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**The priorities and guidelines for the use of CSDP framework,
as deriving from the EU Global Strategy**

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Corinth, September 2016



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**Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών
«Παγκόσμια Πολιτική Οικονομία»**

**Οι προτεραιότητες και οι κατευθύνσεις για την χρήση του
πλαισίου της ΚΠΑΑ, όπως απορρέουν από την Παγκόσμια
Στρατηγική της Ε.Ε**

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Κόρινθος, Σεπτέμβριος 2016

“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we must think.”

Winston Churchill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The process of drafting and submitting this dissertation has been the most challenging academic task I carried out during this master's programme. After an intensive period of three months, writing this note of thanks is the finishing touch on my dissertation.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Efstathios Fakiolas for his excellent guidance and endless patience. He offered help and guidance whenever I asked him to, even long after the normal office hours. Always contributing with insightful comments and remarks, he helped me stay firmly within the boundaries the research purpose dictated. Furthermore, he allowed this dissertation to be completely my own work, reminding me the ultimate goal every research and analysis should target, the search for credible knowledge. I would like to thank also the esteemed PSIR academic staff for their help and support.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family and especially my parents, for their unfailing support and constant encouragement throughout my years of study. My accomplishments would not have been possible without them. My dissertation is dedicated to you. Thank you.

Vasilios Petropoulos

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Keywords: CSDP, Defence, European Union, Policy, Security, Strategy

Abstract

The release of the EU Global Strategy (2016) incorporates the CSDP framework as one of the available means the EU can use to achieve its goals on security. The existence of such a comprehensive strategy can provide, under the proper analysis, indications as to the priorities and guidelines for the use of CSDP framework in the coming period. The demand for the use of CSDP framework is expected to grow and the EU Global Strategy is a catalyst for action. The analysis did provide some useful indications as to the EU's willingness to enhance common defence, the regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action, and the guidelines as to the nature and extent of CSDP missions. The formation and implementation of a tailor made CSDP strategy will eventually determine the course of CSDP framework and could bestow upon the CSDP framework the strategic perspective or not.

Οι προτεραιότητες και οι κατευθύνσεις για την χρήση του πλαισίου της ΚΠΑΑ, όπως απορρέουν από την Παγκόσμια Στρατηγική της Ε.Ε

Σημαντικοί Όροι: Ασφάλεια, Άμυνα, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, ΚΠΑΑ, Πολιτική, Στρατηγική

Περίληψη

Η έκδοση της Παγκόσμιας Στρατηγικής της Ε.Ε (2016), ενσωματώνει το πλαίσιο της ΚΠΑΑ, ως ένα από τα διαθέσιμα μέσα που μπορεί να χρησιμοποιήσει η Ε.Ε, ώστε να επιτύχει τους στόχους της, όσον αφορά την ασφάλεια. Η ύπαρξη μιας τέτοιας περιεκτικής στρατηγικής, μπορεί μέσω της κατάλληλης ανάλυσης, να παράσχει ενδείξεις σχετικά με τις προτεραιότητες και τις κατευθυντήριες γραμμές για τη χρήση του πλαισίου της ΚΠΑΑ την ερχόμενη περίοδο. Η ζήτηση για τη χρησιμοποίηση του πλαισίου της ΚΠΑΑ αναμένεται να αυξηθεί και η Παγκόσμια Στρατηγική αποτελεί καταλύτη για δράση. Η ανάλυση, μας παρείχε κάποιες χρήσιμες ενδείξεις σχετικά με την θέληση της Ε.Ε να ενισχύσει την κοινή άμυνα, σχετικά με τις περιφερειακές και θεματικές προτεραιότητες για τη δράση της ΚΠΑΑ καθώς και για τη φύση και το εύρος των επιχειρήσεων της ΚΠΑΑ. Η σύνθεση και εφαρμογή μιας ειδικής στρατηγικής για την ΚΠΑΑ θα καθορίσει τελικά την πορεία του πλαισίου της ΚΠΑΑ και θα μπορούσε να προσδώσει στο πλαίσιο της ΚΠΑΑ την στρατηγική προοπτική.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Περίληψη

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

CHAPTER 1: THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY	1
1.1 An overview	1
1.2 The problem	3
1.3 Research method and outline	5
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE	8
2.1 The strategy	8
2.2 The evolving EU strategies for security and defence	9
2.3 Core elements of EU's global vision: multipolarity and multilateralism	11
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP's DEFENCE ASPECT	14
3.1 The CSDP-NATO competing frameworks	14
3.2 Defence matters: enhancing CSDP's defence capabilities	16
CHAPTER 4: THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP FRAMEWORK	20
4.1 Interlinked regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action	20
4.2 The nature and extent of CSDP missions	23
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS	29
ANNEXES	33
BIBLIOGRAPHY	39

List of Tables

Table 4.2a	The Status and type of CSDP missions as of July 2016	26
Table 4.2b	CFSP budget and the cost of CSDP civilian missions (2015-2016)	28

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign & Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COE	Council of European Union
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUCO	European Council
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUMSS	European Union Maritime Security Strategy
FPI	Foreign Policy Instruments
FSJ	Freedom, Security and Justice
G3	Group of Three
G8	Group of Eight
HG	Headline Goals

HQ	Headquarters
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission
IO(s)	International Organization(s)
ISS	Internal Security Strategy
MED	Mediterranean
MENA	Middle East & North Africa
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR	Naval Force
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PMG	Politico-Military Group
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TEU	Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

1.1 An overview

The evolving concepts of multilateralism and security, tend to reshape the European Union's (EU) role as a security actor and obliges the EU to transform from entity to regional and global power.¹ We cannot define the EU neither as a federation nor as an international organization², but with core elements from both of them. What started as a security community³ has now evolved into a "hybrid political system"⁴.

The conflicts in Europe have shown the lack of a euro-centric framework for crisis management and common action for security and defence. Driven by the intentions of two great EU Member States (MS), United Kingdom (UK) and France, the efforts to reach an agreement for common action resulted in the "Franco-British Declaration on European Defence (The St. Malo Declaration, 4 December 1998)"⁵ a day considered the actual creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)⁶. The initial inception of ESDP, embraced also the "progressive framing of a common defence policy"⁷ and the creation of "capacity for autonomous action"⁸. The goal was to provide the framework for EU to act in cases/crisis areas did not previously or had minimum impact. Moreover, the Kosovo war exposed once again "the wide and growing gap between US and European military capacities"⁹.

¹ Mario Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 63

² Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 281

³ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 86

⁴ Andrew Glencross, *The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided?* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 148

⁵ Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, eds., *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents* (Routledge, 2000), 243

⁶ ESDP was the pre-Lisbon term for CSDP

⁷ "Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit" (St.Malo, 1998), 1

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1

⁹ Klaus Larres, ed., *A Companion to Europe since 1945* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 237

Today the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) summarizes the EU MS collective approach for the Foreign Policy and Security issues. In parallel to the CFSP lies another set of common policy, an integral part of the CFSP¹⁰, the Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) as renamed in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TEU)¹¹. The CSDP umbrella aims to address a number of security and defence issues and to enhance the EU's crisis management and military capabilities. CSDP consists a "main asset in the EU's foreign policy toolbox"¹². CSDP is a key instrument for external action and the operational arm of CFSP as well.

As far as the EU is concerned the surplus on multilateralism and institutional enthusiasm is undoubted and the CSDP is not an exception. This can be partially explained, due to a) the EU's dual nature (supranational and intergovernmental), b) the multiple levels of governance. The office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) who also serves as the Vice-President of European Commission, created to be the link between the intergovernmental and supranational natures of the Union. This dual office also serves the need for better cooperation between Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and CFSP's various aspects. The creation of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) strengthened the institutional outlet of the external action. The EEAS supervises numerous bodies and committees, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC)¹³, the Politico-Military Group (PMG)¹⁴, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)¹⁵, the EU Military Committee (EUMC)¹⁶ and the EU Military Staff (EUMS)¹⁷ among others¹⁸.

¹⁰ "Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008), 51

¹¹ Ibid., Article 42

¹² Stephan Keukeleire, "European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?," in *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, ed. Federiga Bindi (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 51–72.

¹³ "Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting up the Political and Security Committee (2001/78/CFSP)," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. 30.1.2001 (2001).

¹⁴ PMG responsibilities include EU-NATO relations, partnerships with non-EU countries and other organizations, as well as exercises

¹⁵ "Council Decision of 22 May 2000 Setting up a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. 27.5.2000 (2000).

¹⁶ "Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting up the Military Committee of the European Union (2001/79/CFSP)," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. 30.1.2001 (2001).

The European Council (EUCO), the highest political authority within the EU and the Council of the European Union (COE) at ministerial level, have the responsibility and supervision over CFSP/CSDP. The intergovernmental argument indicates that “integration only takes place if there is a permanent excess of gains and losses for nation-states”¹⁹. As a result, the relevant “decisions” of EUCO (and the COE), are based upon the lowest common denominator and unanimity and consist the outcomes of a long process of negotiations. These decisions due to the above mentioned reasons are often described with the phrase, too little too late. The EU’s ability to act fast and have great impact using CSDP, is partially weakened due to its intergovernmental procedures. However, considering the CSDP’s limitations only as the result of unwilling MS is rather simplistic.²⁰

1.2 The problem

CSDP’s *raison d’être* is to contribute in “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”²¹ outside the Union. Moreover the CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”²². Although the EU as a security community proved to be more powerful than the collective identity²³ and achieved a rapid growth, the theory and experience on CSDP suggest that “traditionally, integration in this area lagged behind supranational developments in economic coordination”²⁴, because defence and security

¹⁷ “Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 Amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the Establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, no. 26.5.2005 (2005).

¹⁸ see Annex A. and Annex B. for more details

¹⁹ Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann, “Theories of European Integration,” in *The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen et al. (Sage Publications, 2015), 8

²⁰ Maria Grazia Galantino and Maria Raquel Freire, eds., *Managing Crises, Making Peace: Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 281

²¹ “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”, Article 42.1

²² *Ibid.*, Article 42.2

²³ Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 12

²⁴ Glencross, *The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided?*, 187

policies lie into the realm of high politics. But, through CSDP “the most ambitious project of military integration in times of peace”²⁵ already takes place.

In order to maximize the impact and effectiveness of CSDP, it is a necessity for the EU to fully incorporate the CSDP in its strategic vision. Otherwise the use and development of CSDP outside a specific strategic framework will be in vain and a complete waste of EU’s resources. In 2015, the mandate provided by the European Council to the HR/VP was clear,

“The High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016”²⁶.

The mandate executed²⁷ by the HR/VP and the largest ever single piece of an EU Strategy on Security and Defence “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”²⁸ released. The manifestation of the EU’s strategic thinking demonstrates how the EU intends to use the full spectrum of the available foreign policy “means”, including the CSDP. So under proper analysis, the incorporation of CSDP to the EU Global Strategy can provide us with useful findings. The purpose of this research is to examine which implications for the use of CSDP framework, arise from the EU Global Strategy. In particular, the research question of this dissertation aims to trace the priorities and guidelines for the use of CSDP framework, as deriving from the EU Global Strategy (2016). We are interested to examine, the how, the where, and the why, the framework of CSDP must be used, according to the EU Global Strategy.

The EU Global Strategy, which released just months prior to the submission of this dissertation, June 2016, provides an excellent, original, and contemporary research opportunity. The findings could provide indications as to the course of CSDP policy making and through this evolution, to confirm or not, the EU’s commitment to implement this global strategy. The deriving priorities and guidelines for CSDP, can also highlight the missing links between the EU Global Strategy

²⁵ Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), vii

²⁶ “European Council Meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) - Conclusions” (Brussels: European Council, 2015), 5

²⁷ An annual phase of consultation with the EU MS, experts on the fields, think-tanks, and academia took place after the EUCO mandate

²⁸ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy” (Brussels: EEAS, 2016).

and a tailor made CSDP strategy. The actual evolution of CSDP is in the hands of the EU political elite since “the political bank of the strategy bridge is both legally and morally in the driving seat for a security community’s policy toward its defence preparation for the future”²⁹. The implementation of this strategy will ultimately define the CSDP and would bestow or not the desired strategic perspective to this policy. The numerous debates and seminars organised prior to the EU Global Strategy release and the many more scheduled to take place in the aftermath of its release, indicate the increased importance of the chosen research topic.

1.3 Research method and outline

Each research aims to shed light on different aspects and questions using different angles and to provide a valuable feedback for future research. The qualitative method qualifies for this research. At first, the CSDP is examined as a policy among the EU’s many others (Common Agricultural Policy, Environmental Policy etc.). These “single policy studies are the most common form of EU research”³⁰ and are proven to be ideal due to their comprehensive perspective. But, what makes this specific policy different than the others is its very nature. The CSDP is about the last bastion of national interests, so just a basic policy analysis about ends and means cannot provide sufficient findings. A certain “elegant” perspective needs to simultaneously apply in order to examine how the CSDP-related priorities and guidelines can be extracted through the EU’s broader strategic context of security and defence. Using the EU’s strategic context as an analytical tool, not only can provide useful insights on CSDP but also allows the research to move among multiple levels of analysis.

The research aims to trace which are the priorities and guidelines for CSDP, as deriving from the EU Global Strategy. The major policy priorities and guidelines for CSDP derive from the clarifications the EU Global Strategy provides for a) the role, EU as a global security and defence actor and provider is willing to undertake, b) the priorities on where (regions) and why

²⁹ Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 166

³⁰ Annica Kronsell and Ian Manners, “Single Policy Study: Three Variations in Design,” in *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, ed. Kennet Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 86

(thematic actions) the EU should intervene, and c) the nature, type, and the extent of actions and capabilities the EU is willing to use.

The research method on all chapters will be based upon a synthesis of the EU primary sources and the related bibliography in an effort to bridge primary research with theory and experience. The EU's bureaucratic and satisfactory transparent function gives us the opportunity to explore numerous valuable documents for this research. Strategies, Strategic documents, Action Plans, Council Conclusions, specialized internal reports and documents, do not only carry weight as primary sources of information, but also reflect a collective multi-level decision making process.

In order to properly form the answer of the research question, we need to structure the research and analysis accordingly. The content structure of this dissertation is thematic, the chapters are formed to correspond to different CSDP-related aspects. Moreover, in each chapter the largest part is especially dedicated to the EU's 2016 Global Strategy (2016) as the research question dictates. Using this method, the research question is partially answered in all chapters by addressing its partial sub questions one by one.

The current introductory chapter, besides a short overview of the CSDP, includes the delineating of the research purpose and research question. In chapters 2-5 the main analysis and research unfold. More specifically, in Chapter 2 we explore a) how EU's strategic perspective places the broader context for CSDP, b) which documents can be characterised as an EU strategy for security and defence and c) how the EU's global vision can provide the level of ambition for the CSDP. The answers to these questions define the main theoretical points of departure for the forthcoming analysis in the next chapters, since the purpose of any theoretical framework is "to bring intellectual order to a domain, identify accepted and contested knowledge, and guide future research"³¹. In chapter 3 we try to map which implications for the EU's common defence, derive from the EU Global Strategy, including the CSDP relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the key role reserved for the development of the EU's defence capabilities. Likewise, in Chapter 4 the research revolves

³¹ David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choices and International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3

on how the European strategy can provide the regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action and the deriving implications for the character of CSDP missions. The concluding chapter 5 presents the key points and core findings of this research as derived from the subsequent reasoning and the evidences we have provided throughout this paper, along with some final concluding remarks on the topic.

Undoubtedly, research delimitations need to apply so to reduce the danger of leading research to other directions or sliding off topic. Research interests do not include the analysis of CSDP missions, namely capacity specifics, weapons systems, and an in-depth analysis of the specific factors led to the civilian and military missions launched. Also, will not focus on a) the debate on theories about European integration per se, b) the analysis of specific aspects of national security and defence strategy for each and every EU MS and c) the decision-making process in lower than intergovernmental level because this process cannot serve the goal of EU's strategic perspective. Finally, with all due respect to the academic staff, my fellow students and anyone else interested in this research is needed to point out that this dissertation is composed under the objective but necessary limitations, imposed by the specific academic process.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE

2.1 The strategy

The term strategy and strategic are widely used in various international theories and have a central place in theory development.³² The Strategic perspective, mostly neglected as to the EU's Policies studies can operate as a broader framework and a valuable analytical approach, capable to explain various aspects of CSDP. Clausewitz's strategic concept –even though not directly relevant to CSDP- can give a clear view of what the strategy is in first place. It elevates thought to the point of a more complete observation:

“Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy. Once it has been determined, from the political conditions, what a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart the course”³³.

An important separation of strategy definitions made by Colin S. Gray,

“1. Strategy (content neutral): The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends. 2. Grand strategy: The direction and use made of any and all among the total assets of a security community for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. 3. Military strategy: The direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics”³⁴.

It is the linking of “ends” and “means” through strategic approaches that lie in the core of the strategic concept. An EU strategy for security could reanimate the CSDP and moreover, through reasoned and rational choices, could translate the deriving priorities and guidelines into policy

³² Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1980); Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley, 1979).

³³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 178

³⁴ Colin S. Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3

making³⁵. The need for a European Strategy pointed out many times as an effort to clarify the “strategic ambiguity which lies at its heart”³⁶. Since the “strategy is about ends and means, or specifically how they are linked”³⁷ and building upon the fact that “strategy needs to provide a direction for the future, to tackle future crises and to prevent new ones”³⁸, this research aims to examine how the EU Global Strategy could provide clear “ends” for CSDP and direct the “means” (CSDP itself) to achieve them.

2.2 The evolving EU strategies for security and defence

United States of America (USA) unilateral action to invade in Iraq (2003) led to an “open conflict”³⁹ within the EU, but, appeared also as an opportunity for the EU to utter a single voice on major global affairs. A number of official documents can be collectively characterized as an “EU Strategy for security” because these documents do intend to operate as the manifestation of EU’s strategic vision. These strategic documents provide clear evidences of the desired global role EU as a whole⁴⁰ is willing to undertake and are fully adopted by the EUCO.

The European Security Strategy (ESS)⁴¹ placed a series of threats it is compelling for the EU to meet in order to achieve the status of “a secure Europe in a better world”⁴² back in 2003. The ESS was a unique Strategic document until then and within its 14 pages displays a) global challenges and key threats, b) strategic objectives, and c) policy implications for Europe. To create the ESS, despite the fact that all 25 EU MS (then) were asked to contribute with their

³⁵ Dirk Peters, *Constrained Balancing: The EU’s Security Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 62-63

³⁶ Christopher J. Bickerton, *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 61

³⁷ Sven Biscop and Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, “CSDP: The Strategic Perspective,” in *Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 65

³⁸ “Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the EUISS Annual Conference” (Brussels, 2015).

³⁹ Keukeleire, “European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?,” 58

⁴⁰ Since all EU MS except Denmark take part on European Council and the CSDP, the initiatives and actions within CSDP framework reflect the EU’s will as a whole at the given time. Denmark’s CSDP opt-out came into being after the Danish ‘no’ vote at the Maastricht referendum in June 1992. In addition to CSDP opt-out, Denmark has opt-outs from entering the Eurozone and the Common Justice system. Moreover, until the submission of this dissertation, the UK had not triggered the TEU Article 50, which commences the process for a MS to leave the EU

⁴¹ EU High Representative, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” (Brussels, 2003).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1

approaches⁴³, distinct national approaches on security and defence are not apparent. The ESS is leaning towards a supranational strategic vision, also adopted by the European Council “which decided to leave the ESS untouched”⁴⁴. Five years later (2008) the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World⁴⁵ released. The TEU (2009)⁴⁶ –although not part of European Strategy- includes provisions on CSDP and conferred legal personality to the Union⁴⁷ leveraging Union’s presence in global governance by providing the ability to participate in International Organisations. The following year the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) ⁴⁸ for the European Union (2010) released as an “indispensable complement”⁴⁹ to ESS mainly because it laid the foundations for closer cooperation between external and internal dimensions of security. In 2015, A Strategic Review - The European Union in a changing global environment (2015)⁵⁰ made a realistic assessment of the EU strengths and weaknesses and paved the way for the EU Global Strategy to be released.

The long-awaited EU Global Strategy (2016) recognises that the potential of the Union is unparalleled and the strategic thinking a necessity.⁵¹ This strategy places CSDP in a broader strategic context of security and defence and aims to provide a more comprehensive strategic vision for the EU as a whole. Five broad sets of challenges directly or indirectly linked to security and defence challenges⁵² respond to a) policy direction, the defence must be enhanced b) flexibility, that will ease the difficulties on cooperation among MS and between implementing

⁴³ Antonio Missiroli, *Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, Reference*, ed. Antonio Missiroli (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015), 14

⁴⁴ Sven Biscop, “Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo ? The EU and Strategy in Times of Crisis,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 14 (2009): 367–84.

⁴⁵ EU High Representative, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World” (Brussels, 2008).

⁴⁶ “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 47

⁴⁸ “Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: ‘Towards a European Security Model’” (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2010). The ISS adopted a month later, “European Council 25/26 March 2010 - Conclusions” (Brussels: European Council, 2010).

⁴⁹ “Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: ‘Towards a European Security Model.’”, 17

⁵⁰ “The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World” (Brussels: EEAS, 2015).

⁵¹ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 3

⁵² “The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World.”, 15-17

partners c) leverage, as to the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy and security goals d) coordination, necessary to effective defence e) capabilities (as the realm of CSDP).

Finally, it is interesting to highlight the change in EU's attitude towards global developments. Pessimism is gradually increasing and insecurity arises. ESS is making an optimistic statement "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free"⁵³ while the Report on ESS Implementation states "the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history"⁵⁴. The Strategic Review sees "an arc of instability surrounds the Union"⁵⁵ and the newly released EU Global Strategy warns that "our Union is under threat"⁵⁶.

2.3 Core elements of EU's global vision: multipolarity and multilateralism

The generation and use of power lie in unity, "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own"⁵⁷ but, the EU as a whole "should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world"⁵⁸. The EU is seeking "an international order based on effective multilateralism"⁵⁹. By promoting multilateralism the EU also aims to rebalance USA's power, "our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA"⁶⁰. Furthermore, the recognition of "USA's supremacy as a military actor justifies the EU's willingness to further enhance its capabilities and increase its coherence"⁶¹. Five years later (2008) and after the invaluable experience of 20 CSDP missions already deployed (then), the Report on ESS Implementation renews commitment to multilateral order and international legitimacy, "everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN

⁵³ EU High Representative, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.", 1

⁵⁴ EU High Representative, "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.", 1

⁵⁵ "The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World.", 1

⁵⁶ "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.", 7

⁵⁷ EU High Representative, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.", 1

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 9

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 13

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 13

objectives”⁶². The Group of Eight (G8) is preferred as an effective decision scheme, making Russia, China, and USA, equal interlocutors for global affairs.

The facts place EU in the Group of three (G3)⁶³ claiming a role that corresponds to its collective fundamentals. The interlinking of economy with “reformed global governance”⁶⁴ and the potential of military capabilities is of increased importance. Moreover, the commitment to multilateralism as a “guarantee for peace”⁶⁵ and the cooperation with “super-powers”⁶⁶ can be now considered the norm present on all strategic documents. The EU rejects “zero-sum game”⁶⁷ and promotes an EU-like regional model for the world. Multilateralism also fits the intergovernmental approach EU uses for CFSP/CSDP issues. The EU’s role as a global security actor is part of the EU role as a global actor. Moreover, the EU’s multilateral approach to security issues has led in cooperation with the UN, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) among others.

Theory and experience show EU’s desire to advance on this topic and try to balance USA’s power primarily within Europe.⁶⁸ The recent years and those to come power seems to be so diffused that some international relations theorists claim “it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony”⁶⁹. But, the EU seems to firmly promote multipolarity scenario and is committed to promote multilateralism as the effective scheme for decision making and crisis management in world affairs. Within this anarchical international system which has the tendency to move beyond unipolarity⁷⁰, this broad “quest for greater European

⁶² EU High Representative, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.”, 11

⁶³ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 3

⁶⁴ Ibid., 4

⁶⁵ Ibid., 15-16

⁶⁶ Ibid., 4

⁶⁷ Ibid., 4

⁶⁸ Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?,” *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (2006): 149–86.

⁶⁹ Joseph S. (Jr) Nye, *Is the American Century Over?* (Polity Press, 2015), 96

⁷⁰ Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics.*, Chapter 6

autonomy”⁷¹ could also on the long-term result in the formation of a European polar, if the EU decisively confronts the opportunities and challenges it presents.

⁷¹ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP'S DEFENCE ASPECT

3.1 The CSDP-NATO competing frameworks

When it comes to defence in Europe, NATO arises undoubtedly as the dominant framework for defence. USA has a hegemonic role within NATO, contributing the most in assets and bearing the following costs.⁷² This political and military alliance operates under the principle of collective defence⁷³ for its MS, mainly associated with European territorial defence from external threats. This “international cooperation took a unique form as the North Atlantic alliance developed into an organization (NATO) uncharacteristic for alliances”⁷⁴ also due to France’s failed attempt to create a European Defence Community as vital part of European integration.

NATO since its creation seems to act regardless of the European integration process and since the collapse of the Soviet Union is in search of a more active role, its enlargement continues and its recent activities show the desire to expand beyond its initial geographical bonding. For example, the NATO’s operation in Libya, is quite interesting because “in terms of operations, the Libya campaign saw an ad hoc coalition make use of the NATO command structure—‘Paris–London Plus’ instead of Berlin Plus”⁷⁵. Moreover, interesting results open to interpretation exported by comparing MS’s dates of accession to EU and NATO.⁷⁶ Among all states that are both NATO and EU members each and every one became a NATO member prior to EU accession. Half of EU-NATO common MS (11 out of 22) entered NATO after the ESS release in 2003. Under this process NATO tried to commit future EU MS to share assets and accept NATO’s command line before entering the EU. This fact can be interpreted in both ways, either

⁷² USA contributes the 72,2% of NATO budget, see *The Secretary General’s Annual Report* (NATO, 2015), 26

⁷³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty” (Washington, 1949), Article 5

⁷⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 353-354

⁷⁵ Sven Biscop, “The UK and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?,” *International Affairs* 88, no. 6 (2012): 1297–1313.

⁷⁶ See Annex C.

it is the disability of CSDP's to claim exclusivity or it is the clear manifestation of NATO's anxiety of going out of business in Europe. In the case of many EU MS the framework of NATO is considered to be the spearhead of the Western system. For UK in particular "a unipolar system based on the authority of the United States and NATO"⁷⁷ is preferred and such system "remained the best guarantee of Britain's global influence and of international security"⁷⁸. On the other hand "France and Germany argued in favour of containing NATO while simultaneously enhancing the importance of the UN and the EU"⁷⁹. Some researchers argue that "It there is no strong desire among EU Member States for the EU to match the capabilities of NATO in the area of 'hard security'"⁸⁰. Moreover, since among EU MS no single one of them can assert a hegemonic role within CSDP, similar to the one USA possesses in NATO, these diverging approaches on CSDP-NATO relations are likely to remain strong in the mid-term.

The European Union and the NATO declared the commitment to cooperation through the EU-NATO Declaration (2002)⁸¹. This Declaration portrayed CSDP as an addition "to the range of instruments"⁸² and to "the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged"⁸³. The EU is accepting new security actors and welcomes their involvement "through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners"⁸⁴. These efforts, according to ESS, stabilized the Balkans and the possibility of a new major conflict is now distancing. Moreover, the EU seems to question NATO's existence indirectly "large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable"⁸⁵. The spread of potential operations is now widening as compared to "Petersberg Tasks"⁸⁶ through adding various more sectors⁸⁷ such as joint disarmament

⁷⁷ Charlotte Wagnsson, *Security in a Greater Europe: The Possibility of a Pan-European Approach* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 111

⁷⁸ Luis Simón, *The Palgrave Macmillan Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security: The EU – NATO Conundrum in Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 160

⁷⁹ Wagnsson, *Security in a Greater Europe: The Possibility of a Pan-European Approach*, 112

⁸⁰ Kaunert and Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*, 207

⁸¹ "EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP" (Brussels, 2002).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 1

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1

⁸⁴ EU High Representative, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.", 8

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3

⁸⁶ "Petersberg Declaration" (Bonn, 1992).

⁸⁷ EU High Representative, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.", 12

operations, terrorism etc. which later formalized through TEU⁸⁸. However, the ESS “does not resolve authoritatively the question”⁸⁹ as to whether the ESDP autonomy and NATO commitments are compatible with the declared goal for operational autonomy. Meanwhile, NATO’s concerns on its future position raised, “however much we intensify our cooperation, neither one of our organisations risks going out of business”⁹⁰. The Report on ESS states that strong EU-NATO relationships must continue “even if formal relations have not advanced”⁹¹ but “in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities”⁹².

3.2 Defence matters: enhancing CSDP’s defence capabilities

The EU is not yet a defensive alliance, but “defence matters”⁹³. To strengthen the collective defence aspect, the so-called “Solidarity Clause”⁹⁴ embodied in the TEU describes the cases on when and how joint action and assistance will take place within the EU’s soil. Eventually, the first thematic debate on the CSDP in 2013, was seen as an opportunity to impart new momentum to CSDP actions and priorities.⁹⁵ The next thematic meeting for CSDP took place in 2015⁹⁶ and the calls for enhancing the development of capabilities and strengthening Europe's defence industry continued.

The EU Global Strategy, still recognizes NATO as the “bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security”⁹⁷ protecting its MS from external threats. However, the EU-NATO relations are part of a broader

⁸⁸ “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”, Article 43.1

⁸⁹ Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, eds., *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective* (Routledge, 2008), 14

⁹⁰ “Remarks by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy,” 2004.

⁹¹ EU High Representative, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.”, 11

⁹² *Ibid.*, 11

⁹³ “European Council 19/20 December 2013 - Conclusions” (Brussels: European Council, 2013), 1

⁹⁴ “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”, Article 222

⁹⁵ “European Council 19/20 December 2013 - Conclusions.”, 2

⁹⁶ “Council Conclusions on CSDP” (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2015).

⁹⁷ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 36

multilateral approach, new formats with new players will be explored.⁹⁸ So, the EU “must take greater responsibility for our security”⁹⁹ and “EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO”¹⁰⁰. In this context the EU urges MS to convert the voluntary approach to defence cooperation into real commitment.¹⁰¹ The increase of defence budgets, the creation of an innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)¹⁰² and the “political economy of peace”¹⁰³ used as a lure for EU MS to renew and increase their commitment on the CSDP under the prospect of shared interests and mutual gains. In short, the EU MS “will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm”¹⁰⁴.

Certainly among the prerequisites for an effective defence cooperation and EU’s strategic autonomy is a solid and a blooming European defence industry. The “investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency”¹⁰⁵. The target is to increase defence cooperation and to create a “solid European defence industry, which is critical for Europe’s autonomy of decision and action”¹⁰⁶ that can increase CSDP’s rapid reaction and response. Raising investments and optimizing the national defence budgets are necessary steps to develop a “full spectrum defence capabilities”¹⁰⁷. The EU budget is limited as to contribution on defence research and technology in the mid-term¹⁰⁸, but the EU commits that the “next budget cycle, will prove instrumental in developing the defence capabilities”¹⁰⁹. Therefore, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is the kingpin of these efforts, providing significant and valuable development in numerous sections of defence capabilities and by integrating the industry standards. The integration of defence industries, can also prove attractive for EU MS also because can lead to positive economic output through economies of scale and pooled procurement projects. It is

⁹⁸ Ibid., 4

⁹⁹ Ibid., 19

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 20

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 46

¹⁰² “Council Conclusions on CSDP.”, 4

¹⁰³ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 31

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 45

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 10

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 11

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 10

¹⁰⁸ See Annex D.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 46

imperative for the EU to avoid duplication with NATO and the conflict of interests, so, the EU MS cannot keep side-lining on CSDP and make use of NATO or other formations. The burden-sharing¹¹⁰ arrangements and an increase on the available resources, cannot be conducted for CSDP and NATO frameworks simultaneously¹¹¹. As a result, the questions regarding the necessary assets for the EU's defence, including the number of troops and the capacity building remain vivid. The complex and hybrid nature of threats, demands hybrid response and hybrid capabilities, such as the reinforcement of the "cyber elements in CSDP missions and operations"¹¹². The development of cyber defence, early warning and strategic communications capabilities to deal with hybrid threats are also among the EDA's top priorities.

When it comes to the diverging strategies, the four global powers within the EU (UK, France, Germany and Italy) do have individual defence strategies and the assets to realize them. The group of post-Soviet and Baltic EU MS do share defence insecurities related to Russia's power. The EU's southern MS (Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Portugal) face serious security threats such as the economic crisis and migration. The alignment of national approaches even more difficult is the varying strategic cultures of EU MS¹¹³ sourcing from different cultures of EU MS.

These implications for the CSDP tend to lead into a step-by-step process to push up to supranational level a number of issues, both technical and political which will ultimately lead to further defence integration. Moreover, the EU's strategic interests dictate a process towards the strategic autonomy, which presupposes an autonomous defence and security planning and distinct hard security capabilities. Otherwise for EU MS to rely "on NATO in 'hard security' would mean to abandon its CSDP or to transform it into something reminiscent of the European

¹¹⁰ Burden-sharing, which also arises as a permanent controversial topic within NATO, can be defined as the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal.

¹¹¹ Burden-sharing still poses as an urgent issue in the "Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (Warsaw, 2016).

¹¹² "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.", 22

¹¹³ Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandra Jonas, eds., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent* (Springer VS, 2013).

Security and Defence Identity of the 1990s”¹¹⁴. All these details and clarifications must be included in a tailor made CSDP-strategy, which “should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy”¹¹⁵.

¹¹⁴ Kaunert and Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA.*, 206

¹¹⁵ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 45

CHAPTER 4

THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP FRAMEWORK

4.1 Interlinked regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action

Some early signs on regional priorities are present on the ESS, because “even in an era of globalization, geography is still important”¹¹⁶ and provides endless opportunities for intervention which “should also be considered”¹¹⁷. In 2008 conflicts remain unsolved or had “flared up”¹¹⁸ and Iran’s nuclear program was an additional threat needed to be confronted. The ISS’s main goal was to provide a strategy for the internal dimension of security and to create a European security model. But, since the “internal security increasingly depends to a large extent on external security”¹¹⁹ the ISS’s ninth chapter “External dimension of internal security/cooperation with third countries”¹²⁰ is seen as an effort to bridge the regional and thematic priorities for these two dimensions. Here we can trace evidences of an ongoing effort to form sub-strategies for specific areas, “bilateral, multilateral and regional approaches among Member States should be developed, where appropriate, to address specific threats”¹²¹ not limited to the EU’s neighbourhood. The 2015 Strategic Review advances regional prioritizing for actions with a more global outlook. The world is divided into five regions a) European Neighbours b) North Africa and the Middle East c) Africa d) Atlantic Partnerships and e) Asia, with respective challenges for each region.¹²²

The CSDP is by definition and legal binding¹²³ linked to the world that lies beneath the EU’s walls. The CSDP’s core duties are peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. This last task may operate as an umbrella term able to serve the EU’s

¹¹⁶ EU High Representative, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.”, 7

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 8

¹¹⁸ EU High Representative, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.”, 1

¹¹⁹ “Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: ‘Towards a European Security Model.’”, 16

¹²⁰ Ibid., 16

¹²¹ Ibid., 16

¹²² “The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World.”, 2

¹²³ “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”, Article 42

self-perceived international role. The relevant UN calls for pre-emptive peace and conflict settlement can give the EU the desired legitimacy and global visibility. The effective use of CSDP framework, needs to prioritize the regional and thematic dimensions for actions properly, able to promote and defend the EU's interests worldwide. Building upon this solid base, the EU Global Strategy seems to put things in order, providing a more comprehensive interlinked approach between regional and thematic action. The comprehensive approach is praised all over the EU Global Strategy and the will to use all available instruments may impart new momentum to the CSDP.

As for the regional priorities for actions, the East and South Dimensions "stretching into Central Asia and south down to Central Africa"¹²⁴ return as a high priority for broader action. Existing and potential fragility in these regions "threatens our vital interests"¹²⁵. From Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War, to the Ukrainian crisis and the Syrian chaos or even the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) uprising, evidences show the European Neighbour is in turmoil and the EU should effectively contribute as security provider on these crises. Otherwise the EU will be obliged to import threats and increase insecurity within the EU itself. The immediate European Neighbourhood is once again the focal point of CSDP action. The European Neighbourhood and more specific the Balkans emerge as central to European interests. Specifically the Balkans are of increasing importance also because their direct correlation to security threats (organized crime, etc.). Alongside the Balkans region, the MENA and the Mediterranean, traditionally provide an advantageous field for strengthening international security. The Africa, will continue to need the CSDP's contribution to everlasting crises. Various CSDP Panels have already been created to help launch concrete initiatives and reach closer ties within the Eastern Neighbours. Despite the fact many EU MS do not wish to be involved in the global turmoil, the security threats in the neighbourhood cannot be ignored. The Experience shows that all CSDP missions, are launched along the EU's eastern and southern dimensions.

The contribution of CSDP to crisis management and pre-emptive peace will continue, but the contemporary security environment requires more than that. The rapid interconnectedness of

¹²⁴ "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.", 23

¹²⁵ Ibid., 23

actors (state, non-state, and people) brings new and unforeseen security threats. As a result, the security agenda is constantly changing and so is the perception of threats and insecurity.¹²⁶ Theory divides threats into traditional or non-traditional. The nature of threats spreads to military, economic, environmental and health fields. Moreover, hybrid and multi-dimensional threats such as terrorism, organized crime, migration, failing/failed states, poverty and economic crises are of increasing importance¹²⁷ and pose as thematic actions of high priority for the EU.

The CSDP missions both military and civilians need to deal with “protracted crises”¹²⁸ as described into the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)¹²⁹. For the EU Global Strategy, the close cooperation between CSDP framework and Freedom, Security and Justice, incorporates CSDP to a broader strategic planning, in an effort to make all CSDP missions “more embedded in a wider EU approach”¹³⁰. A “mandate of a CSDP mission inherently has effects on law enforcement actions in EU territory”¹³¹ and since the threats “know no borders”¹³², the strengthening of these ties in order to develop synergies between CSDP and FSJ has been the subject of several specialized reports and emerges as a necessity. The investment in state and societal resilience is the key to effectively prevent or minimize the potential threats and increase security. For the EU, the lessons learned from Libya and Syria highlight the stability in the EU’s surroundings as a top priority and the future terrain for CSDP missions’ deployment. It is not difficult to understand how migration is linked with the destabilization in the MENA region. The Counterterrorism within the EU’s soil does not fall under the responsibilities of CSDP, but stabilizing surrounding regions and being present where terrorism traces its roots is perceived as an exclusive CSDP-related thematic for action. Moreover, the importance given to the maritime dimension as compared to other thematic priorities has led to the release of the

¹²⁶ For more on perceptions of Security in Europe see Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Chapter 11

¹²⁷ Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2008); Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, eds., *International Security, Volume III, Widening Security* (Sage Publications, 2007).

¹²⁸ “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Brussels, 2015), 14

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 14

¹³⁰ Federica Mogherini, “HRVP / Head of the Agency Report ahead of the June 2015 EC,” 2015., 3

¹³¹ “Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ: Road Map Implementation - Fourth Annual Progress Report Delegations” (Brussels: EEAS, 2015), 6

¹³² “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 50

EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)¹³³ in 2014 and the relevant Action Plan¹³⁴ the same year. For the EU specifically, the maritime dimensions have also direct implications to the economy and economic security, as a valuable source of growth and prosperity as well as an advantageous field of CSDP cooperation with European Border and Coast Guard¹³⁵. Finally, the enlargement issue is essential to EU's security also because any new enlargements must reduce exposure to security risks and avoid the repetition of previous mistakes. The 2004 and 2007 Enlargements still pose serious questions as to the level of exposure on security risks¹³⁶, including organized crime and smuggling networks among them.

4.2 The nature and extent of CSDP missions

Back in 2003 we witnessed the first EU-led military operation a) without the use of NATO assets and b) outside Europe, the Operation Artemis/DRC. The EU emitted a strong message with global reach establishing commitment towards the direction of operational autonomy and a few months later released the ESS. Enhancing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP is a common phrase in almost every CSDP-related document but stills poses as a future requirement.

The lack of coordination between EU MS, has led many times in the past to non-action, which is unfamiliar to the force that exists within the EU. France "feared from the beginning the risk of a confinement of the EU by NATO, or its subordination to it"¹³⁷ and sees for itself a global role through CSDP's development. Even though France did not hesitate to return to NATO structure showing her impatience for CSDP's delays. Moreover, UK and Germany would prefer a softer version of CSDP evolution because "for the UK a civilian approach asserts NATO's primacy, for

¹³³ "European Union Maritime Security Strategy" (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014).

¹³⁴ "EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) - Action Plan" (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014).

¹³⁵ "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.", 20

¹³⁶ Keith White-Hunt, "How the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements Weakened the CFSP and CSDP: A Socio-Economic and Geopolitical Analysis," *Central European Journal of International & Security Studies* 2, no. 8 (2014): 96–114.

¹³⁷ Gabriele Cascone, "ESDP Operations and NATO: Co-Operation, Rivalry or Muddling- Through?," in *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective*, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (Routledge, 2008), 149

Germany such an approach avoids difficult questions about the use of military force”¹³⁸. Italy is the second largest contributor to CSDP’s civilian and military missions (below France) and a proactive supporter of deeper defence integration in the EU. These diverging approaches make extremely complex the analysis for each and every CSDP mission. The EU’s naval action in Somalia for example “a confluence of national, European and global security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests help explain why the operation was launched”¹³⁹.

As to the operational front ESS presents some clear guidelines for CSDP action a) “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”¹⁴⁰, b) “to sustain several operations simultaneously”¹⁴¹, both military and civilian since EU as a whole has the means to realize them c) preventive engagement¹⁴² d) to increase defence budgets and transform national militaries into more flexible and mobile forces¹⁴³. The delays and setbacks on implementation are well known, “the Battle Groups have never been deployed and the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 44 has never been implemented”¹⁴⁴ and were among the primary considerations of the HR/VP report to the European Council¹⁴⁵. The Report on ESS makes a positive evaluation of CSDP record and readmits the need to create “appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability”¹⁴⁶ moreover distinct operations are expected to be strengthened “by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place”¹⁴⁷ clearly reflect the will for operational autonomy.

¹³⁸ Daniel Fiott, ed., *The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives* (Academia press for Egmont-The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015), 12

¹³⁹ Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 70

¹⁴⁰ EU High Representative, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.”, 11

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 11

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 11

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 12

¹⁴⁴ “The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World.”, Chapter 3

¹⁴⁵ Mogherini, “HRVP / Head of the Agency Report ahead of the June 2015 EC.”

¹⁴⁶ EU High Representative, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.”, 9

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 9

The EU Global Strategy, along with the ascertainment that the EU is not just a civilian power comes the statement that “for Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand”¹⁴⁸. The CSDP’s missions deployed under the “European flag”¹⁴⁹ manifest the ambition for EU’s strategic autonomy. It seems to be a significant gap between aspirations and capabilities, because this vision presupposes the CSDP must become more rapid and effective by removing all relevant obstacles both political, economic and operational ones¹⁵⁰. Besides the defence planning, the capabilities development could benefit from an annually discussion and coordination of the EU MS “military spending plans”¹⁵¹. The operational capacity and the use of such force, in large scale still pose a question due to the operational issues are imperative to confront and include the creation of permanent Headquarters, the design of an effective command structure and the logistical support¹⁵². In addition, the shortfalls in intelligence services and strategic reconnaissance are widely recognised. Moreover, the institutional structure needs to be “streamlined”¹⁵³ and the full cooperation between the various EU’s agencies and bodies deployed in each region is a necessity¹⁵⁴.

The EU’s commitment to peaceful resolution is partly because peaceful solutions qualify, but also partly to the reason EU cannot yet effectively make use of force and make a real difference.¹⁵⁵ Although in certain cases of CSDP involvement, the other actors did not present better results even if they were largely involved.¹⁵⁶

Besides the missing links for actual impact, there are cases in which the framework of CSDP has proven to be really effective, EU NAVAL FORCE (NAVFOR) ATALANTA stands out among them¹⁵⁷ and is widely recognised as such. This operation showed that the EU has what it takes to address multiple security challenges by combining military and civilian resources for

¹⁴⁸ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 4

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 4

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 47

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 46

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 47

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 48

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 48-49

¹⁵⁵ e.g. the CSDP mission in Afghanistan

¹⁵⁶ Keukeleire, “European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?”

¹⁵⁷ Kaunert and Zwolski, *The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA.*, Chapter 7

international crisis management and prevention. It is an intergovernmental responsibility to decide “what a vigorous and responsive CSDP can and should look like”¹⁵⁸. To realize the goals for a rapid and effective response to crises using the CSDP “requires Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises”¹⁵⁹.

In spite of the evidences showing that EU MS have participated in CSDP military operations due to a variety of interests and goals, the global role the EU as a whole claims is apparent. The EU sees itself not as a clearly military or civilian power, but rather as a normative great power interested and obliged to impact on global affairs¹⁶⁰. The CSDP need to act complementary to increase the EU’s political weight, mostly based upon “great continuing civil relations at continental and global level”¹⁶¹. A truly empowered global security actor cannot be self-limited to just reacting to events. This argument is strengthened by looking upon the basic features of CSDP Missions. Since 2003, the EU has deployed 33 missions (17 completed and 16 ongoing) to various regions. This record is the evidence of the EU’s presence and contribution to international security but, in order the EU to claim an active role in global security governance, also has to be accepted as part of such.¹⁶²

Table 4.2a
The Status and type of CSDP missions as of July 2016

	Civilian	Military	Total
Completed	11	6	17
Ongoing	10	6	16
Total	21	12	33

Source: Data from the European External Action Service

¹⁵⁸ “The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World.”, 15

¹⁵⁹ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 47

¹⁶⁰ Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elström, “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in Global Politics,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (2012): 93–108.

¹⁶¹ Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order.*, 205

¹⁶² Ginsberg and Penksa, *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact.*, 40

Furthermore, when it comes to military missions, interesting is the fact that the EU as a whole cannot directly provide the necessary funds for these missions. The relevant costs are carried by the EU MS participating in the missions, although, the “Athena Mechanism”¹⁶³ was created in order all EU MS that participate in CSDP to contribute to the common costs of a CSDP military operation. Besides the fact that all 11 military missions were partially funded by this mechanism, there cannot be clear evidences as of the total cost of these missions. The extent of military missions CSDP will launch is directly related to the level of ambitions the EU MS do have. The impact of these missions depends upon the funds EU MS are willing to channel to these operations. This burden-sharing debate among EU MS and the financing of CSDP’s operations still poses a big debate today.¹⁶⁴ The EU NAVFOR MED is an example of successful cooperation between the internal and external dimensions of security¹⁶⁵, its operational duties are to control the illegal migratory flows and to disrupt the smuggling/trafficking networks. The EU’s will to use the full spectrum of its military means, reflects upon the expanded role decided¹⁶⁶ for EU NAVFOR MED.

A further look over CSDP’s budget indicates that CSDP civilian missions consume the largest part of CFSP’s budget. These missions can combine the use of military and normative power within the framework of CSDP¹⁶⁷, civilian missions after all consist “a trademark of CSDP”¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶³ “Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 Establishing a Mechanism to Administer the Financing of Common Costs of EU Operations Having Military or Defence Implications (Athena) and Repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, no. 28.3.2015 (2015).

¹⁶⁴ For more on burden-sharing and the missions of CSDP see Niklas I. M. Nováky, “Who Wants to Pay More? The European Union’s Military Operations and the Dispute over Financial Burden Sharing,” *European Security* 2839, no. February (2016): 1–21.

¹⁶⁵ CMPD, “CMPD Food for Thought Paper ‘From Strengthening Ties between CSDP/FSJ Actors towards More Security in EUROPE’” (Brussels: EEAS, 2016), 3

¹⁶⁶ The mission extended until 27 July 2017, see “European Council Meeting (28 June 2016) – Conclusions” (Brussels: European Council, 2016).

¹⁶⁷ Annika Björkdahl, “Normative and Military Power in EU Peace Support Operations,” in *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Richard G. Whitman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 103

¹⁶⁸ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.”, 47

Table 4.2b
CFSP budget and the cost of CSDP civilian missions (2015-2016)

	2015 (in € millions)	2016 (in € millions)
CFSP Budget	320.77	327.3
CSDP Civilian Missions Cost	258.25	280
CSDP Civilian Missions / CFSP budget	80%	85%

Source: European Commission Budget Data

The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014 - 2020¹⁶⁹ indicates that CSDP's impact in the near future is rather unlikely to increase significantly when it comes to civilian missions. This is due to the fact that CFSP's commitments for the 2014-2020 period range from 320 € millions per year to 350 € millions per year. Within the "Global Europe" category in the EU's budget, CFSP commitments is relatively low and will reach a total of 2,338.72 € millions during the 2014-2020 period, compared to other commitments of the same category, such as the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Humanitarian Aid.

¹⁶⁹ See Annex D.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The biggest change in the EU's thinking is the insertion of a strategic perspective and the formation of a global vision. The collapse of the Soviet Union, left the United States of America as the only superpower, the sole polar of the international system. Since then, few state actors have shown the potential of being characterized as emerging polar. Four among EU's MS, UK, France, Italy and Germany can be characterized as great powers with significant political leverage on a global scale, but no single one of them belongs to this elite category of a potential polar. Obviously, the dynamics change, at least in theory, once the European Union is examined as a unitary actor. The recent release of the EU's Global Strategy, 13 whole years after the ESS released, provided an excellent research opportunity. Today, a more connected, more contested, and more complex world arises, major shifts and diffusions of power are observed, non-traditional threats and challenges are of increasing importance and the non-state actors acquire significant influence on a global scale. Although the EU does not specify who the enemies are, it does specify the global competitors. A multilateral global governance in an emerging multipolar world is preferred and promoted by the EU.

The purpose of this research was to examine which implications for the use of CSDP framework, arise from the EU Global Strategy. In particular, the central research question aimed to trace the priorities and guidelines for the use of CSDP framework, as deriving from the EU Global Strategy (2016). The research design and the overall analysis tried to extract solid evidences and indications as to the how, the where, and the why, the framework of CSDP must be used, according to the EU's Global Strategy. The evidences for the deriving priorities and guidelines can be further divided into three major categories a) the implications for the defence aspect of CSDP, which is directly related to the CSDP-NATO relations, b) the operational implications for CSDP, including the regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action, and the implications for the nature and extent of CSDP missions.

The CSDP framework can prove to be a valuable instrument, able to realize part of the EU's goals on security and defence. The EU's advantages are to be found in its ability to combine different policy instruments in various sectors. Under this view CSDP cannot operate as a standalone policy, instead, CSDP is the collective vehicle to realize some of CFSP's goals. But, a major setback for the rapid development of CSDP is that the handling of this vehicle is an intergovernmental responsibility. The necessary consensus seems that can only be built around topics it already exists. Moreover, in order for the EU to achieve significant impact and strengthen the international security, the use of CSDP must take place in a well-defined and clear strategic context. CSDP is clearly linked to the EU's strategic approaches in an undergoing effort to use this framework, as an instrument able to assist the EU to seize the opportunities which the global environment presents and boost EU's emergence as a "European" polar within the international system. The EU Global Strategy cannot determine the evolution and use of CSDP, this is clearly an intergovernmental responsibility. The political will to adopt and implement this strategy can realize and further clarify the priorities and guidelines set in this strategy for the use of CSDP framework.

Findings indicate it is a priority to strengthen the defence aspect of CSDP in order to provide the EU with the necessary autonomy. The close defence cooperation between the EU MS can be considered the norm from now and on. The further enhancement of the defence industry and the essential role of the EDA can lead to capabilities development and technological advancements through defence research. Moreover, boosting this aspect of CSDP can lead to positive economic outcomes for the EU as a whole. But, the obstacle for the CSDP framework to develop further its defence aspect is the competitive operations of NATO. NATO's comparative advantage to CSDP is that the operations launched under the NATO framework, do not imply another step closer to full integration. Moreover, for some MS, the NATO membership does not only consist an aspect of national strategy, but is seen as a chance to improve bilateral relations with USA securing their perceived national interests. That could make NATO a preferable choice for EU MS that either wish to slow down the integration process or want to retain a special relationship with the USA. The Transatlantic cooperation and the European integration go hand by hand, but it is not yet clear how firmly one holds the other. Implementing the EU Global

Strategy will also clarify further as to whether the NATO consists a companion or competitor to CSDP framework.

Another major breakthrough in this strategy that can reflect upon the CSDP is the perception of interlinked regional and thematic priorities for CSDP action. The fragile environment along the arc of the European neighbourhood makes the effective use of CSDP framework a necessity. The interlinked internal and external dimensions of security and the interlinked regional with thematic priorities is perceived and praised all over the EU Global Strategy. The type of threats, with internal and external dimensions, global and domestic reach, varies as to their nature, motives, and objectives. The increasing importance and presence of hybrid threats requires hybrid responses and the subordination of all available “means” to the broader “goals” for a secure Europe. The EU Global Strategy gives sufficient indications on regional strategies and thematic priorities and rejects an ad hoc role for interventions. The principled pragmatism, not only applies to the level of ambitions, but also extends to the optimal use of available resources. The Eastern and Southern dimensions, stretching south down to Central Africa and into Central Asia arise as the natural priority for action. More specifically the Balkans and the MENA region are expected to be the top priorities, since the spill over effects from potentially non-resilient states will affect the EU. But, it is a complex and difficult task to achieve resilience in these states. We must expect more military missions to be deployed across these countries, mainly to the existing conflict zones. This spectrum of danger spreading across the EU's Eastern and Southern borders, can only be confronted with a closer cooperation between the CSDP and FJS frameworks. The maritime dimension of security emerges as a field of increased importance and an advantageous field for CSDP action. A clear evolving shift from crisis management interventions abroad towards developing synergies between internal and external security strategies to protect the EU is apparent.


The above regional and thematic priorities along with the desired impact the EU wants to have determines the nature and extent of CSDP missions. Rapid engagement and intervention must replace the small-scale and low-impact missions. As to the civilian missions the available budget until 2020 is limited and no significant impact is expected. The military missions presuppose for the EU MS, to make a turn from voluntarism to real commitment. In addition, the military

missions interlink with defence expenditure in the EU and the development of the defence industry and cooperation. Although the necessary advancements cannot realize overnight the action plan to implement the goals set by the strategy must clearly depict the level of ambitions set out in the EU Global Strategy.

A regional approach to global issues seems to be the key to understand how this strategy can reflect upon the CSDP framework. We have sufficient evidences to support the angle that the CSDP framework will be used as a valuable tool to realize part of security goals in the broader European Neighbourhood. The demand for CSDP is likely to grow and to evolve, so, this strategy must operate as a catalyst for action. The existence and formation of a strategy does not guarantee the implementation or the effectiveness. Since its creation 65 years ago, the EU has shaped its course through delicate balancing and compromises under the prospects for mutual gains. The implementation which must follow, is a political responsibility and requires strong political will. The central challenge here is the alignment of short-term mid-term and long-term priorities and guidelines for CSDP, under this strategic concept. Moreover, although the EU Global Strategy provides useful findings as to the priorities and guidelines for the use of CSDP framework, also highlights the missing links that are necessary to form a tailor made strategy for CSDP. The unresolved policy Implications for CSDP include the development a strategic culture, the limits in the use of force, the operational clarifications such as the command structure, and many other debated issues. Further research on the implementation process and future CSDP missions can highlight whether the intergovernmental body of the EU is determined and committed to realize this strategy and throughout this strategy to shape the way for the CSDP.

ANNEXES

Annex A. The EEAS Organisational Chart



Source: "European Union External Action Service," accessed September 5, 2016, <http://eeas.europa.eu/>.

Annex B. The EU Bodies and Committees related to CSDP

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) monitors the international situation and examines the EU's options for response during a crisis outbreak. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) along with the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) carries out preparatory work in various CSDP-related fields for the PSC. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body consisted of the chiefs of defence from all EU countries, directs EU military activities and provides advice on military matters. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of military experts who assist the EUMC. This puzzle is extended with the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Moreover the below list includes the EUCO's preparatory bodies/working parties directly related to CSDP

- Ad hoc Working Party on the Middle East Peace Process (COMEP)
- Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI)
- European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG)
- Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party (MaMa)
- Middle East/Gulf Working Party (MOG)
- Politico-Military Group (PMG)
- Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX)
- Working Party on Conventional Arms Export (COARM)
- Working Party on Dual-Use Goods
- Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN)
- Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP)
- Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects)
- Working Party on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism
- Working Party on the OSCE and the Council of Europe
- Working Party on Transatlantic Relations (COTRA)

Source: "European Commission," accessed September 5, 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/>.

Annex C. List of EU MS accession dates to NATO and the EU

No.	EU MS	NATO accession dates	EU accession date
1	Belgium	1949	1958
2	Bulgaria	2004	2007
3	Croatia	2009	2013
4	Czech Republic	1999	2004
5	Denmark	1949	1973
6	Estonia	2004	2004
7	France	1949	1958
8	Germany	1955	1958
9	Greece	1952	1981
10	Hungary	1999	2004
11	Italy	1949	1958
12	Latvia	2004	2004
13	Lithuania	2004	2004
14	Luxembourg	1949	1958
15	Netherlands	1949	1958
16	Poland	1999	2004
17	Portugal	1949	1986
18	Romania	2004	2007
19	Slovakia	2004	2004
20	Slovenia	2004	2004
21	Spain	1982	1986
22	United Kingdom	1949	1973

Source: European Parliament and NATO data

Annex E. EU MS participation to various influential bodies and groups

No.	EU MS	CSDP	NATO	G7	G20	UN Security Council (permanent MS)	Eurozone
1	Austria	x					x
2	Belgium	x	x				x
3	Bulgaria	x	x				
4	Croatia	x	x				
5	Cyprus	x					x
6	Czech Republic	x	x				
7	Denmark	opt-out	x				opt-out
8	Estonia	x	x				x
9	Finland	x					x
10	France	x	x	x	x	x	x
11	Germany	x	x	x	x		x
12	Greece	x	x				x
13	Hungary	x	x				
14	Ireland	x					x
15	Italy	x	x	x	x		x
16	Latvia	x	x				x
17	Lithuania	x	x				x
18	Luxembourg	x	x				x
19	Malta	x					x
20	Netherlands	x	x				x
21	Poland	x	x				
22	Portugal	x	x				x
23	Romania	x	x				
24	Slovakia	x	x				x
25	Slovenia	x	x				x
26	Spain	x	x				x

27	Sweden	x						
28	United Kingdom	x	x	x	x		x	opt-out

Source: Data gathered from EU, UN, NATO, G7/G8 sources

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