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The transformation of political parties in a liberal democracy and the voting behavior: Greece 2009-2015.

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Η μετεξέλιξη των πολιτικών κομμάτων σε μια φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία και η συμπεριφορά ψηφοφόρου: Ελλάδα 2009-2015.

Σημαντικοί όροι: Δημοκρατία, πολιτικό σύστημα, πολιτικά κόμματα, Ελλάδα, συμπεριφορά ψηφοφόρου.

Περίληψη

Σκοπός της εργασίας είναι να αναλύσει τη μετεξέλιξη των Ελληνικών πολιτικών κομμάτων από πλευράς μάρκετινγκ, σύμφωνα με τη συμπεριφορά των Ελλήνων ψηφοφόρων, ειδικά μετά το 2009. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η εργασία καλείται να απαντήσει στο ερώτημα εάν η συμπεριφορά των Ελλήνων ψηφοφόρων μπορεί να οδηγήσει στη μετεξέλιξη των Ελληνικών κομμάτων. Η απάντηση είναι ναι, εφόσον οι ψηφοφόροι συμπεριφέρονται πλέον σαν καταναλωτές και δεδομένου αυτού τα κόμματα πρέπει να μετεξελιχθούν σε πολιτικούς οργανισμούς. Η σκοπιμότητα, σε ακαδημαϊκό επίπεδο, είναι η συγκέντρωση της υπάρχουσας γνώσης αναφορικά με τη συμπεριφορά ψηφοφόρου και η προώθηση της μελλοντικής έρευνας προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση. Η κύρια συνεισφορά της εργασίας, ενώ προσπαθεί να αναδείξει τη ρεαλιστική συμπεριφορά και αντίδραση των κομμάτων, των υποψηφίων και των ψηφοφόρων, είναι να επαναπροσδιορίσει τις υπάρχουσες Ελληνικές πολιτικές δομές, με απώτερο σκοπό την εξασφάλιση καλύτερων πολιτικών για την κοινωνία. Η μεθοδολογία που ακολουθήθηκε είναι η αποτύπωση της υπάρχουσας γνώσης μέσω της επισκόπησης βιβλιογραφίας, από το Google scholar, τον Ελληνικό ημερήσιο τύπο και το διαδίκτυο, αναφορικά με τους παραπάνω σημαντικούς όρους, διαιρεμένη σε δύο κεφάλαια, με το πρώτο να αποτελεί το θεωρητικό υπόβαθρο και το δεύτερο να παρουσιάζει το Ελληνικό πολιτικό σύστημα, τα ευρήματα και το συμπέρασμα.

The transformation of political parties in a liberal democracy and the voting behavior: Greece 2009-2015.

Keywords: Democracy, political system, political parties, Greece, voting behavior.

Abstract

The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the transformation of the Greek political parties from a marketing perspective according to the Greek voting behavior, especially after 2009. More specifically, the paper will answer the question "can the voting behavior of Greek people lead to the transformation of the Greek political parties?" The answer is yes, since voters act as consumers and therefore parties need to transform into political organizations. The purposefulness of the research in the academic level is to summarize the existing knowledge in terms of voting behavior and to also constitute an additional pedestal for future research towards this direction. The main contribution of the research, while aspiring to highlight the realistic behavior and reaction of parties, candidates and voters, will be to redefine the existing Greek political structures in order to acquire better policies for society. The methodology of the research is the summoning up of the existing knowledge through literature review, from Google scholar, Greek daily press and the internet, in terms of the keywords above, divided in two chapters, the first being the theoretical background and the second presenting the Greek political system, the paper's findings, as well as the conclusion.

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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE VOTING BEHAVIOR IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to analyze and define any political system one must be familiar to the concepts that are being presented. For instance, referring to political parties presupposes a positioning of the term "political parties" in a general concept (e.g. politics) in order to understand analyze and extend our thoughts. However, political concepts are usually based upon values that can lead to misinterpretation or conflicts or even attributed to a higher level of importance than they actually should be (Heywood 2011:19-20). During the last elections in Western Europe, both national and European, we are introduced to a new way of approach by the voters, who show mistrust in the established political systems and behave erratically. It is often said that people vote for or against a political party usually according to their ideological beliefs and political culture. However, these days parties have resented their original role and instead of being a vivid part of society they are more captured by the state. They are not a welcoming home for politically active people, especially for the younger generations. As a result, they might lose their role as motivating force of politics.

In this context, this chapter, which constitutes the theoretical background of the paper, presents the structure of a political system in a liberal democracy and the voting behavior in the specific system. Why? Clearly because one has to live in a liberal democracy in order to be able to deal freely with politics. Moreover, a political system can be created only if the latter is applicable and furthermore, political parties are absolutely useless outside a political system. The methodology used in this chapter is the mapping of the existing knowledge through literature review from Google scholar. In the second part, the structure of the political system is sufficiently analyzed and, more specifically, concepts such as democracy, political system and political parties are introduced. Moreover, in the third part the concept of political culture is presented so as to highlight the role of culture in defining policies. In the fourth part, the paper demonstrates two aspects of voting behavior, one that is already commonly

known through democratic procedures and one derived from a marketing approach. Finally, in the fifth part a resume of the chapter is presented.

1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The study of any democratic regime mostly exists due to the beginning and evolution of democracy through the cultural experience of ancient Greek people. The effect of ancient Greek experience contributes in several ways in the self-fulfillment of humanity. As a result, this particular symbolism of the Athenian Democracy, in "Aristotele's Athenian Constitution", has led it to be a supreme political good. In ancient Greece, the prevailing perception provided social and class discriminations in decision making process, as it gave initial role in specialization and people known as "επαΐοντες (epaiontes)", or in other words the ones who know. In this difficult procedure the aim was to create an elite pattern of election whereas on the other hand, an ostensibly support of the immediate democracy took place. The foundations of the Athenian democracy were the People's Church (the public gathering of people), the Parliament and the Iliaia (a group of 6.000 judges, 600 from each tribe appointed by draw every year). The members of the parliament (MPs), which were 500 (50 from each of the ten tribes), were appointed by draw from catalogues of elected citizens of each tribe. In order for a citizen to be an MP, he had to be an Athenian citizen over 30 years old and who had not been declined of his political rights. An MP could only be elected only for two times with term of one year. The Parliament was a legislative, executive and judiciary body at the same time. Each tribe was in charge of the "Deanery" according to its draw turn and one of the 50 elected MPs would be drawn as the president of the Deanery, named the Janitor of the Deanery, which was the supreme office. This office was held only for 24 hours and only for a single time in an MP's life. The Athenian democracy was based upon the practical principle of power to the people in everyday life, under the principal conditions of the vote of majority, the equality of citizens, the equality before the law and the freedom of speech (Papadis 2015: 13,53,66). On the other hand, Xenophon in his version of the "Athenian Constitution" has a realistic approach of distaste of the development of the Athenian Democracy, as he claims that it was implemented in a utilitarian way and also divided the people in aristocrats and democrats (Mavropoulos 2015: 173).

Democracy literally means power from the people. Although the idea of power from the people is simple, vague and can easily be misinterpreted, however, Abraham Lincoln's speech in Gettysburg (1864) "government of the people, from the people and for the people" gives a clear and specific meaning of the term. That is, political equality, equal distribution of power and influence, with popular participation and governance according to the public interest (Heywood 2011:194). According to Anderson and Guillori (1997) democracy is about winning and losing at election time and democratic governance is about how the political system deals with winners and losers. Politics is the activity or procedure through which groups result to binding collective decisions (Hague and Harrop 2011: 34). Moreover, as an activity in a wider concept politics is the activity through which people create, contain and change the general rules by which they live. Additionally, politics in a public concept is better understood as a combination of intentions, acts and results (Heywood 2011: 65-67).

A political system is the binding division of values in a society, which distinguishes the political system from other systems in the same environment. Although all democracies are considered to be representative ones, nevertheless, through the evolution of democracy a further distinction was made regarding liberal democracy: a compromise of representation, which aims to combine the authorities of democratic governments with the implementation of constraints in their field of action (Hague and Harrop 2011: 35,175). A parliamentary republic system is the one that the government governs –in and in the middle- of the parliament, meaning that there is a merger between the legislative and executive body. The basic characteristics of such a system are that governments are formed after elections that are based on the representative power of political parties, the personnel of the government usually comes from the elected body, the government is based on the trust of the parliament and the public offices of the prime minister and the head of the state are separated (Heywood 2011: 253-255). According to Almond's famous typology there are three types of Western democratic systems: the Anglo-American, the Continental European and the Scandinavian and Low Countries one, which are derived from the relationship between the political and social culture on the one hand and political stability on the other hand (Lijphart 1969). A political party system refers to a general context which is defined not only by the political parties themselves, but also by the interactions between parties that constitute it and the rules

of their operation as well. Political parties copy, learn and compete and moreover, are trying to capture innovation in terms of organization, funding and campaigns. In addition, three party systems can be distinguished: the dominant party system, the two-party system and the multiparty one. A party system is the overall model of parties in a country consisting of the total number and names of the parties (in order to be able to define their share in the political market), the interaction between them and the legal context by which they operate (Hague and Harrop 2011: 391). The paper fully adopts the definition of Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Politics and Law:

> The political system, in this light, might be conceived as a residual instance of power-application, which can only effectively address matters which, from a political perspective, cannot be resolved by other systems, or which, more particularly, cause clear conflicts between one system and another distinct system. The political system's application of power is likely to have the effect of maintaining the conditions of systemic differentiation and of preserving the integrity of distinct systems. […] politics is organized around a two-level coding. First, it is structured around the opposition between government and governed. This means that the political system defines itself in the most primary way as focused on the relation between those who do and those who do not participate in government, and on the subsequent distinction between those issues which are relevant to government and those issues which are not. The exercise of power, on which the political system is functionally concentrated, is thus only possible for those who are in government, and who apply power to those who are not in government. The basic precondition for the existence of a political system is its capacity to identify those who are entitled to wield power and those who are subject to power, and then to determine which issues are relevant to those who wield power and which are not. This differentiation enables the political system to constitute the governed (those who are subject to power) as its internal environment, and so to treat these as the addressees of collectively binding decisions. Second, however, the side of government in this binary scheme is itself then split, as a relation between government and opposition – the opposing sides of which are articulated by political parties. This means that the exercise of power, as government, explains itself in reference or contrast to other organs or associations, which always compete for a share in power. The conflict between the two sides of government is commonly represented by the code conservative/progressive or

even left-wing/right-wing. These terms act as simplifying rubrics (King and Thornhill 2003: 71-72).

A political party is a group of people organized in such a way so as to gain government power through elections. To begin with, the political party clearly aims in public office, although the small ones usually just want to enter the Parliament so as to increase the pressure on the government rather than governing themselves. Secondly, it is organized with official memberships in order to be distinguished from social movements. Finally, its members are united through mutual political preferences and a specific ideology. Political parties can be categorized in mass or membership ones, in representative or integrative ones and in constitutional or revolutionary ones. They are of great importance as they are found everywhere except from dictatorship or other military regimes and vitally combine the state with society (Heywood 2011: 336-339). Mustillo (2009) uses a definition adopted upon a single criterion: party ''appoints candidates at general elections to the system's representative assembly.'' Implied in this definition is that the system's representative assembly refers to the national representative system. Parties pursue alternative strategies with respect to the types of organizations they build in order to mobilize voter support. There are other dimensions, besides electoral performance, of party success. Some parties may have influence disproportionate to the size of their legislative contingent and other times, a new party may use electoral competition as a means to threaten existing parties and, thereby, lead them to adopt the issues or issue positions the new party espouses. In addition, Panebianco's historical approach categorizes the political parties in the elite ones (formed by cliques with mutual interests), the mass ones (formed by groups with non parliamentary roots in order to represent their purposes) and the catch-all ones (formed to define the radical path that many ex-elite and ex- mass ones followed, so as to adjust in the post war political field). Ostrogoski, diagnosed that political parties would lead in the new era of democratic politics: "no matter in which country they grow, the political parties constitute the main instrument for the expression of the political emotions and the active will of the citizens". Sartori defines as political party "any political group that participates in the elections with a formal name and logo and has the ability of running candidates for public office". As opposed to groups of interests, the political parties seek for power and authority. Weber stated that "political parties reside in the house of

power". Nevertheless, political parties have four major functions: (a) to conduct the government, (b) to give substance in the principles of liberal democracy by giving voters the right to choose whoever they want despite leaderships and policies, (c) they are players of political recruitment, and (d) they filter society's interests and transform them to implementable proposals. Parties are complicated organizations, in a way that they are not just a group of people rather than a group of groups with different interests. They are in fact a miniature of a political system (Hague and Harrop 2011: 367-372). A classic example is to look at political parties as an intervening variable between government institutions and society. As Giovanni Sartori states: "But when the society at large becomes politicised, the traffic rules that plug the society into the state, and vice versa, are established by the way in which a party system becomes structured. At this point, parties become channeling agencies and the party system becomes the system of political canalization of the society" (Sartori 1976: 41, Maor 1997: 2). Sartori (2005) also deals with the classification and functions of political parties and argues that the central concept involved in classifying parties is that of the organizational network, which goes beyond the party itself to include the space that the party occupies. Finally, while many different functions can be ascribed to parties, the functions which are central to the notion of party, and which are essentially irreplaceable, are those of participation, electioneering and expression.

Political parties continue to play a central role in the governance of modern democracies and a decline in their voluntary base has important implications for the future of democracy since a decline of membership will weaken partisanship in the electorate, and this in turn will undermine the effectiveness of central government (Whiteley 2009). Usually voters vote for a party under the prospect of governance and because they think the specific party will satisfy their needs (Anderson and Guillori 1997). The most popular classification of party systems is based on a straight count of the number of participating parties, generally in the form of a simple trichotomy: one-party, two-party, and multi-party systems. As a trichotomy, this classification takes its meaning from the fact that party competition begins only when more than one party is part of the system, and coalition politics can only enter the scene when at least three actors are present. Sartori's notion is at the root of the classificatory scheme presented here: "What really weighs in the balance is, in fact, the extent to which a party may

be required as a coalition partner for one or more of the possible governmental majorities. A party may be electorally weak but have a strong coalition-bargaining potential. Conversely, a party may be electorally strong and yet lack coalition-bargaining power" (Swaan 1975).

Ideology plays an important role in framing partisan strategies. Ideological change reflects not only exogenous socio-economic transformations but also endogenous and relatively autonomous epistemic dynamics that bridge intellectual and partisan arenas (Ferrera 2014). Johns (1999) supports that political parties can be distinguished in the degree to which they retain their status as private associations. This loss of privacy will result not from a failure to maintain the integrity of their internal processes, or a conscious determination of the electorate to scrutinize their behavior, but because they are becoming public organizations. Mair (1995) believes that the apparent growth in popular disenchantment with parties can be associated with a contradictory development in which parties at one and the same time become less relevant as representative agencies (in terms of both their purposive role and their position on the ground) while achieving more status and privileges in their role as public-office holders. Harmel and Janda (1994) explain why parties change their strategies and organizational characteristics and support that change does not just happen but results from leadership change (which is a dominant factor within the party) and/or an external stimulus for change. According to Broder's thesis of party decline (Bailey 1990), in the USA neither the Democrats nor the Republicans could adapt to the changes that occurred in the political environment and kept declining. As a result, they were no longer doing even the things that parties are minimally expected to do. Hanley and Sikk (2014) discuss about a new group of parties that they term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs), which combine moderate social and economic policies with anti-establishment appeals and a desire to change the way politics is conducted. They analyse the electoral breakthroughs of AERPs in Central and Eastern Europe, where they have so far been most successful and find five sufficient causal paths combining high or rising corruption, rising unemployment and party system instability.

1.3 POLITICAL CULTURE

In political science concepts are general ideas which are the tools by which we think, interpret and analyze, in order to understand the world. To this context, political culture refers to the psychological orientation of a nation in political subjects, which is expressed in beliefs, symbols and values (Heywood 2011: 19,333). It is in fact, the total web of beliefs, attitudes and values of a society towards the political system. According to Pye, "political culture is the set of fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge, which give form and substance to political processes" (Hague and Harrop 2011: 225-226). Lighterman and Cefai support that "the political culture is the set of symbols and concepts or style operations that organize political issues and form opinions, to individuals or collectives" (Gooding and Tilly 2006: 392). If we perceive the political culture as an independent variable, then this is the subjective side of politics and concerns attitudes, beliefs, standards, values and ideologies within which operates a political system and through them the political behavior is constituted. Therefore, the behavior of people is determined by their values except in cases of violence, coercion or manipulation. If, on the other hand, we subtract the values of behavior, the role of political culture is canceled as an autonomous and variable intervener. In any case, the political culture is influenced and takes place within a political system (Demertzis 1994). Also, Almond and Verba identified the kind of political culture within which a liberal democracy can be developed and established the "civil culture", where many citizens are politically active but the passive minority ensures system stability, resolving the conflict between popular control and effective governance (Hague and Harrop 2011: 227).

Inglehart and Welzel (2003) argue that the political culture that emphasizes values such as self-expression, tolerance, trust and participatory processes is a key factor for a functioning democracy, but is parallel depending on the assimilation of society in the democratic institutions . Inglehart also defines as dependent variables political culture and status, which are a key factor for stability and development of democracy, especially in the countries of northern Europe and North America where we have a direct association between the syndrome of "civil culture" and democracy. Moreover, this relationship finds application in countries with a high sense of democracy and confidence in it, is disturbed when we import as

variable per capita income. On the other hand, in countries like Russia the correlation between regime and political culture is rebutted, as well as other factors (e.g. elite class consciousness) may also ensure a democratic regime despite the economic data (Seligson 2002). Lefort argued that "democracy and totalitarianism depend on the discovery of language, customs and symbols and thus culture does not reflect the regime" (Gooding and Tilly 2006: 399). Lighterman and Cefai claim that political culture is one of the factors for a democratic society and that this is an idea essential if we want to understand what makes the social groups powerful or weak, relevant or irrelevant, as many societies rewrite their social contracts (Gooding and Tilly 2006: 408).

1.4 VOTING BEHAVIOR

1.4.1 ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

Elections are the mechanism through which one can occupy an office or a position through choices of a predefined group of people, the electoral body. Democratic elections are considered those where all adults can vote (depending the definition of adult in each country), each person has one vote , equal value of the vote, secret procedure, and the electoral choice is offered between at least two candidates or political parties. The procedure in each country may differ according to the choice to vote one or more candidates of a party, or the electoral regions that occur and usually lead to the transformation of votes into electoral seats in the parliament. Majority systems give the opportunity to bigger parties to gain a larger number of seats according to the votes they gain. Proportional systems guarantee a more equal representation in terms of votes and parliamentary seats (Heywood 2011: 302-303). Katz defines elections as "the copyright of modern democracy". A proper function of elections ensures a competitive approach on those running for public office as well as the accountability of governments. In addition it allows and strengthens the dialogue between the voters and the parties and as a result between society and the state. In a wider concept the electoral system refers to the total of rules that define an election such as the structure of the ballot, the electoral formula and the districting. The bigger is the number of office open to elections, the more democratic the political system is. However, the election mania may cause fatigue of the voters, low quality voting decision and lack of interest from their part (Hague

and Harrop 2011: 323-328). In order to understand electoral campaigns, party competition and voter representation we have to take under consideration that the aspects of party organization influence which salience strategy is pursued. Parties that have more resources will be able to 'ride the wave' of current concerns while parties with fewer resources are more likely to focus on their best issues. Furthermore, policy seeking parties with strong activist influence will be less likely to 'ride the wave' and more likely to follow issue ownership strategies (Wagner and Meyer 2014).

Henneberg (2008) supports that traditional voting behavior concepts do not provide adequate insight into what effect political marketing phenomena have on voters' perceptions, attitudes, or behavior. Often this is due to the fact that their main explanandum is not the individual voter but groups or the electorate or long-term, structural explanatory constructs that are apparently not affected by political marketing. This precludes a cognitive understanding of voters. On the other hand, tendencies towards more cognitive psychology–influenced voting behavior research allow for the use of consumer behavior theory to be integrated. Knowledge of how people buy can foster knowledge about how voters react to certain political marketing activities and offerings or how citizens perceive policy promises and their implementation. In majority systems voters often abandon their parties when it seems that the latter has no option of predominance in their district and choose to vote for a party or a candidate of different political preferences. This is called tactical voting (Hague and Harrop 2011: 331). The presence of a national economic vote in the countries of Southern Europe (i.e. Greece) highlights the importance of economic voting for the calculus of electoral behavior in these countries. The more the EU is seen as responsible for the economy, the less strong is the national economic vote (Lobo and Beck 2012). DeVries (2010) argues about how political parties' electoral fortunes in national elections are influenced by voters' preferences regarding the European Union (EU). To date, there is increasing evidence demonstrating the impact of EU issues on vote choice in national elections – a process commonly referred to as EU issue voting. Yet little is known about which parties actually gain or lose as a result of EU issue voting. Ioakimidis (2000) states the member states of EU have different approaches towards Europeanization, which results from the interactive osmosis between the national political system, institutions and various elites (political, administrative) on the one hand and the EU

system and processes on the other. The cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal, as well as those of eastern European countries seeking EU membership, seem to conform to the model of intended Europeanization. Bartels (2008) argues that "in 1949 Key produced a masterful portrait of a political order in which electoral behavior meshed seamlessly with party politics, political culture, and the prevailing realities of economic and social hierarchy".

Dassonneville *et al. (*2015) demonstrate that while party switchers and abstainers have a lot in common, switching parties can be considered a more positive choice. Most importantly, contrary to what previous research suggested and in contrast to abstainers, party switchers cannot be characterized as frustrated with politics. Furthermore, the supply side does to a certain extent affect whether voters choose to remain loyal, switch parties, or abstain from voting. Goodman and Murray (2007) suggest that the absence of perceptions of party differences has nontrivial implications for people's voting behavior. According to the latter, individuals who see little to no difference between the major parties are more likely to vote for the incumbent candidate or party and are more likely to defer their vote decision or even to avoid it altogether by abstaining. They believe that the decision to vote may be subject to symbolic differences that reflect a gut feeling about politics and the system of partisanship. However, once voters have made the choice to participate, the perceived differences between the parties—the operational differences—exert a greater effect and serve as one justification for the vote choice. When those justifications are absent, individuals face more preference uncertainty and, therefore, more important, an increased probability of post decisional regret. People attempt to reduce the probability of this regret by deferring the decision or avoiding it altogether. Also, they claim that the absence of partisan information affects voting behavior. Whether partisan information is limited by institutional barriers or by the perceptions of citizens, the lack of partisan information seems to affect voter choices meaningfully.

### 1.4.2 A MARKETING APPROACH

There have been many studies trying to analyze the voter as a consumer and to also indicate the changes that these reactions may bring to the political parties. More specifically, Newman (1985) supports that throughout many several disciplines towards a better understanding of the voter as a consumer, there seems to be a trend of a rational voter, voters pay close

attention to the candidate's personality and performance through media exposure and party identification remains an important factor. On the other hand, Downs (1957) claims that apathy among citizens towards elections, ignorance of the issues, the tendency of parties in a two party system to resemble each other, and the anticonsumer bias of government action can be logically explained as efficient reactions to imperfect information in a large democracy. Despite the latter, Hansen and Jensen (2007) stand by the theory that a political party can be regarded as a service-provider. In exchange for a 'price' (i.e., a person's vote) the political party promises to deliver some societal and other benefits (i.e., the service-output), which usually are claimed to improve people's lives and the overall society. In a marketing context, voters can thus be seen as consumers who are consuming a service, i.e., the decisions and the actions of the political party. Grönroos' theory of relationship marketing (1996) took the research proposal a step further, which aims to demonstrate that the vote itself has transformed to a consuming good in the Greek "political market". As shown in Figure 1.1, Grönroos illustrates the shift towards a resource-based relational approach to marketing from a product-based transactional approach. In the left triangle he presents the three key parties of marketing in a transactional approach, as well as the other three key aspects of marketing along the sides of the triangle. In the right triangle he represents today's market, where every part of the triangle is treated on an individual basis and finally the product itself has disappeared. Additionally, Veloutsou *et al.* (2002) report that academics and market professionals appreciate the importance of relationship marketing for contemporary firms, but argue that relationship marketing strategies and tactics are context specific and as a conclusion demonstrate how business relationships may develop in the future and the practices that should be used under certain scenarios.

But who sets the agenda in terms of demand and supply and of introducing a new product in the market? Furthermore, if we adopt a marketing oriented political theory how should any political system react and who is responsible for designing, evaluating and implementing the correct policies for society: party leaders, candidates or the voters themselves? Logman (1997) claims that businesses looking for custom methods of designing, pricing, selling and delivering their wares can do it themselves or leave it up to the customer.

Figure 1.1
Grönroos' triangle of relationship marketing.

Source: Grönroos (1996), "Relationship marketing: strategic and tactical implications".

1.5 RESUME

In this chapter the aim was to introduce all necessary aspects of a political system in a liberal democracy in order to constitute a theoretical background for the analysis of the Greek political system which is presented on the second chapter. As done so, a liberal political system meshes seamlessly with democracy. In broad speaking, a distinguished system set to solve problems that other systems cannot has to come through people's authorization. A political party is a group of people combined under the same ideas and beliefs so as to gain government through elections in a one-party, two-party or multi-party system. Furthermore, elections deriving from such a system give democratic legislation to a party to govern in terms of majority vote and so as to efficiently deal with people's common problems. In addition, political culture as a set of fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge which gives form and substance to political processes plays a significant role in determining voting behavior. The latter, is starting to more and more look alike the one of a consumer if we regard society as a market, political parties as providers, voters as consumers, vote as price and policies as outputs.

CHAPTER 2: THE GREEK POLITICAL SYSTEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The anti systemic behavior of the European voters could do nothing less than shift the Greek voters towards the same direction. In Western Europe, at the national level, mostly coalition governments still exist as proof to the fact that people no longer trust any one party government and are seeking for fresh candidacies. Furthermore, in Italy, 40 year old -ex mayor of the small city Florence- M. Renzi was appointed Prime-Minister by his political party, because Italians were demanding changes and new uncorrupted politicians in the system. At the European level, the French voted the extreme right party of Z.M. Lepen as a punishment to the political system. In addition, in Greece, a party named "POTAMI" (The River), which is originated only three months before the European elections, managed to enter the European Parliament in 2014 as well as the Greek Parliament in 2015. Moreover, today, 40 year old Alexis Tsipras is the Greek Prime Minister after the last elections, because the Greeks trusted his youth, fresh and radical political speech against the old type parties. More specifically, in the last six years in Greece (2009-2015), the Greek people were unexpectedly led five times to the polling booth for national elections. The only elections that took place on time were those of the European Parliament, every five years, on 2004, on 2009 and on May 2014. In May 2012, Greeks saw the end of a steady stream of single-party governments and the thumping collapse of party politics that held not just individuals, but whole families and even villages tied to the two parties, New Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Social Movement (PASOK) that ruled since 1974. A practically unprecedented large number of parties entered a Greek Parliament re-arranged beyond recognition.

Is this a failure of the political system? Do political parties need to transform? Or, was this outcome only due to the financial crisis and the fiscal policies imposed on the Greeks? Could it simply just an expression of anger and disappointment at the same time with no implications on the political parties? The paper supports that Greek voters used their vote to send old and tired political parties the message that their appeal has waned. They thus told the traditional political parties that they need to transform themselves into flexible and innovative organizations or phase their disappearance into a collapsing political system. They simply

behaved as consumers in a market crowded by largely undifferentiated but heavily branded goods. To this context, the paper will seek to explain the structure of the parties in a "firm way" and analyze the results (a) from the side of the parties, as to what they are trying to accomplish in terms of policies and as to what their long-term political goals are, (b) from the side of the candidates of the parties, as to whether they understand and adopt the above goals and policies so that they are able to communicate them to the voters, and (c) from the side of the voters as to whether they understand and are willing to accept the above policies imposed on them and as to what they can do to improve them. In the second part of this chapter, a historical review of the Greek political system is demonstrated through literature review from Google scholar. In the third part, the findings from a research on the results of the Greek elections as well as some characteristic articles on the subject written in the Greek daily press and the internet are analyzed. Moreover, in the fourth chapter the conclusion of the research, the limitations as well as the proposals for future research are presented. Finally, in the fifth part a resume of this chapter takes place.

2.2 A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM

The Greek party system, according to Pappas (2003), has displayed continuous transformations from a system featuring significant party fragmentation into another characterized by the high concentration of its political forces: a predominant-party system (from 1952 to 1963), a system of polarized pluralism (between 1963 and 1981), and a two-party system (since 1981). Lyrintzis (1984) argues that the major non-communist Greek parties are exclusively clientelistic and have failed to institutionalize those mechanisms and procedures that would link them to their electorates, elaborate and articulate their programs and hence guarantee their effectiveness and longevity as social and political forces. Party politics since the fall of the military junta have continued to be very dependent on the personalities and policies of party leaders. After the junta, the winner in the political system was the competition between the two major parties, ND and PASOK, representing respectively the center-right and the center-left, both having links with the pre junta regime. The political system was completed with smaller parties including the communist (KKE) and the radical left (SYNASPISMOS). The protection of the state patronage was a weapon of

mass management by the parties, as well as the advantage of obtaining the state machine. As a result, the term populism appeared in the political scene, followed by the terms clientelism ("pelatokratia") and bureaucracy as its main characteristics (Lyrintzis 2011). The main reason, in response to the latter, was the fact that populism replaced meritocracy and was reinforced by PASOK, especially after 1981, transforming the party's clientele into a management mechanism and therefore, a basic structure of the Greek state (Mavrogordatos 1997). Clientelism is a binary system based on individual relationships of dependence and evolved as a synonym for modernity, giving the necessary mechanisms for social actors to acquire the appropriate management resources in the form of pyramid (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). Populism, which prevailed after the regime change, resulted in the creation of political groups (PASOK) with common feature the connection of people having as political strategy key the demagogy. These groups objected to the conservative culture which was neglected. All this resulted in the prevalence of populism. In Greece, the strategic battle of political ideas was expressed mainly by the terms right- antiright and a strategy of the middle pole. Although the main difference was mainly the different explanation and addressing of social and national issues, however, an axis of confrontation was formed which had no other purpose than the control of patronage networks of the state and the provision of any kind of service to "our own people" (Demertzis 1994: 133-134, 191-199).

The process of transition to democracy ("Metapolitefsi") was a major rift between the regime that prevailed after the civil war (1946-1949), with the distinction of the anticommunist and anti-liberal triumvir political power (Crown-Army-Parliament), which undermined the democratic activity. Continuity was evident in both the civilian staff, as well as in culture. The policies of Karamanlis (1974-1980), Rallis (1980-1981) and Papandreou (1981-89) showed an adaptation to contemporary European liberal democracy. This happened because they were strangely mixed with the social structures of clientelism, populism, the charismatic leadership, inefficiency of state structure and new conflicts for labor relations (Featherstone 2006: 6-7). However, Greece mostly due to its negative political status towards any kind of reforms was characterized as a "blocked society" (UNE SOCIETÉ BLOQUÉ) (Featherstone 2005). The large number of conflicting laws is often the result of clientelism and the attempt of providing

facilities to specific social groups in order to ensure re-election (Sotiropoulos 2007, Lyrintzis 2011).

The reforms in public policy and administration are usually achieved at "critical junctures". Greece has already passed three: one on the transition to democracy in 1974 and the government of ND of K. Karamanlis, the second in the change of power between ND and PASOK of A. Papandreou in 1981 and the third at its entry in the EU in 2001. Especially in Greece "of the memorandum" due to which the country has entered a dependent path, Greeks are still searching for the new equilibrium. Accordingly, the latter is a typical example of a "critical juncture". Nevertheless, the two permanent complaints against Greek public administration remain inefficiency and corruption (Ladi 2012). Also, the media are presenting issues several times in order to create misperceptions. This contributes to the creation of a negative image of politics (political inefficiency, frustration, political discontent, etc.) whose dimensions are political apathy, indifference and removal from politics (Demertzis 1994: 217). Lyrintzis (2011) argues that we are confronted with a political crisis with unforeseen effects. More specifically he supports that:

> The parties do not generate a discussion about the future development of Greek society and politics. The lack of a serious debate as well as the lack of a confrontation of ideas and political projects reveal a crisis of the political level and reflect a deep depoliticisation. The combination of the economic and political crisis creates an explosive mixture and provides fertile ground for the well known aphorism that all parties and politicians are the same. The legitimacy of the political system is seriously challenged as a significant part of the population identifies a democratic deficit in the management of the crisis and is confronted with a very bleak and worrying image for the future. Similar situations in the past have nurtured the rise of extreme forces with disastrous results. [..] History shows that in times of economic crisis societies turn their electoral preferences to conservative rather than radical political formations. In any case there is enough evidence to suggest that we are finally close to what can be termed the end of the Metapolitefsi (The term used in Greek for the system that emerged after the restoration of Democracy in 1974). There are clear signs of fatigue of the political forces that dominated the Greek political scene for 35 years. Their practices, decisions and omissions have been registered

in the collective social memory, and it is reasonable to assume that this will be registered at the forthcoming elections. The most probable result will be the end of the era of the autonomous one-party governments and possibly a realignment of the political forces.

Incumbent parties in Southern Europe experienced losses in their electoral support that came along with a series of economic reforms imposed by the EU and the IMF. To this context, voting data from Greece (2000–2012) linked voting behavior with the state of the economy. After the memorandum, Greek voters significantly shifted their assignment of responsibility for (economic) policy outcomes from the EU to the national government, which in turn heightened the impact of objective economic conditions on governing party support (Kosmidis 2013). In addition, the relationship between the economy and voting behavior in Greece for the 2004 and 2009 election years has been examined. As done so in other countries, the Greek electorate seems to be punishing the party in government when economic conditions are worse rather than rewarding it when economic conditions improve. In broad speaking, economic evaluations do have an impact on support for the incumbent, but only when the economy is at its worst and the incumbent has no real chance of winning and should expect support only from its long-time loyal supporters. On the other hand, the opposition might gain from the collapse of the incumbent, but in the long run the new government too will have to face the harsh economic reality. This is what actually happened in Greece after the great victory of PASOK in 2009 which faded almost simultaneously when Greece was forced to turn for financial help to the IMF and to its EU partners (Nezi 2012).

Greece seems to conform to the model of intended Europeanization. The Europeanization process, with its far-reaching consequences, led to the rise of new types of political conflicts and ideological cleavages. To this context, the old ideological conflict between right and left has been replaced by a new pattern of conflict between the Europeanists/modernizers on the one hand and the traditionalists on the other. Moreover, the party system has been forced to lessen its control upon the state and progressively shed the habit of using the latter as a means of promoting electoral objectives through the patronage system. It is claimed that despite the fact that new forms of opaque links have been forged between the state, the leading political parties and some strong private firms (diaplekomena symferonta=interlinked interests),

nevertheless, a clear distinction has been established between the party system and the state system (Ioakimidis 2000). Moreover, it is claimed that in Greece, those who are older, belong to the higher classes and those who are more religious vote more for the right (Lobo and Beck 2012). In addition, in Greece open lists enable voters to express their preference not only among parties but also among candidates. The basic principle is that all voters deserve representation and all political groups deserve to be represented in legislatures in proportion to their strength in the electorate. In order to achieve this 'fair' representation, the country is divided into multi-member districts, each district in turn allocating a certain number of seats. A party presents a random or alphabetically ordered list of candidates and voters are free to choose one or more candidates along with the party. The position of each candidate depends entirely on the number of votes that he/she receives. Each political party presents a list of candidates for each district. On the ballot the voters indicate their preference to a political party by selecting one or more candidates from the list. The number of seats assigned to each party in a district is proportional to the number of votes collected by the party (Chatterjee *et al.* 2013). Finally, the paper supports that Papadopoulos' (1989) speculation came true:

> "Two variables could affect the functioning of the party system and thereby initiate wider changes:
>
> *1. Change internal to the political system:* it is possible that election results in the future could make the formation of one-party governments impossible. This fundamental change would affect the political system in many ways […],
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> *2. Change external to the political system:* After 14 years successively of ND and PASOK governments, there is widespread disenchantment with the poor performance of both parties in office, especially as the dynamics of bipartism led parties to promise 'heaven on earth' and raised expectations unduly. Even charisma is no longer immune from rising mistrust […]".

2.3 FINDINGS: GREECE 2009-2015

2.3.1 EMPIRICAL DATA: OPINIONS WRITTEN IN THE GREEK DAILY PRESS AND THE INTERNET (2015)

It is commonly acknowledged that Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1974, after the junta regime, solved the state problem that had kept Greek people divided for years (Simos). In national elections people are called to decide who and how will govern the country. Parties present their programs and people evaluate them according to their future expectations. But the electoral body is not so innocent and surely does not expect for a total change in its daily life just by a change in the government (Voulgarakis). But the main question remains "who corrupts who?" The politicians corrupt the voters or the other way around? The voters corrupt the politicians and that is the end of this discussion. The gifts of the politicians towards the voters were vanished and this habit was replaced by complain, then anger and finally hate. The electoral body is never wrong. It elects the finest who, by a magical way, after the election betray the innocent voters (Tatsopoulos).

The Greek inferiority feeling was used by SYRIZA with the slogans "dignity". The bankruptcy of the country violently ended a political cycle since 1974, and now parties like ND, PASOK and POTAMI must create a new political body. The clock is ticking (Peglis). Greece is now where Ireland was in 2009 and no party seems capable of creating the necessary enthusiasm so that voters will vote for or against it (Mavros). In 2011, Greeks faced the collapsing of the traditional party system where the only competition was the change between the two big parties in office. The elections of 2012 were a political earthquake, which is rarely found even at the international scene. As a reminder no party gained more than 20% and seven parties entered the parliament. In 2015, one party from the late government vanished and another appeared. SYRIZA reached an impressive 36% in a collapsing system. Today even in Spain no party gains more than 25%. The system is not yet stabilized because it is difficult after such an earthquake. The new is not expressed in the earthquake elections, possibly not in the next ones and hardly in the next incoming. As a result one cannot assume that one goes and one leaves, that happens only in stable systems and ours is not yet one. We are facing maybe a new bipolar system because there appears to be o room for more parties

due to the fan approach that leaves no third choice. The transformation of a political formation will be only a change in the ingredients of an already existing one (Nikolakopoulos and Konstantinidis).

Politics, psychology and economy are strongly connected. In 2009 economy pushed political stability. After 2010 despite of the expectations of people, a psychological chasm was created giving space to uncertainty, anxiety and fear. This had negative effect on economy which by its turn worsened the political stability as fear turned to rage and social reaction (Liargkovas). Social flurries during the economic crisis led to the overthrow of the Greek political architecture (Gianitsis). Similarly, in Europe, the rise of the anti systemic parties Podemos and Ciudadanos was not only as a result of the two party system, but also as a negative answer of the Spanish people towards austerity measures (Gerantoni). Anger and fear are the two sovereign emotions in Greece during the last years that defined the political behaviors and led to the delegitimation of common political matches, as well as allowed the obviation of political divisions. An angry expression of the rejection of the political party system, but also a fear, more or less valid, that the fall of certain social groups will be final. The latter defined the vote of punishment and revenge in the elections of 2012, as well as those of 2015, created an ideological discoloration and allowed the partnership between promiscuous people on the count of for or against the memorandum (Pantazopoulos). The creation of a new party with young educated people is imperative. The ideological differences between political parties are insignificant and populism and demagogy must come to an end (Doumas). Unfortunately, populism once again was the winner over realism in the elections on January 2015, which showed that Greek voters over time prefer utopia (Kourtakis).

Tsipras managed after the elections on January 2015 to incorporate the pervasive emotions of indignation and lack of trust, on behalf of the voters, and to express them through the parliamentary framework. Nevertheless, he wasted his record political capital quickly with the "no reason referendum" and his poor results in governance. As a result, today he is against an anti government people movement that he created by his lack in efficient governance of the country (Papazoglou). The president of ND stated in August 2015: "Tsipras goes to elections in order to escape from his responsibilities. We cannot have elections every week. All

political parties are not the same. It is not worth it to express our anger in the poll booth"
(Meimarakis). Syriza was the only small party between the political systems of the EU that
managed to decompose the structure of the Greek party system and to gain in a small period
of two years the majority of the parliamentary seats. How? In order to gain more voters he
insisted in an anti memorandum conflict of populism with the opposite parties. However, the
political system cannot be healed by targeting anyone with a different opinion and by using
old political school means (Papazoglou: Tsipras ii).

The paradox is that even though SYRIZA is losing its power, at the same time ND cannot
capitalize the government's wear out. Obviously, it is not an attractive solution for the voters.
ND showed symptoms of institutionalization and was interested only in party balance and
personal tactics. The party has been evaluated and sentenced by its voters. It is not only the
society that does not "hear" ND but also the other way around (Mihalelis). Former Minister
D. Bakoyani stated that "we are in front of a political issue. What is the vision of ND
regarding the future of the country? What is our proposal and how can it be reliably
materialized? The answer to these questions will point to the right people as well" (Korai).
Another former Minister, N. Dendias claims that ND is facing an existential risk. Either it
redefines its political speech or it will be completely indifferent to the electoral body. Change
in leadership is not enough without political redefinition. Leadership is the tool for
implementing policies (Zampounis). The former transitional leader of ND, V. Meimarakis
believes that the Greek political system is radically changing and the economic crisis created
new needs. As a result, the parties have to immediately evolve and adjust to the new
circumstances in order to be able to express the new social and political trends. Any political
formation that does not do this effort will disappear (Meimarakis: Newpost.gr)

2.3.2 ELECTION RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Greece today is a liberal democracy. According to section 1, article 1 of the Greek
Constitution "The form of government of Greece is that of a parliamentary republic."
Moreover, in the last six years, Greek people went to the polling booths six times (five for
national elections and one for the referendum in July 2015), whereas normally they should be
now in the middle of their second parliament according to the Greek Constitution section 3,

article 5, where it is stated that national elections take place every four years, unless serious national circumstances demand otherwise (Greek Constitution 2015). In addition, according to chapter 1, Greek political culture is defined as the psychological orientation of the Greek people on political issues, which through fundamental values and historical experiences, forms opinions and gives substance to the political processes. Moreover, it shall integrate as growing within a liberal democracy with deep democratic roots and confidence in participative processes irrespective of the political regime over time.

The paper concentrates on the results of the Greek elections after 2009, because since then the Greek society started "shifting erratically" in political terms. Were the results of the recent elections a response by a populace stunned by the crisis and angry at the most painful – and largely misplaced - fiscal reforms ever? Many Greek political analysts support that they were indeed an outcome of the financial crisis and the neo liberal policies and fiscal reforms that needed to be implemented by the governments in order to exit the economic recession. The paper supports that the last double elections in Greece on May and June 2012 and especially those of January and September 2015, highlighted a new way of reaction from the part of the voters, which also gives a specific message to the political parties and their candidates: Greek consumer-voters used their vote to send old and tired political parties the message that their appeal has waned. They, thus, told the traditional political parties that they need to transform themselves into flexible and innovative organizations or phase their disappearance into a collapsing political system.

As seen in Table 1.2, the Greek political system since 1974 was used to one party government until May 2012, when no party managed to gain self-reliance and Greece was led to repetitive elections one month later, on June 2012. For the first time seven parties, after 35 years, entered the Greek Parliament, two of which newcomer parties, Independent Greeks (ANEL) and Democratic Left (DIMAR) as well as the extreme right party Golden Dawn were elected for the first time. The one and only time until then that the Greek parliament had seven parties was in 1977, in a period after the junta regime with high political instability due to the memories of the past. It was shortly after the referendum of 1974, which led to the new Constitution and the change of the Greek regime from Crowned Democracy to Presidential

Democracy, as well as to the first governance of ND with Konstantinos Karamanlis as Prime Minister. After seventeen democratic elections between 1974 and 2015, the Greek state had six self reliant governments of PASOK and five of ND. In between, two all party governments took place in order to bring political stability back in 1989, and a transitional government in 2012 between the first and the second elections. Since June 2012, three governments took place: one with ND (as first party) with PASOK and DIMAR (which left the coalition after one year leaving the two parties in office) and two with SYRIZA (as first party) and ANEL after the double elections that took place on January and September 2015. In September 2015 eight parties entered the parliament, since the Centrist Union of Vassilis Levendis after over twenty five years of unsuccessful attempts to enter the Greek Parliament managed to capture the necessary percentage of 3%. At this point, it should be also stated that although PASOK had a self reliant government in 2009, due to the first memorandum and the political instability that occurred, Prime Minister at the time G. Papandreou resigned, and as a result, a government of bureaucrats took place from November 2011 until May 2012, with Prime Minister the non elected bureaucrat Lucas Papadimos with the parliamentary support of PASOK, ND and LAOS (People's Orthodox Alarm) which politically vanished after that point and never entered the Parliament again. Without a doubt, this was the first sign or a bell ringing for what came next. In addition, another thing that needs to be stated is the fall of the two party system as it was known in Greece. The beginning of the decline started in 2009 where the two first parties had a sum percentage 77, 43% in a historically strong two party system and a five party Parliament. The downfall of the system reached its diminishing point in 2012 with a sum percentage of 35, 69% and a seven party Parliament. After that point, is started to slowly rise again with new correlations in the political scenery, since instead of the two historical parties ND and PASOK now only ND appears, which seems to hold its percentages, and SYRIZA which took the place of PASOK in the center-left after shifting promptly from the radical left to more centrist politics.

Table 1.2
Greek Parties in office

YEAR	PARTIES IN THE PARLIAMENT	% OF THE FIRST TWO PARTIES	ONE PARTY GOVERNMENT	PARTY IN OFFICE
2015B	8	63,55	NO	SYRIZA-ANEL
2015A	7	64,15	NO	SYRIZA-ANEL
2012B	7	56,55	NO	ND-PASOK-DIMAR
2012A	7	35,69	NO	TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
2009	5	77,43	YES	PASOK
2007	5	79,94	YES	ND
2004	4	85,91	YES	ND
2000	4	86,53	YES	PASOK
1996	5	79,61	YES	PASOK
1993	4	86,18	YES	PASOK
1990	6	85,50	YES	ND
1989B	5	86,87	NO	ALL PARTY GOVERNMENT
1989A	5	83,41	NO	ALL PARTY GOVERNMENT
1985	4	86,66	YES	PASOK
1981	3	83,94	YES	PASOK
1977	7	67,18	YES	ND
1974	4	74,19	YES	ND

Source: Greek Parliament (www.hellenicparliament.gr)

Also, as seen in table 2.2, the socialist party PASOK reached a historical low of 13.18% on May 2012 and 12.28% on June from a peak of 43.92% and a strong self-reliance government after the elections of 2009. The conservative party ND received 18.85% and 29.66% respectively from 33.47% on 2009 as outgoing government. The right party LAOS which

entered the Parliament for the first time in 2007 and saw the rise of its percentages in 2009, vanished after the entrance in the coalition of the government of Papadimos, mostly due to its political shift towards the memorandum. Also, in 2012 the newcomer left party DIMAR gained 6.11% and 6.25%. The big surprise was the left party SYRIZA which came second on both elections on 2012 and gained 16.78% and 26.89% respectively from a poor 4.6% on 2009. Finally, under the fear of political instability, a coalition government took place between –the first place party- ND, the third PASOK and the sixth DIMAR. Today, after the elections on January and September 2015, SYRIZA and ANEL formed a coalition government after gaining 36.34% and 35.46% as well as 4.75% and 3.69% respectively. ND reached a 27.81% and saw a small rise in September with 28.09% mostly due to the wear of the January's government. Newcomer party POTAMI reached a promising 6.05% in January but faced a collapse of 2% in September due to its unstructured political speech. Golden Dawn had a steady 6.28% and 6.99%, as well as KKE with 5.47% and 5.55% respectively. Furthermore, DIMAR did not manage to enter the Greek Parliament in January 2015, as it did not gain the limit of 3%, mostly due to its wear from the participation in the 2012 coalition. Finally, PASOK after having reached an historical low of 4.68% went in a coalition with what was left of DIMAR and saw a rise of almost 2% in September (Greek Elections 2015).

Table 2.2
Greek Elections results

YEAR	TOTAL VOTERS	SYRIZA %	ND %	GOLDEN DAWN %	POTAMI %	KKE %	ANEL %	PASOK %	CENTRIST UNION %	DIMAR %	LAOS %
2015B	5.567.930	35,46	28,09	6,99	4,09	5,55	3,69	6,29	3,44	-	-
2015A	5.648.185	36,34	27,81	6,28	6,05	5,47	4,75	4,68		-	-
2012B	5.787.223	26,89	29,66	6,92	-	4,5	7,51	12,28	-	6,25	-
2012A	5.122.292	16,79	18,85	6,97	-	8,48	10,62	13,18	-	6,11	-
2009	6.490.080	4,59	33,49	-	-	7,53	-	43,94	-	-	5,62
2007	6.938.918	5,04	41,84	-	-	8,15	-	38,10	-	-	3,80

Source: Ministry of Interior (www.ypes.gr)

ND and PASOK suffered great losses, mostly because voters perceived them as anxious to hold on to the privileges of office. POTAMI, a political formation of only a few months, blatantly devoid of ideology and led by the TV persona, Stavros Theodorakis managed to capture the attention, and get the votes, of the disenchanted but still willing to participate in the political process. SYRIZA, the party led by the boy next door, managed to offer a clear value proposition: an opportunity to express ones' anger not as revenge, as ANEL, KKE and the Golden Dawn did, but through hope for a change *of* – not just *within* – Europe. Almost all political parties and candidates lacked standard political structure and speech according to their ideological past. Katsikas (2012) claims that this outcome left no doubts about the grave mishandling of the economic crisis, but the most important cause of this failure is the absence of political leadership at both the national and European levels. He suggests that a solution to the Greek crisis will not be found unless Greek and European politicians overcome the constraints of national political calculations and exercise leadership commensurate to the challenge of rescuing Greece and indeed the eurozone itself. On the other hand, while many analysts foresee the collapse of the Greek system, however, in 2002 the British party system was under challenge and a fundamental realignment was thought to be close but the system was if nothing resilient and the two parties remained the fundamental features (Russel 2004).

Surprisingly, Greek voters changed opinion even between the first and the second elections and their vote was totally changeable according to what made them happier at the time and to what campaign communicated better the message that people would easier adapt. Greek political analysts have recently turned to marketing methods and, as a result, study in their polls age, gender, income and education criteria, as well as the causes of the turnout voters. According to Flickinger and Studlar (1992) institutional factors include electoral law, the frequency and competitiveness of elections, as well as the complexity of governing coalitions. Socio-economic and demographic characteristics thought to be significant include age, education, income, occupation and - decreasingly - gender. Also, a combination of political and media dynamics have created a situation whereby electronic media, principally television, have become central to contemporary political communication in Greece (Papathanassopoulos 2000). Persson (2013) raises the issue that while education is positively correlated with voter turnout at the individual level, the increased educational levels in most western countries have

not caused increased voter turnout at the aggregate level. The results show that relative education has a much larger effect on voter turnout than absolute education. Moreover, relative education has a stronger effect when aggregate turnout is low. The relationship between education and voter turnout is a major puzzle in political behavior research. Rosimannus (1995) in "The Two Levels of a Multi-Party System" demonstrated that a voter-centered approach seeks to answer questions about the prestige of parties and society is ready to trust the parties with representing its political interests. Additionally, in "On Party Identification" he portrayed the strength of the ties between parties and the public, or the so-called party loyalty indicator.

On the other hand, the Greeks voted in anger and anxiety, by forgetting their ideological sign, their class consciousness and their family tradition, predominately being worried about their personal future outcomes. More specifically, it seems as if they consider all political parties as damaged goods that have been consumed enough times with unsatisfying results from the part of the customers/voters, who are finally and desperately willing to trust any new product/party. Scullion (2010) believes that, in the life experiences of individuals, we find a messy interface between politics and consumption, where, often unintentionally, we take on citizenly roles and have civic experiences in market spaces as consumers. The latter illustrates a merging of consumption and politics in the everyday lives of individuals, positing that the accidental citizen can act as a catalyst for further political action, and as such, is an important concept with widespread consequences for the discipline of political marketing. Garry (2013) claims that there is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behavior and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions anger and anxiety. Anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Dalton and Weldon (2005) demonstrate that sentiments are broadly negative, that this pessimism has deepened over the past generation and also how the distrust of parties decreases voting turnout, contributes to the fragmentation of contemporary party systems and the electoral base of new protest parties, and stimulates broader cynicism towards government. Also, Costello *et al.* (2012) examine policy congruence between voters and candidates. First, they demonstrate that policy preferences of candidates and voters are

constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, they show that the quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions. Finally, they establish that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation. Önnudóttir (2013) demonstrates that where there are higher proportions of trustees within parties, there is a greater degree of policy congruence, whereas a higher proportion of partisans results in less policy congruence. The proportion of delegates has no significant impact on congruence after taking account of other party and country measures. This indicates that party constraints on representatives are applied at the cost of congruence with voters, and that when representatives enjoy more flexibility to follow their own opinions, the party displays greater congruence with its own voters.

Newcomer parties, ANEL and DIMAR, can also be considered as a surprise. The latter positioned itself as the ruling left party and entered the government coalition in 2012, but after a year exited due to political disputes and vanished in the forthcoming elections of 2015; as so did LAOS after entering the coalition in 2011. It seems that small parties entering a coalition tend to lose their political orientation and as a result their percentages are absorbed from the large parties. Trechsel and Mair (2011) frame and describe a novel method of political party positioning within the European Union and beyond. The EU Profiler project, a large-scale, interdisciplinary, and pan-European research endeavor, takes a step beyond the conventional approaches by including party self-positioning and by using internet-based information technology to offer full documentation of the positions that are identified. Bolleyer *et al.* (2012) demonstrate that new parties generally benefit organisationally from supporting or entering a government coalition. Compared to established parties, new parties have the advantage that their leadership is more able to allocate effectively the spoils of office, and can change still malleable rudimentary party structures so as to respond to intraorganisational demands, as well as the functional demands of holding office. ANEL on the other hand, positioned itself as an anti-memorandum party, which was created by the convergence of heterogeneous, in ideological terms, people. Its campaign power was the dominant position of its leader P. Kammenos, in the use of social media and mostly Facebook. Hollebeeka *et al.*

(2014) by developing and validating a Consumer Brand Engagement scale in specific social media settings, conceptualize CBE as a consumer's positively valenced brand-related cognitive, emotional and behavioral activity during or related to focal consumer/brand interactions.

Nevertheless, the big surprise in the Greek elections was the left party SYRIZA with a rapid rise of its percentages. Was this outcome the result of a successful campaign? Kotler *et al.* (2009: 431) support that brand names associated with their products or services are the most valuable assets in creating, maintaining and strengthening a brand. Also, from a marketing management perspective there are three main challenges to creating and managing brand identities: (i) the initial choices for the brand elements making up the brand, (ii) all accompanying activities must support the brand, and (iii) other associations indirectly transferred to the brand by linking it to some other entity. Eventually, SYRIZA was the winner in that field, acknowledged by all Greek political analysts, by using smart logos and slogans during the campaign. In addition, the left party positioned itself as the leader of the Greek youth (claiming that it is the right time for the revolution of this generation) and used the MP Manolis Glezos (symbol of the Greek resistance in World War II) as a symbol of that cause. Tynan *et al.* (2010) state that customers and suppliers co-create value as a result of a shift from a firm (and product) centric view of value creation to one that focuses on personalized brand experiences. Furthermore, Reeves (2013) defines local political marketing as marketing related strategy, activities, and tactics implemented by a political party in a local geographic constituency, in order to attempt to maximize aggregate potential voter satisfaction and therefore maximize total number of votes.

2.4 DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

There appears to be an osmosis relationship between politicians and voters, since policies these days are implied according to the pressures of society. The behavior of the citizens reshapes and defines the policies. Today, the theoretically open participation of all, with equal rights and opportunities substantially contributes to a more consuming dimension of the election procedure (slogans, mob rule, syntechnies, and promises). At the same time, the devaluing of general targets-aims regarding national causes, collectives, visions and missions

is foreseen. It is commonly argued, that citizens activate public management. In national elections, citizens are called to decide as to whom and in what way will govern their country. Political parties present their programs and people evaluate them according to their beliefs on the historical presence of the parties, as well as their expectations for the future. Moreover, all parties tend to replace their organizational schemes with social media. Social movements nowadays rise through social media. There are no ideological or party characteristics and there also appears to be variability in voting behavior looking much alike consuming behavior. Furthermore, the rise of extreme right parties due to poverty, unemployment, sovereignty of the elites and globalization, is found countries of Western Europe (Bulgaria, Austria, Sweden, and France) as well as in Greece. This trend works in parallel with the rise of euroskeptism, mostly in Britain and Italy, with mutual starting point the controversy over the European vision of the multinationals. According to the latter, there also appear trends of secession from the European community (Ireland and Spain).

Lately, many governments in Greece due to the economic crisis and the financial data of the country encounter problems regarding their promises during the election campaigns and the policies they are called to impose. At the same time, many members of the parliament (MPs) fail to adapt to the obligations of the government at the European level since they are called to implement policies that they are clearly disagree upon belief. Does the electorate body not know all this and has no responsibility? Of course it knows, but in circumstances of emergency people reach out for a leader regardless if at the same time he has lied in order to despoil their vote. It is often said that there is no dead end in democracy and the only solution remains the recording of popular verdict through elections. Furthermore, it is often said that Greeks vote against rather than for a party, so the easy reading of the 2015 vote and the win of SYRIZA, for the first time in Greek political history, is to attribute it to anger and dismiss it as situational. This, however, is only part of the picture. Throughout the short campaign period, political speech was unstructured; slogans were largely devoid of ideological proclamations; candidates shed their past loyalties and attached themselves to formations they had previously fiercely fought against; parties redefined themselves as in favor (PASOK, ND, POTAMI) or against (SYRIZA, ANEL, KKE, Golden Dawn) the 'memorandum'. In this context, it is not really surprising that voters behaved as consumers in a market crowded by

largely undifferentiated but heavily branded goods; a market in which promotion, distribution and packaging outshine product (ideology) and price (policy and other promises). Greek consumers/voters used their vote to send old and tired political parties the message that their appeal has waned. They thus told the traditional political parties that they need to transform themselves into flexible and innovative organizations or phase their disappearance into a collapsing political system. ND and PASOK suffered great losses, mostly because voters perceived them as anxious to hold on to the privileges of office. POTAMI, a political formation of only a few months, blatantly devoid of ideology and led by the TV persona, Stavros Theodorakis managed to capture the attention, and get the votes, of the disenchanted but still willing to participate in the political process. SYRIZA, the party led by the boy next door, managed to offer a clear value proposition: an opportunity to express ones' anger not as revenge, as ANEL, KKE and the Golden Dawn did, but through hope for a change of – not just within – Europe.

What we see is party politics turning to consumer markets governed by the life experiences of individuals. The size of the political market remains constant but the market shares are being redistributed by consumers' willingness to try anything that is new and looks fresh. Individualistic consumers reject the mass produced messages of political parties they see as damaged goods and focus on their personal future outcomes. Political parties of the 21st century are corporations in a market; ideologies are their product and policies are the rice of the goods; candidates are their executives and voters are their customers who buy with their vote. Greek voters responded positively to SYRIZA's well-planned and masterfully executed campaign that used a memorable logo, the easy to digest slogan of a temperate youth revolution and symbols of a glorious national past, such as Manolis Glezos the Nazi resistance fighter. Panos Kammenos, leader of ANEL, an anti-memorandum party created by ideologically heterogeneous, people, was also rewarded for his consistent Social Media presence and clever attack-the-leader advertisements. The parties that understood elections as markets and their campaigns as marketing tools increased their market shares. They promised "heaven on earth" and raised the expectations of previously bored and worn out voters to new heights, never experienced before by the voters of their leaders' generation. They also attracted the votes of older people by reminding them the exhilaration of elections of the

1970's and 80's. But as all good marketers know, a trial purchase does not guarantee repurchase and customer loyalty requires more than charisma and skillful manipulation of consumers' boredom with, anger against and mistrust of competitors.

The paper concludes that the Greek political system is radically changing. Political parties, mostly due to the end of clientelism and the reduced state funds, are forced to transform into organizations and therefore redefine their structure. The main issue remains on who will define the policies, the party or the voters, assuming that ideological orientations seem to have disappeared. The vote itself has transformed into a consuming good in a new "political market". A transformation in the Greek political culture is implemented and thereby voting is no longer predictable according to party loyalty. In Figure 2.1 we are introduced to the paper's approach regarding the transformation of the Greek political parties, as a political marketing approach inspired by Grönroos' triangle. The political party improves its internal marketing in terms of constantly developing its policies. At the same time, the party aims at a better understanding of these policies by the candidates in order to communicate them to their voters. On the other hand it improves its external marketing by keeping the promises given to the voters regarding better policies for society. The bilateral interaction between candidates and voters –giving and keeping promises as an exchange for the vote- is thought to be more direct and more efficient in producing pressure towards the leadership of the party. Therefore, the paper supports that a theory of marketing-oriented voter behavior is considered necessary for the improvement of our society.

The apothegm *"Το φυλάξαι τα αγαθά χαλεπώτερον του κτήσασθαι"* (to keep goods is harder than acquiring them) is attributed to the statesman and orator Demosthenes of ancient Athens. Maybe the modern statesmen of Athens should keep it in mind. Especially because, as all good marketers know, customer loyalty depends on consistently providing customer satisfaction - what remains after the campaign noise has died down and the correctly priced product has met – if not exceeded - expectations. Greek political parties are facing a great challenge in their post junta history. Either they transform into effective political organizations regaining their status and glory in society, or they can keep declining until they vanish whenever the voters decide to do so.

Figure 2.1
The transformation of the Greek political parties.

The fact that the author of the paper only interprets the findings of the literature review and extracts conclusions for the Greek political parties could be referred as common bias. Also, another limitation of the research is that the literature review focuses mostly in marketing oriented behavioral intention, so any future voting outcomes might lead to different conclusions. Moreover, it is concentrated in the extraction of results only in the Greek elections of the last six years, when from a period of well being since from the Olympic games of 2004, a whole society was shifted promptly to the era of the economic crisis from 2009 until today. According to the latter, the results may suffer from a lack of generalizability when other elections are considered. However, the fact that there is not enough literature review on the Greek political system could constitute a pedestal for future research in the specific field and furthermore, future elections in different countries /cultures could be studied towards that direction.

2.5 RESUME

Greek political analysts support that the results of the elections were an outcome of the financial crisis and the neo liberal policies and fiscal reforms that needed to be implemented by the governments in order to exit the economic recession. The paper supports that the last

elections in Greece highlighted a new way of reaction from the part of the voters, which also gives a specific message to the political parties and their candidates: the vote itself has been transformed from an "ideological tool" into a consuming good and political parties, now, need to transform into organizations in order to gain more flexibility inside the collapsing political system. Political speech was unstructured, ideological barriers have disappeared, candidates were confused and voters behaved at will. The vote itself has also transformed into a "revenge tool" and even though the "political market" remains the same in size, nevertheless the consumers/voters are now more easily willing to trust anything new.

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