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SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES HOSTING INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS: STILL TOO BIG FOR MOST OF THE WORLD?

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ABSTRACT

Joel W. Griesbach: Summer Olympic Games Hosting Infrastructure Requirements: Still Too Big for Most of the World?

(Under the supervision of Emeritus Professor Kristine Toohey, AM)

The Summer Olympic Games are currently only being awarded to global giant cities, with Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles slated to host the next three Summer Games. This study aims to examine why global giant cities are currently the only type of city hosting the Games. Furthermore, it aims to define and create an understanding of how another type of city, the mid-tier city, will be able to again host the Games in the future as they have in the past, in cities such as Barcelona, Sydney, and Athens. The literature shows that a history of gigantism and scandals has forced the IOC to the point where it had little choice but to choose only global giant cities because of failed public referenda and intense media scrutiny. Additional research conducted amongst a select group of Olympic experts found that there is a strong belief mid-tier cities will once again be hosts of the Games, and that the future of the Olympic Games is bright thanks to the changes outlined in Agenda 2020 and The New Norm. The project concludes with recommendations for the IOC to go even further in its reforms to guarantee that Olympic ideals and Olympism are central to everything the IOC does, improving the reach and impact of the Olympic Movement and allowing mid-tier cities to once again be part of the narrative about hosting the Summer Olympic Games.

Keywords: Olympic Games, Agenda 2020, The New Norm, infrastructure, global city

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMX: Bicycle Motocross

CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility

EB: IOC Executive Board

EIS: Environmental Impact Statement

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HCC: Host City Contract

HDI: Human Development Index

IBC: International Broadcast Center

IF: International Federation

IAAF: International Amateur Athletic Foundation

IOC: International Olympic Committee

LA: Los Angeles

LAOOC: Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

LOCOG: London Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games

MPC: Main Press Center

NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act

NOC: National Olympic Committee

OCOG: Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games

ODA: Olympic Delivery Authority

OG: Olympic Games

OGGI: Olympic Games Global Impact Program

OPLC: Olympic Park Legacy Company

RHB: Rights Holding Broadcaster

SCCOG: Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games

SLOC: Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic Winter Games

SOPA: Sydney Olympic Park Authority

TOP: The Olympic Partners

UCLA: University of California, Los Angeles

UK: United Kingdom

US: United States

USA: United States of America

USC: University of Southern California

USOC: United States Olympic Committee

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1   Introduction

Beginning in 2012, the Olympic and Paralympic Games began a succession of four out of five Summer Olympiads being hosted in large cities (over eight million residents) in economically powerful countries, with Games held (or to be held) in London, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles. All but Rio are similar types of cities – large, powerful, and situated in wealthy countries. They are global giants (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

But where are mid-tier cities like past hosts Barcelona, Atlanta, Athens, Montréal, and Munich in recent Summer Olympic Games? Only Rio has gone against the recent trend – but it was given the right to host in 2009, when bidding for the Games was still a hot commodity, Brazil's economy was booming, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was actively attempting to bring the Games to the developing world, a trend that has stopped. Another question is, where are new host cites from South America, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East in the list of Olympic hosts? They are nowhere to be found; thus, Olympism and its ideals are not reaching as deeply into the developing world as it could be.

Since Tokyo was awarded the Games in 2013, the IOC has had a paucity of bidders for both the Summer and Winter Games. And as the literature overwhelmingly shows, this is largely because cities, countries, and their residents are increasingly pessimistic about the size, scale, cost, and wisdom of hosting the Olympics – Games that, according to their founder, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, are supposed to represent all of humanity, global friendship, and peace among nations. However, the issue about the size of the Games, and the ability of cities to host them, has been present throughout the modern Games.

De Coubertin (1911/2003) wrote in the Olympic Review:

It would be very unfortunate if the often exaggerated expenses incurred for the most recent Olympiads, a sizeable part of which represented the construction of permanent

buildings, which were moreover unnecessary – temporary structures would fully suffice… it would be very unfortunate if these expenses were to deter countries from putting themselves forward to host the Olympic Games in the future (p. 3).

So, this is not a new phenomenon. In 1911 the Games were already undergoing what many Olympic scholars now call "gigantism." The trend toward gigantism has accelerated over the last 30 years, despite the IOC consistently, yet ineffectively, attempting to rein in spending and size. As Chappelet (2014) points out, it is now difficult even for global cities like London to host the Games, let alone smaller cities like Atlanta and Athens. It is keeping strong hosting candidate cities away, just as de Coubertin worried it would.

In 2014, the IOC introduced Agenda 2020, which included 40 recommendations regarding the future of the Olympic Movement. Agenda 2020's purpose was to again attempt to rein in gigantism, encourage more cities to bid, and in reality, to save their credibility, their image, and by extension, the Olympic Movement. The IOC has since produced additional (and more specific) reforms known as "The New Norm" (International Olympic Committee, 2018b). These various reforms, as well intended as they seem to be, may be reducing the bidding field to only global giants, thus the choices of Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028 under extraordinary circumstances where both Games were awarded at the same time after all other bidders withdrew from the process (Dempsey et al., 2019).

According to Schnitzer & Haizinger (2019), the Agenda 2020 and New Norm reforms have not worked to restore the IOC's credibility. This study examines the history of how the Olympic Movement arrived at this point, what many of the problems are with the current infrastructure requirements, and what may be done to allow mid-tier cities to get back into the ambulatory host rotation in the future. As Verbruggen (2002) expresses it – moving the Olympic Movement to a greater number of cities is a way of securing and growing the Olympic legacy around the world.

1.2   Purpose of Research

The purpose of this study is to generate a deeper understanding of how to make the Summer Olympic Games more accessible for a wider range of hosts among the world's cities. To achieve this, I pose the following research questions:

Main Research Question:

Why are global giants the only cities currently receiving the rights to host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games?

Sub-questions:

Will global giants be the only ones receiving the Summer Games in the future because of the infrastructure requirements of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm?

Is there a paradox between the idea of ambulatory Summer Games and The New Norm requirements?

What framework can the IOC and mid-tier cities develop so that mid-tier cities can successfully bid for and host the Summer Games in the future?

1.3   Significance of Study

At the heart of the Olympic Movement is the idea of Olympism. This is a philosophy, a set of principles and ideals, that sets the Olympics apart from any other sporting endeavor on earth. It aims to mean something so much more than sport. Because of this, everything the IOC does or does not do, or that it represents or misrepresents, is open to examination, elevation, criticism, ridicule, "attention and analysis" (McNamee & Parry, 2012, p. 12). This means that it matters where the Olympic Games are held, how they are held, and what happens to the cities where they are held. There are several excerpts from the current Olympic Charter (2020) that highlight this:

Fundamental Principle of Olympism, Rule #1, Article #3

The Olympic Movement is the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism. *It covers the five continents*. It reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world's athletes at the great sports festival, the Olympic Games. Its symbol is five interlaced rings (International Olympic Committee, 2020b, p. 11).

Mission and Role of the IOC, Rule #2, Article #15:

to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities, regions and countries (International Olympic Committee, 2020b, p. 17).

Location, sites and venues of the Olympic Games, Rule #34:

In the determination of the location, sites and venues of the Olympic Games, priority must be given to the use of existing or temporary venues and infrastructures. *The construction of new permanent venues or infrastructure for the purposes of the organisation of the Olympic Games shall only be considered on the basis of sustainable legacy plans* (International Olympic Committee, 2020b, p. 72).

These excerpts show that the Olympic Games are supposed to represent all the continents, they are supposed to promote positive legacies for their host cities, and they should do it in a sustainable way. But, throughout modern history, the Games have not always held to these higher ideals.

The IOC's own sustainability strategy highlights the need to hold to its own ideals in no uncertain terms, "by taking a more pro-active role in this field [sustainability], we can shift the public narrative from one largely focused on cost, to a greater understanding of the societal value of hosting the Games" (International Olympic Committee, 2017b, p. 39). In other words, by holding to its own ideals, the IOC will be much more able to focus the public discussion on Olympism instead of the perceived failings of the Olympic Movement.

The IOC has not always held firm to its own ideals in regard to sustainability, ethical governance, and leaving a positive legacy for host cities (Lenskyj, 2006). Over time, this has had the direct effect of a "crisis of confidence" (Hersh, 2018, p. 30). As a consequence, fewer cities are bidding, public opinion of the IOC is near an all-time low, and the Olympic brand is tarnished (Hiller, 2020).

As Gold and Gold (2017a) discuss, since the IOC has taken the decision to keep the Games ambulatory, the relationship between the Olympic Games and host cities is at the absolute core of the Olympic project. Because of this centrality, cities need to be protected and positive legacies need to be the norm; negative legacies in the form of long-term city debts, cost overruns, and white elephant venues with little or no future use must be extremely rare. Furthermore, if host cities and their citizens are protected, the Olympic image, and the image of the IOC in particular, can be rehabilitated.

However, many critics and scholars think the only way to truly protect cities is for the ambulatory nature to change. They believe that the Olympic project is unsustainable in its current form and that the Games should shift to a single permanent site or a small rotation of cities with infrastructure already in place (Baade & Matheson, 2016; Dempsey et al., 2019; Dempsey & Zimbalist, 2017; Nicklish, 2016; Tokar, 2020).

But even the harshest critics of the IOC, like Dempsey, Matheson, and Zimbalist (2019) admit that it is not automatic that hosting Olympics must be a losing proposition for cities. Keeping this in mind, this study aims to establish a framework by which the Olympic Games can continue to be ambulatory, not confined to global giant cities, and by which they can widen their reach into areas of the world not recently selected by the Olympic Movement.

This is significant, and by extension, this study, because the proposed framework can be another step in enabling the IOC to concentrate the discussion surrounding the Olympic Games on the true purposes of Olympism and not on controversy and tarnished legacies. The IOC can focus on the ideas of a balanced whole of body, will, and mind through sport, respect for "universal fundamental ethical principles," "the harmonious development of humankind," and

"promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (International Olympic Committee, 2020b, p. 11).

Beyond the philosophical significance behind the Olympic Movement, there is a further practical application to this study. Many academic studies and research projects have advocated which changes need to be made to the Olympic Games, the Olympic Movement, and the IOC, including those by scholars like economist Andrew Zimbalist, philosopher Heather Reid, and social activists like Helen Lenskyj. However, very few studies have been done with the IOC's most recent bidding process in mind, which changes the context, nor have any been done with an eye toward the elevation of the mid-tier city host in the Olympic Movement.

This study focuses primarily on the Summer Olympics and Paralympics, as the infrastructure requirements are generally much greater than the Winter Games. However, there is an undeniable relationship between the Summer and Winter Games, so there will be times when relevant information about the Winter Games in relation to bidding, growth, infrastructure, gigantism, and legacy will be discussed. All research questions, discussion and conclusions will focus on the Summer Games.

1.4   Structure of Dissertation

This study will have a standard dissertation structure with five chapters. Each is discussed briefly below.

Chapter I introduces the topic of global giants and mid-tier cities in regards to hosting the Olympic Games, the main research questions in regards to the topic, some general background, as well as an introduction on the significance of the topic and the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter II is a literature review of the relevant information about the topic, starting with the earliest days of the modern Olympics, illuminating how the Olympic Movement's massive growth and gigantism led to Agenda 2020 and The New Norm with their stated requirements for host cities. It then examines the literature behind the idea of global giants and mid-tier cities,

infrastructure and urban renewal through hosting of the Olympic Games, as well as mega-event and Olympic legacy theory. It concludes with a discussion of what academics perceive the future of the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games will be and what effects the current reforms will have.

Chapter III shows the methodology of the research, including data collected about former and potential future host cities, as well as expert interviews about the effects of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm on the ability of mid-tier cities to host the Summer Olympics.

Chapter IV presents the results of the document analysis collected about former and potential future host cities, as well as the findings of the expert interviews.

Chapter V discusses the findings of the literature review and research to establish a framework and recommendations for both the IOC and potential future host cities on how the Summer Olympic Games can once again be awarded to mid-tier and developing countries around the world.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1   Introduction – Olympic Education and Ambulatory Games

Education has been at the core of the modern Olympic Movement from its very inception. Pierre de Coubertin wanted to educate the world about humanity to create a more peaceful world, albeit from a very ethno-centric and male dominated point of view that is outdated today. He saw sport as a natural educational tool and wanted to utilize it to bring people and countries together. De Coubertin said in 1894, prior to the first modern Games of 1896:

> the restored Olympic Games must provide a happy and fraternal meeting place for the youth of the world, a place where, gradually, the ignorance of each other in which people live will disappear. This ignorance perpetuates ancient hatreds, increases misunderstandings, and precipitates such barbaric events as fights to the finish (de Coubertin, 1894/2000, p. 537).

He wanted to educate people around the world about each other, and illuminate that people around the world are not vastly different after all, despite having different cultures and traditions. Martinkova (2012) expands on this, by pointing out that education, as promulgated through the Olympic Games, creates respect for differences, through which a fear of others will be diminished.

De Coubertin's inspiration came from the ancient Olympic Games, where friendly competition and camaraderie were a distinct and surprising outcome in a world which was even more warlike than our own. Ancient Olympia may have been a religious site, but the emphasis at the ancient Olympics was that everyone was a Hellene (Greek) (Reid, 2006).

De Coubertin took the ancient Games idea of Hellenic unity, adapted and broadened it, and gave the modern Games the idea that we are all *human*. This is a certainty that speaks directly to the ancients' search for truth through open and impartial competition (Reid, 2020). As Reid (2006) discusses, the Olympic Games (ancient and modern) provide a gigantic educational

spectacle that shows all peoples to be equal, and to be accepting of a common set of rules through impartial competition. Because of this common set of rules, everyone can be treated equally through sport, which can lead to acting in a similar manner in the broader world.

This idea of equality and impartiality goes further than just the competition, it is connected to the place where the Olympic Games are held as well. Gold and Gold (2013) emphasize that de Coubertin and his close allies, who became the first members of the IOC, did not see the ancient Olympics as belonging only to the heritage of the modern Greek state, so it was appropriate and necessary to move the modern Olympic Games to cities throughout the world. They believed the Games needed to be ambulatory to further support the idea that we are all human through fairness and the sharing of cultures.

Furthermore, the modern Olympic Games seek an international and humanistic culture that highlights our similarities, yet acknowledges our different cultures and points of view – thus it should not be bound to any particular place (H. Reid, personal communication, August 11, 2020).

The concept that the Games should remain ambulatory because of the educational values of peace, humanity, and understanding of other cultures is central to this dissertation. This should not only include global giants, but also cities from the developing world where there are many cities (like Rio) that are large enough to host the Games but are currently unable to because of infrastructure requirements. Without this mobility around the world, the potential educational impact of the Games is greatly reduced; the Olympics could continue to be attached to an elitist image that powerful cities and countries control the Olympic Movement. The remainder of this chapter will trace the literature outlining many of the controversies surrounding the Olympic Games and how they have grown to a nearly unmanageable size, as well as the steps the IOC has taken to combat these controversies and perceived inadequacies.

2.2   Olympic Growth and the Loss of IOC Credibility

2.2.1   History of Olympic Growth

The tremendous growth of the Olympic Games is one of the most important factors in the trend toward hosting in global giant cities. The Games began in a small way, with few athletes and small entourages, but this small scale changed very early in the Movement's history, a change that has accelerated in recent years.

The first modern Olympic Games were held in Athens in 1896, with only 295 athletes from 14 nations competing in 43 events, funded with both privately and publicly (Zimbalist, 2015). In Paris in 1900 and St. Louis in 1904, the Games were nothing like today's Games, as they were attached to the Paris Exposition and the World's Fair, respectively. Paris had 1,066 male athletes, and only 11 women. St. Louis had 650 total athletes, with just 130 of those from outside the United States (Zimbalist, 2015). All of these Games featured mostly existing or temporary facilities, and the burden was generally very small on the host city (Gold & Gold, 2017b).

By 1908, the Olympics were back on European soil, with greater expected participation. The organizers of the 1908 London Games felt that a custom-built stadium was necessary to host the growing Games, and the White City stadium was built expressly for that purpose (it was later demolished in 1985). This started a new trend of risk-taking and built infrastructure, and was encouraged by the IOC (Gold & Gold, 2017b). Approximately 2,000 athletes participated in the London Games, already six times bigger than the Athens Games only 12 years earlier. By 1912, the organizers of the Stockholm Games were already concerned about cost, "to carry out the Olympic Games of the present day… required not only personal effort on the part of the organizers, but also the most ample financial resources" (Stockholm Organising Committee, 1913/2013, p. 51).

After the cancellation of the 1916 Games, the Olympics went to Antwerp as a sort of recompense for the horrors Belgium suffered during World War I. However, they were awarded

just 16 months before the Games were to be held, and the rigors of the tight timeline were apparent through a serious lack of organization. The stadium was unfinished, the athletic track was in a terrible condition, and the accommodations inadequate (Guttman, 2002). Yet, despite the aftermath of World War I, and Germany's exclusion, the number of athletes grew to 2,591 athletes (only 64 were women) (Zimbalist, 2015).

Antwerp provides a key learning about the perpetuation of an early problem in organizing the Games which can still be seen today, namely the city's elite driving the push to host in order to benefit wealthy boosters more than the city as a whole or its residents. What was initially planned by boosters to be a private contribution of 1 million Belgian francs, with an additional contribution from the city for 800,000 francs became a 1-million-franc loan (at 4 percent interest), plus a public contribution of 2.5 million francs from federal, local and city governments. The Games closed with a deficit of 626,000 francs. Furthermore, the boosters walked away even more wealthy from the interest payments (without having to spend any of their own money), and the city acquired significant debt (Zimbalist, 2015).

Los Angeles in 1932 became the first host city to provide an Athletes' Village at no cost to the athletes, aiming to encourage global travel and reduce costs for the athletes and National Olympic Committees (NOCs) before air travel was common. The idea was a huge success, not least because it brings people together and promotes the ideals of Olympism and internationalism. It has been a requirement by the IOC ever since (Kassens-Noor, 2020). However, the Athletes' Village was another burden on the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs) and the host city that would eventually be one of the greatest budget encumbrances.

Berlin in 1936 continued the growth of the Games, hosting 3,963 athletes, 129 medal events, and 25 venues. Cost was of little consequence, as the Games were intended as a promotional tool for the Third Reich; consequently, organizers created the largest sports complex in the world at the time, the Reichssportfeld (Gold & Gold, 2017b). It was also the first televised Olympics (albeit only in Germany), a forerunner of things to come (Zimbalist, 2015). London and Melbourne would similarly televise the Games nationally.

Following the back-to-back cancellations of 1940 and 1944 due to World War II, and the "austerity games" in London in 1948, urban planning agendas that would come to dominate the Games in later years began to accelerate. The 1960 Games in Rome and the 1964 Games in Tokyo "added ever-larger elements of general urban development to the sporting and cultural dimensions of the Olympic festivals" (Gold & Gold, 2017b, p. 8). Tokyo in particular looked to the Games to support a long-term and city-wide urban planning project (Gold & Gold, 2017b).

The Rome and Tokyo Games also had a tremendous impact on the future of television for the Olympic Movement. Rome was the first Olympics televised in 21 countries in Western Europe, and the first to feature American film rights, with CBS paying $600,000 for rights to show the Games in prime-time (after being flown back to the United States). Tokyo was the first Olympics to be broadcast live via satellite throughout the world (Zimbalist, 2015). By Tokyo 1964, the number of athletes had grown to 5,151 in 172 medal events to take place in 33 separate venues (Zimbalist, 2015).

The next era of Summer Olympic Games was fraught with turmoil. Mexico City 1968 had a pre-Games massacre and Munich 1972 had an in-Games terrorist attack. Montréal had massive cost overruns and a boycott which inspired future boycotts in Moscow 1980 and again in Los Angeles 1984. Los Angeles 1984 and Seoul 1988 brought positivity back to the Games and inspired a new era of commercialism.

In the twenty years from Munich 1972 to Barcelona 1992, the number of countries participating in the Olympic Games grew from 123 to 169, and the number of athletes from 7,800 to 9,000, despite the fact that during this time there were a number of boycotts and other threats to the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2014). By 1996, and the centenary Games in Atlanta, the Games had grown to 10,500 athletes, which is still the arbitrary number used today.

After becoming the new IOC president in 2001, Jacques Rogge triggered the creation of the Olympic Study Commission to examine ways of containing the size of the Olympic Games. When their first report was published in 2003, it made 117 recommendations in five categories: Games Format, Venues and Facilities, Games Management, Number of Accredited Persons, and

Service Levels. Unfortunately, many of the recommendations were ignored, and their reach was limited. Additionally, the commission did not even consider the composition of the sports in the Olympic program, as that was under the auspices of a different IOC commission (Chappelet, 2014).

There are numerous other statistics pointing to the growth of the Games during this period. The number of NOCs sending athletes to the Games increased by 20% from Barcelona in 1992 to London in 2012, and since 1992, almost every country with an NOC has taken part in every Summer Games (Chappelet, 2014). The number of sports has stayed fairly consistent between Barcelona and the present day, with between 25 and 28 sports represented (28 is the maximum allowed), but the number of events increased from 257 in Barcelona to 302 in Beijing and London, and it has been capped at 300 since Sydney 2000. Yet the cap is deceptive, as some sports that supplanted others have sometimes required extra venues, such as Bicycle Motocross (BMX) and marathon swimming (Chappelet, 2014).

One of the most explosive areas of growth for the Games has been the number of accreditations issued in the period from Barcelona 1992 to London 2012, as shown below in Table 1. Media accreditations increased 85%, volunteers increased 102%, and security increased 95%. Accreditations to sponsors, contractors and OCOG staff have also increased significantly, but there are no academically published statistics on these categories (Chappelet, 2014).

Table 1: Number of Accreditations 1992 - 2012

	Barcelona 1992	Atlanta 1996	Sydney 2000	Athens 2004	Beijing 2008	London 2012
Total	129,185	200,551	247,000	255,000	349,000	~360,000
Athletes	9356	10,318	10,651	10,625	10,947	10,568
NOC team officials	7155	5698	5474	6075	5500	5570
IF technical officials/judges	2387	2171	3017	2568	2000	2961
Media	13,082	15,108	21,317	21,500	24,531	24,274
OCOG Olympic volunteers	34,548	47,466	46,967	39,494	70,000	70,000
Security personnel	21,000	14,000	16,000	32,000	n.a.	41,000

Source: Chappelet (2014), IOC

According to Chappelet (2014), media personnel covering the Games increased 89% during the period from Barcelona to London, most especially in the category of rights holding broadcasters (RHB), which increased 125% due to the increasing number of countries and NOCs, and thus the number of RHBs participating from around the world.

Ticketing is a "real dilemma for organizing committees" (Chappelet, 2014, p. 588). The OCOGs want to sell as many tickets as possible to maximize revenue, but this means bigger stadiums that may be too big for post-Games use, and inflate the infrastructure investment. Or OCOGs can build temporary stands that increase the OCOG budget (Chappelet, 2014). Even London 2012, which had a robust legacy plan in place for post-Games use of venues, had significant problems converting the 80,000 seat Olympic stadium to post-Games use for West Ham United Football Club, with a conversion cost of £272 million in addition to its original (and overbudget) construction cost of £429 million (Baade & Matheson, 2016; Chappelet, 2014).

2.2.2   Mexico City 1968, Munich 1972, Montréal 1976, Boycotts

The late 1960s to the early 1980s was quite possibly the most difficult chapter in the long history of the Olympic Games. The IOC was reeling after multiple crises during a tumultuous decade that exhibited a paradox in the implementation of the Olympic Games. They were at once growing in size and stature, but at the same moment, much was unravelling. Cities were contributing to the growth of gigantism and strengthening a culture of cost overruns, there were various boycotts, and there were terrible tragedies that threatened to derail the Olympic Movement.

Just 10 days before the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, at least 260 student protesters were killed and 1,200 were injured in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the Tlatelolco section of Mexico City (Barke, 2017; Kennelly, 2016; Toohey & Veal, 2007; Wilson, 2015). While the massacre did not happen during the Olympics, the protestors were demanding social justice for the extreme poverty in Mexico while the government was spending hundreds of millions on hosting the Olympic Games. According to Lenskyj (2000, p. 107) some of the chants were, 'Justice, yes! Olympics, no!' The perception of the Olympics as elitist was born in these

days of protest, and a link was made between the Olympics and a repressive government willing to massacre its own people in the name of law and order.

Just four years later in Munich, equally appalling and politically driven bloodshed occurred, this time with a direct link to the Olympic Games. On September 5, 1972 a group of Palestinian terrorists from the Black September terror cell broke into the Olympic Village, demanding the immediate release of 234 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. By the end of the standoff and attempted negotiations with German police, 11 Israeli Olympic Team members, 5 terrorists and one German police officer were dead (Zimbalist, 2015). These back-to-back massacres began to take its toll, "The Munich games, like those in Mexico City, are a vivid illustration of how the image of a host city can be tarnished rather than burnished. The brand of the Olympics also began to suffer" (Zimbalist, 2015, p. 15).

Montréal 1976 became infamous for other reasons, namely cost overruns and crippling city debt. Montréal's plans were ambitious, with a whole host of new venues, including an Olympic Stadium in a purpose-built Olympic Park. Despite the ambitious plans, the initial budget was only US$125 million, (Kassens-Noor, 2020). That paltry initial budget makes this 1973 statement by Montréal mayor Jean Drapeau even more striking, "The Montréal Olympics can no more have a deficit, than a man can have a baby" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016; Zimbalist, 2015). But of course, he was grossly incorrect, and Montréal saw the single greatest cost overrun of any Games, with an estimated total cost of US$6 billion. A debt of US$1.6 billion was left to the city of Montréal, which took 30 years to pay off (Kassens-Noor, 2020).

However, there are other perspectives on the Montréal experience. As Toohey and Veal (2007) point out, it is common for persons or companies to take out mortgages and loans to buy houses or fund capital expenditures. Often, these investments take 30 years to pay off. Perhaps the case of Montréal is not any different. Since the venues were used for their intended purposes, and many are still in use today, then maybe the investment was not as poor as it seemed on the surface. It could have been the unrealistic initial budgetary expectations, or conceivably the corrosive political environment of the 1970s, but the reality is that the lasting effect of

Montréal's Olympic experience was another crippling blow to the Olympic Movement still reeling from the Mexico City and Munich experiences.

Munich and Montréal also both put an emphasis on the ability of the Games to provide a medium for undertaking urban development with massive investments and iconic facilities. At that point, Games were seen as risk-free affairs guaranteeing host cities unprecedented publicity on the international stage, and the benefits were seen to be worth the costs (Gold & Gold, 2017c). Both Munich and Montréal were mid-tier cities trying to announce their place in the world, and their Olympics were attempts at creating soft power on the world stage.

Alongside all of these security and financial issues, a simultaneous political crisis was taking place, and the era of boycotts began. At Montréal 1976, 22 African nations refused to participate, protesting the decision of the IOC to allow the New Zealand team to compete after their rugby team, toured apartheid-era South Africa (Kassens-Noor, 2020; Zimbalist, 2015). The boycotts then increased, with the United States' President Jimmy Carter leading a boycott of the 1980 Games in Moscow in protest of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the end, more than 60 countries from around the world boycotted those games, including West Germany, Japan and China (Kassens-Noor, 2020; Zimbalist 2015). That was followed up with a reciprocal Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games where 19 countries from the Soviet bloc declined to participate.

All of this turmoil in security, finance and politics had put the IOC in dire straits by the 1980s. In 1978, Los Angeles was the only bidder for the 1984 Games, mirroring some of the problems the Games have now, although for somewhat different reasons, in that cities did not want to have the responsibility for financial losses as required by the host city contract (Hersh, 2018). By 1980, the IOC had a staff of 20, assets of US$2 million, and US$200,000 in reserves – something that seems astonishing considering the relative wealth of the Olympic Movement today (Hersh, 2018). But the 1980s would bring a striking set of developments that would change everything, putting the Olympic Movement on the path to financial health and its peak of international popularity.

2.2.3   Los Angeles 1984

"The Olympic Movement seemed certain to implode before it reached the centennial celebration" (Dyreson, 2015, p. 173). Then came Los Angeles 1984.

Los Angeles prepared a bid for every Olympic Games from 1948 to 1980 via the private Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games (SCCOG). The city's bid lost every time, but in 1977 the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) elected Los Angeles (LA) as the American candidate by a margin of one vote. LA ran unopposed at the international level, and the IOC selected it as the provisional host in May of 1978. The IOC would not name it official host until the City of LA committed to providing public funding guarantees (Wilson, 2015).

For the first time in many years, the host city held the leverage, not the IOC. Even though it was difficult, the City of LA was able to extract a much more favorable arrangement from the IOC. In July 1978, the mayor of LA, Tom Bradley, sent a letter to the city council recommending that Los Angeles withdraw as hosts of the Games. Simultaneously, a proposition was being prepared for voters to decide if the city would cover cost overruns from the Olympic Games. The tactics worked. The IOC allowed the USOC, rather than the city, to be the guarantor of any cost overruns; thus, the host city contract was signed at the White House in October of 1978 (Kassens-Noor, 2020; Wilson, 2015). City of Los Angeles Proposition N denying cost overrun provisions for the Olympic Games passed in November of 1978 by a margin of 74% - 26% (Yaroslavsky et al., 2015). Dempsey and Zimbalist (2017) contend that LA's circumstances were exceptional. LA had leverage that no other city has had before or since, and the city was insulated from having to provide a "blank check" to the organizing committee in case of cost overruns.

Following the signing of the agreement and the commitment that no public money would go toward the Games, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) had to find a leader to take on the challenge. In March of 1979, Peter Ueberroth, the relatively unknown founder and CEO of First Travel Corporation, was named chairman and general manager of

LAOOC (La Rocco, 2004). He had the unenviable task of finding a viable, and private, way to finance the Games (Kassens-Noor, 2020). Dyreson (2015) contends that Ueberroth and his team at the LAOOC revitalized the Olympic Movement, showing it could be a global commodity once again.

The central drive set by Ueberroth for the Games of 1984 was not to leave a legacy or any type of tangible positive benefit for Los Angeles, but rather to put on a good event and be financially responsible. The organizers simply could not afford to lose money, and Ueberroth was ruthless in his efforts to control costs and minimize risk (Maron, 2018).

The money to produce the Games had to come from somewhere, which is where LA84's true legacy was made. First, the organizers turned to television, which the IOC had only dabbled with to that point. The LAOOC ignited a bidding war with the American television networks, settling on a deal with ABC for US$225 million in September of 1979, for which the LAOOC received two thirds and the IOC received one third (Lindsey, 1979). The IOC learned quickly from LA's lessons about the power of television and broadcast contracts, eventually adopting and expanding LA's model and taking complete control of signing and distributing broadcast income (Dyreson, 2015).

Next, Ueberroth turned to sponsorship, dramatically expanding sponsorship's scale and the categories sold. Sponsorship essentially replaced government subsidy as a driver of Olympic finances for the LA Olympic Games (Dyreson, 2015). Again, the IOC learned quickly, and in 1985 created the The Olympic Partners (TOP) global sponsorship program, which is still in place today. In the cycle from 2013-2016, TOP partnerships brought in over US$1 billion for the IOC (Hersh, 2018). The TOP program allowed the IOC to control sponsorship from the apex of the organization, while still allowing and encouraging OCOGs, NOCs and International Federations (IFs) to sell sponsorship in non-competing categories. Future OCOGs would learn as well. London 2012 sold over US$1.1 billion in sponsorships (Chappelet, 2016a), and Tokyo's domestic sponsorship sales are expected to dwarf that, at over US$3 billion (Glendinning, 2020).

The Games from Rome 1960 through Moscow 1980 emphasized building infrastructure, but Los Angeles did not have this option because of the private nature of the LAOOC and limited funding. Only three venues were built for the Games, a swim stadium at the University of Southern California (USC), a shooting range outside of Los Angeles, and a velodrome at California State University, Dominguez Hills (Wilson, 2015). The Olympic Village was also reimagined, and was spread between three local universities – USC, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) instead of one central location, as had been standard (Wenn, 2015; Wilson, 2015). The IOC was reluctant to accept this housing plan, but LA's leverage over the IOC again came into play and the university accommodations were ultimately accepted (Kassens-Noor, 2020).

Revenue from the 1984 Olympic Games came to roughly US$768.6 million, including television broadcasting rights, sponsorships, ticket sales, and the sale of Olympic commemorative coins (Wilson, 2015). Thanks to very careful fiscal responsibility, the LA Games made a total profit of US$232.5 million. This profit greatly impressed cities around the world considering a bid to host the Games, it showed what was possible and demonstrated the positive feelings that a successful host could receive. Combining the profitability with the global success of the televised proceedings (even in countries that boycotted), the Los Angeles Olympics "fundamentally transformed the economic, political and cultural trajectories of the Olympic spectacles" (Wilson, 2015).

Ironically, the Games that had not planned any significant long-term infrastructure legacy ended up with infrastructure legacy because of the profit from the Games (Wilson, 2015). Any post-Olympic surplus was planned to be split, with the USOC and national sport federations receiving 60%, while the other 40% would be used to create a foundation to support youth sports in Southern California. The USOC used its portion to create the United States Olympic Endowment, which still, almost 40 years later, provides support to developing elite athletes in their quest to win Olympic Medals. The remaining 40% was used to create the Amateur Athletic Foundation, which eventually changed its name to the LA84 Foundation. The LA84 Foundation has the used the money wisely, funding almost 100 new or renovated sporting facilities through

(as of 2013) 257 sports infrastructure grants. These facilities serve community programs for an estimated 500,000 young people each year in the Los Angeles region (Wilson, 2015).

Most Olympic scholars acknowledge several legacies from the LA84 Olympics that changed, and possibly saved, the Olympic Movement. The Games increased broadcasting rights, highlighted sponsorship, and rescued the bidding process. Additionally, the city still has the vital local legacy of the LA84 Foundation, as well as a positive legacy of soft power for Los Angeles. The Games showed that LA had arrived on the world stage and was more than just Hollywood. However, there were several other legacies with long-term impact on the Games. For one, it showcased and foreshadowed the rise of the People's Republic of China, both in sport and politics. When China returned to the Olympics for the first time in over 30 years, it finished fifth in the medal count – tied with Japan and Canada, but with more gold medals than either of them (Dyreson, 2015).

The LA Games also saw the beginning of the rise of women's sport at the Olympics. The number of women competitors only comprised 20% of athletes, but patterns and perspectives were changing. LA84 added the first Olympic women's marathon, a signature Olympic event on the men's side, and also the first women's cycling events (Dyreson, 2015).

The changes in the Olympic Movement inspired by LA84 would not have been possible without a change at the top of the IOC. IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch was willing to make transformative and fundamental changes to rules the Olympics had held as essential throughout its history: a commitment to amateurism and as little focus on commercialism as possible. Under Samaranch's watch, professionals were finally allowed to compete in the Games, commercialism was embraced, and the financial status of the IOC completely turned around (Cohen & Longman, 1999).

"The LA Games marked a watershed for the Olympic Games. After sixteen years of a weakening reputation, the financial success of the LA games… turned the IOC's fortunes around" (Zimbalist, 2015, p. 20). Many lessons were learned, and several new fundamentals such as television and sponsorship were established. but were all of the lessons positive? LA84 indeed

helped save the IOCs finances, but it also started a domino effect in growth and expectations that eventually led to the creation of Agenda 2020.

2.2.4   Lavish Bidding and Bid Scandals 1984 - 2016

The success in Los Angeles changed the IOC; however, that success also ushered in another critical set of problems. Cities worldwide believed they could replicate that success, or use that success as leverage to advance their own interests; consequently, the number of bid cities greatly increased (Figure 1). Bids could no longer be designed based solely on expected revenues and expenses, but rather on how it could impress the IOC membership and defeat bids from competing cities (Baade & Matheson, 2016). Ironically, this competition went against everything Olympism stands for: it was big, extravagant, and not in the spirit of fair play. If you spent more than your opponent, lavished greater gifts and praise, and had a flashier bid with more spectacular development plans, then your bid had a much better chance at success. "All this happened quickly, too quickly for the IOC to adjust" (Mallon, 2000, p. 25). The rapid speed of this change proved too quick for the IOC to create governance systems to avoid corruption.

Figure 1: Number of Bid Cities Olympic Games 1955-2017

This lack of good governance by the IOC had immediate consequences. As early as 1986, IOC member Marc Hodler of Switzerland alerted the Executive Board about the impropriety of some IOC members in their visits to bid cities (Wenn & Martyn, 2006). In fact, on June 16, 1987, a letter was sent by Hodler (supported by IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch) to IOC members, NOCs, and candidate cites to remind them that valuable gifts were not permitted, and

that IOC members should not stay longer than three days in any candidate city (Wenn & Martyn, 2006). It is clear the letter was ignored, and Samaranch turned a blind eye to the allegations, even though a set of reforms called the Hodler Rules were passed by the IOC in 1992. The reforms were ineffectual due to the laissez-faire approach toward monitoring allegations regarding the conduct of candidate cities and the IOC membership throughout the 1990s (Wenn & Martyn, 2006).

A significant change happened when Salt Lake City television station KTVX reported in November of 1998 that Sonia Essomba, daughter of IOC member René Essomba, had been attending American University in Washington, D.C. and that her tuition, rent, and expenses were being paid for by the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002 (SLOC) (Mallon, 2000). Immediately, the SLOC Executive Board instigated an investigation.

What the SLOC Board of Ethics determined was:

- The total amount Sonia Essomba received for tuition, rent, and expenses at American University was US$108,350.
- Sibo Sibandze, son of IOC Member David Sibandze of Swaziland, received US$111,389.12 from the Salt Lake bid and organizing committees.
- John Kim, son of Kim Un-Yong of South Korea, was aided in gaining employment at Keystone Corporation by SLOC president Tom Welch. SLOC was reimbursing Keystone the cost of Kim's employment, up to US$100,000.
- Jean-Claude Ganga of the Republic of Congo visited Salt Lake City six times, during which he was treated for hepatitis, his mother-in-law had total knee replacement surgery and his wife had cosmetic surgery. All of these medical expenses were billed to SLOC; the travel expenses alone for Ganga and his family exceeded US$115,000. Moreover, he received direct cash payments of US$70,000 and participated in a real estate investment scheme that netted him a profit of US$60,000 (SLOC Board of Ethics, 1999, as cited in Mallon, 2000).

Salt Lake City had lost the 1991 IOC vote to host the 1998 Winter Olympics by only four votes. The SLOC Board of Ethics concluded Salt Lake City had lost the 1998 vote because of the "extreme measures taken by the Nagano bid committee to 'befriend' IOC Members" (Mallon, 2000, p. 13). In fact, Japanese companies made donations that may have been in excess of US$15 million to the IOC Museum in Lausanne shortly before the 1991 vote (Mallon, 2000). After the loss, SLOC President Tom Welch and the SLOC even went so far as to codify their mission for international relations in their internal bid documents for the 2002 Winter Games; they were determined to win at any cost, and with direct methods. The operation was to "plan and implement a campaign to secure the winning number of IOC member votes for Salt Lake City in Budapest in 1995" (SLOC Board of Ethics, 1999, as cited in Mallon, 2000). Their goal was to create vote-influencing relationships with individual IOC members, other key members of the Olympic Family, and the USOC (Mallon, 2000). Personal influencing is exactly the trap the Hodler Rules aimed to avoid, but Salt Lake City's bid committee ignored them, and so did a significant number of IOC members.

The IOC launched its own investigation (as did the SLOC, the USOC, the US Senate, and the FBI) led by long-time IOC Member, Dick Pound of Canada (Mallon, 2000). The next two IOC presidents, Jacques Rogge and Thomas Bach, would sit on the six-person IOC ad hoc Commission to Investigate the Conduct of Certain IOC Members and to Consider Possible Changes in the Procedures for the Allocation of the Games of the Olympiad and Olympic Winter Games. By the 23rd of January 1999, Pound and his colleagues presented their findings thus far to the IOC Executive Board. As a result of the findings, the Executive Board immediately suspended six IOC members, pending the final report and a vote from the general IOC Membership at a special session of the IOC in March of that year. At that IOC session, the suspension of all six members was upheld, and two new commissions were created to reform the structure of the IOC (a reform commission and an ethics commission) to make sure this kind of corruption would never again occur (Mallon, 2000). In the end 10 IOC members would lose their membership or resign because of the scandal.

At the Extraordinary Session of the IOC in December of 1999, the reform commission (the IOC 2000 Commission) made numerous recommendations, all of which were enacted by

IOC votes. The most significant changes were: an age limit of 70 for members of the IOC; creating four classifications of IOC members (athletes, NOC Presidents, IF Presidents and individual members); eliminating visits by IOC Members to bid cities; allowing the media to view IOC sessions through closed-circuit television; more financial transparency; the elimination of all gifts between bidding cities and IOC members and their associates; and finally, a significant change in the host city bidding process (Mallon, 2000).

The new bid process was to a two-part process taking place over two years. In the first phase, cities were labeled as applicant cities, and then if their bids were viable, they were given the status of candidate city. This theoretically would reduce costs for host cities and eliminate some of the opportunities for corruptive practices to occur (Oliver & Lauermann, 2017). The second phase was still a competitive process, but only open to approved candidate cities.

During the period of time between the initial allegations in November of 1998, and the adoption of the IOC's reforms in December of 1999, additional allegations came to light in regard to other bid candidates, some of which were:

- The Amsterdam 1992 bid committee reportedly tried to entice IOC members' votes with prostitutes, jewelry, and VCRs (Wenn & Martyn, 2006).
- The Nagano 1998 bid committee spent approximately C$33,000 in gifts and travel enticements on each of 62 IOC members that visited the city (Wenn & Martyn, 2006).
- When Toronto bid for the 1996 Games in 1990, 26 IOC members were found to have broken travel rules by coming with more than one guest, staying longer than they were supposed to, and using first-class tickets. Toronto's bid would cost over US$14 million (Cohen & Longman, 1999).
- Nagano 1998's accounting records were reportedly torched and destroyed by the organizing committee because they contained 'secret information' (Zimbalist, 2015).

Bid committee's excessive gift giving to IOC members was not confined to the general membership. Juan Antonio Samaranch lived an extraordinarily luxurious lifestyle, traveling the world as if he were the head of a large country, all paid by the IOC or bid committees. He was not apologetic about it (Cohen & Longman, 1999). Among the lavish gifts was accommodation during the Nagano Games at the Imperial Suite of the Kokusai Hotel. The room cost was close to US$3,000 per night, with a total cost of US$75,000 for less than four weeks. Additionally, he was given a Japanese sword and painting each valued at about US$16,000. In 1991, prior to the IOC vote for the 1998 Games, he travelled in a private three car train for his trip from Tokyo to Nagano, at least a US$7,000 trip (Cohen & Longman, 1999).

The trifecta of political, security, and financial crises in the 1970s was one of the most considerable challenges in the IOC's history, and the organization's credibility was substantially damaged by a series of major disasters and developments. Despite this, the IOC emerged a stronger organization, due in large part to LA84, plus a willingness to fully embrace capitalism. The first credibility crisis was temporarily overlooked, but not forgotten. In a classic case of 'be careful what you wish for,' the IOC opened itself up to another crisis of corruption and immorality through the bidding process, going against the Olympic value of fair play. This new crisis may or may not have started from the top of the organization, but its leadership was at least culpable of turning a blind eye. The world noticed and the IOC came under fire; although the reforms were enacted relatively quickly in IOC terms, the scandal caused considerable damage to the IOC's reputation, and their credibility was further eroded (Hersh, 2018).

2.2.5 Sochi and the Overly Lavish Games / Gigantism

After partially recovering from the bidding scandal, another crisis was unfolding: a crisis of gigantism. Gigantism is the Olympic phenomenon that host cities produce Games on a massive scale, incurring incredible costs, building venues and infrastructure in excess of what the city actually would need post-Games (Baade & Matheson, 2016; Giannakopoulou, 2020a). As Dyerson (2015) suggests, the productions have, "become so grand that it threatens to limit the pool of bidding cities to the economic giants at the centre of the global economy… or to national governments willing to spend huge sums to promote visions of 'free-market' authoritarianism"

(p. 175). These governments are using the Games as a showcase of their country to drive investment and tourism and to reveal they are stable, successful nations (Schimelpfenig, 2018).

Games such as Athens 2004, Beijing 2008, Sochi 2014, and Rio 2016 were making use of the commercial opportunities enabled by the sea-change from the LA84 Games, but their models of hosting were on a monumental scale much more akin to Montréal or Munich than Los Angeles (Dyreson, 2015). It seems that history repeated itself in the implementation of grand Games plans from 1984 to the present.

And no Games has evinced the nature of gigantism more than the Winter Games of Sochi 2014. Even in 2008, only one year after Sochi was named host, scholars worried that Sochi could become a major issue for the Olympic Movement. Chappelet (2008) pointed out that Russia's chance for a successful Games, in regards to infrastructure and environmental impact, was very low.

Sochi is a seaside town on the shores of the Black Sea that has long been a summer escape for Russian elites. Plans to develop the town of 350,000 people into an attractive European destination were accelerated and amplified by hosting the Games, creating many venues and infrastructure that had little to no use post-Games (Zimbalist, 2015). Not a single venue existed for the Games, so every venue and facility had to be built from scratch, including all supporting infrastructure such as power, sewage, telecommunication, and road systems (Giannakopoulou, 2020a). This fact led to a US$51 billion-dollar cost being reported in the media (Farhi, 2014; MacAloon, 2016), with some sources stating that the cost including both sporting and infrastructure costs may have been as much as US$65 billion (Zimbalist, 2015). The final cost is uncertain, but it is clear the Sochi Games cost more than any Summer or Winter Games in history (Giannakopoulou, 2020a; Müller, 2014).

It is estimated that only 21% of the total cost in Sochi was for sporting infrastructure; the rest was for general infrastructure required to make the Games possible (Giannakopoulou, 2020a). Even though all estimates during the bid phase were on the high side, the Sochi Games still had cost overruns for sporting venue infrastructure of 585% (Müller, 2014).

Table 2: Costs and capacity of 2014 Sochi sports venues

Sport venue	Final cost ($)	Capacity
Coastal cluster		
Fisht Olympic Stadium	703 million	40,000
Bolshoy Ice Dome	302 million	12,000
Adler Arena Skating Center	226 million	8000
Iceberg Skating Palace	272 million	12,000
Ice Cube Curling Center	29.7 million	3000
Mountain cluster		
Laura Biathlon & Ski Complex	1.7 billion	–
Rosa Khutor Alpine Resort	2.6 billion	–
	Ski center (9 km ski tracks)	
	461.7 million	7500
	Extreme Park (36.7 million)	
	• Snowboard park • Free-style center	• 6250 • 4000
	Olympic Village (32-square hectare)	
	97.9 million	50 buildings/for 2600 team members
Sanki Sliding Center	241 million	9000
RusSki Gorki Jumping Center	2.45 billion (+media village)	–

Source: Giannakopoulou (2020b), Müller (2014), Anti-Corruption Foundation (2014)

A few of the reasons for cynicism about Sochi include:

- An entire mountain river was rerouted at great cost (MacAloon, 2016).
- The road and rail lines connecting the airport and venue clusters, built for more than US$10 billion, became too expensive to operate post-Games (Müller, 2015).
- Pay for workers, mostly migrants, varied between US$1.80 and US$2.60 per hour. Workers were often paid late or did not receive pay, and were housed in extremely dense and inadequate conditions, a direct violation of the Olympic Charter (Zimbalist, 2015).
- Before the Games, the 40,000 seat Fisht Olympic Stadium had no realistic planned legacy use. During the Games it was only used for the opening and closing ceremonies. After the Games, its roof was removed and 8,000 seats were added to

prepare it for the World Cup in 2018, where it hosted six matches. In between the Olympics and World Cup its planned use was for football, but the team that played in Sochi as of 2009 had a stadium with a capacity of 10,000, and had filled the stadium only once (Giannakopoulou, 2020a).

Sochi 2014 had a non-sporting agenda in addition to a lack of serious planning (Zimbalist, 2015). The Russian government had ambitious plans of developing the region as an attractive European resort, and hosted the Games as a strategy to "modernize Russian geography" (Golubchikov, 2016, p. 239) both in Russia and outside Russia due to its location on the Black Sea and away from traditional Russian power centers (Golubchikov, 2016). Hosting the Games was also a strategy to create greater soft power both within and without Russia. As for the soft power-strategy, it is clear that Russia regards the Sochi Games as a success. Vladimir Putin's approval rating went from 54% in 2013 to 75% post-Games, and to 86% in February 2015 (Saeed, 2015). The Sochi Games were certainly part of this consolidation of power. Outside Russia, however, the Games may have had the opposite effect, coalescing a view of Russia as autocratic and power hungry, while the damaging press certainly hurt its reputation as an attractive European destination (Zimbalist, 2015).

Setting Sochi aside, gigantism and cost overruns have been a problem for most of the recent Olympics in many types of countries and political environments. According to Baade and Matheson (2016), "the overwhelming conclusion is that in most cases the Olympics are a money-losing proposition for host cities" (p. 202). Even taking out capital infrastructure costs that go outside the sporting requirements of the Games (and can sometimes be many times more expensive than those requirements), the costs have become excessive. The average cost of sporting infrastructure at Games from 1960-2016 in 2015 dollars is US$5.2 billion. London 2012 was the most expensive at US$15 billion (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Beijing cost US$7 billion, Sydney cost US$5 billion, and Barcelona US$10 billion for sporting infrastructure costs. The Athens Games (a mid-tier city in a small country) cost US$11 billion when considering all costs, both sporting and general infrastructure, and may have contributed to worsening the economic crisis that engulfed Greece in the subsequent years. The Greek government was left with US$7 billion in debt following the 2004 Athens Games (Hersh, 2018).

Several distinct reasons for the ubiquitous cost overruns at recent Games can be recognized. First of all, bid committees deliberately underestimate costs and downplay projected complications in order to increase the likelihood of bidding victory. Next, extra features and amenities are added to venues that are unnecessary in a strictly sporting sense, but apply pressure to other competing cities to keep up. The Games currently require a massive amount of infrastructure, with approximately 35 different sporting venues, an Olympic Village, a media center, a broadcast center, transportation to all of these locations, medical clinics, and communications infrastructure. Because there is so much to prepare within a finite deadline, usual government and legal regulations can be set aside, enabling possible corruption and back room deals – just to make sure the Games happen on time without a hitch. Rushing inevitably leads to higher costs (Dempsey & Zimbalist, 2017).

These costs can be offset by the profits from hosting. However, economic impact studies that are commonly commissioned by bid committees prior to Olympic Games inevitably present a rosy picture. A 1996 Atlanta study forecast US$5.142 billion dollars in economic impact (in 1996 dollars), while a London study for the 2012 Games predicted an economic impact of £1.936 billion (in 2012 pounds) (Baade & Matheson, 2016). Even accounting for a difference in exchange rate, there is no way to believe that a study planned for 1996 should expect more economic activity than a study done in 2012, while the larger impact is in a less expensive market (Atlanta) than one of the most expensive markets in the world (London) (Baade & Matheson, 2016). "If one wishes to know the true economic impact of an event, take whatever numbers the promoters are touting and move the decimal point one place to the left" (Baade & Matheson, 2016, p. 207).

If gigantism is the norm, cost overruns and crippling public debt a usual outcome, and cost benefits not enough to justify the cost, why do any cities still look to host the Games? According to Baade and Matheson (2016), there are several reasons. First, there are always some winners, particularly in heavy construction and hospitality industries, who are often leading the drive to host the Games. Second, the aspiration to host may be propelled by the egos of country or city leaders as an expression of political or economic power. Third, the concept of the "winner's curse," an auction theory that when "parties are bidding on an asset of uncertain

value… the winner will tend to be the bidder who is most prone to overestimating the value of the asset… the winner is likely to be systematically disappointed" (Baade & Matheson, 2016, pp. 213-214).

The Salt Lake City bid scandal, crippling debts in cities such as Montréal and Athens, and the 2014 Sochi Games financial overindulgence all drove a deeper wedge into the IOC's credibility (Hersh, 2018). Sochi had to build every venue, and won the Games just as they would realize them, with a lot of money and aggressiveness, and also some very effective marketing and PR efforts ("How Sochi Won the 2014 Olympic Games," 2014). This aggressiveness, according to Hersh (2018), took its toll on the IOC, "Sochi was the straw that broke the camel's back" (p. 32).

In recent years the IOC has been beset by crisis after crisis, with a doping crisis as well as the bid scandal crisis and the gigantism crisis (Lesjø, 2018). Doping, while not the topic of this paper, must be acknowledged as another significant factor in how the IOC's credibility is viewed. Sochi 2014 has been the key factor in the gigantism crisis, leading to a slew of failed referenda (discussed later in detail) and an enormous amount of criticism, which helped usher in the creation of Agenda 2020 and its set of reforms (also discussed later in detail) (MacAloon, 2016). As gigantism has taken hold, it means that only cities with larger populations and in wealthy countries can afford the scale of investment and infrastructure (Essex & Chalkley, 2002). Mid-tier cities and developing countries are left out and only private sector boosters, such as developers, look to profit financially (Dempsey & Zimbalist, 2017).

2.3   The IOC, Sustainability and Legacy

Gold and Gold (2014) contend that the discussion surrounding the Olympics since 1896 has had four phases where a particular topic was at the center of Olympic discourse. The first stage was memory, the second was regeneration, the third was sustainability, and the fourth was legacy. All topics are still part of the discourse, but each has been more influential at different moments in history.

The first stage, memory, was an attempt to bring the Games back as a connection to ancient Western culture, adding distinction to the Games and, by extension, to the host city. Little was built (with some major exceptions), and the focus was on sport and prestige (Gold & Gold, 2013). The second stage, regeneration, had its rise after the austere Games following World War II, where cities increasingly looked to the Games as a means of accelerating urban regeneration (Gold & Gold, 2014). The third stage, sustainability, came about primarily in connection to the Winter Games as a response to addressing the environmental impacts that those Games can have in non-urban, natural, and sometimes protected areas, and was subsequently applied to the Summer Games (Gold & Gold, 2013). The final stage, legacy, is a fashionable word today, in which Olympic Games organizations profess a desire to have long-term positive legacy outcomes in the cities that host the Games (Gold & Gold, 2013). This section discusses the embrace of the latter two stages of discourse by the IOC in an endeavor to add understanding about the connection of these two stages to Agenda 2020 and its effects on mid-tier city bidding and hosting.

According to Chappelet (2008), the first Games to particularly take environmental considerations into account was the Winter Games of Sapporo in 1972. Venues were located close together to reduce transport issues and increase post-Games use, including moving a ski jump tower from the initially proposed site. Additionally, the Mount Eniwa downhill run, which had to be carved out within Shikotsu National Park, was removed following the Games and all removed trees were replanted.

The IOC's embrace of sustainability really occurred at the beginning of the 1990s in the leadup to the Winter Games of Lillehammer 1994. The Norwegian parliament led the way in 1990, when they included five 'green goals' as a requirement for the Olympic committee in its production of the Games. It required the committee to, "increase international awareness of ecological questions; to safeguard and develop the region's environmental qualities; to contribute to economic development and sustainable growth; to adapt the architecture and land use to the topology of the landscape; and to protect the quality of the environment and of life during the games" (Chappelet, 2008, p. 1892).

The bid committee acted in tangible terms. It employed an environmental coordinator early on, relocating the speed skating oval's planned location in order to protect a sanctuary for rare birds. It also committed to adhere to strict sustainability standards in its workspaces and bid committee activities. The protocols it created were later adopted by over 25% of Norway's municipalities (Chappelet, 2008).

Norway's leadership in moving the sustainability issue away from simple environmental protection initiatives to a more holistic view of sustainable development had a real effect, and the IOC acted upon this. In 1991, the IOC added language to the Olympic Charter that Olympic Games should be held "in conditions which demonstrate a responsible concern for environmental issues" (Gold & Gold, 2013, p. 3529). In 1992, long-time IOC member Dick Pound drafted a statement of principle about sustainability that was adopted by the IOC Executive Board (Chappelet, 2008). In 1994, the IOC added environment as the third pillar of Olympism along with Sport and Culture, and in 1996 more sustainability language was added to the Olympic Charter (Gold & Gold, 2013). By 1999, the IOC had enacted Agenda 21, which was a new set of policies designed to increase the focus on sustainability, improve socio-economic conditions, and strengthen the Olympic role of women, indigenous populations and young persons; unfortunately, it was completely overshadowed by the Salt Lake City bidding crisis (Chappelet, 2008).

In 2003 the IOC's ideas on the importance of sustainability were formalized with the creation of the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) program. This program stipulated 150 indicators in sustainable development, to be presented to the IOC in four reports over 12 years. Once at the initiation of the candidacy, one during the preparation phase, a year after the Games, and three years after the Games (Chappelet, 2008; Gold & Gold, 2013). By 2016, the IOC developed its first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategy when it introduced the IOC Sustainability Strategy. The strategy outlined three areas of responsibility for the IOC: the IOC as an organization, as the owner of the Olympic Games, and as the leader of the Olympic Movement (Helminen, 2018). The embrace of sustainability, according to Helminen (2018), "came quite quickly and late, therefore it has also been defined as opportunistic" (p. 39). Geeraert and Gauthier (2017) concur, "Despite these controls we are witnessing a negative trend:

recent editions of the Olympic Games have fallen short of their sustainability goals or have caused negative environmental impacts" (p. 16).

Just as the idea of sustainability was being written into the Olympic Charter and in other Olympic initiatives, the concept of Olympic legacy began to emerge as the dominant area of discourse, which it remains today. Its first mention was in reference to the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, but the word did not arise often, and wasn't mentioned much again until a 1980 symposium in Lausanne (Gold & Gold, 2017b) and again in the 1981 bid for the 1988 Calgary Games in reference to the specialized sports facilities being built as a planned legacy for those Games (Preuss, 2019).

The beginnings of the formalizing of legacy discourse began in the bid documents for Atlanta 1996, where they emphasized what the Olympics would leave behind for the City of Atlanta in sporting infrastructure and in a less tangible, but still important, community, organizational and academic legacy. Sydney 2000 similarly adopted this language, and since that time the discourse around the Olympic Movement has maintained legacy as its primary topic (Chappelet, 2008).

From 2000 onward, bid committees were asked to include legacy planning in their bid proposals, but according to Preuss (2019), OCOGs failed to take this part of their bid seriously and rarely followed through on promises made. By 2003, the Olympic Charter was amended to include the language mentioned earlier – that the Games should promote a positive legacy for Olympic cities (Maron, 2018). That language is still in place today. But it was not until London 2012 that legacy was a true, formal part of the bidding process when the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) took very careful planning steps to ensure that every venue would have a post-Games legacy use (Preuss, 2019). In 2015, the IOC finally created a new commission specifically created to consult on, manage, and supervise legacy – the Sustainability and Legacy Commission (Preuss, 2019). Legacy has been further codified in the Agenda 2020 and New Norm documents of 2014 and 2018 respectively and will be discussed at length in sections 2.5 and 2.7.

According to Gold and Gold (2017b), legacy is a vague, yet all-inclusive term that is "able to draw together disparate ideas and visions considered beneficial or indeed problematic beneath the same banner but allowing the details to be left for local resolution" (p. 10).

Legacy can be tangible or intangible, positive or negative, related to infrastructure or in non-material ways, intentional or unintentional, easy to measure or very difficult (Preuss, 2015). Legacy can change over time, seen as a positive in one era, or as a negative in a different era (Preuss, 2015). Athens' Panathenaic Stadium is a case in point. The stadium, built thousands of years ago for the ancient Panathenaic Games of Athens, was expanded and turned into a marble stadium in the 2nd Century, then left to the ravages of time. But when the Olympic Movement was reborn in 1896, it was once again renovated and used for those Games, and finally finished entirely in marble for the 1906 Intercalated Games. Yet again, it descended into (mostly) disuse during the 20th Century. It was given another life when it was used for archery and the marathon finish line for the 2004 Athens Games. It is now one of the premier tourist attractions in Athens and is self-sufficient. The stadium's legacy was seen differently in each era, and is generally now regarded positively (Georgiadis & Theodorikakos, 2016).

While legacy can be fluid, the IOC is now looking for planned legacy and for cities to leverage the Games for long-term benefits (Bason & Grix, 2018). The IOC's renewed focus on planned legacy has caused the term legacy to become ubiquitous in IOC and host city documents. The term was mentioned 49 times in the Candidature Questionnaire for the 2024 Olympic Games (Bason & Grix, 2018). In response to that questionnaire, Paris' bid for the 2024 Games discussed planned legacies, but it highlighted intangible legacies, as few of the venues or infrastructure will have to be built for the Games. Paris 2024's third candidature file legacy section spoke to education programs, consulting programs assembling ideas about Games' impact and legacy, programs promoting sporting participation and healthy lifestyles, and efforts to provide community members employment and opportunities through volunteerism (Paris 2024, 2017). Some of these aforementioned legacies are intangible and difficult to measure.

2.4   Public Referenda

As the crises at the IOC continued, seemingly back-to-back for the last 25 years, a lack of credibility revealed itself in the court of public opinion. Failed referenda in countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Austria and Canada (see Table 3) have occurred over the last 10 years. Governments and local elites boosting the Games were compelled into accepting these referenda or were inhibited by opinion polls that inevitably came out against hosting the Games (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017; MacAloon, 2016). When a referendum is held, and results indicate against bidding for or hosting the Games, politicians in a democracy would not attempt to go against the results (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017).

According to Guala (2009), citizen voting to bid on the Olympic Games in Europe has historically been infrequent, with the exception of Switzerland where referenda are central to Swiss democracy. Prior to 2010, bid referenda had about a 50% success rate in Switzerland. Besides the case of Switzerland, only one other negative referendum of note had occurred, in 1991 in the Italian Aosta Valley, where 84.7 percent voted against a bid for the 1998 Games (Guala, 2009). Two referenda did pass in Salzburg, Austria in 1997 and 2005 in terms of bidding for the 2006 and 2014 Games respectively, but the city did not win either of its bids (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017). Outside of Europe, and prior to 2010, there have only been a few other examples of referenda or votes regarding the Olympic Games, primarily in the USA. The most notable was in Denver, which had already won the right to host the Games of 1976. In 1972, a huge turnout of 93% yielded a 60% negative result on whether public funds should be used to finance the Games. As a result, Denver rescinded its offer to host the Games and the IOC awarded the Games to Innsbruck, Austria where the Games had been held only eight years earlier (Chappelet, 2008). Salt Lake City also had a referendum in 1989, which passed, but it was not on whether to bid or not, just on whether a sales tax revenue could be used for Olympic facility construction. Similarly, there was a successful vote in Atlanta in 1994 issuing bonds for the Games. Los Angeles had a similar vote in 1978 but rejected any public funding being used to host the 1984 Games. None of the USA referenda were based on whether to actually bid or not – that has been a peculiarly European phenomenon.

The turning point on Olympic bid referenda in Europe truly began in 2013. Graubünden, Switzerland and Munich, Germany both voted against a bid for the Winter Games of 2026, and Vienna, Austria also voted against a bid for the 2028 Summer Games. Zaragoza and Barcelona, both in Spain, and later Stockholm, Sweden also withdrew bids because of local politics (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017). During that period, Oslo, Norway did have a positive referendum to move forward with a bid. But all of this activity was prior to the Sochi Games where the Olympic Brand took a battering because of the stories of gigantism and cost overruns (Hersh, 2018). Post-Sochi, Lviv, Ukraine pulled out because of politics, and Krakow, Poland withdrew because of another negative referendum. This left only three bidders for the 2022 Winter Games – Beijing, China; Almaty, Kazakhstan; and Oslo, Norway. So, what was once a race of 10 cities was whittled down to three, without any IOC input (Lesjø, 2018; Könecke & de Nooij, 2017). The situation was about to become more dire.

"The bidding process for the Winter Olympic Games in 2022 can be considered a turning point in the history of the IOC and the Olympic Movement" (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017, p. 3). According to MacAloon (2016), this was because Europe has been the center of the Olympic Movement – its home and biggest supporter throughout the modern Olympic era, but that support was eroding. Following Sochi and the stories about its financial and environmental missteps, the only city that had a positive referendum for the 2022 Winter Games, Oslo, became nervous. The polling in Oslo to support the bid plummeted, and when it came time for the Norwegian Government to approve a financial guarantee for the Games, the government would not support it, blaming low public opinion (Lesjø, 2018; MacAloon, 2016). On October 1, 2014, Oslo officially withdrew as a bid city for the 2022 Winter Games.

The Oslo decision was devastating to the IOC because it was the obvious choice, a powerful, wealthy nation with the greatest winter sports legacy in the world, and clearly the best of the three bids (Lesjø, 2018). According to Lesjø (2018), Sochi happened at a critical moment in the Oslo bid campaign. Negative reports on finances, the Russian regime's record on human rights and a controversy on LBGT rights prior to the Games, along with the reports of Russian doping violations all contributed to public opinion. Lesjø (2018) stated, "Public opinion's ambivalence may be formulated as 'Yes' to the Winter Olympics but 'No' to its owner, the IOC"

(p. 61). While Norwegians love winter sport and the Olympics, they were critical of the lack of accountability by the IOC toward its acceptance of autocratic states. In the end, the IOC only had bids from two autocratic states that have questionable human rights records and a severe lack of transparency (Lesjø, 2018). In the end, Beijing won the bid for the 2022 Winter Games.

Könecki and de Nooij (2017) write about the difference in Olympic bidding between democratic and authoritarian regimes. They note that democracies are significantly less likely to see their bids through to the end of the bid process, and that authoritarian governments are very likely to complete the bid process. Pressures from external stakeholders, such as the media, activist groups, or the population at large, are simply not as likely to be considered in autocratic states, and citizens are less likely to oppose any governmental decision. Könecki and de Nooij (2017) suggest that the IOC uses these authoritarian states and bids, despite being in direct violation of the Olympic Charter, as an insurance policy when all other bids go by the wayside from one type of political pressure or another. The IOC's financial existence is completely reliant on the Olympic Games and with no Games, the IOC could cease to exist. The IOC was forced to use that 'insurance policy' to keep the Olympics alive by choosing Beijing 2022 when Oslo pulled out of bidding.

In December of 2014, just two months after Oslo withdrew, the IOC released Agenda 2020, the set of reforms designed to make the Olympics less expensive to bid on and produce, and more attractive to cities. As MacAloon stated in 2016, "2024 bids will have to prove sustainable and the 2026 Winter Games attractive before the IOC can declare itself out of the woods" (p. 773). Five years later, it is clear this did not happen. The bids for 2024 Summer, 2026 Winter and 2028 Summer Games all had several referenda fail, among other political decisions (see Table 3), and it is clear that Agenda 2020, to this point, has still had little or no effect on the attractiveness of the bidding process.

Of the 15 cities that announced serious interest in the three Games in 2024, 2026 and 2028, only four made it to the end of the process. Seven of the cities (Boston, USA; Vienna, Austria [pre-Agenda 2020]; Hamburg, Germany; Budapest, Hungary; Innsbruck, Austria; Sion, Switzerland; and Calgary, Canada) all pulled out because of negative referenda or threats of a

referendum that would likely fail. The others all pulled out because of political reasons, or in the case of Sapporo, because of the after-effects of the large earthquake on the Japanese island of Hokkaido as it was preparing the bid. Sapporo announced it would later bid for 2030 instead. Interestingly, this list even includes former Olympic hosts that should have a percentage of the infrastructure needed already in place.

Table 3: City referenda on Olympic Bids 2022, 2024/28, 2026

Bidding Process for Olympic Games in…	City	Country	In case of referendum: Referendum against Bid	Bid terminated due to political concerns	Host City for Games in…
2022 (pre-Agenda 2020)	Zaragoza	Spain		YES	
	Barcelona	Spain		YES	
	Munich	Germany	YES		
	Graubünden	Switzerland	YES		
	Stockholm	Sweden		YES	
	Lviv	Ukraine		YES	
	Krakow	Poland	YES		
	Oslo	Norway	NO	YES	
	Almaty	Kazakhstan			NOT elected
	Beijing	China			2022
2024/28 (post-Agenda 2020)	Boston	USA	THREAT	YES	
	Vienna	Austria	YES		
	Hamburg	Germany	YES		
	Rome	Italy		YES	
	Budapest	Hungary	THREAT	YES	
	Paris	France			2024
	Los Angeles	USA			2028
2026 (post-Agenda 2020)	Innsbruck	Austria	YES		
	Sion	Switzerland	YES		
	Graz	Austria		YES	
	Sapporo	Japan		NO	
	Calgary	Canada	YES		
	Stockholm	Sweden			NOT elected
	Milan-Cortina	Italy			2026

Source: Author's Own Table, Könecke & de Nooij (2017)

Instead of turning away a very good bid from Los Angeles for the 2024 Games (after it took over for Boston as the candidate city from the USA), the IOC awarded the city the 2028 Games and Paris the 2024 Games in an unprecedented tripartite deal (Schnitzer & Haizinger, 2019). This deal effectively bought the IOC time to further refine the bidding process, and hopefully public opinion, before awarding the Games of 2030 and 2032. For the 2024, 2026, and the 2028 Games, the only "loser" of all four cities to make it to the end of the bidding process, Stockholm, didn't have a government guarantee from the City of Stockholm for cost overruns, but rather this was provided by its partner, Åre, a very small city that it would be hard to imagine could absorb the kind of cost overruns recent Olympics have had (Dempsey et al., 2019).

IOC president Thomas Bach was quoted as saying the bidding process needed to change because the, "process produces too many losers" (Wharton, 2016). However, it has only produced two losers in the last four Olympic bidding cycles, Almaty and Stockholm. It seems the problem is simply not having enough interested parties.

Residents don't accept that the prestige of hosting the Games is enough, they believe that the interests of their city must take precedence, evident from the spate of negative referenda. This is not the identity the IOC wants for the Olympic brand; instead, it wants a lasting positive legacy in every city, with the interests of the city and the interests of the Olympics going hand in hand (Hiller, 2020). Agenda 2020 and its attempt to improve IOC credibility and turn around the trend of negative referenda and public opinion is one of the most important topics of this study, and will be examined in the following pages.

2.5   Creation of Agenda 2020

As far back as 2002, the IOC publicly recognized that it had a problem on their hands with the size and complexity of the Games. The Olympic Games Study Commission (2002), quoted the IOC Coordination Commission for the 2000 Sydney Games, "Measures will have to be taken to control the future growth of the Games. The Games certainly must not be allowed to grow any larger, otherwise they will present a major risk" (p. 3). An unnamed Olympic organizer suggested that, "the IOC has to be careful that it doesn't become a victim of its own success"

(Olympic Games Study Commission, 2002, p. 3). Unfortunately, the report transferred a good amount of the responsibility to Games organizers, with the IOC not taking full responsibility (Toohey, 2008), and the new set of reforms had little effect.

According to Chappelet (2014), efforts to keep the Games' size in check prior to Agenda 2020 had focused on the Games program – taking away or adding events, sports or disciplines, including capping the number of sports at 28 and the number of events at around 300. But the cap on sports and athletes didn't actually address the full issue, as the number of competitors in each sport can vary widely (some with only 100 competitors, while some may have 500). Additionally, it did not address the technical infrastructure needed for certain sports, such as canoe courses and velodromes, which are much more expensive and difficult to build than venues for fencing or judo, only requiring simple gyms. Agenda 2020 aimed to target further, more tangible ways of reducing size.

When Thomas Bach was elected to the presidency of the IOC in September 2013, he began the process of creating Agenda 2020, with full approval from the IOC Session that took place at Sochi 2014 (MacAloon, 2016) and was very closely connected with the IOC 2000 Commission, which Bach was a part of, with one big difference. This time they collected over 40,000 public submissions which were processed through 14 working groups over the course of 2014, all in the aftermath of the bad press over Sochi and the worsening crisis over the 2022 bid process (Baade & Matheson, 2016; MacAloon, 2016; Oliver & Lauermann, 2017; Schnitzer & Haizinger, 2019). As MacAloon (2016) says, "each successive defection from the contest for the 2022 Winter Games increased the pressure on IOC members to respect the Agenda 2020 process and to anticipate real change" (p. 769). At the December 2014 Session, the IOC approved all 40 recommendations as finalized by the working groups, only weeks after Oslo pulled out of the race for the 2022 Winter Games (MacAloon, 2016).

Oliver and Lauermann (2017) contend that Agenda 2020 was an attempt to avoid future bidding crises when there is a lack of applicant cities. It is clear the main focuses of the document, and most immediate concerns, were bidding procedures, sustainability, and legacy (MacAloon 2016; Oliver & Lauermann, 2017). The Agenda 2020 recommendations also had a

further emphasis on supporting human rights, improving transparency and good governance, reducing spending, and a heightened focus on gender balance. This is further clarified in Thomas Bach's opening speech at the 127th IOC Session in Monaco on December 7, 2014, "With a new philosophy in the bidding procedure we are encouraging potential candidate cities to present to us a holistic concept of respect for the environment, feasibility and of development, to leave a lasting legacy" (International Olympic Committee, 2014, p. 4). The following IOC recommendations concentrate on the operational requirements of planning and producing the Games:

- Recommendation 1: Shape the bidding process as an invitation
- Recommendation 2: Evaluate bid cities by assessing key opportunities and risks
- Recommendation 3: Reduce the cost of bidding
- Recommendation 4: Include sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games
- Recommendation 12: Reduce the cost and reinforce the flexibility of the Olympic Games management
- Recommendation 13: Maximize synergies with Olympic Movement stakeholders (International Olympic Committee, 2014)

Under recommendation 1 there are several supplementary, but very important points: the IOC will now provide an assistance phase with the IOC taking a much more active role in the coordination of the Games; the IOC is to actively promote the maximum use of existing facilities and temporary venues; there is now flexibility for events held outside the host city or even the host country for reasons of sustainability; the IOC will make the Host City Contract (HCC) publicly available; and the HCC will now include details on the financial contribution of the IOC to the OCOG (International Olympic Committee, 2014).

Recommendation 2 also has additional important points: first, the IOC will now give cities a more positive bid evaluation when maximizing the use of existing facilities and temporary venues when no long-term venue legacy is justifiable; second, the IOC will clarify the two different budgets of the Games between long-term infrastructure and operational budget with the IOC contribution to the OCOG to be emphasized (International Olympic Committee, 2014).

Following the Agenda 2020 recommendations, the bid process was changed, instituting the 'invitation phase,' which is not a formal commitment to bid, but a time to create an exchange of ideas between potential candidates and the IOC. Then approved candidate cities moved to a candidate phase where they would submit three separate sets of bid documents, requiring approval after each stage by the IOC Executive Board before moving to the next round. Then, the full IOC membership would elect the next host from all cities that make it to the final bid submission (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017; Oliver & Lauermann, 2017). This process was instituted for the choice of the 2024 Summer Games. The IOC would now attempt to help cities align their infrastructure needs with the Games requirements (Oliver & Lauermann, 2017).

The reaction to Agenda 2020 from scholars and critics has been decidedly mixed. Hirthler (2015) says it is a "game changer" (p. 8) and provides a much clearer blueprint for aligning city and Olympic needs, and that all host cities will be approaching the bid from the same set of standards. MacAloon (2016) says this model is one, "by which the IOC and the bid committees / OCOGs are conceived of as partners sharing more fully both responsibility and risk" (p. 772). MacAloon (2016) goes on to point out that the IOC is now "on record against white elephants" (p. 773).

Yet many more reactions to Agenda 2020 have been skeptical. Tokar (2020) says Olympic Agenda 2020 does not have a system of accountability written into it for host cities when they inevitably fall short of their stated goals. Oliver and Lauermann (2017) note that the decision to choose Beijing over Almaty, which had a much smaller budget for their proposed 2020 Games, was an early indication that the IOC membership has not fully embraced the ideas of Agenda 2020 that speak to fiscal responsibility. Dempsey and Zimbalist (2017) are harsher, "Agenda 2020 should be viewed skeptically by potential hosts. Until proven otherwise, it amounts to nothing more than spin" (p. 11). In their view, it is simply rhetoric that attempts to regenerate interest in bidding.

Similarly critical, and yet optimistically, MacAloon (2016) writes eloquently about the meaning of the words 'Olympic Movement,' the word movement and its definition being the key, "It is about passionate, determined, relentless action in favour of unrealized and difficult,

perhaps even utopian goals" (p. 774). A movement is always working against other rival or adversarial forces. He believes the IOC, in order to more suitably fulfill the goals of Olympism, cannot remain an apolitical organization and must move forward in a manner where it is actively involved in human rights causes. By extension, it must choose hosts that fit the profile it wants to project, which is often found in liberal democratic societies. To regain standing and credibility in these kinds of systems, there needs to be a real effort to reestablish the concept of an 'Olympic Movement.'

Chappelet (2016a) writes at length how the IOC is now not just the leader of an organization, but a complex Olympic *system* with thousands of stakeholders, in which the IOC's decisions, successes, or failings (or any other stakeholders), effect all of the other stakeholders. Further, Chappelet (2016a) points out that the IOC's self-labelling as a movement does not really fit in with how it implements its duties today. Scholars such as MacAloon (2016) feel the IOC should become not only the leader of this system but should rededicate itself to the idea of being the leader of a movement as well as a leader of a system.

According to some scholars, controlling that system in an accountable way is the key to moving forward. Geeraert and Gauthier (2017) suggest that while there are some weak mechanisms of controlling OCOGs, the IOC may be "unwilling or unable to control Games organisers" (p. 17). These Games organizers ultimately decide the fate of the budget and cost overruns, which have a massive effect on the credibility of the IOC. Because of this, the IOC has to make sure the concept of the bid is sound and relatively risk free from the outset, and that there is a realistic way to hold organizers accountable in their environmental, sustainability, and legacy goals. Additionally, everyone in the system needs to 'buy in,' and, as of 2015, one of the Olympic system's most important stakeholders, the USOC, still had not done so. Dempsey and Zimbalist (2017) point out that if the USOC did believe in Agenda 2020, it would not have chosen Boston over Los Angeles, because LA's bid was as close to the requirements of Agenda 2020 as it could possibly be, while Boston's bid was risky and costly.

As of this writing, and as discussed earlier, in the years since the introduction of Agenda 2020, referenda have continued to fail globally, and the bidding crisis has not abated. In 2017,

the IOC made the decision to award both Paris and Los Angeles the 2024 and 2028 Games respectively. These are two bids that fall in line quite neatly with Agenda 2020, but both cities are also global giants with pre-existing infrastructure that allows them to do what most other potential host cities cannot: host a Games with almost their entire budget going to operational expenses.

2.6   Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028, Tokyo 2020

2.6.1   Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028

Paris and Los Angeles will both host the Olympics for the third time when they respectively host the Games in 2024 and 2028. Both cities have long Olympic traditions, and also have been consistent bidders. They are also both global giants, whose existing infrastructure will allow them to host the Games with minimal risk and minimal build, in-line with Agenda 2020 requirements. Könecke and de Nooij (2017) and Kassens-Noor (2020) believe the decision to award both the 2024 Games and the 2028 Games (after all other bidders for 2024 had withdrawn) simultaneously allowed the IOC to gain time before the next Summer Games bidding process for 2032. In addition, they believe the IOC views it as important that three straight Summer Games will be hosted in democratic countries – Japan, France, and the USA – after the 2022 Winter Games election which damaged its credibility in the West and happened after the reforms of Agenda 2020 had taken effect. Critics say this unprecedented decision to award two Games was a "result of desperation on the part of the IOC to hang on to its remaining bidders" (Dempsey et al., 2019, p. 26).

The IOC's perspective from the IOC 2024 Evaluation Commission was focused only on the positives of the choice, "We have two very different cities with two great proposals that truly fit their own unique circumstances, promising legacies that will benefit the local populations and the Olympic Movement long into the future" (International Olympic Committee, 2017d, p. 12). The commission report points out LA's bid had "fully embraced" (International Olympic Committee, 2017d, p. 12) Agenda 2020 and that LA has capable venues in excess of what is needed to host the Games.

The Paris bid for 2024 put a large focus on the use of existing or temporary venues, with 93% of all venues needed for the Games falling in those categories (International Olympic Committee, 2017d). The bid's three large builds are a new aquatics center, which will cost approximately US$123 million, the Paris Arena II, which was planned to be built regardless of the Games, and the Athletes' Village, at a very large expense of US$1.5 billion (although none of these venues are part of the official Paris budget as they are not included in the operational expenses of the Games themselves) (Paris 2024, 2017). The Paris bid discusses the legacy plans of these venues several times, noting they have a strong planned use following the Games (Paris 2024, 2017). Legacy is a term Paris 2024 used often in its bid documents, citing the planned and continuous use of these venues for the city's residents. The plan complements a 2030 development plan previously approved by the Paris region in 2013 (Paris 2024, 2017). Thus, the Olympic bid proposal fits in with the city's long-term plans, not the other way around.

The LA bid for 2024 also focused on existing or temporary venues, but it had a greater emphasis on the "spirit of Olympic Agenda 2020" (LA 2028, 2017, p 4). The bid acknowledged the "challenging media coverage from recent Games, and unknown coverage of the Games over the next seven years" (LA 2028, 2017, p. 4) to emphasize that the Los Angeles concept of the Games is a necessary and replicable concept of the future for all Games (LA 2028, 2017). The LA bid concept sought to send a positive operational and organizational message that will resonate for all future Olympic hosts. The LA concept was grounded in using existing and temporary venues, as well as using the UCLA campus as the Athletes' Village (thus not building any new athlete housing) and the USC campus as the Media Village and Media Center (LA 2028, 2017).

Los Angeles, by taking the second slot for the 2028 Games, negotiated a financial agreement from the IOC which was somewhat similar to their deal in 1984. LA 2028 will receive money in advance, some of which will be used to support youth sport programs, and a special arrangement to keep more of any profit, adding to the chances of financial success for that particular Games (Maron, 2018). LA 2028 bid documents placed legacy plans as highly as Paris. Their concept was to provide a lasting legacy to the Olympic Movement by NOT building infrastructure specifically for the Games, in alignment with Agenda 2020. Regarding the Los

Angeles bid and plan, Maron (2018) states the city's "planning begins from the legacy of avoiding a negative legacy" (p. 18). Urban regeneration, building new infrastructure for the city, and building new sports venues were all unnecessary, and in accord with Agenda 2020. Dempsey et al. (2019) believe the LA Olympics "looks to carry that commitment to economic stability forward into the future with costs less than half that of other recent Olympics" (p. 4).

Projects of great magnitude inevitably generate some criticism, with LA 2028 being no exception. Kassens-Noor (2020) explains that LA and the USOC learned much from Boston's disastrous bid experience, namely to keep the process opaque and avoid public engagement, which is not necessarily what Agenda 2020 espouses. This helped to weaken any potential bid resistance, further aided by a shortened timeline than Boston had.

2.6.2   Tokyo 2020 (2021) / COVID 19

The Tokyo 2020 Games were awarded in September 2013, well before Agenda 2020 was approved in December 2014; despite this, Agenda 2020 reforms did eventually impact the Tokyo Games. Another key to understanding Tokyo 2020 is recognizing the city was assigned the Games at the very beginning of the referendum crisis, and thus the bid process was not as impacted as the processes for 2022 / 2024 / 2026 / 2028. That being said, there were only five total candidates compared to nine for the London Games eight years earlier, so a downward pattern was manifesting.

Tokyo is a global giant city, and one that could seemingly have had an Agenda 2020-like bid similar to Paris or LA because of its size and built-in infrastructure. However, that was not the bid committee's vision. They planned to build 10 new venues (Tokyo 2020, 2013) plus a massive new Athletes' Village (Wharton, 2019). Of all the new construction, the most controversial was the new Olympic Stadium, designed by famous architect Zaha Hadid, costing an estimated US$2 billion (Wharton, 2019). This would replace the Olympic Stadium built for the 1964 Tokyo Games. Agenda 2020's impact on Tokyo was most felt in regards to the stadium; the original stadium design was discarded, replaced by a new design that would cost about half of the original one (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017; Wharton, 2019). The combination of

Agenda 2020 reforms, and great public pressure put on organizers generated this substantial revision (Wharton, 2019). According to Zimbalist (2015), if the IOC was chiefly interested in reform and avoiding financial excess, Tokyo was probably the worst of the three choices, which also included Madrid and Istanbul. Madrid, for example, was budgeted at only US$1.9 billion dollars, less than the cost of Tokyo's original stadium design. Yet, the push for reform hadn't wholly begun, Thomas Bach took on the IOC's presidency in the same session that Tokyo was awarded the Games, and the Agenda 2020 process did not start for several more months.

Regardless of what positive impacts Agenda 2020 had on Tokyo's eventual bottom line, the costs have been enormous. The initial planned output was estimated at $US30 billion, between Games operational expenses and non-attributed, but Games-related, infrastructure costs. This may have dropped to about US$25.6 billion after the changes credited to Agenda 2020 and The New Norm were made (Rowberg & Rinckner, 2019; Wharton, 2019). However, costs have increased due to the postponement of the Games to 2021 and the additional measures that will need to be implemented to mitigate the dangers of COVID-19. Pavitt (2020) reports that additional expenses due to the postponement and COVID-19 will be US$2.8 billion on top of the already planned expenses, even though the Organizing Committee is carrying out cost savings measures in most areas. All of the early decisions combined with recent impacts from COVID-19 will make Tokyo one of the most expensive Games in history. Boykoff and Gaffney (2020) believe the IOC is not fulfilling its promises to environmentalism and sustainability, and appears not concerned enough about the human cost to Japanese taxpayers having to pay for these increases. They hoped the cost of the Games and the IOCs attitude about it would be the focus of the dialogue surrounding these Games, but these issues may take a temporary backseat to current COVID -19 challenges. This assessment was written before the full impacts of COVID-19 have been realized.

Not only did COVID-19 delay the Tokyo Games by at least a year to 2021, it is possible that the Games may not even happen, which would be disastrous for Olympic Movement stakeholders, including the Tokyo organizing committee, the IOC, and the IFs and NOCs who rely on cash disbursements from the IOC for the bulk of their own budgets. *Inside the Games*

sportswriter David Owen (2020) says, "I still do not believe that anyone can say with certainty whether Tokyo 2020 will go ahead."

If it does happen, the Tokyo Olympics may have a completely different look and feel, with few or even no spectators, or only local spectators, and there may be many competitors who choose not to compete for safety reasons (Owen, 2020). However, in Owen's (2020) estimation, it is likely that the IOC and the Tokyo organizing committee will move forward with the Games. Television is the largest generator of income for the Olympics, with sponsorship a close second. If the Games still occur with most of the athletes expected to compete, then the IOC will be able to achieve most of its expected income from the Tokyo Games (Owen, 2020).

2.7   The New Norm

The introduction of Agenda 2020 ushered in new round of reforms for the IOC. In many ways, Agenda 2020's recommendations were only suggestions, with little specificity behind them. The New Norm, published in 2018, codified the changes recommended in 2014 by Agenda 2020, with 118 definitive new rules and requirements. Seeing that the rate of negative referenda had not slowed down since the introduction of Agenda 2020, the IOC hopes that the clear-cut changes proposed in The New Norm will ultimately have the anticipated impact of improving perception and making Olympic hosting more attractive (Schnitzer & Haizinger, 2019). As part of a tranche of reforms, The New Norm set down specific requirements regarding changes to the bid process and production of the Olympics that should precipitate significant cost savings for future host cities.

According to Schnitzer and Haizinger (2019), The New Norm established three major initiatives: a redesign of the candidature process, a new strategy in regards to legacy approach, and the introduction of a new partnership concept called the '7-year Journey Together'. They describe attributes of The New Norm, "the candidature process for the OG bid should become more efficient and cost-effective for potential bidders, whilst the operational requirements for host cities delivering the Games should be reduced, the Olympic legacy should be secured throughout the event lifecycle" (p. 3). The document also introduced more flexibility regarding

the number and size of training and competition venues, as well as the Olympic Village, International Broadcast Center, and the Main Press Center.

The full contents of The New Norm are too extensive to place into this document in full, but below are important excerpts. (For further information see Appendix II):

Candidature

Stage One, "Dialogue", is non-committal and enables the city to explore options and opportunities openly and in depth with the IOC and its stakeholders. Cities are not required to submit formal proposals and guarantees or deliver presentations during Stage One.

Stage Two, a shorter and lighter "Candidature" phase, emphasises the way that Games proposals should align with the city's long-term local, regional and national development goals. During this stage, details regarding organisation and delivery are also provided by the cities.

Throughout the process, the IOC will provide technical experts to help cities and NOCs develop their candidature concepts. All have extensive experience in bidding for and hosting Olympic Games, with specialised knowledge related to areas such as sports, venues, infrastructure, transport, accommodation, security, sustainability, legacy, finance and marketing. Costs for all expert support visits are covered by the IOC and the same group is available to all cities (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 4).

Legacy

Securing long-term benefits from hosting the Olympic Games has long been a recognised goal for the Olympic Movement. The Games leave tangible and intangible benefits, ranging from sports participation and infrastructure to social and economic legacies.

Realising positive and enduring benefits from the Games needs consistent focus and management. To be successful, such planning should also be synchronised with the host city's long-term urban development goals.

Objective 1: Embed legacy through the Olympic Games lifecycle

Objective 2: Document, analyse and communicate the legacy of the Olympic Games

Objective 3: Encourage Olympic legacy celebration

Objective 4: Build strategic partnerships (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 5)

As covered earlier in section 2.5, the bidding process changed following the publication of Agenda 2020 to a two-step "invitation" and then "candidate city" process with three stages during the candidate city portion. This process was in place for the 2024 Summer Games bidding contest. Yet even this simplified process was deemed too demanding and expensive, and it was replaced by the process set out in The New Norm for the Winter Games of 2026. The "invitation" stage was now called "dialogue," and instead of requiring three separate submissions by the host city, there was now only one bid submission that was then voted on by the IOC membership to bestow hosting rights (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, pp. 14-15).

As pointed out in The New Norm document, a desire for positive legacy has been part of the Olympic Charter for quite some time, but several new additional keys are outlined. First, planning should be in-line with the city's long-term urban planning goals. Those goals should come first, and development should not happen *because* of the Olympics. Also, it is important to note that cities are now expected to think of legacy at the *very beginning* of their planning process, instead of as an afterthought. The New Norm stresses the need for legacy to be at the heart of every Games bid.

There has been very little discussion and academic scholarship analyzing The New Norm to date. Its true impact will not be known for many years; however, in the literature on this topic, Kassens-Noor (2020) believes that The New Norm's three initiatives were designed "to change the Olympic value proposition for organizing (not hosting) the Games" (p. 21). The New Norm is trying to keep the Olympics from appropriating a city's development needs and financial well-

being. Hiller (2020) believes The New Norm has the potential to change the single-host city model that particularly stresses city resources; if this new model takes hold, it will be a test whether public opinion changes favorably.

The New Norm introductions make it easier and cheaper for global giant host cities that have the infrastructure to host the Games, but its impacts on mid-tier cities could be a challenge moving forward due lack of infrastructure required for hosting a large-scale international event. The next section discusses the concepts of global cities and global giant cities.

2.8   The Concept of Global City in Olympic Terms

According to Chappelet (2014), "much more than a sporting occasion, the Olympic Games have become a 'soft arms race' between powerful nations and a unique media event that shines the spotlight on existing and future global cities" (p. 591). So, what are global cities?

The term was first popularized in Saskia Sassen's seminal 1991 work "The Global City" in which she established the term and a definition. Her conception states that although internationalization has brought growth to smaller cities, management and top-level control of the globalized economy is concentrated in only a few major centers: New York, London and Tokyo. With the advent of a globally connected economy, one would think that power would be further dispersed, and the power of individual nations and cities would decrease. But Sassen posits that instead there was a "development of specific geographic control sites in the international economic order" (Sassen, 1991, p. 5).

New concepts and ideas have emerged since 1991. In 2008, Sassen expanded her argument to suggest all power is no longer in the hands of the nation-state, which used to be the dominant power in international politics and the authority over people and territorial space. Global cities have partially replaced this power because of globalization and digitization, privatization and deregulation (Sassen, 2008). The Olympic Games, according to Verbruggen (2002), may have had a small hand in this, suggesting that Coubertin's real genius was creating a

cross-national system of sports management that went across national borders, which during his time, were "extremely watertight" (p. 22).

Beyond the breaking down of international borders, the whole idea of the global city has expanded. In 2016 Trujillo and Parilla published "Redefining Global Cities," which was part of the Global Cities Initiative, a joint project between the Brookings Institute and J.P. Morgan Chase. They proposed the expansion of global cities, now including six large metro markets in their top tier of cities, called "Global Giants": London, Los Angeles, New York, Osaka-Kobe, Paris, and Tokyo (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016). The project breaks down the 123 largest metro *economies* into seven categories. Besides the aforementioned Global Giants, they also introduce the following: Asian Anchors, Emerging Gateways, Factory China, Knowledge Capitals, American Middleweights, and International Middleweights (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016). Trujillo and Parilla (2016) draw their conclusions on where these metro areas fit into each category on five considerations: tradable clusters, innovation, talent, infrastructure, and governance, and they use a wide range of real-world economic and social data that feeds each city into one of these categories. For a full list of all cities and categories, see Appendix III.

On average, Global Giants are home to 19.4 million residents, generate over $1 trillion in real output, have extremely productive and wealthy metro economies, with the second highest nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person and per worker of all the categories (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016). Global Giants serve as the "key nodes in global capital and talent flows" (p. 2).

"Asian Anchors" is a group of Pacific-based metro areas in Beijing, Hong Kong, Seoul-Incheon, Shanghai, and Singapore, plus Moscow. They serve the same purpose on the Pacific Rim as Global Giants do for the world economy, and are the economic hubs for that region of the world (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

"Emerging Gateways" are 28 cities focused mostly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, including Cape Town, Istanbul, Mexico City, Mumbai, and São Paulo. Their middle classes are growing, but they trail their global colleagues in key factors of competitiveness (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

"Factory China" are 22 Chinese cities reliant on export. These cities are growing, but still quite poor compared to many of the rest of the list's cities. Cities in this category include Chengdu, Dalian, and Shenyang (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

"Knowledge Capitals" are 19 mid-size metro areas that are productive and innovative, mostly in the US, with several from Europe. Cities like Atlanta, Chicago, San Diego, Seattle, Stockholm, and Zürich (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

"American Middleweights" are 16 mid-size US metro areas. These cities are moderately wealthy with strong universities and other anchors, but not as competitive as some of their contestants in the American market. Cities in this category include, Cleveland, Miami, Phoenix, Sacramento, and St. Louis (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

The final category is "International Middleweights," primarily made up of 26 cities in Australia, Canada, and Europe, with a few other outliers. Examples are Hamburg, Rome, Athens, Kitakyushu-Fukuoka, Tel-Aviv, and Toronto. These are globally connected cities, but still somewhat lagging behind since the financial recession of 2008 (Trujillo & Parilla, 2016).

When looking at the full list of 123 cities, all former Summer Olympic host cities (and many Winter host cities) are included except for Antwerp and Helsinki (the list of former Summer Olympic cities includes many mid-tier cities). With the selection of Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles, the Global Giant category is the only category of city currently hosting the Summer Games, consolidating Olympic power within the few cities in the Global Giant category, just as Sassen declares world economic power has been consolidated into Global Giants. Gigantism, politics, and financial considerations have all factored into this development within the Olympic Movement.

2.9   Olympic Infrastructure

2.9.1 Temporary Venues of the Olympic Games

One aspect of infrastructure build that has become increasingly important to the Olympic Games, particularly for potential mid-tier host cities, is the concept of building temporary venues. It may be the only way these kinds of cities can justify hosting, since the IOC now discourages leaving behind white elephants, huge Olympic Parks, and unnecessary infrastructure. The IOC cites sustainability and the wish to avoid negative legacy as the reason for favoring temporary venues. However, temporary structures built for the Olympic Games can still be very complex and costly. They are not necessarily the simple and cheap solutions they seem to be (Smith, 2014b).

The London 2012 Games employed the most temporary venues to date. The Games plan called for eight new permanent venues, 17 existing venues with overlays and small permanent construction, and seven temporary venues, with a total of 300,000 seats placed in temporary venues (Azzali, 2019; Nimmo et al., 2011). Of these temporary venues, the Basketball Arena has been the most examined by academics.

LOCOG decided early on that London had no permanent legacy use for a new 12,000-seat arena. But the Basketball Arena was a very complex build, as it needed to be used for four sports (Olympic basketball and handball, and Paralympic basketball and wheelchair rugby). It had to be able to be taken apart in components that could be recycled or reused in a sustainable way. It had a roof with a span of almost 100 meters. Nothing like this had ever been built in the UK before (Nimmo et al., 2011). Delivery of this venue fell to the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), which was responsible for the permanent venues and the most complex temporary venues, while LOCOG was responsible for the simpler temporary venues and overlays in existing venues (Nimmo et al., 2011).

The final decision on how and where to construct the Basketball Arena was not made until 2009, and construction was completed in May of 2011, a full year ahead of the Games. It

hosted its first test event in August 2011. In the end, it cost £43 million to build, £15 million under budget (Nimmo et al., 2011). But as Smith (2014b) points out, that is a great deal of money to be spent on a venue that is only going to have planned use for a little over a year, with its main events only of four weeks duration. In fact, it was almost the same cost as a permanent venue also built at the Olympic Park, viz. – The Copper Box. That being said, the Basketball Arena didn't continue to cost money in maintenance after the Games (once the dismantle was completed), and the cost was covered by the revenues the Games produced. However, immediate solutions for its dismantling were not truly considered, with assumptions made that it would find a new home somewhere in the UK or that it might even be transferred to Rio for the 2016 Games. This latter proposition became cost-prohibitive when transportation and reconstruction costs were considered. In the end, it sat unused for quite some years before 90% of it was sold off as component parts, reused, or recycled (Davis, 2019). "London's temporary installations were more impactful in terms of carbons and cost than they might have been" (Davis, 2019, p. 14).

Another large temporary venue that was built for the London Games was the Greenwich Park equestrian arena. This was a 23,000-seat arena built on the public Greenwich Park in the shadow of the National Maritime Museum, offering expansive views over London (Smith, 2014a). This venue was far more controversial than the Basketball Arena, with vocal opposition from locals worried about limited access to a public space and damage to the environment, as well as setting a dangerous precedent for future use (Smith, 2014a). On the other side of the argument, there were complaints from some in the equestrian community that there would be no tangible legacy left for their sport, or as Smith (2014b) says, "This highlights one of the problems justifying temporary structures in an era when every stakeholder wants their legacy priorities to be privileged" (p. 105). Similar to the Basketball Arena, the cost was also very significant. The venue was budgeted at £6 million, although it is rumored that it cost anywhere from £60 million - £120 million (Rayner, 2012) – although since the Greenwich build was financed by LOCOG, a private organization, there is no public documentation of this.

Regardless of the high cost that temporary venues sometimes incur, worries about use of space in dense cities, and environmental concerns, the IOC has fully supported the idea of

temporary venues in the wake of Agenda 2020. The 2024 HCC Operational Requirements for Paris note, "temporary venues shall be developed in the most cost-effective way, weighing the cost of the technical solution against the revenue-generating potential for the events it will host" (International Olympic Committee, 2018a, p. 201). This means the temporary venue should pay for itself in ticketing and other revenues from hosting the Games. And in addition to the wording found in Agenda 2020 and The New Norm documents, as well as the aforementioned HCC Operational Requirements, the IOC Sustainability Strategy states that the Games should, "maximise use of existing facilities and temporary and demountable structures, and only develop new permanent facilities that offer long-term benefits for local communities and contribute to the development of sustainable cities" (International Olympic Committee, 2017b, p. 54). These regulations will be in place for every host following Paris 2024, but will be implemented as much as possible for Tokyo, Beijing, and Paris in the meantime.

It is clear the IOC has committed to a path forward with use of temporary facilities, and this path is likely one of the only ways a mid-tier city will realistically be able to host future Games. Nevertheless, it is not without pitfalls in cost, environmental and carbon impacts, and will not always be supported by stakeholders in specific sports. Smith (2014b) believes that use of temporary facilities will be most effective when taking place on existing 'brownfield sites' where the controversies of using public space can be avoided and those sites can then be subsequently redeveloped as "conventional 'pieces' in the urban jigsaw or as open space (rather than as Olympic Parks)" (p. 105). The choice of using temporary venues will be a continuous balancing act between the desire for leaving the sporting infrastructure legacy of a city improved, and the real desire to avoid white elephants that continually produce long-term unsustainable costs (Smith, 2014b).

2.9.2 Urban Renewal and Creating Infrastructure Legacy

Since the 1960s, the Olympics and other mega-events have consistently been used as a catalyst for urban renewal and regeneration (Azzali, 2019). According to Smith (2017), urban regeneration differentiates from broad urban planning policy by its specific focus on rejuvenating particular geographical locations such as brownfield sites that have suffered in the post-industrial

era. Part of this phenomenon, according to Maron (2018), is because events have "great cultural power" (p. 158) as a link between moments in history, such as the Olympic Games, and urban space which can create a "collective urban identity" (p. 8).

City, national, and transnational 'elites' in politics, financing, real estate, and construction look to the Olympics as a way to capitalize on the 'collective urban identity' by hosting the Games and the built infrastructure they insist it requires without much input from the local community (Traganou, 2016). They use the Games as a way of leveraging funding that might not have otherwise have been available without hosting the Games (Hiller, 2002; Müller, 2015). The Games can also have a catalytic effect, serving to fast-track projects that might have happened in a city eventually, but would have taken much longer to happen without the looming and immovable deadline of the Olympic Games (Dempsey et al., 2019; Essex & Chalkley, 2002; Kassens-Noor, 2019; Preuss, 2015). This uncompromising deadline can lead to a major problem for the Olympics, what Lenskyj (2006) calls the "ticking clock" syndrome. This is the phenomenon that construction and urban regeneration must be completed in time for the Olympics, and because of that fact, cost control and the normal processes that are in place for bidding and good governance may be circumvented in order to complete the project on time (Hiller, 2002; Lenskyj 2006; Preuss, 2015). This can lead to initial budgets being ignored and to enormous cost overruns.

Additionally, the massive requirements of the Olympics can cause an Olympic host city to "contort itself to accommodate the thirty-plus Olympic venues" (Dempsey & Zimbalist, 2017, p. 158). The Olympics can seemingly force a city to make different decisions on the use of urban space than they would have without the Olympics. This can lead to oversized venues and stadiums that are little used and continuing to cost taxpayers (Azzali, 2019; Baade & Matheson, 2016; Davis, 2019).

According to Smith (2017), "The Olympic Games do not and cannot regenerate urban areas. Regeneration achievements are sometimes attributed to the Games when they are actually the result of parallel urban initiatives or macro-environmental factors" (p. 219). The results of regeneration are better when there is a pre-planned urban renewal and venue use in a particular

location closer to a city center, such as Atlanta. When the goal is to create an entirely new space and new demand, such as in Sydney, there is often the risk that the demand will take many years to develop and catch up (Smith, 2017).

Even a plan as seemingly urban renewal-free as LA2028 began with a major regeneration project in mind. The initial bid documents included new housing for the Athletes' Village in an area locally called the "Piggyback Yard," owned by railway giant Union Pacific (Kassens-Noor, 2020; Maron, 2018). This project, had it occurred, would likely have gone well over the US$1 billion budget and would have been very difficult to complete without major controversy. (Kassens-Noor, 2020). Even though LA had the informing document of Agenda 2020 and had all the infrastructure needed, the bid committee still initially tried to include a major regeneration project, showing how ingrained urban renewal can be for potential host cities.

Urban renewal for the Olympic Games can also have unintended consequences. Regeneration is supposed to improve the space and lives of the residents in what Traganou (2016) calls "spatial determinism" (p. 235). However, a redeveloped site now has increased value and the persons that lived there before may be pushed out as more affluent people move in, causing relocation of the previous local community and further deterioration of their living condition (Traganou, 2016). This kind of outcome is antithetical to the stated values of the IOC and Olympism's goal of "the preservation of human dignity" (International Olympic Committee, 2020b).

The Summer Olympic Games have abundant examples of associated urban renewal projects and infrastructure legacy. Some examples include:

Munich 1972 built an Olympic Park northwest of the city, extending a subway line to access it. The site was a former dumping ground for rubble from Allied bombing during World War II when Munich was almost completely destroyed. Seven venues were built at Olympiapark, all of which are still in use today. Since its construction in 1972, it has hosted at least 10,000 events. The Olympic Village and the International Broadcast Center (IBC) – Main Press Center (MPC) are fully occupied, or are part of a university complex (Hirthler, 2015).

Barcelona 1992 is likely the most well-known and celebrated story of urban renewal in the Olympic Games. What sets Barcelona apart is that its plans for redevelopment were in place well before they were awarded the Games in 1986 (Zimbalist, 2015). Early plans began in 1976, but the city's first feasibility study for hosting of the Games was not undertaken until 1983. By 1986, when Barcelona received the rights to host the Games, the organizing committee chose to refurbish a stadium originally built in 1936, with 27 venues already built and another five already under construction. Only five new venues still needed to be constructed, so the focus was not on building sports facilities, but rather on urban renewal of the city (Zimbalist, 2015). Eighty three percent of the cost of the Barcelona Games was on investments in urban infrastructure, with the entire waterfront being re-envisioned and rebuilt (Gold & Gold, 2008). Barcelona enjoyed increased stature as a travel destination in Europe over the ensuing years, in some part because of the Olympics. It rose from the 11th most visited city in Europe in 1990 to 4th by 2009 (Zimbalist, 2015). Despite many successes, there were some negative impacts for residents because of the redevelopment plan. The post-Games Olympic Village was supposed to have subsidized housing, but by 1991, almost all of the 6,000 units had been sold at market value to young professionals, resulting in high levels of displacement. From 1986-1992, new housing costs in Barcelona rose 250%, with similar increases in the rental market. (Lenskyj, 2006).

The Atlanta Games of 1996 were certainly viewed negatively in the immediate aftermath. With a terrorist incident, multiple organizational and transportation issues, an image as the 'disposable games', and extreme commercialism, it has a poor legacy image in Olympic circles (Hirthler, 2015). And yet there was a great deal of infrastructure built for the Games which has left a long-term Olympic infrastructure legacy to the city of Atlanta. Unquestionably, the jewel of the redevelopment plan in downtown Atlanta was Centennial Olympic Park (Toohey & Veal, 2007), the largest urban park built in the United States in 25 years. It remains Atlanta's most important legacy from the Games, not least because it served as a catalyst for further development. Since 1996, there has been at least US$2.3 billion in additional economic development in the downtown area, including building the National Center for Civil and Human Rights, World of Coke, and the American College Football Hall of Fame. (Hirthler, 2015).

Sydney's urban renewal strategy was to build Sydney Olympic Park as the main cluster of venues for the Games on a former brownfield site west of central Sydney – very similar to Munich's rejuvenation of a formerly polluted and run-down area. The site contained the main Olympic stadium, Stadium Australia (now ANZ Stadium), and numerous other venues for the Games. It now has nine major sport and entertainment facilities, and is surrounded by one of the largest urban parklands in the world (Toohey, 2008). Immediately after the Games, there was criticism regarding lack of use for the facilities, and legacy promises going unfulfilled. However, the park hosts approximately 1,800 events every year (Toohey, 2008). In 2001, the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) was created to plan and manage the park. The focus of SOPA has been to diversify the development of the park, adding residential housing and attracting business to its ever-expanding portfolio (Gold & Gold, 2017b). Similar to Atlanta, maintaining the legacy of the park has been a constant process of investment, which has been many times more costly than the initial building of the park.

The Athens Games plan was extremely ambitious. Not only did the organizing committee and the Greek government build an Olympic Park with a main stadium and many other venues, as in Sydney and Munich, they also built most of the venues beyond the Olympic Park as permanent facilities. These permanent facilities were intentionally built around the city, with the aim of providing sporting legacies benefitting many neighborhoods (Gold & Gold, 2017b). However, the legacy of the Athens Games sporting infrastructure has been one of the most criticized in Olympic history as, "there were neither specific master plans developed before or immediately after the Games to plan for the use of Olympic infrastructure nor any strategic authority charged with guiding further development" (Gold & Gold, 2017b, p. 16). There was no further legacy plan for many of the venues for post-Games use. Athens still has many venues with no planned use that are in severe disrepair, with a few exceptions that have been converted to non-sporting venues after years of debate and millions of Euros in additional investment (Davis, 2019).

The ambitious public works projects were much more successful in their implementation, with major investments in the metro, roads and railways, as well as the opening of Eleftherios Venizelos International Airport in 2001. There was also significant investment in pedestrian

walkways and links between archaeological sites centered in the area around the Acropolis (Gold & Gold, 2017b). Day-to-day life and tourist accommodations in Athens were improved. On the other hand, all the investment in sporting venues and additional infrastructure within the city happened too quickly and at too great a cost for a small country with a limited GDP to absorb without damage. According to Traganou (2016), some economists believe that the Greek state's investment in the Olympics was a significant factor in sparking the ongoing economic crisis in Greece, since the investments only helped particular sectors of the economy. With a cost of $11 billion, double what was originally budgeted, and covered mostly by the Greek government, the Greek public at large was disadvantaged, and are still paying for the mistakes of its government (Flyvbjerg, et al., 2016).

The Chinese government, similar to Athens, looked to the Games as a catalyst for city-wide modernization. There were upgrades in road and rail systems, airport expansion, utility renovations, and improvement in tourism, retail, and cultural facilities (Gold & Gold, 2017b). Beijing also created a massive Olympic Park. But again, as in Athens, many of the sporting venues sat abandoned following the Games, or were converted at great cost. The Bird's Nest stadium still has no viable permanent tenant, and the venues for kayaking, rowing, beach volleyball, and baseball were deteriorating only four years after the Games (Gold & Gold, 2017b). The Water Cube, the swimming and diving venue, is now an indoor water park. However, many of the venues will be reused or repurposed for the Winter Games of 2022, so there is some success in the intent that the Olympic Park would continue to attract international events post-Games (Gold & Gold, 2017b).

There is a great deal of scholarly literature on urban development surrounding the London Games. This is largely due to the fact that a great percentage of Olympic scholarship comes from the UK (Thomson, et al., 2018), and because it was the first Games to truly have a legacy plan in place from the outset of bidding. As Gold & Gold (2013) assert, "the emphasis on legacy was ubiquitous" (p. 3537).

While many venues were spread out across London in either temporary or existing venues, the London bid committee saw the opportunity for a major redevelopment and urban

regeneration of the contaminated Lea Valley in East London. In 2002, the Greater London Authority supported the bid project, believing the vision for the Games coincided with its new London plan eventually published in 2004, which would provide the catalyst for mobilizing public funding for the plan for East London (Davis, 2019). The vision was to create a site not only with sporting venues, but a mixed development with entertainment, housing, and business, creating a new high-tech hub for London. By 2009, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) was founded to create the legacy master plan for the park (now Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park) and all of its venues, including vendors to run and maintain all permanent structures (Davis, 2019; Gold & Gold, 2013). Similar to Barcelona, the plan preceded the Games.

The biggest challenge in securing the legacy of the park was the Olympic Stadium, now London Stadium. Original plans called for a large temporary venue, which would be reduced to a small, modest stadium after the Games, and become the home for British Athletics (Davis, 2019). But in the leadup to the Games, several football clubs showed interest in having their permanent residence in the stadium, and the plans were changed to make it a more long-lasting venue. When the very complex process was finished, and the stadium was reopened in 2016, the final cost of the reconstruction was £272 million. This was on top of the original construction cost of £429 million (Gibson, 2015).

In addition to specific instances in host cities, there are several other problematic aspects of Olympic urban renewal projects. First, there is the subject of transport. As Kassens-Noor (2019) discusses, public transport projects normally take so long and are so expensive that using the finite timeline of the Games as a catalyst is dangerous because it can cause poor decision-making and cost overruns by rushing to meet that finite timeline. Another problematic area is the Olympic Village. Dempsey et al. (2019) point out that the village is often built by a private developer, but in both Vancouver 2010 and in London 2012, the private developer pulled out of the project, leaving the city to cover the costs. If this happened under normal circumstances, the development would simply wait until another developer came along, and the city would not need to assume the financial burden.

Oliver and Lauermann (2017) indicate the risk involved for the IOC in the inclination for Olympic host cities to use the Games for urban renewal:

> Beyond the risk of the IOC being viewed as an urban development corporation in disguise, the propensity for bid cities to use the Olympic bid process to not simply develop an urban vision, but as a means to achieve that vision, is heightened (pp. 19-20).

Looking forward, it seems that Agenda 2020 and The New Norm are designed to take the urban renewal risk away in its wording and increase the focus on using existing venues (Kassens-Noor, 2019). Müller (2015) believes that the urban planning agenda needs to be completely dissociated from the Olympic project, which will decrease risk for all cities and the IOC. Despite some successes, the recent past shows that urban renewal as part of the Olympic project is largely a risky venture.

2.10 Conceptual Framework: Legacy Theory

Future bidders and host cities have many decisions to make. What does that city want their Olympic legacy to be? Tangible infrastructure, as in Barcelona and London? Or a less easy to define, but still very real, intangible legacy, as in the case of Los Angeles 1984? Will Agenda 2020 and The New Norm even allow for tangible infrastructure development? But what is the concept of legacy? What are the scholarly frameworks that outline theories of Olympic legacy?

Chappelet (2012) indicates that, "the concept of legacy is vast and above all somewhat unclear" (p. 77). He defines the legacy of mega-sporting events as, "all that remains and may be considered as consequences of the event in its environment" (p. 78). As mentioned earlier in section 2.3, legacy can be tangible and intangible, positive or negative, intentional or unintentional (Preuss, 2007). Many scholars have defined the characteristics of the term legacy, including the IOC in December 2017, "Olympic legacy is the result of vision. It encompasses all the tangible and intangible benefits initiated or accelerated by the hosting of the Olympic Games / sport events for people, cities / territories and the Olympic Movement" (International Olympic

Committee, 2017c, p.13). This is simple and direct, but does not address the potential negative legacy outcomes.

One of legacy's early definitions comes from Olympic scholar Richard Cashman in 2002. He defined six different types of legacies. First is economic legacy, a tangible justification of the costs and burdens of producing the Olympic Games, including balancing the Olympic budget. Second is a legacy of the built and physical environment, the changes in the city's surroundings and civic landscape in the form of urban renewal. Third is information and education legacy, passing down Games' knowledge and learnings, while also educating young people about sport and Olympism. Fourth is the legacy of public life, politics, and culture, defined as the new methods of collaboration and partnering within a city as a result of the Olympic project, as well as the upgrade of human skills and applications of technology. Fifth is the legacy of sport, which is in improved facilities and of sport culture within the city. Sixth and final, is the legacy of symbols, memory, and history left by the Olympic Games in any given host city – it is related to the memorable emotional history and legacy of the Games.

Cashman (2002) also notes that some scholars view tangible legacy as 'hard' legacy and intangible legacy as 'soft' legacy. These terms imply that some forms of legacy may be considered more important than others because of the difference in the ease of measuring the types respectively, but this may not necessarily be true. Is the LA84 legacy any less than the legacy of Barcelona 1992 in Olympic history because there was little physical evidence of the Games left behind? Most academics would probably agree they are on equal stature in many ways, albeit for different reasons.

Another Olympic scholar, Holger Preuss, created this definition of legacy in 2015:

(1) It lasts longer than the event and its directly initiated impacts. Legacies can derive from structures already completed before the event, but most legacy stems from changed location factors after the event takes place (time).
(2) It produces new opportunities out of an initial impact and may even develop its own dynamics over time as the environment changes (new initiatives).

(3) It consists of changes that bring positive outcomes for some stakeholders and negative outcomes for others (value).

(4) It may be tangible or intangible, or material or non-material (tangibility).

(5) It is essentially limited to a defined space, that is, a city, but some of its effects may extend beyond the city. It can be individual (affecting only one person) and local, or international and global (space).

(6) It is often developed indirectly by the event. A negative legacy reminds us that outcomes may be unintentional (intention) (Preuss, 2015, p. 647).

By 2019, Preuss had advanced his theories, pointing out that legacy is not the actual structural change in a host city, but the corollary result of the change, and he refined his definition into a simple statement, "Legacy is any outcomes that affect people and/or space caused by structural changes that stem from the Olympic Games" (Preuss, 2019, p. 6). He proposes a framework for the analysis of legacy outcomes as shown in Table 4. First off, every analysis must be based on the understanding that the Olympic Games invariably cause changes to existing structures. Secondly, those changes always have consequences for the people and landscape. Third of all, the impact of these changes creates value, but these values may be decidedly different for every stakeholder. Fourth, "The context in which a person perceives the consequence of a structural change influences the individually perceived value" (Preuss, 2019, p. 108). Fifth, the structural changes are going to occur in different realms, be it sport, culture, education, economy, health, or tourism, and these changes, positive or negative, will shift the value of the Games to each stakeholder. The focus should always be on improving quality of life for residents in any host city. Sixth, legacy is dynamic, with the perceived worth of structural changing over time. Finally, Olympic legacy is bound to the city or region in which the Games are held.

According to Preuss, the structural changes occurring within the Olympic Games are: Urban development (affecting space), environmental enhancement (affecting space), policies and governance (affecting people), human development (affecting people), intellectual property (affecting people), and social development (affecting people). He suggests all of these structural changes occur with every Olympic host, and the IOC maintains responsibility to maximize

positive legacy and leverage it for positive outcomes for both the city and the IOC. Because this structural change can be so enormous and the potential negative outcomes so dire, legacy must be formulated beginning in the earliest stages of bid development, "A legacy needs to be planned" (Preuss, 2015, p. 657).

Table 4: Preuss' legacy analysis framework

	Fundamental premises	Explanation
FP1	Olympic Games always cause a change of existing structures	Nature of legacy, assumptions
FP2	Structural changes have a consequence for people and/or space	taken from definition
FP3	The consequence of a structural change creates value determined by a co-creation of firms, stakeholders and environmental circumstances	Value creation from legacy for people
FP4	The value of consequences from a structural change is always a value-in-context	
FP5	The consequences of a structural change occur in different areas/branches and affect the quality of life	
FP6	The value of consequences from a structural change alters over time	Flexibility of the framework
FP7	The consequences of a structural change is always bound to a territory	

Source: Preuss (2019)

Finally, Preuss (2019) submits a basic system of legacy measurement for each of the structural changes expected from hosting an Olympic Games. To measure urban development, Preuss proposes to assess what urban infrastructure was changed because of the Games and then use the rating system to scrutinize the value-in-use for the end users of the changed infrastructure. For environmental enhancement, he recommends measuring the carbon footprint of all changes, including the chain of production. For the structural changes in policies and government, he proposes both qualitative interviews and quantitative questionnaires analyzing affected organizations. For human development structural changes, he advises developing interviews and tests to measure the increase in learned knowledge. He points out that it is nearly impossible to measure intellectual property changes because of the gradual development and implementation. For social development, he nominates, again, interviews or questionnaires since this structural change involves changes in beliefs or habits. Further, he suggests much more scholarship is needed to establish these measurement tools, which could be a critical topic for a future Olympic Legacy Symposium.

The IOC can no longer afford to create negative legacies, which is one reason why it is so important to study legacies. All of the above legacy information helps the IOC, the Olympic

Movement, and academics to further understand legacy and be better equipped to avoid future negative legacy. Martin Müller (2015) calls this negative legacy the "mega-event syndrome" (p. 6). He outlines seven symptoms of mega-event syndrome to be avoided by bidders and host cities at all costs, namely overpromising of benefits, underestimation of costs, event takeover, public risk-taking, rule of exception, elite capture, and event fix (See Table 5). Müller (2015) goes on to put forward fundamental important changes in Olympic policy: reduce risk by disassociating large scale urban renewal from mega-event productions, hosts negotiating with governing bodies for better financial conditions, cap public spending, and seek independent counsel about the costs and value of hosting. He also suggests that governing bodies should minimize the size and complexity of their events.

Table 5: Mega-event syndrome: symptoms / consequences

Symptom	Description	Consequences
1. Overpromising of benefits	Overestimating positive effects of mega-events	• Misallocation of resources • Loss of trust with citizenry
2. Underestimation of costs	Actual budget > planned budget	• Misallocation of resources • Profiteering • Subpar construction quality • Budget shortfalls
3. Event takeover	Event priorities become planning priorities	• Event needs displace urban infrastructure needs • Oversized infrastructure • Unfinished infrastructure
4. Public risk taking	Public takes risk for private benefits	• Public funds for limited or no public benefits • Profiteering
5. Rule of exception	Suspension of regular rule of law	• Displacement • Reduced public oversight • Limited public participation
6. Elite capture	Inequitable distribution of resources	• Spatially uneven urban landscape • Gentrification
7. Event fix	Mega-events become seemingly quick fixes for major planning challenges	• Event determines national priority for funding • Bypassing of regular planning process • Waste of resources on event as lever for urban development

Source: Müller (2015)

Gold and Gold (2017c) point out that discussion about Olympic Games legacy investments invariably evokes questions of equity. They argue there are, "five dimensions of equity connected with Olympic legacy" (Gold & Gold, 2017a, p. 307). They are: *intergenerational equity* – the disseminating of legacy resources from generation to generation;

social equity – in which all people in a society, regardless of class, have equal rights to the created legacy of a city; *economic equity* – in which Games legacy wealth is fairly distributed throughout a city population; *environmental equity* – a sustainable and healthy legacy for all; and *spatial equity* – fairness in the allocation of legacy, regardless of location.

Rogerson (2016) asserts 'legacy planning' should be replaced by the words 'event leveraging' because of the myriad of negative outcomes of legacy. Leveraging is planned, strategic, and increases the chances for positive benefits for all stakeholders, as long as a comprehensive approach is implemented (Chalip, 2014). Rogerson (2016) also notes the need for a greater emphasis on pre-Olympic legacy in order to maximize interactions between stakeholders and event processes, causing a further advancement in the discussions about value and event leveraging. In fact, Thomson et al. (2018) emphasize that the literature on legacy overwhelmingly agrees that pre-planning for legacy is essential to positive outcomes, as is a further focus on the plans following the Games. Chappelet and Lee (2016) echo the sentiment, saying "without strategic planning to cover the entire processes of such events, including bidding, host cities and their home countries are more likely to face disastrous financial deficits in the aftermath of the events" (p. 11).

Gold and Gold (2017a) argue that master planning is no longer in vogue in urban planning, and that Olympic infrastructure legacy is essential because it is driven by a formal and universal planning framework in a way that general urban planning is not. Maron (2018) indicates that most academic study of legacy focuses on infrastructure; although the focus on intangible benefits is growing, social and cultural legacies must be further studied to advance legacy theory and measurability. This is now more important than ever, especially for mid-tier cities, with the implementation of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm and minimizing infrastructure build.

There is an ever-growing body of Olympic legacy research and scholarship, but it is a vast field, with a plethora of different interpretations and definitions touching many distinct facets of the Olympic project. Yet the research comes from a fairly narrow group of authors, is very focused on individual Games and their impact, and has been around a relatively short time

(Thompson et al., 2018). Thompson et al. (2018) believe legacy research needs to be improved by a greater focus on interdisciplinary research, expanding the reach of the sport legacy analyst into more established fields such as economics, social development, policy, and planning. By broadening the investigations, particularly into social realms, the focus of the Olympic Movement may shift further away from urban development and closer toward the social aims its philosophy champions.

2.11 Where the IOC Invitation Process is Going: 2032 and Beyond

As mentioned in section 2.7, the candidature process changed between the bidding for the 2024 Summer Games and the 2026 Winter Games. Instead of a two-step process that was in actuality a four-step process, it was adjusted to become more clearly two-steps. The first stage of the 2026 bid process was a "dialogue" stage in which interested cities had one year of exploration with the IOC to assess the risks and benefits of hosting the Games, with a great deal of input for all interested cities from IOC technical experts, paid for by the IOC. Then it moved to a second, shortened, one-year "candidature" stage where dialogue and input were continually exchanged (International Olympic Committee, 2017a). One aspect remained the same, specifically, the entire current IOC membership voted to award the bid at the end of the process, selecting Milan-Cortina over Stockholm. According to Livingstone (2020e), cost of bidding for 2026 dropped 80% from the previous cycle, which could be considered a very successful change for the IOC. But as noted by Dempsey and Zimbalist in 2017,

> the International Olympic Committee appears to remain committed to the auction-style process it has overseen, and from which it has benefited, for more than a century. The IOC seems unwilling to make substantial and substantive changes… The predictable result will be that every two years the IOC's ninety-odd voting members will continue to select bids that meet the needs of the International Olympic Committee (and its media and corporate funders) even when these bids pose substantial risks (p.172).

The auction-style bidding was still present for 2026, and the problems of competitive bidding remained an unsolved issue for the IOC. The process was still not a true 'invitation', as stipulated by Agenda 2020; however, the IOC was not yet finished with updating the bidding process.

With continued bad press, more negative referenda in 2017 and 2018, and continued withdrawals, it was clear the IOC's instituted changes had not been enough to reinvigorate the bidding process. Schnitzer and Haizinger (2019) argue that taxpayers were still holding the IOC accountable for past mistakes, and city residents did not understand or accept the philosophy of Agenda 2020, despite status as an important stakeholder. It is also apparent when examining bid documents for the 2024 bid process and the 2026 process, as well as the IOC Coordination Commission documents for each, that the bids for 2024 contained much greater detail and were evaluated more positively than either of the 2026 bids (International Olympic Committee, 2019b).

At the 134th Session in Lausanne in June 2019, the bid process was finally turned into a true invitation process as Agenda 2020 promised in 2014. Future Host Commissions for both the Summer and Winter Games were instituted to ultimately decide the hosts of Games post-2028. The Future Host Commissions will have *permanent* ongoing dialogue with all interested cities, *regardless* of Games edition (International Olympic Committee, 2019a). This is called the 'continuous dialogue' phase. Additionally, the seven-year timeline to award the Games was abolished; the Games could now be awarded as far out or as close to the Games date as the IOC desired. There is some irony here as, just one year earlier, The New Norm had put forward a central theme of the '7-year Journey Together'. The Commissions will work with all potential host cities, engaging in constant monitoring and analysis of all interested cities simultaneously. The Commissions give regular updates to the IOC Executive Board (EB) on the progress of all potential host cities (International Olympic Committee, 2019a). At some unknown point, the Commission will make a recommendation to the Executive Board for the preferred host(s) for a specific edition of the Games. Then the Executive Board will begin 'targeted dialogue' with the preferred host(s). During this 'targeted dialogue' phase, the EB and Future Host Commission will work with the preferred hosts(s) to make the bids stronger and theoretically more in line with the IOC's strategic plans in legacy, sustainability, and all other Agenda 2020 and New

Norm recommendations. Then the EB will put forth a vote to the entire membership of the IOC who will then select the host for a specific edition of the Games at an IOC session (International Olympic Committee, 2019a). See Figure 2 for further information on the new bidding format.

Figure 2: IOC Future Host Commission Process

Source: International Olympic Committee, 2019a

Over the last 15 years, there have been many recommendations for improving the Olympic Movement and the bidding process. The next part of this section examines how select scholars and critics think the Olympic Movement should proceed. Some of these ideas may have been addressed by Agenda 2020, while others may not, yet it is illuminating to hear the ideas for a conceivable path forward beyond Agenda 2020 and the 2032 bid process.

In 2007, Toohey and Veal wrote about the advantages and disadvantages of the idea of hosting the Olympics at a permanent site, ending the ambulatory nature of the Games (discussed in section 1.3). They view the advantages as being: "the end of the 'bid circus'" (p. 283), cost savings, ideal facilities being guaranteed, and management benefits by having the same core staff at each Games. Conversely, they regard the disadvantages as: not spreading the benefits around

the world, environmental conditions would be fairly constant at the single site benefitting only one type of athlete for each Games, host country politics (what if the host country's politics changed dramatically?), and finally, what country would be chosen that would be fair to all? The newly introduced bid process seems to help with ending the 'bid circus' and installing cost savings, which leaves only the two weaker advantages to the argument for a permanent site.

In 2015, Olympic critic Andrew Zimbalist believed the Olympics could be held in a permanent site, although he stops short of recommending it. Again, the goal is to eradicate the bidding crisis and auction-style winner's curse. He also posited the IOC should consider four or eight-year terms for members, with a limit of two terms. Finally, he strongly urges the IOC to share more of the revenue from the Games with the host city or country. However, he fails to consider the effect this would have on the IFs, the NOCs and Olympic Solidarity. As of the last completed Olympic cycle from 2013-2016, the IOC took in $US5 billion, and allocated 50% of the revenues, or US$2.5 billion, to Olympic hosts in Rio and Sochi. But another US$1.9 billion, or 38%, went to IFs, NOCs and to Olympic Solidarity (International Olympic Committee, 2020a). If that money was instead given to host cities, the money pipeline for grass-root sport across the world would be turned off, and the Olympic Movement would suffer.

A rotational idea was proposed by Jean-Loup Chappelet (2016b), in which he argues that existing Olympic Parks could be used on a rotating basis as an anchor for each Olympic Games, as most continents have Olympic Parks with a significant number of venues in place. Asia (Beijing), South America (Rio), Europe (Athens and London) and Oceania (Sydney) all have the base of venues that would be needed to host a Games. Only North America and Africa (which has never hosted a Games) do not. This structure would solve the problem of constructing facilities and Olympic Parks at each Games, limiting costs solely to renovations, but it would keep new cities from hosting future Games.

Jacqueline Kennelly (2016) offers further recommendations. First, she asks the IOC to introduce real accountability measures into the bidding process to ensure that social legacy goals are actually met. She also echoes Zimbalist's assertion that the IOC should share more of the generated revenue from the Games with host cities. And finally, in her strongest

recommendation, she says that public money should not be permitted to be spent on the Olympics. She claims that this would "remove the temptation to farcically claim that social legacies are a likely outcome of the Games and might even force Olympic organizers to work within their budgets" (Kennelly, 2016, p. 154).

Jilly Traganou, also in 2016, echoes Kennelly's assertions about social legacy. She believes that social responsibility should become a fourth pillar of the Olympic Movement, hoping Olympic host cities will change their focus to helping raise the quality of life for those most in need, through affordable housing, rent control, unrestricted use of public space, and guaranteed freedom of assembly. Furthermore, she believes the Olympic Movement should begin to include those that are currently excluded in the Olympic decision-making process, "restoring the inclusivity of Olympism" (Traganou, 2016, p. 315).

In 2018, Philip Hersh made several recommendations. First, that the Games should rotate through recent host cities, encouraging cities to maintain facilities and keep them from becoming white elephants. Second, the Games should add extreme sports to bring in a younger audience, while simultaneously purging "outdated" sports like modern pentathlon. Third, the number of participants should be reduced in all sports. Fourth, prioritizing temporary venues that can be moved and reused elsewhere. This is especially relevant for a mid-tier city without enough venues. Fifth, host cities should not attach their bids to enormous infrastructure projects. Sixth, the IOC must strengthen oversight of Olympic projects and hold organizing committees accountable for failures. Seventh, the IOC must hold firm on its policies against state-sponsored drug cheating. And finally, immediate action should be taken against IOC members charged with unethical conduct.

In 2020, Holly Tokar presented a paper about applying the United States' National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to the Olympic Games. While NEPA would have no jurisdiction over Olympic Games held outside America, the Act could be adapted for Olympic use. NEPA requires that any federal actions with the possibility of affecting the human environment must produce a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Olympic Games would certainly fit this description. NEPA does not require the project to make the

smallest environmental impact possible, but only that the EIS is thorough and aids all parties in making good decisions, particularly in relation to the environment. Such a full analysis would give the IOC a detailed picture of all options for site selection, allowing its members to choose the host cities best aligning with the IOC's goals (Tokar, 2020). These alternatives could be: taking no action whatsoever and leaving the process as it is (it must be noted, she does not consider the newest 'continuous dialogue' bid process in her paper), or choosing five different rotating locations, or choosing one permanent site. Under the NEPA style review, the process would allow the IOC to examine and compare all these alternatives, and have a more informed discussion about how to proceed (Tokar, 2020). She states, "When the matrix comparing alternatives is complete, the IOC can assess whether systemic change is warranted as the best way to fulfill its mission. This educated decision making is the goal of such a NEPA-style analysis" (Tokar, 2020, p. 470).

The summation of these numerous recommendations could help enlighten the bid process and problems with hosting the Olympic Games. However, there appear to be two options for mid-tier cities which have not previously hosted: they will either be squeezed out of future hosting, or the IOC will find ways to take these sorts of recommendations from Olympic scholarship with the goal of continuing to refine Agenda 2020 so that mid-tier cities are able to stay part of the ambulatory rotation. As Maron (2018) points out, "Most cities simply do not have access to all the required venues like LA does that meet the desired standards and that can serve the iconic background needs of the event" (p. 19). It will be challenging to find viable and attractive solutions, but the new continuous dialogue phase brings a fresh dimension into the process that may allow cities to mature steadily to the point where the infrastructure necessary to host a Games has already been built gradually, dictated by the city's inherent need and growth without the direct pressure of a finite Games date looming on the horizon. Then, the city may be ready to host the Games, and will subsequently earn the award, instead of the other way around where the awarding precipitates the city's growth.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

3.1   Introduction

The preceding chapters introduced the existing literature in chronological order to track the progression of IOC credibility. Background was also given on how these challenges led to potential solutions in the form of Agenda 2020, The New Norm, and the new 'continuous dialogue' bidding procedure. Concepts such as legacy and temporary venues were discussed since both are very relevant to the future of mid-tier cities securing a part in the ambulatory rotation of the Olympic Games. Additionally, a description and definition of Global Giants and other types of global cities was presented in order to provide a working classification of the cities that are currently winning rights to host the Summer Olympic Games.

Moving forward, this study purposes to fill in the gaps in knowledge concerning how mid-tier cities can once again be part of the rotation of the Olympic Games. Several research methods will build on the knowledge gained from the literature review sections.

3.2   Methods

This study is a mixed methods research project, combining quantitative and qualitative methods of research, providing insights into whether mid-tier cities can continue to host the Games. The data was analyzed to provide a framework for the IOC and mid-tier cities on how mid-tier cities can once again be an important part of the Olympic Movement.

The quantitative research methods used charted city metro area population statistics, the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, and Freedom House's Global Freedom Scores for all Summer Games hosts back to Montréal 1976 and all cities / regions which have expressed interest in hosting the Summer Games in the future. These were then integrated into charts demonstrating what types of cities have hosted the Games previously, what cities are currently preparing to host, and what categories potential future host cities fall into.

Two qualitative research methods were used. First, conducting analysis of numerous IOC documents, including, but not limited to: the Olympic Charter, Agenda 2020, The New Norm, Evaluation Commission Reports for the 2024 Games, Evaluation Commission Reports for the 2026 Games, etc. Additionally, as part of the literature review, a large number of academic journal articles, book chapters, books, newspaper articles, and internet sources were read and analyzed to obtain a deep understanding of the subject. Lastly, interviews were conducted either by recording video calls or phone calls, using a purposive convenient sampling of 16 Olympic experts with a snowballing technique.

3.3   Data Collection

3.3.1   HDI Data Collection

Data was collected from the United Nations Development Programme in the form of its annual Human Development Index (HDI) rankings from its website, http://hdr.undp.org/en.

3.3.2   Population Data Collection

Population data was collected primarily from MacroTrends.net, which collects its population data from the United Nations world population prospects. This same data site was used for 95% of included cities to create the maximum amount of consistency in comparing city metro areas. When data was not available for a city (primarily only small cities in Germany) then the website CityPopulation.de was used, which predominantly uses German governmental sources.

3.3.3   Freedom House Global Freedom Scores

Freedom House's Global Freedom Scores were collected from their website, FreedomHouse.org.

3.3.4   Interviews

All 16 interviews were semi-structured and conducted in English via video call or phone call, with the exception of one done in writing. Interviewees were initially chosen as a purposive sampling of experts on the Olympic bidding process, while further interviewees were found using snowball sampling upon recommendations from initial interviewees.

3.4   Nature of the Data

The nature of the qualitative data in the literature review is historical and instructive, while the qualitative data from interviews is more forward looking in nature, with a focus on future possibilities for the Olympic Movement.

The nature of the quantitative data is also historical and instructive in part, but the sets of data create a snapshot in time of each city or region that has had, will have, or is considering hosting the Olympic Games.

3.5   Data Analysis

The analysis of the data was guided by knowledge gained in understanding of the Olympic Movement and the Olympic bid process as well as a philosophical understanding of Olympism. Interviews were transcribed by the author and analyzed via coding as outlined by Neuman (2014) using qualitative data program NVivo. All data was read and organized by open codes, or labels, which were applied to data from all interviews. This allowed the data to be organized into a convenient and practical format. A second examination of the data was completed, which Neuman (2014) refers to as axial coding, to identify and apply connections between data sets and further clarify the major themes of the data. The final analysis of the data (selective coding) consolidated codes and identified quotes to be used in the results section of this study, and to further identify cohesive data sets to be used in the final discussion and conclusion section.

3.6   Validity of the Data

HDI ranks each country in the world based on a mathematical formula that combining indicators in three dimensions: long and healthy life, knowledge, and decent standard of living. HDI was, "created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone" (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). This was chosen as an appropriate statistical data set due to its consistency with Olympism's fundamental views.

The sheer magnitude of the Olympic Games requires metro population size to be regarded as an important factor in selecting hosts. Small cities simply do not have the infrastructure in place to host gigantic mega-events, thus it is imperative to consider size as a factor in determining appropriate host cities.

The Freedom in the World Report was chosen as a third indicator in charting host cities because of the credibility problem the IOC has combatted over the last 10 years. The literature has shown that, among other factors, the choices to award two autocratic countries the Winter Games, Sochi 2014 and Beijing 2022, have hurt the IOC's credibility in world democracies and have been a significant factor in the failures of referenda, ultimately leading to the current bidding crisis (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017).

An attempt was made to obtain a wide sampling of interviewees from around the world in order to achieve a maximum diversity in responses. The Olympics are a worldwide phenomenon, so it was deemed important to obtain a range of perspectives on the bid opportunities of mid-tier cities, without relying purely on a Western worldview of the Olympic Games and the bid process. However, due to logistical issues in sourcing interviewees, almost half of the interviewees came from the United States, and all but two came from either North America or Europe. There is also a distinctly male point of view, with only two females represented in the final sample of interviewees. Interviewees came from a diverse group of organizations, with a mix of IOC Members, IOC Staff, Olympic Scholars, Olympic Journalists, Olympic Consultants, International Federations, and from one NOC.

Table 6: Expert Interviewee Information

Role of the Interviewee	Type of Institution	Date & Interview Duration	Method	Acronym
Consultant / Former IOC Director	For-profit Event Company	20 October 2020 (38 min)	via Zoom	I-A
IOC Member	International Multi-sport Federation	20 October 2020 (57 min)	by telephone	I-B
Consultant	For-profit Event Company	28 October 2020 (108 min)	via Zoom	I-C
Council Member	International Sport Federation	29 October 2020 (52 min)	via Zoom	I-D
Executive Director	International Multi-sport Federation	30 October 2020 (62 min)	via Zoom	I-E
Scholar	Public University	3 November 2020 (48 min)	via Zoom	I-F
Scholar	Public University	9 November 2020 (57 min)	via MS Teams	I-G
Journalist	Olympic Publication	10 November 2020 (23 min)	via Zoom	I-H
Scholar	Public University	12 November 2020 (37 min)	by telephone	I-I
IOC Member	International Multi-sport Federation	17 November 2020 (38 min)	via Zoom	I-J
President	International Multi-sport Federation	18 November 2020 ---	in writing	I-K
Consultant / Scholar	For-profit Event Company	18 November 2020 (70 min)	via Zoom	I-L
Journalist	Olympic Publication	23 November 2020 (106 min)	via Skype	I-M
Division Director	National Olympic Committee	23 November 2020 (65 min)	via Zoom	I-N
IOC Director	International Multi-sport Federation	25 November 2020 (23 min)	via MS Teams	I-O
President / IOC Member	International Federation / International Multi-sport Federation	7 January 2021 (40 min)	via MS Teams	I-P

Countries Represented: Australia (1), Brazil (1), Canada (1), Italy (1), Qatar (1), Switzerland (1), UK (3), USA (7)
Demographic Breakdown: 14 Male, 2 Female

3.7   Reliability of the Data

All studies and data research of this nature have an unavoidable element of personal bias, whether it be in what literature was chosen to review, in what data was chosen to study, or in choosing interview subjects. This study has attempted to limit biases as much as possible and to study the gathered data with an open mind.

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS

4.1   Introduction

The inspiration for this study came from a realization that the Olympic Games had shifted to a particular type of city in the near-consecutive choices of London, Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles. Once further study commenced, it was established, as shown in the literature review section, that this was not accidental; these Global Giant cities are truly the only cities with the infrastructure in place to absorb the current size and cost of the Games. It seems Agenda 2020 and The New Norm were created to help cease or slow this move toward Global Giants, thus opening up more of the world to the Olympic Games.

Once the above parameters were established, and the indicators of HDI, metro population and the Freedom in the World Report were decided upon, charts were made to outline which categories each former host city and named host city fell into. Then the same statistical analysis was applied to all known cities that have shown an interest in hosting the Games in the future for 2032 / 2036. In this way, it is possible to discover historical patterns and note likely issues with future bids.

4.2   Comparison of Past/Named Hosts and Potential Future Hosts

As shown in Table 7 below, *every* city that has hosted the Olympic Games since 1976 has either been ranked in the top 30 in HDI rankings for the host country, has had a metro population over 8 million people, or both. Cities that are either under 30-HDI or over 8 million people are classified as mid-tier cities, and cities that evince both are classified as Global Giant cities. This establishes historical parameters for necessary requirements to host the Games. In essence, a smaller city can host the Games if it comes from a wealthy country with a high standard of living as indicated by the HDI ranking, and a city from a less wealthy country can only host the Games if it has a massive population and the corresponding infrastructure that goes with it.

It is clear that mid-tier cities were the primary recipient of the Games from 1976 – 2008, but as gigantism and the bid crisis took hold, only Global Giants became capable of hosting the Summer Games, and by 2017, they were the only ones even *bidding* to host the Games, despite Agenda 2020's enactment three years earlier.

Table 7: Past and Named Summer Olympic Host City Types

Host City	Country	HDI Country Ranking at time of Olympics	Metro Population at time of Olympics	City Type	Why City Type?	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Montréal 1976*	Canada	3	2,803,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	N/A
Moscow 1980*	Soviet Union	31	8,136,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	N/A
Los Angeles 1984*	**United States**	**2**	**10,044,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**N/A**
Seoul 1988*	South Korea	37	10,027,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	N/A
Barcelona 1992	Spain	23	4,152,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	N/A
Atlanta 1996	United States	3	2,919,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	N/A
Sydney 2000	Australia	2	3,780,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	N/A
Athens 2004	Greece	28	3,182,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	N/A
Beijing 2008	China	104	14,964,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	N/A
London 2012	**United Kingdom**	**19**	**8,293,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (94)**
Rio 2016	Brazil	80	13,057,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Free (75)
Tokyo 2021**	**Japan**	**19**	**37,393,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (96)**
Paris 2024**	**France**	**26**	**11,017,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (90)**
Los Angeles 2028**	**United States**	**15**	**12,447,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (86)**

Sources: Author's Own Table, Freedom House (2020), MacroTrends.net (n.d.-a – af), United Nations Development Programme (2019a), United Nations Development Programme (2019b)

* HDI Rankings from 1990, first year of HDI Rankings
** HDI Ranking from 2019, most recent year of HDI rankings, population data as of 2020
% Total score ranging from 100 (most free) to 0 (least free), with three categories (free – partly free – not free)

ALL CITIES in 123 largest metro economies

GLOBAL GIANT: Over-30 HDI and Over 8m population
Mid-Tier: Either Over 30-HDI or Under 8m population

As seen in Table 8 below, it seems that Agenda 2020, The New Norm, and the new invitation process have helped create a robust list of potential bidders for the Olympic Games, at

least at this early stage for 2032 and beyond. This must be a positive development from an IOC perspective; the reforms may finally be having their intended effect. However, it must be noted (see page 38), that 24 cities expressed interest in bidding for the Winter Games of 2022 and 2026 and the Summer Games of 2024 and 2028. Only 6 cities of the 24 made it to the end of the bidding process, so a seemingly strong field could easily be reduced dramatically for a variety of geopolitical or economic reasons. Table 8 below also features many mid-tier cities, which could be interpreted as a positive development from an IOC point of view that the Games may be more accessible due to recent changes.

It should be noted that for the purposes of Table 7 and 8, and this study, the Brookings Institute Global Giant designation has been expanded to include three additional cities that have a metro population over 8 million and have a sub-30 HDI ranking. Seoul is the addition on Table 7 and 8 below, but two others have been added as well: Nagoya, Japan and Chicago, USA – these can be referenced in Appendix V in the complete list of Global Giant and mid-tier cities as uncovered by the research.

The city that has seemed to take control of the early 2032 bidding race has been a regional bid – Brisbane and Southeast Queensland, Australia (Livingstone, 2020b). The bid was temporarily placed on hold during the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, and it is a fairly small population center, while Australia does have a very high HDI ranking. The bid is also from another western-style country directly after the Games in France and the USA, although it happens to be on the other side of the world.

Two cities from South Asia are potential bidders, Mumbai, India and Jakarta, Indonesia. But as Rio showed, cities that are from countries with very low HDI rankings, like Mumbai and Jakarta, come with heavy risks. The lower the HDI ranking, the more likely the city is going to need to build a great deal of infrastructure, or it will have to invest heavily in temporary venues and infrastructure. Jakarta also has the additional issue of being in a country that is considered only partly free by the Freedom of the World scoring system.

Table 8: Potential Future Summer Olympic Host Cities

Potential Host City for 2032 / 2036*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population (2020)	City Type	Why City Type?	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Brisbane-Queensland**^	Australia	6	3,452,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Budapest**	Hungary	43	1,768,000	Unlikely	Neither Criteria	Partly Free (79)
Chengdu-Chongqing^#	China	85	25,008,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Doha**+#	Qatar	41	2,881,053	Unlikely	Neither Criteria	Not Free (25)
Istanbul#	Turkey	59	15,190,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (32)
Jakarta**	Indonesia	111	10,770,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Partly Free (61)
London	**United Kingdom**	**15**	**9,304,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (94)**
Madrid-Valencia^	Spain	25	7,452,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (92)
Montréal – Toronto^	**Canada**	**13**	**10,418,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (98)**
Mumbai	India	129	20,411,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Free (71)
North-Central Italy**^	Italy	29	1,584,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
Rhine-Ruhr^	Germany	4	6,119,842	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Rotterdam-Amsterdam^	Netherlands	10	2,159,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (99)
Seoul-Pyongyang	**South and North Korea**	**22/NL**	**12,764,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (83) and Not Free (3)**
Shanghai#	China	85	27,058,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)

Sources: Author's Own Table, Camp (2017), CityPopulation.de (n.d.-a – h), Freedom House (2020), "L'idea del sindaco di Firenze: 'Olimpiadi 2032 insieme a Bologna'," (2019), Livingstone (2018), Livingstone (2019), Livingstone (2020a), Livingstone (2020c), Livingstone (2020d), Livingstone (2020f), Livingstone (2020g), Livingstone (2020h), Livingstone (2020i), Livingstone (2021) MacroTrends.net (n.d.-a – af), Majendie (2019), Montréal and Toronto, Canada's new Olympic bet (2021), Morgan (2020a), United Nations Development Programme (2019b)

* HDI Ranking from 2019, most recent year of HDI rankings, population data as of 2020
** Not in top 123 largest metro economies
+ Population data for entire country, not the city
% Total score ranging from 100 (most free) to 0 (least free), with three categories (free – partly free – not free)
^ Regional Bid, see Appendix IV for population calculations
# Citizens are not free

GLOBAL GIANT: Over-30 HDI and Over 8m population
Mid-Tier: Either Over 30-HDI or Under 8m population
Unlikely: Under 30-HDI and Under 8m population

The Freedom in the World score is also an issue for the cities of Chengdu-Chongqing, China; Doha, Qatar; Istanbul, Turkey; and Shanghai, China. As shown earlier in the literature review (see section 2.4), when the Olympics are hosted by autocratic countries not in-line with Olympic principles of human rights and inclusion, then the IOC's credibility is hurt in the places where most of their financial support comes from, namely Europe and North America (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017). This is a likely consideration for the IOC moving forward. While the organization may want the Games go to as many places in the world as possible, it needs to consider the consequences of doing so, which it did not with Sochi, nor in accepting the bid of Beijing 2022. Doha has a relatively high HDI ranking (although not top 30) and it is not a large city, in fact, it is so small that the chart above shows the population of the entire county of Qatar. If Doha were to win the Games, it would be the first time since at least 1976 that a city to get the Games would have a small population and also be below-30 HDI. Nevertheless, Qatar's HDI ranking of 41 is close to the under-30 threshold, and by 2032 it may climb into the top 30, making Doha a true mid-tier city. Istanbul, on the other hand, has the population to fit the mid-tier city criteria, while the HDI ranking is not extremely low. It also has the advantage of having been through several attempts at bidding where it was close to getting the Games. But again, Turkey is not considered free by the Freedom in the World score. Chengdu-Chongqing and Shanghai, similarly to Istanbul, certainly meet the population requirements even though the HDI ranking of China is relatively low, but China is considered even less free than Turkey, coming in with a score of 10 out of 100.

There are six early candidate cities for future Summer Games from cities / regions in Europe. London has expressed interest in hosting the Games in 2036 (Majendie, 2019), and is a Global Giant who recently hosted the Games and has significant infrastructure in place. Madrid-Valencia, Spain is nearly a Global Giant with the combined metro populations of the two cities. Madrid, with a low-cost bid that was a precursor to the Agenda 2020 reforms, was a very serious bidder for the 2020 Games awarded to Tokyo. The North-Central Italy prospect is a regional bid, as the two main cities in the region, Florence and Bologna, both have under a million residents, but even with the two populations combined it is still a low-population center. Another early candidate from Europe is the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region based around Cologne, Düsseldorf, Dortmund, and Essen in Germany. This bid indicates that, if successful, it would

stage events in as many as 16 different German cities that add up to over 6 million in population, with some estimates giving the region over 10 million people, which would give this bid Global Giant status. The Rotterdam-Amsterdam bid is also regional, combining the two biggest cities in the Netherlands to make the infrastructure needs easier to handle. This bid is a clear push from two regional mid-tier cities from a country with a high HDI ranking. Budapest, Hungary is also developing a bid. Budapest does not fit into the historical criteria for hosting the Games, even as a mid-tier candidate. However, they have spent years hosting international competitions in many sports, and had a well-received bid for the 2024 Games that was ultimately withdrawn, so it could be a chance for the IOC to open up the Games to the former Eastern Bloc for the first time.

The prospect of a Montréal – Toronto joint bid is a very recent development that is another example of the regional concept stressed in Agenda 2020. The combined population of over 10 million puts a potential bid into the Global Giant category. Canada is considered free, has a high HDI ranking, and would have most of the infrastructure in place. This seems to be setting the stage for a bid beyond 2032, as it would be a second city in North America in a row after LA28.

The final bid on this list is the Seoul-Pyongyang bid. Seoul on its own is now a Global Giant in Olympic terms, and the primary reason for this partnership is a political one. This bid would only be 11 years after Tokyo hosted the Games.

4.3   Interview Findings

The second section of research findings, the analysis of expert interviews, is organized around three main themes that emerged from this data. First, the theme of mid-tier cities hosting the Games in the future. Second, emphasis and allowance of regional bids, along with a new acceptance of flexibility and adaptability in how the Games are executed and produced. Third, potential complications, hazards, and missed opportunities in the recent adjustments the IOC has made to the bidding and hosting process which make the Games more accessible to mid-tier cities.

4.3.1   Mid-Tier Cities Will Host Future Games

The respondents believed the IOC has made real, tangible change to their requirements for bidding and hosting the Games. They unanimously agreed these changes will allow mid-tier cities to get back into the rotation for future Games. The quotes below demonstrate their viewpoints on the challenges involved in awarding the Games to a mid-tier city:

"They've got to look at selecting bid cities as part of their brand management process… So, mid-tier cities, yes, but they got to pick one, and they got to have some skin in the game in that, and they need to understand from the business perspective." **(I-C)**

"Well, I think it is possible, but it's still a challenge and there's much more work has got to be done." **(I-E)**

"I'm with giving all the cities the ability to bid, if they meet the minimum requirement to host the Olympic Games. These days the Olympic Games give a lot of capital for any cities that organize the Olympic Games or the Winter Games if they manage it in a good way." **(I-G)**

"So, the incentive for these big cities isn't always there, where for cities like Brisbane, there's a lot more incentive to develop their region. So, yeah, there's definitely space for those mid-tier cities, mid-tier regions moving forward." **(I-H)**

"It would serve the best interest for mid-size cities to be given a good shot at the Summer Games, rather than one of these mega cities. It would be good for the IOC's image, and they have to be aware of that word, image, there's no doubt about that." **(I-I)**

"The IOC is walking the walk, they're doing the things that they say that they're going to do, and this is really, really important… this is the key to going to places that ordinarily, you would think could not host an Olympic Games... Because the infrastructure requirements are becoming smaller and smaller." **(I-M)**

"I believe that mid-size cities and mid-size countries that are on an upward trend of development could meet the requirements in a sustainable way to organize Olympic Games. Again, would have to be along the lines, recommendations, of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm, and with a major intervention and contribution from the IOC." **(I-N)**

"The objective is that very one, that we increase the number of cities that can consider it. I think it just requires a different approach where you have more temporary venues, where you have more remote venues and you look at it in a in a completely different way." **(I-O)**

"I think it's less about the size and the scope of the city and more about the political structure that it's being delivered in. Having said that, I do think that The New Norm will help mitigate some of those challenges by giving a better shake of the dice to some of those cities, and I think the IOC will need, always, to do what it can." **(I-P)**

The respondents truly believed the IOC has made changes that will positively impact the likelihood of mid-tier cities hosting the Games and that it will be good for the IOC's image to get back to mid-tier cities in a responsible, sustainable way, in line with Agenda 2020 reforms.

4.3.2   The IOC Has Changed - Regions

The most popular reason for the respondents' collective optimism in regards to the ability of mid-tier cities to host the Games in the future is the emphasis on regional hosting. This allows spreading out of the necessary infrastructure, resulting in less building in an individual city, reducing cost and mitigating risk. The following quotes demonstrate the advantages of this approach:

"OK, you may be able to spread the Games over two or three cities. I saw the other day that Holland is looking at a potential scenario for the future, would you be destroying the principle of the Olympic ideal by spreading it between Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague? No, because they're already so close together." **(I-A)**

"We're now saying you can, if there's regions in reasonable proximity, as long as you are duplicating everything for the athletes in the Olympic Village, and I think it is important the athletes get an opportunity to move from village to village, when you want to bring your whole team together… But having more than one city I think and concept of a region is good." **(I-B)**

"The IOC, over the years, have driven everybody into this little corral, this corner by interpreting the Olympic Charter one way, because they wanted to have all the athletes in a single Olympic Village. So, getting away from this hysteria around a centralized Games, that's the only way they can do this so that they can bring middle-tier cities into the fold." **(I-C)**

"The other thing that you're going to see, and the IOC has already opened this for an option, is the fact that it doesn't have to be just one country. The World Cup of soccer, they did one in Japan and Korea. I think everybody saw that as a great way to spread the economics of a major sporting event so that neither country would have to bear the brunt of all the building of the facilities." **(I-D)**

"What they've done is they've opened it up to more regional concepts where in the past they wanted a city and that was it. It's going to be different because I think regions will become more of a trend." **(I-H)**

"The changes open up bidding and hosting to multiple cities within a country and even allow joint bids from more than one country. The Games are no longer necessarily city-centric but may be region, nation or multi-nation hosted. This reduces infrastructure costs as a multi-city approach gives flexibility to use existing venues with a wide geographical spread." **(I-K)**

"What's going to happen is you're going to have a combination of cities that raise their hand, or regions, because almost all will be regions now, the regions that raise their hand, the IOC would really like to go here for this reason, or that reason." **(I-M)**

"The ambition is really that we make better use of existing venues, even if it means we have to have a wider geographical scope and then we work the efficiencies of the operations of it, but nevertheless, you don't need to build anything. I think one of the key takeaways is really if there is no legacy clearly established no venues will be built, they will be temporary or found elsewhere with creative operational models coming on top of it." **(I-O)**

"There's no question at all that The New Norm is the way of looking at things, and actually one of the concepts within Agenda 2020 and The New Norm is the fact that in future there may be more of an opportunity to spread out the cost beyond the curtilage of city, and maybe into a region... Personally, I think that makes, over the long haul, a great deal more sense." **(I-P)**

The regional concept had very strong support amongst the respondents, by far the most popular reason for optimism. They believed it will not often be a solo mid-tier city hosting future Games, but rather a host region with an anchoring mid-tier city.

4.3.3 The IOC Has Changed – Flexibility, Adaptability

The second reason for collective optimism among interviewed Olympic experts is that they believed Agenda 2020 and The New Norm have created a new level of flexibility and adaptability that will allow the Games to include mid-tier cities as hosts. The following quotes highlight how the IOC needs to adapt to ensure that policy innovations translate to action.

"I think the IOC is trying to introduce far more flexibility into the process." **(I-A)**

"You'd hope that before they put their hand up sport will have a place in that society that there are these venues… Do they have to be purely sporting venues? Can they be community venues that are then adapted? Community halls that are large spaces just like we use exhibition halls, and put temporary seating in there, so there's much more flexibility there." **(I-B)**

"The IOC have to be super flexible going forward, we're not going to change this city to host your Games, we're going to take the Games and make them fit to your resources, assets. The IOC thinks, yes, that's how we're going to do it in the future, but they sure as hell better stick to that." **(I-C)**

"Instead of the city having to fit its city plan, and development plan and so on, into our model, if you like, of how the Games has to be delivered, it should be turned on its head now, so the city says, right, here is our city plan for how we're going to develop our city in the next 20 years or more, so how can we adapt the Olympic Games to fit in with our city plan?" **(I-E)**

"The New Norm starts with the fact that you don't have to do it the way it's been done before, and you are free to propose a different way of hosting the Games because we don't want the city to be made for the Games, we want the city to be able to host the Games." **(I-J)**

"Let's not figure out what a city has to do to adjust to the Olympic Games, let's figure out how the Olympic Games can fit into the city and serve its current, social, economic, political and development agendas. And let's find ways of only building what we absolutely, absolutely have to build, let's adapt existing architecture wherever we can, and let's find ways of building only what we have to, and only if it has a sustainable post-Games use." *(I-L)*

"It gives a lot of flexibility, and that will be the main word to be remembered when we talk about The New Norm, it's really about providing more options to more cities to do it the way that is relevant in their context. It's all about flexibility." **(I-O)**

The idea that the Games now must fit the city (not the other way around) and be flexible in how the operations of the Games are implemented was a common theme. Respondents believed the IOC has reformed in such a way that the prior practice of always picking the biggest, most expensive bid is truly a thing of the past.

4.3.4   Potential Complications and Hazards with IOC Changes

The overall tone of the interviewees was very positive about the future of the Olympic Movement, despite the acknowledgement of past mistakes and excesses by cities and the IOC. However, even with all the changes codified with the introduction of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm, there were several major concerns expressed about the future of the Games, specifically about the continuing large scale of the Games in terms of athletes and individual events, as well as about keeping the messages of Olympism at the forefront of everything the IOC does. The following indicative quotes demonstrate the range of concerns.

"I wouldn't read necessarily too much into the creation of this new commission structure. It is merely a vehicle to sort of facilitate the formality of an ongoing dialogue. In practice one senior IOC member and a couple of the IOC directors will be the ones who are having a discussion discreetly, behind closed doors, to gently work with potential interested parties as to is there a way of doing this?" **(I-A)**

"The size of the Games has got away a little bit. We, under Agenda 2020, we brought in the provision for the Organizing Committee to have the ability to identify some sports for their edition of the Games… Now the problem then was that at a time we're talking about New Norm, Agenda 2020 cutting back costs, we suddenly added 474 athletes." **(I-B)**

"I think it's odd that you're putting people in charge of this who are responsible for the mess we're in. We're talking about a multi-billion-dollar decision that needs to be predicated in an objective assessment of the possibilities before you. And I'm just not convinced that you could keep going internally and internally." **(I-C)**

"How can Beijing 2022 pass? I'm going to tell you when that happens, there are going to be so many stories written on the carbon footprint, the non-sustainability of that, and the IOC is going to be right back to where they were three, four years ago, they don't even get it. They picked a city that's going to take all they're trying to do with New Norms and Agenda 2020, they picked a city that's going to disprove that." **(I-C)**

"My belief is, that having more than 10,500 athletes at the Games, 33 sports, and I can't remember how many we're at for Tokyo, but 300 and X medal events is far too big and is not sustainable in the long term." **(I-E)**

"If the IOC is going through a path with a more technical point of view from the bidding process, if they're considering a huge weight on the infrastructure, on the funding and everything else that they need for the Games, we would have more technical bids than just political decisions on what they want for the Olympic Movement... I don't know if they really want to go that technical, because then they would lose this character of international organization and international Games." **(I-F)**

"I haven't been a big proponent to it [the new bidding process]. *It makes sense for their organization where they have greater control of having these conversations rather than having a formal bid process... But at the same time, you're cloaking the whole process and nobody gets to see it, so you go back to those pre-1998 days where there could be corruption, we don't know what deals are going on... for the IOC it's good, for everybody else maybe not so good."* **(I-H)**

"It [the new bidding process] creates much longer lead times, and we know that most cities are run by politicians, and over time that might become problematic if one politician is all for the go, and then the next mayor wins being against hosting the Games. So, there's some perils involved in this approach." **(I-J)**

"You're a bid city, you've now custom made your bid on the basis of the IOC's advice and their programs, and then you're not selected, someone else is selected. And so, when you have one source for all the bid cities as the lead consultant, it gets a little bit sticky when the consultant has to recommend only one of those four cities." **(I-L)**

"The real challenge is going to be getting the IFs, the International Federations, to accept smaller venues. That, in in a nutshell, that is going to be it." **(I-L)**

"Now, there is a line that they haven't crossed, and the line that they have not crossed, which in my view they will have to in the future, is to reduce the number of sports. In my view, 28 is too many and they're going to have to make it smaller… This is the problem, this is the box that Bach has gotten himself into, because now the athletes are everything." **(I-M)**

The most common denominator is that the respondents believed the size of the Games, in the form of sheer number of athletes, sports, and venues must be reduced in order to keep the Games accessible to more cities. They also believed unequivocally, and very passionately, that the IOC must keep pushing itself forward and continue to self-examine in order to truly follow the reformation path they've outlined.

4.4   Conclusion

Historically, the data showed that past Summer Olympic host cities have been either Global Giants or mid-tier cities, until the next three Olympic Games, which are being hosted in Tokyo, Paris and Los Angeles, all Global Giant cities. The data also showed that primarily mid-tier cities are interested in hosting a future edition of the Games (post-2028), while analysis of interviews with Olympic experts supported the idea that some of these mid-tier cities will have a chance to host the Games in the future. They believed the IOC's reforms of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm are having a real effect on interest in hosting the Games, primarily because of the emphasis on regional bids, flexibility, and a new adaptability of the Olympic Games to fit within a city. Respondents were very positive about the future, but warned it is imperative the Games get smaller, and that the IOC must continue to self-examine and hold itself accountable for all the recently implemented reforms and measures.

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Introduction

The research findings of this project are a study in contrasts. Much of the literature has had a decidedly negative point of view about the past and future of the Olympic Movement (see chapters 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.4, and 2.11). In contrast, interviewees had positive views of the reforms made by the IOC in the form of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm, while also acknowledging past mistakes.

All the research questions have clear answers which will be deliberated in the following sections. But, as many interviewees discussed, and as Thomas Bach has made explicit, the IOC is following the mantra 'change or be changed.' There is a clear desire by the IOC to be proactive, to change the Olympic Movement for the better, and to create more positive impacts for the world's citizens. As Verbruggen (2002) states, the IOC,

> must never get carried away by the phenomenal success of the Olympic Games and
> must constantly call itself into question. It must set itself high standards and watch out for
> the signs that indicate that the sporting movement is never safe from the possibility of
> decline (pg. 27).

5.2   Discussion

5.2.1   Global Giants vs. Mid-Tier Cities

The main research question of this study was: *Why are Global Giants the only cities currently receiving the rights to host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games?* The answer, made clear during the literature review, is multi-faceted and has deep roots stretching back decades. The IOC became a victim of its own success, eventually losing credibility in the eyes of many citizens the world over. This loss of credibility happened because of a series of scandals or incidents from the 1960s to Sochi 2014 (Hersh, 2018). It began with political tragedies in

Mexico City 1968 and Munich 1972, continued with the cost overruns of Montréal 1976, IOC corruption in the form of the lavish bidding and the bid scandals of the late 1990s, and was cemented by the critical human rights stories and gigantism of Sochi 2014 (Hersh, 2018). The public could see that the IOC had fallen in love with grand Olympic visions in the form of massive construction with likely high-cost overruns, and PR stunts when choosing hosts. The series of scandals and unfavorable media coverage eventually led to the period of negative referenda over the last 10 years, where global citizens have largely been rejecting the idea of hosting the Games (Lesjø, 2018), leaving the IOC in extremely difficult circumstances by having only few hosts for its single product, the Olympic Games.

The IOC responded by going into a period of deep self-reflection, starting with the Agenda 2020 reforms. However, the reforms had little effect on public sentiment; cities kept dropping out of bid races for both the Summer and Winter Games, and the IOC was eventually left with just two candidates for the 2024 Games, Paris and Los Angeles. The IOC then made the unprecedented decision to award Games to both cities, Paris in 2024 and Los Angeles in 2028 (Könecke & de Nooij, 2017). This was, above all, a *safe* decision for the IOC during a turbulent time in its history, as those cities' visions were both in-line with Agenda 2020, had little infrastructure to build, and would be relatively low-risk (Dempsey et al., 2019). With Tokyo already in line, the immediate future of the Summer Games was secure, but only for a single type of city, the Global Giant. Mid-tier cities were no longer in the discussion, at least in the short term.

The first sub-question of this study was: *Will Global Giants be the only ones receiving the Summer Games in the future because of the infrastructure requirements of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm?* The answer to this question, as outlined in the results section 4.3.1 based on data from the interviews, has been an *emphatic NO*. Unanimously, all interviewees believe the Games will go back to mid-tier cities in the future. Why are they so optimistic about the future of mid-tier cities? Because the changes of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm will have finally taken full effect, and in these reforms, they believe the IOC really has changed its philosophy toward what is expected of itself, a host, and how that host is awarded the Olympic Games. The Olympics are now expected to adapt to the city, not the city adapting to the Games.

The first reason for optimism, according to the research shown in section 4.3.2, is the emphasis on regional bids. This tactic will allow bidding cities to spread out the cost of the Games to an entire region. Furthermore, this ensures the option for a city to look to another adjacent city that may already have that infrastructure in place, if the first city does not have anything suitable of its own. This would aid greatly in reducing costs and potential cost overruns. The expected 2032 Olympic bids are a testament to the IOC embracing the idea of regional hosts. Regional bids are being proposed in Australia, China, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands at this early stage for the 2032 Games. All of these bids are anchored by a mid-tier city (such as Brisbane or Amsterdam), emphasizing that for mid-tier cities, the regional model is their future in the Olympic hosting cycle. No longer will a city like Montréal be expected to build every venue from scratch and to build a compact Olympic Park in order to host the Games; it will be able to have bid partner cities in its region, keeping infrastructure build at an absolute minimum.

Interviewees were also optimistic about the future for mid-tier cities because of a new flexibility introduced into the Olympic Games and Olympic hosting requirements as shown in section 4.3.3. They point to a willingness by the IOC and International Federations to accept creative and adaptable solutions for venues. Maybe a venue will not be used for sport after the Games, as has most often been the case in the past; instead, a venue such as a community hall, used as sporting venue during the Games, could be converted back to its original use following the Games. Interviewees focused on the idea that the Games must fit into the city's (or region's) long-term plans, adapting the Games to fit their long-range goals. The New Norm allows for a new flexibility in execution that the Games; a city or region will be encouraged to propose new ideas and solutions to the complex structure of the Olympic Games, and the IOC pledges to be more open to these new ideas. No longer does an Olympic Park have to be built from scratch in every city.

Another reason for optimism toward future mid-tier hosts is a belief that the new bidding process will allow the IOC to make better, more informed decisions about how specific cities will host. The research showed that interviewees affirm the new dialogue phase will make the IOC and the cities/regions truer partners in the Olympic project. The IOC is trying to avoid a

straight auction-style competition where the most impressive bid, or best PR team, wins the right to host the Games. As Interviewee E states, "I think it's absolutely correct and more modern to do it that way because this whole idea of creating a sort of city beauty contest in front of the world and then they present, to my mind, is so out of sync with global societal views of the world."

The IOC's new approach to bidding still allows for multiple candidate cities that could both advance to the 'preferred host(s)' stage and the final voting stage at an IOC session, meaning that auction-style voting could still be possible. Because of this, the IOC must strike a delicate balance. On one hand, interviewees expressed a desire by the IOC to have those that define strategy, the Executive Board, make the most important decisions, such as choosing host cities. However, they also believed that the IOC general membership should be included in the final decision process, since choosing a host city is traditionally one of their most important functions. There is also a strong desire to keep healthy competition going between the cities, creating pressure on each city to create the best bids possible. According to respondents, it is unknown whether the auction-style bid is really a relic of a bygone era, but it seems possible that the Executive Board will only put forth a single host for an edition of the Games and that the full IOC general membership will only have rubber-stamp approval, similar to what happened with Paris and Los Angeles for 2024 / 2028. It is also possible that a double-award such as 2024 / 2028 could happen again in if two host cities have exceedingly excellent bids both far ahead of other potential hosts. Yet until the process reveals itself over time, the details regarding how it will work and the final outcome are both somewhat uncertain. It is a chance to improve the IOC's credibility around the world with smart hosting decisions upholding the ideals of Olympism while simultaneously retaining solid future hosts. The key will prove to be keeping the Executive Board accountable and free from corruption, ensuring a reliance on 'city beauty contests' is kept in the past.

5.2.2 Ambulatory Games and Paradox of New Norm Requirements?

The second sub-question of this study was: *Is there a paradox between the idea of ambulatory Summer Games and The New Norm requirements?* According to Olympic experts who were interviewed for this research, the answer to this is another *resounding NO*. The

respondents gave credence to this primarily because of the emphasized regional context for future Olympic Games and the flexibility built into The New Norm.

When looking at future potential host cities, as outlined in section 4.2 in Table 8, most cities on the list have an authentic chance at hosting the Games eventually. This can be attributed to nascent focus on regions, the new flexibility of the Games requirements, and the introduction of the new bidding process including an open-ended dialogue phase. None of these cities will ever "lose" the bid, they will simply move to focus on a different year further in the future, if they choose to do so. It could be possible, for geo-political reasons such as expanding Olympism and broadening market, the IOC would be interested in taking the Games to Mumbai. Contrarily, it may also be established during the dialogue phase that Mumbai lacks the infrastructure to host the 2032 Games with a reasonable budget. It could be judged the city simply needs more development time, and the new bid structure will allow the IOC to give them that time, for example, eight years hence in 2040. Inevitably, cities will move in and out of the process based on their own changing circumstances and politics, but the IOC's door will always be open, and bids will never be completely disregarded.

5.2.3   The Critics are Still Critical

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the critics of the Olympic Movement have a very different view from the results this study collected in interview form, mostly from Olympic experts who are also Olympic insiders. Many disapprovers such as Flyvbjerg, Dempsey, and Zimbalist still condemn the IOC despite all of its efforts to turn the tide of public, media, and critical sentiment.

Flyvbjerg et al. (2020) recently released a blistering critique of Olympic economics and the risk of hosting the Olympic Games. They suggest that the Games are likely to produce extremely random economic risks and those risks, largely because those risks are,

> the most challenging type of risk to manage, because it is maximal, unpredictable, and difficult to protect against via conventional methods… the IOC and potential hosts must

understand the existence of fat tails [extreme randomness] as a matter of fact, i.e., that hosting the Games is extremely risky business in terms of cost. If they do not understand the risk, and its particular power-law nature, they cannot hope to effectively protect themselves against it (p. 13).

Despite all the changes being made by the IOC, Dempsey et al. (2019) similarly maintain that "a negative outcome from hosting is not inevitable; it is just simply highly probable" (pg. 14).

The IOC's changes point to a positive reform in its culture, and also an adjustment in how bids are analyzed and awarded, but it is too early to know whether they will take effect in the way the IOC plans. The doubters, as shown above, do not believe this will occur, and it is difficult to blame them. After all, the IOC has previously attempted to make major changes to the size and scope of the Games (by the Olympic Games Study Commission of 2002), but instead of getting smaller and more manageable, the opposite occurred. The most expensive bids, with the biggest infrastructure to build, the highest risk, and supremely dazzling presentations were usually the winners over the last 30 years. So, the question is, now that the new processes are in place, will the IOC make smart host choices that will advance Olympism around the world in a sustainable and manageable way? Interviewee C states what the IOC should do to promote the new process and the way cities should manage the Olympic budget, "I think it's like anything in life, if you want a certain behavior or an outcome, you have to start rewarding it. Until they [the IOC] start rewarding the behavior they desire, they're never going to get the behavior they desire." The IOC needs to adhere to its reforms, and do what it says it is going to do, or all of these reforms will mean nothing in the public eye. It is certainly possible, and maybe even likely, that the reforms will take effect as hoped, but it is also understandable why many people aren't convinced.

Another area of concern surrounding the new bid process is whether this new process will be entirely transparent. As Interviewee H states, "You're cloaking the whole process and nobody gets to see it, so you go back to those pre-1998 days when there could be corruption, we don't know what deals are going on." In other words, because of its very nature, the dialogue phase of the process cannot be public, these are conversations between small groups of powerful

individuals who, at least at that early stage, would have a very difficult time being completely transparent. As Interviewee P puts it, "look, there is clearly a balance there" between transparency and a desire to move things forward without outside forces throwing up roadblocks at an early stage. Once the conversations reach the next targeted phase, where more transparency will certainly occur, and the decision moves into the hands of the EB, will the major decisions regarding host cities already have been settled? Interviewee A mentions in section 4.3.3 that, in practice, the new bidding process will be a very small group of IOC members and having discreet discussions behind closed doors. But does this give the citizens of a host city or region any say in the process? Will the process be too far along before they get involved? Navigating this delicate balance will prove to be extremely demanding for cities.

5.2.4   Additional Discussion

Agenda 2020 and The New Norm have certainly not improved public opinion since negative referenda, public skepticism, and media criticism are still occurring. Additionally, it is possible that the criticism is only going to get worse over the next year and a half before it gets better. Tokyo 2020 was already going to be an extremely expensive Games, possibly the most expensive Summer Games ever, and the costs have increased because of the rescheduling to 2021 and COVID-19 safety measures. The media has already jumped on this story, "Tokyo has built nearly a dozen new buildings specifically for this Olympics, with billions more spent on infrastructure, security, marketing and countless other details" (Leitch, 2021). Close behind Tokyo (if the Games are held) may come the Beijing Winter Games of 2022, which already has its own share of controversy including human rights issues in China as well as stories of excessive infrastructure spending in the mountain regions several hours away from Beijing where all mountain venues had to be built from scratch. As Liam Morgan (2020b) of *Inside the Games* writes, "A coalition of human rights groups has called on the IOC to strip Beijing of the 2022 Winter Olympics… because of the alleged mistreatment of its own citizens." As far as infrastructure, the massive winter sports build was a need fulfilled for the citizens of China, but will the media once again accuse the IOC of excess and violations of its own Olympic Charter because of its choice in partner?

Agenda 2020 and The New Norm, however, have seemed to have a very positive impact on the number of interested cities in the Summer and Winter Games. As shown in Table 8, 15 different cities/regions have shown some level of interest in the Summer Games for 2032 or 2036. Fifteen is an extremely healthy number, but the question remains, after Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022, will all those cities still be interested? The next year and a half could be a difficult news cycle based on negative coverage from those two Games. The real impacts of Agenda 2020 and The New Norm will likely not be truly seen until after Paris 2024, Milan 2026, and Los Angeles 2028. If those Games all go well, exhibit budget surpluses, and include minimal stories about gigantism, cost overruns and IOC excess, the Olympic Movement may be safe for another generation. The IOC can then refocus the conversation surrounding the Games away from infrastructure and legacy discussion into deliberation and analysis of the values and goals of Olympism itself. As Kassens-Noor (2020) says, "LA 2028 and Paris 2024 will determine the future of the Olympics" (p. 4).

The future of the global Olympic brand rests inescapably on the IOC beginning to place the Games outside of Europe, North America, Japan, China, and Australia. This is not to say the Games should never re-visit those regions from time to time as there are multiple existing Olympic Parks that could be utilized. Eventually Africa may host the Games, along with the Middle East, South Asia and another attempt in South America. The values of Olympism and Olympic Solidarity mandate that in this age of fractious politics and international differences of opinion, the world be introduced to the Olympic Movement by more than just their televisions, computers, and phones, and for the Olympics to set an example for the rest of the world. The IOC was certainly heading toward widening the Olympics' worldwide reach when Rio was awarded the Games. However, the back-to-back experiences in Sochi and Rio have caused the IOC to become increasingly risk averse. "Rio was such an unmitigated disaster from an operational delivery standpoint… never have I seen such, bordering on criminal management incompetence. You know, you're [the IOC] not doing that again" (I-A). Interviewee A continues, "the IOC is out of the risk business for a long time," because many IOC members lived through Rio and never want to repeat that experience. Finally, Interviewee A asserts, "I don't see the Games going to Africa in my lifetime." These statements get to the heart of the matter as to why

Global Giants are dominating Games hosting at the moment: a deep fear of risk by the IOC membership.

As mentioned in section 1.3, many detractors keep advocating the idea of containing the Games in one or a few permanent locations, or that two successive Games should be given to the same host, avoiding the "Eternal Beginner Syndrome" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2020, p. 14) of hosts having to learn how to host before every Games. This would be a strong way of limiting risk and operational and infrastructure expense. However, research has mostly rejected this idea. Interviewee C states,

> The genius in the way the Olympic Games are structured is that every two years a community of people, not a city, not a nation, a small community of people, believers, idealists, get to reinterpret and I dare say, resurrect the Olympic brand in their own prism, their own view of the world based on their culture… If you tell me that we're just going to rotate the Olympic Games between Athens and LA and London and Moscow, it will die on the vine, it will become rote, it will become a business.

Versions of this same sentiment were communicated by most interviewees, and it is unlikely that Olympic insiders and the IOC will, in the foreseeable future, consider a rotation of the Games. Internationalism is simply too important to the Olympic Movement as a whole, and the opportunity to keep the brand fresh too compelling to consider holding the Games in one permanent site.

The IOC has a difficult balancing act ahead of itself, to keep expanding the Olympic Brand around the world, even into the developing world, and to keep the Games ambulatory, while at the same time making the Olympics a less risky proposition. Those two ideas are the true paradox for the Olympic Movement going forward. The IOC has to do this in a way that upholds the Olympic ideals, is sustainable, and promotes a positive legacy for all future hosts, thus improving the IOCs image and credibility in the eyes of the public and the media.

5.3   Framework / Recommendations

The final sub-question of this study is: *What framework can the IOC and mid-tier cities develop so that mid-tier cities can successfully bid for and host the Summer Games in the future?* After analyzing all of the data from the literature review and the research part of this study, it is apparent that much of the framework for allowing mid-tier cities to get back into rotation have already been put in place through Agenda 2020, The New Norm, and overall IOC strategy. That being said, still more can be done to improve the IOC's credibility, allowing the IOC to keep mid-tier cities in the rotation by not being forced to award hosting rights only to Global Giants. The following section provides some recommendations to the IOC and potential bid cities that build on the results of this study.

IOC Recommendations

Greater Budget Oversight over Organizing Committees

The IOC has often been blamed when Olympic budgets spiral out of control, but in reality, this is often the fault of the local organizing committee and local politicians who push force their own agendas onto the Olympic project. The IOC needs to have greater involvement in the budget process, since its reputation is on the line, not just the reputation of the organizing committee. The IOC will now have a much greater role in the budget during the bidding phase, which is a good starting point, but it is unclear whether it will have much additional input, other than in an advisory role, following the bidding phase. The IOC could implement concrete steps to keep cities accountable to their stated budget. This could be in the form of fines, or withholding promised IOC dollars from the organizing committees if they operate a certain percentage over budget.

Cap Public Expenditures

The fact that the IOC requires municipal or federal entities to guarantee blank checks to organizing committees in the case of budgetary inflation has been the root cause of most of the cost overruns of past Olympics (Flyvbjerg et al., 2020). Not having this financial backstop is what drove the LA84 Games to come in under budget, the organizers had no choice but to stay

within their budgetary means, and the Games were still considered great by most observers. All Games could be held to this same financial standard and have a limit on public funds. By implementing a cap, Olympic organizing committees will have no choice but to adhere more closely to their budgets. As Müller (2015) states, "Capping expenditures reduces the risk of profiteering and overspending; earmarking prevents funds for urban development from being diverted to hosting the event itself" (p. 13).

Larger Budget Contingency Requirements

As the history of the Games has shown, and Flyvbjerg et al. (2020) point out, the average budget contingency of the risky Olympic project is not nearly enough, at around 9.1%. Most Games' final budgets have exceeded that amount, sometimes even double the original budget, so a larger contingency percentage can minimize risk in this regard. This practice, combined with better cost management, as emphasized in The New Norm could help keep the Olympic projects on track and on budget.

IOC Leverage Over Organizing Committees

The IOC does not have a great deal of leverage over OCOGs once the Games are awarded, particularly as the date of the Games approaches. The IOC has little recourse if there are budget issues or Olympic Charter violations. They have adopted the approach of minimizing public or media outcry when the committee or host country violates the human rights of its own citizens or has major budget problems. Theoretically, during every cycle, the IOC could have a backup host prepared to take over the Games in case organizing committees or host countries do not follow through on their promises in upholding the Olympic Charter. Los Angeles or London, because of their ample venues and hosting history could be two plausible options that could host a Games in less than two years. The power of pulling the Games from a city would likely never be used, but the mere fact that it could be an option may assist in keeping OCOGs in line out of fear of losing the Games.

Further Distancing from Urban Renewal

The desire for leaving a physical legacy is extremely embedded in the Olympic project, and the IOC has been more active in educating recent bid and organizing committees in their

desire for creating physical changes to their city in the lead-up to the Olympic Games through Agenda 2020 and The New Norm. But the IOC and the IFs, which approve all venues, could go further and completely disassociate the Games from urban renewal. If new venues are needed for the Games, find them in an adjacent city, state, or country. Do not award the Games until the housing is already in place for the Olympic Village, or use a local university when possible. There can be no doubt that infrastructure build should not be part of the Olympic project, such as new, grandiose Olympic Parks or local public transportation initiatives that may be necessary for the city, but are outside the scope of the Olympic project. Currently, unnecessary infrastructure build is certainly discouraged but remains allowed in specific circumstances. The IOC should investigate means of further disassociating the Games from massive city urban renewal projects.

Keep Hosting Decisions Within the Executive Board

As covered in section 2.11 the IOC has maintained the possibility that multiple bids could advance all the way to the full membership's final vote. The concluding phase of bidding could still conceivably contain an auction-style competition, which would open the door for a threatening risk of excess. Cities attempting to outshine each other at the critical, ultimate moment of the selection process could dredge up a host of old problems. Under the current bidding format, the Executive Board may only grant the IOC membership authority for a rubber-stamp approval, but it remains unclear at present. The IOC can opt to take the finishing step in this direction, definitively setting forth an intention to reserve the final hosting decision for the Executive Board, thus changing the closing vote to simply a confirmation of the Executive Board's decision.

Adjust the Sporting Program

It is problematic to remove a sport once it is included in the Games, but the IOC has done so in the past, and could conceivably remove additional sports from the Games. This would require cooperation and difficult negotiations with IFs, and may instigate a great deal of controversy. In an attempt to analyze sports objectively, there are sports on the roster whose popularity has undeniably waned, and some sports with too great a logistical complexity to keep including them. Sports to consider removing include kayaking (massive infrastructure build that is not needed later on in most cities); sports that may not always hold up to the Olympic

philosophy of inclusion because they are only available to elite classes, such as equestrian, sailing, and modern pentathlon; or combat sports that mimic warfare, such as boxing or taekwondo. Removing these sports would reduce the number of athletes, some of the complexity of the Games, and arguably create better adherence to values of the Olympic Charter, all allowing interested bidders to spend less money on hosting the Games.

Require One of Every Four Summer Games to be Awarded to Developing Nations

To further develop the Games, and to broaden the message of Olympic Solidarity, the IOC could guarantee that a city / region in a developing country from a higher Human Development Index nation be awarded the Games in one out of every four Games. These cities are, by the definition created in section 4.2, usually mid-tier cities, but they come with a much higher risk than mid-tier cities in lower HDI nations. Awarding the Games to these types of cities or regions can happen by saving a significant amount of revenue income from each four-year revenue cycle and putting it into a fund (that may grow with interest) specifically for hosts from developing countries. For example, if US$333 million dollars was saved from the IOC profits from the Paris cycle in 2024, US$333 million dollars from the Los Angeles cycle in 2028, and US$333 million dollars from the 2032 cycle, by the 2036 Games, there would be an additional fund of between US$1 billion – US$2 billion dollars on top of the usual IOC contribution from broadcast rights and the TOP program, which on its own is expected to be US$2 billion for the LA 2028 Games (Reid, 2019). This would bring the host city from a developing nation a total contribution to well over US$3 billion dollars, dramatically lowering the risks for that city or nation's government and citizens. Without doubt, any cities chosen for this program would have to be held to very strict criteria in adherence to the Olympic Charter and budget reconciliation.

Avoid Autocracy and Human Rights Violators

A central tenet of this study asserts that the Games should move around the world to as many nations as possible. However, the IOC needs to be more mindful in its choice of future hosts, avoiding countries that are autocratic in nature with a current history of extreme human rights violations, in order to better adhere to the sentiments of the Olympic Charter. Allowing states like this to be hosts, regardless of the IOC's belief in being an apolitical organization, is dangerous to the future of the Olympic Games. The Freedom House Global Freedom Scores are

one example of a metric the IOC could use in aiding its decision making about hosting rights, but there are others, including the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index. While having host cities / regions from autocratic states has been acceptable to the IOC in the recent past, it can no longer stay completely apolitical, this is against the central themes of the Olympic Charter, which states that Olympism should be "promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (International Olympic Committee, 2020b, p. 11). Allowing future Olympics to be hosted in autocratic nations is fraught with danger because of the likelihood of overspending and human rights violations further tarnishing the Olympic brand and public sentiment toward the IOC. Selecting Sochi in 2014 and Beijing in 2008 and 2022 provided short- term gains, but resulted in long-term loss for the credibility of the Olympic Movement, forcing the Movement into the current situation where mid-tier cities find it more formidable to compete for hosting the Games.

Bid Committee and Potential Host City Recommendations

Become Part of the Conversation

Potential mid-tier host cities and bid committees need to engage in a dialogue conversation with the IOC promptly if they want to host a future Games. As shown by the number of cities expressing interest in 2032/36, there could be a long line for future Games, especially if the recent reforms truly take hold and are demonstrated to be effective by the Paris 2024 and LA 2028 Games. Bidding will now cost the bid committees and cities less than in the past, and the IOC is now providing more guidance to help the bid committee craft a creative, realistic, and innovative bid that will meet the reforms of the IOC and be acceptable to the public. It may take a city 20, 30, or even 40 years to win a bid, but without starting the conversation that many years in advance, it may never happen.

OCOGs Have to Hold Themselves Accountable

As mentioned earlier in this section, the IOC can improve its record in holding organizing committees accountable, but OCOGs have a responsibility to do this for themselves as well. The days of simply going over budget just to get the Olympics prepared on time need to be over; citizens should not be the ones to bear the extra costs. If organizing committees truly believe in

Olympic ideals and the Olympic Charter, they will take the lessons of Olympism to heart and not be overly swayed by elite, local influencers in the development, construction and political realm. By taking more responsibility, a better model of hosting can be exhibited which will pay dividends for future hosts and their citizens in mid-tier cities.

OCOGs Need to Present Realistic and Economical Bids

OCOGs should no longer minimize cost estimates and exaggerate positive economic impacts in their early bid documents. Truth and transparency must rule their decision making, and sustainability and positive legacy must be at the core of these resolutions. This is imperative for the positive future of the Olympic Movement, which is closely tied to the ideals of truth, justice, and sustainability. OCOGs are an equally important part of upholding Olympism as the IOC; each OCOG holds the future of the Games in its hands.

More Private Funding for Olympic Games

OCOGs and interested mid-tier cities must attempt to put a greater emphasis on raising private money to finance the Olympic Games wherever possible, understanding the impossibility in certain socialist or communist societies. If one looks back at Olympic history, the Games that came at or under budget were primarily private bids using little public money, with no financial backstop from government entities. Ending the Olympic project with a surplus can have just as great a positive legacy for a city (e.g. Los Angeles 1984) as leaving behind 20 new venues, consigning the city to debt for 40 years. By putting an emphasis on private funding, OCOGs will have more accountability to themselves and the budgets they are managing, which will in turn support the credibility of the Olympic Movement and encourage more cities to follow their lead.

5.4   Limitations

As with any study, there are limitations to the research. First, despite the efforts of the author to interview Olympic critics, the interviewees were mostly Olympic insiders. This may mean they presented the point of view of an Olympic supporter. Second, things can change rapidly, and with the worldwide pandemic still raging around the world, it is unknown what effect that will have on the future of the Olympic Movement. For example, what happens if the

Tokyo Games are canceled? That would have a devastating effect on the Olympic Movement and the finances of the IOC. Finally, there is so much applicable research on the topic that only a small fraction of it could be considered for this study; in all likelihood there are many other worthy concepts about the Olympic Movement that were not investigated here.

5.5   Finale

The future legacy of the Olympic Games should be a legacy of pure Olympism and ideals, not just infrastructure. A reduction in the size and complexity of the Games could move the focus away from urban development and back to Olympism. Olympism is about advancing a movement of sport, respect for culture, internationalism, and a universal respect for human rights (International Olympic Committee, 2020b). In order to truly espouse these ideals, the Summer Olympics cannot go solely to where the world's economic power lies, and the Games have to be ambulatory. The IOC must expand its respect for the humanity of all cultures and peoples be compelled to do everything in its power to flatten out economic and soft power across all cities, countries, and continents by making the Games more accessible to every citizen of the world.

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APPENDIX I: AGENDA 2020 RECOMMENDATIONS

20+20 Recommendations to Shape the Future of the Olympic Movement

1) Shape the bidding process as an invitation

2) Evaluate bid cities by assessing key opportunities and risks

3) Reduce the cost of bidding

4) Include sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games

5) Include sustainability within the Olympic Movement's daily operations

6) Cooperate closely with other sports event organisers

7) Strengthen relationships with organisations managing sport for people with different abilities

8) Forge relationships with professional leagues

9) Set a framework for the Olympic programme

10) Move from a sport-based to an event-based programme

11) Foster gender equality

12) Reduce the cost and reinforce the flexibility of Olympic Games management

13) Maximise synergies with Olympic Movement stakeholders

14) Strengthen the 6th Fundamental Principle of Olympism

15) Change the philosophy to protecting clean athletes

16) Leverage the IOC USD 20 million fund to protect clean athletes

17) Honour clean athletes

18) Strengthen support to athletes

19) Launch an Olympic Channel

20) Enter into strategic partnerships

21) Strengthen IOC advocacy capacity

22) Spread Olympic values-based education

23) Engage with communities

24) Evaluate the Sport for Hope programme

25) Review Youth Olympic Games positioning

26) Further blend sport and culture

27) Comply with basic principles of good governance

28) Support autonomy

29) Increase transparency

30) Strengthen the IOC Ethics Commission independence

31) Ensure compliance

32) Strengthen ethics

33) Further involve sponsors in "Olympism in Action" programmes

34) Develop a global licensing programme

35) Foster TOP sponsors' engagement with NOCs

36) Extend access to the Olympic brand for non-commercial use

37) Address IOC membership age limit

38) Implement a targeted recruitment process

39) Foster dialogue with society and within the Olympic Movement

40) Review scope and composition of IOC commissions

(International Olympic Committee, 2014)

APPENDIX II: KEY NEW NORM REQUIREMENTS

Selection of key New Norm requirements in reference to the bid process and infrastructure.

Three major initiatives:

1. Redesigning of the Candidature Process – Approved by the IOC Session in June 2017, fully implemented for the Olympic Winter Games 2026

2. The IOC Legacy Strategic Approach – Adopted by the IOC Executive Board in December 2017

3. 7-year Journey Together – A transformation of organisation and delivery of future Olympic and Paralympic Games, rooted in the analysis of previous editions and a toolkit of 100 specific measures (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 3)

Candidature

Stage One: "Dialogue", is non-committal and enables the city to explore options and opportunities openly and in depth with the IOC and its stakeholders. Cities are not required to submit formal proposals and guarantees or deliver presentations during Stage One.

Stage Two: A shorter and lighter "Candidature" phase, emphasises the way that Games proposals should align with the city's long-term local, regional and national development goals. During this stage, details regarding organisation and delivery are also provided by the cities.

Throughout the process, the IOC will provide technical experts to help cities and NOCs develop their candidature concepts. All have extensive experience in bidding for and hosting Olympic Games, with specialised knowledge related to areas such as sports, venues, infrastructure, transport, accommodation, security, sustainability, legacy, finance and marketing. Costs for all expert support visits are covered by the IOC and the same group is available to all cities (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 4).

Legacy

Securing long-term benefits from hosting the Olympic Games has long been a recognised goal for the Olympic Movement. The Games leave tangible and intangible benefits, ranging from sports participation and infrastructure to social and economic legacies.

Realising positive and enduring benefits from the Games needs consistent focus and management. To be successful, such planning should also be synchronised with the host city's long-term urban development goals.

Objective 1:   Embed legacy through the Olympic Games lifecycle

Objective 2:   Document, analyse and communicate the legacy of the Olympic Games

Objective 3:   Encourage Olympic legacy celebration

Objective 4:   Build strategic partnerships (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 5)

7-year Journey Together - Games Requirements: Competition and Training Venues Specific Measures:

29.   In keeping with Recommendation 1 of Olympic Agenda 2020, which calls for the maximum use of existing facilities and temporary / demountable venues as well as competitions or venues outside the host country for reasons of sustainability, OCOGs are strongly encouraged to observe the following measures:

- Temporary venues should be developed in the most cost-effective way, weighing the cost of the technical solution against the revenue-generating potential for the events it will host;

- New permanent venues should be considered only if a viable business plan is presented detailing proven post-Games demand, funding and future operational usage, including operator; and

- For the specific case of mono-functional venues (i.e. venues whose main usage is limited to one sport / event) no permanent construction will be required. Instead, competitions should be moved to the most suitable existing venue, in agreement between the IOC and the IF(s) concerned, even if located outside the host city / country.

31. The IOC and IFs will ensure that venue requirements at the Olympic Games do not exceed those of each sport's World Championships

32. No minimum requirements for venue capacities. Instead, capacity should be determined according to context (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, pp. 25-26)

Olympic Villages

Currently, the requirements ask for 16,000 beds (that reach 17,000 once contingency is included) in the main Olympic Village for the Olympic Games and 4,900 beds for the Olympic Winter Games. However, the physical distribution of competition venues often leads to sub-villages and other venue-dedicated accommodation for athletes, resulting in overcapacities at the main Olympic Village (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 27).

Specific Measures:

42. Guarantee only one bed for each athlete either at the main or an additional Olympic Village

44. Advise Candidate Cities / OCOGs to consider temporary or demountable solutions for the Olympic Village(s), if no existing facility is suitable and permanent facilities are not required post-Games (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 28).

International Broadcast Centre / Main Press Centre / Media Services

Specific Measures:

48. Candidate Cities / OCOGs to consider multi-site, temporary or demountable solutions for the IBC and the MPC if no existing facility is suitable.

49. Candidate Cities / OCOGs to use appropriate adjacent facilities such as offices, restaurants, etc., to reduce the MPC footprint.

50. Candidate Cities / OCOGs to consider temporary media facilities when existing venues are not sufficient for the Games and permanent facilities are not required post-Games (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 29).

Transport

Specific Measures:

79.   Candidate Cities and OCOGs to propose transport plans which combine the use of OCOG-dedicated resources and public transport, while maintaining an integrated and effective end-to-end transport service. The reliance on public transport in the host city and co-host cities must be based on the robustness and availability of an existing network. OCOGs are encouraged to find solutions which minimise usage of a dedicated fleet and buses. A client-by-client approach should be taken, based on the actual needs of the clients.

80.   Combine OCOG transport services, while maintaining an integrated and effective end-to-end transport service. Suggestions include, but are not limited to:

   − Combining Transport for Media (TM) and T3 services (a transport system for designated persons, including IOC employees and Games clients, that can include passenger cars, shuttles and buses); and

   − Providing shuttles for use by all stakeholders for short distances, for example between venues or after late-night competitions.

81.   Based on the data captured at each edition of the Games, identify transport facilities and services, such as dedicated parking, that are underutilised and better align them to match actual needs and usage, thereby lowering operational costs.

82.   Candidate Cities and OGOCs to propose arrival and departure transport plans which maximise the use of public transport or other "user-pay" services. Options would vary from city to city depending on the distances being travelled and the standard of the public transport network. OCOGs will still be responsible for ensuring integrated and effective end-to-end services.

85.   Limit the number of dedicated vehicles provided free of charge to stakeholders and convert certain services to user-pay / rate-card options.

89.   Further leverage transport solutions that build on potential developments in the future in the industry (e.g. autonomous driving, connected vehicles, pooling / sharing solutions, etc.). The TOP Partner for mobility will work closely with future OCOGs and relevant authorities to develop solutions applicable to the Games context. This will guarantee

improvements in efficiency and sustainability for Games transport services (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, pp. 35-36).

Accommodation

In addition to providing accommodation for the athletes and team officials in the Olympic Village(s), OCOGs must also take care of the accommodation needs of many other stakeholders (referees, workforce, journalists, broadcasters, sponsors, etc.) at the Games. This represents 41,000 rooms for the Olympic Games and 24,000 for the Olympic Winter Games.

Specific Measures

90.   Reduce the overall requirements to avoid reserving rooms that will be released shortly before the Games or not used, and adjust the period of stay to actual use. The anticipated decrease would be based on data captured at Games time and needs would be adjusted accordingly for the next edition.

91.   To offer more flexibility to OCOGs, use of alternative accommodation solutions is encouraged (for example home-stay programmes, apartment rental websites and others). Additionally, OCOGs are encouraged to use temporary accommodation when existing capacities are insufficient or there is no post-Games need for new permanent structures (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, p. 37).

Maximum savings of $959 million USD for Summer Olympics:

In addition, capital investments and other Games-related expenses incurred by public authorities (i.e. non-OCOG budget) could also be positively impacted. These savings are dependent on the existing infrastructure in future host cities and will therefore differ significantly from city to city; however, they do reflect the savings that previous Games organisers could have achieved, if such measures had been applied. The major areas where such savings could be observed are the following:

- Competition and Training Venues: The increased flexibility in venue selection criteria arising from the use of existing mono-functional venues, even if located outside the host city / region; the elimination of minimum venue capacities, combined with increased

venue sharing opportunities; and reduced venue-specific requirements, can lead to significant savings related to venue construction.

- Olympic Village(s): The proposed measures guarantee one bed for every athlete at an Olympic Village while matching the capacity of the Village(s) to actual demands. This optimisation takes into consideration the physical distribution of competition venues that often leads to sub-villages or other venue-dedicated accommodation, thereby ensuring no over-capacities or duplication of bed requirements at the main Olympic Village. This can lead to a potential reduction in the size of the Olympic Village(s) that need(s) to be constructed and thereby also to a potential reduction of the construction costs.

- International Broadcast Centre / Main Press Centre: The proposed measures allow for optimised size and introduce greater flexibility regarding the type of facilities (i.e. use of multi-site, temporary or demountable solutions) to be used for the IBC and / or the MPC. If no existing facility is suitable and new facilities have to be developed, these measures allow for significant potential savings.

- Games Services: The key measures relating to Games Services that may impact capital investment or non-OCOG budgets mainly concern accommodation and transport. In particular, workforce accommodation tends to be a significant cost. In addition, the reduction of venue capacity requirements and therefore by default alignment with the existing transport infrastructure translates into lower infrastructure upgrade requirements (e.g. if venue capacities are planned according to existing transport capacities) (International Olympic Committee, 2018b, pp. 48-49).

APPENDIX III: REDEFINING GLOBAL CITIES

Seven Categories for Global Cities: 2016 Brookings Institute and J.P. Morgan Chase

GLOBAL GIANTS

London, Los Angeles, New York, Osaka-Kobe, Paris, Tokyo

ASIAN ANCHORS

Beijing, Hong Kong, Moscow, Seoul-Incheon, Shanghai, Singapore

EMERGING GATEWAYS

Ankara, Brasilia, Busan-Ulsan, Cape Town, Chongqing, Delhi, Ekurhuleni, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Istanbul, Jinan, Johannesburg, Katowice-Ostrava, Mexico City, Monterrey, Mumbai, Nanjing, Ningbo, Pretoria, Rio de Janeiro, Saint Petersburg, Santiago, São Paulo, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Warsaw, Wuhan, Xi'an

FACTORY CHINA

Changchun, Changsha, Changzhou, Chengdu, Dalian, Dongguan, Foshan, Fuzhou, Haerbin, Hefei, Nantong, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Suzhou, Tangshan, Wenzhou, Wuxi, Xuzhou, Yantai, Zhengzhou, Zibo

KNOWLEDGE CAPITALS

Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Hartford, Houston, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle, Stockholm, Washington, D.C., Zürich

AMERICAN MIDDLEWEIGHTS

Charlotte, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Miami, Orlando, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Riverside, Sacramento, San Antonio, St. Louis, Tampa

INTERNATIONAL MIDDLEWEIGHTS

Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Birmingham (UK), Brussels, Copenhagen-Malmö, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Köln-Düsseldorf, Kitakyushu-Fukuoka, Madrid, Melbourne, Milan, Montréal, Munich, Nagoya, Perth, Rome, Rotterdam-Amsterdam, Stuttgart, Sydney, Tel-Aviv, Toronto, Vancouver, Vienna-Bratislava

(Trujillo & Parilla, 2016, pp. 3-5)

APPENDIX IV: REGIONAL HOST CALCULATIONS

Rhine-Ruhr Bid:

Aachen	248,960
Bochum	376,000
Bonn	320,000
Cologne	1,119,000
Dortmund	590,000
Duisburg	515,000
Düsseldorf	632,000
Essen	582,000
Gelsenkirchen	259,645
Krefeld	227,417
Leverkusen	163,729
Mönchengladbach	261,034
Neuss	153,896
Oberhausen	210,764
Recklinghausen	111,397
Wuppertal	349,000
TOTAL	**6,119,842**

Rotterdam-Amsterdam Bid:

Amsterdam	1,149,000
Rotterdam	1,010,000
TOTAL	**2,159,000**

Madrid-Valencia Bid:

Madrid	6,618,000
Valencia	834,000
TOTAL	**7,452,000**

Brisbane-Queensland Bid:

Brisbane	2,406,000
Gold Coast - Tweed Head	699,000
Sunshine Coast	347,000
TOTAL	**3,452,000**

North-Central Italy Bid:

Bologna	806,000
Florence	708,000
TOTAL	**1,514,000**

Montréal-Toronto Bid:

Montréal	4,221,000
Toronto	6,197,000
TOTAL	**10,418,000**

APPENDIX V: GLOBAL AND MID-TIER CITY CHART

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
AFRICA						
Luanda#	Angola	149	8,330,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (32)
Kinshasa#	Democratic Republic of the Congo	179	14,342,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (18)
Cairo#	Egypt	116	20,901,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (21)
Lagos	Nigeria	158	14,368,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (47)
ASIA						
Dhaka	Bangladesh	113	21,006,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (39)
Beijing#	China	85	20,463,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Chengdu#	China	85	9,136,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (10)
Chongqing#	China	85	15,872,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Guangzhou#	China	85	13,302,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Shanghai#	China	85	27,058,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Shenzhen#	China	85	12,357,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (10)
Tianjin#	China	85	13,589,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Wuhan#	China	85	8,365,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (10)
Xi'an#	China	85	8,001,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (10)
Hong Kong	China (SAR)	4	7,548,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Partly Free (55)
Ahmadabad	India	129	8,059,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (71)
Bangalore	India	129	12,327,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (71)
Calcutta	India	129	14,850,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (71)
Delhi	India	129	30,291,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Free (71)
Hyderabad	India	129	10,004,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (71)
Madras	India	129	10,971,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (71)
Mumbai	India	129	20,411,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Free (71)
Jakarta	Indonesia	111	10,770,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Partly Free (61)
Tehran#	Iran	65	9,135,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (17)
Tel-Aviv	Israel	22	4,181,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (76)
Hiroshima	Japan	19	2,083,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Kitakyushu-Fukuoka	Japan	19	5,529,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Nagoya	**Japan**	**19**	**9,552,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (96)**
Osaka-Kobe	**Japan**	**19**	**19,165,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (96)**
Sapporo	Japan	19	2,670,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Sendai	Japan	19	2,327,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Shizuoka-Hamamatsu	Japan	19	2,922,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Tokyo	**Japan**	**19**	**37,393,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (96)**
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	61	7,997,000	Bubble	Population close	Partly Free (52)
Karachi	Pakistan	152	16,094,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (38)
Lahore	Pakistan	152	12,642,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (38)
Manila	Philippines	106	13,923,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (59)
Singapore	Singapore	9	5,935,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Partly Free (50)
Bulsan-Ulsan	South Korea	22	4,375,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (83)
Daegu	South Korea	22	2,199,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (83)
Daejon	South Korea	22	1,566,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (83)
Gwangju	South Korea	22	1,522,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (83)
Seoul-Incheon	**South Korea**	**22**	**12,764,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (83)**
Bangkok	Thailand	77	10,539,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (32)
Ho Chi Minh City#	Vietnam	118	8,602,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (20)

EUROPE

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Vienna-Bratislava	Austria & Slovakia	20 / 36	2,365,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (93) & Free (88)
Antwerp	Belgium	17	1,042,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Brussels	Belgium	17	2,081,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Prague	Czech Republic	26	1,306,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (91)
Copenhagen-Malmo	Denmark & Sweden	11 / 8	1,668,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97) / Free (100)
Helsinki	Finland	12	1,305,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (100)
Lille	France	26	1,063,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (90)
Lyon	France	26	1,719,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (90)
Marseille	France	26	1,608,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (90)
Paris	**France**	**26**	**11,017,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (90)**
Berlin	Germany	4	3,562,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Frankfurt Rhine-Main	Germany	4	5,821,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Hamburg	Germany	4	1,791,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Munich	Germany	4	1,538,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Rhine-Ruhr	Germany	4	6,119,842	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Athens	Greece	32	3,153,000	Bubble	HDI close / former host	Free (88)

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Budapest	Hungary	43	1,768,000	Bubble	HDI Close	Partly Free (70)
Dublin	Ireland	3	1,228,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Milan	Italy	29	3,140,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
Naples	Italy	29	2,187,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
North-Central Italy	Italy	29	1,514,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
Rome	Italy	29	4,257,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
Turin	Italy	29	1,792,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (89)
Rotterdam-Amsterdam	Netherlands	10	2,159,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (99)
Oslo	Norway	1	1,027,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (100)
Warsaw	Poland	32	1,783,000	Bubble	HDI Close	Free (84)
Katowice-Ostrava	Poland & Czech Republic	32 / 26	5,300,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (84) / Free (91)
Lisbon	Portugal	40	2,957,000	Bubble	HDI Close	Free (96)
Porto	Portugal	40	1,313,000	Bubble	HDI Close	Free (96)
Moscow#	Russia	49	12,538,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Not Free (20)
Barcelona	Spain	25	5,586,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (92)
Madrid-Valencia	Spain	25	7,452,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (92)
Stockholm	Sweden	8	1,633,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (100)
Zürich	Switzerland	2	1,395,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (96)
Istanbul#	Turkey	59	15,190,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Not Free (32)
Birmingham	United Kingdom	15	2,607,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Glasgow	United Kingdom	15	1,673,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
Leeds	United Kingdom	15	1,889,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
London	**United Kingdom**	**15**	**9,304,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (94)**
Manchester	United Kingdom	15	2,730,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (94)
NORTH AMERICA						
Calgary	Canada	13	1,513,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Edmonton	Canada	13	1,461,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Montréal	Canada	13	4,221,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Ottawa	Canada	13	1,393,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Toronto	Canada	13	6,197,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Vancouver	Canada	13	2,581,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (98)
Mexico City	Mexico	76	21,872,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Partly Free (62)

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
Atlanta	United States	15	5,803,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Austin	United States	15	2,053,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Baltimore	United States	15	2,325,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Boston	United States	15	4,309,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Charlotte	United States	15	2,054,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Chicago	**United States**	**15**	**8,865,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (86)**
Cincinnati	United States	15	1,746,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Cleveland	United States	15	1,763,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Columbus	United States	15	1,644,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Dallas	United States	15	6,301,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Denver	United States	15	2,827,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Detroit	United States	15	3,548,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Houston	United States	15	6,371,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Indianapolis	United States	15	1,807,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Jacksonville	United States	15	1,280,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Kansas City	United States	15	1,686,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Las Vegas	United States	15	2,699,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Los Angeles	**United States**	**15**	**12,447,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (86)**
Louisville	United States	15	1,089,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Memphis	United States	15	1,150,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Miami	United States	15	6,122,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Milwaukee	United States	15	1,439,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Minneapolis	United States	15	2,926,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Nashville	United States	15	1,249,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
New York City	**United States**	**15**	**18,804,000**	**Global Giant**	**Meets both criteria**	**Free (86)**
Orlando	United States	15	1,923,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Philadelphia	United States	15	5,717,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Phoenix	United States	15	4,511,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Pittsburgh	United States	15	1,704,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Portland	United States	15	2,151,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Providence	United States	15	1,200,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Richmond	United States	15	1,105,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Riverside	United States	15	2,469,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Sacramento	United States	15	2,123,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Salt Lake City	United States	15	1,169,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
San Antonio	United States	15	2,320,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
San Diego	United States	15	3,251,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)

World Cities*	Country	HDI Country Ranking (2020)	Metro Population	City Type	Why City Type	Freedom in the World Report 2020%
San Francisco	United States	15	3,314,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
San Jose	United States	15	1,791,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Seattle	United States	15	3,433,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
St. Louis	United States	15	2,213,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Tampa	United States	15	2,877,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Virginia Beach	United States	15	1,477,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
Washington, D.C.	United States	15	5,322,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (86)
OCEANIA						
Adelaide	Australia	6	1,336,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Brisbane-Queensland	Australia	6	3,452,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Melbourne	Australia	6	4,968,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Perth	Australia	6	2,042,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Sydney	Australia	6	4,926,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
Auckland	New Zealand	14	1,607,000	Mid-Tier	Under 8m	Free (97)
SOUTH AMERICA						
Buenos Aires	Argentina	48	15,154,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (85)
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	79	13,458,000	Mid-Tier	Over-30 HDI	Free (75)
São Paulo	Brazil	79	22,043,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (75)
Santiago	Chile	42	6,767,000	Bubble	HDI Close	Free (90)
Bogotá	Colombia	79	10,978,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Partly Free (66)
Lima	Peru	82	10,719,000	Mid-Tier	Over 30-HDI	Free (72)

* HDI Ranking from 2019, most recent year of HDI rankings, population data as of 2020
% Total score ranging from 100 (most free) to 0 (least free), with three categories (free – partly free – not free)
# Citizens are not free

GLOBAL GIANT: Over-30 HDI and Over 8m population
Mid-Tier: Either Over 30-HDI or Under 8m population
Bubble: Very close in either HDI rankings or population size

Sources: Author's Own Table, CityPopulation.de (n.d.-a – h), Freedom House (2020),
MacroTrends.net (n.d.), United Nations Development Programme (2019b)