks by the LRA.⁶¹⁵ In a peace initiative report it is argued that the UPDF was engaged in the protection of IDP camps in only 33 out of 456 attacks by the LRA, in a six-month period in 2002; furthermore, according to the same report, UPDF forces were mostly located in the centre of the IDP camps, using the refugees as a shield from the attacks.⁶¹⁶ In addition to insecurity, there were serious issues over health conditions, sanitation and nutrition; furthermore, severe were the effects on the social and economic life of the population in the north.⁶¹⁷ As a result, in early 1997, about 270.000 people were living in IDP camps in Gulu district and thousands had moved from villages to

⁶⁰⁹ Hema Chatlani, "Uganda: A nation in crisis," 37 *Cal. W. Int'l LJ* (2007): 285

⁶¹⁰ For a brief summary of attacks see 'Minorities at Risk Project', *Chronology for Acholi in Uganda*, 2004, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38ea1e.html>

⁶¹¹ Paul Amoru, and Sam Lawino, "Ghosts of Atiak Massacre haunt Acholi 15 years later," *The Monitor*, May 8, 2010, available at web: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201005100791.html>

⁶¹² Cathy Majtenyi, "Insecurity in Northern Uganda: Are people being given the protection they deserve?," *Refugee* 17, no.4 (1998): 23

⁶¹³ iDMC, *Uganda: Difficulties continue for returnees and remaining IDPs as development phase begins* (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010)

⁶¹⁴ Ogenga Otunnu, "The path to genocide in Northern Uganda," *Refugee* 17, no.3 (1998): 7

⁶¹⁵ Willet Weeks, *Pushing the envelope: Moving beyond 'protected villages' in Northern Uganda*, Report submitted to the United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (New York, 2002), 2

⁶¹⁶ Lomo and Hovil, *Behind the violence: The war in Northern Uganda*

⁶¹⁷ Paul Omach, *Civil war and internal displacement in Northern Uganda: 1986-1998*, WP (NURRU Publications, 2002)

urban areas, in addition to 80.000 displaced in Kitgum district.⁶¹⁸ Continuation of Sudan's support to the LRA forces, in addition to Sudanese support towards Allied Democratic Forces⁶¹⁹ (ADF) - a newly emerged guerrilla movement in Uganda - led to the breaking of diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan.⁶²⁰ An important development took place in 1999, when Ugandan and Sudanese governments signed the Nairobi peace agreement where various issues such as cessation of hostilities between the two countries and military co-operation⁶²¹ were addressed. Moreover, the governments of Sudan and of Uganda reached an agreement to stop supporting rebel groups, the LRA and the SPLA respectively.⁶²² Although expectations for the resolution of the conflict were high, soon events took a different path: the LRA rebels - who were excluded from the agreement- unleashed a new wave of attacks.⁶²³ Restoration of diplomatic ties between Uganda and Sudan was the first step for another military campaign against the LRA bases situated in Southern Sudan. In addition, in 2000, Sudan took various initiatives to re-establish international relations and to ease concerns about its support to terrorist activities.⁶²⁴ In this context, Sudanese government in 2002 gave permission to Uganda to deploy its troops in Southern Sudan against the LRA bases in an operation that was named *Operation Iron Fist*.⁶²⁵ It was launched in April 2002 and was supposed to be a "knock-out blow" against the rebels.⁶²⁶ While from a military aspect this operation had little success in its main objectives, from a humanitarian aspect, reports for human rights violations including killings committed by UPDF personnel towards

⁶¹⁸ WFP, *WFP Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons: Country case study on internal displacement: Uganda – Displacement in the Northern and Western Districts* (Rome: World Food Program, 1999)

⁶¹⁹ Alexander de Waal, *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 200

⁶²⁰ Korwa G. Adar, *Sudan: The internal and external contexts of conflict and conflict resolution*, WriteNet Paper No. 06/2000, UNHCR, Center for Documentation and Research (2000), 5

⁶²¹ Patrick Oguru Otto, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement," in *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda*

⁶²² Human Rights Watch, *Stolen children: abduction and recruitment in Northern Uganda*, Vol.15, no7(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 4

⁶²³ Otto, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement"

⁶²⁴ Thomas Ofcansky, "Sudan: Recent History," in *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, ed. Katharine Murison (London: Europa Publications, Press, 2003), 1019

⁶²⁵ Keith Somerville, "Uganda's rebels keep the faith," *BBC*, July 3 (2002) available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2083241.stm>

⁶²⁶ International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Understanding and solving the conflict," ICG Africa Report No 77 (2004): 15

civilians in Southern Sudan came into surface soon after,⁶²⁷ in addition to reports for economic exploitation of the military campaign.⁶²⁸ However, it had a devastating effect on the population of Northern Uganda: LRA rebels escaped UPDF forces and returned to northern Uganda attacking indiscriminately at civilians, villages, Sudanese refugee camps, relief convoys; Ugandan government ordered population of northern Ugandan to return to the IDP camps.⁶²⁹ LRA attacks expanded against cities in Central Uganda, such as Lira, Apac, Katakwi and Soroti, areas that had not been a target in the past;⁶³⁰ furthermore, 10.000 people were abducted during that year.⁶³¹ As a result the number of IDP raised from 400.000 people in early 2002 to more than 1.200.000 after *Operation Iron Fist*.⁶³² According to a UN report, *Operation Iron Fist* "has indirectly created the worst humanitarian situation the region has ever seen."⁶³³ In early 2004, the Ugandan government made another step towards a military solution for the conflict through the launching of *Operation Fist II*.⁶³⁴ For one more time, LRA forces - which in the meanwhile were continuing their brutal attacks, such as the massacre in Barlonya camp in Lira where more than 200 civilians were murdered⁶³⁵ - responded by initiating a new series of brutal attacks such as the incidents at the Pagak and Lukodi refugee camps.⁶³⁶ On the other hand, it is estimated that in 2005, around a thousand people were dying in the IDP

⁶²⁷ International Crisis Group, "LRA: A regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony," ICG Africa Report No 157 (2010): 1

⁶²⁸ Mareike Schomerus, "The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview," HSBA, Geneva: Small Arms Survey (2007): 30

⁶²⁹ Annette Weber, Jemera Rone, and Joseph Saunders, *Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda*, Vol. 15, no. 12(A) (New York: HRW, 2003)

⁶³⁰ Phillip Kasaija Apuuli, "The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 4, no.1 (2006)

⁶³¹ World Vision, "Northern Uganda: Not another "Iron Fist" debacle," *World Vision*, June 23, 2008, available at <http://www.worldvision.org/news.nsf/news/uganda-stalemate-20080623>

⁶³² Chris Dolan, "Peace and conflict in northern Uganda 2002-06," in *Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda* (updated 2010: The Juba peace process), ed. Okello Lucima (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010)

⁶³³ OCHA-IRIN, *Special Report: Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict* (New York: OCHA/IRIN, 2003)

⁶³⁴ Louise Mallinder, "Uganda at a crossroads: Narrowing the amnesty?," Queen's University Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, WP 1 (2009): 13

⁶³⁵ "World court to probe Uganda Killing," *BBC*, February 23, 2004, available at web: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3512563.stm>

⁶³⁶ Phuong N. Pham, Patrick Vinck, Marieke Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di Giovanni, *Forgotten Voices: A population-based survey of attitudes about peace and justice in Northern Uganda* (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice & Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkley, 2005), 17

camps every week, due to diseases, malnutrition and violent incidents.⁶³⁷ Olara Ottunnu, former UN Under-Secretary General and Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, named this situation as a *genocide*, underlining that the whole society in northern Uganda is "being systematically destroyed -- physically, culturally, emotionally, socially, and economically" describing IDP camps as "concentration camps".⁶³⁸

Earlier in 2000, the Government of Uganda (GoU) had introduced the Amnesty Act 2000 where amnesty was granted to Ugandans that participated in rebellion acts against the Government of Uganda since 1986.⁶³⁹ Although this initiative could be considered as a positive step towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, it came under criticism due to specific exclusions and raised questions about the real motives of the government. Through this act almost 23.500 combatants were granted amnesty and more than half of them were LRA members;⁶⁴⁰ however there was a substantial issue that hindered the whole peace process: the top ranked commanders of the LRA were excluded. On the other hand, interviews with abductees and ex-soldiers of LRA reveal that Kony tried to conceal the amnesty act from LRA members, even officers.⁶⁴¹

At an international level, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in US had changed the geopolitical scene: Museveni took advantage of the new order to become an ally of the US. Soon after the attacks, the US government passed the USA Patriotic Act and

⁶³⁷ MoH, WHO, UNICEF, IRC, *Health and mortality survey among internally displaced persons in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts, northern Uganda* (Kampala: World Health Organization, 2005)

⁶³⁸ Olara A. Ottunnu, "Northern Uganda: Profile of a Genocide," *The Monitor*, January 8, 2006, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000290.html

⁶³⁹ Lucy Hovil, and Zachary Lomo, "Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: the potential for conflict resolution and long-term reconciliation," *Refugee Law Project*, WP No.15, (2005): 4

⁶⁴⁰ US Department of State, "2009 Human Rights Report: Uganda", *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135982.htm>

⁶⁴¹ Christopher Blattman, and Jeannie Annan, "On the nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the abductees say," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 141

LRA was included in the *terrorist exclusion list*;⁶⁴² earlier, Sudan – under Bashir’s presidency – had been named as a *terrorist state*.⁶⁴³ In this context, over the next years, the Ugandan Government made further steps that hindered the peaceful resolution of the conflict: in 2002, Uganda’s parliament passed the new Anti-terrorist law,⁶⁴⁴ a move that raised concerns about human rights, political opposition, press freedom⁶⁴⁵ and could hinder the peace process,⁶⁴⁶ focusing on the later, peace initiatives could be affected as those who were working at a grass-root level could face severe charges, such as treason.⁶⁴⁷ On the other hand, in December 2003, the GoU initiated a controversial process by referring the situation of LRA to the ICC.⁶⁴⁸ In June 2004 the Prosecutor of the ICC opened a case of investigation in the conflict in Northern Uganda. Subsequently, the ICC issued arrest warrants for five high ranked LRA’s members, among which Kony and LRA’s deputy commander-in-chief, Vincent Otti.⁶⁴⁹ The intervention of the ICC has brought about critical concerns about the evolution of the peace process⁶⁵⁰ and become a controversial issue between peace builders and human rights advocates. In the aftermath of the arrest warrants, Betty Bigombe, former Minister of State for the Pacification of Northern Uganda and a well-known peace mediator⁶⁵¹ who had been trying during the previous months to engage both sides in peace talks,⁶⁵² expressed critical concerns.⁶⁵³ Moreover, another

⁶⁴² US Department of State, Terrorist Exclusion List (2004) Office of the Coordinator for CounterTerrorism, available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm>

⁶⁴³ Jonathan Steele, "Darfur wasn't genocide and Sudan is not a terrorist state," *The Guardian*, October 7, 2005, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/07/usa.sudan>

⁶⁴⁴ John Kakande, "Museveni Assents to Anti-terrorism Act," *The New Vision*, June 13, 2002, available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200206130443.html>

⁶⁴⁵ Solomy B. Bossa, and Titus Mulindwa, "The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (Uganda): Human Rights Concerns and Implications," Paper presented to the International Commission of Jurists, September 15, (2004)

⁶⁴⁶ iDMC, *Uganda: Uncertain peace process impedes return in north while protection crisis looms in Karamoja region: A profile of the internal displacement situation* (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007), 76

⁶⁴⁷ Dolan, "Peace and Conflict in northern Uganda 2002-06"

⁶⁴⁸ ICC, "President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC," (Press Release) January 29, 2004

⁶⁴⁹ IRIN, "ICC issues arrest warrants for LRA leaders," October 7, 2005, available at web: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=56630>

⁶⁵⁰ Apuuli, "The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda"

⁶⁵¹ "Uganda: Betty Bigombe, Semakula, Sallamu Make Comeback", *The New Vision*, March 12, 2010, available at web: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003150440.html>

⁶⁵² IRIN, "Uganda: ICC indictments to affect northern peace efforts, says mediator," October 10, 2005, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=56654>

issue of utmost importance was the impartiality of ICC. According to Allen,⁶⁵⁴ concerns about ICC bias existed from the very early beginning when Museveni and the ICC prosecutor announced together in a press conference the initiation of the investigation; while at a later stage the Chief Prosecutor stated that "we are analysing crimes within the situation of Northern Uganda by whomever committed", concerns were not eased, based on the belief that Museveni would have never engaged the ICC if he was not able to control the process. In this context, despite the numerous reports about crimes committed by the UPDF,⁶⁵⁵ the Office of the Chief Prosecutor stated that "The UPDF has been investigated, but alleged crimes perpetrated by the Ugandan government were not grave enough to reach the threshold. We focus on the gravity of a crime."⁶⁵⁶ A new round of negotiations started in late 2004, with Betty Bigombe as the main negotiator; although a permanent cease-fire did not take place and attacks from LRA continued, prospects for peace were not so dim.⁶⁵⁷ It was the first time that there was minimal progress in the peace process and there were signs that the government of Uganda started changing its position over the peace issue, under pressure from the international community such as the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act that Bush administration passed in 2004.⁶⁵⁸

Till 2005, conflict was confined mainly in northern Uganda and at a lesser degree in the central and east regions of the country and in Southern Sudan. However, in September 2005 further regionalization began when the first LRA forces infiltrated DRC, set up bases in Garamba National Park and performed attacks in nearby

⁶⁵³ Apolo Kakaire, "Uganda Mediator Critical of ICC Indictments," *ACR*, Issue 60, April 15, 2006, available at:

<http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/ugandan-mediator-critical-icc-indictments>

⁶⁵⁴ Tim Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army* (London: Zed Books, 2006), 97

⁶⁵⁵ Matthew Brubacher, "The ICC investigation of the Lord's Resistance Army: an insider's view," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 269

⁶⁵⁶ Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*, 193

⁶⁵⁷ Pham et al., *Forgotten Voices: Population-based survey on attitudes about peace and justice in Northern Uganda*, 17

⁶⁵⁸ Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act of 2264 § 108-283, 118 Stat. 912 (2004)

areas.⁶⁵⁹ One of the most important peace initiatives during the last two decades of war took place in July 2006 in Juba, Southern Sudan. This was led by the government of Southern Sudan and the main participants were the government of Uganda and the LRA; the participation of the government of Southern Sudan, which had a mediation role, was strengthening the whole peace process and was raising hopes for peace establishment in comparison to previous initiatives of recent past.⁶⁶⁰ In Juba, cessation of hostilities was an urgent priority and the first results were evident soon after the beginning of the talks. More specifically, on early August the first ceasefire was declared,⁶⁶¹ effective for a few weeks. While the Juba talks did not result in a peace agreement, the whole peace process gained momentum and led to further acts of negotiations. During the next months several rounds of talks had taken place - often with participants walking out and quitting negotiations - trying to sort out the complex issues that came out of this process, such as arrest warrants from ICC for members of LRA, amnesty, disagreements with human right supporters. The Juba peace process was not sealed with a permanent agreement, as Kony during the last steps of the process either asked for clarifications⁶⁶² or did not show up in meetings.⁶⁶³ The failure of the peace process gave way, for one more time, to a new military campaign, the so-called *Operation Lighting Thunder* which was launched in December 2008 and it was a joint military attack of UPDF, DRC and Government of South Sudan - with the help of the US⁶⁶⁴ - against LRA's bases in an area in the north-eastern DRC, close to Ugandan borders.⁶⁶⁵ While according to official reports, this

⁶⁵⁹ Joost van Puijenbroek, and Nico Plooijer, "How enlighting is the Thunder? Study on the Lord's Resistance Army in the border of DR Congo, Sudan and Uganda," IKV PAX Christi (2009): 10

⁶⁶⁰ IRIN, "Living with the LRA: The Juba Peace Initiative," June 1, 2007, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=58&ReportId=72471>

⁶⁶¹ John Akec, "Juba Talks: A cessation of Hostilities or a Mousetrap for LRA?," *Sudan Tribune*, August 31, 2006, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article17343>

⁶⁶² Milton Olupot, "Rebel Chief refuses to sign peace deal," *The New Vision*, April 10, 2008, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200804110001.html>

⁶⁶³ Mareike Schomerus, and Kennedy Tumutegyeize, *After Operation Lighting Thunder* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2009), 8

⁶⁶⁴ Jeffrey Gettleman, and Eric Schmitt, "US Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels," *New York Times*, February 6, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=uganda&st=cse

⁶⁶⁵ Enough Project, "No Excuses: the End of the Lord's Resistance Army is in Sight," Enough Project/Resolve Uganda Statement on Operation Lighting Thunder (2009), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/no-excuses-end-lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army-sight>

three-month operation was a military success,⁶⁶⁶ new information revealed a military failure: the loss of hundreds of UPDF soldiers and their equipment and few direct hits on LRA.⁶⁶⁷ As a result of this attack, LRA forces were split in small armed groups and were dispersed in Central African Republic, DRC and Southern Sudan, making LRA a regional threat.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, this operation had a devastating effect on the population of these areas: soon after the attack, the LRA committed severe atrocities over civilians in nearby areas – mainly in Congo - which resulted in more than 900 people killed, 400 abducted and an estimated of 130.000 displaced.⁶⁶⁹ LRA attacks continued with severe brutality - such as the incidents that took place in December 2009 in northeastern Congo where 321 civilians were massacred and 250 were abducted.⁶⁷⁰ Based on recent data, it is estimated that 400.000 people have been displaced and thousands have been killed or abducted.⁶⁷¹ Continuation of LRA attacks and the incompetence of the strategy⁶⁷² followed by government armies in the region - with the contribution of the US - against rebel activity - led the Obama administration to sign into law the *LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act* in May 2010,⁶⁷³ through which the US would provide support to African governments so as to protect civilians and to cease rebel activity.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁶⁶ IRIN, "DRC: Civilians suffer as Uganda takes on LRA," January, 20, 2009, available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82475>

⁶⁶⁷ Ronald A. Atinkson, "Revisiting 'Operation Lightning Thunder'," *The Independent* (UG), June 9, 2009, available at: <http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-insight/1039-revisiting-operation-lightning-thunder>

⁶⁶⁸ Ellie Kemp, *Ghosts of Christmas Past: Protecting Civilians from the LRA* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2010), 10

⁶⁶⁹ Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP) Statemen, February, 2009, available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/NUAPPStatement_200902_ENG.pdf

⁶⁷⁰ van Woudenberg *et al.*, *Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo*, 18

⁶⁷¹ UNHCR, "UNHCR field offices reporting rise in LRA attacks, displacement in CAR", Briefing Notes, May 14, 2010, Geneva, Suisse: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4bed39619.html>

⁶⁷² Human Rights Watch, "Congo/Central African Republic: LRA Victims Appeal to Obama," Human Rights Watch, November 11, 2010, available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/10/congocentral-african-republic-lra-victims-appeal-obama>

⁶⁷³ "The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA): All You Want to Know", *The African Sun Times*, June 11, 2013, available at <http://africansuntimes.com/2013/06/the-lords-resistance-army-lra-all-you-want-to-know>

⁶⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Questions and Answers on the Lord's Resistance Army", Human Rights Watch, March, 12, 2012 available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-joseph-kony-and-lords-resistance-army>

5.4 Conflict analysis

Conflict in Uganda is a complex issue. Its roots do not have a single cause and tension is not confined in a specific geographic area; rather, conflicts are inter-related and the consequences do affect the whole country. Identity of actors participating in such prolonged situations varies, including actors from inside the country but also from outside the borders. In this context, it can be argued that competition for power among different groups - political or military, socio-economic division, tribal and resource issues, marginalization, poverty and greed are some of the facts that have created a chaotic environment. In other cases, conflict is not fueled by internal affairs but rather is affected by incidents taking place in neighboring countries, with the participation of powerful foreign actors. The complexity of the situation makes the identification of the exact causes that prevented the establishment of peace in northern Uganda for such a long period of time difficult; however, a further analysis of the facts and of the main actors could shed light and give a better understanding of the underlying factors that led to extended violence and make proposals for the future. This examination can only be made in a historical context that focus on political, social and economic facts. This analysis is necessary for the assessment of the peacebuilding project as, on the one hand, it can be examined whether the intervention takes into consideration the historical context and on the other hand, if it is adapted to the current conditions.

5.4.1 Use of the conflict

As Finnstrom underlines, quoting a research study,

"The current conflict in northern Uganda has its roots in ethnic mistrust between the Acholi people and the ethnic groups of central and southern

Uganda as well as in the religious and spiritual beliefs of the Acholi people and the manipulation of these beliefs. Ethnic divisions were compounded by 68 years of British rule...."⁶⁷⁵

This statement about ethnic and religious diversion is frequently met when discussing about conflict in northern Uganda.⁶⁷⁶ However, despite the widespread perception that these are the main causes of the conflict, it could be argued that this is not the case and that other causes exist.⁶⁷⁷ In order to understand better the issue of diversity in the country, it should be noted that in the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, 56 different ethnic groups were identified, belonging to four linguistic groups.⁶⁷⁸ However, Conversi⁶⁷⁹ investigating Tanzania - one of the most heterogeneous countries of the world with over 120 different ethnic groups - argues that the *non-assimilationist* policies that Tanzanian governments followed almost eliminated major ethnic conflicts or civil wars. The replacement of the English language with Swahili, which could not be connected with specific ethnic groups and the absence of a dominant religion contributed to stability. On the other hand, homogenization, "an artificial, state-mandated, top-down attempt to impose a homogeneous culture upon a heterogeneous population" may lead to conflict.⁶⁸⁰ Okelo in 1967, in a speech to the National Assembly argued that "some people accuse religion and tribalism of being the cause of instability in this country but I say no. The real cause of instability on the country is over-eating by some human beings."⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁵ Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, *Against all odds: Surviving the war on adolescents. Promoting the protection and capacity of Ugandan and Sudanese adolescents in northern Uganda. Participatory research study with adolescents in northern Uganda May-July 2001*, 81, quoted in Finnstrom, *Living with bad surroundings*, 8

⁶⁷⁶ Kisekka-Ntale, *Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda*

⁶⁷⁷ Finnstrom, *Living with bad surroundings*, 8

⁶⁷⁸ Donald Rukare, "The Access to Justice Challenge in Uganda," in *Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty*, ed. Dan Banik (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 111

⁶⁷⁹ Daniele Conversi, "Democracy, nationalism and culture: a social critique of liberal monoculturalism," *Sociology Compass* 1 (2007)

⁶⁸⁰ *ibid*, 13

⁶⁸¹ Edward Kannyo, "Uganda," in *International Handbook of Human Rights*, ed. Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), 400

Kasozi in his research about the social origins of conflict in Uganda examines whether there are specific weaknesses into the Ugandan society that have led to this prolonged and violent crisis;⁶⁸² Kasozi argues that in reality it is the unequal distribution of Uganda's resources that is at the root of the problem;⁶⁸³ this, in addition to the absence of a social powerful class – a result of the colonial administration - that could protect its interests through peace. Rather, the colonial system made necessary the existence of a *big man*⁶⁸⁴ that is in total control. In modern Uganda, President Museveni has been ruling the country for more than 25 years, a period that has been characterized by a prolonged conflict in northern Uganda. While Museveni went into power claiming the establishment of a unified state, in reality the approach followed seems to be based on different motives. According to Branch,⁶⁸⁵ during the Obote II period, the NRA defined its struggle for power on a north-south division. This division provided Museveni with a solution for the overcoming of the tribal heterogeneity between the NRA origin and Luwero triangle population which was NRA's base and the main theatre of rebel activity; support of local population was vital for NRA's survival and expansion in other areas in the south. The Acholi, being a majority in the Obote's army, were designated as a common *enemy* and NRA's rebellion was resembled as a struggle of Southerners towards Northerners. This strategy also provided convenient solution to NRA's internal political issues. In this context Ginywera-Pinchwa⁶⁸⁶ analyses whether a *Northern Question* existed and argues that "the North had become a problem in the eyes of many people" underlining that in early 1980s there was a widespread perception in the south that stability would only be established when Northerners were thrown away from power and replaced by others. Similarly to the use of a North-South division by Museveni prior to his ascendancy to power, it should be examined whether a similar strategy has been followed by Museveni - through the prolongation of the conflict - for the establishment of his ruling for over 25 years. Analyzing this

⁶⁸² Kasozi, *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964-1985*

⁶⁸³ *ibid*

⁶⁸⁴ *ibid*, 9

⁶⁸⁵ Branch, "Exploring the roots of LRA violence: political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland," 29-31

⁶⁸⁶ A.G. Ginywera-Pinchwa, "Is there a 'Northern Question'?", in *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (Oslo: The International Peace Research Institute, 1989), 54

issue, Kustenbauder⁶⁸⁷ builds his approach on Keen's⁶⁸⁸ argument that in civil wars opposing actors may be fighting for the promotion of their own economic benefits, while winning the war is not a priority; in this context Kustenbauder argues that President Museveni and his government benefited politically, economically and militarily through the continuation of the conflict, while LRA members also enjoyed benefits. From a political point of view it could be argued that conflict in Northern Uganda was used by the official government as an efficient mean to suppress opposition in the North part of the country through the *tying* of any group or person that was opposing to the governments' approaches with the rebels movements.⁶⁸⁹ The 1991 military campaign *Operation North* had a devastating effect on the political structure of the country: several popular politicians from the north that questioned the military operation were accused of being rebels collaborators and subsequently were arrested and tortured; all of them were detained in prison for two years, when accusations collapsed and they were released.⁶⁹⁰ Mwenda⁶⁹¹ argues that

"the war became an important political instrument to literally blackmail people in the south to support the NRM – simply by equating a change in government with a return of violence and northern domination. The war also became an effective tool to delegitimize voices of opposition from Northern Uganda. Many senior politicians from the North were labeled rebel collaborators by the regime. Being associated with a murderous cult greatly weakened their national appeal, especially among populations in central and western Uganda. This strategy shifted from being a temporary expedient during

⁶⁸⁷ Mathew Kustenbauder, "Northern Uganda: protracted conflict and structures of violence," in *War and Peace in Africa*, ed. Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijioke Njoku (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010)

⁶⁸⁸ David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)

⁶⁸⁹ Lawrence Cline, "Spirits and the Cross: Religiously Based Violent Movements in Uganda," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no.2 (2003): 124

⁶⁹⁰ Lomo and Hovil, *Behind the violence: The war in Northern Uganda*, 12; Branch, "Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998," 17

⁶⁹¹ Andrew Mwenda, "Uganda's politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA rebellion," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 54

elections to being a permanent fixture of the NRM's political narrative in the south".

Focusing on the initial co-operation between Acholi people and the government and the subsequent abandonment of local population in early 1990s, Branch⁶⁹² offers a critical approach and investigates the possible causes. Author underlines that this was the first time that the two parts had come close and were co-operating and should the government forces had stayed in the area, the war could have soon reached to an end. Concerning the reasons for the abandonment, Branch offers three explanations: first, it could be a "strategic miscalculation" for the government side under the pressure to present a victory over the rebel movement. Secondly, that government was following a strategic plan to use LRA as an instrument for the destruction of the Acholi people. Lastly, the government might have wanted not to give a final solution to the problem, so as to prolong the conflict for its own interests. Gersony⁶⁹³ expands these possible government interests arguing that continuation of conflict gave the opportunity to the government to keep military expenses without donors' objections. Furthermore, conflict could be used as a *smokescreen* for transport of military equipment to the SPLA; last, high rank military personnel pursued the continuation of the operation for personal economic profits. Even in recent days, such extended is the problem of corruption in the army that its payroll is found to be the largest corruption plague in Uganda;⁶⁹⁴ this is related to the issue of *ghost soldiers* that are registered in the army payroll but have either died or do not serve the army anymore, while senior commanders pocket their salaries.⁶⁹⁵ As described in a 2003 report about the conflict, "the war has become an income-generating project for some."⁶⁹⁶ Even President Museveni stated that "It is true that

⁶⁹² Branch, "Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998," 16-17

⁶⁹³ Gersony, *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a field-based assessment of the civil conflicts in Northern Uganda*, 38

⁶⁹⁴ Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, "Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 42, no.2 (2008): 185

⁶⁹⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁹⁶ Human Rights & Peace Centre, and Liu Institute for Global Issues, *The hidden war: the forgotten people. War in Acholiland and its ramifications for peace and security in Uganda* (Kampala: Makerere

in the past army officers were doing business out of the suffering of the people of Acholi and they did not want it [the war] to end".⁶⁹⁷ On the other hand, despite such official statements, the government is often accused for abusing funds from the Ministry of Defense in order to finance activities of the ruling party, including actions for the elections.⁶⁹⁸ Corruption in Uganda is being described as "widespread and endemic at all levels of society."⁶⁹⁹ In the Corruption Perceptions Index published by the well-known anti-corruption NGO *Transparency International*, Uganda has one of the highest scores.⁷⁰⁰

From the early beginning of the conflict in northern Uganda, the GoU tried to find a solution through military intervention. However in other cases of conflict, as in Soroti, Katakwi and Kumi the government followed the path of negotiations,⁷⁰¹ similarly to the case of Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) from the West Nile region and the signing of a peace agreement in December 2002.⁷⁰² Concerning the various peacebuilding initiatives for northern Uganda, Branch argues that "the sabotaging of the peace talks made it clear that certain sectors within the NRA wanted the LRA to continue to exist, and would do whatever necessary to ensure that they remained in the bush".⁷⁰³ Museveni's statement "Please, I do not want to hear of talks with Kony" that were made publicly before *Operation Iron Fist*⁷⁰⁴ reveals his intention about ending the conflict with non-military means. In the

University, 2003) 8, available at

http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/30Oct2003_Uganda_fullreport.pdf

⁶⁹⁷ *New Vision*, November 29, 1996, quoted in Jessica Banfield, and Jana Naujoks, *Enabling peace economies through early recovery - Perspectives from Uganda* (London: International Alert 2009), 36

⁶⁹⁸ Sabiti Makara, "Uganda's 2006 Multiparty Elections: Consolidating Democracy and Building Peace?," *East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights* 13, no.1 (2007): 62-63

⁶⁹⁹ Marie Chene, *Overview of Corruption Uganda*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center (2009): 2, available at <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=191>

⁷⁰⁰ Corruption Perceptions Index (2009) Transparency International, available at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009

⁷⁰¹ Kissekka-Ntale, "Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda," 436

⁷⁰² Lucy Hovil, and Zachary Lomo, "Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region," *Refugee Law Project*, WP No.12 (2004)

⁷⁰³ Branch, "Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998," 18

⁷⁰⁴ Will Ross, "Lord's Terror," *BBC Focus on Africa*, 14,2 quoted in Briefings, Review of African Political Economy 31, no.99 (2004): 141

context of Kustenbauder's argument, it can be argued that President Museveni has used the army to reinforce his own *power base*; as it has been the case with Obote and Amin Dada, the majority of the top rank officers came from president's region, a fact that reinforces the role of the army as a mean to serve specific interests rather than acting as a national institution.⁷⁰⁵ As Giovanni argues, Museveni "has gone hand in hand with a personalization of politics and an extreme concentration of power that further narrowed the democratic content of the no-party system";⁷⁰⁶ and conflict in northern Uganda provided an adequate environment for the government to follow political approaches and implement strategies that could not be justified in other cases.⁷⁰⁷

A clear example of this approach is the strategy that Museveni followed in successive election processes, so as to retain himself in power. In 1989, the first elections at a national level were held, while in 1994 the election process to the Constituent Assembly took place; however in both cases the non-party rule limited the discussion on policy issues.⁷⁰⁸ In 1995, after a five-year process of making where grassroots participation had been secured, a new constitution was approved; one of the main issues in the constitution was a two-term limit for president.⁷⁰⁹ But despite this fundamental initiative, the new constitution was a means for the empowerment of the government party.⁷¹⁰ In the 1996 elections, Museveni won getting around 75 percent of the votes;⁷¹¹ however observers did not describe this process as *free and fair*⁷¹² and allegations arose for the "monetisation of elections" from the government

⁷⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Understanding and solving the conflict," 13

⁷⁰⁶ Giovanni M. Carbone, " 'Populism' visits Africa: the case of Yoweri Museveni and no-party democracy in Uganda," Crisis States Research Centre, WP 73, London School of Economics and Political Science (2005)

⁷⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Understanding and solving the conflict," 11

⁷⁰⁸ Charles N. Bwana, "Voting Patterns in Uganda's Elections: Could it be the end of the National Resistance Movement's (NRM) domination in Uganda's politics?," IFRA, *Les Cahiers* 41 (2008): 85-86

⁷⁰⁹ Anne Mugisha, "Museveni's machinations," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no.2 (2004): 140

⁷¹⁰ Sabiti Makara, "Deepening Democracy through Multipartyism: The Bumpy Road to Uganda's 2011 Elections," *Africa Spectrum* 45, no.2 (2010): 82-83

⁷¹¹ "Will Museveni win yet again?," *The Economist*, March 1, 2001, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/518717>

⁷¹² Laurie Cooper, and Daniel Stroux, "International Election Observation in Uganda Compromise at the Expense of Substance," *Afrika Spectrum* 31, no.2 (1996)

party.⁷¹³ In 2001 the last election process under the *Movement* system took place. Museveni was declared a winner, getting 69 percent of the vote and the leader of the opposition, Besigye got about 27 percent; for one more time, it cannot be argued that these elections took place in a free and fair environment since reports surfaced for serious malpractices from the Election Committee, in addition to various acts of violence related to the election process.⁷¹⁴ In 2005, multi-party elections were re-instituted, after pressure from donors on Uganda government for more democratic changes;⁷¹⁵ an advancement frequently met in African states that has been named by critics as *donor democracy*.⁷¹⁶ However, as Mwenda argues, it seems that this change took place in order to draw attention away from other significant constitutional changes that Museveni passed, such as the ability for the President to stay in office for more than two terms - although in Museveni's election manifesto in 2001, he had declared that if he was elected, his second term would be the last one, in addition to other amendments that were limiting judiciary and parliamentary authority.⁷¹⁷ Another approach for the re-establishment of multi-party elections, rejects the approach of donors' pressure; rather it is argued that NRM's internal competition - that peaked in 2001 elections - and the challenging of Museveni's ruling that initiated this process, followed by a series of constitutional changes so as to ensure that current leadership remains in the same hands;⁷¹⁸ Makara argues that this change was a "strategic calculation that would give the NRM a new lease on their life in power."⁷¹⁹

Thus, in 2006 the first multi-party elections took place since 1980, where Museveni won 59 percent of the vote, while his main opponet, Kizza Besigye got 37

⁷¹³ William Muhumuza, "Money and Powering Uganda's 1996 Elections," *African Journal of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1997)

⁷¹⁴ Sabiti Makara, Lise Rakner and Rwengabo Sabastiano, *Administering Uganda's 2006 Multiparty Elections: The Role of the Electoral Commission*, Christian Michelsen Institute, WP 5 (2008), 3-4

⁷¹⁵ "Uganda backs multi-party return," *BBC*, August 1, 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4726419.stm>

⁷¹⁶ "The heart of the matter," *The Economist*, May 11, 2000, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/333437>

⁷¹⁷ Andrew Mwenda, "Personalizing power in Uganda," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no.3 (2007): 24

⁷¹⁸ Sabiti Makara, Lise Rakner, and Lars Svasand, "Turnaround: The National Resistance Movement and the Reintroduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda," *International Political Science Review* 30, no.2 (2009)

⁷¹⁹ Makara, "Deepening Democracy through Multipartyism: The Bumpy Road to Uganda's 2011 Elections," 83

percent.⁷²⁰ Besigye, leader of the opposition party *Forum for Democratic Change* (FDC) - who had been a former comrade-in-arms with Museveni during the guerrilla war⁷²¹ - had returned in October 2005 from a four-year exile to be a candidate for presidential elections;⁷²² however, soon after his return, Besigye was arrested and charged with treason and concealment of treason - as rebel collaborator of People's Redemption Army and rape.⁷²³ Besigye was imprisoned for almost two months⁷²⁴ but was later released on bail,⁷²⁵ having lost precious time for the election campaign. Government tried to suppress any reaction, banning rallies and demonstrations related to this issue, and warning media not to cover the trial.⁷²⁶ Such a strategy is frequently followed and journalists are often arrested or interrogated when report against government policy.⁷²⁷ In the *Freedom of Press* report in 2009, status in Uganda is being described as "partly free."⁷²⁸ As in the past, Museveni used the official state institutions to intimidate opposition to his regime. By accusing FDC leader for being a rebel collaborator, Besigye was being associated in the minds of Ugandans with a culture of violence. EU observers reported⁷²⁹ that while the electoral process had been generally transparent and relatively peaceful, they underline that "a level playing field was not in place" arguing that ruling party had a favorable treatment from the official institutions of the state. Moreover, there are numerous serious allegations for NRM's infringements before and during the election process.⁷³⁰ Interestingly, Museveni was severely defeated in almost all

⁷²⁰ Siri, Gloppen, *et al.*, *Uganda's 2006 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections*, Christian Michelsen Institute, 10 (2006), 4

⁷²¹ "Country Under NRM 24 Years Later," *Daily Nation*, January 28, 2010, available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201001281008.html>

⁷²² "Uganda exile returns for election," *BBC*, October 26, 2005, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4376368.stm>

⁷²³ Hillary Kiirya, "Besigye arrested for treason," *The New Vision*, November 15, 2005, available at <http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/466000>

⁷²⁴ "Besigye Back in Campaign Trail," *ACR*, Issue 50, January 12, 2006, available at: <http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/uganda-besigye-back-campaign-trail>

⁷²⁵ David White, "Dirty tricks surround Ugandan election campaigns," *Financial Times*, February 20, 2006, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea4848f2-a236-11da-9096-0000779e2340.html>

⁷²⁶ IRIN, "Profile of main opposition leader Kiiza Besigye," February 15, 2006, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58147>

⁷²⁷ Peter Bouckaert, *Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and political Repression in Uganda*

⁷²⁸ *Freedom of the Press (2009) Uganda*, *Freedom House*, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2741f126.html>

⁷²⁹ EU, Uganda. Final Report on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: General Elections 18 February 2011, Election Observation Mission (2011), 5

⁷³⁰ Makara, "Uganda's 2006 Multiparty Elections: Consolidating Democracy and Building Peace?"

districts in the North and in specific areas in the East.⁷³¹ This result clearly depicts the complaints of the people in the North and, at a lesser degree, in the East for their on-going economic and social marginalization and emphasizes the failure of Museveni's policy to establish peace in the region.⁷³² This pattern of results that underlines the division of North and South had also been noted in the 1996 and 2001 elections.⁷³³ In February 2011, general elections took place where President Museveni won 68 percent of the votes;⁷³⁴ however opposition rejected the results, claiming an unfair environment through the extensive use of resources from the ruling party.⁷³⁵ The European Union Election Observation Mission in its preliminary statement for Uganda reports that while election process was rather free, "the power of incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the level playing field between the competing candidates and political parties."⁷³⁶

Moreover, current government has used another method to retain itself in power by following a divide and rule policy which, among others, disregard national unity and promotes the rise of ethnicity among different tribes.⁷³⁷ Just after independence, Uganda had 15 districts, in 1991 the number of districts increased to 38 and in 2001 there were 56; in this manner, a strategy of isolating each ethnic group in its own area has been followed.⁷³⁸ This trend continued over the last years and in 2008 there

⁷³¹ "Uganda Decides 2006", *Sunday Monitor*, February 26, 2006, available at <http://www.upcparty.net/memboard/electionResults.pdf>

⁷³² Makara, "Uganda's 2006 Multiparty Elections: Consolidating Democracy and Building Peace," 81

⁷³³ Bwana, "Voting Patterns in Uganda's Elections: Could it be the end of the National Resistance Movement's (NRM) domination in Uganda's politics?," 90

⁷³⁴ "Ugandan election: Yoweri Museveni wins fresh term," *BBC*, 20 February, 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12516562>

⁷³⁵ Xan Rice, "Ugandan leader wins presidential election rejected as fraudulent by opposition," *The Guardian*, February 20, 2011, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/20/ugandan-leader-wins-presidential-election>

⁷³⁶ EU Election Observation Mission, UGANDA 2011 ELECTIONS: IMPROVEMENTS MARRED BY AVOIDABLE FAILURES, Press Release, February 26, 2011, Kampala, available at http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/press_release_preliminarystatement_uganda_20_february_en.pdf

⁷³⁷ "Museveni districts breeding tribal wars?," *The Independent*, June 30, 2009, available at <http://independent.co.ug/cover-story/1111-museveni-districts-breeding-tribal-wars>

⁷³⁸ Basil O. Nwankwo, *Institutional Design and Functionality of African Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Nigeria and Uganda* (Berlin: Tenea Verlag, 2003): 173-174

were 80 districts⁷³⁹ and 112 in 2010.⁷⁴⁰ Government argues in favor of this strategy so that various services⁷⁴¹ - among others health, education, monitoring of lower levels of administration, security, agricultural issues - are brought closer to the people.⁷⁴² However, while in some cases through district fragmentation, tension between people of different ethnicities is reduced and locals are facilitated to participate in political life, it is argued that Museveni has gained significantly in political terms.⁷⁴³ As it is argued, "The creation of many new specialized agencies enabled the ruling Movement to use these enclaves to give jobs to its supporters and evade the ban on recruitment in the civil service. It also offered the regime an opportunity to continue using public resources to maintain its political support".⁷⁴⁴ In the same context, Green rejects government's arguments for a more effective way of offering services to the public and of managing ethnic tensions and argues that Museveni used districts fragmentation as patronage, giving him the opportunity to re-build his support base that was lost through important liberal economic reforms, implemented in the 1990s.⁷⁴⁵

Moreover, the GoU had an active participation in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, especially Rwanda and DRC. As far as Rwanda is concerned, in early 1990, soldiers - mainly with Rwandan roots - of UPDF created the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA); with the support of the GoU, the RPA marched towards Rwanda's capital,

⁷³⁹ Emmanuel Mwaka Lutukumoi, "DP promises to take services closer to people," *The Monitor*, January 24, 2011, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201101260100.html>

⁷⁴⁰ "Uganda districts now 112," *The Independent*, May 5, 2010, available at <http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/component/content/article/106-myblog/2881-uganda-districts-now-112>

⁷⁴¹ Responsibilities of Districts as administration units are defined in Local Governments Acts, 1997, Government of Uganda, see Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Local Government, Local Government System in Uganda, available at <http://www.molg.go.ug/departments/directorate-of-local-government-administration/local-councils-development/94-molg/departments/local-councils-development/228-local-government-system-in-uganda>

⁷⁴² Nicholas Awortwi, A.H.J. Helmsing, and E. Oyuku-Ocen, "Bringing Services Closer to the People? Explaining the proliferation of local government districts in Uganda," in *Issues in Social Development and Local Governance in Uganda*, ed. Nicholas Awortwi, and Auma Okwany (Maastricht: Shaker Publisher, 2010), 38

⁷⁴³ *ibid*

⁷⁴⁴ Andrew Mwenda, and Roger Tangri, "Patronage politics, donor reforms, and regime consolidation in Uganda," *African Affairs* 104, no.416 (2005): 457

⁷⁴⁵ Elliott Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda," *St Comp Int Dev* 45 (2010): 94

Kigali in order to overthrow Habyarimana, then president of Rwanda.⁷⁴⁶ That was the beginning of a conflict that led in 1994 to a mass genocide in Rwanda where over 800.000 Tutsi were massacred by Hutu over a three-month period.⁷⁴⁷ In DRC, the GoU has interfered twice with military means: first, in 1997 when supported the removal of Mobutu from power and the establishment of Kabila and later, in 1998, when the GoU supported Kabila's overthrow.⁷⁴⁸ One of the arguments used by the GoU for the justification of the military campaigns was to fight effectively the ADF rebels who had established bases in Congolese territory and were launching attacks to Eastern regions of Uganda.⁷⁴⁹ While Ugandan concerns for invading Eastern Congo seem to be legitimate,⁷⁵⁰ what followed seems to provide evidence that what may have started as a security issue later became a pursuit of economic interests.⁷⁵¹ Further research revealed close ties between top Ugandan and Rwandan government officials and commanders of the army with international mining corporations.⁷⁵² Thus, it is questionable whether GoU's real motive was the extermination of rebel forces or, as Congolese government feared, the main purpose was the economic exploitation of Congolese resources from the early beginning;⁷⁵³ but as Prunier argues, the fact that UPDF was active more than a thousand kilometers from the Ugandan borders reveals its different objectives.⁷⁵⁴ Moreover, it should be noted that the presence of military forces from Uganda and Rwanda extended the severe destabilization of DRC, causing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis with over 3.5 million deaths over a four-year period.⁷⁵⁵ In this context, DRC government opened a case against Uganda in the International Court

⁷⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, "Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or enemies?," ICG Africa Report No14 (2000): 3

⁷⁴⁷ Alison Desforges, *Leave None to Tell the Story* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999)

⁷⁴⁸ Willie Breytenbach, Dalitso Chilemba, Thomas A. Brown, and Charlotte Plantive, "Conflicts in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila," *African Security Review* 8, no.5 (1999)

⁷⁴⁹ Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Current African Issues* 22, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (2000): 5

⁷⁵⁰ John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no.2 (2001): 272

⁷⁵¹ Prunier, "Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)"

⁷⁵² William Reno, "Uganda's politics of war and debt relief," *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no.3 (2002)

⁷⁵³ Julia Spiegel, and Noel Atama, "Finishing the Fight Against the LRA," Enough Project (2009)

⁷⁵⁴ Gerard Prunier, "L'Ouganda et les guerres Congolaises," *Politique Africaine* 75 (1999): 44 quoted in Clark, "Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations," 272

⁷⁵⁵ Dena Montague, "Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *SAIS Review* 22, no.1 (2002)

of Justice; in 2005, the Court found Uganda guilty of invading, violating human rights and illegally exploiting Congolese resources and in its ruling recommended that Uganda should pay reparations of up to \$10 billion to the government of DRC.⁷⁵⁶ Furthermore, Clark argues that Uganda's intervention in DRC and the close co-operation with Rwanda over the years, give credibility to the widespread idea of building a Tutsi empire in the region.⁷⁵⁷ Furthermore, Uganda's intervention had another significant negative effect on the state building process as it extended the fragmentation of the state and made government dependent of military troops that were beyond its control.⁷⁵⁸ Reno, investigating Uganda's intervention in DRC, relates it with foreign aid; author argues that exploitation of DRC's resources and subsequently Uganda's increased export earnings made Uganda appear as a success story in Africa, allowing continuation of funding from donors and reinforcing Museveni's political status inside and outside of the country.⁷⁵⁹ However donors are not irresponsible: on the contrary, research reveals that although donors were well informed about the military operations and the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding, Uganda continued to receive economic and military aid⁷⁶⁰ as Uganda and Rwanda were of high interest of US foreign policy. The US tried to minimize France's influence in Rwanda and build up a US Protectorate in the region; thus, the US with the support of the British, provided military support to UPDF and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to implement their strategy.⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁶ Timothy B. Reid, "Killing them softly: Has foreign aid to Rwanda and Uganda contributed to the humanitarian tragedy in the DRC?," *African Policy Journal* 1 (2006): 74-94

⁷⁵⁷ Ogenga Otunnu, "Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zairian war," in *War and peace in Zaire-Congo: analyzing and evaluating intervention*, ed. Howard Adelman & Govind C. Rao (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004)

⁷⁵⁸ Stein Sundstol Eriksen, "The Congo war and the prospects for state formation: Rwanda and Uganda compared," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no.7 (2005)

⁷⁵⁹ Reno, "Uganda's politics of war and debt relief"

⁷⁶⁰ Reid, "Killing them softly: Has foreign aid to Rwanda and Uganda contributed to the humanitarian tragedy in the DRC?"

⁷⁶¹ Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order* (Ontario: Global Research, 2003), 112

5.4.2 LRA

In addition to the multiple causes of war in Uganda, it should be taken under consideration the fact that in principle, conflict is dynamic; Doom and Vlassenroot argue that "in many cases, a mix of motives is at work and the dynamics of a conflict may change while it is in progress."⁷⁶² As it has been presented, apart from the government of Uganda, another major actor in the conflict is the LRA; its leader, Kony, is often presented as a spiritual leader or as a psychopath and remains elusive. On the other hand, information about LRA is scarce and contradictory, making this rebel group and its ideology a difficult to understand case. There is no doubt that since 1987 the LRA rebels have committed severe atrocities to the population of Northern Uganda and in other regions through children abductions, rapes, killings, torturing, mutilating and looting; activities that had a devastating effect on the lives of millions of people. Even Kony, has apologized for such actions and has stated that "I cannot say that we are fighting clean war [or that] Museveni is fighting dirty war, that one is difficult to say. Because a clean war is known by God only."⁷⁶³ On the other hand, it is a paradox why a rebel group that claims fighting for the people of Northern Uganda may commit such crimes to the local population. A brief analysis of LRA group might provide a better understanding for the continuation of the conflict.

While there is a widely accepted perception that LRA is just a vicious rebel group,⁷⁶⁴ it should be noted that there is also a different approach that has not been presented for years, as the government of Uganda has put great effort to control the information about the conditions in the north part of the country and the conflict with LRA and present the situation in its favor. Especially in the past, research in these areas was a very risky task, thus the involvement of the government army - the

⁷⁶² Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: a new *koine*? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," 6

⁷⁶³ Schomerus, "The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview," 14

⁷⁶⁴ It should be clearly noted that it is not in the scope of this research to absolve the crimes committed by the LRA or from any other side. However, in order to present a round view of the conflict in Northern Uganda, it is vital to investigate the identity of the LRA movement and its evolution.

UPDF - was a necessity;⁷⁶⁵ consequently, this could easily hinder research and lead to non-independent results. However, research over the last years has shed light into this dark side.

Initially, LRA went into war against the government objecting to the policy issues followed by the new leading group, violations of human rights by government forces, failure to hold elections, no representation of Northerners and due to mistrust to the new authorities. In this context, a mission led by an Acholi elder who met UPDA forces in 1986, confirmed the political, social and economic demands over the new government.⁷⁶⁶ Research has revealed that from the early beginning, LRA representatives raised economic, political and social issues such as the processes of Northern Uganda's reconstruction and rehabilitation, issues of land reform, compensations for lost property and a referendum about federalism.⁷⁶⁷ Analytically, Allen⁷⁶⁸ summarizes LRA claims as:

"(a) an all-party 'National Conference' followed by general elections; (b) creation of a Religious Affairs Ministry to 'see an end to the use of witchcraft and sorcery by promotion of the Ten Commandments'; (c) rehabilitation of the economy and rehabilitation of the country's infrastructure; (d) national unity (through inter-tribal marriages and language instruction); (e) education for all; (f) policies encouraging foreign investment; (g) the independence of the judiciary; (h) the formation of an ethnically balanced national army; (i) improved diplomatic relations with neighbouring states; and (j) relocation of Uganda's administrative capital to Kigumba in Masindi district".

⁷⁶⁵ Schomerus, "The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview," 11

⁷⁶⁶ Ginywera-Pinchwa, "Is there a 'Northern Question'?", in *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*, 60

⁷⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace," ICG Africa Report No.124 (2007)

⁷⁶⁸ Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*, 43

Indeed, there are significant incidents that contradict the perception that LRA did not - at least at a time - have a political agenda. In 1990s LRA published a number of manifestos, where issues such as the re-institution of multiparty politics, a call for legitimate elections, reforms in the parliament are reported; moreover, human rights, national unity, criticism for the government of Museveni, a balanced development strategy that does not exclude northern regions - including LRA's economic proposals - were also topics that were raised.⁷⁶⁹ On the other hand, there is a widespread approach - mainly supported by officials in the government and by other related third parties - that the LRA political manifestos are in fact presented by the Acholi Diaspora, which is cut off from present conditions in Uganda.⁷⁷⁰ Moreover, as Dolan⁷⁷¹ describes, in late 1990s LRA was broadcasting in a daily basis through a radio station called *Radio Free Uganda*. Throughout the one-hour program, LRA was campaigning against Museveni ruling, following at times critical political approaches and promoting LRA's political agenda; soon after, the radio broadcast was blocked by government forces. Another case was the popular *Radio Mega FM* in Gulu – a radio station committed to peacebuilding that was established mainly through a grant from DFID - which once broadcasted a live communication with Kony and Vincent Otti; again, soon such initiatives were banned.⁷⁷² This act was another step in the strategy that the government of Uganda has tried to implement for many years, aiming to carry out a propaganda war. One of its main targets was to depoliticize the conflict and present the LRA as a rebel group aiming at the establishment of the rules of the Ten Commandments⁷⁷³ and that LRA leadership has no political agenda or ideology⁷⁷⁴ being just a terrorist organization that targets

⁷⁶⁹ Finnstrom, *Living with bad surroundings*, 122-123

⁷⁷⁰ Sverker Finnstrom, "An African hell of colonial imagination? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, another story," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 87

⁷⁷¹ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 84-85

⁷⁷² *ibid*

⁷⁷³ Schomerus, "The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview," 15

⁷⁷⁴ Sallie Simba Kayunga, "The Impact of armed opposition on the movement system in Uganda," in *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*, 114-115

civilians; this strategy of presenting opposing sides as criminal organizations or destabilization factors is often used by those in power.⁷⁷⁵

However, the question about LRA and its offensive and violent attitude over the population of northern Uganda remains. As it has been presented, in late 1980s LRA forces enjoyed some support from civilian population in the northern regions due to violent actions from NRM and mistrust for the new government. However, soon the dynamics of the conflict took over: as Mwenda argues, Sudan's support had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict, by affecting the incentives of both the LRA and the government of Uganda. As far the LRA is concerned, its military and political approach changed: with a continuous supply of weapons the LRA abandoned its effort of trying to get support from the Acholi population in order to continue fighting and "became a criminal/terrorist organization unleashing indiscriminate violence and terror on the civilian population."⁷⁷⁶ Schomerus argues that Sudan's official support to LRA legitimized the political agenda and the main objectives of the rebel group.⁷⁷⁷ Olsen,⁷⁷⁸ researching the atrocities committed by LRA members, finds that their aims are economic, strategic and psychological; however, Olsen concludes that the turn of the local population towards a peaceful solution makes LRA members feel insecure and unsupported, thus using extensive violence in order to control civilians and prevent collaboration of locals with government forces. In its 2004 report, the Refugee Law Project concludes that while strong complaints and criticism exist in the population of northern Uganda, LRA movement is "a poor expression of these and enjoys no popular support amongst the civilian population."⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁵ Doom and Vlassenroot report as such the cases of Turkish government over the Kurdish issue and PKK, the Sri-Lankan authorities and the guerilla war with Tamil Tigers, the cases of RAF in Germany the Red Brigades in Italy. Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: a new *koine*? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," 6

⁷⁷⁶ Mwenda, "Uganda's politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA rebellion," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, 49

⁷⁷⁷ Schomerus, "The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview," 24

⁷⁷⁸ Kasper Thams Olsen, "Violence against civilians in Civil War - Understanding atrocities by the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," Working Paper No.8, Conflict Research Group (2007)

⁷⁷⁹ Lomo and Hovil, *Behind the violence: The war in Northern Uganda*, 3

5.5 Current conditions

"To many Ugandans, the widespread conception, mainly held by outsiders, that their country is an oasis of stability, economic progress, and democracy is a frustrating mirage. For those without privileged protection from the unilateral exercise of governmental authority, however benign or enlightened this authority may appear to be, this image of Uganda as an arena of boundless political openings and relentless economic progress is grossly deceptive"⁷⁸⁰

Ever since 2006, Uganda is slowly emerging from a conflict that lasted for decades. As it has been presented, while in Juba a permanent peace agreement had not been signed, the GoU and LRA delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities in August 2006. In 2008 the next step took place with the signing of a Permanent Ceasefire and in addition to military action that pushed LRA away from the Ugandan borders - towards DRC and Central African Republic - the conditions in Northern Uganda changed considerably.⁷⁸¹ Over a four-year period, the improvement of security conditions in northern regions gave the opportunity to more than 1.500.000 internally displaced people that were living in camps with poor conditions, to either return to their homelands or to move to other areas.⁷⁸² Earlier in 2004, the GoU had introduced a National Policy for IDP.⁷⁸³ Through this act, the government committed to protect refugees and to resolve IDP issues, facilitating their return and integration.⁷⁸⁴ However, despite the governmental initiative, the massive movement of population has brought about a series of problems: food and water security,

⁷⁸⁰ Sseenkumba, "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralising Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM," 172

⁷⁸¹ Dagne, "Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda"

⁷⁸² iDMC, *Uganda: Difficulties continue for returnees and remaining IDPs as development phase begins*

⁷⁸³ Refugee Law Project, "What about us? The exclusion of IDPs from Uganda's IDP related policies and interventions," Kampala: RLP (2007): 2

⁷⁸⁴ Joy Miller, "Uganda's IDP policy," *Forced Migration Review* 27 (2007): 78

health, education and protection and land issues⁷⁸⁵ that hindered the return and re-integration of IDP: as a result, in January 2010, there were still about 120.000 internally displaced persons in Uganda,⁷⁸⁶ while many more were fighting against social and economic marginalization. In economic terms, from 1999 Uganda has achieved an average real growth rate of more than 5 percent per year, peaking in 2008 with a 6.9 percent rate.⁷⁸⁷ But development has not been equally distributed: in 2005, GDP per person in northern Uganda was varying from US \$108 in the western regions up to US \$123 in the eastern regions, in comparison to US \$330, calculated at a national level.⁷⁸⁸ Thus, in 2007 the GoU announced the introduction of a new development program for Northern Uganda, the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) targeting at poverty reduction and attempting to improve life conditions in northern regions; it was supposed to be a three-year program with a budget of \$600 millions.⁷⁸⁹ However, soon after the GoU decided to postpone the implementation of this plan until July 2009.⁷⁹⁰ Ever since, while there are questions about its implementation and its impact⁷⁹¹ - especially from Acholi people being ignorant about the plan and members of parliament from Acholi supporting that there is high risk that relief funds will never reach the community in the north⁷⁹² -

⁷⁸⁵ OCHA, *UGANDA: Humanitarian Profile 2011*, New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2011)

⁷⁸⁶ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) *Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Uganda*, March 1, 2011, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d806bc112f.html>

⁷⁸⁷ Index Mundi (2011) Uganda GDP (real growth rate), available at <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=66&c=ug&l=en>

⁷⁸⁸ Chris Dolan, [Is the PRDP a Three-Legged Table? Challenges for NGOs in moving from humanitarian and short term interventions to longer term approaches in light of the PRDP and the conflict setting] (Keynote speech given at NGO seminar for Scandinavian based International NGOs working in Northern Uganda, Kampala, April 10, 2008)

⁷⁸⁹ GoU [Government of Uganda], "Peace, Recovery and development plan for Northern Uganda 2007-2010", Kampala (2007), available at http://www.beyondjuba.org/policy_documents/Ug.PRDP.pdf

⁷⁹⁰ iDMC, "Peace, Recovery and Development: Challenges in Northern Uganda," Norwegian Refugee Council (2009)

⁷⁹¹ Richard M. Kavuma, "Govt playing politics with North's recovery," *The Observer*, March 18, 2009 available at http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2638:govt-playing-politics-with-norths-recovery&catid=34:news&Itemid=59

⁷⁹² Edward Echwalu, 'Northern MPs fear theft of relief money', *The Observer*, 26 March 2009, http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2668:northern-mps-fear-theft-of-relief-money&catid=34:news

representatives of official government re-assure for the safety of the funds;⁷⁹³ however the effectiveness and the results of this plan are yet to be examined based on future reports. But apart from poverty, grievances from the population of Northern Uganda - on issues such as political marginalization, inequalities, exclusion - over the NRM government are still present. Rebel movements - based on ethnic lines - might be re-born when inequalities exist, in addition to disrespect from *dysfunctional governments* for the political rights of people.⁷⁹⁴ A culture of victimization of the same ethnic groups in all cases,⁷⁹⁵ in addition to the policy that Museveni has followed in the past - not permitting members of other ethnic groups to gain access to crucial positions - further increase chances for conflict.⁷⁹⁶

Over these years, while no serious acts of warfare have been reported, it could be argued that peace has not been consolidated in northern Uganda. In general, the process of post-conflict peacebuilding is a rather complicated procedure that has to address various different issues and includes a variety of activities and actors. In the UN report *An Agenda for Peace*, it is argued that

"Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security

⁷⁹³ Hudson Apunyo, "PRDP funds safe, minister assures northern Uganda," *Daily Monitor*, August 18, 2011, available at <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1220898/-/bjy7b4z/-/index.html>

⁷⁹⁴ Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, "Civil wars and poverty: The role of external interventions, political rights and economic growth," Paper presented at the World Bank's Conference on Civil Conflicts, Crime and Violence, Washington, DC: World Bank (1999): 3

⁷⁹⁵ Armin Langer, and Graham K. Brown, "Cultural Status Inequalities: An Important Dimension of Group Mobilization," in *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*, ed. Frances Stewart (New York: Palgrave, 2007)

⁷⁹⁶ Stefan Lindemann, "Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda," *African Affairs* 110, no.440 (2011)

personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation."⁷⁹⁷

Galtung goes one step further arguing that "there is an intimate connection between peace thinking and the geopolitical situation of the country region that produces it."⁷⁹⁸ In the case of northern Uganda, rather than peace, situation could be considered to be closer to what Galtung calls as *negative peace*⁷⁹⁹ since the causes of conflict seem to be present. Galtung's approach distinguishes *negative* peace and *positive* peace; negative peace is defined as "the absence of violence, absence of war" while positive peace is defined as "the integration of human society."⁸⁰⁰ The meaning of negative peace is rather straight forward, referring to a notion of cessation of hostilities. On the other hand, the concept of positive peace is more complicated as it includes the notions of *legitimacy* and *justice*.⁸⁰¹ Peace cannot be fully established unless serious issues and injustice are resolved; and these refer to a variety of topics - economic, social and political - and to different levels - from the level of individuals escalating to issues related to society as a whole.⁸⁰² Even more, Ramsbotham *et al.* underline the necessity for a deeper approach, arguing that "At an intrapersonal level positive peace goes beyond absence of anxiety and embraces the idea of deep inner peace through integrity (wholeness) of being, physical, emotional, spiritual."⁸⁰³ In northern Uganda, despite the absence of war, conflict

⁷⁹⁷ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*

⁷⁹⁸ Johan Galtung, "Towards a Theory of Freedom and Identity: A New Frontier in Peace Research," *Peace Problems: Some Case Studies, Essays in Peace Research*, vol. 5 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1980), 431 quoted in Ira Chernus, "Order and Disorder in the Definition of Peace," *Peace & Change* 18, no.2 (1993): 100

⁷⁹⁹ Johan Galtung, *Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization* (Oslo: Prio, 1996)

⁸⁰⁰ Kathleen M. Weigert, "Structural Violence," in *Stress of War, Conflict and Disaster*, ed. George Fink (San Diego: Academic Press, 2010), 127

⁸⁰¹ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 12

⁸⁰² *ibid*, 12

⁸⁰³ *ibid*, 12

does not belong to the past; as Kligerman argues,⁸⁰⁴ conflict has transformed: land privatization, investments from foreign actors and land disputes might have the same results with the war, leading to insecurity, displacement, malnutrition and poverty.

5.5.1 Issues and possible threats in northern Uganda

Through IDP return, issues of significant importance have surfaced that should be addressed so as tension is not escalated and the pacification process continues. In the post-conflict environment of northern Uganda one such issue is land. Land issues and disputes over property are so extended - and have a rising trend⁸⁰⁵ - that they could evolve into a real threat.⁸⁰⁶ The resolution of such issues is of utmost important: Autesserre⁸⁰⁷ - using Kalyvas' analysis⁸⁰⁸ who argues that conflict at local and national level are inter-related based on *cleavage* and of *alliance* factors - argues that in DRC, after the war and during the transition period, local problems - competition over political power and economic such as land issues - got an autonomous state and led to armed conflict that could put at risk peace agreements at national level. In Uganda, despite the new national land policy that was introduced to address land tenure issues, there are still doubts whether its implementation is effective.⁸⁰⁹ Thus, in the Acholi region land disputes constitute the

⁸⁰⁴ Nicole Kligerman, "Alienation in Acholiland: War, Privatization, and Land Displacement in Northern Uganda," Independent Study Collection (ISP), Paper 675, Macalester College (2009)

⁸⁰⁵ IRIN, "Escalating Land Disputes in the North," February 17, 2011 available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201102180189.html>

⁸⁰⁶ Maya Mailer, *From Emergency to Recovery: Rescuing northern Uganda's transition*, Oxford: Oxfam Briefing Paper (2008), 12

⁸⁰⁷ Severine Autesserre, "D.R. Congo: Explaining Peace Building Failures, 2003-2006," *Review of African Political Economy* 34, no.113 (2007)

⁸⁰⁸ Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspective on Politics* 1, no.3 (2003)

⁸⁰⁹ Samuel B. Mabikke, "Escalating Land Grabbing in Post-conflict Regions of Northern Uganda: A Need for Strengthening Good Land Governance in Acholi Region," Paper Presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 6-8 April (2011), 5-6

major cause of conflict.⁸¹⁰ The NGO *Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment* warned in 2009 that land conflicts were expected to escalate in 30 districts.⁸¹¹ Land in Uganda, especially in northern regions, is of utmost importance as it remains the main source of income and is the key factor for economic development.⁸¹² But apart from the economic significance, land ownership has also other important dimensions: Professor Okoth-Ogendo argues that in Africa

"As a social, cultural and ontological resource, land is an important factor in the construction of social identity, the organisation of religious life, and the production and reproduction of culture.. land is an enormous political resource. It defines power relations between and among individuals, families and communities under established systems of governance."⁸¹³

The problem of land has its roots in the ownership system. Land ownership in northern Uganda follows a traditional way.⁸¹⁴ About 90 percent of rural land is owned under customary tenure; being a member of a family or of a clan gives rights to use the land.⁸¹⁵ For generations, there were no official titles proving possession of the land; rather it was the elders that were supposed to have the knowledge for land

⁸¹⁰ Jenny Vaughan and Tim Stewart, *Land Disputes in Acholiland: A Conflict and Market Assessment*, MercyCorps (2011), 4

⁸¹¹ Lydia Namubiru, "Land Wars threaten 30 Districts," *The New Vision*, April 24, 2009, available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200904250034.html>

⁸¹² GoU, "The National Land Policy," Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Working Draft 4, Kampala, 2009, available at web 8/11/2011: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/26556353/National-Land-Policy-for-Uganda>

⁸¹³ Okoth, W. Ogendo, Hasting, "Land Rights in Africa - Interrogating the tenure security discourse," Keynote Address in 'Land Tenure Security for Poverty Reduction in Eastern and Southern Africa' Workshop, Kampala, June 27-29, 2006, available at web 15/11/2011: http://www.landcoalition.org/pdf/ev06_ifad_Niger.pdf

⁸¹⁴ Judy Adoko, and Simon Levine, *Land Matters in Land Tenure Displacement: The Importance of Land Rights in Acholiland and What Threatens Them* (Kampala: CSOPNU, 2004)

⁸¹⁵ ARLPI, *Resolving Land Conflict in Acholiland: A Guide for Community Based Stakeholders*, Gulu: *The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative* (2010), 7, available at <http://www.arlpi.org/arlpi-unveils-new-land-conflict-mitigation-tool>

issues, intervening in disputes.⁸¹⁶ The majority of IDP population was young - displaced 15 years old and younger constituted more than 50 percent of the population of IDP camps⁸¹⁷ - with some of the younger returnees to be born in the IDP camps; thus when many of the elders that knew land boundaries died before passing knowledge to the younger generation, many of the returnees had no information about their rights; in addition, some of the early returnees took advantage and occupied neighboring land. A World Bank study on land conflict in Acholi and Lango region found that the vast majority of returnees that participated in the study had faced threats over land tenure issues, whereas 59 percent of the respondents considered these threats as significant.⁸¹⁸ Recent research from African countries reveals that the number of land disputes in similar conditions is positively correlated to the duration of the displacement.⁸¹⁹ The problem of land deepens through the way investments are being carried out in two productive sectors: the oil industry and mass agriculture. In October 2006, the GoU officially announced the discovery of viable oil reserves in Western Uganda.⁸²⁰ As a result oil companies, officials and individuals have tried to obtain property rights over land that was considered to be communal; however local communities are unaware of the processes and mechanisms so as to manage such situations.⁸²¹ In a 2009 report it is argued that in five districts in Western Uganda, conflicts related to land and oil were "in incubation stage."⁸²² Oil discovery also increases tension in two other ways:⁸²³ firstly, there is an on-going population movement towards regions where oil has been discovered, as migrants anticipate possible rents made by the government. In

⁸¹⁶ Ingunn Bjorkhaug, Morten Boas, Anne Hatloy, and Kathleen M. Jennings, "Returning to uncertainty? Addressing vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda," Office of the Prime Minister / UNDP, 2007, available at: <http://www.fafo.no/nyhet/return2uncertainty.pdf>

⁸¹⁷ Morten Boas and Anne Hatloy, *Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Person Profiling Study*, UNDP/GoU/FAFO, vol.1, (2005), 11

⁸¹⁸ Margaret A. Rugadya, Eddie Nsamba-Gayiiya, and Herbert Kamusiime, *Analysis of post-conflict land policy and land administration: A survey of IDP return and resettlement issues and lessons*, Kampala (2008), 7

⁸¹⁹ Peter E. Hetz, Gregory Myers, and Renee Giovarelli, *Land Matters in Northern Uganda: Anything Grows; Anything Goes. Post-conflict 'conflicts' lie in Land* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2007)

⁸²⁰ OREA, *Managing Oil Revenues in Uganda: A Policy Note*, OREA Knowledge Series, No.1 (2009)

⁸²¹ A. M. Rugadya, "Countering regional, national and local conflict impacts of oil discoveries in the Albertine Rift Uganda," Oxfam (2009)

⁸²² *ibid*, 35

⁸²³ Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon, "Oil extraction and the potential for domestic instability in Uganda," *African Studies Quarterly* 12, no.3 (2011): 30

this context, ethnic tribes such as the Banyoro who inhabit in these areas for centuries, feel their presence as a threat; secondly, strong rivalry exist for the distribution of oil revenues among different provinces and ethnic tribes. In a similar case, during the 1990s, in Angola the discovery of oil reserves and the subsequent contacts with international oil companies supported the purchase of weapons which was later used for the launching of government military operations, fueling the civil war.⁸²⁴

In political terms, tension is also escalated due to distrust between the GoU and the Acholi leadership; for one more time, the Acholis are left with a feeling that central government and investors are trying to take advantage of the situation and grab their land, marginalizing local society.⁸²⁵ In this context, as it quoted in Atkinson, a World Bank report recommends that the GoU should stop the issuing of land titles in Acholi and Lango districts to investors until IDP have returned.⁸²⁶ Kathman and Shannon argue that oil discovery and subsequently oil revenues could be used by current government, consolidating Museveni in power for many years through a *patron-client system*.⁸²⁷ In the same context, there is the risk that despite decentralization and anti-corruption measures, administration at local level is weaken and officials from higher government positions try to exploit oil resources.⁸²⁸ In this context, Ross investigating results of 14 econometric studies on the relation between civil war and natural resources, concludes that in countries with oil, probabilities for *separatist* conflict are higher.⁸²⁹ Investments that exclude the

⁸²⁴ Michael Comerford, "Peace agreements in Angola and implications for governance," *Conflict Trends*, 3 (2007): 16

⁸²⁵ Margaret A. Rugadya, and Herbert Kamusiime, *Escalating Land Conflicts in Uganda: A review of evidence from recent studies and surveys,* Report to the International Republican Institute and the Ugandan Round Table, Oxfam (2009)

⁸²⁶ Ronald Atkinson, "Land Issues in Acholi in The Transition from War to Peace," *The Examiner*, 4, HURIFO (2008)

⁸²⁷ Kathman and Shannon, "Oil extraction and the potential for domestic instability in Uganda"

⁸²⁸ Jessica Banfield, "Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda," *Investing in Peace*, no.2 (Kampala: International Alert, 2009)

⁸²⁹ Michael L. Ross, "What do we know about natural resources and civil war?," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no.3 (2004)

protection of the interests of locals could result in social unrest and subsequently lead to conflict.⁸³⁰

5.5.2 Resource services

Access to resources is identified by many scholars as a major reason that can lead to conflict,⁸³¹ although their scarcity is not recognized as a single and only cause for conflict but rather as a "threat multiplier";⁸³² this potential threat is augmented in cases of fragile states with low levels of governance.⁸³³ In the same context, while conflict and poverty are inter-related, no consensus exist on whether conflict leads to poverty, if the reverse relation is valid or whether this is a two-way relationship.⁸³⁴ In northern Uganda, apart from the losses of social capital and the destruction of economic activity, the war had a devastating effect on the infrastructure⁸³⁵ and the delivery of services such as education, health. For the local population, situation became worst with the return of IDP. In the decentralization system that has been implemented in Uganda, the provision of essential services such as water, health care, education is under the responsibility of local governments.⁸³⁶ But after the 2006 elections Museveni's government suspended the *graduated tax* that was generating the majority of income for the local governments, promising that adequate funds will be transferred from the central government; but needs of the

⁸³⁰ Alex Evans, "Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict," Background Paper for World Development Report 2011 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 12

⁸³¹ Evans, *ibid*; Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievances in civil war," World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355 (2000); James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no.1 (2003)

⁸³² Gareth Evans, [Conflict Potential in a World of Climate Change] (Speech, Bucerius Summer School on Global Governance, Berlin, August 29, 2008)

⁸³³ Evans, "Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict"

⁸³⁴ Rasheed Draman, "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship," Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, Addis Ababa (2003), 5

⁸³⁵ Justine Nannyonjo, "Conflicts, poverty and human development in Northern Uganda," *The Round Table* 94, no.381 (2005)

⁸³⁶ Awortwi *et al.*, "Bringing Services Closer to the People? Explaining the proliferation of local government districts in Uganda"

local administration were not met, reducing quality and quantity of offered services and increasing dependence on central government.⁸³⁷

5.5.3 Ex-combatants, re-integration and justice

Apart from the return of IDP, another major issue was the re-habilitation and re-integration of ex-combatants, mostly members of LRA. One of the common tactics followed by LRA so as to alienate abductees from their communities and make escape and return difficult, was to force them kill members of their own families or relatives and neighbors. In this context, for abducted members of LRA - either soldiers, officers or women used as wives - leaving LRA was an extremely dangerous and difficult task; in some cases, chances for survival were higher when remaining in the ranks of LRA, rather than trying to escape and re-integrate into society.⁸³⁸ In practice, re-integration of IDP and ex-combatants is not a simple process; rather it depends on various social, economic and psychological factors.⁸³⁹ As it is highlighted in a World Bank report, in northern Uganda the "safety-net systems" of the communities and the traditional structures and forms of local societies have been damaged severely from the conflict, as exactly was the case with the human capital and the capacity of local administrative structures.⁸⁴⁰ As far as the social aspect is concerned, Leff⁸⁴¹ - investigating the re-integration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone - focuses on social capital which Leff describes - citing Putnam⁸⁴² - "as networks of

⁸³⁷ Terrell Manyak, and Isaac Wasswa Katono, "Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda: Governance Adrift," *African Studies Quarterly* 11, no.4 (2010): 9

⁸³⁸ Ledio Cakaj, *Too Far from Home: Demobilizing the Lord's Resistance Army* (Washington: Enough Project, 2011), 4

⁸³⁹ GUSCO (Gulu Support the Children Organization), "Re-integration of Returnees, Ex-combatants and Other War-Affected Persons in the communities of Gulu and Amuru districts, Northern Uganda," Kampala, (2010): 23

⁸⁴⁰ World Bank, *Implementation Completion and Results Completion*, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project, Report No: ICR00001211, (2009), 1

⁸⁴¹ Johan Leff, "The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 8, no.1 (2008): 12

⁸⁴² Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992)

trust, which are based on agreed upon norms that can enhance efficiency through collaborative action."⁸⁴³ These norms form bonds across people that overcome boundaries based on ethnicity, religion and other factors, creating networks that subsequently will reinforce the dimensions of sustainable peace and economic development.⁸⁴⁴

Moreover, the process of reconciliation is closely related to the issue of justice. It is estimated that over the last 25 years of conflict, about 500.000 people have been killed. In the PRDP, justice - through both traditional and formal or official forms - has been identified by the GoU as a mean for one of its strategic objectives - peacebuilding and reconciliation.⁸⁴⁵ However, an approach for justice and reconciliation in order to be effective should be in the same context of the social structures that exist in the Acholi and other regions of northern Uganda. In the traditional society of the Acholi, a spiritual dimension is present.⁸⁴⁶ Tradition, justice and reconciliation and the spiritual world all come together at the performance of rituals for cleansing. *Gomo tong* (bending of spears) and *nyono tong gweno* (stepping on eggs) or *Mato Oput*.⁸⁴⁷ *Mato Oput* ceremony brings together perpetrators and victims - or their families - who have to drink a bitter root.⁸⁴⁸ *Mato Oput* is based on the Acholi's notion of communal life where an issue among members of the community is not considered at a personal level but rather regard it as a matter that should be addressed at a community level.⁸⁴⁹ In a 2008 report by Amnesty International, the importance of traditional justice and reconciliation ceremonies is

⁸⁴³ Ibid, 12

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid, 12

⁸⁴⁵ GoU, Peace, Recovery and development plan for Northern Uganda , 94

⁸⁴⁶ Finnstrom, *Living with bad surroundings*; Christine Mbabazi Mpyangu, "The Acholi Worldview and the Importance of Rituals," in *Culture, Religion and the Reintegration of Female Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda*, ed. Bard Maeland (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2010), 107

⁸⁴⁷ Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*, 164-165; Luc Huyse, and Mark Salter, *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008), ch.4

⁸⁴⁸ IRIN, "Former LRA combatants struggle for forgiveness," November 10, 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/91019/uganda-former-lra-combatants-struggle-for-forgiveness>

⁸⁴⁹ Timothy Murithi, "Rebuilding Social Trust in Northern Uganda," *Peace Review* 14, no.3 (2002): 292-293

highlighted for the atrocities committed in northern Uganda.⁸⁵⁰ In 1997, Sociologist Dennis Pais in his well-cited report *The Bending of Spears* underlined the necessity for a community based approach for reconciliation that is "far beyond the limited approaches of conservative western legal systems."⁸⁵¹ Although the number of disputes could be well above what the traditional and official land adjudication system can cope with,⁸⁵² there is still a strong debate on the issue of traditional justice.⁸⁵³ For example Allen⁸⁵⁴ takes a critical position over *Mato Oput* and traditional justice processes, raising issues about their origin and implementation and questions their effectiveness. But re-integration process is not a panacea and it should be implemented while other policies that tackle economic, political and social problems are applied by the government; otherwise another rebellion could rise in northern Uganda.⁸⁵⁵ Reconciliation and the creation of a national identity for Ugandans without a north-south division was - and still remains - one of the most important topics that should be addressed first⁸⁵⁶ as ethnic diversity is still a reality and a source of tension. In 2009, violent riots burst in Kampala between supporters of the Baganda's king and government forces⁸⁵⁷ as the government blocked the king

⁸⁵⁰ Amnesty International, *Uganda: Agreement and Annex on Accountability and Reconciliation Falls Short of a Comprehensive Plan to end Impunity*, March 1, 2008, AFR 59/001/2008

⁸⁵¹ Dennis Pais, *'The Bending of Spears': producing consensus for peace and development in Northern Uganda*, (London: International Alert, 1997), 2

⁸⁵² Hetz, et al., *Land Matters in Northern Uganda: Anything Grows; Anything Goes. Post-conflict "conflicts" lie in Land*

⁸⁵³ Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Eric Stover, Marieke Wierdam, Andrew Moss, and Richard Bailey, *When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda* (Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, 2007); Tim Allen, and Mareike Schomerus, *A hard Homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception center process in northern Uganda* (Washington, DC: USAID/UNICEF, 2006)

⁸⁵⁴ Tim Allen, "Bitter roots: the 'invention' of Acholi traditional justice," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*

⁸⁵⁵ Anna Borzello, "The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army," *Conflict, Security and Development* 7, no.3 (2007): 408

⁸⁵⁶ Tarcis Kabwegyere, [Reconciliation vs. Understanding the Challenges of Uganda's Future] (Speech at the Civil Society Consultative Conference on 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Reconciliation Process in Uganda', Makerere University, Kampala, February 12-14, 2007)

⁸⁵⁷ "Hundreds arrested in deadly Uganda riots," *CNN World*, September 13, 2009, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-13/world/uganda.arrests_1_cultural-affairs-uganda-government?_s=PM:WORLD

from visiting an area in Buganda which seeks autonomy from Buganda kingdom.⁸⁵⁸
During the three-days riots, over 20 people died.⁸⁵⁹

5.6 Peacebuilding intervention: *Strengthening civil society in northern Uganda for conflict early warning and prevention*

5.6.1 The EU policy framework and its tools

During the 1990s, the international community made gradual steps towards the formation of a new extended framework of intervention covering a variety of issues, from human development to economic expansion; in addition to these, security issues were introduced among which human security and peacebuilding gained considerable momentum in the agenda and were identified as legitimate fields of intervention for international actors.⁸⁶⁰ These concerns of the global community were expressed at the 2000 Millennium Summit where the Millennium Declaration was adopted. European Union was among the top actors that signed this new program of action. In the present era, the achievement of the Millennium Goals remains a daunting challenge for both donors and aid recipients; in some poor countries this task becomes even more difficult as there is the threat of conflict. While the notion of conflict prevention was not directly included in the Millennium Development Goals, it is closely related as it constitutes one of the most serious obstacles for MDG accomplishment.⁸⁶¹ Conflict destabilizes official institutions and damages economic activity in fragile states, weakening the process of achieving

⁸⁵⁸ Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question: a peek in to the future," *Transition*, 106 (2011)

⁸⁵⁹ "Riots in Uganda: In Whose Interest?," *The Economist*, September 17, 2009, Kampala, available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/14465663>

⁸⁶⁰ Necla Tschirgi, *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?*, International Peace Academy Studies in Security and Development (2003)

⁸⁶¹ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-year strategic review, Children and conflict in a changing world* (New York: UNICEF, 2009)

MDG; but this also works in the other way as under-development can lead to conflict.

In this context, the EU – one of the largest donors at global level - has recently changed its policy of intervention⁸⁶² towards a holistic strategy, aiming at improving governance, security and development,⁸⁶³ highlighting the importance of conflict prevention in numerous official documents⁸⁶⁴ and identifying it "as one of the main objectives of the EU's external relations."⁸⁶⁵ According to the Commission, conflict prevention is defined as "the broad range of policies for anticipating and reacting to social, political and economic factors which could result in the breakdown of a society."⁸⁶⁶ Thus, the EU, in the context of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduced in the late 1990s the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as its "operations arm."⁸⁶⁷ Concerning peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities, various steps were made through the adoption of the Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001) and the Gothenburg Program (2001).⁸⁶⁸ In December 2003, the EU initiated the European Security Strategy (ESS) where strategic goals were defined and a framework for state members' coherent action was set up.⁸⁶⁹ Through this framework the EU's external actions, security and defense policies were adapted to

⁸⁶² For an overview of EU policy over conflict prevention see Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert, "The EU and conflict prevention: a brief historic overview," Institute for International Law, WP53 (2003)

⁸⁶³ Fernanda Faria, and Richard Youngs, "European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building," *FRIDE*, Working Paper 94 (2010)

⁸⁶⁴ COM (2000) 212 Final, "The European Community's Development Policy," Brussels, Communication on Conflict Prevention 11 April 2001; see also Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, 15 and 16 June 2001, SN 200/1/01 REV.1

⁸⁶⁵ Council of the European Union, "Presidency report to the European Council on EU activities in the framework of prevention," 11013/07, June 13, 2007

⁸⁶⁶ COM (1996) 332 Final, "The European Union and the issues of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond," March 6, 1996, quoted in Els Vanheusden, "Overview of the Conflict Prevention Policy of the EU," (2010): 5, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948514>

⁸⁶⁷ Mix E. Derek, "The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (2013): 10

⁸⁶⁸ Michal Natorski, "The European Union Peacebuilding Approach: Governance and Practices of the Instrument for Stability," *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)* Report No.111 (2011): 1

⁸⁶⁹ Abdurrahim Siradag, "The Eu's Security Policy towards Africa: Causes, Rationales, and Dynamics," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 4 (2012)

the new security environment.⁸⁷⁰ The EES was a major step towards the establishment of EU as a global actor in the security sector.⁸⁷¹ In January 1st 2007, EC regulation 1717/2006 came into force, setting up the *Instrument for Stability* (IfS), the new EU's crisis response mechanism:⁸⁷² this had three main objectives: a) to secure a quick and reliable reaction to emerging crises, b) to ensure that global and trans-regional security threats are addressed c) to contribute to capacity building of various actors for addressing crises prevention. The IfS, which substituted the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),⁸⁷³ was to be used as a tool in the *security-development nexus* and it refers to the relationship between development and peace and security.⁸⁷⁴ As it is argued in an EU report, "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace."⁸⁷⁵

Ever since 1950s, there is a clear trend in armed conflict: Traditional inter-state wars have become less frequent while there has been a rise of intra-state wars.⁸⁷⁶ In the period 1989-1992, out of 82 conflicts, there were only three cases of inter-state wars.⁸⁷⁷ As a consequence, there have also been fundamental changes in various levels of the conflicts: firstly, concerning the participants in the conflicts, with non-state actors having a significant role.⁸⁷⁸ Secondly, in the nature of the conflict and

⁸⁷⁰ Thierry Tardy, "The European Union: From conflict prevention to 'preventive engagement,' still a civilian power lacking a strategic culture," *International Journal* 62, no.3 (2007)

⁸⁷¹ Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 129

⁸⁷² Regulation (EC) No. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability [2006] OJ L. 327/1, 2006

⁸⁷³ Simone Gortx, and Andrew Sherriff, *1st Among Equals? The Instrument for Stability and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the EU's new financial perspective*, Briefing Note 39 (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2012)

⁸⁷⁴ Stephen Ganzle, *Coping with the 'Security-Development Nexus': The European Community's Instrument for Stability - Rationale and Potential* (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2009)

⁸⁷⁵ Javier Solana, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World*, S407/08, Brussels, December 11, (2008), 8

⁸⁷⁶ Nils Petter Gleditsch, Petter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Marageta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no.5 (2002)

⁸⁷⁷ Goodhand, "From wars to complex political emergencies: Understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder," 13

⁸⁷⁸ Paul R. Hensel, "The More Things Change...: Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19, no.1 (2002)

the way it is conducted: in such cases civilians are the main victims either as a result of warfare operations or because of famine and spread of diseases.⁸⁷⁹ Moreover, these rising conflicts have significantly different causes, related to a variety of fields⁸⁸⁰ making conflict prevention and peace building more complicated. While national governments do carry the main responsibility for conflict prevention,⁸⁸¹ the complexity of such processes, in addition to conflicts' proliferation that took place in 1990s, has highlighted the importance of civil society's contribution.⁸⁸² This significance comes from civil society organizations's (CSO) special characteristics, some of which are:⁸⁸³ a) the ability of civil society organizations to be active at both grass-root and macro level, linking different and distant actors, b) their potential to act fast, overcoming official and time-consuming procedures, c) CSOs can use tools such as community mediation on which they have long experience from the field, in contrast to governments that have little access to such instruments. Moreover, as Chigas argues,⁸⁸⁴ in cases of public negotiations for conflict resolution, official bodies run the risk to be accused for making concessions; on the other hand, CSOs can be more flexible, overcoming such constraints in sensitive issues without risking to lose their credibility.⁸⁸⁵ Moreover as Orjuela argues - citing Putnam⁸⁸⁶ - civil society can contribute in the creation of social capital and build ties of trust and cooperation, linking people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds; and this can be a

⁸⁷⁹ Andreas Wenger, and Simon J. A. Mason, "The civilianization of armed conflict: trends and implications," *International Review of the Red Cross* 90, no.872 (2008)

⁸⁸⁰ Dan Smith, "Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict," in *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Hand book*, ed. Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, and Ropers Norbert (Wiesbaden: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004)

⁸⁸¹ UN, Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985-S/2001/574 (2001)

⁸⁸² Thania Paffenholz, and Christoph Spurk, "Civil Society, Civic engagement and Peacebuilding," *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction* 36 (2006); UN, Department of Public Information, *Security Council stresses need for broad conflict prevention strategy, underlines potential contribution of civil society in process*, S/PRST/2005/42, September 20, 2005

⁸⁸³ Anna Matveeva, *Early warning and early response: conceptual and empirical dilemmas* (The Hague: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006), 36

⁸⁸⁴ Diana V. Chigas, "Unofficial Interventions with Official Actors: Parallel Negotiation Training in Violent Intrastate Conflicts," *International Negotiations* 2 (1997): 409

⁸⁸⁵ Paul van Tongeren, "Exploring the Local Capacity for Peace: The Role of NGOs," in *Prevention and Management of Violent Conflicts: An International Directory* (Utrecht: The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1998)

⁸⁸⁶ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*

major step towards peace establishment.⁸⁸⁷ Donors, governments and multilateral agencies introduced policies and planned new frameworks so as to include and strengthen civil society.⁸⁸⁸ In this context, the European Commission in 2008 published a call for proposals for the component of crisis preparedness, under the Annual Action Programmes 2007-2008.

According to the call, its main objectives were three-fold: first, to build up the capacity of non-state actors such as civil society, organizations and networks that focus on the processes of mediation, aid delivery and post-conflict recovery. Secondly, to make more significant the role and participation of non-state actors in conflict prevention through early-warning networks and to strengthen their ability to provide an in-depth analysis from the ground. Thirdly, to create a link between civil society actors and EU bodies, so as to build an efficient mechanism of EU institutions' response in cases of crisis. Moreover, the strengthening of collaboration among civil society organizations, the improvement of relation between civil society organizations - at regional and international level - and the development of CSOs' knowledge-base were among the top priorities of the program. Over the last years, early warning systems have become popular - especially in Africa⁸⁸⁹ - for the creation of efficient networks, so as to avoid cases such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1990s, where initial reports were - deliberately or not - ignored.⁸⁹⁰ This call for proposals was addressed, among others, to NGOs, cooperatives, networks, universities, churches, private and public foundations that were active in processes relevant to the main objectives of the program. The proposed programs were supposed to have a duration between 12 and 36 months; and since this was a program aiming at crisis prevention instead of an action against an existing conflict, there was no limitations

⁸⁸⁷ Camilla Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: a role for Civil Society?," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no.2 (2003): 197

⁸⁸⁸ Reiner Forster, and Mark Mattner, *Civil Society and Peace building Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006)

⁸⁸⁹ Thelma Ekiyor, "The role of civil society in conflict prevention: West African experiences," *Disarmament Forum* (2008)

⁸⁹⁰ Frederik Grunfeld and Anke Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The role of bystanders* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007)

or restrictions on the area of implementation. The deadline for the submission of applications was the 29th of April, 2008 and proposals' evaluation was to last until late October 2008, when the final results were to be announced.

The Commission in order to evaluate proposals submitted for its calls, uses a three-step evaluation process: first applicants submit a concept note of their proposal. During this phase, the concept of the proposal and its relevance to the context call is evaluated, in addition to checks for the proposal's methodology, sustainability and for other major information for the applicants. In the second phase, successful applicants are invited to submit a full application and all supporting documents. In this phase, selection and award criteria are used for evaluation. The selection criteria focus on two aspects: first, on the financial and operational competence of the applicants so as to examine whether they have the required sources to continue their operation throughout the whole duration of the program and cover their share in the co-fund, where this is required. Secondly, characteristics such as organizations' capacity in management and in the implementation of their work of both the applicant and the partners are scrutinized. On the other hand, award criteria are used so as to ensure that applications do match the objectives and priorities of the EU. Successful applications reach the final step, where the eligibility of the applicant and partners is being checked through the included documentation.

5.6.2 Project description

Overall, the proposed action was aiming at the establishment of peace in the war-torn region of northern Uganda through the empowerment of the capacity of various actors such as CSOs, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), NGOs specialized in topics of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, mediation; these organizations could become the foundations of an early warning network that could

identify rising tensions and threats and subsequently take steps towards conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, one of the main objectives of the project was the support of dialogue with the Ugandan government for possible threats for peace and for policy issues that affect the people in northern Uganda. In addition, the facilitation of communication between grass-root organizations and higher levels of state administration was also in the scope of the project. Furthermore, research on traditional forms of reconciliation was to be conducted; such results would contribute to the development and application of innovative methodologies for reconciliation.




Diagram 5.1: Structure of proposed early warning system, source: Dr. Eugenia Vathakou

The early warning system was structured so as to function and interact both from the bottom up but also in the reverse way; it also had various levels of administration. While the project focused on 2000 civil society organizations based in northern Uganda and the creation of an early warning mechanism, the proposed action would have multiplier effects as the final beneficiaries would be a large part of the population of northern Uganda, including communities, IDP, ex-combatants. The network of the early warning mechanism was planned to include most of the districts in northern Uganda - especially those which had been severely affected by the conflict. At a lower organization level, the early warning mechanism was planned to include 2000 grass-root organizations active on the field. These organizations would be already focused on peacebuilding or related activities, thus carrying invaluable expertise for the advancement of the project. Thus, grass-root organizations would work in the field gathering data, having an active role in mediation of possible threats that could rise in their own communities and in raising awareness. These organizations would inform on a frequent basis the resource officers who would administer this information and would disseminate valuable data towards other grass-root organizations. According to the proposal, 20 resource offices were to be established in 20 districts of Northern Uganda. From each resource office, one representative was to be trained in five relative topics - such as mediation, conflict analysis and resolution, intervention - so as to extend his/her capacity on the field and to be in position to train part of the CSOs (2000 organizations in total) that would be engaged at grass-root level. Resource officers were to be selected among candidates already experienced in related issues through a process of interviews and evaluation of past work and qualifications. Their tasks were to report to and consult the Advisory Board, the next higher administration body. The Advisory Board was to be informed through bi-monthly reports, while participating and offering guidance in cases of conflict mediation. The Advisory Board was planned to be comprised of eight experts on issues such as conflict resolution, advocacy and lobbying who also should have knowledge of the local conditions. Its main role was to supervise training of resource officers and to offer

support and guidance to the resource officers. In addition, the Advisory Board would prepare policy analysis reports for the core actors, at national and international level. Moreover, two more bodies were to be established: forums and the National Committee. In practice, three forums were to be established in different areas in northern Uganda where members of civil society, representatives from the districts, the local government and the international NGOs were to participate. The main task of the forums was to act as an instrument for the exchange of approaches between other actors-participants, the analysis of current conditions; another task of the forums would be the monitoring of the PRDP implementation and the preparation of reports for the Advisory Group for lobbying and advocacy. Another body was the National Committee: although not directly engaged in the management of the project, this committee was planned to have a very important role. Comprised by members of the Advisory Group and by members of the Ugandan parliament - coming mainly from northern regions - its task would be to link the grass-root level with the national level. In the committee, reports and recommendations from the Advisory Group were to be discussed and where necessary, such reports could be sent to the Parliament, engaging the government for vital issues and suggesting possible solutions and interventions. Another body, the Project Steering Management and Evaluation Committee (PSMEC) having the main responsibility for the management of the project, would consist of three members, coming from the main partners.

5.6.3 Implementing actors

The project was to be implemented by a Greek NGO - the applicant organization – that had past experience - among others - in the field of post-conflict interventions and in humanitarian and emergency assistance; furthermore the Greek NGO had implemented programs for the re-integration of IDP and ex-combatants. Moreover, the other main partners of the project were: a) a Network of human rights

organizations based in Uganda that would constitute the local main partner, sharing its extended network and its knowledge about local conditions and b) a UK based academic research centre, specialized in peace and conflict issues, contributing with its expertise in the field and providing innovative methods for conflict resolution.

The project was to be implemented in two phases: a) during the first months the establishment of the main mechanism and bodies was to take place and the capacity building component would be put into practice and b) the full operation of the project with the early warning network put in practice. The duration of the project was 30 months. However, according to the proposal, project's sustainability after its completion was secured, as the main actors were already active in the field; thus, their activities would continue in an enhanced network. In addition, an analytic time framework was included that described in detail the activities of the project, their duration and the implementing body of each action. The total budget of the program was 708.090 euro. This was to be covered mainly through a grant from the European Commission, and the rest through co-funding provided by the two main partners. EC's funding was 547.353 euro while partners should provide co-funding of 160.737 euro. In the proposal an analytic outline of the budget was included, where the cost of each action was estimated. However, it should be noted that the Commission poses a limitation to administrative costs that should not exceed seven percent of the total budget.

For the Greek organization, this was the second attempt to participate in a joint program with an Ugandan organization. When the crisis preparedness component was announced, Greek NGO's staff contacted the Ugandan Network and discussions about potential co-operation took place. Soon after, it was decided to submit a joint-proposal for the creation of an early warning mechanism on the war-torn area of northern Uganda. For the preparation of the proposal a member of the Greek NGO - that was later assigned as a project manager - visited Uganda and with

members of the Ugandan Network traveled to northern Uganda for two weeks, making visits on the ground and to other projects that have been implemented, gathering information and having consultations with key stakeholders with expertise on the topics of conflict management and conflict resolution. Through on the ground analysis, the real conditions, issues and potential threats in Northern Uganda were identified. Moreover, discussions with experts on peacebuilding provided an insight of local conditions and of other relevant programs, so as to avoid an over-lapping of activities. During discussions with experts on the field, it was found out that in various regions in northern Uganda there were some excellent peacebuilding initiatives set up by very small organizations. Two such organizations were the *Life Concern* in Nebbi and the *Teso Karamoja Women Initiative for Peace* from the Karamoja region. Such organizations were founded on a voluntary basis and had gradually grown to small organizations. However these entities had little capacity to support their projects. As funding was scarce, the implementation of their activities had become problematic; capacity had been reported as a major issue by the majority of the NGOs and CBOs's staff with whom the project team came in contact. Also, contact was made with an academic who was the Director of a specialized centre on African conflict and peacebuilding issues in a UK university. From the very beginning, the academic representative expressed his/her commitment to participate in the project and frequent communication was established for consultations on the preparation of the full application for the project. In this context, a Partnership Statement was signed with the academic representative for the submission of the application. Under this scheme, the academic institution was to provide expertise in conflict analysis issues. Furthermore, meetings with local officials took place in order to comprehend their approaches and intentions over peacebuilding programs, so as to secure support, co-ownership and avoid conflict of interests, increasing the effectiveness of the project.

5.6.4 Award of the program and initiation of activities

As it has been presented, the Commission's award decision for the proposed projects was to be announced on October 30, 2008. According to the official procedure, after the announcement the beneficiaries would be offered a contract. An indicative date for the initialization of the project implementation was March 2009. However, the contract signing took place in June 2009. According to the policy that EC follows for the implementation of development programs, 50 percent of the total funding pledged by EC is being paid with the signing of the contract. In this context funds were provided to the main applicant, who was also responsible for the implementation of the project. While project was initially planned to begin just after the signing of the contract, the team with the representatives of the Greek NGO went to Uganda in mid September 2009 for the launch of the project. Among the first tasks of the project team was to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the other two partners. For that, the director of the UK academic department traveled to Uganda for a few days and extensive meetings took place where various issues were tackled. For the Ugandan partner, it was the first time that was participating in a project funded by the EC. Thus, its members were not aware of the official procedures and the bureaucratic processes that the Commission requires, such as report writing, auditing issues. Another issue that had to be discussed extensively was co-funding as according to the proposal, each of the two main partners had to contribute to the total budget. The Ugandan organization, having participated in the past in projects where full funding was secured by donors, had not developed any fundraising mechanisms.

The academic director remained in Kampala for a few days for the first meetings and then returned to the UK. As it became evident through discussions, he/she was mainly interested in the research activities of the project, clearly aiming at publishing research papers on the issue of traditional forms of justice and reconciliation. While

communication continued, soon after the academic director expressed concerns - based on a report by the accountant of the university - that the payment for the engagement of the university, as proposed in the budget, was rather low for the UK standards. The project team was informed that the University could not sign the MoU. Over the next few days, there was no response from the academic representative, despite project manager's efforts to contact him/her. Then, after the project manager made contact with another person in the university, it became known that the academic department had been replaced by a new department with which the academic director had no relation. Surprisingly the UK academic director had failed to inform the other project partners for this advancement, although considerable time had passed. The Dean of the university - contacted by the project manager - was ignorant of the participation of the university in the project. The Dean, after investigating this *internal* issue, proposed the disengagement of the university from the project. Since this constituted a significant modification of the contract terms, the Commission was officially informed and agreed on the alteration as long as the UK academic department was replaced by another academic institution. After consultation with the local partner in Kampala, it was decided to hold discussions with representatives of a department from a local University - a well reputed institution, especially in peacebuilding studies, situated in Kampala. Moreover, another non-profit organization - registered in the Ugandan NGO Registration Board - that was founded in 1995 was also to participate in the project. This organization specialized in conflict prevention activities, in management and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding. It should be noted that these two new partners would be engaged at a much lower cost in comparison to the UK academic department. However, the disengagement of the UK academic partner caused considerable delay in the initiation of the project. The MoU between the Greek NGO and the main local partner was planned to be signed in late September 2009, after the kick-off meeting which took place on September 14, 2009. But these advancements postponed the signing and the initiation of the core of project's activities. Finally, the MoU between the two main partners was signed in February 2010. In the MoU, the rules and the obligations of the two partners were agreed,

referring also to financial and management issues. Also, the actions and the aims of the project were also clearly described.

5.6.5 Project set-up

Although the MoU signing was postponed for a few months, in the meanwhile the project team was working on the establishment the backbone of the project. An important step was the identification of the 20 NGOs - one in each of the 20 target regions - that would be the resource offices and the selection of one representative from each of these organizations that would take action as a resource officer. These 20 resources officers would be connecting grass-root organizations with sub-national and national bodies. For the identification purposes and other tasks of the project, the team traveled twice throughout northern Uganda and had successive meetings with members of civil society. Prior research and arrangements had been made so as to pre-select organizations that were more suitable for the needs of the project. In most cases, the interviews were conducted in major cities of the districts; interviewees were asked to travel to these places and travel expenses, food or accommodation - where necessary - were funded by the project's budget. Interviewees were asked to bring receipts for their expenses but in most cases receipts were not provided; also, the requested amounts were usually higher than what the team had projected. Inflating expenses was a practice that many interviewees were following. The concept of the selection process was that through the interviews and the discussions, the most appropriate and experienced organizations would be chosen. For the selection of the organizations, criteria such as their commitment to the program, the existence of linkages with other grass-root organizations in their area or nearby regions, the qualified personnel and past work experience in peacebuilding, gender balance and knowledge of English language were considered. With each one of the 20 organizations, a MoU was to be signed. Surprisingly, identifying organizations suitable for the needs of the program proved to

be a difficult task. While in some war-torn districts effective initiatives were undertaken by few small peacebuilding organizations with little capacity and support, in other areas peacebuilding organizations were non-existent and actors from other sectors - such as human rights - were selected. Moreover, through this process an interesting paradox was reached: while initially it was assumed that in a war-torn area the local peacebuilding organizations would have received support from the GoU, this was not the case: as it became evident from interviews with local experts on the field, the GoU had hardly provided any support to peacebuilding organizations; these organizations were either self-funded or foreign donors were providing financial support. Moreover, selection process gave an invaluable insight into how some organizations operate in order to survive: following donors' priorities. Thus, in some regions, organizations that had long expertise in peacebuilding in the past, had started to alienate from this sector, not because they were willing to do so or as if threats were non-existent but due to donors changing their priorities targets. Thus, in many cases organizations were diverting from peacebuilding programs to the implementation of other projects such as HIV prevention - a sector that was thriving in Uganda - where it was much easier for small organizations to secure funds.

One of the most critical positions in the project was that of the project coordinator. While during initial discussions among the two main partners it was planned that the project coordinator will be an employee of the network, it was later decided to make a public announcement for this position so as to select a person with extensive experience on project management. In this context, communications were made among the different organizations of the network and also a call for applicants was made in a high circulation newspaper. In the budget, it was planned that the project coordinator would receive a monthly payment of about 600 euro which for the Ugandan standards was a high salary. Although the initial total budget was made in consultation with the local partner who provided the necessary information for the local conditions, during the selection process members of the local partner argued for a higher salary for the project coordinator in order to attract professionals with

the highest qualifications. In practice, the selection process went on smoothly, with numerous applications to be received. Out of these, it was decided to have interviews with six applicants.

Moreover, an important step in the initial phase was to secure co-funding. A potential source was the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the Greek Legislation (Law 2731/1999), Hellenic Aid⁸⁹¹ - a body that was founded in 1999 for the co-ordination and monitoring of the Greek development activities⁸⁹² after Greece became a member of DAC⁸⁹³ - was obliged to co-fund programs that had been approved by the EC. For the submission of the funding application Hellenic Aid required a support letter from an official Ugandan administration body; that could be a related Ministry (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of northern Uganda) or from local administrative authorities (LC1). This support letter was not to include a pledge for financial assistance from the Ugandan government or any other local body for the project. Rather the support letter was meant to be a simple expression of approval - from the recipient's side - for the activities of the project, acknowledging its feasible contribution to the issues of conflict and peacebuilding. By this way, issues such as ownership, harmonization and alignment of projects with the local national strategy are being taken under consideration, so as to secure that the interests of the different actors are not conflicting, thus promoting the projects' effectiveness and impact. Since there was a deadline for application submissions to Hellenic Aid, it was a top priority for the project team to get the support letter and send it back to Athens. It should be noted that an attempt to acquire a similar letter for submission with the initial application for the call of proposals was made, but without successful results. To obtain the

⁸⁹¹ According to the Greek legislation, the official body responsible for the formation and co-ordination of the Greek development policy is The Directorate General of International Development Cooperation - Hellenic Aid which operates under the umbrella of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁹² Hellenic Aid, *Annual Report of the Greek Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Co-operation and Assistance*, Athens (2003), 29, available at http://www.hellenicaid.gr/images/stories/docs/ydas3_ektheseis/report_2003_greek.zip

⁸⁹³ OECD - DAC, *Peer Review of Greece* (Paris: OECD, 1996) available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/10/38023102.pdf>

support letter the team visited various ministries in Kampala (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Pacification for Northern Uganda) multiple times. The project team had meetings with the deputy secretaries of the ministers to whom the project was presented, its aims were discussed and consultations were made. In some cases, the team had meetings with even higher officials, such as with the Minister of Pacification for Northern Uganda. Such meetings were extreme time consuming as special arrangements had to be made in advance and sometimes they had to be called off as officials were not available. During the meetings, while all officials were agreeing with the concept of the project and its potential results, none of them agreed to sign the letter of support, although it was made clear to them that no financial support was requested. After numerous attempts with high ranked Ugandan Government officials, it became obvious that there was no political will to support the project. Initially, the reasons were not clear, since there was no negative feedback from officials about possible harmful results or any recommendations that should be taken under consideration in project's implementation.

Although such an approach seems incomprehensible, one possible explanation came after further discussions with staff of the main local partner where the Greek representatives were informed about recent past: as the Network was an important and well known supporter of human rights, it was at an opposite side with the current government. In many cases, the network had a role of a *watchdog* of the government, reporting and accusing the GoU for human rights abuses. As the project team had already lost valuable time trying to convince officials instead of tackling serious issues for the initiation of the project and as the deadline for the submission of the support letter was coming closer, the project team decided to move to Gulu - where project's central office would be situated - and have talks with local officials. The first meeting took place with the resident district commissioner of Gulu who was

considered to have an important role for the establishment of peace in the region;⁸⁹⁴ the commissioner was a former UPDA rebel who later became a high ranked UPDF officer,⁸⁹⁵ having elected under the NRM.⁸⁹⁶ After a short presentation of the project to the commissioner and a quick discussion, the commissioner also refused to provide the support letter, arguing that the proposed project was just another project that INGOs had come to the region to implement without having real knowledge of local conditions and genuine interest. Moreover, the commissioner underlined that development projects should be *in accordance with government directions and programs*. Interestingly, the commissioner was very critical over the activities of human rights organizations, arguing that authorities would definitely be informed if *abnormal activities* - which referred to activities that were opposed to government's approaches - were performed by human rights organizations. However, a recommendation from the commissioner was that locals should be employed for the office's positions. One of the last options for the support letter was the deputy district commissioner of Gulu whose office was next to district commissioner's office. After a very short presentation of the program to the deputy officer, he/she expressed a positive attitude over the project and agreed to sign the support letter under the condition that in the letter it should be clearly mentioned and emphasized that the proposed project would also be implemented in a specific region - which had been already identified as target region - as it was his/her electoral district. The deputy would also keep a copy of the letter for serving his/her own political interests for the upcoming elections as a proof of contribution to the local economy through the project's implementation. Moreover, the deputy secretary asked whether one of his/her relatives - adult, aged around 20 - could take any paid position in the project. It was agreed to return the next day to get the letter and have a short interview with the relative of the deputy, although it was made

⁸⁹⁴ Edris Kiggundu, "Col Ochora's complex life," *The Observer*, March 10, 2011, available at http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12502&Itemid=59

⁸⁹⁵ Rauxen Zedriga, "An open letter to Mr. Ofwono Opondo," *Uganda Correspondent*, December 13 (2010) available at <http://www.ugandacorrespondent.com/articles/2010/12/an-open-letter-to-mr-ofwono-opondo-part-1/>

⁸⁹⁶ Sharon S. Tibenda, "Museveni asked to sack his RDC over 'Kakyabali' talk," *Uganda Correspondent*, January 31, 2011, available at <http://www.ugandacorrespondent.com/articles/2011/01/museveni-asked-to-sack-his-rdc-over-%E2%80%98kakyabali%E2%80%99-talk/>

clear to him/her that while no paid position could be secured, some options for part-time placement would be investigated. As scheduled, the next day deputy signed the letter and the team headed for Kampala to send it to Greek NGO's central office in Athens. For the delivery, a well-known western courier company was selected. The letter was put in a sealed envelope with the logo and the information of the network of human rights network printed on it. In short-time, while the transfer had been completed and the letter was delivered to its destination in Athens, the team was informed that the content of the envelope had been inspected officially by Ugandan government authorities.

The central office of the project was to be established in the town of Gulu, situated in the Gulu district in Northern Uganda. While Gulu today is a thriving administrative and commercial center for the Acholiland, in the past it has been in the epicenter of the war. The project team traveled twice to Gulu and visited various places in search of suitable facilities for the establishment of the central office. Arrangements with owners of buildings were made first over the phone, getting initial information about the location, the building and the rent. In almost all cases the requested rent was substantially high for the Ugandan standards. Then the team was moving to visit the place; however when the project team was meeting in person with owners and more details were given about the tenant - an INGO implementing a peacebuilding project - surprisingly the requested rent was much higher in comparison to what was initially discussed. After discussions with staff of western NGOs situated in Gulu area, the team was informed that when locals were seeing an INGO coming to their region, they assumed that it was a chance to get rich quickly, overcharging goods and services. This issue was caused after big western aid organizations with large budgets established in the area, making deals with locals without negotiating rents or services. That resulted to a substantial increase of the operation cost for the implementation of their programs, a fact that significantly affected NGOs with smaller budgets. As a result, from then on, only the local partners of the team were present in the initial negotiations with the owners. Finally, after the project team visited various buildings in the city of Gulu, a suitable place was identified to be

rented for the establishment of the central office. According to the agreement, the building was to be renovated by the owner and rented from December 2009. In late November 2009, the first phase of the project was almost completed and the departure of the second Greek volunteer from Uganda was just days away, as exactly scheduled.

5.6.6 Continuation of activities

According to the initial planning, the next major step was the training of the 20 resource officers that should have taken place in January or February 2010 but as the MoU had not been signed, training was postponed. After long preparations, the training took place from July 18 to July 31, 2010 in hotel *Triangle* in Jinja - central Uganda. The main training was conducted by seven trainers, two coming from the local NGO that was engaged in the project, two from the local university and three from the two main implementing organizations. The main issues on which the seminar focused were: conflict analysis and early warning, mediation skills, advocacy for peace, and linking peace to development. Special attention was given to the PRDP. During the training, various tools and techniques were used in addition to practical examples and methodologies so as to ensure the effective transfer of knowledge. At the end of the training, an evaluation of this session was conducted, the results of which were discussed in the Project Management Group. According to the project proposal, the training was to last 15 days. A small modification was made: in this context, it was decided to divide the training session in two parts, with the first to last 13 days while the second part was to be used for the preparation of training material that would be used by the resource officers for the training process of the grass-root organizations. While the training process went on smoothly, some of the participants complained, requesting that it should have taken place in a much more expensive and luxurious place with more amenities, as was the case in past similar events organized by foreign NGOs.

Moreover, till August 2010, the internet portal of the project that was to be used for advocacy, communication and networking had been established and was operational. In addition, a database was set up containing information about the activities of the Resource Offices, identifying activities and current issues. Also, information about other organizations and official bodies active in each region were collected. Moreover, steps were made for the establishment of the Advisory Group and the National Committee. Due to advancements with the academic partner, the set up of the Advisory Group was delayed until the new partners were officially engaged. An informal meeting of the Advisory Group took place in July 2010 for the preparation of the training session for the resources officers. In this meeting five experts representing all project partners participated. Moreover, according to the plans, in the Advisory Group representatives from the three forums would participate, in addition to one representative from the Gulu University of Peace and Strategic Studies and the advisory officer of the project. The Advisory Group was to assemble every four months. As far as the National Committee was concerned, contact was made with members of the Ugandan parliament that were elected in northern Uganda. Moreover, communication with the AMANI forum⁸⁹⁷ (or the Great Lakes Forum on Peace) was initiated.⁸⁹⁸ AMANI forum's representatives expressed their will to support the project and participate in its activities. In mid July 2010, the Project Steering Management and Evaluation Committee was met in Kampala to discuss future steps of the project.

⁸⁹⁷ "Amani Forum," Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, Parliamentary Fora
<http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/members-of-parliament/parliamentary-fora/amani-forum>

⁸⁹⁸ The AMANI forum is a network that consists of parliamentarians from various African countries such as DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and aims in the establishment of peace.

5.6.7 Financial crisis in Greece and consequences

During the first decade of the new millennium, there have been tremendous financial fluctuations in Greece. In 2001-2002, Greece entered the European Monetary Union, replacing its national currency with the *euro*,⁸⁹⁹ while the Greek economy was developing at high rates; the real GDP increased by 5.6 percent in 2003, 4.9 percent in 2004, 4.5 percent in 2006 and 4.0 and 2.9 percent in 2007 and 2008 respectively.⁹⁰⁰ The adoption of euro led to lower interest rates and government borrowing increased substantially.⁹⁰¹ Greek governments were able to borrow with lower interest rates in comparison to the country's real fiscal conditions. As a result, throughout these years, fiscal deficit and external debt increased considerably.⁹⁰² In 2008 and 2009 a severe global financial crisis started to unfold.⁹⁰³ While initially Greece seemed to remain untouched by the new economic conditions, soon investors became much more risk averse;⁹⁰⁴ thus, countries with large debts that were highly dependent on external borrowing for budget funding and debt amortization became extremely vulnerable.⁹⁰⁵ In 2009, Greece's fiscal deficit was over 15 percent of GDP while public debt reached a record high of 140 percent of GDP in 2010.⁹⁰⁶ As a result, interest rates increased significantly at levels that borrowing and repayment was not viable. Soon after, Greece asked from the EU and the IMF to intervene and provide financial assistance.⁹⁰⁷ As a result, Greek

⁸⁹⁹ "Greece joins eurozone," *BBC News*, January 1, 2001, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1095783.stm>

⁹⁰⁰ UN, *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2010* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 145, available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2010wesp.pdf

⁹⁰¹ "A Very European Crisis," *The Economist*, February 4, 2010, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/15452594>

⁹⁰² IMF, *Greece: IMF Country Report No. 09/244 for the 2009 Article IV Consultation* (Washington, DC: IMF, 2009)

⁹⁰³ IMF, *World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: IMF, 2009)

⁹⁰⁴ OECD, *Economic Survey of Greece* (Paris: OECD, 2009)

⁹⁰⁵ Rebecca M. Nelson, Paul Belkin, and Derek E. Mix, "Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, policy Responses, and Implications," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (2011)

⁹⁰⁶ OECD, *Economic Survey of Greece* (Paris: OECD, 2011)

⁹⁰⁷ European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs, "Euro area and IMF agreement on financial support programme for Greece," European Commission, May 3, 2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-05-03-statement-commissioner-rehn-imf-on-greece_en.htm

government suspended its development cooperation assistance program. No further funding was to be given to development NGOs by the Greek official institutions, a measure that also affected the EU co-funded projects. Hellenic Aid issued a circular informing that for 2010 no call for proposals for project funding would be made, a measure that was expanded for 2011 and 2012. This advancement was another setback in the collaboration between the Greek development NGOs and the official state mechanisms.⁹⁰⁸

As far as the peacebuilding project in Uganda is concerned, the effects of the financial crisis on the peacebuilding project were soon to become evident. According to the terms of the proposal, the two main implementing actors should have an own contribution to the total project budget of about 22.3 percent. Thus, the two organizations should either contribute their own funds or seek funding from another donor; as none of the organizations had developed till then a fundraising mechanism - through donations, contributions from foundations - the only option was an external donor. In the recent past, Hellenic Aid had been one of the main providers of the co-funding for past development projects funded by different EU's agencies (EuropeAid, ECHO, EAR) implemented by the Greek development organization. However, as Hellenic Aid seized funding, a financial vacuum was created which - in addition to the inability of the two organizations to secure funds from other sources - would prove to be an obstacle that could not be overcome, leading the early warning network to a dead end. When the funding issue became evident, the Greek

⁹⁰⁸ Earlier, in March 2006 the Hellenic Committee of Non-Governmental Development Organizations initiated a communication process with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs raising important issues that Greek development NGOs were facing. Among these, maybe the most prominent was the required letter of guarantee. According to the Greek legislation, for participation in Hellenic Aid's call of proposals, applicants should submit a letter of guarantee, the size of which depends on the total budget of the contract. This requirement had caused considerable problems in the operation of the Greek development NGOs, as these organizations did not have special access to the banking system. Moreover other issues such as the funding and the co-funding processes, the administrative cost, monitoring issues were underlined. In this context, concerns were raised about the impact of those issues on the sustainability of the organizations, which would later prove to be a real threat: in 2007, there were 22 Greek Development NGOs active; three years later, only 12 remained, while the rest had ceased operation due to financial issues. In August 2011, Hellenic Platform for Development addressed a letter to Hellenic Aid and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where various issues over the operation of Greek Development NGOs were addressed.

NGO proposed to the main local partner in Kampala to revise project activities and subsequently reduce substantially the budget. Thus, the Greek Financial Manager asked for a scale down of activities. Such reductions in the budget would mean that project activities would be implemented in fewer regions in northern Uganda in comparison to the initial plan. However, the Ugandan organization did not reply on a proposed revised the MoU. In December 2010, the implementation of project activities was brought to a halt. Due to lack of funding, the office in Gulu - which had become operational in July 2010, closed and contracts with staff - apart from the project coordinator, an assistant co-ordinator, a financial officer and its assistant, an advocacy officer and a driver had been hired - were terminated. In June 2011, communication between the Commission, the Greek and the Ugandan NGO was initiated looking for a solution in the co-funding issue.⁹⁰⁹ The reply from the official EC bodies underlined that funding from EC could not be increased over the rate of 77.3 percent of the total expenditure and proposed two solutions: either the Greek (or the Ugandan) partner finds another third-source for the co-funding or in case this was not possible, submit audited financial statements to the Commission and close the project.⁹¹⁰ Finally, as funding could not be secured, project's operations seized.

5.7 Project assessment

Evidently, due to financial issues the early warning project in Uganda failed to achieve its main goals. About a year and a half after it was launched, activities seized. While major steps for the establishment of the project's backbone had been made, the core mechanism was never put in action and activity on the field was minimal. Although some of the projected activities were completed, discussing about

⁹⁰⁹ Letter from Greek Organization to European Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, August 3, 2011

⁹¹⁰ Electronic communication from European Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments to Greek Organization, August 11, 2011

the project's impact or its effectiveness is meaningless. However, a brief assessment can be made in theoretical terms, considering the current conditions and the needs in the field - in relation to the historical context and the social, political and economic environment that have been established in Uganda - and comparing them to the proposed activities of the early-warning project. Thus, the main question is whether the activities that were to be implemented in the context of the project were addressing the rising issues in the field and whether they were adapted to the local conditions. Based on the historical analysis and the investigation of the present conditions in Uganda, it could be argued that indeed the early-warning project matched the society's needs. As it has been presented, while warfare has ceased in northern Uganda, *positive* peace has not been established. Tension over land issues - especially after the discovery of oil reserves - access to resource services, grievances over political marginalization and inequalities are issues that remain open and could gradually escalate to conflict. The aim of the early warning project was to focus on these, tracking rising tensions at the ground and attempting to mediate; also it could act as an intermediate between local authorities and the national government so as to promote dialogue at a wider level. This could also contribute to the reconciliation process and to the ease of ethnic divisions between north and south that still remain alive. In addition, the project would contribute to the capacity building of civil society organizations and reinforce the co-operation network, facts that would secure sustainability. Moreover, mechanisms were included for the engagement of international actors, the role of which is of significant importance for the peacebuilding process. The successful design of the project was also evident through the discussions that the project's staff held with personnel from local NGOs and other organizations who - apart from their willingness to participate in the project - made minimal remarks and comments for the improvement of activities. Thus, overall, it could be argued that the early-warning project was well-designed so as to address the requirements in the field. On the other hand, the early termination of the project offers the opportunity for the examination of the reasons - that although not directly related to its implementation - led a well designed project, to a complete halt.

5.7.1 Ownership of the project

As it has been presented, one of the most critical factors for the effectiveness of an intervention is ownership from local authorities. However, before focusing on the issue of local ownership, an overview of the framework of the relations between Uganda and EU will be given. Historically, close relations between the EU and the African countries were initiated just after the establishment of the then EC in 1957 when the "first framework for 'association'" was laid out in the Treaty of Rome; this was later substituted by the Yaounde Conventions.⁹¹¹ A new era in the relations among EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states was initiated in 2000 with the Cotonou Agreement, which established a new framework, away from the agenda set up – since 1975 - in the Lomé conventions (I-IV); in the Cotonou Agreement the political dialogue among EU and the ACP states and strategic issues on aid allocations were highlighted.⁹¹² In the first article of the agreement, it is stated that the aim is to:

"promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment. The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy."⁹¹³

⁹¹¹ Alex Nunn, and Sophia Price, "Managing Development: EU and African Relations through the Evolution of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements," *Historical Materialism* 12, no.4 (2004): 211

⁹¹² Stephen R. Hurt, "Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no.1 (2003)

⁹¹³ European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement* (revised 2010), 16

Under the Cotonou agreement, the EU has set up the European Development Fund (EDF) as the main tool for the provision of developing assistance to ACP states.⁹¹⁴ The 11th European Development Fund that will cover the period 2014-2020 is expected to provide 34 billion euro to 78 ACP states,⁹¹⁵ with Uganda to be among the recipient countries.⁹¹⁶ Also, in the fundamental principles of the agreement the necessity for ownership of development strategies was highlighted, in addition to harmonization and alignment.⁹¹⁷ Uganda, which had also signed the Lome I agreement in 1975, was one of the African states that signed the Cotonou agreement.⁹¹⁸ Moreover, Uganda is one of the 189 countries that have signed the Millennium Development Goals declaration. According to the Ugandan legislation, the international agreements and the co-operation framework with the EU, European NGOs that aim to implement development projects in Uganda do not need to seek special permission from the official bodies of the local government. Moreover, although an EU delegation is present in Uganda, consultations between the foreign NGOs and the staff of delegation is not a requirement for the submission of proposals or the signing of the contract. But the commitments of the Ugandan government - nor the absence of an approval mechanism - do not ensure local ownership of projects. Early in 2008, when representatives of the Greek NGO visited Uganda to conduct research for the submission of the proposal with staff of local partner, various visits were made to government officials. Back then, a letter of support was also requested from various officials as that would support the project proposal - although this was not a required document from the EU. Even then, such a letter was not provided by the Ugandan officials.

⁹¹⁴ COM (2011) 837 Final, E.C. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, December 7

⁹¹⁵ Mikaela Gavas, "Replenishing the 11th European Development Fund," Background Note, London: ODI (2012)

⁹¹⁶ European Union, *European Union announces 11th EDF*, [press release] Delegation of the European Union to Uganda, June 13, 2013

⁹¹⁷ *ibid*

⁹¹⁸ Karin Arts, "ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement," *Common Market Law Review* 40, no.1 (2003)

As it has been argued extensively in the historical part, in reality the GoU under Museveni's rule has used the conflict to establish itself in power for decades. In political, economic and military terms the ruling party managed to prolong the conflict so as to concentrate power and in the same time to keep the north region - where support for government party is low - underdeveloped. Apart from the local government, other groups - for example military personnel - also had considerable gains. Eventhough since 2008 violent confrontation with guerrilla groups has seized, peace has not returned to Northern Uganda. Rather, a situation of *negative peace* exists where tension can easily escalate to violence, which subsequently could be exploited by the current Ugandan government for political and economic reasons. Moreover, it should be noted that in December 2012, the EU joined other large donors - the UK, Germany, Denmark - that had earlier suspended aid disbursements to Ugandan government when it was discovered that large sums of aid that were supposed to contribute to the recovery of northern Uganda had been stolen by officials from the Prime Minister's Office.⁹¹⁹ In this context, it is questionable whether the GoU really wanted the implementation of such a project in the northern region; rather, the project was accepted and tolerated so as not to cause a reaction by the international community. But such an approach - although might not affect directly the implementation of the project activities - is of utmost significance for the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions as these are related and subject to a wider framework of intervention and engagement. Interestingly, the issue of project's ownership by the local government became evident to the researcher only because of the support letter. Although various meetings and discussions had been made with state official bodies, these had a rather informative status and no objections were ever raised towards the necessity of the project. In reality, the only time that local participation - from a governmental aspect - was sought after, officials refused to contribute. Had it not been for the support letter, such an important issue could have gone unnoticed. However, the concept of ownership is not limited to the powerful actors. As it was argued, it was evident from the very

⁹¹⁹ "EU Joins national donors in freezing aid to Uganda over graft," *Reuters*, December 4, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/us-uganda-aid-idUSBRE8B30DA20121204>; Peter Nyanzi, "Declining donor aid," *The Independent*, April 28, 2013, available at <http://www.independent.co.ug/business/business-news/7721-declining-donor-aid>

beginning that for many individuals and organizations that were - either directly or indirectly - involved in the project, its effective implementation and success were not priorities; rather, personal interests and aims were what counted more and were defining their attitudes.⁹²⁰

⁹²⁰ A behavior pattern that is being analyzed by Allison and Zelikow in Alison Graham, and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuba missile crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999)

CHAPTER 6

Evaluating NGOs Peacebuilding Activities: A Case Study in FYROM

6.1 Introduction

In the previous section the Ugandan case study was presented. Through the analysis in a historical and political context, it was argued that the current government of Uganda under Museveni's rule prolonged and used the conflict in northern Uganda to establish itself in power, causing a humanitarian crisis and following policies that augmented ethnic tensions, keeping the north part of the country in destitute conditions for years. It was only after donors put pressure on the Ugandan government - a fact that highlights the importance of donors' political will for engagement - in 2003 that Museveni gradually changed his strategy towards negotiations with the guerrilla group. Although a peace agreement had not been signed, warfare has stopped since 2008 and a recovery process has started. However, a *positive* peace has not yet been established. Northern Uganda still remains - politically - a hostile ground for Museveni; instability and underdevelopment in the north favor Museveni's interests and his support base in southern Uganda. In this context, it was argued that the implementation of a peacebuilding project by an international NGO - funded by the EU - in the conflict affected areas in the north was not in the interests of the local government. Through a series of events, it became evident that local government lacked ownership for the project; although this might not have a direct effect on its activities, indirectly it weakens its *impact*, undermining the establishment of peace through the lack of a supportive and holistic - economic, social, political - environment. As far as the

evaluation of the peacebuilding project is concerned, a final assessment for the project results is not feasible as it failed to complete due to financial constraints. The findings of this empirical research are in accordance with various key points analyzed in the theoretical framework of peacebuilding effectiveness, such as the crucial role of ownership and the necessity for political will. Moreover, other factors - such as the incentives and interests of powerful groups and of individuals - that can have an impact on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects were highlighted.

On the other hand, in this section, two peacebuilding projects implemented in FYROM will be assessed. Similarly to the analysis path followed in the Ugandan case study, first the historical and political context of the former Yugoslavia will be presented, describing the evolution of its disintegration and the war that followed. In this part, the focus is on the peace efforts made initially by the EU and subsequently the diplomatic and military engagement that led to the Dayton Agreement; subsequently the conflict and the path to the peace agreement in Kosovo war is investigated. Through this analysis, the incentives of the international community and major actors' contribution to peace are examined. In the second part, the conflict that erupted in FYROM in 2001 is considered, focusing on the role of local, regional and international actors and the strategy that led to the signing of the peace agreement in Ohrid. On the other hand, the empirical research analyzes the effectiveness of two peacebuilding projects that were implemented in FYROM soon after the peace agreement. Using the evaluation path analyzed in the methodology section, assessment of results at a micro but mainly at macro level is being attempted; in this way, the necessity for a holistic approach in peacebuilding is emphasized, as exactly argued in the theoretical section. Conclusions are also reached over the engagement - related to the establishment of peace - of the EU in the post-conflict environment in FYROM.

6.2 Historical context

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) consisted of six entities: Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Yugoslavia was a highly heterogeneous entity in ethnic terms.⁹²¹ Moreover, religion was another dividing factor as the national identity of the different ethnicities was very closely related to religious beliefs:⁹²² Serbians were Orthodox, Croats and Slovenes were Catholics while in Bosnia Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims co-existed. In every republic, there was one dominant national group, with the exception of BiH⁹²³ where - according to the 1991 census - Muslims, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats represented 44 percent, 31 and 17 percent of the population respectively.⁹²⁴ In addition, language and historical relations of the different republics were also major dividing factors.⁹²⁵ Tito in order to ensure unity of the new country followed a strategy of mixing ethnic groups in the republics.⁹²⁶

Although people from different ethnicities were living together for decades, grievances were deep rooted and demands were frequently brutally contained, such as the Croatian Spring in 1971 - a national movement seeking more freedom for Croatia⁹²⁷ after which Croatia would become known as the *silent republic*, a fact that would last till 1989⁹²⁸ - the imprisonment of Muslim nationalists⁹²⁹ or the Serbian and Albanian opposing demands over the case of Kosovo. In 1974, the new Constitution that was voted missed the opportunity to counter rising issues and it became a

⁹²¹ Loraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 51

⁹²² Stella Alexander, "The national and religious background of Yugoslavia," *Religion in Communist Lands* 10, no.2 (1982): 215

⁹²³ Duan Janjic, "Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia: the Demise of Communism and the Rise of the 'New Elites' of Nationalism," in *Yugoslavia, the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region*, ed. Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 29

⁹²⁴ George W. Gawrych, "Roots of Bosnian Realities," *Military Review* 77, no.4 (1997)

⁹²⁵ Dragomar Vojnic, "Disparity and Disintegration: the Economic Dimension of Yugoslavia's Demise," in *Yugoslavia, the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region*

⁹²⁶ Franke Wilmer, "The Social Construction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia," *Social Justice* 25, no.4 (1998)

⁹²⁷ Robert Greenberg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and Its Disintegration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32

⁹²⁸ William Bartlett, *Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans* (London: Routledge, 2002), 33

⁹²⁹ Franke Wilmer, *The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 46

turning point in the history of Yugoslavia.⁹³⁰ As Akhavan and Howse argue, the 1974 Constitution failed to create a real federation; rather, Yugoslavia remained a "unitary" state under the rule of Tito.⁹³¹ In 1980, Tito, who till then had a balancing role, securing unity among the different ethnic groups,⁹³² passed away.⁹³³ Without his presence, nationalism was growing in almost all the republics.⁹³⁴

In political terms, although Tito's Yugoslavia followed a socialist path, it had a special status for the West: a dispute between Tito and Stalin that took place in June 1948 meant the breaking of close relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.⁹³⁵ For decades, Yugoslavia had a role as a *bridge* between the two rivalry blocs - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization; but rather than be attached to one side, Yugoslavia tried to follow an independent path, participating in the Non-Aligned Movement.⁹³⁶ In this context, the US was identifying Tito's Yugoslavia as a factor that could undermine the Soviet Union, hoping that other satellite countries of the eastern bloc might follow Yugoslavia's path.⁹³⁷

In the 1980s, Yugoslav economy stagnated.⁹³⁸ Inflation, unemployment, inequalities in the level of living in the republics and social issues - declining services in health

⁹³⁰ Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia, the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region*, 60

⁹³¹ *ibid*, 72

⁹³² Kasymov argues that "With the death of Tito, an ideological vacuum was produced in the historical memory of each group, which was easily filled with myths and prejudices against each other rather than with values of unity and respect, which are essential for the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups within a society." Shavkat Kasymov, "The Question of Ethnic Cohesion among South Slav Nations during World War II and After," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no.2 (2011): 304

⁹³³ Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 37

⁹³⁴ Charles Bukowski, "Slovenia's Transition to Democracy: Theory and Practice," *East European Quarterly* 33, no.1 (1999): 69

⁹³⁵ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 25

⁹³⁶ Marija Krstic, "The SFR Yugoslavia during the Cold War the current Serbian Foreign Policy," *Antropologija*, 11, no.1 (2011)

⁹³⁷ Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, 43-44

⁹³⁸ James H. Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 10

and education sectors - all contributed to the rising of ethnic tensions.⁹³⁹ Putting the blame on the other republics was an easy solution.⁹⁴⁰ Economic issues were exaggerated by the political advancements at global level: the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, brought about considerable changes in geopolitical strategies. In this context, Yugoslavia was losing its unique political role and other issues, such as the human rights agenda was gaining momentum in the US, where Yugoslavia's reputation was poor - especially concerning the suppression of Albanians in Kosovo.⁹⁴¹ The access that Yugoslavia had to western financial markets during the Cold War period ceased,⁹⁴² the US financial assistance to Yugoslavia's Federal Government was limited and the prospects of joining the Council of Europe were fading.⁹⁴³ Similarly, the political arena of the Yugoslav republics was severely affected by political and economic reforms in USSR, introduced by the General Secretary of the Communist Party Michael Gorbachev. With communism collapsing, communist elites in Yugoslavia tried to "regain legitimacy through a change in their ideological image."⁹⁴⁴ Political parties moved from a communist ideology towards internal nationalist policies.⁹⁴⁵

However, the failure of addressing effectively the underlying political, ethnic and economic issues and the presence of *power-hungry* and *insecure* officials contributed towards the rising of nationalism.⁹⁴⁶ A supporting institutional environment was being laid for years as the republics, rather than maintaining the federal status of

⁹³⁹ Gregory O. Hall, "The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic," *East European Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1999): 233

⁹⁴⁰ Jim Seroka, "Variation in the Evolution of the Yugoslav Communist Parties," in *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation*, ed. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 73

⁹⁴¹ Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.2 (1995)

⁹⁴² David Chandler, "Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989-1999," in *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Crisis*, ed. Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (London: Pluto Press, 2000)

⁹⁴³ *ibid*

⁹⁴⁴ Aleksandar Pavkovic, "Anticipating the disintegration: Nationalisms in former Yugoslavia," *Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 25, no.3 (1997): 428

⁹⁴⁵ *ibid*

⁹⁴⁶ Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia," 73

Yugoslavia, were planning their economic and political internal structure in a way that was limiting influence from federal institutions.⁹⁴⁷ Moreover, even under Tito's leadership, discussions on political issues were taking the form of "rivalries between republics."⁹⁴⁸

6.2.1 Dynamics of ethnicities

As it has been described, Yugoslavia was composed of different ethnic groups. Among these, Serbs comprised 36 percent of the total population, thus constituting the majority.⁹⁴⁹ They had an exceptional status among the other ethnic groups: state bureaucracy, the army and the police were mainly dominated by Serbs and Belgrade was the capital of Yugoslavia.⁹⁵⁰ Moreover, the Serbian position had historical roots as after the first World War in Yugoslavia - under the leadership of Alexander - Serbians dominated Croats and Slovenes; Tito tried to undermine Serbian dominance through the creation of the republics of FYROM and Montenegro and the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, causing Serbian grievances.⁹⁵¹ Serbian dominance was challenged by Croats, the second largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. For years, Serbs and Croats were the two major opposing sides: *Croatian separatism vs Serbian centralism*. Serbians were supporting the central character of governance for the federation, under Serbian rule, while Croats were in favor of power decentralization, having also the support of other republics.⁹⁵²

⁹⁴⁷ Zarko Puhovski, "Yugoslav Origins of the Post-Yugoslav Situation and the Bleak Prospects for Civil Society," in *Yugoslavia, the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region*, 130

⁹⁴⁸ Bette Denich, "Unmaking multi-ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis observed," *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* 11, no.1 & 2 (1993): 50

⁹⁴⁹ Chauncy D. Harris, "New European Countries and Their Minorities," *The Geographical Review* 83, no.3 (1993)

⁹⁵⁰ Stephen Schwartz, "Beyond 'Ancient Hatreds': What Really Happened to Yugoslavia," *Policy Review* 97 (1999)

⁹⁵¹ Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatred," *Foreign Policy* 91 (1993): 11

⁹⁵² Vesna Pesic, *Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996)

Veljko Vujacic offers a theoretical background for the dynamics that develop in multinational polities, an approach that can be applied to the case of Yugoslavia.⁹⁵³ According to Vujacic, dominant groups in such states

"tend to adopt a state-wide identity, often at the expense of suppressing their own particularism [...] As long as the central state (whether unitary or federal) remains the ultimate locus of sovereignty, the dominant group is likely to be satisfied with its role of 'people of state.' [But in case smaller groups confront the unitary nature of the state, then] "dominant national groups will begin to reassert particularist claims

An expression of these, and a famous incident that highlighted the ascent of Serbian nationalism was the Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences that was published in 1986. In this document Serbian intellectuals presented Serbian people as the "underdog of the Yugoslav federation",⁹⁵⁴ raising Serbian grievances⁹⁵⁵ and claiming that all Serbs should live in a unified Serbian state with expanded borders.⁹⁵⁶ Moreover, it was argued that Serbian people were being discriminated in economic, social and cultural terms and recommendations were made to redress these supposed inequalities.⁹⁵⁷ Such advancements had similar effects in other republics. For example, Croats were highly alarmed by the memorandum and nationalist sentiments were growing.⁹⁵⁸ In such an environment, there was every probability that "a Serbian demagogue would arise to exploit" Serbian grievances

⁹⁵³ Veljko Vujacic, "Serbian Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic and the origins of the Yugoslav War," *The Harriman Review* 8, no.4 (1995)

⁹⁵⁴ Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Serbian Church and the Serbian Nation," in *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 106

⁹⁵⁵ Christos Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for Eternal Identity* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003), 25

⁹⁵⁶ Philip J. Cohen, *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1996), 116

⁹⁵⁷ Aleksandar Pavkovic, "From Yugoslavism to Serbism: the Serb national idea 1986-1996," *Nations and Nationalism* 4 (1998): 513

⁹⁵⁸ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Whose Democracy?: Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 87

and nationalist sentiments.⁹⁵⁹ And that person was Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic identified Serbian grievances over Kosovo as a political opportunity to establish himself in power.⁹⁶⁰ In contrast to Milosevic's attitude in the past - when he was orientated towards communist ideology - and the different important professional positions that he held, Milosevic had shown no signs of nationalism.⁹⁶¹ In 1987 Milosevic became the leader of the League of Communists in Serbia, after an internal coup in the party, promising to re-establish Serbian dominance, a fact that fueled nationalist fears in the other republics.⁹⁶²

In the meanwhile, the political developments that took place in mid 1980s in the former USSR brought a wave of freedom in the eastern bloc.⁹⁶³ Thus, a few years later, one by one the communist countries - Poland, Hungary, East Germany - sought after their independence from Moscow.⁹⁶⁴ Yugoslavia's turn was next to come. In the Yugoslav case, political steps went along with economic breakthroughs: in 1989, Yugoslavia's Prime Minister Ante Markovic announced economic reforms and a turn towards market economy.⁹⁶⁵ Moreover, a shift to a system of multiparty parliamentary democracy was also decided.⁹⁶⁶ But rather than holding elections at a federal level, throughout 1990 elections took place in each Yugoslav republic,⁹⁶⁷ in a process where political parties were based on ethnic terms.⁹⁶⁸ Results in the republics varied, but nationalism triumphed: in Slovenia and Croatia communist

⁹⁵⁹ Warren Zimmermann, "The Demons of Kosovo," *The National Interest*, 52 (1998)

⁹⁶⁰ Agneza Bozic-Roberson, "Words before the War: Milosevic's Use of Mass Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethnopolitical Conflict in Former Yugoslavia," *East European Quarterly* 38, 4 (2004)

⁹⁶¹ Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 43-94

⁹⁶² Robert Mandel, *The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 122

⁹⁶³ Steven Morewood, "Gorbachev and the Collapse of Communism," *History Review* 31 (1998)

⁹⁶⁴ David Painter, *The Cold War: An International History* (London: Routledge, 1999), 107-108

⁹⁶⁵ Miron Rezun, *Europe and War in the Balkans: Toward a New Yugoslav Identity* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 115

⁹⁶⁶ Milica Delevic, "Economic Sanctions as a foreign policy tool: the case of Yugoslavia," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no.1 (1998)

⁹⁶⁷ Bojko Bucar, "Independence and Integration into the International Community: A Window of Opportunity," in *Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the European Union*, ed. Mojmir Mrak, Matija Rojee, and Carlos Silva-Jauregui (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 37

⁹⁶⁸ Ian Jeffries, *The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to the Economies in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2002)

parties lost to nationalist political entities, while in Serbia Milosevic and its Socialist Party of Serbia won; in Montenegro communists remained in power while in FYROM nationalists won, and in BiH results were mixed, based on the ethnic synthesis of the population.⁹⁶⁹ In Croatia another nationalist, Franco Tudjman came into power.⁹⁷⁰ After Tudjman ascended into power, instead of following modest policies that could suppress ethnic tension, a process of *Croatisation* was initiated.⁹⁷¹ As discussions about secession were taking place, in mid 1990 Milosevic warned Slovenia and Croatia that in case of secession, borders would be redrawn so as to protect the Serbian minorities that were living in that areas.⁹⁷² The 600.000 Serbs that were living in Vojna Krajina became the point of interest for the Serbian nationalist movement, a fact that reinforced the rising Croatian nationalism.⁹⁷³ In this context, Croatia started to arm itself, preparing for conflict with Serbia.⁹⁷⁴ Economic retaliation was another way to put pressure on these two republics: duties were imposed on their exports and their properties in Serbia were confiscated.⁹⁷⁵ Furthermore, in December 1990, Milosevic moved without authorization \$1.8 billion from the federal bank to Serbia so as to secure interests of his supporters, an action that caused the furious reaction of the then Yugoslavia's Prime Minister, Ante Markovic and of the other republics.⁹⁷⁶ On the other hand, for months republics were limiting their support to the federal budget.⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁶⁹ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise* (London: Routledge, 1999), 138-214

⁹⁷⁰ Thomas Cushman, "Anthropology and Genocide in the Balkans: An Analysis of Conceptual Practices of Power," *Anthropological Theory* 4, no.5 (2004): 12

⁹⁷¹ Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 93

⁹⁷² Danielle S. Sreemac, *War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 62

⁹⁷³ Alex J. Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-Old Dream* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 56

⁹⁷⁴ Anthony Oberschall, *Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence* (London: Routledge, 2007), 107

⁹⁷⁵ Christopher Cviic, "Implications of the crisis in South-Eastern Europe," *The Adelphi Papers* 32, no.265 (1991): 86

⁹⁷⁶ Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath* (Westport, CT - Greenwood Press, 2004), 20

⁹⁷⁷ Laslo Sekelj, "Is a peaceful Yugoslavia possible?," *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie* 6, no.2 (1996): 270

Slovenia, whose proposition for a con-federal model as a continuation for Yugoslavia had been rejected earlier by the Serbian leadership,⁹⁷⁸ held a referendum for independence in December 1990.⁹⁷⁹ Croatia later followed with a referendum in May 1991; in both countries a vast majority of voters was in favor of self-determination. In early 1991, as tension between Serbia and Croatia was growing, Milosevic and Tudjman had secret negotiations for the partition of BiH, so as to avoid conflict between them.⁹⁸⁰ In the same line with Milosevic, Tudjman had the vision of creating a Greater Croatia⁹⁸¹ and would soon express territorial claims over Bosnia.⁹⁸² When such news became known, the idea of independence started to become solid for the Bosnian government.⁹⁸³ At a federal level, Milosevic who had been elected President of Serbia, by controlling Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo had the ability to paralyze the Federal government.⁹⁸⁴ In May 1991 Croatian politician Stipe Mesic was to become the next President of Yugoslavia under the country's rotating presidency system, a move that was blocked by Serbia; Prime Minister Markovic was still in office but unable to continue proposed reforms.⁹⁸⁵ As the federal status of Yugoslavia was collapsing, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June 1991.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁷⁸ Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 194

⁹⁷⁹ Evan Kraft, Milan Vodopivec, and Milan Cviki, "Slovenia" in *First Steps toward Economic Independence: New States of the Post communist World*, ed. Michael L. Wyzan (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 139

⁹⁸⁰ Jeanne M. Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution That Wouldn't Go Quietly* (New York: Algora, 2006), 47

⁹⁸¹ Robert Hislope, "Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy," *East European Quarterly* 30, no.4 (1996)

⁹⁸² Jelena Lovric, "The knife over Bosnia," *The Independent*, August 3, 2012, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/the-knife-over-bosnia-franjo-tudjmans-plan-for-a-greater-croatia-involves-silencing-all-critics-jelena-lovric-a-croat-argues-that-his-intolerant-policies-helped-push-his-country-into-war-1537934.html>

⁹⁸³ Rezun, *Europe and War in the Balkans: Toward a New Yugoslav Identity*, 152

⁹⁸⁴ Robert Weiner, *Change in Eastern Europe* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 137

⁹⁸⁵ James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 33, no.4 (1991): 291

⁹⁸⁶ Matjaz Klemencic and Mitja Zagar, *The former Yugoslavia's diverse peoples: a reference sourcebook* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2004), 305

6.3 The war in former Yugoslavia

Slovenia managed to secede without falling into serious incidents of warfare, except from a brief military encounter with the Yugoslav army that lasted ten days.⁹⁸⁷ For Slovenia, maybe the most important factor for its peaceful transition - in contrast to the other republics - was the homogeneity of the people,⁹⁸⁸ as, in 1991, 87.6 percent of population were Slovenes.⁹⁸⁹ However, unlike Slovenia, the secession of Croatia would lead to bloodshed. Declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia put extreme pressure on the other republics, limiting their options: they had to choose either to participate in a federation where they would be under Serbian dominance - since the two other strong actors had already exited - or follow the same path of independence.⁹⁹⁰ The disintegration process gained significant momentum after the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) - one of the most unified institutions that was considered to be a *guard* for the rights of the republics - moved against Slovenia; as Serbian leadership of JNA supported the concept of a Greater Serbia, nationalism in the other republics continued to rise.⁹⁹¹ Croatian independence meant that Croatian Serbs were losing the status of constitutive people in Croatia, becoming an ethnic minority.⁹⁹² Serbs in Croatia - constituting 12 percent of total population - reacted and declared their secession.⁹⁹³ This was made on the assumption that if self-determination of the republics was a right they could exercise, then it was also an

⁹⁸⁷ Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia," in *The Transition in Eastern Europe* - vol. 1, ed. Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot, and Jeffrey D. Sachs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 198

⁹⁸⁸ Taylor B. Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 62

⁹⁸⁹ Matjaz Klemencic and Mitja Zagar, *The former Yugoslavia's diverse peoples: a reference sourcebook*, 296

⁹⁹⁰ William Maley, "The United Nations and ethnic conflict management: Lessons from the disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 25, no.3 (1997): 562

⁹⁹¹ Kenneth E. Basom, "Prospects for Democracy in Serbia and Croatia," *East European Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (1995)

⁹⁹² David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 189

⁹⁹³ George Macesich, *Integration and Stabilization: A Monetary View* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 24

adequate solution for minorities in the republics.⁹⁹⁴ The first minor violent incidents among Croats and Serbs that were observed during the first months of 1991 were gradually transforming to serious clashes with the participation of military and police forces.⁹⁹⁵ The activity of para-military groups such as the *Red Berets* became an excuse for Croatian extremists to counter-attack and commit atrocities against Serbs in Krajina, which was used by Serbian authorities as a justification for their actions.⁹⁹⁶ In Gagnon's words, this "was a purposeful strategic use of military force on the part of elites in Belgrade and Zagreb that had the immediate goal of destroying heterogeneous communities in the most ethnically plural parts of Croatia."⁹⁹⁷ In June 1991, under the command of Milosevic, the JNA invaded Croatia in order to protect Serbs that were living in Croatian territory.⁹⁹⁸ A plan for the building of a Greater Serbia as a successive entity of former Yugoslavia that would unify Serbs in different regions had just begun, including BiH and parts of Croatia.⁹⁹⁹

In the first months of 1992, a cease fire was announced; but 27 percent of Croatia, mainly the area of Krajina, was under Serbian control.¹⁰⁰⁰ In February 1992 through the adoption of Security Council's Resolution 743 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in Croatia - with its headquarters in Sarajevo - for a twelve-month period.¹⁰⁰¹ Initially, Bosnian authorities held a neutral position over the Croatian-Serbian conflict.¹⁰⁰² But soon, as secret plans for the division of Bosnia became known, Bosnian leadership - after holding a referendum- announced

⁹⁹⁴ Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 36

⁹⁹⁵ Edith Marko-Stockl, "The Making of Ethnic Insecurity: A Case Study of the Krajina Serbs," *Human Security Perspectives* 1, no.2 (2004): 26

⁹⁹⁶ Philip Valere Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War* (Cornell University Press, 2004), 106-107

⁹⁹⁷ *ibid*

⁹⁹⁸ Scott Grosscup, "The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State Immunity and the Specter of Victor's Justice," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 32, no.2 (2004)

⁹⁹⁹ Josip Glaurdic, "Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Milosevic Telephone Intercepts, 1991-1992," *East European Politics and Societies* 23 (2009)

¹⁰⁰⁰ Sumantra Bose, *Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 122

¹⁰⁰¹ Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 86-87

¹⁰⁰² Jim Seroka, "Yugoslavia and Its Successor States," in *Developments in East European Politics*, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul Lewis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 118

the formation of an independent republic.¹⁰⁰³ This move was rejected by Bosnian Serb leadership who subsequently announced the secession from the republic of BiH.¹⁰⁰⁴ Although the EU and the US recognized BiH,¹⁰⁰⁵ Serbian forces launched a vicious *ethnic cleansing* attack against areas of BiH.¹⁰⁰⁶ Soon after, Serbian forces - Bosnian Serbs and the Yugoslav Army - managed to be in control of about two thirds of Bosnian territory, setting up the Serb Republic of Bosnia (Republika Srpska).¹⁰⁰⁷ The final aim was to perform a process of ethnic cleansing, expelling Croats and Muslims from regions bordering Serbia. On the other hand, Bosnian Croats initiated their own military attack - with the help of the Tadjman government - so as to satisfy their territorial aspirations.¹⁰⁰⁸ Till August 1992, more than 2.5 million people had been displaced from Bosnia; the displacement was more "an objective rather than [...] a consequence of the war."¹⁰⁰⁹ As conditions deteriorated, the UN decided to expand UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia.¹⁰¹⁰ In October 1992, a no-fly-zone over Bosnia was set up by UN¹⁰¹¹

Despite the presence of international forces, Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo would become a besieged city for almost four years, from mid 1992 till late 1995 where thousands of people - civilians and soldiers - would die.¹⁰¹² Over the next three years, the war - in which three armies, the Army of BiH, the Serbian Republika Srpska Army

¹⁰⁰³ Rezun, *Europe and War in the Balkans: Toward a New Yugoslav Identity*, 152

¹⁰⁰⁴ Alcira Kreimer, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 20

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ronald Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union," *European Journal of International Law* 4, no.1 (1993), 50

¹⁰⁰⁶ Sean D. Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: the United Nations in an evolving world order* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1996), 200

¹⁰⁰⁷ Jutta Paczulla, "The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton. Peace Efforts in Bosnia - Herzegovina," *International Journal* 60, no.1 (2004)

¹⁰⁰⁸ Roberto Belloni, "Bosnia: Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15, no.3-4 (2009): 358

¹⁰⁰⁹ Kirsten Young, "UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina," *International Review of the Red Cross* 83, no.843 (2001): 782

¹⁰¹⁰ Elinor C. Sloan, *Bosnia and the New Collective Security* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 20-21

¹⁰¹¹ Joshua Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996), 115

¹⁰¹² Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, and John Hagan, "The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice," *Law & Society Review* 40, no.2 (2006)

and the Croatian Defence Committee were conflicting¹⁰¹³ - would go under various phases where Muslims, Croats and Serbs would change roles, being either the victims or the perpetrators.¹⁰¹⁴ In Serbia, Milosevic, through the use of the war, had the chance to establish himself in power by eliminating political opposition and suppressing voices calling for peace.¹⁰¹⁵ The economic sanctions that were imposed on Serbia in May 1992 had a counter effect and further empowered Milosevic over its opponents.¹⁰¹⁶ In May 1993 six areas (including Sarajevo) were declared as safe zones protected by UN; in this context, NATO also announced that military action would be taken if these areas were attacked.¹⁰¹⁷ In March 1994, there was normalization in the relations between BiH and Croatia: under pressure from the US administration, negotiations took place between the leaders of BiH and Croatia in Washington.¹⁰¹⁸ In the aftermath of the negotiation process, a peace accord was signed, ending the war between the two entities.¹⁰¹⁹ In January 1995 President of Croatia Tudjman notified UN that the UN mandate would not be renewed.¹⁰²⁰ In the aftermath, Croatia launched two major military campaigns to retake areas controlled by Serbian forces and the Krajina region: *Operation Flash* (May 1995) and *Operation Storm* (August).¹⁰²¹ The accomplishment of the initial goals of these operations¹⁰²² resulted in the displacement of more than 100.000 Serbs.¹⁰²³ These operations not

¹⁰¹³ Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall?: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (London: Verso, 1997), 57

¹⁰¹⁴ Ewa Tabeau, and Jakub Bijak, "War-related Deaths in the 1992-1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results," *European Journal of Population* 21, no.2-3 (2005): 189

¹⁰¹⁵ Eric D. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 2010), 24

¹⁰¹⁶ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, 232

¹⁰¹⁷ Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Nicholas Sambanis, "Bosnia's Civil War," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis* - vol. 2, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 193

¹⁰¹⁸ Roland Kostic, "American nation-building abroad: Exceptional powers, broken promises and the making of 'Bosnia,'" in *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding: Peace from the Ashes of War?*, ed. Mikael Eriksson and Ronald Kostic (New York: Routledge, 2013), 27-28

¹⁰¹⁹ Stephen Kinzer, Croatian Leader Backs Pact by Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, *The New York Times*, March 5, 1994, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/05/world/croatian-leader-backs-pact-by-bosnia-s-muslims-and-croats.html>

¹⁰²⁰ Miomir Zuzul, "Just Settlement: The Return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia," *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 2 (1998)

¹⁰²¹ Bartlett, *Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans*, 69

¹⁰²² Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 114

¹⁰²³ Cathie Carmichael, *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 61

only had the approval of US administration¹⁰²⁴ but also its support in military equipment, intelligence and training.¹⁰²⁵ In reality, as Holbrooke disclosed later, a cease-fire agreement was postponed in mid 1995 so as Croats and Bosnians had the chance to counter-attack and retake areas that Serbian and Bosnian Serbs had conquered earlier.¹⁰²⁶ Moreover as Touval argues, before the general Croatian and Bosnian counterattack that forced Serbs and Bosnian Serbs military units to retreat from the conquered areas, the international community did not have as a priority the implementation of a general truce, as that would create a *status quo* and mediating actors could be under severe criticism for "accepting de facto partitioning and ethnic cleansing."¹⁰²⁷ After a mortar attack in Sarajevo launched by Serbian forces that killed 37 people,¹⁰²⁸ NATO initiated *Operation Deliberate Force*, an air military campaign against Serbian targets that lasted two weeks.¹⁰²⁹ The military operation was the outcome of a change in the approach that the international community was following till then: military action would become "a partner to diplomacy."¹⁰³⁰ This military campaign put Serbian leadership under great pressure to negotiate a peace agreement.¹⁰³¹

The war in Bosnia ended with the agreement that was signed in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.¹⁰³² It is estimated that it resulted in the death of about 97.000 people; 65 percent were Bosnian Muslims, 25 percent were Serbs and more than 8

¹⁰²⁴ Sremac, *War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict*, 180

¹⁰²⁵ Edward S. Herman, and David Peterson, *The Politics of Genocide* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010), 82

¹⁰²⁶ Peter H. Liotta, *Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 163

¹⁰²⁷ Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95*, 132

¹⁰²⁸ Andrew Marshall, "NATO Jets Hit Serbs as 'Deliberate Force' Goes On," *The Independent*, September 1, 1995, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/nato-jets-hit-serbs-as-deliberate-force-goes-on-1598848.html>

¹⁰²⁹ Robert C. Owen, "Operation Deliberate Force: A Case Study on Humanitarian Constraints in Aerospace Warfare," Harvard Kennedy School (2001): 61

¹⁰³⁰ Elizabeth M. Cousens, and Charles K. Cater, *Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 24

¹⁰³¹ Neil Fenton, *Understanding the UN Security Council: Coercion Or Consent?* (Albanshot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 177

¹⁰³² Marko Attila Hoare, "The Bosnian War's Forgotten Turning Point: The Bihać Crisis of Autumn 1994," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no.1 (2011): 91

percent were Croats.¹⁰³³ The peace accord identified two entities, Republika Srpska and a Federation of Muslim-Croats instead of creating a unitary state.¹⁰³⁴

6.4 The EU and the Yugoslav disintegration

Initially, the strategy of European Community over the Yugoslav crisis was the preservation of the integrity of Yugoslavia as a unified state, since its breakdown could open a *Pandora's Box* in Balkans due to the complex foundations that Yugoslavia was built on.¹⁰³⁵ But after the political developments and the violent incidents in Slovenia and Croatia, it became evident that the EU - which was in a reformation phase through the Maastricht Treaty - had to intervene so as to avoid an ignition of war in the region. In this context, it was in 1991 when the foreign minister of Luxemburg, Jacques Poos, stated publicly that handling successfully the case of Yugoslavia would be the "hour of Europe".¹⁰³⁶ Similarly, a US official stated in 1991 that "after all, it's not our problem - it's a European problem...."¹⁰³⁷ When violence burst in Slovenia, the EC intervened effectively and an agreement on the cessation of hostilities was reached through the Brioni Agreement that was signed in July 1991.¹⁰³⁸ Moreover, Slovenia and Croatia accepted a three-month moratorium on

¹⁰³³ "Bosnia war dead figure announced," *BBC*, June 21, 2007 available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm>

¹⁰³⁴ Robert Hayden, "Let Dayton be Dayton" in *Exiting the Balkan Thicket*, ed. Gary T. Dempsey (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2002), 70-72

¹⁰³⁵ Erik Faucompret, *The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the European Union*, University of Antwerp (2001): 9, available at http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=*TEWHI&n=14357&ct=009823&e=21588

¹⁰³⁶ Financial Times, July 1, 1991, quoted in Paul Kubicek and Dana Parke, "European Union and Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Darfur and Beyond," *EU External Affairs Review* 60 (2011) available at http://www.global-europe.org/articles_pdf/6422001-kubicek_and_parke_eu_review_july_2011.pdf

¹⁰³⁷ CES, "What Happened to Yugoslavia? The War, The Peace and the Future," University of North Carolina (2004): 6, available at <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/teachingresources/balkan-crisis.pdf>

¹⁰³⁸ Norbert Both, *From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990-1995* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 105

the implementation of their independence declaration.¹⁰³⁹ Despite this successful step, soon after fighting re-emerged in Croatia and proposals were made by EC members for the deployment of a peacekeeping force but disagreements between EC members prevailed and no decision was taken.¹⁰⁴⁰ Despite an initiative for a common EC foreign and security policy,¹⁰⁴¹ the EC was struggling to present itself as a "united international actor" and its foreign policy was far from being characterized as cohesive.¹⁰⁴² The EC tried to intervene by holding a peace conference in The Hague in September 1991, where the concept of a loose confederation was proposed but was later rejected by Milosevic.¹⁰⁴³ As tension was growing and diplomatic efforts were ineffective, even EC members were calling for the engagement of UN, which was officially initiated with the adoption of Resolution 713 in September 1991.¹⁰⁴⁴ In this context, the EC imposed an arms embargo on former Yugoslavia, which was followed by the UN Security Council decision to expand the arms embargo on all republics of former Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁴⁵ In the meanwhile, an EC arbitration commission was set up to provide legal advice concerning the secession of the Yugoslav republics, led by French jurist Robert Badinter.¹⁰⁴⁶ On the other hand, the UN, then more involved in the Yugoslavia case, made further steps: Cyrus Vance - a former United States Secretary of State - was appointed as UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy in Yugoslavia. An International Conference on the former Yugoslavia that was organized in Geneva in December 1991 with the representation of Cyrus Vance (UN) and Dave Owen (EC),¹⁰⁴⁷ failed to produce solid results.

¹⁰³⁹ Janez Drnovsek, "The Political Reasons for the Dissolution of SRF Yugoslavia," in *Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the European Union*, 11

¹⁰⁴⁰ Sonia Lucarelli, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 21

¹⁰⁴¹ Delevic, "Economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool: the case of Yugoslavia"

¹⁰⁴² Josip Glaurdic, "In Pursuit of Unity," *The RUSI Journal* 157, no.1 (2012)

¹⁰⁴³ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 267

¹⁰⁴⁴ Lucarelli, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation*, 23

¹⁰⁴⁵ "EU arms embargo on the former SFR of Yugoslavia," SIPRI, available at:

http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/bosnia/eu-arms-embargo-on-the-former-sfr-of-yugoslavia-bosnia-and-herzegovina-pdf (last modified November 20, 2012)

¹⁰⁴⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 248

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ana E. Juncos, "The EU's post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?," *Southern European Politics* 6, no.2 (2005): 95

In December 1991, the German government made known its decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁰⁴⁸ This move was in contrast to the Badinter commission's recommendations - delaying recognition of the republics until minority issues were resolved - as that could bring them on the brink of war.¹⁰⁴⁹ Such an action was a clear example of the different path that EC state members were following, according to their strategic interests: Germany strongly supported the secession of Croatia and Slovenia, putting pressure on other countries to recognize them.¹⁰⁵⁰ Concerning Germany's motives for the support of secession, Flora Lewis argues that in reality it seems that it was "just a combination of circumstances, misjudgments, and muffled messages" that defined its intervention instead of secret plans.¹⁰⁵¹ In the same line, Thumann argues that it was not economic interests that drove German policy, but rather a feeling of helping those that were victims of Serbian hostility and that were seeking their *self-determination*, an argument that was keen for German people due to the recent unification of East and West Germany.¹⁰⁵² But while Germany was in the frontline for the breakup of Yugoslavia, in later phases and especially during the war in Bosnia, it had a very limited role, avoiding direct engagement.¹⁰⁵³ On the other hand, Lukic and Lynch argue that "the aggregate supranational interest of the EC in the Yugoslav conflict in fact closely reflected the national interests of France and the UK."¹⁰⁵⁴ Another EC

¹⁰⁴⁸ Sonia Lucarelli, "Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia: An institutionalist perspective," *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 32, no.2 (1997)

¹⁰⁴⁹ Steven L. Burg, and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk: M.E. Sharp, 1999), 93-94; Martyn Rady, "Self-determination and the dissolution of Yugoslavia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19, no.2 (1996): 385; Peter Radan, "The Badinter arbitration commission and the partition of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 25, no.3 (1997)

¹⁰⁵⁰ Michel Chossudovsky, "Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia," *Capital & Class* 21, no.2 (1997): 1-12

¹⁰⁵¹ Flora Lewis, "Bavarian TV and the Balkan War," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 11, no.3 (1994)

¹⁰⁵² Michael Thumann, "Between ambition and Germany's policy toward Yugoslavia 1991-1993," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 25, no.3 (1997)

¹⁰⁵³ Hans W. Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav crisis," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 37, no.4 (1995)

¹⁰⁵⁴ Reneo Lukic, and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 259 quoted in Dejan Marolov, "The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia - Special emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia," *Analytical* 8 (2012): 95

initiative for a peaceful resolution took place in March 1992, and became known as the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, which proposed the partition of BiH according to ethnic lines.¹⁰⁵⁵ This plan was rejected by BiH nationalists and non-nationalists entities.¹⁰⁵⁶ Gradually, as EU initiatives were ineffective and conflict was intensifying, the UN were taking the lead in the management of the crisis.¹⁰⁵⁷ In 1993, the Vance-Owen plan was firstly rejected by Bosnian-Serbs in January 1993 and subsequently in March, April and finally in May; such attempts were doomed to fail as the main negotiators were not granted with the main tools so as to follow a *carrot and stick* approach, convincing conflicting parties to agree on a mutual plan.¹⁰⁵⁸ Subsequently, Vance was replaced by former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg; Owen and Stoltenberg proposed a new plan that remained on the surface from July 1994 to August 1994 but the US administration failed to support it, thus limiting its possibilities for success.¹⁰⁵⁹

Former diplomatic failures and active intervention of actors that had a passive role till then led to new advancements: in April 1994, the Contact Group was established with the participation of United States, Germany, France, Russia and the United Kingdom and its main aim was to make a cohesive path¹⁰⁶⁰ for the different diplomatic efforts implemented so far.¹⁰⁶¹ Contact group was set up after suggestion of negotiator Owen who - having been engaged in the peace process - had the belief

¹⁰⁵⁵ Mike Karadjis, *Bosnia, Kosova & the West* (Chippendale, Resistance Books, 2000), 65

¹⁰⁵⁶ Doga Ulas Eralp, *Politics of the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012): 59

¹⁰⁵⁷ Alex MacLeod, "French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership," *International Journal* 52, no.2 (1997): 243

¹⁰⁵⁸ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 301

¹⁰⁵⁹ Francine Friedman, and Robin Alison Remington, "Bosnian Muslim Views of National Security" in *Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants*, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 101

¹⁰⁶⁰ Edemskii argues that "[f]rustration and the belated realization that nothing useful could be achieved while the major powers pushed moderately different policies", Andrei Edemskii, "Russian Perspectives," in *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, ed. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) quoted in Helen Leigh-Phippard, "The Contact Group on (and In) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation," *International Journal* 53, no.2 (1998): 312-313

¹⁰⁶¹ Querim Qerimi, "An informal world the role and the status of contact group under international law," *Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law* 7 (2007): 130-131

that the approaches and the bodies that were involved till then in the crisis management were inappropriate.¹⁰⁶² However, despite the positive reception of this new actor, Contact group's proposal was rejected by Bosnian Serbs; for one more time, the lack of the ability to use force was one of the main reasons for the failure of the initiative,¹⁰⁶³ in addition to the different strategic interests the Contact Group's members had.¹⁰⁶⁴ Similarly, the UNPROFOR in BiH was failing in its tasks: one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the UNPROFOR in BiH, was that it lacked the ability to use force, thus no pressure could be put to conflicting group to cease hostilities and negotiate a peace accord.¹⁰⁶⁵ In 1995, severe acts of warfare shocked the international community and from then on the "delusion of impartial peacekeeping"¹⁰⁶⁶ was left behind, identifying "Serbs as aggressors and the Muslims as victims."¹⁰⁶⁷ The mortar bombing of Sarajevo's market, the massacre in Srebrenica where Serbian forces perpetuated the worst war crime since World War II, murdering about 8000 Muslims - mostly men and male children¹⁰⁶⁸- and the capturing of UN peacekeepers as hostages by Bosnian Serbs forces so as to use them as *human shields* on targets and avoid their bombing,¹⁰⁶⁹ all contributed to a change in the approach that international community was following over the war in former Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration having decided to engage effectively in the peace process sent Richard Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs, to negotiate with warring parties.¹⁰⁷⁰ In Dayton, negotiations among Croats, Serbians and representatives from BiH took place with

¹⁰⁶² Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95*, 127

¹⁰⁶³ *ibid*, 129-130

¹⁰⁶⁴ Faucompret, *The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the European Union*, 13

¹⁰⁶⁵ David Anderson, "The UN's Role in the Former Yugoslavia: the failure of the Middle Way," Research Paper No. 15, PRS Australia (1995): 5

¹⁰⁶⁶ Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994): 24 quoted in Adriana Camisar, Boris Diechtiareff, Bartol Letica, and Christine Switzer, "An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords," *The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy*, Tufts University (2005):5

¹⁰⁶⁷ *ibid*

¹⁰⁶⁸ Vesna Peric Zimonjic, and Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, "Serbian President asks for pardon over Srebrenica massacre," *The Independent*, April 25, 2013, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/serbian-president-asks-for-pardon-over-srebrenica-massacre-8588828.html>

¹⁰⁶⁹ John F. Hillen, "Killing with Kindness: The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia," *Foreign Policy* Briefing No.34, Washington, DC: Cato Institute (1995)

¹⁰⁷⁰ Camisar *et al.*, *An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords*, 2

mediation of US.¹⁰⁷¹ The Dayton peace accord sealed the first phase of the Yugoslav drama.

In general, the war that followed the political advancements of the early 1990s was not a random event nor should it be attributed to one single cause (among others ethnic hatred, nationalism, economic collapse etc); rather it was the result of a combination of factors, the analysis of which must take into consideration the beliefs of the political actors¹⁰⁷² but not "ancient hatreds" as some western commentators have argued. As Cigar argues "Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina was neither a spontaneous expression of communal hatreds, extending back over a millennium, nor was it a primeval popular emotion, which the Serbian leadership could not control."¹⁰⁷³ Milosevic, without question a prime actor in the drama, is not the only responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war.

6.5 The Kosovo case

Although the Dayton agreement stopped the war, it failed to establish peace as in areas where populations from different ethnicities co-existed, ethnic divisions and separating policies were still taking place.¹⁰⁷⁴ Such a fine example is the case of Kosovo. In Kosovo the vast majority of population is Albanian; on the other hand, Kosovo is of special significance for Serbian people.¹⁰⁷⁵ For them, Kosovo is like a

¹⁰⁷¹ Steven Auster Miller, "Mediation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Second Application," *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal* 9 (2006)

¹⁰⁷² Dejan Jovic, "Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A critical review of explanatory approaches," *European Journal of Social Theory* 4, no.1 (2001)

¹⁰⁷³ Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 6

¹⁰⁷⁴ Charles Crawford, "Balkan Chill: The Intrinsic Weakness of the Dayton Accords," *Harvard International Review*, 21, no. 1 (1998)

¹⁰⁷⁵ Christopher Layne, "Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War," in *Nato's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000), 12

holy place because of the legendary battle of Polje against the Turks that took place in the era of Ottoman Empire in 1389.¹⁰⁷⁶ However, Albanians - who are considered to be descendants of ancient Illyrians - have been living in the region for centuries, far before the arrival of Slavs in the Balkans.¹⁰⁷⁷ Over the years, constant migration of Serbian people towards Serbia and a high rate of birth from Albanian people changed considerably the proportion of the population: while in 1961 Albanians constituted about 68 percent of the population and Serbians accounted for the 27 percent, in the next two decades percentage of Albanians increased to 77 percent - Serbians decreased to a mere 15 percent.¹⁰⁷⁸ Apart from that, over all these years, both Serbians and Albanians were expressing grievances. The 1974 Yugoslav constitution did not manage to bring closer the two communities: the autonomous status of Kosovo was confirmed¹⁰⁷⁹ and a process of power decentralization was followed, limiting Serbia's control over Kosovo and Vojvodina,¹⁰⁸⁰ thus contributing significantly to a strong polarization between Albanians and Serbians.¹⁰⁸¹ In 1981, massive riots by Albanians burst in Kosovo; however, what started as a protest from students demanding improvements in their standards of living,¹⁰⁸² was gradually transformed to massive demonstrations demanding a republic status for Kosovo,¹⁰⁸³ fueling in turn Serbian nationalism.¹⁰⁸⁴ Kosovo kept its autonomy within the Republic of Serbia till 1990 when the central Yugoslav leadership removed power from local authorities.¹⁰⁸⁵ In this context, a *shadow state* was set up by local elites which was

¹⁰⁷⁶ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33

¹⁰⁷⁷ Mehmet Ocal, and Ayse Aslihan Celenk, "Making of a New State in the Balkans: Kosovo," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 4 (2010)

¹⁰⁷⁸ Nebojsa Vladislavljevic, "Nationalism, social movement theory and the grass roots movement of kosovo sebs, 1985-1988," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no.5 (2002): 777

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ruth Wedgwood, "NATOS's campaign in Yugoslavia," *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no.4 (1999): 828

¹⁰⁸⁰ MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? : Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia*, 65

¹⁰⁸¹ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*, 37-39

¹⁰⁸² Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis, and Caspar Ten Dam, "A Success Story? Analysing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans," *East European Quarterly* 42, no.2 (2008): 162

¹⁰⁸³ Nebojsa Vladislavljevic, "Grassroots groups, Milosevic or dissident intellectuals? A controversy over the origins and dynamics of the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 32, no.4 (2004): 785

¹⁰⁸⁴ Peter Radan, *The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law* (London: Routledge, 2001), 154

¹⁰⁸⁵ Besnik Pula, "The emergence of the Kosovo 'parallel state,' 1988-1992," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 32, no.4 (2004)

constituted by various bodies, such as a parliament and a presidency.¹⁰⁸⁶ In May 1992, unofficial elections took place where the Democratic League of Kosovo party won the election and Ibrahim Rugova - a prominent Kosovo Albanian leader that had non-violent beliefs - became the *president* of this unofficial entity.¹⁰⁸⁷ Since then, Kosovar leadership avoided direct negotiations with the Serbian officials, as that could be interpreted as a recognition of the Serbian rule over Kosovo and looked for international mediation; on the other hand, for Serbia, Kosovo was considered to be an internal issue.¹⁰⁸⁸ Until the late 1990s, international community had also the belief that it should not intervene in Kosovo, a path that facilitated co-operation with Serbian leadership which was necessary for the termination of war in Bosnia; however this strategy had a side-effect as it increased Serbian oppression towards Kosovo Albanians.¹⁰⁸⁹ The Dayton agreement failed to tackle any of the Kosovo issues and Kosovo Albanians were much disappointed: their six-year passive Rugova's attitude seemed to have no results.¹⁰⁹⁰ For Kosovo Albanians, the Dayton agreement came as a shock as they watched the Bosnian Serbs, who after having committed severe atrocities over civilian population, to be given a large part of Bosnia, getting across the message that violence pays.¹⁰⁹¹

The Dayton agreement referred to the enhancement of human rights conditions in Kosovo, as a prerequisite for the termination of sanctions against Serbia.¹⁰⁹² Based on that, in September 1996, an agreement was signed between Milosevic and

¹⁰⁸⁶ Stephan Hensell, and Felix Gerdes, "Elites and International Actors in Post-War Societies: The Limits of Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* 19, no.2 (2012): 161

¹⁰⁸⁷ Jeffries, *The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to the Economies in Transition*, 432

¹⁰⁸⁸ Thanos Veremis, "How Mediation Could Help Resolve the Kosovo Crisis," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1998 available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/opinion/13iht-edver.t.html>

¹⁰⁸⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) quoted in Klejda, Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no.12 (2008): 1109

¹⁰⁹⁰ William G. O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 22

¹⁰⁹¹ Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no.3 (1999)

¹⁰⁹² Duska Anastasijevic, "The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimization Versus Responsibility," in *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000), 55

Rugova, concerning the education system.¹⁰⁹³ However, despite the agreement no further progress was made for its implementation.¹⁰⁹⁴ In addition, some of the war sanctions that had been imposed on Serbia were lifted and further contacts with Milosevic were encouraged; for one more time, this kind of support towards the nationalist Serbian leader had an impact on linkages with Serbian opposition, weakening its ability to confront Milosevic.¹⁰⁹⁵ The non-violent approach that Albanians were following till then started to lose its popularity and credibility. The Kosovo Liberation Army - or UCK in local language - that had been founded in 1993 was secretly training its members in military camps in Albania for years¹⁰⁹⁶ but had minimal activity till then. However this was about to change. As no progress was made at the political level, the violent path started to gain momentum among the Kosovo population. Kosovo Liberation Army's (KLA) first well-planned attack was carried out on April 22, 1996 when its forces attacked at the same time at four different Serbian targets, leaving behind two police officers dead.¹⁰⁹⁷ In 1997 an incident that took place in neighboring Albania had a significant impact on the evolution of the conflict in Kosovo: thus, as a result of a financial scandal,¹⁰⁹⁸ severe violent riots burst in Albania during which major military depots were looted.¹⁰⁹⁹ As a consequence, large quantities of arms and ammunition became available and were smuggled towards Kosovo.¹¹⁰⁰ The abundant supply of arms, the unsatisfactory results of the Dayton agreement, the unaccomplished expectations for a peaceful solution and the on-going Serbian oppression contributed to the mature of adequate conditions for a more organized warfare. Thus, on January 4, 1998 KLA declared that it would engage in warfare for the unification of Albania and Kosovo; soon the KLA

¹⁰⁹³ Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 277

¹⁰⁹⁴ Paulin Kola, *In Search for Greater Albania* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2003), 316-317

¹⁰⁹⁵ James Hooper, "Kosovo's Mark," *Harvard International Review* 22, no.2 (2000): 28

¹⁰⁹⁶ O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace*, 23

¹⁰⁹⁷ International Crisis Group, "Kosovo's Long Hot Summer: Briefing on Military, Humanitarian and Political Developments in Kosovo," ICG Balkans Report, no.41 (1998): 2

¹⁰⁹⁸ "Explosion at Albanian weapons depot kills 20," *CNN World*, April 30, 1997, available at http://articles.cnn.com/1997-04-30/world/9704_30_albania_1_explosion-depot-albanians?_s=PM:WORLD

¹⁰⁹⁹ Sami Faltas, and Wolf-Christian Paes, *"You Have Removed the Devil From Our Door": An Assessment of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) Project in Albania*, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, (Belgrade: Seesac, 2003), 3

¹¹⁰⁰ M.A. Smith, "Albania 1997-1998," *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, S42 (1999): 4

activity commenced, and four Serbian police officers were killed in the first attack.¹¹⁰¹ In March 1998, Serbian forces attacked villages in the area of Drenica in Kosovo, committing atrocities and killing 83 people, including several women and children.¹¹⁰² These incidents changed considerably the evolution of the conflict: in the aftermath of the attacks, the KLA movement gained significant momentum as a great number of Albanians started joining the KLA.¹¹⁰³ The expansion of the KLA forces continued and in July 1998, the KLA had managed to control about 30 percent of the Kosovo territory.¹¹⁰⁴

During the 1998 summer and fall, the aggression of Serbian forces continued and in September 1998, after Milosevic declared the defeat of the KLA, a new massacre committed by Yugoslav forces in Obrinje came into light.¹¹⁰⁵ International community reacted and NATO warned that air strikes will be conducted against Serbian forces should Milosevic did not comply with Security Council Resolution 1199,¹¹⁰⁶ which demanded a ceasefire, initiation of negotiations and measures for avoidance of humanitarian disaster.¹¹⁰⁷ A new peace initiative - the Hill process - directed by US officials was set up in Spring 1999; despite disagreements, pressure was put so as to reach an accord.¹¹⁰⁸ At that time, the Contact Group was in favor of the integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but with a more autonomous Kosovo.¹¹⁰⁹ US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright stated that "We have made it clear to Milosevic and Kosovars that we do not support independence for Kosovo,

¹¹⁰¹ Ben Fowkes, *Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 111

¹¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, *Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo* (New York: HRW, 1998)

¹¹⁰³ Agon Demjaha, "The Kosovo conflict: A perspective from inside," in *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*, 34

¹¹⁰⁴ Marc Sommers, and Peter Buckland, *Parallel worlds: Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo* (Paris: International Institute for Education Planning, 2004), 32

¹¹⁰⁵ Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, and John G. McGinn, *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 15

¹¹⁰⁶ Rachel Kerr, *The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 193

¹¹⁰⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (S/RES/1199, September 23, 1998)

¹¹⁰⁸ Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs* 75, no.2 (1999): 220

¹¹⁰⁹ Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 178

that we want Serbia out of Kosovo, not Kosovo out of Serbia."¹¹¹⁰ KLA's leadership, disappointed with the international community's approach, continued the attacks so as to provoke Serbian forces to unleash indiscriminate violence against civilians, a fact that could spark a fierce reaction from Western countries.¹¹¹¹ Soon after, another mass execution committed by Serbian forces was uncovered in Racak in January 1999 where 45 Albanian civilians were murdered.¹¹¹² As in the case of BiH, it became evident that diplomacy alone was not an adequate solution, forcing the Contact Group to use the "diplomacy of the ultimatum."¹¹¹³ One of the last chances for an agreement among warring parties was the conference that took place in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999.¹¹¹⁴ Soon after, another round of negotiations was organized in Paris.¹¹¹⁵ The Albanian side agreed, under the threat of losing international support in case of non-accepting the peace plan.¹¹¹⁶ But while these conferences were supposed to promote a peaceful solution, critics argue that in reality they were doomed to fail and used by NATO to trigger a military operation.¹¹¹⁷ During negotiation process, Milosevic had agreed in some of the terms of the agreement, rejecting the proposal for the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force and counter-proposing a UN-led or OSCE operation,¹¹¹⁸ a solution that was later rejected by NATO.¹¹¹⁹ However, it is questionable whether Milosevic had any real chance - even if he had the will - of accepting NATO's proposal as that would definitely led to his weakening through a) losing support for his

¹¹¹⁰ James Ker-Lindsay, "From autonomy to independence: the evolution of international thinking on Kosovo, 1998-2005," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 11, no.2 (2009): 145

¹¹¹¹ *ibid*

¹¹¹² Michael Meyer, "Dead Where They Lay," *Newsweek International*, June 24 (2002)

¹¹¹³ Alex J. Bellamy, "Lessons unlearned: Why coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no.2 (2000): 101

¹¹¹⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: Nato's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), 78

¹¹¹⁵ Paul R. Williams, "The Norm of Justice and the Negotiation of the Rambouillet/Paris Peace Accords," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 13, no.1 (2000): 208

¹¹¹⁶ Janez Drnovsek, "Yugoslavia in Retrospect," *Harvard International Review* 23, no.1 (2001)

¹¹¹⁷ For a short presentation of pro-war and anti-war approaches see Eric Herring, "From Rambouillet to the Kosovo accords: NATO'S war against Serbia and its aftermath," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 4, no.3-4 (2000)

¹¹¹⁸ Seth Ackerman, "Forgotten Coverage of Rambouillet Negotiations: Was a Peaceful Kosovo Solution Rejected by the US?," *FAIR*, May 14, 1999, available at <http://fair.org/press-release/forgotten-coverage-of-rambouillet-negotiations/>

¹¹¹⁹ Paul F.J. Aranas, *Smokescreen: The US, NATO and the illegitimate use of force* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2012), 129

coalition government and b) because of fear of nationalist military officers who threaten to overturn him in case he agreed and later possibly be accused as a traitor.¹¹²⁰ Henry Kissinger - ex Secretary of State - stated that "the Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing."¹¹²¹ At the end of the process, the accord was signed only by Kosovar Albanians, and in a sense the blame was put on Serbians for the non-agreement.¹¹²² In the aftermath of negotiations failure in Rambouillet and Paris, Serbia launched a military operation in Kosovo that was characterized by extreme brutality , causing a massive refugee wave of over 800.000 Kosovars towards neighboring countries.¹¹²³

On the 24th of March 1999, NATO launched a military operation against Milosevic's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). As a result, over a time period of 9 weeks, around 340.000 refugees fled from Kosovo and entered FYROM.¹¹²⁴ In early June, after consultations between US, Russia and European Union an ultimatum was delivered to Milosevic by the Finnish President Ahtisaari;¹¹²⁵ finally, Serbian President fearing the continuation of the destructive bombing, agreed to NATO's terms.¹¹²⁶ After 78 days of bombing - which took place without Security Council's authorisation - Milosevic withdrew FRY military forces and agreed to the presence of UN Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.¹¹²⁷

Among others, in the agreement a buffer zone was established between Serbia and Kosovo where Yugoslav forces were not allowed to enter;¹¹²⁸ this buffer zone at the

¹¹²⁰ Marlene Nadle, "The Myth and Milosevic," *The Nation*, April 1, 1999, available at <http://www.thenation.com/article/myth-and-milosevic#>

¹¹²¹ Ian Bancroft, "Serbia's anniversary is a timely reminder," *The Guardian*, March 24, 2009, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo>

¹¹²² "Rambouillet talks 'designed to fail'," *BBC*, March 19, 2000, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/682877.stm>

¹¹²³ International Crisis Group, "Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan," *Europe Report No 182*, (2007): 2

¹¹²⁴ Donco Donev, Silvana Onceva, and Ilija Cligorov, "Refugee Crisis in Macedonia during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999," *Croatian Medical Journal* 43, no.2 (2002): 184

¹¹²⁵ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 56

¹¹²⁶ Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 91-93

¹¹²⁷ International Crisis Group, "Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan," 42

¹¹²⁸ John Norris, *Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 226

east part of Kosovo - bordering also with FYROM - would be of significant importance for the evolution of conflict in FYROM.

6.6 Conflict in FYROM

FYROM is a small, land-locked country, covering an area of about 25.000 sq. km, situated between Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Kosovo and Serbia. Once a republic of former Yugoslavia, it has a population of about 2 million. As the case with other former Yugoslav republics, FYROM does not have an ethnically homogeneous population. According to the 2002 census, Slav-macedonians is the biggest ethnic group in FYROM, constituting 64 percent of the population; other minority groups are the Albanians (25 percent) - although the Albanians claim that they constitute a higher proportion of the population - Turks (3.9 percent) and Roma (2.6 percent).¹¹²⁹ Concerning religion, there are two main categories: Orthodox Christians (65 percent) and Muslims (32 percent); there is a strong relation between ethnicity and religion, with the majority of Slav-macedonians to be Christians, while Albanians are mostly Muslims.¹¹³⁰ Geographically, divisions can also be noted: Albanians constitute a majority in some areas in the western area of FYROM, such as in Tetovo (74.4 percent), Gostivar (63.7 percent), and in Kicevo, Struga and Debar.¹¹³¹ FYROM declared independence in September 1991,¹¹³² after holding a referendum - which ethnic Albanians boycotted¹¹³³ - two months earlier.¹¹³⁴ In contrast to the warfare in

¹¹²⁹ "Macedonia Overview," Minority Rights Group International, accessed on 13/6/2013, available at <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4021#peoples>

¹¹³⁰ US Department of State, "2010 International Religious Freedom Report: Macedonia," *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, November 17, 2010, available at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148958.htm>

¹¹³¹ Aydin Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity superseding Religion," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 28, no.1 (2000): 80

¹¹³² Andrew Rossos, "The disintegration of Yugoslavia, Macedonia's independence and stability in the Balkans," in *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation*, ed. Brad K. Blitz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 110

¹¹³³ Elez Biberaj, *Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 257

¹¹³⁴ Zachary T. Irwin, "Macedonia since 1989," in *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 334

the other republics of former Yugoslavia, FYROM managed to escape serious violent incidents till late 1990s and was considered to be "an oasis of peace"; but while there was no armed conflict, serious political, ethnic, social, cultural issues were undermining its stability.¹¹³⁵ Although FYROM managed to avoid conflict, in ethnic terms there was strong polarization between Slav-macedonians and Albanians. As in many other cases in former Yugoslavia, it seems that political developments - such as the voting of the new constitution in 1991 - put the country on a wrong track. Denko Maleski¹¹³⁶ argues that back in 1991 a nationalist strategy based on the concept that the country belongs to Slav-macedonians was followed, disregarding interests of other nationalities and minority groups.¹¹³⁷ Albanians were supporting a multi-ethnic state where they would have a constitutive status; but the proposals of the Albanian political parties were rejected in the parliament.¹¹³⁸ In comparison to the status that the Albanian community had under the 1974 Constitution of SFRY, the 1991 Constitution was a downgradion.¹¹³⁹ After independence, FYROM was under pressure mainly from Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Serbia over issues of national identity; in this environment Slav-macedonian nationalism started to emerge, a fact that had direct effect on the relationship between Slav-macedonians and Albanians.¹¹⁴⁰ As a consequence, while Slav-macedonian and Albanian nationalism was weak in the early 1990s - divisions were mainly based on ideological and personal issues - over the next decade the political arena was dominated by the ethnic factor.¹¹⁴¹ Similarly, in economic terms, the first years after independence FYROM's economy went into a severe crisis where the GDP declined by 7.5 percent ,

¹¹³⁵ Biljana Vankovska, "The Republic of Macedonia's paradoxes in peacebuilding: being an object and/or an actor?," *Crossroads Foreign Policy Journal* (January 1, 2011), available at [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The Republic of Macedonia's paradoxes in peacebuilding: being an...-a0272078613](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Republic+of+Macedonia's+paradoxes+in+peacebuilding:+being+an...-a0272078613)

¹¹³⁶ Foreign Minister of FYROM from 1991 to 1993 and ambassador to the United Nations over the period 1993-1997

¹¹³⁷ Mirjana Maleski, "The Causes of a War: Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia in 2001," *New Balkan Politics* 8 (2003)

¹¹³⁸ Rizvan Sulejmani, "Consensus Democracy and Power-Sharing in Macedonia," in *Power sharing and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement* (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008), 135

¹¹³⁹ Armend Reka, "The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-ethnic Relations in Macedonia," *Human Rights Review* 9 (2008): 56

¹¹⁴⁰ Jenny Engstrom, "The Power of Perception: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Inter-ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no.3 (2002): 6-7

¹¹⁴¹ Kevin Adamson, and Dejan Jovic, "The Macedonian-Albanian political frontier: the re-articulation of post-Yugoslav political identities," *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no.3 (2004): 304-305

1.8 percent and 1.2 percent for 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively; UN economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM's limited access to financial markets because of recognition issues and the Greek embargo imposed in 1994-1995 had a serious impact on the local economy.¹¹⁴² Although coalition governments with the participation of Albanian political parties were formed throughout 1990s, grievances did exist.¹¹⁴³ Various other initiatives had been made, such as the Council of Interethnic Relations - set up in 1993 - where representatives from all ethnic groups were participating, focusing on interethnic issues and on dialogue.¹¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, disagreements emerged on the use of the Albanian language as an official language of FYROM, or the founding of Tetovo University.¹¹⁴⁵ Moreover, just after independence only 3 percent of civil servants were from the Albanian ethnic group;¹¹⁴⁶ similarly low levels of Albanian participation were met in the security forces.¹¹⁴⁷ This low representation of Albanians in official bodies and various incidents of unnecessary excess violence from the securities forces against Albanian community members fueled ethnic tension and contributed to the representation of police as state's "oppressive arm."¹¹⁴⁸

In October 1998, when the last - before the crisis - parliamentary elections were held, a new coalition government was formed with the participation of Slav-macedonian and Albanian nationalist parties, a fact that created optimism for the resolve of issues that were affecting stability.¹¹⁴⁹ Indeed, for some of the issues that

¹¹⁴² Silvana Mojsavska, "Macedonia's Economic Arrangements with International Organizations: Gains and Losses," London: London School of Economics and Political Science, DP 29 (2005): 11-12

¹¹⁴³ Victor Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 172-178

¹¹⁴⁴ Peter H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 69

¹¹⁴⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, "The new wolves at the door: conflict in Macedonia," *Civil Wars* 5, no.1 (2002)

¹¹⁴⁶ Tatiana P. Rizova, "A Case of Contested Sovereignty: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-2002," *Review of European Studies* 3, no.2 (2011): 74

¹¹⁴⁷ International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Report: Fact-Finding Missions Regarding the Ongoing Crisis and Human Rights Violations in the Republic of Macedonia* (Vienna: IHF, 2001)

¹¹⁴⁸ Reka, *The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-ethnic Relations in Macedonia*, 60

¹¹⁴⁹ Stefan Krause, *New faces in Skopje. Lessons from the Macedonian elections and the challenges facing the new government*, ICG Balkans Report No 51 (1999)

fueled ethnic tensions steps had been made and negotiations were continuing.¹¹⁵⁰ International actors also had a role in the stability of FYROM. In this context, UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) - former UNPROFOR that was firstly established in early 1993 - was re-organised in 1995 in FYROM and had a preventing role through monitoring and reporting advancements -covering bordering areas with Albania and FYR - that could hinder stability and security.¹¹⁵¹ In reality, the UNPREDEP was the first preventive mission of the UN in its history, as till then UN forces were intervening either during or after war operations.¹¹⁵² On the other hand, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, created a refugee wave of over 400.000 Kosovar Albanians towards FYROM and put under severe pressure infrastructure and resources in FYROM.¹¹⁵³ NATO's operation had also a direct impact on the escalation of ethnic tensions in FYROM: while Albanians were in favor of NATO's intervention, Slav-macedonians were against as there was a belief that a similar to Kosovo *separatist campaign* could be followed by Albanians in FYROM.¹¹⁵⁴ Slav-macedonians were also considerably concerned that the refugee wave could alter significantly the demographic synthesis of the country.¹¹⁵⁵ In this context, refugees from Kosovo caused friction among political parties: while the government was claiming that the number of refugees had exceeded state's capabilities, making appeals to international community for the provision of help, Albanian community claimed that Kosovars refugees were "at home" and should stay in FYROM.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵⁰ Brenda Pearson, *Putting Peace into practice: Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge?*, Special Report 96 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), 4

¹¹⁵¹ Eli Stamnes, "Critical security studies and the united nations preventive deployment in Macedonia," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no.1 (2004): 166-167

¹¹⁵² Alice Ackerman, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 114

¹¹⁵³ International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: Filling the security vacuum," ICG Balkans Briefing (2001): 6

¹¹⁵⁴ Christopher K. Lamont, *Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 92

¹¹⁵⁵ Hugh Dellios, "Nato Air Strategy Under Fire," *Chicago Tribune*, March 29, 1999, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-03-29/news/9903290195_1_macedonian-territory-albanian-yugoslav-forces

¹¹⁵⁶ Bilyana Vankovska, "The Impact of the Kosovo Conflict on Macedonia: Between the Hammer and the Anvil," Paper presented at Information Management in the Field of Security Policy in the Southeast European Region Workshop, Vienna (2000), available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/infomanagment9.pdf

6.6.1 Uprising of violence and intervention of international actors

Conflict burst in FYROM in early 2001. The violent guerrilla uprising was an unforeseen event for the international community, the population and the official actors in FYROM.¹¹⁵⁷ Mincheva¹¹⁵⁸ identifies two stages in the evolution of the conflict: during the initial stage fighters from Kosovo infiltrated FYROM spreading out conflict. In stage two - April to August - domestic actors - politicians and civilians - joined the insurgency. The first violent incident took place in the Tearce village, close to Tetovo on January 22, 2001 where a police station was attacked by an Albanian armed group, the National Liberation Army (NLA) killing one police officer and wounding three.¹¹⁵⁹ In February, various incidents occurred in Tanusevci, where initially a short battle between government army and rebels took place after reports from a television group that on its way to the village armed men - some of them having the KLA's emblem and claiming to be a "national defense force of the village" held and questioned them; over the next few days, shooting incidents around that area continued, escalating tension.¹¹⁶⁰ Initially NLA had no defined aims, and broad concepts such as Great Kosovo and Great Albania were mentioned in its messages; but soon after issues such as constitutional changes and Albanian human rights were included in NLA's agenda.¹¹⁶¹ In March 2001, violence burst in Skopska Crna Gora region from where 22.000 people fled; in May 2001, warfare took place in other regions (Kumanovo, Arachinovo and Lipkovo) causing a major refugee movement.¹¹⁶² For one more time, the international community was absent in

¹¹⁵⁷ Ingrid Vik, "Conflicting Perceptions: A study of prevailing interpretations of the conflict in Macedonia among Albanian and Macedonian Communities," The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 1, (2003): 19-22

¹¹⁵⁸ Ljubov G. Mincheva, "Dissolving Boundaries between Domestic and Regional/ International Conflict: The Albanian Ethnoterritorial Separatist Movement and the Macedonian 2001 crisis," *New Balkans Politics* 9 (2005)

¹¹⁵⁹ Pal Kolsto, *Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts: Representations of Self and Other* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 175

¹¹⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, "The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion," ICG Balkans Report No.109 (2001): 3-5

¹¹⁶¹ Zidas Daskalovski, "The Macedonian Conflict of 2001: Between successful diplomacy, rhetoric and terror," *Studies in Post-Communism Occasional Papers*, No.7, Francis Xavier University (2004): 1

¹¹⁶² Norwegian Refugee Council - Global IDP Project, *Internally displaced people: A Global Survey* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002), 155

military terms. The presence of the UNPREDEP had been terminated a few years earlier, in February 1999, when China vetoed its renewal, despite the recommendation of UN Secretary-General for its continuation.¹¹⁶³ China's attitude could be explained as a counter measure for the recognition of Taiwan by FYROM, which was also connected to a Taiwanese aid package of \$1 billion towards FYROM.¹¹⁶⁴ Speculations can only be made about what would have happened if the UNPREDEP had remained in FYROM and whether it could have prevented the escalation of the conflict.¹¹⁶⁵

In June, NLA forces occupied Arachinovo but the counter attack of the government army failed and it was only after mediation of international actors that rebels left the city;¹¹⁶⁶ NATO intervened so as to secure the transfer of guerrilla groups out of the city, a move that was heavily criticized.¹¹⁶⁷ In this context Lord Ashdown, former British diplomat and the next High Representative of international community in BiH, argued about NATO deployment that "the cost of doing it will be far less than the cost of civil war, with a potential to widen into a regional conflict involving two NATO nations, Greece and Turkey, on opposite sides."¹¹⁶⁸ The confined warfare in the north part of FYROM ended with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in August 2001. Overall, the eight-month conflict resulted in the death of about 200¹¹⁶⁹ and the displacement of 170.000 people.¹¹⁷⁰ It is estimated that 5393

¹¹⁶³ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council fails to extend mandate of United Nations preventive deployment force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, SC/6648, February 25, 1999, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990225.sc6648.html>

¹¹⁶⁴ Sezai Ozcelik, "The Theory and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Preventive Deployment in Macedonia," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 3, no.11 (2006): 117-118

¹¹⁶⁵ Zoran Ilievski, *Country specific report: conflict settlement agreement Macedonia* (Bozen: European Academy, 2007), 16

¹¹⁶⁶ Iso Rusi, "From Army to Party - The Politics of The NLA," in *The 2001 Conflict in FYROM - Reflections*, Institute of War & Peace Reporting (Surrey: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2004)

¹¹⁶⁷ John Phillips, *Macedonia Warlords & Rebels in the Balkans* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2004), 132

¹¹⁶⁸ *ibid*, 132

¹¹⁶⁹ Florian Bieber, "Power sharing and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement," in *Power sharing and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement* (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008), 7

¹¹⁷⁰ UNHCR, 2002 Mid-Year Progress Report - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , available at <http://www.unhcr.org/3daabeff23.pdf> (accessed on 13/6/2013)

houses and 72 public buildings were destroyed during the crisis.¹¹⁷¹ Most damages occurred mainly in the cities of Lipkovo, Arachinovo, Tetovo.¹¹⁷² In economic terms, the conflict had a severe impact: a 5 percent reduction in GDP for the first four months of 2001 in comparison to the same period the previous year.¹¹⁷³

6.6.2 Beneath the conflict

As it has been described, the violent uprising came as a surprise for external and internal actors. Focusing on that, several researchers have drawn their attention on the reasons that caused and fueled the crisis. Rather than concentrating on the well known path of ethnic tensions, some researchers follow a different approach for the investigation of NLA's emergence and the conflict escalation and relate it with a race for political power as well as mafia and illegal actions. As Hislope highlights

"the question of minority rights in FYROM is dangerously complex. Many of the fine points of debate are political manipulations by both sides. While many of the ethnic communities' complaints are valid, some are exaggerations and misrepresentations."¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁷¹ Human Settlement Country Profile, Republic of Macedonia (2004), available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/macedonia/HSettIMacedonia04f.pdf> (accessed on 13/6/2013)

¹¹⁷² European Commission / International Management Group, *Damage Assessment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Geneva, 2001, 12, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/macedonia/documents/img/mac_damage_assessment.pdf

¹¹⁷³ The World Bank, *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Transitional Support Strategy*, Report No. 22628-MK (2001), 4, available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/09/01/000094946_0108210403593/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf

¹¹⁷⁴ Fred Abrahams, *A threat to "stability." Human rights violations in Macedonia* (Helsinki: Human Rights Watch, 1996)

In a 2001 report by International Crisis Group it is stated that "The reasons for the fighting are interlinked in a web of political self-interests in Kosovo and in Macedonia, criminality, a warped diaspora view of the real situation in the country, and unleashed frustration caused by chronic discrimination against Albanians."¹¹⁷⁵ However, the spark for the crisis seems to be a border demarcation agreement that was signed in February 2001 between FRY and FYROM; Slav-macedonian forces started patrolling border area, threatening on-going illegal operations that were active over the last ten years.¹¹⁷⁶ In a 2002 publication by Safeworld - a UK based NGO - it is reported that safeguarding of "lucrative smuggling routes" was among NLA's priorities, rather than a political agenda.¹¹⁷⁷ French criminologist Xavier Raufer argues that NLA is regarded by Italian intelligence service as an Albanian group that is in "a criminal conspiracy of Balkan clan-chiefs, gangsters in the diaspora and former members of the Albanian secret service."¹¹⁷⁸ This approach is in line with Tomovska who argues that criminal groups used ethnic tensions in their interest.¹¹⁷⁹ Kim also argues that Albanian militants active in the past in Kosovo, Serbia and FYROM - groups also active in illegal operations - tried to create tension and provoke a military reaction - either from Serbia or FYROM - so as to gain support from the West for Kosovo independence.¹¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, when NATO and UN intervened in Kosovo in 1999 and warfare activity decreased, some of the leaders of the KLA tried to enter in the political arena of Kosovo; in this context, Ali Ahmeti founded a political party (named the *81 Movement*) but its campaign was not successful in the elections.¹¹⁸¹ After that, as Lund argues, it seems that for Ahmeti, FYROM was "his last chance to become an Albanian leader"; thus, he and the other

¹¹⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: The last chance for peace," ICG Balkans Report No 113 (2001), 5

¹¹⁷⁶ Saso Ordanovski, "Lions & Tigers: The Militarisation of the Macedonian Right," in *The 2001 Conflict in FYROM - Reflections*

¹¹⁷⁷ Ian Davis, *Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: The Nature of the Problem* (London: Safeworld, 2002), 23

¹¹⁷⁸ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Macedonia: The National Liberation Army's (UCK) involvement in smuggling operations; coercion of locals in Ohrid*, February 21 (2003) MCD40620.E, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f7d4dc815.html>

¹¹⁷⁹ Ivana Tomovska, "Macedonia 2001 and beyond: New or Old War," *HUMSEC Journal* 2 (2008): 87

¹¹⁸⁰ Julie Kim, *Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002)

¹¹⁸¹ Michael S. Lund, "Greed and Grievance Diverter: How Macedonia avoided civil war, 1990-2001," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, 242

leaders of the KLA saw an opportunity in FYROM - using Albanian grievances - to promote their personal and political interests.¹¹⁸² Moreover, Pearson argues that the conflict initially started as an "intra-Albanian crisis" where a struggle for political power among Albanians took place in which Ali Ahmeti had a major role against the legitimate political parties that were representing the Albanians.¹¹⁸³ Furthermore, Hislope focuses to the organized crime, the high levels of corruption in the FYROM state as a main factor for the uprising of rebel activity.¹¹⁸⁴ In this context, Ilievski - citing Hislope - highlights the close relations among corrupted officials that have an important role in the conflict management in FYROM in the 1990s; thus, to Hislope words corrupt exchange "provides incentives to ethnic party elites to maintain coalition government despite the pressures that typically emanate from intra-ethnic party competition and the general absence of political or value consensus among coalition partners."¹¹⁸⁵ Such exchange, while contributed significantly to preserving the coalition government had a severe side-effect on the status of institutions (concerning governance, judicial system, security), thus fuelling grievances and undermining the state of FYROM.¹¹⁸⁶ In all, Engstrom argues that the conflict in FYROM, rather than a conflict on ethnic rights can be summarized as an issue of "who holds the power" among the elites of the two groups.¹¹⁸⁷

With the uprising of violent events, Albanian political parties lost power and influence, being substituted by the leadership of the rebels; over the next few months considerable changes took place in the political arena of FYROM and at the end the powerful groups from the two communities "had re-established criminal

¹¹⁸² *ibid*

¹¹⁸³ Pearson, *Putting Peace into practice: Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge?*, 4

¹¹⁸⁴ Robert Hislope, "The Calm before the Storm? The Influence of Cross-Border Networks, Corruption, and Contraband on Macedonian Stability and Regional Security," Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California (2002)

¹¹⁸⁵ Zoran Ilievski, *Ethnic Mobilization in Macedonia* (Bozen: European Academy, 2007), 8

¹¹⁸⁶ *ibid*, 9

¹¹⁸⁷ Jenny Engstrom, "Multi-ethnicity of Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian State," *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 1 (2002): 6

spheres of influence with their Kosovo partners and competitors after the end of the Kosovo crisis."¹¹⁸⁸

6.6.3 Mediation

In contrast to the case of Yugoslavia's disintegration, EU and its members acted in a cohesive way without *unilateral actions*, although early signs and alarming reports were either underestimated or overlooked.¹¹⁸⁹ When conflict started to escalate, prime minister of FYROM Ljubco Georgievski and other high rank officials supported a military response against the rebel movement.¹¹⁹⁰ On the one hand, EU and US strongly supported a "proportional use of force" as a response from the FYROM's army.¹¹⁹¹ In May, a document signed by the chairman of FYROM's Academy of Sciences and Arts surfaced supporting the exchange of populations and of land; this proposal was not denounced by then-prime minister Georgievski.¹¹⁹² On the other hand, as FYROM government's approach was recognized as the main issue that hindered peace process,¹¹⁹³ the EU and other international actors used a *carrot and stick* strategy to promote a diplomatic approach rather than a military solution that could lead to a civil war. As FYROM's memberships for EU and NATO were extremely popular among the population, they were used as an incentive for negotiations which resulted in the formation of a coalition government with the participation of all Parliamentary parties in May 2001.¹¹⁹⁴ Earlier a crucial step was made with the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between EU and

¹¹⁸⁸ Ordanovski, "Lions & Tigers: The Militarisation of the Macedonian Right," in *Ohrid and Beyond: A Cross-ethnic Investigation into the Macedonian Crisis*, 21

¹¹⁸⁹ Ulrich Schneckener, "Developing and applying EU crisis management: Test case Macedonia," *ECMI*, Working Paper 14 (2002): 36-37

¹¹⁹⁰ Ilievski, *Conflict settlement agreement Macedonia*, 9

¹¹⁹¹ Ordanovski, "Lions & Tigers: The Militarisation of the Macedonian Right," in *Ohrid and Beyond: A Cross-ethnic Investigation into the Macedonian Crisis*, 18

¹¹⁹² Eben Friedman, "The Spectre of Territorial Division and the Ohrid Agreement," *ECMI* 9 (2003)

¹¹⁹³ Robert Hislope, "Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost-war in Macedonia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26, no.1 (2003): 142

¹¹⁹⁴ Zoran Ilievski, and Dane Taleski, "Was the EU's Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?," *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 8, no.3-4 (2009): 357

FYROM, which was the first country in South East Europe to make this step towards EU integration.¹¹⁹⁵ The EU's Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was established in 1999 aiming at reforms that Western Balkan countries should undertake in order to be in a similar trajectory with EU principles and secure future accession to the union.¹¹⁹⁶ Apart from reforms in sectors that have been indicated earlier, this process aimed at the enhancement of regional co-operation and bilateral relation among neighboring countries in the region, promoting stability.¹¹⁹⁷ This agreement provided a policy framework that FYROM should adapt to over issues of human rights, democracy, rule of law towards an integration process with EU.¹¹⁹⁸ Throughout June and July, peace talks continued, although negotiations stalled at times.¹¹⁹⁹ International envoys Francois Leotard and James Pardew from EU and NATO respectively provided the political parties a draft constitution that was the basis for further discussions.¹²⁰⁰ In financial terms, support was given through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program that was set up in 2000,¹²⁰¹ with the commitment to provide 4.65 billion euro in assistance over the period 2000-2006; the SAP was to be followed by the EU's *Country Strategies and a Regional Strategy for 2002—2006* initiative that focused on sectors such as reconstruction, building of institutions, establishment of rule of law.¹²⁰²

But apart from EU and NATO, other actors had also a role during negotiation process: Ukraine, FYROM's main arms supplier, was under pressure from US and European officials to stop selling weapons to FYROM, so as to promote a diplomatic

¹¹⁹⁵ Jeffries, *The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to the Economies in Transition*, 62

¹¹⁹⁶ Nikolaos Tzifakis, "The Intentions-Declarations Gap in the EU Policies towards the Western Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 34, no.2 (2006)

¹¹⁹⁷ Harald Schenker, "The Stabilization and Association Process: An Engine of European Integration in Need of Tuning," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 1 (2008): 1-19

¹¹⁹⁸ Schneckener, *Developing and applying EU crisis management: Test case Macedonia*, 31

¹¹⁹⁹ Kim, *Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict*, 9

¹²⁰⁰ "Macedonia envoys' peace plan," *CNN*, July 7, 2001, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/07/macedonia.envoys/>

¹²⁰¹ Ettore Greco, "South-Eastern Europe: the expanding EU role," in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, ed. Roland Dannreuther (New York: Routledge, 2004), 65

¹²⁰² David Phinnemore, and Peter Siani-Davies, "Beyond intervention? The Balkans, the Stability Pact and the European Union," in *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995*, ed. Peter Siani-Davies (London: Routledge, 2003), 182

solution.¹²⁰³ Moreover, regional factors also contributed to the peace process: then Albanian President Sali Berisha was against an Albanian military intervention as that could have a severe effect on the economic assistance that Albania was receiving from abroad and secondly because of Serbian threats for retaliation.¹²⁰⁴

As a result of the negotiation process, the OFA was signed on August 13, ending the eight-month conflict. Had EU, US, NATO, OSCE and the other actors not joined efforts and used their unique capabilities, consequences could have been far more severe.¹²⁰⁵ Still, while there is no doubt that EU contributed significantly in the signing of the agreement, Markovic *et al.* argue - through research based on qualitative and quantitative methods - that EU and US had different roles in the carrot and stick process where EU was the *carrot* and US the *stick*.¹²⁰⁶

In the aftermath of the peace agreement, *Operation Essential Harvest* was launched in late August by NATO forces for the voluntary disarmament of ethnic Albanian groups.¹²⁰⁷ Concerning the OFA, the basic principles included agreement on the preservation of FYROM's sovereignty and territorial integrity, highlighting the multi-ethnic dimension of the society; furthermore, apart from the cessation of hostilities, reference was made to issues such as the development of a decentralized

¹²⁰³ "Solana joins Macedonia peace drive," *CNN*, August 5, 2001, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2001-08-05/world/macedonia.talks_1_ethnic-albanian-peace-plan-peace-deal?_s=PM:WORLD; Micha Savic, "Macedonia Rebels Attack Police," *Washington Post*, August 4, 2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20010804/aponline131202_001.htm

¹²⁰⁴ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2000), 115 quoted in Keiichi Kubo, "Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UCK in Kosovo," *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no.7 (2010): 1139

¹²⁰⁵ Reinhardt Rummel, "The EU's Involvement in Conflict Prevention - Strategy and Practice," in *Conflict Prevention: Is the European Union Ready?*, ed. Jan Wouters and Vincent Kronenberger, Brussels, 2004

¹²⁰⁶ Nenad Markovic, Zoran Ilievski, Ivan Damjanovski, and Vladimir Bozinovski, "The role of the European Union in the democratic consolidation and ethnic conflict management in the Republic of Macedonia," Regional Research Promotion Programme-Western Balkans, Ss Cyril and Methodius University Skopje (2011): 19

¹²⁰⁷ "NATO Authorises the Deployment of Headquarters of Task Force Harvest," NATO Press Release 112, August 15, 2001, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-112e.htm>

government, non-discrimination and equitable representation, education and use of languages.¹²⁰⁸

Despite the signing of the agreement, there was a long way until peace was established. High rank officials in the government - such as the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior Affairs - were opposed to the accord claiming that constitutional changes "were imposed through terrorism, force and pressure."¹²⁰⁹ Similarly, Slav-macedonians were in their majority against the accord as they were perceiving Albanian revolt as a secessionist movement, rather than a struggle in pursuit of equal rights; in this context, Slav-macedonians were afraid that their national existence and security was under threat.¹²¹⁰

In reality, Slav-macedonians and Albanians faced the same problem but from different perspectives, a situation that seems to be like a zero sum equation where one's loss is another's gain; in one hand, Slav-macedonians struggled to safeguard "the state as a nation-state, regarding its multiethnic composition" while Albanians sought for political and cultural improvements over their present position.¹²¹¹ Atanasov presents poll results that took place among Slav-macedonians over possible accepted changes on different issues, prior to the signing of the OFA: according to the results, the vast majority (over 90 percent) of Slav-macedonians were against changes in the preamble of the constitution, the recognition of Albanians as constitutive people, the federalization of the country and a state-own university in Albanian language.¹²¹² More moderate positions - but still negative to a large extend - Slav-macedonians expressed over changes in further participation of Albanians in the

¹²⁰⁸ "Ohrid Framework Agreement," University College Dublin,
<http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf>

¹²⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, "Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it," ICG Balkans Report No 122 (2001): 3

¹²¹⁰ Ulf Brunnbauer, "The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 1 (2002)

¹²¹¹ Petar Atanasov, "Macedonia between nationalism(s) and multiculturalism: the framework agreement and its multicultural conjectures," *Sociologija* XLV, No.4 (2003): 304

¹²¹² Petar Atanasov, "The Progress of the 'Ohrid Process' in Macedonia," in *Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. Lessons from South East Europe and Strategic Consequences for the Euro-Atlantic Community*, ed. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Gustav Gustenai and Plamen Pantev (Vienna and Sofia: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence in co-operation with PFP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2006), 183

state administration and in the decentralization process.¹²¹³ On the other hand, the Albanian side while generally satisfied had also to make compromises.¹²¹⁴

The OFA although "put an end to the conflict, but it did not put an end to the sources of this conflict."¹²¹⁵ Instead of a multinational state, a bi-national state is being promoted, where also other ethnic communities are marginalized.¹²¹⁶ As it argued by Vankovska

"To paraphrase Mary Kaldor, in its haste to fix the problem the international community fell into the trap set by the local parties in conflict, and rushed to embrace the thesis of ancient hatred between ethnic groups and the impossibility for them to live together. Thus, the simplest solution was to "separate" the "hostile" ethnic groups, to impose political power sharing and territorial arrangements that would guarantee a sort of a negative peace (based on the ethnicisation of politics and ghettoisation of citizens from different ethnic backgrounds). The simplest solution is not always the best solution, but it fulfils the criteria of a quick fix, at least in the short-term. To be frank, it is exactly what the so-called international community is ready and willing to do, and what local elites are able and motivated to achieve, in order to govern the country as long as possible. As for long-term results, there is still considerable uncertainty, but one can already venture a preliminary conclusion: the road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions!"¹²¹⁷

¹²¹³ *ibid*

¹²¹⁴ Vasko Vaskotrevski and Veton Latifi, "The Ohrid Framework Agreement Negotiations" in *The 2001 Conflict in FYROM - Reflections*

¹²¹⁵ Blerim Reka, "The Ohrid Framework Agreement - a New Political Philosophy for the functioning of a Multi-ethnic State," in *Ten Years from the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Is Macedonia Functioning as a multi-ethnic state?*, ed. Blerim Reka (Tetovo: SEEU, 2011), 12

¹²¹⁶ Engstrom, "Multi-ethnicity of Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian State"

¹²¹⁷ Biljana Vankovska, "The role of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the peace process in Macedonia," in *Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement, and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans*, ed. Stefano Bianchini, Joseph Marko, Craig Nation, and Milica Uvalic (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2007), 41-42.

One of the priorities of the peace process was the return of displaced people, a process that while has been exceptionally successful - in 2003, over 95 percent of displaced had managed to go back where they were living before displacement - in areas where returnees constituted a minority, serious re-integration issues were brought about.¹²¹⁸ In this context, although the number of IDP was expected to drop further through housing reconstruction programs, that would not be a solution by itself as many refugees were reluctant to continue living there because of feelings of insecurity and lack of services and infrastructure.¹²¹⁹ These issues were also identified by a UNHCR report where it was indicated that the return of IDP was hindered by various factors such as the limited provision of basic services, the destruction of houses, the ethnic tensions.¹²²⁰ A step towards reconciliation was made in March 2002, when an amnesty law was passed through FYROM Parliament.¹²²¹

In a UNDP survey conducted in 2003 among both Slav-macedonians and Albanians, the majority of Slav-macedonians (61.8 percent) and 38.2 percent of Albanians replied that the *ideal situation* for them would be that both people live as one peacefully.¹²²² A survey conducted among Slav-macedonians and Albanians was included in a 2003 UNDP early warning report, highlighting the main issues that concerned them: high unemployment (78.8 percent), poverty (66 percent), corruption (54.8 percent), crime (43.1 percent) and high prices (32.4 percent) were the main problems, while ethnic problems were ranked sixth (29.5 percent).¹²²³ However, the reconciliation process was not without issues: one of the most critical points in the implementation of OFA was the *Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self-Government* that the government tried to pass in mid 2004; this movement was

¹²¹⁸ International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: No Room for Complacency," ICG Europe Report No 149 (2003): 22

¹²¹⁹ Norwegian Refugee Council - Global IDP Project, *Macedonia: fear prevents remaining IDPs from returning home* (Geneva, 2004), 3

¹²²⁰ UNHCR, *Global Appeal 2003* (Geneva: UNCHR, 2003)

¹²²¹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2003: Macedonia* (New York: HRW, 2003), 346-347

¹²²² UNDP, *Early Warning Report: FYR Macedonia*, No.1 (Skopje, 2003), 41

¹²²³ *ibid*, 21

met with fierce resistance from the opposition and other bodies.¹²²⁴ Although the law passed in August 2004, a nationalist group called *World Macedonian Congress* initiated the gathering of signatures for a referendum on the issue, a movement that got the support of the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE, which had signed the OFA.¹²²⁵ As the referendum movement was gaining momentum, it became evident that it could disrupt the implementation of the agreement; in this context, international actors' support for the government through diplomatic and political actions, such as the US recognition of FYROM with its constitutional name or the indications of positive prospects for EU and NATO integration in case the Ohrid agreement remained active, contributed considerably to securing a low turnout in the polls, which meant the defeat of the opposition.¹²²⁶ But this intervention was not without side-effects: the open involvement of international actors in the internal affairs created a public outcry forcing international representatives to support their suggestions in modest way.¹²²⁷ As Atanasov argues, the intensity of the recommendations and warnings have caused deep distrust in the society.¹²²⁸

6.7 EU's framework for intervention

During the crisis, the EU was an active actor that participated and contributed effectively towards its resolution. FYROM's Foreign Minister, Srgjan Kerim stated that "This is a Europe that speaks with one voice and that is efficient", while Arben Xhaferi leader of Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) - an ethnic Albanian political party - commented that "Troops and weapons did not stop the violence. What did was the

¹²²⁴ Council of Europe, "Report on the Referendum in 'the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,'" 15 December 2004, Council of Europe, CG/BUR (11) 75, available at web <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=808867> (accessed on 11/12/2012)

¹²²⁵ Goran Stojkovski, "Analysis of the Referendum and the Post-Referendum Situation in Macedonia," *IRIS*, Sofia: Institute for Regional and international Studies (2005): 2-3

¹²²⁶ International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet," ICG Europe Briefing No 37 (2005): 3

¹²²⁷ *ibid*, 3-4

¹²²⁸ Atanasov, "The Progress of the 'Ohrid Process' in Macedonia," in *Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. Lessons from South East Europe and Strategic Consequences for the Euro-Atlantic Community*, 189

hope provided by the EU that it would intervene in starting political negotiations". Furthermore, the EU consolidated its efforts and its presence after the crisis, acting "as a reminder in order to fulfill the OFA requirements and avoid reactivation of the conflict", supporting changes through projects and programs.¹²²⁹ On the other hand, there was a considerable change in the US foreign policy in 2001: under the new Bush administration, the region of Balkans was not anymore a priority in the US national and security agenda, especially after the 9/11 attacks.¹²³⁰

The EU had established in 2000 the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) as its main tool for the provision of assistance to the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia - including Kosovo - and the FYROM.¹²³¹ Refugee and displaced people issues were priorities for the CARDS program.¹²³² The EAR became a tool of significance importance as most of the EU's assistance was directed through its mechanisms.¹²³³ On 26 February 2001, European Commission established the regulation for the RRM.¹²³⁴ Under this scheme, on 3 October 2001 the European Commission decided to implement a Confidence Building Programme in FYROM, establishing the foundations for the implementation of OFA; priority of this program, which aimed at the facilitation of IDP to return, was the repair of infrastructure, de-mining operations and activities for building trust in the FYROM's society.¹²³⁵ Under the RRM, the European Commission's Justice and Home Affairs

¹²²⁹ Markovic, *et al.*, "The role of the European Union in the democratic consolidation and ethnic conflict management in the Republic of Macedonia," 19

¹²³⁰ James W. Pardew, "Diplomatic History of the OFA," in *Ten Years from the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Is Macedonia Functioning as a multi-ethnic state?*, 22

¹²³¹ Council Regulation (EC) No 2667/2000 on the European Agency for Reconstruction, Official Journal of the European Union L 65

¹²³² Stephen M. Tull, "The European Union and Croatia: negotiating "Europeanization" amid national, regional, and international interests," in *The European Union and Democratization*, ed. Paul J. Kubicek (New York: Routledge, 2003), 138

¹²³³ Luigi Sandrin, Delivering on promises to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: The Work of the European Agency, EAR (2007), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/publications/main/documents/FYROMagencyarticle7May07.pdf>

¹²³⁴ Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, *Official Journal L 57*

¹²³⁵ European Commission Press Release, IP/01/1368 of 4 October 2001: EU support for building confidence in FYROM

Mission was one of the major initiatives that was launched in March 2002 and had a 18-month duration, focusing on police and judicial issues.¹²³⁶ Another main actor in the reconstruction process was the International Management Group (IMG) which offered technical assistance to the EC Delegation in FYROM. The IMG is an international organization - founded in 1994 - where 13 EU member states participate, that offered also technical assistance on infrastructural issues in the case of BiH.¹²³⁷

6.8 Project Description: Housing reconstruction in Arachinovo

One of the most well-known acts of warfare during the conflict in FYROM took place in Arachinovo, a city of 10.000 inhabitants, situated about ten kilometers away from Skopje, the capital of FYROM. In June, a group of about 500 NLA fighters entered Arachinovo.¹²³⁸ The capture of the city by guerrilla forces meant the exodus of most of Arachinovo's Slav-macedonians inhabitants.¹²³⁹ The armed conflict between the government army and the guerrilla group that followed, resulted to extensive damages in the infrastructure. According to a 2001 damage assessment report ordered by the European Commission, in Arachinovo 1107 damaged houses were identified and categorized according to the level of destruction (categories I-II-III-IV, where category I is the least damaged).¹²⁴⁰ At a country level, 47 percent of damaged houses were identified as category I, 29 percent as category II, 14 percent as category III and 10 percent as category IV.¹²⁴¹ As soon as the conflict ended, the majority of EU

¹²³⁶ Isabelle Ioannides, "Police Mission in Macedonia," in *Evaluating the European Union's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, ed. Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 86

¹²³⁷ "International Management Group: A Short Profile," <http://www.img-int.org/Central/Public08/>

¹²³⁸ Alice Ackermann, "International Intervention in Macedonia: from preventive engagement to peace implementation," in *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995*, 113

¹²³⁹ Goran Tomasevic, "Mayor checks battered Macedonia village for return," July 13, 2001, Reliefweb, <http://reliefweb.int/report/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/mayor-checks-battered-macedonia-village-return>

¹²⁴⁰ European Commission / International Management Group, *Damage Assessment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, 12

¹²⁴¹ *ibid*, 13

interventions aimed at the housing reconstruction process in areas where different ethnicities were living together so as to facilitate the return of displaced people.¹²⁴²

In this context, a contract for a housing reconstruction project was signed between EAR and a Greek Development NGO on August 2002. The total duration of this project was six months and its total budget was 2.351.150 euro. EC was to fund the reconstruction project in full. The objective of the proposed project was to repair 160 houses in Arachinovo so as to facilitate the return of the displaced people and to improve living conditions for inhabitants of damaged houses, thus reducing ethnic tensions and contributing to the implementation of the OFA. Funds were to be transferred in three installments: 40 percent of the total amount was to be paid with the signing of the agreement, then a payment of 40 percent of estimated eligible costs was due after approval of the Inception Report of the Operation and Financial Report and then a final payment after approval of the Final Technical and Financial Report of the Operation. The focus of this intervention would be houses that had suffered serious damage. According to the proposal, 85 houses of category III and 75 of category IV would be made habitable. It was estimated that the total number of direct beneficiaries would be 1120 people (assuming seven people per family). Beneficiaries were to be selected from both communities, ethnic Albanians and Slav-macedonians. Whereas returnees and Community Shelter Residents had priority, the selection of beneficiaries would be based on social and economic criteria, using a point system so as to secure a fair process. Moreover, houses of Slav-macedonians would be a priority so as to facilitate the return of minorities. In any case, the condition of the house - as a result of the warfare - would be the main criterion.

It should be noted that the applicant organization was already active in the Arachinovo area and had completed the repair of 150 houses (categories III and IV). Based on past experiences, the Greek NGO proposed that a written agreement between the beneficiary-owner of the property, the Greek implementing actor and

¹²⁴² Zoran Ilievski, *The Role of Human and Minority Rights in the Process of Reconstruction and Reconciliation for State and Nation-Building* (Bozen: European Academy, 2008), 25

an official authority - such as the Reconstruction Committee - should be signed ensuring that the beneficiary accepted the proposed intervention and would not express new demands during the reconstruction process. Moreover, after consultations with donors' representatives, it was decided that the beneficiary – when submitting a request for house reconstruction - should undertake a written obligation that he/she will return to the house and live there when the repairs had finished. Unless the beneficiary agreed to return, his/her house was not reconstructed. However, a minimum timeframe that the beneficiary should live in the house was not defined. In this context, the beneficiary could just return for a day or a few hours and then decide whether he/she would stay or sell the house and leave the area.

According to the proposal, a four-step process would guarantee an effective intervention. First, local communities were to be informed about the reconstruction project and a process of data collection would be initiated for potential beneficiaries. In the second step, social workers and technical staff would work together so as to prepare a list of beneficiaries that meet the defined criteria, discussing with families and visiting damaged houses. The prepared lists would then be submitted to a Reconstruction Committee for approval, together with separate technical reports - concerning the condition of the damaged houses - for every intervention needed for a complete assessment. The technical team would be consisted of specialized and experienced personnel where architect and/or engineer would participate. The third step was about the supply and distribution of materials for housing reconstruction while the forth step focused on the labor assistance needs. An important aspect of the project was the participation of the beneficiaries themselves in the reconstruction process of the houses. This was to take place in two levels: first, for the transportation of building materials, a task that would be a responsibility of the beneficiaries. Moreover, beneficiaries were expected to participate in the rebuilding activities themselves, in addition to contracted labor. Self-commitment of beneficiaries was of vital importance for a successful result, a prerequisite that was seem to be secured with these two steps. Signed agreements with the beneficiaries

were to be reached on these issues before the initiation of the activities so as to avoid future problems and misunderstandings.

6.8.1 Implementation

In every village committees were organized by its leaders so as people could follow the work and its progress. Moreover, in order to secure transparency and build trust with the community, the Housing Reconstruction Committee (HRC) was set up, consisting of five members with participation of locals - including members of the minorities - to be a priority. In this context, the HRC took the role of a participatory mechanism and overall, of an institution that promoted social coherence.¹²⁴³ In practice, the HRC proposed cases of houses that should be reconstructed, then the technical team of the Greek NGO made a social assessment of each case that was followed by a technical report and these were submitted again to the HRC that was taking the final decision for reconstruction. During the implementation of the project, although requests for housing reconstruction were submitted by IDP who at the same time were expressing security concerns, being worried about returning and living in a hostile environment. Research conducted by an independent researcher during the reconstruction phase among IDP that were living in the collective centers, gave an insight into the real motives of IDP: the majority of the Slav-macedonias IDP, although requested to have their houses rebuilt, their real motives was not to return back, but to sell the repaired property and go and live somewhere where they would feel secure.¹²⁴⁴ Over the next months, works continued and considerable progress was made. Till December 2002, 123 houses had been rebuilt. However, at that time the members of the HRC resigned, causing a significant setback to the project, as not all the houses for reconstruction had been identified till then. In December 2002, the EAR Programme Manager informed the Mayor of Arachinovo for this advancement, stating that the remaining time was not sufficient for the rebuilding of the rest of the

¹²⁴³ Vasilis Mpalaskas, interview by author, Athens, June 13, 2013

¹²⁴⁴ Vasiliki Neofotistos, interview with author, Skopje, July 25, 2012

houses and that these may be included in a future reconstruction project. In reality, similar incidents had taken place multiple times throughout the implementation of the projects. As a field expert that had worked in the project explained,¹²⁴⁵ such incidents were part of a bargaining process that began with the initialization of the intervention. Similar to negotiations among governments, donors and powerful groups that were taking place at a higher political level, at local level there was a trade-off process where each side was trying to maximize its gains. The fulfillment of the Albanians' requests – for reconstruction works, employment, provision of material - was a prerequisite for realization of works in the houses of Slav-macedonians. Similarly, the Mayor of Arachinovo – an important political figure in the area - also intervened among the guerrilla forces and the international community. Despite such problems, the implementing actors managed to reconstruct the expected number of houses in the projected timeframe.

Furthermore, the implementation of a project in a post-conflict environment is subject to security issues that may hinder considerably the on-going activities of the project. In this context, the staff of the Greek organization and project workers faced many threats by inhabitants that had various requests - asking for more materials, seeking employment, requests to rebuild houses that were out of the scope of the project. In many cases, project staff, monitoring team, workers, suppliers were scared to enter the city of Arachinovo, putting at risk the continuation of the project's activities. In another case, just after the end of the conflict, an Italian organization was trying to deliver emergency aid to conflict affected areas in the northern part of FYROM. Such extensive were the security threats against the project personnel - mainly coming from nationalist extremists - that the directors of the Italian organization decided to cease operations and leave the country.¹²⁴⁶ Among others, such incidents required significant flexibility in the way project was implemented so as to follow the dynamics of the post-conflict environment. In many cases during the implementation of the housing

¹²⁴⁵ Pantelis Sklias, interview with author, Athens, November 14, 2013

¹²⁴⁶ Eugenia Vathakou, interview with author, Athens, July 30, 2012

reconstruction project, some of the project staff had to build personal links with the local population and gain their trust so as to safeguard their security and preserve the continuation of the activities.¹²⁴⁷ Such actions go far beyond the code of conduct and donors' participation and flexibility becomes a necessity. Despite such issues, the reconstruction project managed to achieve its goal and the 160 houses were rebuilt.

6.8.2 Project evaluation: Results and impact assessment

As it has been described, the reconstruction project met its main goal, rebuilding the 160 houses. However, a question that arises is whether the project had any real impact towards reconciliation and the establishment of peace in the region. For this assessment, the five criteria of the RPP that have been presented earlier will be used.¹²⁴⁸

Interestingly, although the project achieved its main goal, almost none of the RPP criteria is met. Taking into consideration the historical context and the evolution of the conflict, it could be argued that the housing reconstruction project did not have a direct effect on the causes that ignited violence (first criterion) in 2001, nor was it planned to have such a role. As far as the engagement of political institutions - a factor of utmost importance for establishment of peace - it could be argued that these activities did not have any effect to. On the contrary, extremist political parties were trying to create tension, discouraging the return of IDP, so as to increase their influence on government policy. Furthermore, concentrating on the

¹²⁴⁷ Vasilis Mpalaskas, interview by author, Athens, June 13, 2013

¹²⁴⁸ It should be noted that out of the RPP's toolkit, for the assessment of the peacebuilding projects in FYROM only the five criteria are being used.

improvements in security issues, it could be argued that the housing reconstruction project not only failed to improve conditions but rather sensitive groups - returnees - became more vulnerable and their feeling of insecurity - in the absence of support activities - was augmented.

"A technicality which became a *Social Institution*"

Concerning the second criterion - whether as a result of the project, people developed their own initiatives - it could be argued that such an informal initiative was developed at the materials distribution center. For a more efficient distribution of building materials, a warehouse was set up. Soon after the implementation of the project, the warehouse became a meeting place where dialogue among beneficiaries themselves and among beneficiaries and the project staff was taking place. As the staff of the project reported, through dialogue and communication, an informal conflict resolution mechanism was established covering simple and complex issues: from technical issues to cases of using weapons and force. Moreover, transparency in the distribution of materials contributed to the establishment of trust among beneficiaries and the staff, enhancing *Social Convergence* and supporting this informal *initiative*.

Overall, although the reconstruction project achieved its main goals, it could be argued that in reality it was ineffective: apart from the rebuilding process, its aim was to bring again together the two communities in places where they have been living for decades. However, while houses were reconstructed, the project failed to encourage the return of displaced families and to establish a pillar for the implementation of the OFA. In practice, the project had been evaluated based on the well established log framework and has been assessed as successful; this gives ground to the argument that the log framework is not a suitable tool for the

assessment of peacebuilding projects. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the project shows that although the return of IDP in conflict affected areas might be a step to the right direction, it is not a panacea; nor should such processes be induced and sped up. Throughout the duration of the project, the lack of mechanisms specialized at the reconciliation process and the promotion of dialogue became evident. Social and ethnic issues remained unresolved, hindering the impact of the reconstruction projects. At some point, informal mechanisms - such as the HRC and the meetings at the warehouse - took this role; but the unofficial character and the limited capacity restricted their range of action, leaving a vacuum that would prove to be a colossal obstacle for the achievement of the OFA's aims. Similarly, it is doubtful whether the government of FYROM had any real interest in the reconstruction process in Arachinovo and the subsequent return of Slav-macedonians; rather it was the international community that pushed this process forward. In this context, since there was no real internal political support for this process, it is questionable whether the government would take further initiatives for the reconciliation process.

In many cases, political pressure coming from donors and local governments so as to present immediate results push towards the return of IDP; in Darfur in 2009, the US envoy to Sudan was criticized for politically inducing the return of IDP.¹²⁴⁹ Similarly, in many other cases of IDP, most political initiatives and resource allocations were made towards the return of displaced people, rather than local integration or relocation.¹²⁵⁰ However, the return process is not a single-stage and cut-off event: rather it is a continuous process where various factors should be taken under consideration until a durable solution is reached.¹²⁵¹ Such conclusions are being reported from war-torn countries like Afghanistan, Iraq where millions of people were displaced; in Burundi, as it is quoted in Fagen, the UNHCR mission in

¹²⁴⁹ Louisa Seferis, "Darfur's Displacement Dilemma: Operational Coordination and Aid Reform for IDP Returns," *The Fletcher Journal of Human Security* 25 (2010), 69

¹²⁵⁰ iDMC, *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009* (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010), 10

¹²⁵¹ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Benchmarks for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*, Brookings Institution, University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, DC

2009 concluded that "repatriation and reintegration of returnees to their rural areas of origin had been 'satisfactory' but possibilities of its being durable were extremely low."¹²⁵² The international community seems not to have taken the lesson from the case of Bosnia: as Walter Kaelin - Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons - reports, although serious consideration was given to reconstruction, sustainable return was problematic.¹²⁵³ Furthermore, return should not be the only option; rather IDP must have the option of integration where displaced or of relocating.¹²⁵⁴

Security issues and post-conflict conditions that were of utmost importance in reducing ethnic tensions were not a priority for the EAR. As it has been presented, one of the top priorities of EU intervention just after the end of the conflict was the reconstruction of houses, so as IDP can return. However, this approach was not part of a broad plan of engagement that would include complementary interventions required in such a complex and fragile environment; rather, success was based mainly on tangible results.

6.9 Project Description: Community development through improvement of interethnic relations and reconciliation

The project aimed at the improvement of inter-ethnic relations and reconciliation in FYROM. A mechanism for the promotion of dialogue among the different ethnic groups was to be set up through the establishment of inter-ethnic councils in three

¹²⁵² Weiss Patricia Fagen, *Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 13

¹²⁵³ Walter Kaelin "Durable Solutions For Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension Of Peacebuilding," Briefing Paper submitted by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons to the Peacebuilding Commission - Working Group on Lessons Learned, March 13, 2008, 6

¹²⁵⁴ UN OCHA, *The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva: OCHA, 2004)

municipalities in northern FYROM. The project was implemented in the context of Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Assistance. The total budget of the program, which was partly funded by EAR, was 193.500 euro and the Greek Development NGO had to contribute the sum of 10.750 euro. It had an eighteenth-month duration, starting in April 2003, till September 2004 and was to be implemented in three conflict-affected areas, in the municipalities of Arachinovo, Lipkovo and Cair. Apart from the Greek development NGO which was the main contractor, there were four other partners: the delegation of an international Human Right organization in FYROM, a local based research institute on social, political and juridical issues and two local NGOs focusing on humanitarian and social projects. The project was based on a step-by-step approach so as to secure that advancements were based on solid ground and were fully supported by previous activities. Analytically, according to the project proposal, one inter-ethnic council was to be established in each of the three municipalities. In these councils, local people with high status coming from both Albanian and Slav-macedonian ethnic groups were to participate. These key members were to be provided with skills and knowledge for the promotion of dialogue on inter-ethnic issues and for taking action for the resolution of relevant problems at local level. In this way, structures of dialogue and inter-ethnic networks were being established on the ground. Furthermore, discussions on approaches, techniques and on effective tools for conflict resolution were also planned during training sessions. In addition to the training sessions, a number of workshops was to be organized for the promotion of project's objectives. The material of the trainings was planned to be published in a manual, including feedback from the participants. Another proposed activity of the project was the establishment of three documentation and information centers - one in each of the three areas - that would distribute information about the activities and the actions of the councils. For a more effective distribution of the information, the publishing of four newsletters was planned. Furthermore, for a better assessment of the actual conditions on the ground, three opinions polls were to be conducted among the local population in the three designated areas on issues such as security, ethnic relations. Finally, a website was to be established promoting information about project's activities and its progress, in addition to the publication of a leaflet at the end of the project, that would sum up the evolution of the project.

6.9.1 Implementation of interethnic project

As described in the proposal, two inter-ethnic councils were to be established in the municipalities of Arachinovo and of Lipkovo. After discussions and consultations with the local people, the councils were formed, each having 16 members, with representatives from local authorities such as the police, the municipality, the civil society. However, the set up of the council in the municipality of Cair met difficulties. For Cair municipality, two villages - Ljubanci and Ljuboten - were selected for project implementation. During the initial consultations with the representatives of the two villages, it became evident that due to disagreements among the habitants of the villages, the formation of an inter-village council was not possible. Thus, it was decided to make two separate intra-village councils and then proceed as initially planned. While this step was completed in the village of Ljubanci, in the Ljuboten village disputes among the Albanians - either personal or political - did not permit the council establishment. Two documentation and information centers were established, one in Arachinovo and another one in Lipkovo. In charge of the documentation centers was a resource person that also contributed to the coordination of project's activities, providing information to the project's staff. The centers, which were equipped with phone and fax lines and with internet connection provided information about the project activities and also informed people about other EAR interventions. Moreover, support to the staff of other NGOs was provided, through the use of the center's facilities. On the other hand, the establishment of a documentation center in Cair proved to be not feasible due to local conditions.

As far as the training sessions are concerned, they were launched in August 2003, four months after the initiation of the project. Overall, 165 hours of training took place where all there councils participated. Training focused on the issues of conflict, on democratic institutions, on the participation of civil society and of citizens in local

self-governance. Six training sessions took place with the council of Arachinovo. The issues discussed included subjects such as inter-ethnic dialogue, causes and sources of conflict, reaction to conflict and peaceful resolution, minority and majority rights, meaning and function of a multicultural society. In the case of Lipkovo, nine sessions were organized where various subjects were discussed, such as the perceptions and misperceptions in a conflict, basic principles of divisions of governance, citizens' initiatives for the OFA. In the case of Ljubanci, discussed issues were similar to those in Lipkovo sessions. After the completion of the training sessions, the workshops and awareness building meetings were organized. The first workshop took place in Struga - a city lying on the shore of Ohrid lake - and had a two-day duration. In this workshop, the inter-village council of Arachinovo was involved with the participation of more Slav-macedonians, habitants of Arachinovo or displaced Slav-macedonians that were living in the collective centers. In this context, an environment for favorable discussion was set up, focusing on issues such as the return of IDP. One of the outputs of the workshop was an initiative to contact and inform displaced Slav-macedonians - living in collective centers - about the council's will to support them so as to return to their houses. Furthermore, a study trip took place in June, lasting a week with the participation of the three councils. This study trip was part of the training process and focused on conflict and conflict resolution, including - among other issues - analysis of case studies such as the division in Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestine issue. As far as the awareness building meetings are concerned, these were held towards the end of the project. Again, these meetings had as an objective to raise awareness over inter-ethnic issues. Four such meetings were organized in Arachinovo and effort was put so different participants to come in every meeting. Similarly in Lipkovo six meetings were held.

According to the final report, the project fulfilled its initial objectives. Analytically, the main goals of the project were:

- to improve inter-ethnic relations and to support dialogue

- Empower civil society
- Improve negotiation and communication skills of participants and investigate sources of conflict and possible methods for resolution
- Establish links between people of different ethnicities and organizations
- Empower periphery in terms of resources and expertise

Moreover, as it is being described in the final report, the project supported an initiative so that 55 displaced families of ethnic Slav-macedonians could return to Matejce; in addition, in the aftermath of their return, consultations between the implementing organizations and the government took place so as to expand assistance and cover the needs of the returning IDP. In this context, a similar initiative was to be discussed in the council of Arachinovo for the support of the return of 20 displaced families to Arachinovo. The initial terms of the contract had been revised in July 2003 after consultations with EAR, as advancements in the field showed that the creation of an intra-council in Cair could not be set up. Moreover, political - or personal - confrontations of individuals and of specific groups had also an impact on the effectiveness of program. In the case of Ljuboten, intra-ethnic confrontations among Albanians and Slav-macedonians - in contrast to the expected inter-ethnic differences - did not permit the establishment of the intra-village council. Moreover, for the achievement of all proposed objectives, the implementing actors requested a one-month extension, without expanding the initial budget.

As it has been presented, various issues came up during the implementation of the inter-ethnic program that affected its activities. Such a case was the decision taken by the government to cease the provision of food to those IDP that had chosen to live outside of the collective centers. This advancement caused friction among the IDP and as a result the meetings for awareness building that were planned to take place in the collective places had to be postponed. However, these meetings had to be

cancelled permanently as the referendum that opposition political parties tried to organize, further escalated tension.

Moreover, in the context of the project, an initiative was taken by the council of Arachinovo during the last months of the project implementation: the council addressed a letter to the Slav-macedonians, calling for common steps among the two ethnic groups towards reconciliation, honest cooperation, mutual support and about joining forces against security fears so as to make Arachinovo a symbol of peaceful co-existence. Interestingly, this initiative provoked a reaction from various government mechanisms which were deeply annoyed by the project activities. Over the following weeks from the publication of the letter, agents of the secret service and police officers performed various checks in the office of the Greek partner; a practice that was uncommon till that time. Although it is not clear whether these security checks had the approval of the government, it is good evidence that powerful groups did not want the promotion of the reconciliation process; rather ethnic tension was among their aims. Such incidents - and subsequent official steps and reaction - highlight the issue of ownership of the reconciliation process. As a consequence of the tense conditions, a few months before the end of project activities, the Greek project coordinator was moved to another program that was being implemented in Kosovo. While initially this action was done on the justification that project in the Kosovo area needed further assistance from a well-experienced person, it was later found out that this move was due to threats and security issues.

6.9.2 Project Evaluation: Results and impact assessment

The aim of the interethnic project was to bring together the two communities so that dialogue can be established. In reality, the inter-ethnic project was a missing step in the post-conflict EU intervention in FYROM. As it has been described, soon

after the end of conflict, the EU focused mainly on the reconstruction of infrastructure in various areas of FYROM. In this context, the return of IDP was a priority. Although such projects were completed according to plans, their effectiveness was doubtful as refugees were reluctant to return due to security concerns, although their houses had been reconstructed. Thus, as in similar post-conflict environments, a holistic intervention was required.

Concerning the five RPP criteria for project effectiveness:

The project focused on the improvement of inter-ethnic relations between Slav-macedonians and Albanians. Although grievances existed between the two populations, it is doubtful whether ethnic diversity itself was a major cause of the conflict. As described in the previous section, ethnic diversity was rather used by powerful elites to cause further tension. On the other hand, in post-conflict areas where ethnic hatred was incited and used as a dividing factor - often presented through the media as the main cause of the conflict - interventions aiming at reconciliation and at the improvement of inter-ethnic relations is of utmost importance. Thus, although the intervention does not affect a main cause of war, it followed the dynamics of the conflict and contributed significantly to bring together the two communities at a local level, this being a proof that people from different ethnic groups can live together. Moreover, as far as the launch of initiatives from local people, in the context of the project there were two proposals for the facilitation of displaced Slav-macedonian families to return, in Matejce and in Arachinovo. For a more effective intervention, consultations with the government were initiated so as to provide financial assistance to the returning IDP. In September 2004 the council addressed a letter to the Slav-macedonians IDP that were living in the city before the conflict, further promoting dialogue and proposing to join forces so as to make Arachinovo a symbol of reconciliation. A common path that would contribute to the enhancement of security issues, thus supporting the

return of the IDP to Arachinovo was proposed setting the foundations for a peaceful co-existence. However, although such initiatives aim to the creation of a positive context in a post-conflict environment, they are often met with reaction. Thus, this initiative provoked a fierce reaction from extremist nationalist that were seeking the continuation of ethnic tension. In this context, various articles were published in the press arguing against such initiatives and negatively commenting the reconciliation process. Moreover, government security forces also were engaged, performing searches and investigations in the office of the Greek organization in Skopje, seizing material for further analysis. It is not clear whether government officials ordered or were informed about such advancements or if these investigations took place under the supervision of secret services which sometimes act independently, beyond the control of the official state mechanisms. Still, although the local government was engaged in the peace process, it is doubtful whether it had real ownership for interventions; rather local participation was due to pressure from international donors. Concerning the other two criteria - improvement of security issues as a result of the project and the potential approach of locals to violent incidents - their assessment is not possible due to research constraints - time and limited funds - as described in methodology section.

Overall, it could be argued that while the interethnic project was completed successfully, its impact was limited by the lack of ownership and political support from internal actors. Furthermore, the outcomes and the dissemination of the project positive results are subject to the implementation of related interventions in future, just as the housing reconstruction project required a parallel intervention for improvements in interethnic relations; however, such strategies are subject to the political will and support of the international community and of powerful internal actors. Such effects highlight in practice the holistic approach that peacebuilding policies should follow.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Peace is a question of political will

"Wars and conflicts are not inevitable. They are caused by human beings. There are always interests that are furthered by war. Therefore those who have power and influence can also stop them"

"Peace is a question of political will"

Martti Ahtisaari

As it has been presented, development assistance effectiveness is subject to a variety of factors that may not be directly related to the implementation of the activities. Among these, ownership of the interventions is a major factor. However, as it has been argued extensively, for peacebuilding activities implemented by NGOs, ownership - from both donors' and recipients' side - is of utmost importance. Thus, the first hypothesis - as defined in the methodology chapter - has been confirmed. In many cases, political elites and powerful groups – in addition to foreign actors that seek to promote their interests through the warfare - often use conflict as a means to retain their positions, disrupting peace efforts and prolonging warfare. In the case of Uganda, it was argued extensively in this thesis that this was the path that Museveni's government followed for many years in Northern Uganda. Similarly, in FYROM, it seems that the real causes of the 2001 conflict were the political self-interests, criminality and corruption, rather than ethnic tensions. NGOs peacebuilding interventions simply cannot cope with the dynamics of an armed

conflict or against strong political and economic interests that are seeking to ignite or promote conflict. Against such conditions, it is the international community at top level (for example the UN, western governments, the EU) that has the power - in political, economic and military terms - to put pressure on the powerful actors of a conflict so as to avoid continuation of hostilities and promote negotiations towards the establishment of peace. However, for such an engagement, the political will of the international actors is a prerequisite. In the case of Uganda, it was only in 2003 that the international community drew its attention to the drama that was unfolding in Northern Uganda for years. As it has been argued, Uganda - under Museveni's rule - was considered by donors to be a success story in Africa, a fact that secured international support for Museveni for years. However, support was also given on the ground of donors' foreign policy issues. Uganda became a US ally against the so-called *terrorist state* of Sudan, securing political and financial support. Similarly, for years the Ugandan government was supporting the SPLA movement against Khartoum government; on the other hand, Sudan's government was assisting the LRA to destabilize Uganda. Moreover, French influence in the region was a target for the US and UK foreign policy. Thus, while warfare was mainly confined in the northern part of Uganda, the political background that supported the crisis included powerful actors in other continents. Since 2003, donors put Museveni under pressure for political changes in Uganda and for improvements in the conditions in northern Uganda. Negotiations with LRA were supported, a fact that led to the 2006 peace talks in Juba. However, the northern parts of the country - a politically hostile ground for the Ugandan government - did not seem to be in its priority list. In this context, the peacebuilding project that would contribute to stability and subsequently to development in the region, did not meet the support of the high-ranked officials, apart from one case where personal political interests prevailed. Thus, it was argued that there was no ownership for the early warning project from the Ugandan government side; a fact that while might not affect project activities directly, indirectly it hinders its impact as the wider support framework - economic, social and political - that peacebuilding requires - is missing. In addition to the lack of political will, the financial problems that subsequently led

the project to a complete halt give support to the argument that a well-designed intervention might fail due to unrelated - to its activities - factors.

In the case of former Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s the EU tried to take the lead and intervene so as to avoid the ignition of war but failed dramatically. When war burst, it was only through the military actions of NATO and the engagement of the US that the conflicting actors signed the Dayton agreement. Similarly, in Kosovo, the international community was engaged, but it was only after NATO's military intervention that an agreement was reached. In FYROM, when conflict burst in 2001, the EU had a strong participation in the negotiation process, using a stick and carrot approach. For one more time, a peace agreement was finally reached through the coordinated efforts of international actors. As far as the two peacebuilding projects are concerned, it was argued that the reconstruction project, although completed as planned, had negligible impact; there was no contribution to the reconciliation nor to the peacebuilding process – both of which were its wider targets - as security reasons averted the return of the IDP. The impact assessment - through the RPP criteria - gives ground to the argument that the log framework - which was used for its evaluation - is inadequate for the assessment of peacebuilding projects and special tools are needed. Moreover, the security issues highlighted the lack of a supportive framework that would concentrate on the reconciliation process through inter-ethnic dialogue and co-operation. This vacuum was partly filled in 2003 when interventions for reconciliation were launched, such as the inter-ethnic project that was presented. While a complete meta-evaluation of the project was bound by limitations, it was argued that the impact of the inter-ethnic project was limited by the lack of ownership by internal powerful actors; political will for the establishment of a supportive framework was missing.

As it has been presented, while hostilities in FYROM ceased, the EU's intervention was heavily criticized during the various phases of engagement. Although an agreement was signed, this augmented the divisions among the two ethnic groups. Similarly, after the signing of the OFA, the EU had as an immediate

priority the reconstruction of infrastructure and houses, without focusing on the improvement of relations between the two communities. A question that comes up is whether it could have worked in another way. As an expert that worked in the reconstruction project argued,¹²⁵⁵ in a post-conflict environment an intervention focusing on the improvement of inter-ethnic relations is meaningless, unless emergency needs - food, housing - are met. Another question that comes up and needs further investigation is whether the reconstruction project had any chances of success from the early beginning. Had the EU bureaucrats that designed the framework of intervention taken into consideration past experience from similar cases of IDP, such as in Bosnia where, although the Dayton agreement underlined the necessity for all IDP to be able to return where they were living before the ignition of war, it was only four years after the peace agreement - in 2000 - that a significant number of minority IDP and refugees started to return;¹²⁵⁶ as Heimerl argues, in post-conflict environment, expecting nationalist elites to "implement the DPA¹²⁵⁷ and to promote returns without discrimination was a doomed undertaking."¹²⁵⁸ In late 2003, in FYROM there were still 2678 IDP; insecurity due to ethnic tension, destroyed houses and economic constraints were among the most important reasons that blocked IDP return.¹²⁵⁹ Feelings of insecurity were further fueled by various incidents, such as the attacks, lootings or destruction of reconstructed Slav-macedonians' houses in the Lipkovo area, close to Arachinovo; displaced Slav-macedonians considered such actions committed by ethnic Albanian as a deterrent to their return.¹²⁶⁰ Thus, overall, did the EU really believe in the effectiveness of these projects or was it just a means to compensate people that had lost their property – either Albanians or Slav-macedonians – and act as a *buy-out* for peace, leaving the two communities divided? On the other hand, is a settlement - through reintegration, dialogue and co-operation - among ethnic

¹²⁵⁵ Fotis Vlachos, interview by author, Athens, June 14, 2013

¹²⁵⁶ Daniela Heimerl, "The return of refugees and internally displaced persons: From coercion to sustainability?," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no.3 (2005): 383

¹²⁵⁷ DPA - Dayton Peace Agreement

¹²⁵⁸ *ibid*, 379

¹²⁵⁹ Norwegian Refugee Council - Global IDP Project, *Profile of Internal Displacement: Macedonia* (Geneva, 2004), 76

¹²⁶⁰ *ibid*, 67

groups in civil wars feasible in every case, so that communities can continue living together peacefully? Some scholars argue that partitioning according to ethnic lines improves chances for peace and democracy.¹²⁶¹ Similarly, Kaufmann argues that "solutions that aim at restoring multi-ethnic civil politics and at avoiding population transfers - such as power-sharing, state-rebuilding, or identity reconstruction - cannot work because they do nothing to dampen the security dilemma, and because ethnic fears and hatreds hardened by war are extremely resistant to change."¹²⁶²

As far as donors are concerned, it is not clear whether humanitarian reasons do have any contribution to the formation of peacebuilding interventions; rather, it seems that other interests motivate them to intervene and stop hostilities. In the case of FYROM, further research is needed for the investigation of the incentives and the assessment of the overall strategy that the EU followed. Similarly, concerning Uganda, the interventions of the EU should be related and examined in a wider policy framework. These findings come in contrast to the initial assumption of this thesis that the assessment of aid was to be attempted on a *developmental* basis, trying to exclude political and commercial interests that donors may have. Moreover, another issue that requires further research is the activities of Hellenic Aid; as it has been presented briefly, the co-operation of the Greek development NGOs with Hellenic Aid was problematic. While a framework for dialogue between these actors was attempted to be established in 2006, the initiative did not have any considerable results. The activities of the Hellenic Aid and the relations with the Greek development NGOs - which were its main operations arms - in addition to the investigation of the effectiveness of Hellenic Aid program - are sectors that have hardly been researched. For years, despite the criticism and the complaints of the Greek NGOs, these issues have remained unanswered. The economic crisis that

¹²⁶¹ Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996); Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security* 23, no.2 (1998); Alexander B. Downes, "The holy land divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars," *Security Studies* 10, no.4 (2001)

¹²⁶² Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," 139

Greece faces, stimulates the tackle and the investigation of these issues that in the past were left out of the agenda. In this context, past¹²⁶³ and recent¹²⁶⁴ articles in the Greek press offer support to accusations for mismanagement, patron-client relations between Hellenic Aid and the Greek NGOs, lack of transparency and corruption; facts that were partly confirmed through interviews with staff that had worked for Greek NGOs.¹²⁶⁵ Thus, a systematic analysis of Hellenic Aid's activities could shed light to the main factors that affected their results.

7.1 Micro - macro paradox in NGOs peacebuilding activities & the role of civil society

In 1986 Paul Mosley introduced the concept of micro - macro paradox in the aid effectiveness literature: while development projects are assessed to be effective at a micro level, no significant relation can be established between aid and growth. *Inaccurate measurement* - in the calculation of projects' rate of return and on countries' growth rates - is one of the possible causes for the paradox. Similarly, in the peacebuilding sector, the evaluation process and the measurement of the results of NGOs activities remains a challenging task: while some interventions have tangible results - for example housing reconstruction - that can be measured, the

¹²⁶³ For example, see Thomas Tsatsis, "Η εν πολλαίς αμαρτίες περιπεσούσα «Αλληλεγγύη», " *Eleytherotypia*, September 4, 2010, available at <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=199463>

¹²⁶⁴ Manos Charalambakis, "Ο κατάλογος με τις χρηματοδοτήσεις ΜΚΟ του υπ. Εξωτερικών," *Ta Nea*, February 19, 2014, available at <http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5088091/o-katalogos-metis-xrmatodothseis/>; "«ΧΡΥΣΟΠΛΗΡΩΜΕΝΕΣ» ΜΕ ΚΡΑΤΙΚΟ ΧΡΗΜΑ - Χωρίς έλεγχο η λίστα με τις ΜΚΟ," *Ethnos*, March 11, 2014, available at <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22768&subid=2&pubid=63975653>; "Στο μικροσκόπιο 118 προγράμματα ΜΚΟ αρμοδιότητας ΥΠΕΞ," *To Vima*, February 27, 2014, available at <http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=572046>; "Στέλεχος ΥΠΕΞ: «Τουλάχιστον άλλες 50 αμαρτωλές ΜΚΟ», " *To Pontiki*, February 19, 2014, available at <http://www.topontiki.gr/article/67912/Stelexos-UPEKS-Toulaxiston-alles-50-amartoles-MKO>

¹²⁶⁵ Maria Tsolka, interview with author, Kampala, October 25, 2009; Eugenia Vathakou, interview with author, Athens, July 30, 2012; Giannis Diagelakis, interview with author, Athens, October 10, 2013

real impact of these projects and the evaluation of initiatives with intangible results - such as reconciliation, improvements in security and in inter-ethnic relations - are fundamentally difficult to be assessed; furthermore, the establishment of a causality link between similar interventions and improvements of conditions at a greater - societal - level is yet to be analyzed. Despite the various methodologies and approaches that researchers and scholars have developed over the last years, the international community lacks a well-defined evaluation framework that can assess peacebuilding projects and their impact. Furthermore, apart from the outputs and the impact of the NGOs peacebuilding projects, there is no doubt that no single agency or any intervention on its own can bring peace. Tobi Dress¹²⁶⁶ argues that:

"no single organization, institution, sector, group, gender or UN department, regardless of its stature, can be expected to singularly shoulder the enormous burden of creating sustainable peace in any given community, let alone worldwide. Peacebuilding is, of necessity and by definition, an inclusive, representative and participatory process, and is, in fact, the ultimate collaborative effort."

Although peacebuilding activities in micro, meso and macro level can take place autonomously, for an effective strategy such interventions should be complementary to each other.¹²⁶⁷ Consensus and partnership should exist at horizontal level – mainly among local powerful groups - but also at vertical level, including national and international groups, civil society organizations and the people.¹²⁶⁸ The complexity of a post-conflict environment requires a holistic approach that would include political, economic, social issues and the participation of multiple - local, national and international - actors. These findings confirm the

¹²⁶⁶ Tobi Press, *Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict* (Geneva: United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 2005), 6, quoted in Tim Murithi, *The Ethics of Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 7

¹²⁶⁷ Murithi, *ibid*, 8

¹²⁶⁸ Donais, Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes, 14

second hypothesis. Geo-political and economic interests and motives of main actors - donors, western governments, powerful local governments and elites, international organizations - control the dynamics of warfare and of the post-conflict environments. These constitute an immense barrier for civil society actors to overcome and define the conceptual context in which NGOs peacebuilding activities are to be implemented; and to a large extent, these conditions define the impact of NGOs activities. Thus, it is argued in this thesis that a micro - macro paradox also exists in the peacebuilding sector. Although the civil society contributes to the establishment of peace, its function is rather "supportive" and not "decisive".¹²⁶⁹ Such findings have also been highlighted at top level: In 2010 the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined the importance of political commitment in peacebuilding.¹²⁷⁰ In the same year, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation in cooperation with the UN Department of Field Support highlighted the contributive role of peacekeeping - instead of being a substitute - to a political process.¹²⁷¹ Still, for such an approach, the political will for engagement - aiming at the resolution of crises - is a pre-condition for the establishment of peace.

However, it should be further investigated whether, at a broader level of aid effectiveness, the lack of political will is another cause for the micro - macro paradox. Is development assistance designed in a holistic framework that aims at poor countries' economic growth? Are donors really committed to delivering aid in an efficient way? Or do western policies - over commercial, foreign policy issues etc. - favor in reality donors' interests, significantly affecting the effectiveness of aid? Assessment of aid effectiveness in this context is not straight-forward: rather than evaluating interventions independently, a holistic assessment approach should be followed. Furthermore, in addition to measuring results at a confined project or

¹²⁶⁹ Paffenholz, *Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding*

¹²⁷⁰ UN, Department of Public Information, *Peacebuilding Complex, Multifaceted Undertaking Requiring Significant Resources*, SG/SM/12846, April 16, 2010

¹²⁷¹ UN, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.1* (New York: UN, 2010)

program level, the impact of every intervention should be assessed and linkages with a wider environment should be analyzed.

Another question that arises is what could be the role of civil society actors in the peacebuilding sector, as NGOs peacebuilding activities are significantly affected by the conditions in a wider political and societal context. In a survey that was published in 2012 by Alliance for Peacebuilding, experts in the field highlighted the main challenges that affect peacebuilding: lack of funding, lack of political will at international level and the recipients' internal political situation were the top three factors (81 percent, 61 percent and 51 percent respectively).¹²⁷² In this context, a question that arises is whether civil society actors can contribute to the enhancement of the conditions in the peacebuilding sector. It is debatable whether NGOs affect politics, at international and local level. Some researchers have supported the "push of NGOs", arguing in favor of the ability of NGOs to intervene at international level, while others discuss the "pull of NGOs", where civil society organizations act as delegates of international institutions.¹²⁷³ Still, while peacebuilding activities at a micro (or meso) level are strongly affected by actions of official actors, a reverse causality can take place and such initiatives may have an impact at a higher level. Such an example is the case of South Africa where unofficial - track II - efforts during 1984-1990 - where NGOs also participated - prepared the conditions for negotiations at Track I level.¹²⁷⁴ In the case of peace talks in Sri Lanka since 2000, NGOs had a significant involvement and contributed to Track II initiatives when official negotiations had been brought to a halt; as Goodhand and Klem state, "Track Two ideally serves as a backchannel or safety net for Track One."¹²⁷⁵ Similarly, at national and local level civil society can generate a momentum of political change against "opportunistic elites", building "social

¹²⁷² Melanie Greenberg, Emily Mallozzi and Sarah Cechvala, *Peacebuilding 2.0 Mapping the Boundaries of an Expanding Field* (Washington, DC: Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2012), 31

¹²⁷³ Patrice McMahon, "NGOs and Peacebuilding: Challenges and Choices for future research," *Special Issue of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* (2011): 213

¹²⁷⁴ Daniel Lieberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2002)

¹²⁷⁵ Jonathan Goodhand, and Bart Klem, *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005* (Colombo: The Asia Foundation, 2005), 75-76

energy" that creates the conditions for peacebuilding.¹²⁷⁶ In 1997, Lederach¹²⁷⁷ contributed to the debate over what the most effective way of intervention for building peace is: from the bottom up or the reverse way, from the top down. Lederach argues that it is the middle segment (level II, leaders from NGOs, academics) of the pyramid that can support a peacebuilding process in the long-run; moreover, the middle level can act as a bridge, connecting the grass-root level with the top leadership.¹²⁷⁸ This becomes essential as a well-designed strategy might fail in the long-run if local actors have not been consulted.¹²⁷⁹ In Northern Ireland, it is the civil society, grass-root organizations and other local actors that promote peacebuilding activities, rather than political parties.¹²⁸⁰ Such low level - track II and III - activities do influence the processes of conflict and peacebuilding.¹²⁸¹ In an Oxfam report for Afghanistan over security issues, the necessity for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach that would focus on community level is highlighted; such strategies can strengthen links at family and tribal level - institutions that are of significant importance in the Afghan society - bringing stability and empowering the peacebuilding process at higher administration level.¹²⁸² But while politics is part of the peacebuilding process at top level, NGOs should maintain their neutral character;¹²⁸³ Goodhand and Atkinson,¹²⁸⁴ focusing on the response of the international community to three different conflicts (Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka) argue that NGOs should follow a more independent path - invest in their capacity building and make comprehensive analyzes of the conditions in the field, develop advocacy strategies so as to confront policies that address issues at local

¹²⁷⁶ *ibid*, 84-85

¹²⁷⁷ John Paul Lederach, *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)

¹²⁷⁸ *ibid*, 37-60

¹²⁷⁹ Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Kristin E. Kosek, "Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail: The Role of Local Participation," *Conflict and Cooperation* 40, no.4 (2005)

¹²⁸⁰ Chuck Thiessen, Sean Byrne, Olga Skarlato, and Pauline Tennent, "Civil society leaders and Northern Ireland's peace process: Hopes and fears for the future," *Humanity & Society* 34, no.1 (2010)

¹²⁸¹ Feargal Cochrane, "Two Cheers for the NGOs: Building Peace From Below in Northern Ireland," in *A Farewell to Arms?: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*, ed. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006)

¹²⁸² Matt Waldman, *Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: The Case for a National Strategy* (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2008)

¹²⁸³ Michael Schloms, "Humanitarian NGOs in Peace Process," *International Peacekeeping* 10, no.1 (2003)

¹²⁸⁴ Jonathan Goodhand, and Philippa Atkinson, *Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement* (London: International Alert, 2001)

level. Jean Pictet relates the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to a swimmer arguing that "like a swimmer, is in politics up to its neck. Also like the swimmer, who advances in the water but who drowns if he swallows it, the ICRC must reckon with politics without becoming a part of it."¹²⁸⁵

¹²⁸⁵ Jean Pictet, *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1979) quoted in Schloms, "Humanitarian NGOs in Peace Process," 47

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