



**UNIVERSITY OF PELOPONNESE
FACULTY OF HUMAN MOVEMENT AND
QUALITY OF LIFE SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF SPORTS ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT**

MASTER'S THESIS

**“OLYMPIC STUDIES, OLYMPIC EDUCATION, ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT OF OLYMPIC EVENTS”**

Honored

Security threats to the Olympic Games

Felix M Lechner

Supervisor: Kristin Toohey
Professor

Sparta, **December, 2014**



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ABSTRACT

Security at international mega events like the Olympic Games is an up to date topic in the media. For this reason this thesis looks at security threats at Olympic Events. The introductory literature research shows that not much research has been done on the topic in the last millennium. Only recently the interest of scholars in the topic rose rapidly, especially also after events like 9/11. Most of the publications are also made in direct context to specific Games and events, only little about security at the Olympics or at mega events in general.

This work is first defining security threats to Olympic Games to than do a historical literature review and a review on potential risks developed in context of similar events with a hermeneutic approach. By this an overview on security threats to Olympic Games in past and present and a non-exhaustive overview on potential security threats to events in future is presented.

After this four groups, the Games Family, the Organising Committee, Spectators and Host City / Country, are developed to describe the potential threatened parties. Possible threats are than grouped by their origin in security threats by constructions and environment, security threat emerging out of situations and intentional created security threats. In a last step of analysis possible causes for the formation of security threats within the three groups are described.

The paper concludes that Olympic Games have a high potential for security threats, also due to the nature of the Olympic Movement. But also in other events security is a key part of planning and implementing events. This paper is just a scratch on the surface of security as the whole topic is very complex.

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A. INTRODUCTION

"The Sochi Olympic Games should be a demonstration of unity in diversity and of remarkable athletic achievements – not a platform for politics or division. This is even more important after the cowardly terrorist attacks in Russia which we utterly condemn. Terrorism must never triumph. We trust that the Russian authorities will deliver safe and secure Olympic Winter Games for all athletes and all participants."
Thomas Bach, President of the International Olympic Committee, promotes true Olympic values in his New Year's Message following two terrorist attacks on the Russian city of Volgograd. (insidethegames, 2014)

Terrorist attacks in Russia only a few weeks before the start of the Olympic Games once again started a discussion on security issues of the Olympic Games. While Thomas Bach calls for Olympic values in his New Year's Message, US experts voiced new security concerns and questioned Russian authorities' capability of delivering secure games for athletes and other attendees (comp. Grobe, 2014). And the world is watching while the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi start. Security experts from all over the world look at the small city of only 350.000 inhabitants. Russian authorities in the meanwhile do everything to ensure secure games, for example more than 40.000 troops and police officers are in the city. To not hurt the atmosphere of the Games and make people feeling like imprisoned they are wearing purple uniforms, similar to those of the Games Organizers. (comp. Whiteside, 2014)

The discussions on security topics of international mega-sporting-events like the Olympics are nothing new those days. Only two years earlier when the Summer Olympic Games in London took place in 2012 one could read about numerous security measures in place for the games. A *"major Olympics security exercise"* was it named by an article in April 2012 with *"the Met and 10 other police forces, as well as thousands of troops and security staff"* playing their part to keep the Games safe (BBC,

2012). The concerns became even worse when it turned out that the contracted security company G4S wouldn't be able to deliver the planned staff and the government saw themselves forced to bring more than 5,000 additional troops to secure the games and their surroundings (comp. Parsons, 2012). And also before London security measures and threats have been an issue within the Organization of Olympic Games. "*We had such a high threat scenario in the Winter Games 12 years ago in Salt Lake City just after 9/11*" mentions for example Thomas Bach (Whiteside, 2014).

Discussion and concerns on security are not only a reaction on actual security breaches but mainly based on threats. A total of 82 bomb threats, including a hoax bomb threat during opening ceremony were recorded in Athens Olympic Games 2004. More than 600 cases of 'suspicious packages' were recorded in Salt Lake City Olympic Games 2002. And another of many examples is also the hoax bomb threats to the Olympic Games in Nagano in 1998. (Fussey, pp. 239–241) To analyse those threats and assess if such a threat is a real risk or just the attempt to catch attention during an international event watched all over the world or even something less like a bad joke is the difficult task of the organizers.

Security is not just an issue for and in the media. It also not only threats put out by known and unknown individuals or groups. That there are real security threats within sporting mega events and especially the Olympic Games is a sad fact known from history; At the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 Palestine terrorist group 'Black September' attacked the Olympic village and took 11 Israeli athletes and officials as hostages. The hostages and a police officer got murdered later that day. Two dead and 110 insured people were the result of a bomb attack in the Olympic Centennial Park at the Atlanta Olympic Games 1996. Also other international events became the aim of attacks, such as at the Boston Marathon in 2013 where two Islamic terrorists bombed

spectators and runners. (Toohey & Veal, 2007, pp. 107–109; Russell, 2013, p. vii; Fussey, pp. 239–241)

It's not only terrorist motivated actions that threaten organizers, athletes, spectators and all other people involved in mega events. Only seven months before the opening ceremony of the FIFA football world cup a headline shocked people all over the world: "*World Cup soccer stadium collapse kills 2 in Brazil*" (The Associated Press, 2013). As it turned out a construction crane collapsed and fell into the almost finished Arena Corinthians in Sao Paulo, which later hosted the opening game of the football world championship. The collapse of this between \$200 and \$360 million stadium was not the first incident during the preparation of the world champion ship in Brazil as well as the Olympic Games taking place in 2016 in Rio. A part of the roof collapsed from the weight of water at Salvador's stadium. Another stadium, which will host track and field in Rio during the Olympic Games, was closed down several months in fear of the roof collapsing and a further worker died at the new Palmeiras stadium earlier that year. Also it was not the first time of construction problems in Brazil, the 2007 built Engenhao Stadium in Rio had to be closed down after engineers warned that the roof was in danger of collapse. (Barlow, 2013; The Associated Press, 2013) Not necessarily a threat to the life of people but nevertheless a big issue within the media has also been construction problems in Sochi where the 2014 Winter Olympic Games took place. When the Games kicked off at February the 7th the media, especially the social media, were full of reports from problems athletes and journalists had when they arrived to Sochi. The twitter hashtag #SochiProblems was created and more than 219,000 people followed the twitter account @SochiProblems already on the opening day. Many published pictures and videos of unfinished hotel rooms, undrinkable tap water and final constructions from the Olympic city can be found in the media. (Villapaz, 2014) The

Washington Post even published “*15 signs that Russia is not very ready for the Olympics*” only two days before the opening ceremony. (Dewey, 2014) Although there have been construction delays in earlier games, for example at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens and even in London work was only finished days before the start of the Games, the bad press was never that much. It threatened the successful delivery of Olympic Games in Russia.

As long as nobody got insured or even killed bad press is a threat to a sporting mega event, which can be overcome – as also seen in Sochi where over all very successful Games were delivered. The case gets worse when people get harmed. In 1999 five people got killed and at least 39 insured some of them seriously, in the Bergisel stadium in Innsbruck. The stadium was built for the Olympic Games in Innsbruck in 1964 as a ski jumping stadium. Beside this many other events were held in the traditional Bergisel stadium with a spectacular view over the city of Innsbruck. One of those events taking place annually in the stadium was the Air & Style. On this Saturday the 4th of December it ended in a tragedy when the 40,000 spectators tried to leave the stadium after the snowboard event. A mass panic started in which victims got harmed, as the media reported the next day. (Spiegel Online, 1999) In 2013 the case was investigated again by a team from the university hospital for anaesthesia and intensive care Innsbruck. The authors conclude that not a mass panic but compaction of spectators combined with darkness, declivity and the design of the stadium led to the accident. They conclude further that in the future it will not be possible to exclude such accidents in connection with the gathering of people but that the chance and the impact could be held within a minimum if planning starts early, enough resources are provided, all parties work together and are aware of their responsibility. (Wagner, Fälker, & Wenzel, 2013)

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Searching on the topic security threats to Olympic Games one can find a small number of books, which are published, mainly within the last few years. One of the first publications was *“The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective”* (Toohey & Veal, 2007). First published in 2000 and edited in 2007 this book was an outcome of a high amount of researches on the Olympic Games after Sydney was chosen as the host city for the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in 2000. As the title already says, the research presented in the book looks at the Olympic Games from all possible directions of social sciences. In the chapter on Politics, Nationalism and the Olympic Movement there can be also found a subchapter on Political demonstrations, terrorism and security at the Games. Within this chapter it is shown that the Olympic Games were used by *“individuals with no affiliation to the Olympics to draw attention to issues unrelated to the Olympic Movement”* (Toohey & Veal, 2007, p. 106), already as early as the Opening Ceremony in 1952 in Helsinki but even more since the Games are more and more available to the whole world via television. Amongst relatively harmless incidents there are found less innocent incidents which are also described in the chapter together with their impact on the following Games. In the Sydney Games in 2000 an Olympic Intelligence Centre was introduced as an answer to the sophisticated Olympic security issues resulting from terrorism and other violence at previous Olympic Games. But also terrorist attacks not related to the Olympic Games at all are influencing organizing sporting events. The attacks in the USA at September 11th in 2001 (9/11) were the reason for numerous additional security measures at Salt Lake City Winter Games 2002 and were also named as a reason for low spectator numbers at the Athens Olympic Games in 2004.

Short before the latest issue of the Olympic Summer Games in London in 2012 a book with the subtitle “*Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond*” was published: “*Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City*” (Fussey, 2011). Already the introduction discusses the aspirations of the Modern Olympic Movement that extend beyond sport. By promoting values beyond the sports, such as the Olympic values or the Olympic Truce, combined with the rituals within the Olympic Games one can indeed look at the Olympic Movement as a “*twentieth-century religion*” with an “*universal appeal*” (cited in Fussey, 2011, p. 1) as proclaimed by Avery Brundage, president of the IOC from 1952 to 1972. Furthermore the association of the Olympics with non-sporting attempts like improving trade or demonstrate political power leads to the author’s question:

“to what extent, and via what policies, is an event like the Olympics worth hosting and protecting? And in what policing/security milieu should the event be performed?” (Fussey, 2011, p. 2)

Hosting the Olympic Games especially after previous attacks like Atlanta 1996 or events like 9/11 produces high costs for securing the Games – according to the author not only financial costs. In the book they analyze the impact of the London Games and their security operations on East London. In a first part the hosting of 2012 is set in a context, in a second part supplying 2012 security is described and analyzed from several points of view. In the conclusion it is pointed out that terrorist threats have been part of planning Olympic Games since Munich 1972. 9/11, the Madrid train bombings and the bombings at July 7th in central London, only 20 hours after awarding the Games of the XXXth Olympiad to London, as well as a number of recent attacks have connected hosting mega-events and the fear of violence. For this reason security planning will play a crucial role within organizing Olympic Events for years to come. Further tasks for

security will also be to create international security standards in hosting cities and develop plans to handle issues like Rio's high murder rate and the fear of robberies against tourists.

A view more books on Terrorism can be found, either in direct connection to the Olympic Games such as *"Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future"* (Fussey) – Peter Fussey is one of the authors here again – or also on terrorism in general and relating to the Olympic Games such as *"A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned"* (Haberfeld & Hassell, 2009). Of course searching for security threats to Olympic Games also supplies work which is influenced by actual attacks, such as the David Clay Large's book on the Olympic Games of 1972 named *"Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror and Triumph at the Olympic Games"* (2012).

A collection of papers on *"Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events"* (Bennett & Haggerty, 2011) show that a high standard of security, including big numbers of forces and police, is now common in host countries of a World Cup, Olympic Games, the Expo the G8 or G20 summit or any other mega-event.

"Elsewhere we have witnessed: increased use of video-surveillance at prominent and vulnerable sites; uses of secure perimeter fencing; criminal background checks for employees, volunteers and athletes; vehicle monitoring; the use of radio-frequency identification devices (RFIDs) on passes and tickets; biometric identification measures; satellite monitoring; the designation of special "fan zones" for collective viewing of events; the regulation of protest and dissent; overhead unmanned aerial vehicles; mobile fingerprinting identification systems; and enhanced controls at land, sea and air borders." (Bennett & Haggerty, 2011, p. 2)

It is pointed out that while any event is to some extent unique it is also always a process of learning and passing on lessons about security. Organizations as the IOC are the brokers of this knowledge and each event must improve further by the lessons learned. Although one might conclude that these efforts could thwart any serious incident, this seems to be not the case. The global media attention on these kind of events serve terrorists purposes even if they attack a softer target such as less defended periphery of the event. The papers in this book deal with security and surveillance, two concepts having generated diverse literatures and are tending to mean different things in academic and public media discourses. Surveillance has become a routine and necessary component of security initiatives. In the same moment it raises concerns of rendering our lives more transparent.

The Olympic Games described as “*the world largest security operations outside of war*” by authorities and critics can be found in Philip Boyle’s article “*Securing the Olympic Games: Exemplifications of Global Governance*” within “*The Palgrave Handbook of Olympic Studies*” (Lenskyj & Wagg, pp. 394–407). He points out that only little critical scholarship on policing and security has been done compared to other aspects of the Games although the budgets for security grow exponential, especially after previous attacks, for example \$180 million in Sydney 2000, and after 9/11, Athens 2004 have spent estimated \$1.5 billion on security. This slight interest in security of the Games is changing though by a range of scholars expressing interested in the security issues of events after 9/11.

A similar observation can be made by looking at research papers and articles. A number of case studies on security at Olympic Games are published; in “*Safety and Security at Special Events: The Case of the Salt Lake City Olympic Games*” (Decker et al., 2005) a team of researchers with wide-ranging access to material related to the security

operations at the Winter Olympic Games 2002 describes the challenges of establishing a temporary security organization on large scale events which offer the potential for considerable threats to public safety. To do so they focus on the specific areas: changing definitions of safety and security during the Games, the development and maintenance of organizational structures and interaction and lessons learned for other large-scale events. About a year before the 2010 Winter Games "*Olympic Security: Assessing the Risk of Terrorism at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games*" (Zekulin, 2009) was published in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. This paper identifies three specific challenges which previous Olympic security planners have faced – logistical challenges, inter-agency cooperation and dependence on volunteers – and examines them in the special context of the Vancouver Olympic Games. The outcome is that security at the Olympic Games is affected by challenges of Olympic Security planning generally as well as specific issues of the host city Vancouver. It also suggests that a terrorist attack appears unlikely while other disruptions such as from domestic groups remain possible. Greece facing an outstanding challenge by having the task to deliver secure Olympic Games 2004 in a small planet where everything that happens concerns and affects everyone of us is the topic in "*Security for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games*" (Floridis, 2004).

And even papers which have not mentioned certain games on which they are relating are written and published in context of specific Games. "Securing the Olympic Games: A Model of International Cooperation to Confront New Threats" (Voulgarakis, 2005) for example is a self-congratulation of the minister for the secure organization of the Olympic Games in Athens 2004 in which the Greeks effort, to deliver secure games as first hosts of Summer Olympic Games after 9/11, is praised. "*Olympic Security Collaboration*" (Thomson, 2008) points out the increased threats to security as a risk

brought in by the chance for China hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. The international spotlight on Olympic Games is mainly the source of this increased security risk as it makes the Games a high-profile target for both local and international terrorist and activists.

Searching more generally on security at major events it turns out that also in these researches not related directly to the Olympics the research on security aspects are linked to an exemplary event. Changed expectations and increased costs made event organizers changing their structures after 9/11 to realize events with appropriate security. Aggravating is the fact that effective security measures must be taken while in the same time the enjoyment of spectators should not be adversely affected as investigated on the example of 2004 Rugby World Cup in "*Impacts of Terrorism-Related Safety and Security Measures at a Major Sport Event*" (Taylor & Toohey, 2005). More general relating on security at sport mega events is the paper "*Security Governance and Sport Mega-events: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda*" (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010). Increasing security issues after 9/11 are also here the trigger to argue for a synthetic theoretical framework for researches within security governance at sport mega events.

All these papers are published post 9/11 which underlines Boyle's observation of a higher interest in security issues of sporting mega events, especially the Olympics in the 21st century. The reasons for the new and growing interest may vary or even be a combination between actual attacks that happened around the beginning of the new millennium, a smaller world in the terms of the possibility to transfer pictures and messages to all edges of the globe within seconds and international stages the world is looking at like the Olympic Games are. Anyhow the growing interest as well as more and more growing budgets for security operations and the media reporting on security

issues show how important security at mega events, especially sporting mega events became.

Another interesting fact shows up looking at some recent publications on security at mega events. In the last few years it is not only about how to secure the events anymore but another factor gains more and more significance: surveillance. "*Watched by the Games: Surveillance and security at the Olympics*" (Sugden, 2012) describes the necessity of security operations and surveillance to ensure the safety of London 2012 Olympic Games, considering the Olympic Games as ideological and symbolized event based on Western, liberal and democratic values and as such for individuals not sharing these values a "*mouth-watering target*" for disruption, violence and terroristic actions. These security and surveillance measures have impacts on the host city, as the conclusion shows, especially in terms of civil liberties. Boyle and Haggerty, two scholars from the University of Alberta which were already mentioned above, also create a direct link between 'spectacle' and 'surveillance' in their paper "*Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex*" (2009) by analyzing mega-events in the context of Foucault's declaration "*our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance*" (cited in Boyle & Haggerty, 2009, p. 1). These articles as well as other publications like the already mentioned book "*Security Games: surveillance and control at mega events*" (Bennett & Haggerty, 2011) show a new and currently growing interest in surveillance, not only as a necessary aspect of securing events but also as a threat to civil rights and privacy.

C. OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

By looking at media reports, papers and books across the time of the Modern Olympic Games one can see as in the Introduction and a first literature review above that there are numerous possible threats to safety and security of anyhow involved persons and goods of mega sporting events like the Olympic Games. Especially in the 21st century after cruel and unexpected attacks like 9/11, the Atlanta bombing or attacks to host cities in the preparation to host the Olympic Games, like happened in London and Sochi, security became a media relevant topic and high expectations are set into delivering secure and safe events. But also before that security breaches have been a topic, earlier attacks like the assassination in Munich 1972 set off investigations and efforts to make the Games more secure. Compared to the concerns existing today about security at Olympic Games the research being done and published and the solutions provided is not sufficient, yet. Potential security breaches are now more than ever a constant threat organizers of all kind of events have to be aware of and prepared for. It also attracts attention that the same scholars show up as publisher, author or co-author in different constellations across the field. The current situation as briefly shown in the literature review has a high demand on further, critical and independent research on the topic generally.

It can also be noticed that the majority of the publications mentioned above are specifically concentrating on an upcoming or just passed event. Nevertheless it turns to look like the possible security threats to different events tend to be similar, although their potential appearance and impact as well as the probability of their occurrence differ depending on place, time, surrounding and many factors more. To define and structure these possible security threats it shall be first defined what security threats to the Olympic Games are and how they can be described. Existing definitions will be

compared and adapted to do so. This shall be followed by determining different kind of security threats by a historical literature review of successful and prevented security breaches as well as an analysis of potential security risks developed by organizers and security-responsible of similar events, and their partners. All this reviews are conducted in an objective hermeneutics approach as described by Oevermann (Brüsemeister, 2008); relevant literature such as scientific and historical books, papers or reports, newspaper and other media articles as well as reports will be reviewed and compared without interpreting them. These data then will be analysed and where adequate interpreted to reach the objectives.

The Objective of this analysis is to provide an overview of security threats to the Olympic Games in the past and the present as well as a non-exhaustive overview on potential future threats to possibly enable responsible organisers of future sport events to take the necessary measures. For all that it has to be said that there will be never a final evaluation of potential security threats, especially of those to sporting events. Also a detailed analysis can only be done in respect to the respective project and its special circumstances, needs and environment. For these reason all outcomes can only be seen as a first step and inspiration for those who are in charge of a risk management in these areas. A permanent adaption to all possible and actual circumstances has to be made in every moment of planning and conducting such projects to try to prevent it from all security breaches and, in case this was not possible, make available all necessary resources and take all measures to reduce the impact of such a breach to a minimum.

D. SECURITY THREATS TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES

1. Definitions

Before being able to collect information on ‘security threats to the Olympic Games’ it is necessary to define what one means by these terms. As already seen in the Introduction and the Literature Review above searching for security threats in combination with Olympic Games provides a wide range of information. No matter how far purpose, method or objective differ, in most cases security in connection with Olympic Games is brought in context to terrorist acts like 9/11 on some point. The question arises if security threats to Olympic Games are potential terrorist attacks? It can be assumed that this is definitely true vice versa – potential attacks are security threats – but there is more than this. To create a common understanding for readers and the author following there will be defined what to understand by ‘security threats’ and also what events are ‘Olympic Games’?

1.1. Security Threats

President Dwight D. Eisenhower once said “*security means taking weapons out of circulation*” (cited in Floridis, 2004, p. 2). Obviously it is not that easy to achieve this goal as well as it is not that easy and not up to date anymore to define security like this. Translating ‘security’ in other languages one finds words like ‘Sicherheit’, ‘sécurité’, ‘sicurezza’, ‘seguridad’, ‘säkerhet’ and ‘bezpieczeństwo’. It turns out to be interesting if one translates the German, French, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and Polish – to name just a few examples – words for ‘security’ back to English. All the named translations translate back to ‘security’ as well as ‘safety’. While those languages got the same word for Safety and Security, the English language differs as can be read in a dictionary:

*safety - “ the state of being safe and protected from danger or harm”
(Hornby, 2000, p. 1128)*

*security – “the activities involved in protecting a country, building or
person against attack, danger, etc.” (Hornby, 2000, p. 1155)*

By these definitions on the one site safety describes the state of a person or good of being protected of any danger or harm. Any danger or harm means not only by an attack or an acute danger but also from any person, thing or situation, also himself, colleagues, working tools and normal day to day processes. To make sure employees are in a safe environment is the task of the employer. Lot of countries have even founded a Health and Safety authority, like for example in Great Britain where the Health and Safety Executive provides “*a new regulatory framework for work place health and safety*”. Their homepage promotes their aim “*to reduce work-related death, injury and ill health.*” (*Health and Safety Executive*)

On the other site security also aims in protecting persons and all kind of goods from danger and harm. Unlike in the previous paragraph from a security point of view only potential harms from attacks and acute dangers are relevant. This mainly includes unforeseeable or unswayable situations.

To provide a safe environment for all persons and goods involved in a project or company it is necessary that all safety and all security measures are taken to prevent any harm from them. In big organizations such as the Olympic Games this responsibility falls, depending of their kind of threat to the general safety, in the tasks of two departments; Operational Health & Safety on the one, Security Operations on the other side (comp. International Olympic Committee, 2013a, p.24). Those who are responsible for these measures have to work close together at any time. This paper will concentrate on the security point of view.

Many efforts have been done to define and redefine ‘security’, although most of them rather redefined the policy agendas and the priority of different issues like human rights, environment, crime, social justice or the traditional concern of external military threats, instead of the concept of security itself. Compared to other terms which are widely defined and explained, the term ‘security’, although frequently used is rarely explicated. As ‘security’ is easily combinable with verbs and adjectives it allows a wide range of possible meanings of security and not one single formula to describe the meaning. This is also true when looking at ‘security’ from the values and threats being secured. (comp. Baldwin, 1997)

By trying to specify the definition and narrow it down to the relevance it is needed for this paper one would start searching for ‘security threats’. A often cited definition would be the following on threats to national security:

“a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” (Ullman, 1983, p. 133)

The author describes this definition as more useful, although certainly not conventional, than thinking of national security in terms of military threats as this thinking would draw away attention of all non-military threats undermining a nation’s system. There again it is obvious that ‘security’, even ‘security threat’ cannot be defined universal but must be defined within the context it is used in. What we should take away from Ullman’s definition is to not draw away attention from possible security threats by concentrating exclusively on terrorist attacks or similar tragic mass killings. Also soft

goods such as quality of life and having the choice are goods which are worth being protected.

For the purpose of this paper a security threat shall be defined as a situation which is threatening in any way the successful protection against harm or endangerment of any person or good being involved in the Olympic Games, including the organizers and their employees and volunteers, sportsmen and officials, spectators, sponsors, residents of the host cities or any other stakeholders and their rights and goods.

1.2. Olympic Games

There are numerous definitions for the Olympic Games. The dictionary for example says:

“The Olympic Games (also the Olympics) [...] an international sports festival held every four years in a different country” (Hornby, 2000, p. 883)

On the contrary to this wide definition the Olympic Charter defines very exact what the Olympic Games are, who has to or is allowed to organise them and how it is allowed to take part under which rules. In general it says:

“1. The Olympic Games are competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries. They bring together the athletes selected by their respective NOCs, whose entries have been accepted by the IOC. They compete under the technical direction of the IFs concerned.

2. The Olympic Games consist of the Games of the Olympiad and the Olympic Winter Games. Only those sports which are practised on snow or ice are considered as winter sports.” (International Olympic Committee, 2013c, p. 21)

Additional to the original Olympic Games of the Modern Times as described in the Olympic charter today the IOC also promotes Youth Olympic Games. Other groups within the Olympic Movement such as the European Olympic Committees (EOC) also organise similar events as for example the European Games, first time held in 2015 in Baku or the European Youth Olympic Festival.

For the purpose of this paper Olympic Games shall be defined as a multisport event with international significance held under the Symbol of the Olympic Rings.

2. Security Threats to Mega Events in History

In Ancient Greece people knew the ‘ekecheiria’, a sacred truce which was an essential feature of presumably all kind of festivals where visitors from other states were expected. The Games in Olympia, which gave their name to the Modern Olympic Games, were one of those festivals. The sacred truce was no everlasting or at least for the time of the festival lasting peace as it is often understood nowadays but it granted free passage for people travelling to the festival. This was essential for athletes and spectators, as due to a lack of political unity the many different Greek states had often conflicts and free travelling was not for granted. But already in Greek antiquity occasional breaches have taken place. There are for example records telling the story of Phrynon who was robbed on his way to Olympia by soldiers. (comp. Beale, 2011, pp. 180–181)

The Ancient Olympic Games have been a religious celebration of human sportsmanship and as such a holy and sacred event for all Greeks, irrespective of which of the Greek states they were belonging to. Also the modern Olympic Movement relies on rituals to create emotions and spiritual attachment, such as the ceremonies as well as the torch relay, it sees itself as a philosophy of life and it promotes values, universal values which apply to any person as it is promoted in the Olympic Charter. Although the IOC sees

part of its role to “*oppose any political or commercial abuse of sports and athletes*”, states that “*any form of discrimination with regard to [...] religion, politics [...] is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement*” and members of the IOC have to take an oath in which they swear “*to keep [themselves] free from any political or commercial influence and from any racial or religious consideration*” (International Olympic Committee, 2013c, pp. 12,17,32-33) many critics and even members of the Olympic Movement see the Olympics as commercialized, promoting the wrong or non-universal values or as a twentieth century church as already cited above. Combined with being a spectacle which is broadcasted in the whole world and with an outstanding media coverage, only during the Games in Beijing 2008 4.3 billion people have been reached via television, internet and mobile devices, which no other event reaches, this makes the Olympic Games to a stage for those who want to send a message around the world. (comp. International Olympic Committee, 2008, pp. 24ff) That this is not only a potential danger and also individuals intending to disrupt the Games for their own purposes is not the online threat to security can be seen from history:

2.1. Black Friday - Munich 1972

In 1972 Munich was hosting the Games of the XXth Olympiad. Under the official motto “The Happy Games” the National Olympic Committee of Germany welcomed sportsmen, spectators and officials from around the world in Munich. But a tragic incident should overshadow The Happy Games. On the 5th of September in the early morning a group of eight armed Palestinians climbed the fence of the Olympic Village, stormed the accommodation of the Israeli team, shot two Israelis in their accommodation and took a further nine hostages. The hostage-takers were members of the Palestinian revolution commando ‘Black September’ and in a first statement they demanded the Federal Republic of Germany to accept to take them with their Israeli

hostages to any place designated by them in three parties on three different planes. Later the group demanded the release of 200 Arabs from the captivity in Israel and the free departure of the Palestine forces and the Israeli hostages from the village. After several hours of attempts of German authorities to free the hostages diplomatically, they came to the agreement that only a forceful liberation offered a chance to free the hostages alive. Therefore it was agreed to take the members of Black September and the hostages to the Airport in Fürstfeldbruck where German police tried to overpower the Palestinian forces and free the hostages. During this attempt all nine hostages, one police officer and five members of Black September were killed, the three remaining members were imprisoned shortly after. (comp. proSport GmbH & Co KG, pp. 32–35)

2.2. Atlanta bombing - 1996

“For seventeen days in the summer of 1996 the world came together in peace and harmony in Atlanta for what became the largest gathering of athletes and nations in Olympic history.” (Peachtree Publishers, 1996, p. V)

But also during the Atlanta Games an attack overshadowed the peaceful and harmonic atmosphere of the event. On the 27th of July a suspicious backpack was found after an anonymous 911 call in the Centennial Olympic Park. While evacuating the area a pipe bomb which was placed in the backpack exploded. A 44 year old woman from Georgia was killed directly from the blast, another person died from a heart attack and 110 people were injured. The Olympic Park had to stay closed for three days to enable investigations, the Games continued though in the meanwhile. Organizers later described the attack as an act of terrorism against Atlanta, the Olympic Family and visitors from all over the world. (comp. Peachtree Publishers, 1996, p. 87)

In 2005 Eric Robert Rudolph, a single individual, pleads guilty to a total of four bombings including the bombing in the Olympic Park in 1996 and releases an 11-pages

statement in which he reveals the legalization of abortion and “*aberrant sexual behaviour*” as his motive for these offenses. Additional to his attacks on two women’s clinics and a lesbian nightclub he regarded the bombing in the Olympic Park as an opportunity to “*shame the United States for the legalization of abortion*”. In the statement he also apologized for the result of this bombing as his attempt has not been to harm innocent civilians. (comp. CNN, 2005)

2.3. Air & Style 1999 – Bergisl

The “Air & Style” is an snowboard jumping event series which took place the first time in 1993 in Innsbruck and from than annually in Innsbruck, up to the incident in 1999 and after this again from 2008 to 2014, as well as in Munich in the years from 2005 to 2008 and in 2011, in Seefeld from 2000 to 2005 and in Beijing from 2010 to 2014. While at the first event in 1993 the organisers only expected a view hundred people more than several thousand showed up. On this basis the event was developed and professionalized. (comp. AIR + STYLE & SHAUN WHITE ENTERPRISES, 2014)

On the 4th of December in 1999 the 7th edition of the Air & Style took place in the Bergisl stadium in Innsbruck. The Bergisl stadium is a ski jumping arena built for the Olympic Games in 1964 and used again for the Olympic Games in 1976. In their declaration of the event on the 4th of December 1999 to the authorities the organizers expected between 40,000 and 45,000 spectators. In a discussion round with the authorities and the emergency forces it was agreed that no measures additional to those in the year before need to be taken as the event in 1998 ran without any incidents. Only view days before the event the leading emergency doctor pushed through to implement three times more paramedics and seven instead of three emergency doctors on sight. The actual amount of spectators was in the end 21,318 – about half of what was approved.

After an incident-free event the spectators started to leave the Bergisl stadium at about 9:35 PM. Most of them tried to exit the stadium at one exit at the west side. The result was a human scrum on the slightly sloping way to this exit in which several people fell. Within the scrum it was not possible to help the people and more and more people fell. Police and other spectators tried to hold back following spectators trying to leave the stadium which was eventually only possible by warning shouts given by the police. The called emergency doctors and paramedics found a total of ten people which needed resuscitation. Four of them died on site, another one of them after arriving to the hospital. The resurrection of the five remaining victims resulted in the return of the spontaneous circulation and they were brought to the hospital. The coroner certified a combination of heart failure and apnoea as a result of thoracic pressure. The whole incident resulted in a red alert for the city of Innsbruck, the county of Innsbruck and an adjacent county with an additional 36 ambulances, about 100 paramedics and four emergency doctor vehicles. 38 injured persons had to be supplied on site. A total of six people died, another four fell in a vegetative state cause of the incident. The number of slightly insured persons is not defined. (comp. Wagner et al., 2013)

The Bergisl stadium was originally designed for up to 60,000 spectators. This was reduced by the authorities to 38,000 later. Thus the actual number of spectators was within the approved capacity. Nevertheless earlier events have shown that the stadium was not suitable for mega events, which later lead to the judgement that the city of Innsbruck should have declined the event and for not having done this have to cover big parts of the 10.7 million Euros compensation. The stadium was redesigned with an additional exit, the total number of spectators was reduced to 13,000 and after events spectators now can leave the stadium only block by block. Also the event-law in Tirol was aggravated as a result of the incident. (comp. Wagner et al., 2013, pp. 43–44)

2.4. Loveparade Duisburg 2010

The Loveparade is a Techno Event, originally organised as a political demonstration with parade, which took place annually from 1989 to 2001 in Berlin, in 2003 again in Berlin, 2007 in Essen and 2008 in Dortmund. The planned parade in 2009 in Bochum was cancelled. In 2010 the Loveparade took place again, at 24th of July in Duisburg, in the context of RUHR.2010 – a series of events in the Ruhr-area which was elected the cultural capital of Europe 2010. (Wikipedia, 2014b)

During this last issue of the Loveparade 21 people lost their live and more than 400 got injured during a mass panic in a tunnel. Before the event authorities, organizers and public services were calculating with 250,000 to 500,000 participants, up to 5000 patients and 700 ambulance transports to hospitals in Duisburg and neighbouring counties. These incidents were scheduled incidents taking place during the event without expecting any major incidents. Numerous paramedical stations with emergency doctor and an ambulance vehicle were installed and the surrounding hospitals had been prepared. 1,600 medical staff was scheduled for the event. At around 5:00 PM a mass panic occurred in the tunnel which was entry and exit to the old freight depot which was the venue for the event. 16 people died on site, 35 got critical and many more slightly injured. The ambulance service and involved hospitals counted about 5,600 patient-contacts in relation to the event. Medical staff was expanded to 4,000 due to the mass panic. (comp. Ackermann et al., 2011, pp. 483–484 , Marx, 2013)

In the following investigations on the causes for the incident organizers, authorities and police were trying to push responsibilities on each other. In fact numerous mistakes from several involved institutions before and during the event as well as several unlucky circumstances are documented; the location did not fulfil legal requirements to host the event, those requirements were weakened by the authorities due to high pressure of the

organizer (e.g. for 220,000 spectators 440m of emergency exit are needed, 155m were identified by the organizer). The permission by the city of Duisburg was only issued on the morning of the event. The security service had less staff at the event than required. Communications of and with police was not ensured due to absent radios and no priority for emergency service mobile phones. There was no counting of participants of the event in place. Beforehand expressed demurs by police officials and uninvolved individuals and institutions were not followed but also not expressed vehemently. (Funke, 2012, pp. 483–484)

2.5. Pre-Games-Bombings London 2012 and Sochi 2014

Not on site of the Olympic Games but in their context are two attacks linked to the two latest editions of the Olympic Games as they took place during the preparations for the Games and therefore had enormous influence as well as media interest. On the 7th of July in 2005 suicide bombers attacked the central London's transport network. 52 people died and about 700 got injured. Interrogations showed that the offenders were Muslims with close contact to Pakistan, the presumed ringleader already had come into appearance in context of an earlier alleged bomb plot before. Some reports even claim that one of the bombers was in contact with al-Qaeda. (Gill & Phythian, 2006, pp. 122f., Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005)

Also the preparations of the following Winter Games in Sochi 2014 were interrupted by a suicide bombing. On the 18th of January in 2014, less than a month before the opening ceremony of the XXII Winter Olympic Games a militant group named 'the Helpers of Sunnah' claimed responsibility for the twin suicide bombings in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), Russia. The bombings took place on the 29th of December and killed 33 people and injured 65 more. In their statement the group announced further attacks, also with chemical weapons and also targeting the Sochi Winter Olympic Games. It is

supposed that ‘The Helpers of Sunnah’ are a subgroup of the Caucasus Emirate who aims to create an independent Islamic state in Russia’s North Caucasus. This affiliation would be also the motive for the attack and the threats. (Nodirbek Soliyev, 2014)

2.6. Oktoberfest Assassination 1980

The Munich Oktoberfest is an annual traditional festival with millions of guests, both local and internationally. Several so called tents, also known as “beer halls”, actually temporary restaurants with some thousand seats, are built on a free surface in the inner city of Munich. Combined with numerous rollercoasters and stalls it is one of the biggest funfairs in the world. 13 people died and more than 200 got insured, 68 of them seriously, when a bomb exploded at the main entrance of the Munich Oktoberfest in the evening of September 26th 1980. The bomb exploded while the right-wing extremist student Gundolf Köhler was about to stow it in a trash can at 10:19 PM. The exact course and motive of the act is not definitely clarified up to today. Although several witnesses were mentioning independently at least one more person in close contact to the offender only seconds before the detonation the criminal police office of Bavaria and the federal public prosecutor closed the case in 1982 as the act of a single person, Gundolf Köhler, who got killed by the assassination himself. Since this time several individuals, amongst them the journalist Ulrich Chaussy and the lawyer Werner Dietrich, are investigation in the case of the Munich Oktoberfest Assassination of 1980 and are accusing the authorities of poor investigations and even covering-up an right-wing extremist act. The fact that Gudolf Köhler was demonstrably member of the right-wing extremist union “Wehrsporgruppe Hoffmann”, statements of witnesses and evidences which weren’t considered yet are the reasons for a resumption of the case by the federal public prosecution office this year, 34 years later. (comp. Chaussy, 2014, pp. 12-14, 17-23, Lill, 2014, Neuman, 2014)

2.7. Boston Marathon Bombings 2013

The third Monday of April in Massachusetts is a state holiday, Patriots' Day, which marks the start of the Revolutionary War. It is also traditionally the day on which the local Baseball team, the Red Sox, organize a morning home game in honour of the holiday which also allows the spectators to join as spectators of the traditionally Boston Marathon after the game. The Marathon is the most famous and oldest marathon conducted in the United States (US). In 2013 the Patriots' Day and the 117th Boston Marathon took place on the 15th of April. 23 thousand runners took part in this year's marathon; they started in several waves between 9:30 and 10:40 AM in Hopkinton. Half a million spectators, including children and students, gather every year along the 42.2 km race track. Most spectators, including many friends and families of the runners gather around the finishing area to great together with volunteers the runners when they finish the race. At 2:50 PM, a bit more than 4 hours after the race has started, a time on which some thousands runners had already crossed the finishing line while another some thousands were still to come, 2 bombs detonated near the finishing line. Three people got killed and over 260 people had been injured, about 10% of them critical, due to the attack. The offenders who placed the bombs have been two brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Their motive was, according to Dzhokhar, to protect the Islam from the US. Although interrogations showed that they were not connected to any known terrorist groups. View days after the attack, on April 18th and 19th, the suspects killed a police officer, hijacked a car and got involved in a firefight with the police in which Tamerlan got killed. Short after Dzhokhar got captured in a public manhunt. (comp. Bodden, 2014, pp. 7-9,11-12,15, 48ff., 66ff., Wikipedia, 2013, Bluman, 2013)

Publications on the Boston Marathon Bombings published since the incident up to today, about one and a half years later, predominantly praise the "*Rapid Response*"

(Bodden, 2014, p. 16) and describe the “*success [...] due to incredible resources available in Boston*”(Bluman, 2013). At the same time they warn, as Eric M. Bluman, Medical Director at Brigham & Women’s Hospital and one of the doctors on duty at the day of the Boston Marathon Bombings, that “*we cannot rely on such a fortuitous combination of circumstances [...] to limit the devastation*” and that we have to be prepared when the next event occurs from which “*we don’t know the who, what, or when*” (2013).

2.8. Riots and robberies in Rio

Only seven weeks before the start of the soccer world cup 2014 in Rio de Janeiro heavy riots took place in the city. Residents attacked busy tourist zones and blamed police of having killed an innocent citizen. Authorities have been concerned about security before the soccer world championship and the Olympic Games taking place in Rio in 2016. They were not only afraid of demonstration and riots by the angry public who had to finance the projects but also concerned of mass robberies of Rio’s tourists and the generally high criminal rate. In 2008 therefore a police program started to control criminality in the slums of Rio in order to provide a secure environment for spectators, athletes and officials of the events. The program got hard criticism like needless encroachments of police forces which supposedly ended in the dead of civilians. These critics were the material for new demonstrations and riots. (Memmot, 2014)

2.9. Violent Spectators

Risks on any events are incidents being initiated or involving spectators, especially in sports. There is even a “*List of violent spectator incidents in sports*” (Wikipedia, 2014a) published which is listing, reliably sourced, violent confrontations of spectators with athletes, coaches and officials as well as other incidents that caused delays and cancellation of the event. The incidents reach from 1879 to today and from single

spectators attacking single sportsmen to riots in which whole spectator groups attacked officials and each other. All of these incidents resulted in delays or cancellation of the event, in injuries and even in death. Although most of those incidents took place at single sporting event and mainly in sports with a, often rival, fan club culture like football, those scenarios are not unrealistic for multi-sport events with generally less aggressive spectator groups.

3. Potential Security Threats to Mega Events – Risk analysis

As seen from the literature review security became more and more important, not only for events, within the last years. Authorities, operators, public and private security and rescue services and many more responsible individuals and organisations realized the necessity of being prepared for the worst. In the course of this procedure it seems not anymore enough to be prepared for incidents which already happened before. More and more often one can hear of situations which have never been there before. To be also prepared for these unimaginable scenarios analysis of potential risks are made and simulated, theoretical as well as in live exercises. Although potential risks of sport mega events might vary from one to the other it seems most likely that they will be similar to those of other events. For this reason looking into earlier risk analysis and adapting them to the own event would be a promising way of preparing for potential security threats at the own event. Searching for those risk-analysis or security concepts soon shows the problem of this approach: One can find basically none as they all seem to be, for understandable reasons, top secret. Only after something happened the responsible publish what measures they have taken before. Therefore following it only can be given insight in one actual security concept, further there will be described some more potential security threats which can be found in the literature.

3.1. Security Concept Isarinsselfest Munich

The Isarinsselfest in Munich is an annual three-day street festival in Munich on both sides and the bridges of the river Isar. It is an open air event, free of entry fees, with a wide range of cultural and culinary offers. The expected number of spectators is up to 50,000 per day while only a 25,000 peak is estimated. For the Event a public main and several side roads are getting closed. The authorities demand a detailed security concept from the organizers, in which amongst other points also potential security risks are identified, their probability is determined and measures taken to avoid such incidents as well as to react on them are described. The scenarios described in the security concept reach from “*disruption by spectator behaviour*” via minor offenses and excessive use of alcohol and anaesthetics up to overcrowding, fire and gas alarms, collapse of temporary and permanent buildings and bomb threats. Also not primary security relevant incidents like a blackout, failure of toilets, change of weather and even the collapse of the public transport system are mentioned and their influence on the security of the event is discussed. Even detailed scenarios like a person falling in the river or a plane crash are considered. The actions to take are direct intervention by the private security service within their legal scope, notification of public security services, including police, fire fighting service and ambulance and the cooperation of different services including the relevant hierarchy. But also precautionary measures like elevated railing, the installation of a cross organizations security headquarter and backup supply and disposal facilities are taken. To react on situations witch endanger health and life of people a detailed evacuation concept is part of the security concept, regulating responsibilities and actions to be taken. (Morgott, 2013, pp. 5, 17, 19-26)

3.2. More security for new threats

Within the last decades every Organizing Committee of Olympic Games was facing new challenges. The security measures taken were extensive and mostly obvious. In 1992 Barcelona feared terror attacks in context of the recently finished Gulf War as well as ETA attacks. For this a highly militaristic security regime with over 25,000 staff was put in place. After bombings in the World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City the 1996 Atlanta Games led high attention to the protection of buildings. 20,000 military and police forces and 5,000 volunteer security staff combined with testing of NASA technology in the relevant areas was the result. Security patrols, security scuba divers and helicopters as well as, for the time, high tech ID badges were installed to create an environment in which terror could not act. Four years later also Sydney set on a security system which was omnipresent; although it was important for the organizers that security in the same time was unobtrusive. Athens in 2004 faced a whole new situation as the first Summer Olympic Games after 9/11. Over 100,000 police and military forces, a network of 13,000 surveillance cameras and many more measures like anti-aircraft missiles, chemical detectors, minesweepers, early warning surveillance planes and even NATO troops were brought in. Athens had to ensure that athletes, officials, Games family and spectators were safe while being part of the world's biggest sporting event – and the whole world was watching. (comp. Coaffee, 2011, pp. 124f.)

All this attention to security at the Olympic Games, including camera surveillance and also biometric provision and facial recognition, seem to make Olympic sites to a secure environment. Critics argue though that surveillance might recognize offenders before the actual crime but not their intention and therefore are not suitable to prevent the attacks. Also displacement is brought in as an important dynamic of the security systems development. It is argued that offenders will try to circumvent the defences put

in place, rather than to overcome them, which leads to attacks on different locations (spatial displacement), at different times (temporal displacement) and to the adopting of new techniques (tactical displacement). Attacks not on the site of but related to the Olympic Games are the result as seen not only recently when the transport system was attacked before the London 2012 and the Sochi 2014 Games. (comp. Swain, 2011)

4. Analysis

One probably can never imagine what kind of security threats will wait for us in the future, but by analysing those which are already detected those responsible for the security can at least be prepared as much as possible to prevent them or react adequate if necessary. The research done so far shows that numerous different threats to the security of all persons, hard and soft goods involved in any event can occur. Therefore it does not matter if this event is a mega sporting event of international significance, as the Olympic Games are, or any other kind of event. To recognize the potential security threats it is necessary to look on different aspects of the event in their event-specific context and environment. As potential threats vary in each context and environment the risk analysis can never be the same as of another event, would even not be the same of the same event held in a different time or place or political or social context. On the basis of the determined threats above the following aspects of analysis can be defined.

4.1. Who or what is threatened?

When planning to make something or somebody secure the first thing obviously is to be sure of what or whom it is about to protect. In the context of the Olympic Games on the first view this seems to be pretty obvious: The athletes, the spectators, the officials, the stadia and of course the IOC-representatives. Thinking of it again, looking a little behind the scenes one might also recognize the volunteers and employees of the OC, as

well as of the NOCs, the OC's suppliers and the sponsors plus all of their personal goods.

Looking at the historical research above it turns out that there is way more to think and care about. And it also shows that the aims differ over time. In the first outstanding terrorist attack to the Olympic Games in Munich 1972 athletes and their officials were attacked. In 1980 on the Munich Oktoberfest as well as in 1996 at the Atlanta Olympic Games spectators were attacked within a 'secure' area. Before the two latest editions of the Olympic Games in London and Sochi attacks on public transport systems have been conducted, random individuals not anyhow linked to the event itself have been the victims. And in 2013 at the Boston Marathon Bombings again spectators have been attacked, in this case along the 42.2 km long track, a basically not securable area. This observation underlines the theory of displacement described above; when identified weaknesses are secured as much as possible perpetrators do not try to overcome the security precautions and try the same attack again but look for new places, techniques and timeslots. Also when looking at the incidents with violent spectators, incidents which can be assumed haven't been planned beforehand but just emerged from the situation, one can see as by time the incidents within the field of play, later within the stadia became less and less while more incidents happened after the events and outside the premises. This can also be explained by crowing security measures within the stadia what is followed by a displacement of such incidents to less secured areas.

The potential threatened parties can, on the basis of the research, be defined and structured as following. Not all parties can be identified within one group though as well as their might be individuals or groups which fit in several descriptions.

Games Family

- NOCs including their representatives, athletes, officials and staff as well as their equipment, personal belongings and public image
- IOC including their members and staff as well as the Olympic brand
- IFs including their representatives, officials and staff as well as their equipment and their public image
- Partners / Sponsors including their staff as well as their brands
- Broadcasters including their journalists and staff as well as their equipment
- Athletes not belonging to an NOC (marching under the Olympic Flag) as well as their equipment and personal belongings
- OC including their members and representatives as well as their public image

Organising Committee (OC)

- OC members as well as their public image
- Rented and own stadia, cars, offices, equipment, etc.
- Employees, Volunteers and contracted or seconded workers as well as their personal belongings
- Public image
- Financial medium

Spectators

Within the stadia as well as other gatherings like public viewings, team houses and around the Games

Host City / Host Country

- Citizens, politicians and representatives as well as their personal belongings and buildings (offices and homes)

- International image and reputation
- Financial medium including influence on trade, tourism and currency
- Public buildings, infrastructure and facilities

4.2. What kind of threats?

As already mentioned above the most important difference in security threats is probably the intention. It can be differed in intentional created threats, threats emerging out of situations and threats by constructions and environment.

Security threats by constructions and environment are such threats which occur from construction mistakes, such as the collapsing stadia in Rio, inadequate maintenance of constructions or natural hazards. Those security threats can be mainly prevented beforehand which is one of the tasks of the safety department. Although security department have to be aware of these potential threats as in spite of all measures taken to avoid them they might occur and bring a high security risk to some or all of the groups identified above. Also it will be security to be responsible for necessary measures as evacuations and emergency response. Furthermore incidents with constructions, as seen above in the Bergisl incident or at the Loveparade, or environmental influence, like a sudden storm, might provoke behaviour of humans which lead to security threats emerging out of the situation like a mass panic.

Security threats emerging out of situations are those incidents which endanger life and health of humans or the integrity of goods out of a sudden. For example fans are disappointed of a game or a decision and start attacking officials, fans of the other teams or just random people and things; people are getting panic within large crowds, as seen in the examples above; Sites are getting overcrowded. But also from situations outside the actual event security threats can emerge, as seen in Rio where the dissatisfaction

with the politics around the Games let to riots. Nobody is planning these situations and they are very much depending on individual humans, their constitution and reaction, what makes it difficult to foresee their exact place and time of occurrence.

Intentional created security threats are classical attacks. Offenders can be individuals or groups, working alone or within an organisation. Their aims can be individuals or groups, specific or random. Their intentions and motivations vary widely. Beside 'normal' criminality like robberies and mayhems by individuals or gangs, we have seen attacks political, religious and financial motivated, in context to the Games or just abusing them as a stage, as well as those of mental ill offenders, aiming in getting something or just setting a statement. The Olympic Games with their international participation and outstanding media coverage are not only the probably biggest stage available in today's globalised world but also a controversial discussable institution itself. Additional to those attacks already happened and those which were prevented in future further potential attacks, some of them already determined in risk analysis some unimaginable from a today's point of view, will threaten the Olympic Games. Complete new ways of attacking the Games, such as new weapons, cyber-attacks or even worse scenarios will demand more and more from security departments and services.

4.3. From where are the threats coming?

The different kinds of security threats described have many different root causes. Security threats by construction or environment or obviously caused by the corresponding construction or an environmental influence. Looking on the constructions as a cause for security threats the case gets more difficult. A construction per se is not threatening anyone or anything. The problem occurs from the production and maintenance of the constructing. Botch in the building phase, financial retrenchments, substandard material or time pressure during the construction phase or in maintaining

existing constructions lead to hazardous weaknesses. Also environmental threats are normally not occurring out of the blue. Analysing weather records and forecasts give an idea of situations which have to be expected so that the necessary measures can be taken or the relocation in time or place can be considered.

Security threats which are emerging out of the situation are those which are the most unpredictable ones. But also for these cases a prediction is possible. Crowd managers analyse the behaviour of people in special surroundings beforehand and can predict potential situations in which security relevant situations occur. Analysing fans and their fan culture can give an idea of their aggressions potential. And spontaneous demonstrations will only take place within crowds which are already subliminal dissatisfied with a situation – which also can be identified beforehand. Knowing the potential of emerging security threats helps to set measures in place which prevent or control the situation.

The widest range from where the threat can come from is found within the intentional created security threats. A single individual person or a group of individuals, representing their own or an organisation's opinion or pursuing a specific goal; A single person or a group belonging to a radical group, political, religious, financial or otherwise motivated; Even political or religious organisations. Their aims can reach from capturing some goods or money, via threatening, hurting or killing random or specific people to gain media attention or blackmail specific actions and statements by them or others or extort money, up to reaching huge devastation and dying in order to underline their opinion or punish someone or something. Also the personal involvement of the offenders differs. While some offenders just want to get attention and not putting their own life and integrity in danger, others are ready or even planning to die in order to reach their aim. A third group of offenders is not even putting themselves in any

danger or context of the attack by staying away from the action itself, either by using remote controlling technology or as an initiator who gets other persons to do the attack on his behalf.

E. SUMMARY

Potential security threats to events in general are multifarious, depending on the event itself, the surrounding and environment, political and social situations and many more. Especially Olympic Events have a high potential of being threatened intentionally due to their nature. As a 21st century religion, representing a set of values which are, in the eyes of the officials of the Olympic Movement, universal it provokes international criticism. Combined with multi media coverage to basically any edge of our globe, which means being the biggest stage possible, it is a high class target for those who are seeking attention for their opinion. Those who are not accepting the Olympic Values as values which are compatible with their own believes, irrelevant if religious, political or otherwise, could feel threatened or patronized by the Olympic Movement. To use the Movement itself, its greatest outcome, the Olympic Games, as a place to raise their doubt seems almost logical. But also those who want to raise awareness for non-Olympic topics see a potential to make the whole world listening by obstructing the Olympic Games. These unique features of Olympic Events, combined with the fact that enormous numbers of people from all over the world meet in one city at the same time, make them, not only from a security point of view, special from any other events.

For Olympic Events especially but also for any other event considering potential security threats is key to a successful event. To guarantee for the security of all parties involved, Games Family, OC, spectators and the host city and country, is the duty of the organizers or hosts. To prevent possibly all security threats, those from constructions and environment, those which emerge from situations as well as those which are intentional, and by this prevent any harm to those involved and their property, detailed analysis are necessary. Also everything has to be prepared to react if the prevention was unsuccessful. Threats we have seen in the past and possible threats which were already

identified, as described above, can be a first overview of potential risks. A detailed analysis though can only be made in context of the specific event. Also risk analysis of an event is never finished but an ongoing task within the planning as well as the implementation of an event.

Reading this paper, which is just a little scratch on the surface of security threats to events in general and the Olympic Games specifically, gives an idea of how complex the topic 'security' in a context of events is actually. As stated in the introduction the purpose of this research on 'Security threats to Olympic Games' was to *"to provide an overview of security threats to the Olympic Games [...] to possibly enable responsible organisers of future sport events to take the necessary measures"* (see C). This aims especially on these organisers within small OCs, e.g. of a local Olympic Day or similar small events of clubs etc., who haven't had contact to the world of security, yet. Realising the complexity of security threats and, even more important, the necessity of dealing with their potential appearance is important to deliver secure events from all sizes in the future.

F. OUTLINE: SECURITY AS A THREAT TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES?

Every year security expenses and efforts for security at the Olympic Games rise; 25,000 security staff in Barcelona in 1992, \$180 million spent for security in Sydney 2000, \$1.5 billion and 100,000 security staff in Athens 2004, the ‘major security exercise’ London 2012. It is expected by the hosts to provide a secure environment for welcoming the world for the globe’s biggest sporting exercise, on any costs. In the same time critics raise; defence missiles next to the Olympic stadium, hundreds of armed forces around the Olympic venues, Accreditations with more security characteristics than money and controls like entering a high security prison create an Olympic experience far away from the ‘Happy Games’. Organisers are already aware of the thin line between making everyone feeling safe and creating an imprisoned atmosphere as could be seen by Sydney’s efforts to great an omnipresent but unobtrusive security atmosphere as well as Sochi’s attempts to cover their plenty armed forces in Game-Maker-Uniforms.

To know in any moment what is going on where and to indentify security threats early enough new and more surveillance technology is been brought in. This surveillance seem to create transparent people. Being able to be watched, checked and controlled at any time also raises serious doubts in context to civil rights.

This development seems to be both a necessary part of being able to host the Olympic Games and a heavy burden brought by being awarded to host them. Inexorable increasing security measures, required to be up to date with potential security threats, start to become a threat to games itself: First, spectators, athletes and officials seem to start feeling uncomfortable – but what would be the Olympic Games without them

attending? Secondly, costs seem to rise in every edition of the Games – but how long can we afford this?

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**HELLENIC REPUBLIC
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With knowledge of my personal responsibility taking legal consequences into account according to the provisions of the article 11 paragraph 2 (Process of deleting from students' records) of the Regulation of Postgraduate Study Programme I hereby declare that during completion of the thesis under the title "Security threats to the Olympic Games" I did not use all or part of another author's work or his/her ideas and beliefs without reference to the relevant source (book, newspaper or magazine article, website etc..).

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