

**University of the Peloponnese
School of Social and Political Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations**

**The Political Influence of Diasporas:
Indians, Cubans and Jews in the United States**

Niki Vlachou

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Νίκη Βλάχου

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Abstract

Keywords: diaspora, foreign policy analysis, ethnic lobbies

The research focuses on the diasporas and on the political power those groups could, under certain conditions attain. This power, consequently, when effectively employed, could potentially enable them to exert influence on the foreign policy decision making in their hostland, when lobbying for homeland related issues. However, and despite the fact that diasporas, at least in liberal and open hostlands such as the United States, share the same liberties concerning their freedom to mobilize, not all are perceived to be equally successful in effectively promoting their foreign policy related goals. Some diasporas, such as the Jewish in the United States, are widely perceived to be extremely influential politically, while others have not been able to become equally successful. At the same time, even the same influential diaspora might be successful in promoting certain issues, while failing to promote others.

In light of the abovementioned, the research focuses on the elements that when present might enhance the capacity of the diaspora to effectively promote its homeland related goal and, therefore, exert political influence in hostland. This target is sought to be accomplished by employing the case study research method, comparing three different diasporas and their efforts to promote specific homeland related issues. Additionally, by dividing those elements under question in two categories depending on the ability or inability of the diaspora to manipulate them to their benefit, the research attempts to determine whether groups, lacking certain elements are predetermined to fail in promoting their interests and whether success is possible for certain groups, only, that share certain characteristics.

According to the results of the study of the three American based diasporas and their respective endeavors to promote their homeland related issues in the United States, the factors that are under control of the group to modify seem to be key in exerting influence.

ΥΠΕΥΘΥΝΗ ΔΗΛΩΣΗ

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A. Introduction

According to data provided by the United Nations, in 2020 the number of migrants worldwide reached the 280.598 million people. The increasing nature of the phenomenon is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in 1990 the number of migrants worldwide was 152.98 million, while by 2000 it had already reached the 173.210 million (United Nations, 2020). The United States remains one of their preferential destinations, having become the hostland of around 50.30 million migrants (United Nations, 2020).

Along with the phenomenon, the countries' perception of those peoples has gradually been evolved. Contrary to the past mentality, diasporas are no longer perceived by the hostlands as a threat to their societies' cohesion, while at the same time their former homelands no longer treat them as an unnecessary burden. Consequently, those people are no longer marginalized and nowadays diasporas in the democratic hostlands enjoy the same liberties and political rights with the natives, while the fact that they are no longer required to cut the ties with their former homelands enables them to maintain a hybrid identity and strive for their homelands' wellbeing from afar. Diaspora, therefore, has nowadays become a political phenomenon that could, under conditions, exert influence on both homeland and hostland politics.

Acknowledging the political nature of diasporas, the research focuses on the influence they could exert on their hostland foreign policy decision making when lobbying for homeland related issues. Many diasporas in the United States have attempted to promote their homeland related issues and exert influence on the American political system with varying, however, degrees of success. There are diasporas that are perceived by their hostland as highly influential ethnic interest groups, such as the Jews, the Greeks or the Cubans residing in the United States, groups that have in the past demonstrated their ability to effectively promote their goals, while others, despite exerting efforts, have not managed to have notable successes. Therefore, the primary aim of the research is to identify which factors might have a positive contribution to a diaspora's efforts to promote their homeland related interests in hostland, since not all diasporas have been equally effective in successfully promoting them. However, even the same influential diaspora, including the abovementioned ones, is not always able to successfully promote all of their issues. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to

focus on the study of successful diasporic endeavors rather than influential diasporas, in general. Consequently, the aim of the research is to pinpoint certain elements successful diasporic efforts share, elements related to both the group, as well as to the nature of the specific issue they wish to promote. Additionally, the secondary aim is to examine whether success is predetermined and possible for certain diasporas, only, that share certain, inherent, elements or whether every group has, in theory, the ability to exert influence and effectively promote its homeland related interests. This secondary aim is sought to be accomplished by dividing the aforementioned factors in two categories. The first category includes those factors that are inherent to the group or are closely depended on the nature of the specific issue diaspora seeks to promote, and, therefore, they are more or less permanent and beyond the ability of the diaspora to modify them. In the factors of the first category, elements like the size of the group or the congruence of the issue they seek to promote with the hostland national interests are included, since they are given, and the group does not have the power to alter them or adjust them at will. The second category includes the factors that could be manipulated by the group to its benefit in order to successfully promote the desired issue and exert influence. The effective allocation of its resources or the selection of the most efficient strategy to reach the final goal are factors that belong to the second category and depend on the ability of the group to effectively utilize them.

B. Methodology

In order to achieve both the aforementioned aims, the research employs the case study method, as well as the comparative method, examining three different diasporas and their efforts to influence the American foreign policy over three specific homeland related issues.

According to Lijphart (1971:691), the advantage of the case study research method lies on its narrow focus on one case, only, Flyvbjerg (2006:221), also, admits that the case study research exploits the advantage of depth, while both Lijphart (1971:693) and Bennett, Elman (2007) stress the importance of the method for the fields of the political science and international relations.

The inability to validate or falsify a theory or produce generalizable conclusions from the study of a single case, does not impede the method from contributing to the formation of new propositions and, therefore, to theory according to Lijphart (1971:691), while Rule, Vaughn Mitchell (2015:9) and Gerring (2004:350) agree that the study of multiple cases could elevate the degree of certainty concerning the findings. Additionally, as Iacono, Brown, Holtham (2009:40) stress, the case study research aims at studying the phenomenon within its natural environment and its own context. Flyvbjerg (2006:221), also, underlines the importance of the context-depended knowledge that can be acquired via the in-depth study of a case, Dooley (2002:337) acknowledges that the cases represent real life, actual events, therefore, depicting either successes or failures, while Iacono, Brown and Holtham (2009:40), stress that the difference between the case study and an experiment lies precisely in the fact that during an experiment the phenomenon is isolated from its context, while in the case study research the context within the phenomenon occurs is equally important.

Concerning the relation of the case study method with theory, Lijphart (1971:692) categorizes the case studies research based on the aim and the eventual contribution in theory building or theory testing. He, thus, identifies six, ideal types of case study research, admitting that a case may pertain in more than one. These types are: a) the atheoretical type, which is purely descriptive in nature, neither based on a theory nor aiming at reaching one, being therefore, able, only indirectly able to contribute to theory formation by pinpointing useful information on the case. b) the interpretative type, which although similarly with the atheoretical one, it does not aim at building theory, it is, however, based on the existing theory in order to provide an

explanation for the case under study. c) the hypothesis generating type, where through the study of cases, a hypothesis is sought to be validated and then generalized. d) the theory-confirming and e) the theory-infirming types, where theory is being tested and it is either validated or falsified by the cases' research. Finally, f) the deviant type, where the case is specifically selected due to its deviation from the existing theory and its study aims at identifying the reason for this deviation.

Løkke and Sørensen (2014:66), also, underline the importance of the method in testing theories and assessing their validity, as well as their boundaries, thus, contributing to theory development, while Bennett (2004:21) admits its contribution in both reaching new hypotheses by employing the "logic of discovery" as well as in testing the already existing hypotheses by employing the "logic of confirmation". Baxter and Jack (2008:551) admit that setting specific hypotheses deriving from the already existing theory facilitates the research by guiding it, while according to Mahoney (2007:126), qualitative approaches of research are more able to identify new hypotheses by discovering new variables. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:26) describe that in theory-driven case study research, the research is constructed in the framework of the existing theory to then proceed to theory building, while Rule, and Vaughn Mitchell (2015:9), also, acknowledge that the same case can from theory application proceed to theory generation. Concerning the falsification of the theory, Flyvbjerg (2006:228) stresses the ability of the case study method and its in-depth research in pointing out Popper's black swans or deviations. Clarke and Primo (2007:744) admit that the prevailing method in political science research is hypothetico-deductivism, where a set of hypotheses is tested, and its validation confirms the theory and vice versa, while Park, Konge and Artino (2020:690), also, stress the circular nature of the hypothetico-deductivist logic, where the hypotheses derive from theory, and they are tested in order to either confirm or infirm it.

The abovementioned ability of the case study method to primarily test the existing theory and, consequently, contribute to the development of new variables (Lijphart's (1971:692) theory confirming and infirming type of case study) was employed in the present research.

As mentioned before, with the aim of determining the factors that may contribute to some diasporas being more influential than others when mobilizing and promoting homeland related interests in their hostland, the present research analyzes three case studies. Three specific diasporic efforts, two successful and one

unsuccessful, are examined in depth, in order to discover certain elements that contributed to the final result and their ultimate ability, or inability, to promote the desired issue and exert influence.

Scholars have in the past identified certain elements, whose presence can increase diaspora's ability to exert influence within the hostland political system. Following the hypothetico deductivist train of thought and through Bennett's (2004:21) theory of confirmation, the existing theory and the aforementioned elements are, therefore, put into test in the three case studies of the research. The existing theory serves, therefore, like a guide, as Baxter and Jack (2008:551) admit, in order to primarily test it and, consequently, through the cases' in-depth analysis and by employing Bennett's (2004:21) "logic of discovery", to identify new elements that contributed to the result of the specific cases.

Additionally, the close dependence of the case under study with its environment and its context (Iacono, Brown, Holtham (2009:40), Flyvbjerg (2006:221)) is of utmost importance in the cases under study. The elements that can contribute to diasporic influence, as mentioned before, are not only inherent to the group, but they also entail factors external to the group and beyond its ability to control or alter. The congruence of the issue with the hostland or the other actors' stance and actions, as well as with the wider environment the pursue of the certain issue has created (in homeland, hostland, or internationally), is of utmost importance and may ultimately determine the ability of the group to become influential and promote the issue.

Additionally, and in order to ensure the comparative analysis of the three cases, the research kept the political system constant. All three groups under study operate within the American political system, therefore the fact that they all enjoy the same liberties and the same limitations concerning their ability to mobilize renders the efforts comparable. Since the political system and its structure is common for all three groups and their target, as well, the efforts become comparable, since each diaspora, depending on the issue, strives to exert influence on the American Congress, approaching the overall effort according to the resources available and employing different strategies.

The data employed, derives mainly by secondary resources, as well as by legislation adopted by the American Congress and official press releases from the White House and other governmental and international bodies. Scientific articles from various academic journals, books, and other publications, published interviews of actors involved in the cases, in hindsight acknowledging or justifying their actions,

diasporic press articles and diasporic media reports, diasporic organizations' press releases, as well as global news agencies news and reports were also employed.

C. Cases

The three cases under study include: a) the efforts of the Indian diaspora to ensure the conclusion of the nuclear cooperation between the United States and India in 2008 under the Bush Presidency, b) the prolonged and continuous efforts of the Cuban diaspora to ensure the maintenance of the Cuban embargo that was imposed in 1962 and, finally, c) the effort of the Jewish diaspora to block the nuclear deal between the United States and Iran under the Obama Presidency. The first two case studies describe successful efforts on behalf of the respective ethnic groups, with the difference that in the Indian case the goal sought by the group is time specific, while in the Cuban case, the aim to maintain the embargo that was imposed in 1960's refers to a prolonged effort, extending during many Presidencies. On the contrary, the third case study refers to an unsuccessful effort undertaken by the, unanimously accepted as highly influential, Jewish lobby.

The timeframe of the diasporas' activities ranges from the end of the Cold War onwards, with the two cases, the Indian and the Jewish American ones, being extremely time limited, since they refer to a specific issue the groups wish to promote and their efforts were concluded within one Presidency, while the Cuban diaspora's case study refers to a prolonged campaign on behalf of the group, attempting to influence a series of Presidencies, others in different degrees in favor of the embargo, and some Presidencies even being completely against its continuation.

By maintaining the same hostland, the United States, for all three case studies the comparison is facilitated, since all three groups are operating within the same political system and therefore, all three share the same opportunities, as well as the same limitations concerning their available range of activities, as well as their freedom to mobilize. Therefore, since the external environment and the liberties it provides are common for all three groups, one group's eventual success or failure could not be attributed to the limitations posed by it concerning their mobilization.

The importance of the research lies in the fact that, primarily, the factors that could in theory enhance diaspora's influence are placed into test in real case studies in order to determine their potential contribution in the final result, while by being divided

in two categories, beyond and under the control of the group, it could be discovered to what extent any given diaspora group could have the possibility to become influential or whether success is only possible to diasporas privileged to share certain factors, while others lacking those factors are bound to fail.

Concerning the limitations of the research, the inherent difficulty of measuring qualitative elements, such as the influence of a certain isolated actor in the final decision making, applies to this research, as well.

Regarding the case studies of the research, the three specific diasporic efforts were selected due to the fact that the contribution of certain factors to the final result was deemed to be more evident. The, otherwise, highly influential Jewish diaspora failed to promote the specific issue and block the nuclear deal the Obama Presidency sought to conclude with Iran. Therefore, the case study becomes more interesting as to which elements missed from this specific effort of the otherwise influential and powerful Jewish diaspora, leading to their failure. The Cuban diaspora's case could also be very indicative of the importance and the contribution of certain factors, since the same group attempts to promote the same issue in different eras and in different Presidencies. Their campaign has been ongoing since the 1960's and they strive to exert influence in different Presidencies, others in favor of the embargo, in varied, however, degrees, and others resolutely against it. Therefore, the fact that the embargo is still in force and the group has succeeded in such a prolonged effort under different Presidencies allows for a more apt study on the factors and their importance. Additionally, throughout the decades the group, also, evolved and this could also demonstrate the importance of certain group related factors in the effort. On the other hand, the Indian Americans until their success in the case study under question, had been a group completely unaccustomed to political campaigns in hostland, never before being massively mobilized in order to promote any of their homeland related goals. Therefore, the priority some factors acquired in their mobilization, as well as their influence on the final result becomes more evident.

D. Structure of thesis/Chapters

The first chapter of the thesis provides a theoretical approach of the phenomenon of diaspora, describing its evolution throughout the years and provides definitions of its key components, as well as description of the interconnectivity and the relations among those components. Consequently, it describes the diasporic identity and the nature of the diasporic activity and mobilization, which is a prerequisite for the group to be willing to exert political influence in favor of its homeland.

The second chapter focuses on the political importance the phenomenon has acquired in the last decades. Diasporas, similarly, with all the other non-ethnic interest groups, are now mobilized and lobby in order to either promote their group or homeland related interests. An overview of the studies concerning the factors that could enable the diaspora to become influential follows. Scholars as early as in the 1980's were attempting to identify certain factors that could contribute to the higher chances of a group becoming influential. Other scholars focus more on the group and its resources, other scholars focus more on the leadership and the mobilization aspects. All, accept, however, the political nature those groups have acquired, which equally with the non-ethnic domestic interest groups lobby the American political system and seek to advance their interests. Having, therefore, presented the existing theory and the elements that could contribute to the diasporic influence, divided in the two aforementioned categories based on the ability of the group to control them, the three case studies follow with the aim of determining the validity of the theory.

Each of the three following chapters begins by describing the respective diaspora in the United States, as well as the specific issue each group seeks to promote. Subsequently, the efforts of the diaspora to reach the successful (in the cases of Cuban and Indian diasporas), or the unsuccessful (for the Jewish diaspora) result are described in detail. In the framework of these specific diasporic efforts, the factors of the two categories are examined.

More precisely, the first category includes the factors that cannot be controlled or altered by the group. This category, therefore, includes both the permanent traits, quantitative and qualitative, of the group, as well as factors related to the nature of the issue and its resonance with the homeland and hostland national interests, elements which are given and unchangeable to the specific diasporic effort. The group related factors, such as its size and its geographical distribution are inherent elements to the

group that could not be adjusted or modified by the group at will. The issue related factors of the first category are also beyond the ability of the group to control, since the stance of both homeland and hostland, as well as the perceived congruence of the issue with both countries is also beyond the ability of the diaspora to control. It should also be noted that the limitations posed by the group related factors are permanent and apply to any of the group's efforts, while the issue related factors apply to the certain endeavor, only, and will not necessarily apply in another group's endeavor seeking to promote another issue. As mentioned before, therefore, the context cannot be separated by the case to research.

More specifically, this category of permanent factors includes the size of the diaspora, as well as their geographical placement across the United States, the qualitative characteristics of its members and their affluency and, consequently, their ability to vote in the American elections and raise money to support the effort. In theory, a larger group, geographically concentrated in key States that could have an impact on the voting result and with affluent members that are able to donate large sums of money to promote the issue could have an advantage when attempting to promote its interests. On the other hand, congruence of the issue they wish to promote with the hostland could in theory facilitate the group's efforts to succeed, while receiving support from their homeland on the issue could also theoretically enhance the efforts of the group.

Closely related to and dependent on the nature of the specific issue the diaspora wishes to promote is, also, the wider environment, within which the group will have to operate. According to the nature of the issue, the group could have to confront powerful rivals, or its efforts could be supported by the presence of important allies, both in homeland, but most importantly in hostland, where their mobilization takes place. Potential allies could be either in the form of other diasporas, of groups from the wider hostland society, or even international groups which could reinforce the diasporic efforts and have a positive effect to the final outcome. On the contrary, powerful rivals competing against the group could pose limitations to the effectiveness of its efforts and divide the hostland society's view concerning the issue. The rivals could also be other diasporas or non-ethnic interest groups in the hostland. Since, as mentioned before, the nature of the issue is a given and a permanent factor, the reaction of the hostland wider society and the other hostland based groups', ethnic or nonethnic, is also a given to the group's effort. Therefore, within the environment that has been created, and it is beyond the ability of the group to control, the group will have to adjust its

strategy, accordingly, bearing in mind the limitations posed by the rivals, as well as the support it could receive from the allies.

Therefore, in sum, the factors of this first category could either enhance or place obstacles to the entire effort of the diaspora to promote their issue, they are, however, either inherent to the group, or given due to the nature of the issue. Consequently, the group has no control over them and is only able to react to them.

The second category includes the factors that could contribute positively to the diaspora's success in promoting their issue and lie within the ability of the group to control them and adjust them to its benefit. The organizational structure of the diaspora, in general, as well as the organization of the specific effort could have an impact on the result. The overall organization and the effective allocation of power and responsibilities within the group, could have a positive impact on the ability of the group to sustain such efforts that require a wide scale mobilization of its members. Additionally, the creation of specific vehicles or organizations to support the specific diasporic effort and promote the issue, exclusively, could also have an impact on the result. Central leadership, either in the form of an influential individual, or in the form of a central organization within the diaspora that is universally accepted and undertakes key role, bearing the overall responsibility to organize all efforts to promote the issue, uniting all other local diasporic organizations is another element that could have an impact on the success. Additionally, the homogeneity among all the diasporic organizations and individuals concerning the final goal the group is trying to achieve is also an element that could have an influence on the result of the endeavor.

In this second category of factors, therefore, all strategies and tactics that will be employed by the group in order to promote the specific issue more effectively are included. Those strategies, of course, are not common for all groups and for all endeavors. The selection of the most suitable strategy to promote a certain issue depends, however, on the issue and the lobbying target, as well as on the available resources of the group, therefore, they are closely linked to the elements of the first category. Different diasporas will seek to employ different tactics based on their inherent abilities and characteristics, such as the size and the ability of their members to make donations and support financially the effort or opt to exert an influence through coordinated voting.

Summarizing, the qualitative, as well as the quantitative traits of the group pertaining in the first category of factors are important elements, but also beyond the

control of the group. The size of the diaspora, as well as its geographical dispersion in key States that could enable them to act as a voting block and have better chances in promoting their interests, as well as the ability of its members to make donations and contribute to the mobilization are elements inherent to the group that could not be modified. Additionally, the congruence of the issue the group attempts to promote with the hostland or the homeland, as well as the opposition or support received by other hostland groups, ethnic or nonethnic, are also elements that could not be altered by the group. Therefore, it is evident that the factors of the first category could be beneficial and contribute to the final result, they are, however, given and the group can in a more passive way accept them. On the other hand, the organization of the group and the tactics its leadership will decide to employ in order to promote the issue under question, always operating under the limitations the factors of the first category can pose, are elements that depend on the group and its abilities. The resources of the first category, therefore, when not effectively mobilized or utilized can have no impact on the final result. A populous and affluent, but not mobilized, diaspora can only consist of an unexploited asset with zero contribution to the promotion of the issue. Therefore, the organizational traits of the second category are closely related to the permanent resources of the group that belong to the first category of factors.

E. Argument

Following the study of the three case studies concerning the importance of the factors of both categories (under and beyond control of the group) in the three respective efforts, the key arguments can be summarized as follows:

All three diasporas under study were similar in size, all comprising a very small percentage of the American peoples and, therefore, their numbers alone could not ensure their ability to have an impact on the overall electoral result on a national scale. The small size did not hinder any of the groups, however, to effectively mobilize and ultimately become influential.

Concerning the diasporas' geographical distribution across the United States and the impact this placement could have on their ability to become influential, two of the groups were favorably situated in key States and, also, in significant numbers to be considered influential voting blocs, locally. The third, although dispersed converted this disadvantage in opportunity to approach even more lawmakers and therefore, taking advantage of its multi-State geographical placement.

The qualitative elements of the group were similar in all three case studies under research. Despite their small numbers, all three diasporas included members that were active parts of the American community, they were not marginalized, thus being able to exercise their voting rights, as well as in possession of high incomes and higher education. Therefore, all three groups had available significant material resources that could be employed in donations and in promoting lawmakers' campaigns in order to, thus, exert influence. The existence of an affluent and educated group as a factor seems to have an impact on the effectiveness of the diasporic effort, under the condition, however, that the members of the group are mobilized, and the available resources are effectively tapped by the group leadership.

Concerning the nature of the issue each of the three groups sought to promote and the congruence with hostland interests, it should be underlined that we refer to the stance of the American Presidency. The issue of congruence with the American foreign policy interests, however, has become more entangled, since both the President and the Congress are involved in the foreign policy making and each could perceive in a different manner the foreign policy national interests. Therefore, the factor of the congruence will depend by the stance of both the President and the Congress, thus the relations between the Executive and Legislative could also be significant.

Concerning the congruence of the issue with the homeland, in two of the case studies the issue was totally in line with the homeland. However, the absence of congruence with the homeland interests did not seem to pose a significant setback to the third group, either.

Regarding the environment within which the lobbying activities of the group take place when promoting the specific issue, the group may have to encounter obstacles by other rival groups, as well as support by other like-minded actors. All three groups of the research had to face strong opposition by domestic, non-ethnic groups when promoting their issues. As for assistance provided by powerful allies, from the three diasporas of the research, only one had significant support from domestic like-minded groups and the unusual degree of their cooperation and organization of the efforts seemed to have been key for the final result.

Contrary to the aforementioned factors, which are beyond the ability of the group to control their presence, being either inherent to the group or closely dependent on the issue under question, the factors of the second category can be manipulated by the diaspora. This second category includes factors related to the organizational structure of the group and the strategies it will seek to employ, always in the framework and under the limitations the factors of the first group pose.

Common element for all three diasporas had been their similar organization. All three diasporas had a solid organizational structure, based on the successful example of the Jewish diaspora. Additionally, two of the groups, in order to promote the specific issue created a specialized body undertaking exclusively the organizational and mobilizational effort.

In all three cases, the factor of the leadership had been equally important, with central bodies organizing the efforts of the rest of the community. In one case, only, the leadership was assumed, for a certain period, not by a diasporic organization but by a charismatic individual, whose death clearly demonstrated the impact his effective leadership had for the success of the group.

Concerning the factor of homogeneity within the members of the community, it applies primarily regarding the acceptance on behalf of the community of the issue and its importance, thus, ensuring the group mobilization and, consequently, regarding the most efficient approach to pursue it. In two of the cases, the leadership managed to transmit both the urgency of the issue, as well as ensure the community's acceptance

concerning the strategy to effectively pursue it. The third group failed in both, and the issue acquired a partisan character undermining the entire effort.

Concerning the strategies to exert influence, all three groups acknowledged the importance of effectively framing the issue they wished to promote in a manner that could be regarded consistent either with the American ideals or the American national interests.

Additionally, and despite the fact that, as mentioned before, the factors of the first category can pose limitations to the groups' ability to exert influence, the group by acknowledging those limitations and adjusting its activities and strategies, accordingly, may be able to circumvent them to a degree. At the same time, nonetheless, the aforementioned resources would be of no use to the diasporic effort, if they are not effectively mobilized and deployed by the group. Therefore, the selection of strategies that will be pursued by the group in order to exert influence will have to take into consideration the limitations, as well as the opportunities the available to the group resources can offer.

All three groups accurately perceived that the primary target of their campaigns included the members of the American Congress. The structure of the American political system and the process foreign policy decision making is reached, with both the President, as well as the Legislative branch acting as coexecutors of foreign policy decision making, justifies the importance the lawmakers acquire for any of the group's campaigns. Additionally, lawmakers are easier to approach than the President, while their being in a constant state of an electoral campaign in order to ensure their reelection, makes them more open to influences by their voters, locally. All three diasporas in the research acknowledged the importance the lawmakers had for successfully promoting their issue, therefore they approached them in a systematic manner, exerting pressure to them by employing both their financial resources, as well as their members' votes and personal contacts, locally. In all three cases, the lawmakers were targeted by the group in a coordinated and targeted manner according to the importance their support could have for reaching the final goal.

Summarizing, in all three diasporic efforts under research, the factors that are under the control of the group seem to have a greater impact on the final result and the group's ability to exert influence, since elements and resources of the first category of factors, although in theory important for an effective mobilization, are practically annulled if not properly mobilized and utilized. The effective mobilization of all

members as well as the effective deployment of all the resources by the community leadership seems to be key. Therefore, the approach of the group leadership does not entail influencing the lawmakers, only, but is comprehensive and in many levels, requiring primarily internal mobilization and organization. The approach of the effort in a business-like manner, assessing the resources available, both quantitative and qualitative, and the limitations, as well as the opportunities they create seems to have been key for the three efforts. The ability of the group leadership to primarily identify the lobbying targets and consequently utilize effectively the available resources is also crucial. The American Congress, due to the structure of the American political system, is vital for any foreign policy related decision and all three groups having accurately perceived its importance, concentrated all efforts on influencing its members and gaining their support.

The centralized leadership, therefore, by either a diasporic organization or by an individual, accepted by the community as their representative, may have an impact on the ability of the group to exert influence. However, although in all three cases the diaspora leadership played the central role in lobbying, the role of the members of the community, as well as that of the local activists was also important, with members of diaspora, utilizing their personal relations with the lawmakers of their State of residence, were lobbying, locally, in order to exert influence, as well.

Chapter 1: Diaspora, conceptional and historical approach

Introduction

The first Chapter aims to present the term of diaspora and its evolution throughout the years, as well as the various theoretical approaches employed in order for it to be defined. Additionally, the main elements of diaspora, namely the triangle consisting of homeland, hostland, and the members of the diaspora are examined, as well as their interconnection.

The chapter begins with the definition of the term, describing how from being almost synonymous to one case only, the Jewish, and with a negative, even catastrophic, meaning came to describe a variety of different cases. The stages that led to this transformation are described, as well as the discussion whether this all-inclusive character the term gradually acquired is ultimately a positive phenomenon or it eventually leads to the limitation of its explanatory ability. Consequently, the scholars' efforts to address the aforementioned issue and prevent a potential loss of the term's descriptive capacity by setting certain criteria and characteristics are described.

Having presented the debate on the definition of the term and on who can claim membership to a diaspora, the chapter moves to the relations of the group with the two other elements of the triangle and the perceptions of both homeland and hostland regarding diasporas. It describes how from the initial negative stance both countries maintained against diasporas, homelands realized the importance of their co-ethnics and the support, both economic and political, they can provide from afar, while hostlands seized to perceive them as a threat to their social cohesion, encouraging them to maintain their contacts with their former homelands, as well as their hybrid identity. The efforts on behalf of the homelands to approach those populations, nurturing their sense of belonging and at the same time ensuring their support are also described.

Having portrayed the relations among the three elements, focus is then directed to the group itself and its members' particular identity, which is different from both the homeland as well as the hostland mainstream identities. This identity evolves and alters even within the group, with members of the diaspora residing to different hostlands developing different identities and members residing in the same hostland along with the progression of the generations also gradually acquiring different identities. The progression of generations and their sense of belonging to the homeland is then

discussed. As the generations progress, the direct experience with the homeland is lost, and the inclusion in the diaspora becomes a conscious choice.

The abovementioned traits of diaspora are of utmost importance for the group's mobilization and identity formation. There are individuals, who, due to their common ancestry theoretically belong to diaspora, they are, however, completely assimilated to their hostland and no longer perceive themselves as part of it, while others do maintain the identification with the land of their forefathers and consciously consider themselves as part of the group. Therefore, of all the individuals sharing a common origin, only those who still identify with the homeland can be mobilized in order to ensure its wellbeing and protect its interests. Having established the target group, diaspora leadership will then have to be able to trigger their mobilization concerning a specific issue.

Nevertheless, it is underlined that the mobilization on behalf of the diaspora is not a constant and permanent phenomenon, since there are times when a specific issue appears and diaspora reacts and becomes extremely active, while the rest of the times, when the homeland faces no particular issues, the majority of its members is inactive. Therefore, the importance of the leadership for the transition from one phase to the other is accentuated, as well as their ability to effectively transmit to the community the urgency of the issue at hand, thus ensuring the group's mobilization.

1.1 Definition of the term

Diaspora as a term has changed radically over the years. A term that despite the fact that in the past it used to be almost synonymous to the Jewish diasporic existence and its use limited to the aforementioned ethnic group, in the last years it is applied when referring to almost every group that resides outside its original homeland (Safran, 1991:83, Vertovec, 2005:1, Bruneau, 2010:35, Carter, 2005:55).

The ambiguity of the term is evident from its very conception. In ancient Greece, the word "diaspora" did not have the negative and catastrophic meaning it acquired later, after becoming associated and almost synonymous with the Jewish experience and exilic life. For ancient Greeks, it merely meant migration and colonialism, having a positive meaning (Cohen, 1996:508, Shuval, 2000:42). However, even this origin of the term is contested, since according to Tölölyan (2012:5), the ancient Greeks never

used the word in this sense and the first time that the word was used in Greece was in 1453 after the loss of Constantinople.

The undeniable fact remains, however, that the term became almost synonymous with the Jewish case and the original notion of the word is almost lost (Cohen, 1996:507). In the past, in order for a group to be called a diaspora, it was mandatory to resemble to the model case, the Jewish diaspora, and share its main characteristics. Gradually, this dependence of the term on the Jewish case and its experiences became so loose to the point of almost nonexistence, with different kinds of groups, even linguistic groups, to be considered as diasporas (Brubaker, 2005:3). Tölöyan (2012:5), on the other hand, referring to his original introduction of the journal “diaspora”, admits that were he publishing today the journal he would have chosen the word “dispersion” instead of “diaspora”, since it is more general than diaspora, which is only a kind of dispersion.

Diaspora gradually acquired a considerably wider meaning than it should. Safran (1991:83) agrees that from the total disregard of the phenomenon in the past, today so many different communities have adopted the denomination that the term is in danger of losing its meaning. Diaspora became chic (Cohen, 2008:8), a catchword (Sökefeld, 2006:265), a global word (Dufoix, 2008:108), a buzzword (Brinkerhoff, 2011:37), overused (Gamlen, 2011:5), an all-purpose word (Dufoix, 2008:1), even fashionable (Brubaker, 2005:8). Brubaker refers to a “diaspora” of diaspora and acknowledges an “explosion of interest” (Brubaker, 2005:1), while Bruneau finds this interest exhibited by both the scholars as well as the media to the phenomenon as unprecedented (Bruneau, 2010:35).

Many scholars agree that the uncontrollable expansion of the term and the all-inclusive character it acquired poses a threat to its explanatory power and ultimately to its very meaning (Safran, 1991:83, Butler, 2001:189, Shuval, 2000:41, Sökefeld, 2006:265, Vertovec, 1999:1, Brubaker, 2005:3, Baser and Swain, 2010:39), while Brubaker warns that its “universalization” could lead to its eventual disappearance (2005:3).

Even the base of the diasporic experience and the main element awarding a group the title of diaspora, which is the connection with their homeland, has become gradually less important and in some cases, it is even completely lost (Brubaker, 2005:2).

Despite the fact that, as Dufoix (2008:106) admits, this detachment from the negative and catastrophic meaning it had during the time it was associated with the

Jewish case is “relieving from a burden” the term, Cohen (2008:35), who also perceives this evolution as a positive phenomenon, stresses the importance of setting boundaries as to who can be classified as belonging in diaspora and who cannot.

1.2 Definition evolution

According to Dufoix (2008:20), the first scholar who attempted to organize the study of the phenomenon, concluding to an early typology has been John Armstrong in 1976. Armstrong (1976:393) separated diasporas in two broad categories, the proletarian and the mobilized. Proletarian diaspora consists of unskilled workers, with no resources and skills available in order to be able to avoid marginalization in their hostland, while the mobilized diaspora has both the skills and the resources to ultimately become part of their hostland society and gradually to exert influence.

In an attempt to depict the evolution of the term “diaspora” throughout its long history, Cohen (2008:1) distinguishes four phases the term went through, with each one of them bearing some special characteristics:

- Phase 1: This classical phase, which lasted until 1980 includes the perception of the Jewish diaspora as “the Diaspora” and the later addition of the Greeks and Armenians, first, and, consequently, the addition of African and Irish cases, as well. The necessary element of this phase is the victimhood and the trauma that led the people to abandon their homeland, thus creating a diaspora. Therefore, in this stage it is the very trauma that awards the community the title of “diaspora”, binds together its members and leads them to a collective organization.
- Phase 2: Initiated in the 1980’s and lasted until the end of the decade, the second phase is marked by the characterization of even more groups as diasporas, a denomination attached to them by others or even by themselves. The phase is characterized by the scholars’ attempt to enlarge the notion of the term and include more groups to the “classical” diasporas of the first phase. Therefore, the traumatic experience is no longer a prerequisite for a group to be considered a diaspora.
- Phase 3: This phase is extending from mid 1990’s until the end of the millennium and is characterized by the constructionists’ approach to detach the so-far essential and unquestionable elements of diaspora (that is homeland and

ethnicity or religion), arguing that identities in modern world have become so fluid and de-territorialized that such elements only limit the descriptive power of the phenomenon.

- Phase 4: This final phase is extending from 2000's onwards and is characterized as the consolidation phase. The constructionists' efforts of the previous phase to eradicate the meaning the two core elements are mostly rejected on the grounds that they are rendering the term completely useless. Their remark, however, about the fluid character of identity, was accepted and led to a reexamination of the relation between homeland and diaspora and more importantly, their mobilization.

Concerning the approaches to define the term, Dufoix (2008:21) admitted that three approaches were employed.

- Open definitions: They include definitions that are too general and broad, allowing many groups to be categorized as diasporas.
- Categorical definitions: According to this approach, in order for a group to be defined as diaspora it has to satisfy certain, pre-decided characteristics and criteria, thus producing "true" and "false" diasporas.
- Oxymoronic definitions: The focus of this approach moves to diversity and hybridity and the fact that identity is fluid is key.

1.3 Criteria for determining members of diaspora

As mentioned before, the all-inclusive and diffused meaning the term diaspora acquired over the years alarmed the scholars that it may pose a threat to its explanatory power and ultimately to its very meaning turning it useless. In order to avoid this, scholars attempted to establish specific criteria in order to determine which groups can indeed be described as diasporas.

Butler (2001: 190) acknowledges that the ethnographic approach, that is the study of a single group, in attempting to determine the typical characteristics and prerequisites for defining diaspora, is very problematic. Despite the fact that, as he accepts, this approach has provided helpful results in the past, one cannot neglect its main weakness, which is the fact that characteristics present in one specific diaspora may not be met in

the study of another. This difference could be attributed to different historical conditions, as well as to the group itself.

Therefore, as he admits, in order to overcome the limitations of the ethnographic approach the checklist approach was employed, and scholars sought to determine a set of characteristics that will be applied to all diasporas, regardless of their history or any specific conditions of their existence (Butler, 2001: 190).

Cohen, (2008:15) proposes four strategies to decide whether a group can actually be defined as “diaspora”, thus avoiding the complete loss of the term’s meaning:

- The employment of emic and etic dimensions: However important it is for individuals to wish to belong to diaspora, their membership cannot be uncritically accepted just because they claim membership. They have to be bound by common history and use this connection to organize and mobilize.
- Observation of the phenomenon through time: The group should maintain the cohesion and their distinctive character within the hostland after consequent generations instead of becoming completely assimilated in the hostland society.
- Establishment of a list of common characteristics based on the existing cases, which would be considered as a prerequisite for any group to be characterized as diaspora. Still, he admits that no diaspora can comply with all of the criteria of the list at all times of its existence.
- Set up a typology with “ideal types” to categorize diasporas according to their most distinguishing characteristic.

Safran (1991:83) was the first to propose a series of concrete criteria a group should fulfill in order to be called a diaspora, admitting, however, that the only group covering the entire series of characteristics is the Jewish. The criteria were the following:

- The members of the group should be dispersed to two or more countries
- They must maintain a collective identity, despite the fact that they no longer reside in their homeland
- They should not be fully assimilated or even accepted in their hostland
- They should view their homeland is their real home, believing that at some point they will return to it
- They should feel the responsibility to contribute to their homeland wellbeing

- They should preserve the contacts and relations with their homeland

Elaborating Safran's set of characteristics of diaspora Cohen (2008:17) identified a set of "common features", since he admits that there is no diaspora that can fulfill all of them at the same time. Those features are:

- Safran's precondition of the group existing in more than two countries remains, adding however, the element of a trauma that in many cases coexists with the dispersal.
- He adds the element of group being dispersed for voluntary reasons, thus detaching the term from the traumatic and violent Jewish experience.
- The existence of a collective memory and the connection with their original homeland and its history.
- The perception of homeland as the ideal home and the feeling of being responsible to contribute to its wellbeing remains, adding the element of the altogether creation of the homeland in cases of an imagined community.
- The wish to return eventually to the homeland.
- The members maintain their connection as a group within the hostland and their sense of being a distinct group within the homeland also derives from their common history and common ancestry.
- A problematic relationship within their hostland, not having fully assimilated and perhaps even not having been fully accepted.
- A sense of solidarity with other members or other groups of co-ethnics that reside to other countries.
- The possibility to ultimately be able to achieve a successful life in hostland.

Bruneau (2010:38) proposed another categorization of diasporas, according to the significance four characteristics have for their existence and maintenance.

- Diasporas that are created and maintained the bond for entrepreneurial reasons, where the homeland has a very limited influence (Indian and Chinese belonging to this category).
- Diasporas that are bound together by common religion and language (such as Greek and Jewish diasporas).

- Diasporas bound together by a common political cause concerning their homeland (example is the Palestinian diaspora).
- Diasporas bound together by common culture or race, despite the fact that its members may not actually share a common homeland or even an identity (example is the Black diaspora).

Brubaker (2005:5) acknowledges three core characteristics that are mostly accepted to apply to diasporas, those being: the dispersion from the original homeland, the maintenance of relations with homeland, as well as the maintenance of their members' distinctive identity within the hostland society, emphasizing, however, the temporal dimension in the maintenance of their distinctive identity, since in order to be able to refer to a group as a diaspora, its members' common and distinctive identity has to be maintained after the second and the third generations. Butler (2001:192), also, stresses the importance of the “temporal – historical” factor, that is the perseverance of the group throughout the generations, claiming that the group has to preserve its distinct identity for at least two generations in order to be a diaspora.

In order to detach the research from the group itself, Butler (2001:194) proposed to shift the focus of research to a framework that would include the main characteristics of diasporas. He proposed, therefore, the study of five dimensions that are common to all diasporas. These are:

- The reason and conditions under which the dispersion took place
- The relationship with homeland
- The relationship with hostland
- The relationship among its members and the various groups
- Comparative studies including various diasporas

Cohen (2008:18) based on the reasons that led to displacement distinguishes five “ideal types” of diasporas: a) Victim diaspora: In this case, the displacement was forced, and this catastrophic event marked the existence of the group and defines them. Jewish diaspora, along with Armenian best describe the category. The rest of the categories are the result of volunteer dispersion in order to b) search work (Labor diaspora), c) to colonize (Imperial diaspora) or engage in trade activities (Trade diaspora). The final type, the e) Deterritorialized diaspora, has already lost the link with the homeland, but

the group still maintains a distinctive and common identity that unites them, making them a diaspora. Adamson (2016:292), however, claims such categorizations to be oversimplification, since they present diasporas to be a homogenous group and do not take into consideration the different causes of dispersal that might coexist within the same diaspora.

In answer to Cohen's classification of diasporas, Esman (2009:15) proposed another categorization, based not on the reason that led to their displacement, but on their activities within the hostland society. Esman's three categories therefore are: a) Labor diaspora, consisting of mostly unskilled workers arriving at hostland to attain work and improve their lives, b) settler diaspora, being those diasporas that arrived to take over the hostland, such examples being the Spanish and French arriving in Americas and c) entrepreneurial diasporas, skilled people who move to take advantage of the better opportunities available in another country.

Yamashiro (2015:179), also, admits that diaspora became a “fuzzy” concept and suggested to employ the terms “overseas co-ethnics” for those who are united simply by ancestry and “coethnic diaspora” for those overseas coethnics who actually consist of the diaspora, they have maintained contact with their homeland, and they are actively engaged to its wellbeing.

1.4 Homeland, Hostland past perceptions

Diaspora nowadays, is no longer detached from the homeland but maintains the links with it, while it exists and operates within a triangle including the homeland, the hostland and the group itself. Glick Schiller et al (1995:48), also, admit that the contemporary “transmigrants”, who are not detached completely from their homeland upon leaving, live simultaneously in two geographical places, connecting them.

However, this mutual dependance among the three parts of the triangle is a contemporary phenomenon. Both homelands' and hostlands' perceptions of diasporas in the past did not allow such a mutual relationship, and they have changed radically through the years.

1.4.1 Past hostland attitude towards diasporas

Until recently, it was Handlin's (1973 [1951], 6) view of immigrants as “the uprooted”, the “victim diasporas” that were brought to mind when speaking of diaspora

(Bose, 2006:59). States (both homelands and hostlands) regarded members of diasporas as ‘lost populations’ that should either return to their countries of origin or completely detach themselves from them and totally incorporate to their new homes (Bauböck, 2008:1).

Hostlands were demanding the migrants’ absolute assimilation and complete abandonment of their prior ethnic identities (Shuval, 2000:44), thus attempting to impose to them a form of “social amnesia” (Anagnostu, 2004:26). Diasporas had to abandon their former identity and any connection they shared with their original homeland and be fully assimilated to their new society (Shuval, 2000:44, Glick Schiller et al. 1995:51). Any bond that might persevere, connecting them with their previous homeland was perceived as an act of treason to their new country and immigrants who kept such links were seen as a threat to the hostland society. The demand for a forced and violent abandonment of their prior identities is more than obvious in the official statement made by the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1820 and is cited by Anagnostu (2004:25). Referring to the immigrants that wished to reside in America, Adams wrote that they “*must cast off the European skin, never to resume it*” and that “*they must look forward to their prosperity rather than backward to their ancestors*”. His words clearly demonstrate how diasporas were perceived to be a menace to the nation homogeneity in America of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century and how any difference was sought to be eliminated by imposing a forced form of “social amnesia” (Anagnostu, 2004:26).

Today it is acknowledged that states no longer can be a homogenous entity, but plurality and diversity exist and even prevail (Tölölyan, 1991:6). Therefore, diasporas are no longer forced to fully assimilate and disappear within the mainstream identity of their hostland. The attitude of the past that focused on diasporas’ instant and absolute assimilation to the hostland has been abandoned and the maintenance of a parallel relation with their former homelands is not only allowed, but also sought (Ancien, Boyle, Kitchin, 2009:3). Members of diasporas are no longer perceived by their hostland to be traitors or menace to the society due to their connection with their homeland and their homelands are approaching them to maintain the contacts.

Contrary to the past diasporas, the diasporas nowadays do not necessarily need a shared traumatic past to unite their members. The element that unites their members is precisely this distinct identity they share, while, contrary to the past, belonging to diaspora became a source of esteem rather than disgrace (Vertovec, 2005:2).

Additionally, the new technological advancements and the means of communication allow members of diaspora to be constantly up to date with events concerning their “virtual identity community” and their homelands (Adamson, 2005:36).

1.4.2 Past homeland attitude towards its diaspora

In the past, however, diasporas were not forced to face the hostility and prejudice towards them only from their hostlands. Their prior homeland upon their departure abandoned them, as well. Liu (2011:821) cites a public announcement issued by the Chinese Government in 1953, admitting that the Chinese diaspora will have to rely on their own means and their mutual solidarity to safeguard their interests in their new hostlands, admitting, thus, that, their homeland has severed all links with them and will exert no effort to protect or assist them.

In our days this past attitude has been completely revised. Today’s diasporas from deserters and traitors turned to be regarded as heroes and model citizens (Gamlen, 2011:4). After being ignored in the past, they are now perceived to be the state’s ambassadors abroad and the lobbyists, who are able to promote their homeland’s interests in their new hostland (Adamson, 2016:293).

Dominican State’s past denomination of its diaspora as “Dominicanos Ausentes” (absent Dominicans) changed to “Dominicanos en el exterior” (Dominicans abroad), Haiti’s hostility towards its diaspora was transformed to such a degree that now diaspora is considered to be the tenth department of the State, in addition to the nine administrative departments within the country (Fouron et al, 1996:137, Itzigsohn, 2000:1135, Itzigsohn et al, 1999:327), while only recently the Lebanese government stated that it considers Lebanon as a phoenix with two wings, with Lebanese population abroad representing one of the wings, thus consisting an integral part of the country (Hourani, 2007:3).

Comparing the attitude of diaspora with the past, its members nowadays are not isolated or trapped to a geographical place. Communication and transportation technologies have made the entire world interconnected, so the ties with those left back in homeland do not break (Shuval, 2000:45, Butler, 2001:190, Glick Schiller et al. 1995:52). In the past, both homeland and hostland wished for the absolute assimilation of the migrants in their new countries, while nowadays the relation with the homeland is of utmost importance. Homeland governments nowadays not only make conscious

efforts to take advantage of their scattered populations, but they also feel a responsibility towards them and their well-being (Ancien, Boyle, Kitchin, 2009:3).

Ragazzi (2014:75), also, admits the conscious efforts the homelands exert in order to approach their former citizens, efforts that have also acquired an official character, by either setting up competent departments dealing with issues of diasporas or even by creating a specialized Ministry to be even more focused and effective in dealing with these issues. Adamson (2016:294) and Gamlen (2014), also, underline the institutionalization of the homelands' efforts to approach their diasporas following a long period of abandonment.

1.5 Return to Homeland

Many scholars admit that in many – actually in most - of the cases the return to homeland is not a plausible and realistic option for the members of diasporas. Homeland can be an actual geographical place, or just an imaginary one.

According to Safran (1991:94) this return is more of an “eschatological concept”, a “utopia” and a “defense mechanism”, employed to steel the members of the group against the difficulties life away from homeland can present, while Shuval (2000:48), also, agrees that the possibility of a return alleviates the problems of living in a foreign land and that it not always an actual scenario. Abdelhady (2008:432) and Safran (1991:90) stress the fact that the return may be impossible, since the homeland may not even exist, or within the time of their absence, it may have been completely transformed and become not inviting. Shuval (2000:41), also, perceives their eventual return as an eschatological concept, since homeland might have become a place no longer welcoming, agrees however, that such a dream, such an expectation of return makes life easier in hostland (Shuval, 2000:48). Safran (1991:90), however, also admits that, ultimately, with the progression of the generations, the life in diaspora might be perceived as a better option and the migrants may not actually wish to return.

The subsequent generations, who have been born and raised in hostland and know the homeland of their fathers only through narrations, most probably do not equally share the yearn to return to an unknown to them place. They can only become familiar with it and attach importance to it through the narrations of the previous generations. Therefore, the continuation of the diaspora is based on the transmittance of the

importance the homeland has to the younger generations, who lack firsthand experience of it.

1.6 Homeland strategies

As mentioned before, nowadays, diasporas consist an integral part of their homelands, who actively and consciously exert efforts to approach them and be able to take advantage of their economic as well as political support. However, as Gamlen (2014:193) acknowledges, homelands no longer have the authority to exert power on their populations residing abroad and therefore they focus on imparting on them the wish and the obligation to provide their support to their homelands, also by acknowledging them to be an integral part of the society.

In order to approach their diaspora, most homeland governments have attempted, as mentioned before, to institutionalize the relationship, by creating competent Ministries or sections within their bureaucracies to deal with their diaspora's affairs. This shift in the homelands' mentality is obvious and demonstrated by the data provided by Gamlen (2014:185), according to which in 2014 of all the United Nations member states, 110 had created a form of an official institution to deal with their diaspora, while in 1970, the respective number of member states have been less than 10.

Ancien et al. (2009:3) admit that countries with populous diasporas have formulated comprehensive strategies, consisting of series of initiatives undertaken in a systematic way with the aim of primarily building and consequently maintaining relations with their diasporas. Gamlen (2014:181) admits that, initially, those homelands' efforts to approach their diaspora had mostly been unsystematic and undertaken by various agencies and Institutions within both the Executive and Legislative.

Concerning the relation of the group with their homeland, Dufoix (2008:xv) discerned four “ideal types”, admitting however, that they are not mutually exclusive, since they may coexist within the same diaspora and at different times and cases. Those types are a) the centro-peripheral, where homeland plays an active role to both the creation and the organization of its diaspora abroad, b) the enclaved, where diaspora is locally organized, with its members supporting each other, c) the atopic, where diaspora consists of groups located in different countries, they are organized across nations and linked together by their common origin and identity and finally, d) the antagonistic,

where diaspora is against its homeland government and tries to overthrow it from abroad.

However, as Vertovec (2005:9) admits, despite the fact that homelands not only welcome, but actively seek their diaspora's financial and political support, they are cautious against providing them with voting rights and parliamentary representation, fearing their involvement in the homeland politics.

1.7 Diasporic Identity

1.7.1 Multiple identities

The past view of the world as static, where peoples were viewed as a one-dimensional entity with predetermined and unitary identity is long gone (Glick Schiller et al. 1995:48).

Shuval (2000:46) stresses the triadic relationship between hostland, homeland and the members of diaspora, while for Bruneau (2010:10), as well, diaspora equals a coexistence in three different levels: the transnational, the community and the hostland and homeland, levels not equally important for every member of the group and the importance varying at different times. Bose (2006:59), also stresses the "dialectic of connections" between the two places – homeland and hostland, while Werbner (2002:123), also agrees that in the "chaorder" diaspora exists, and despite being consisted of autonomous and geographically dispersed groups, characterized by the lack of a central authority to lead and organize them, those groups still acknowledge homeland as their center and feel responsible towards it.

Diasporic identity is admittedly different from both homeland and hostland identity. When migrants arrive in their new hostland, their already formed identity, that of their past homeland, erodes through the new life and the new experiences in hostland. However, their former identity is never completely lost, but evolves, it merges with the new influences and a new identity, completely distinct from both the ones predominant in homeland and in hostland is gradually created (Glick Schiller et al. 1995:53, Bruneau, 2010:10, Ancien et al., 2009:3, Ogden, 2008:2).

Since the members of diaspora are also dispersed in various hostlands, the group itself has multiple identities that are different not only between homeland and hostland, but between different subgroups in different hostlands. In this sense, Bruneau (2010:10)

fittingly depicts diaspora as a “patchwork” of families, communities and networks within a hostland.

Consequently, diaspora by definition is not a homogenous group and any attempt to approach or organize it should take this fact under consideration.

1.7.2 Progression of generations

Diasporas consist of several waves and generations, of which only the first generation -if still existing- has an actual experience of the homeland.

Tölöyan (2012:11), also, acknowledges that nowadays the majority of diasporas is not newly formed. They exist for more than two generations and many of their members do not have personal, firsthand experiences of their fathers' homeland, having been born and grown up in hostland, in many cases not even speaking the language of their fathers' homeland. The forefathers' homeland is, therefore, a place known to the subsequent generations only through narrations and never actually being visited. However, they maintain a hybrid identity and choose to preserve a relationship with their ancestors' homeland and acknowledge themselves as members of diaspora, even wish to contribute to the homeland prosperity. They, therefore, consciously decide to identify with the homeland their fathers came from and be included in the “diaspora”. Butler, 2001:192, Gans, 1979:8 and Tölöyan, 2012:11, also underline the conscious character of inclusion in a diaspora, since members of subsequent generations, have to consciously adopt the identity of their ancestors.

It is also a fact that not all people sharing a common ancestry will develop this sense of belonging to their fathers' land of origin, though. Consequently, people with common ancestry cannot automatically be considered as members of diaspora (Vertovec, 2005:3, Brubaker, 2005:11, Sökefeld, 2006:267). Peoples' displacement from one place to another does not automatically convert them to members of a diaspora. Vertovec (2005:3), also, stresses the importance of the self-identification, underlining that it is meaningless to include a person in diaspora based simply on his origin.

1.7.3 Sense of belonging

As mentioned before, in order for a diaspora to exist and more importantly to be willing to act to the benefit and wellbeing of its homeland, their members must feel the connection and identify themselves as members (Vertovec, 2005:3).

According to Bruneau (2010:47), diasporas, having long lost the connection they once had with their homeland, they have to create a spiritual one, a connection that will enable them to continue perceiving themselves as part of it. What binds, therefore, together the members of diaspora and at the same time differentiates them from the other groups in hostland is their “iconography”, the symbols employed to create a “virtual faith”, that separates them from other groups, possessing another “virtual faith” based on other symbols. It is exactly the preservation of these symbols according to Bruneau (2010:38) and their passing to the subsequent generations that guarantees the existence of the diaspora.

The members will, therefore, have to develop a common identity, what Sökefeld (2006:267) calls an “imagination of community” to form a diaspora. Without a common identity - or at least the perception of it -, without an “imagination of community” no diaspora can exist. Sökefeld (2006:268), however, admits that this sense of community is symbolic, and the group, being perceived as a “transnational imagined community”, does not necessarily need to have many actual relations with the homeland. Butler (2001:192), also, agrees that this identity construction can form and maintain a diaspora even if homeland no longer exists or is radically different than the place they have in their memories, while according to Bruneau, (2010:3), the three kinds of symbols that could be employed to bind together diaspora are the religion, the political memory and the social organization.

It is exactly for this reason that Brubaker (2005:11) characterizes the definitions that focus on the social aspect of diasporas as strong, in contrast with the weak ones that place the emphasis on the ancestry, and they cannot be accurate. According to Adamson (2016:292), too, any definition that would focus exclusively on the element of the common origin could not be accurate, ignoring the fact that some migrants will maintain the homeland identity, while others will lose it and be completely assimilated to their new countries.

1.7.4 Mobilization

Diasporic identity is, therefore, of utmost importance and an essential prerequisite to the initial creation and subsequent mobilization of the group. The group has to feel the bond with the homeland, even if at certain periods may be latent. In other case, it cannot be mobilized to address even a threatening to the homeland issue. Maintaining the sense of belonging to diaspora is a prerequisite for the mobilization of the group and their active involvement in supporting their homeland. Werbner (2002:121), also, acknowledges that what binds the members of diaspora together and leads them to mobilize to action is a mutual feeling of responsibility towards the homeland, admitting however, that the group remains autonomous in their mobilization, which is not centrally induced and controlled (Werbner, 2002:123).

Shain (1994:815), also, agrees that the creation and continuous maintenance of a diasporic identity is of utmost importance for a group to be able to exert influence, while Adamson and Koinova (2011:5) admit that diasporas are involved in “transnational identity politics”, since their politics across borders are the result of a common identity that binds together their members and not the efforts to mobilize to gain something or achieve a normative change. In the same vein of thought, Adamson (2008:12) notices the nonexistence of diaspora in the literature of transnational movements, admitting that both the formation and the mobilization of diaspora could better be explained in the framework of transnational movements. To the already proposed by Keck and Sikkink categories of transnational networks, which include: a) those pursuing instrumental goals, such as banks or corporations, b) those united by shared causal ideas, such as epistemic communities, c) those characterized by shared values, such as various advocacy groups, Adamson (2008:12) adds a fourth one, those characterized by a shared identity, calling them transnational identity networks. Comparing to the advocacy groups Adamson (2008:14) admits that the link between members of a group united by an idea and common beliefs is much more fluid than the link between members who share a common identity.

Three schools can explain ethnic identity creation according to Paul (2000:25):
a) Instrumentalism, where ethnicity is employed as a means of mobilization for competitive reasons, b) Primordialism, where the ethnic identity is viewed as the natural outcome, as the result of a common origin and culture, c) Constructionism, where identities are fluid, and they are the result of elites' conscious attempts to create them.

Esman (1994:241) occupies the middle ground between the primordialsists and instrumentalists, acknowledging the necessity of a common element, the origin, as the basis uniting the group and upon which leaders can mobilize it.

Adamson (2008:5), also, distinguishes two different approaches in the academic literature concerning the formation of diaspora. The first, the essentialist one, perceives diasporas to be the simple and natural outcome of migration and geographical dislocation of peoples that took place worldwide throughout the history and at different times. The second, the constructivist approach, on the other hand, perceives diasporas to be a socially constructed group. According to this approach, diasporas no longer exist simply as a result of the geographical displacement and movement of their people, but the group's existence and their potential mobilization have to be consciously organized.

Esman (2009:115) underlines the importance a common trauma in the past can have in uniting a group for many generations, such as in the case of the Jews, and Paul (2000:43) agrees that symbols such as trauma or religion are necessary constituting the base for uniting a group of peoples. Baser (2014:360), on the other hand, rejects the centrality of a common trauma in the past in achieving to successfully mobilize the group, admitting that this view could not provide an adequate explanation for the mobilization the majority of diasporas nowadays, whose members were not forced out of their countries but left for economic reasons and have therefore no traumatic experience to share. Bandele (2010), also, argues that ethnocultural ties and religion are not the only factors that can unite a community to form a diaspora and leads to a common political orientation and action, by citing as an example the African diaspora, where the variety of nations doesn't allow great similarity between the peoples, still they managed to unite and act like a united diaspora community due to the fact that they have been oppressed and maltreated as a whole. What united them to act transnationally was not the common religion, or culture or the geographic location but a common goal to banish oppression and act for the good of their race.

However, nostalgia for their homeland or the homeland of the ancestors is not the only reason that could trigger their mobilization according to Baser (2014:360), since the group can mobilize to pursue its own interests. Heindl (2013:465), also, admits that diaspora acts independently from both the homeland and the hostland, while they may also have their own agenda, with Baser (2014:359), also, claiming that there are cases, when the group may not act totally altruistically to support its homeland, but to support their groups' interests and wellbeing in hostland.

Concerning their initial engagement with the diaspora affairs, apart from their desire to contribute to their homeland wellbeing, the group by becoming organized and participating in the hostland political system acquires an elevated status and influence in hostland's political system.

Butler (2001:190), also admits that the conversion of a group to diaspora may be a conscious choice in order to escape the notion of weakness and acquire an elevated position within the hostland society. Baser (2014:360) also agrees that diasporas in parallel with supporting their homeland, they also may have an ulterior motive to strengthen their own status in hostland. Political elites, especially, who are involved in hostland politics advocating the support to homeland and organizing the other members of diaspora gain even more status and voice within the hostland political system. Biswas (2004:271), also claims that this active engagement with the homeland affairs may be the result of their wish to strengthen their position in both countries.

Heindl (2013:478), also, admits that diasporas are not as they are frequently perceived romantics that envision life in their origin homeland, but strategically organized groups that act not always to the benefit of their homeland, but also with the aim of serving their own interests.

1.7.5 Diasporic identity formation

Adamson (2008:2) and Baser (2014:359), also perceiving diasporas as the result of transnational mobilization activities undertaken by political entrepreneurs, link these political elites' efforts with identity creation. Adamson and Demetriou (2007:498) perceive diaspora not simply as a descriptive term but also as a prescriptive one in the sense that identity is always in the process of creation from political entrepreneurs. Diasporas, thus, according to Adamson and Koinova (2011:5) are involved in "transnational identity politics", since their politics across borders are the result of a common identity that binds together their members and the stimulus for mobilization is not the perspective of gaining something or achieving a normative change.

The very "dense social network", created as a result of the technological advances that permit diasporas to stay connected with their homelands and with other groups despite distance, can be employed as a means of political mobilization (Adamson, 2005:34). Diasporas become, thus, transnational political actors mobilizing across countries for achieving a political project (Adamson and Koinova, 2011:3).

The centrality of political elites in diaspora creation and organization is also accentuated by King and Melvin (1999:109), who parallelize diasporas created by the political elites with actual nations, while both Ogden (2008:4) and Shain and Barth (2003:450) perceive diasporas to be, and ultimately to act, as independent political actors, while Armstrong (1976:394), as well, acknowledged that within his so-called mobilized diasporas the elites who are responsible for the symbols manipulation are included. Paul (2000:26), also, admits that only the constructionist approach can provide a sufficient explanation on why ethnic groups mobilize and attributes the successful mobilization to the elites and their manipulation of the identities that unite the group.

Concerning the characterization of diasporas as imagined communities, Esman (2009:9) admits that their being viewed as an actual social construct can be more useful, since they are affecting both homeland and hostland. Gamlen (2014:184) admits, too, that diasporas are increasingly understood today as projects that can be influenced by political elites, while Esman (1994:245) also agrees that ethnic mobilization is not spontaneous but the result of the leaders' organized efforts. Adamson and Demetriou (2007:497), also perceive diaspora to be a social construction living across borders, having maintained a collective identity pertaining to their homeland and operating transnationally with internal organization and cohesion.

Adamson (2008:18), however, takes it one step further, stating that many times diaspora is created with the ulterior motive to be politically useful to the political entrepreneurs who created it and who are responsible for mobilizing it with the aim to consequently use them politically.

1.7.6 Leadership

As mentioned before, the fact that people share a common origin does not guarantee that they will ultimately become part of a diaspora. There are people who will consciously maintain the link with their homeland and the homeland of their ancestors, while others who will completely assimilate to their new homeland and sever all links of the past.

Therefore, the group the leadership addresses and attempts to organize and mobilize consists of those who have consciously maintained the connection. However, even within this group that is theoretically accessible and politically useful to the elites,

not all members demonstrate the same degree of participation and involvement. Brubaker (2005:12) admits that only a minority is actively and consistently acting as diaspora. Shain (1994:816), also, admits that there are different roles that exist within the community, with the core members, being the elites, constantly active and leading the group, the rear-guard members, activists that on a regular basis are participating in the mobilization efforts of the leaders and the silent members, being the potential members who belong to the “imagined community”, they are not actively participating in a constant basis, but are mobilized once there is a crisis. In the same vein, Esman (1994:32) admits that within the group there are four roles, the leaders, the activists, the members and the sympathizers.

Therefore, the leaders focus their efforts on the silent members, in order to trigger them to participate and mobilize them to participate in large scale grassroots activities.

1.7.7 Diasporic Activity

Diasporas’ interest to homeland affairs, however, tends not to have the same degree of intensity at all times. There are periods when their members are actively involved and mobilized, participating to the leaders’ activities to promote issues related with their homeland and other periods characterized by latency and inactivity (Shuval, 2000:46, Gamlen, 2011:6, Vertovec, 2005:3). Safran (1991:93), also, admits that diaspora may be interested in homeland only until a specific goal is successfully achieved and then becomes indifferent -dormant- again. Werbner (2002:125) agrees with Safran that the existence of an issue perceived by the group as important for their homeland and uniting them is the key in mobilizing them.

For this reason, Brubaker (2015:13) claims that it is more accurate and more useful to speak of diasporic stances rather than diaspora as a bounded group. Cushman (2018:loc 678) also agrees on the sporadic nature of their engagement and the ad hoc nature their lobbying has.

Diaspora mobilization and its transition from the dormant phase to the active phase can be the result of events taking place in homeland or hostland (Baser, 2014:356). According to Esman (1994:30), these events can either threaten the security or the wellbeing of the homeland or the group and therefore trigger a defensive mobilization, or there are cases when the group mobilizes offensively, in order to

support activities and issues to the benefit of either the homeland or the group. He admits, however, that the highest degree of mobilization on behalf of the group is succeeded in cases when defensive mobilization is required. Esman (2009:115) admits that national issues, as well as the victimization of their co-ethnics, can mobilize even the apathetic members of diaspora to support them, while cases of natural disasters diaspora tend also to unite in order to support economically their co-ethnics (Vertovec, 2005:3). In these cases, the silent members, who theoretically belong to the diaspora but do not actively participate, can more easily mobilize to respond to a threat to their homeland or co-ethnics worldwide.

However, the group has to primarily perceive the issue as threatening to the wellbeing of its homeland and consequently be centrally organized in order to react.

It is the responsibility of the elites, therefore, to primarily effectively transmit the importance of the issues to the members, especially the silent who are inactive but a potential source of mobilization, and consequently to effectively organize them to effectively mobilize.

In this chapter, therefore, the main elements of diaspora were presented, along with their interconnections. Key is the notion of the mobilization of the group, as well as the importance of the diaspora leadership in achieving it. This leads to the second chapter, which stresses the political importance of diaspora and introduces the existing theory on the factors that could contribute to diaspora's influence in hostland when promoting homeland foreign policy related interests.

Chapter 2: Political influence of diaspora

Introduction

Having presented the term and the key elements of diaspora, Chapter 2 focuses on its political importance and the political influence it can under conditions exert. From the past perception that those groups were lost populations that had no political value, nowadays they are recognized by both homelands and hostlands as significant political actors.

Despite the fact that scholars are divided on the character of diaspora's involvement in the politics of both homeland as well as hostland, some perceiving its nature to be benevolent, others negative, even catastrophic, their political importance is, nevertheless, acknowledged.

Focus is then directed on the American based diasporas and on their ability to exert political influence, acknowledging that not all of these ethnic groups have been equally effective in promoting their homeland related foreign policy interests. There are diasporas, such as the Jewish, the Greek or the Cuban, that are considered to be particularly influential, while others, despite their efforts, have not succeeded in becoming equally effective within the American politics.

Therefore, the Chapter presents the scholars' efforts to explicate the reason why some diasporas have been effective in promoting their interests while others not, by determining certain factors that may contribute to this increased influence. Those factors will be studied in the subsequent chapters in relation to the three case studies to determine their contribution. Furthermore, and in an effort to determine whether there are diasporas bound to succeed or fail due to presence or lack of certain elements, the aforementioned factors will be divided in two categories. The first includes those factors that are predetermined and beyond the control of the group to manipulate or alter them, such as the size of the group or its geographical distribution across the States. The second category includes factors that can be manipulated by the group, such as the ability to mobilize its members or the effective allocation of its resources. Therefore, this division enables to determine whether success is up to a point predetermined and a possible option for certain groups only, which are fortunate to share certain characteristics. Should permanent and unchangeable factors of the first category, such as the group size and the geographical concentration, be key for the ultimate success, a

small and geographically dispersed across the States group would theoretically be less likely to become influential. By the same logic, should the effective leadership and allocation of the available resources, therefore factors of the second category, be key to the group's increased influence, success could theoretically be accessible to any group.

Still, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, diaspora activity is not constant but takes place in the framework of a specific issue that arises. Therefore, the abovementioned factors are examined in the framework of the specific issues that the three diasporas under question wish to promote, and some may not apply in another effort even of the same diaspora.

2.1 Political importance of Diaspora

In the past, the role of diasporas as political actors was not only neglected by foreign policy analysts and scholars, but diaspora was even considered to be completely irrelevant to the foreign policy making (Haney, Vanderbush, 1999:341, Paul and Paul, 2009:5). Diaspora was regarded by politicians as a social and political phenomenon with a transitory character, that had a very limited impact on their societies, given the fact that its numbers were insignificant and their members' ability to exert any influence, and especially politically, was deemed to be extremely limited (Sheffer, 2003:239).

After the aforementioned long period of underestimating diaspora's potential political strength and ability to influence, we have entered a period of recognition by both their homelands and hostlands. Contrary to these past perceptions, the term became increasingly associated with foreign policy to the degree of becoming a political slogan utilized for mobilizing the members of the group (Bauböck, 2008:2). Werbner (2002:121) emphasizes the political character of diaspora, perceiving it to be "a transnational network of dispersed political subjects", Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004:1183) acknowledge that the mere movement of peoples across borders is a political phenomenon, while according to Vertovec (2005:1) members of diaspora consist of an important political asset for their homelands. For Baser and Swain (2010:40), also, diaspora comprises a political project and the emphasis is, thus, placed to their political orientation.

The acknowledgement of the political importance gradually acquired by diaspora could not be acknowledged in a more official manner than in the case of the NATO meeting held in Madrid in July 1997. In the aforementioned meeting, where the expansion of the Organization to include Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic was under discussion, the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien criticized (accidentally to an open microphone) to his Belgian and Luxembourg counterparts, Jean-Luc Dehaene and Jean-Claude Juncker respectively, the American stance on the issue. According to Prime Minister Chretien, the American stand concerning the aforementioned expansion was primarily dictated by the need to ensure ethnic groups' votes domestically and was not led by the national interest in the region (Paul and Paul, 2009:1). Amazed by the power of ethnic voting in the United States, the Canadian Prime Minister admitted that in his country such a political behavior and "selling" of votes would lead policymakers to prison (Blitzer, 1997).

Thurber, Campbell and Dulio (2018:loc101), also, perceive ethnic lobbying not simply as not waning, but on the contrary, as being intensified with new players entering the American political scene.

Rubenzer (2011:108) admits, however, that ethnic interest groups act similarly with all other domestic interest groups, lobbying with the aim of pursuing their interests. Those interests are focused on their community, as well as their homeland and its wellbeing, as this wellbeing is perceived by the group. There can be a variety of issues, ranging from issues of a more or less permanent character, to ad hoc issues that arise at certain moments and mobilize the group to respond.

Abdile (2010), Antwi-Boateng (2011), Baser and Swain (2010), Budabin (2014), Kent (2006), Kleist (2008) and Lyons (2004) study the diasporas' role in conflicts taking place in their homelands. Sinatti and Horst (2014), Van Hear, Pieke, Vertovec (2004), Hourani (2007), Brinkerhoff (2011) and Gillespie, Riddle, Sayre and Sturges (1999) study the role diasporas can play in the development of their homelands. Newland and Patrick (2004), Johnson (2007), Copeland-Carson (2007), Aysa-Lastra (2007) focus on the role of diaspora in philanthropic activities in their homeland and actions towards their co-ethnics' poverty reduction. On the other hand, according to Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000), as well as for Cushman (2018:loc 669) the allocation of the foreign aid, which sometimes favors certain countries at the expense of others, which unquestionably would have a greater need for support, can be explained by pressures at the domestic level by their respective diasporas.

However, concerning the character of the influence exerted, there is a disagreement among the scholars. Some scholars perceive diaspora to have a positive impact in the American foreign policy making, while others claim it to be destructive. Some claim that they can be peacemakers, others that they are even responsible for the continuation of wars in their homeland. Shain and Barth (2003:450), also, admit that the contribution is not always benevolent, and can also become a source of instability and tension in the homelands. Adamson (2008:2) agrees that their influence in peacekeeping efforts can be both positive and negative. Engaging ethnic groups to foreign policy is a “truly positive phenomenon” according to Shain (1995:87), while Lindsay (2002:40) and Carter (2005:62), also, admit that this engagement is beneficial to the American interests, since diasporas transmit to their homelands the American values and interests.

In the United States, however, the suspicion that diasporas could potentially be harmful could be traced also back to 1787 and to James Madison’s warning against the mischief of factions. According to him, factions, being a small minority, could attempt to influence the state and bring harm (Library of Congress, n.d.). According to Newhouse (2009:92), also, this influence leads to the erosion of the America’s credibility and influence, internationally, therefore, and ethnic lobbies have a negative impact on the foreign policy making (Newhouse, 2009:74). Sharma (2017:34), also, admits that there can be a dark side in their influence for both homeland as well as hostland interests.

2.2 Factors enabling influence

Acknowledging the fact that diasporas have become a player in the foreign policy arena also acquiring a potential political power, as well, scholars have attempted to pinpoint the factors that lead some diasporas to be more effective than others. There are diasporas, such as the Jewish, Greek or Cuban, which have exploited their political strength and influence in order to promote their homelands’ or their very own foreign policy interests, while others, despite exerting all efforts, constantly fail in influencing their hostland’s policy making process.

Accepting this difference among groups’ efficiency in promoting their foreign policy related interests, scholars have attempted to discern the elements certain

diasporas share, which make them more efficient than the others in exerting influence promoting the issue they wish.

According to Ahrari (1987:156) the elements that could increase the ability of an ethnic interest group to exert influence within the American political system are related to:

- **The issue under question and its compatibility with the American interests.** The success of the group in influencing the hostland government depends heavily on the specific homeland related issue they seek to promote. If the issue is considered to be in line with the American interests, they are much more likely to be able to succeed in promoting it.
- **The degree of assimilation in their hostland.** The group has to be assimilated enough in the American society, in order to be politically active and have the right to vote. A marginalized group has by definition no possibility to influence the politics. However, at the same time, the groups should not be completely assimilated, but its members have to still share a connection with their old homeland. Thus, they should still perceive themselves to be part of their homeland and, therefore, feel the obligation to protect it and its people by promoting its interests from afar.
- **The degree of homogeneity within the group.** Although he accepts that the homogeneity of the group is a factor influencing and increasing the group's success, he, nevertheless, accepts it to be a "minor determinant", claiming that homogeneity within the group has not always been translated to an increased influence.

Despite the fact that Ahrari (1987:155) does acknowledge that some diasporas are, therefore, more influential than others, he rejects their ability to steer foreign policy, which according to him remains in the absolute jurisdiction of the President and the Congress.

Esman (1994), on the other hand, focused more on the qualitative characteristics of the group, its leadership and the patterns of organization and mobilization. According to Esman (1994:32), once mobilized, the group is more likely to succeed in being influential when the following characteristics are present:

- **Political Opportunity Structure:** The environment (both in homeland and hostland) in which the group has to exist and mobilize is of utmost importance. Democratic environments allow, primarily the formation and the existence of such groups, and subsequently provides them with the right to mobilize in favor of their old countries. On the contrary, totalitarian systems do not offer the same degree of liberty and an ethnic interest group cannot even be formed under such a regime, much less demand a role in the foreign policy making. Additionally, the degree of cooperation the group can establish with the homeland and the hostland government also depends on the regime of both. The selection of the strategies, therefore, that can be employed by diasporas will be totally different and is totally depended on the political system of both the countries of origin and residence.
- **Group leadership:** He identifies specific roles within the group, those of leaders, activists, members and sympathizers, the most vital of those four being the leadership of the group. Leaders are responsible for both the strategies employed by the group, as well as for the internal cohesion and the relations with the other elements of the society. The abilities of the political elites that head the group and are responsible for organizing and directing its actions can contribute to its acquiring increased influence. However, the role of the other three categories is not to be underestimated, as well, since their existence is necessary, and their efficient deployment can lead to successful results.
- **Ideology:** Ideology has a twofold function. Primarily it is used to unite and mobilize all of the members of the group, even the inactive ones, in the face of a common enemy of the homeland or a specific goal, while at the same time it can legitimize the group's mobilization to the hostland society. The creation of a common ideology, uniting the members and urging them to take action is of utmost importance. According to him, ideology must justify to the members of the group the need for their mobilization and present a specific outcome, which would make their struggle worthwhile. Leadership that will be successful in creating and diffusing such an ideology could lead to a more united and thus mobilized group, also making their cause more justified and accepted by the general public.
- **Organization:** The effective organization of the groups that operate within a diaspora and the effective distribution and allocation of the responsibilities each one will have, is important in creating an influential group.

- **Goals:** The specificity of the goal and whether it is accepted and pursued by all the members is crucial for the group's success. Within the group, however, there may be differences concerning the fundamental goal or the way for its achievement that could endanger the unity and ultimately the influence.
- **Resources:** The resources, both material as well as non-material, such as the members of the group and their qualitative characteristics, available to the group are important, and they are the elements that will ultimately define the strategy that will be selected by the leadership. Their effective deployment will raise the chances of their being more successful.
- **Strategies and tactics:** The effective deployment of the available to the group resources by selecting the correct strategies is key to success, since no matter how many resources a group may possess, they have to be effectively employed in order for them to be translated into effective action and success.

He admits, however, that the above-mentioned elements do not consist detached and separate categories, but they are mutually depended, since the strategies are depended on both the political opportunity structure, as well as the resources available, and they differ from a group to another.

Haney and Vanderbush (1999:344) admit that despite the interest scholars demonstrated in determining the exact factors that lead some diaspora groups to become more effective in influencing than others, no agreement has been reached. They cite the most commonly accepted factors, according to which some groups are more influential than the others.

- **Organization:** The pattern of the group's organization can potentially lead to a better degree of effectiveness, an example of this being the Jewish diaspora with the organization of the AIPAC.
- **Placement of the group:** A more populous group, with its members being strategically located in key constituencies could take advantage of their voting power in order to exert pressure and achieve a higher degree of influence.
- **Issue under question:** Groups that are mobilized in order to promote issues that are already in line with the hostland interests have better chance of succeeding in promoting them, rather than groups promoting issues that are perceived to be against the hostland interests ("pushing an open door" element). Additionally, there

is an even better opportunity to promote the issue when the general public is in favor.

- **Access to policy makers:** The group can become more successful by having established access to the policy makers at all levels that can promote their views. However, they accept that gaining access and exerting influence to the lawmakers is generally easier comparing with having to influence the Executive branch.
- **Mutual support with the policy makers:** The group can establish such a mutual relationship with the policy makers by providing them with the votes of its members and offering funds to run their campaigns, as well as being their source of information. In exchange, and after assuming their duties, the policy makers can offer the group their support in return, having reached a symbiotic relation.

Paul and Paul (2009), on the other hand, stray from Esman's leadership-focused approach in order to study the easier measurable and more permanent characteristics of the group. Paul and Paul (2009:102) concentrated on the following features when attempting to demonstrate the reason why some groups are more successful influencing their hostland politics comparing to others.

- **Size and placement of the group.** The groups with the most members have the opportunity to achieve a more effective mobilization. However, as they accept, it is not only their total number that bears importance, but its geographical concentration to one or more regions as well, since it becomes easier to employ its voting power during the elections, creating a voting block and acquire a voice in the Congress.
- **An issue or a threat upon which they can be mobilized.** They agree that most of the times the issues that could be perceived as important enough to mobilize the community are those that threaten the homeland and not the positive ones. Against an issue that might be perceived as a threat by the group, even the most distanced and apathetic of the members are more easily motivated to participate and act in a defensive mobilization. Additionally, a common traumatic event in the past could also generate a closer cohesion among its members.
- **Financial resources.** The more affluent the group is, the biggest ability it has to become influential, by employing those resources in order to fund campaigns, support lawmakers, sustain the organization and engage in various mobilization activities. They are, however, dependent to the group organization, since the

members' contributions have to be efficiently collected and employed in order to succeed. Additionally, they find the existence of a permanent central authority to be key in collecting and managing the resources.

- **Assimilation to hostland.** The members of diaspora have to be part of their hostland society but not fully integrated, maintaining however the link with their homeland, in order to have the wish to lobby to its benefit. The degree of assimilation, therefore, must be the correct one, since they must be assimilated enough to be able to take part in the political life of their hostland and on the other hand they should still maintain an interest towards their homeland to be able to mobilize to its benefit.
- **Issues they are trying to promote.** If the issue is in line with the hostland politics and seeks to maintain the existing status quo, the group has more possibilities of being successful contrary to the groups they wish to change the existing status quo.

There are common elements, acknowledged by all the above-mentioned scholars as important in creating successful and influential diaspora groups. However, each scholar places emphasis on different aspects of the group. Ahrari (1987) focuses more on the adaptation of the group and the characteristics that would make their political mobilization to be primarily accepted by the hostland in order to consequently be able to influence it. However, their being permitted to mobilize, does not automatically mean that they also will, or that all members will equally share the obligation to engage. Equally, despite the fact that they no longer are viewed as threat to the cohesion of their hostland society, the result of their efforts is not guaranteed to be successful.

Esman's (1994) approach with its emphasis on the leadership and organization is more elite focused. The group undeniably has to be accepted by the hostland society in order to primarily be able to organize, however, there must be an efficient organization and leadership in order to mobilize the members of the group and engage even the more apathetic of them transmitting them the emergency of the issue and the importance of their participation. Otherwise, an unmotivated group has no possibility to exert any influence. Therefore, the group's leadership and their efforts in creating a common ideology and coordinate all material strengths of the group are of utmost importance. The group, as mentioned before, may, theoretically and based on the

common origin, include numerous members, strategically placed in the United States and wealthy, however, without the proper incentive and mobilization all these elements cannot be considered as assets. Paul and Paul (2009), on the other hand, focus on the more tangible elements of the group, since elements like ideology or the effective leadership are not measurable.

Table 1, therefore, summarizes the key factors identified by the abovementioned scholars that could have an impact on the ability of a diaspora to exert influence.

TABLE 1

Ahrari	Esman	Haney, Vanderbush	Paul, Paul
1987:156	1994:32	1999:344	2009:102
Issue-compatibility	POS	Size placement	Size placement
assimilation	Group leadership	organizational strength	issue or a threat
homogeneity	Ideology	goal salience	Financial resources
	Organization	Open door element	Assimilation
	Goals	Access to decision centers	Issues
	Resources	Symbiotic relation with mps	

2.3 Synthesis of Factors

The factors that were mentioned above and are perceived to be having a positive impact on the ability of a diaspora group to exert influence will be examined in the framework of the three case studies under question. These factors will be further divided in two broad categories, according to the degree of control the group can have over them. In the first category, the factors included are more or less predetermined and beyond the ability of the group to modify them. On the contrary, the factors included in the second category depend on the group and its abilities, being, therefore, within the group's ability to be modified and manipulated.

According to this categorization, therefore, not only the elements or the patterns of elements that contribute to the group being influential will be identified in the specific case studies, but at the same time it will also be identified the degree of control one group has over them and whether any group can overcome shortage of elements of

the first group that are predetermined, by effectively manipulating the elements of the second group.

Table 2, therefore, presents the factors that will be examined in the framework of the three case studies categorized, as mentioned, according to the ability of the diaspora to exert control over them.

However, as Sheffer (2015:52) admits, measuring the degree of influence of the interest groups is extremely difficult, since even when the group has achieved their goal, their efforts were only part of the elements that eventually had an influence on the policy makers and their decision making. Therefore, as he admits only the policy makers could confirm which of the elements influenced them the most in reaching their decision (Sheffer, 2015:53).

Table 2

A. Factors beyond control of the group	B. Factors under control of the group
1. Issue <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in line with U.S. interests - in line with homeland 	1. Leadership/organizational structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key central organization - Influential leader - Factions within the group unified
2. Resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - size of the group - geographical distribution - wealth of the group - assimilation 	2. Strategies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Successful framing of issue <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To fellow community members • To targets of lobbying - Resource's deployment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral • Financial • Grassroots activities - Target of Lobbying <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive • Legislative
3. POS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberty to mobilize in hostland - Lack of powerful rival groups - Powerful allies 	

2.3.A Factors beyond control of the group

As mentioned before, the elements in this category are more or less predetermined and given to the group. The fact, however, that these factors are not under its direct control, does not necessarily mean that the group cannot exert efforts to minimize the difficulties they may cause. For example, the issue that came up at a certain time may be beyond its reach to modify, since it is an event that has happened and compels the group to mobilize, however, the framing of the issue and the strategy selected to respond depend completely on the group.

2.3.A.1 Issue

Most of the times the issue is imposed on the group and not initiated by it. Whether it is a threat, or an initiative derived by either the hostland or the homeland, the group is rarely actively consulted or involved in its creation. Especially in the cases where the aforementioned defensive mobilization takes place, the group can only act reactively, in response to the threat.

However, notwithstanding the issue, the type of the mobilization of the group is crucial. Shain (1995) admits, that in order for a diaspora strategy to be effective, it has to be consistent with the American values and ideals, stressing that diasporas that will select non-democratic means will fail in exerting any influence. Carter (2005:61), also, admits that it is imperative the group's actions to be in line with the hostland values, while Shain and Barth (2003:455) stress the importance of the creation of a favorable group identity within the hostland society. Esman (2009:125) also accepts the centrality of the congruence of the issue with the hostland foreign policy goals, admits, however, that diasporas may present their causes as either in line with hostland national interests or its values.

Most scholars stress the importance of the nature of the issue and its compatibility with the hostland national interests. Attempting to promote an issue that is already considered to be in congruence with the American foreign policy goals leads the group to become an ally and therefore become also more influential. However, since the Congress became a vital player in the foreign policy field along with the President, the perceived national interests are also set by the Congress. Still, as Saideman

(2002:99) admits, the fact that the hostland society most of the times is rather ignorant about the foreign policy issues the group promotes allows them to be highly influential.

On the other hand, the stance of the homeland on the issue might coincide with the group's and have synergetic relation, therefore, being allies, or the group might perceive homeland's national interest in a different way and act against the homeland, opposing it.

Therefore, the two factors under question will be whether the issue is

- In line with the perceived hostland interests
- In line with the perceived homeland national interests

2.3.A.2 Resources

Another element that cannot be controlled by the group is the availability of the resources to be employed. By resources, we refer to both the human and the material assets, to both the qualitative and quantitative elements of the group, which are in a great extent predetermined.

The number of the people with common origin that reside in the United States is predetermined, their favorable - or less favorable - geographical distribution across the country is equally a given, as is the degree of their assimilation, and therefore their eligibility to vote and be employed politically. The group has no direct control over those factors and, therefore, cannot ensure their manipulation to its benefit. The group is equally unable to exert control to the financial situation of its members, as well as to their ability to contribute to the campaigns they organize.

However, the effective deployment of those predetermined elements to the benefit of the group and their effective mobilization lies within the abilities of the group and will be included in the strategies of the second category. Even if the group is privileged, being populous and wealthy, without the members being effectively mobilized and organized to contribute to the common cause they cannot be considered an asset.

Therefore, the factors under question will be

- Populous community that could exert influence in voting
- Community concentrated in key areas that could act as a voting block

- Group assimilated enough in the American society and being able to exert their political rights.
- Favorable qualitative characteristics, wealthy group with increased ability to offer donations and thus influence the politicians' campaigns.

2.3.A.3 Political Opportunity Structure

The group can also have very limited control over the environment it is mobilizing. The regime of both homeland and hostland, as well as the degree of political liberties offered to ethnic groups is beyond their control.

In liberal countries, like the United States, international relations are conducted as Putnam (1988) described as a two-level game, with the government being obliged to negotiate not only with other nations (level one) but with the domestic actors as well (level two), ethnic groups belonging to the latter. Saideman (2002:100) also agrees that the means the group will adopt depend greatly on the type of the regime in hostland, since certain strategies such as the donations and acting like voting blocks are valid only in democracies, Baser and Swain (2010:46) attribute the different strategies employed by members of the same diasporas residing in different hostlands to the different political opportunity structures prevailing in each country, while Adamson and Koinova (2011:3) and Heindl (2013:469) admit that the mobilization and the selection of strategies depend on the hostland environment.

As far as regards the United States, Shain and Barth (2003:460) claim that it is a “weak state”, being open to society influences. Newhouse (2009:74) and Thurber et al. (2018:loc 202) also, attribute the ability of the ethnic lobbies to influence the American foreign policy to its political system, with Shain (1994:811) admitting that such influences not only are not prohibited, but are actually encouraged in the framework of the pluralistic and democratic American environment. Lobbying within the American political system consists of a constitutionally protected right, allowing, therefore, the ethnic minorities, along with the other domestic interest groups, to employ all tactics available to lobby the government and promote their interests.

The liberty to mobilize, therefore, is an element common for all the groups under study, since they all reside in the United States and they all mobilize to influence the American politics, both Administrative and Legislative branches. Therefore, since they all operate in the same environment, they all enjoy the same degree of liberties,

therefore theoretically all possess the same opportunities in achieving their goal and exerting influence. Consequently, the factor of the accessibility in the hostland is common for all case studies.

However, since all interest groups enjoy the same liberties within the American political system, the group has the opportunity to ally with both ethnic and nonethnic groups in order to promote its interests, therefore, increasing the possibility of exerting influence. Sheffer (2015:53), also, stresses the importance of cooperating with other diasporas in their effort to eliminate opposition and promote their views.

At the same time, though, the opposing groups, also, are operating within the same framework and are allowed to counter lobby and diminish the possibilities of influencing and ultimately prevent the group from achieving its goal. Depending on the issue they seek to promote, diasporas may have to face opposition either from other ethnic groups or from completely irrelevant to the foreign policy field groups, business, or other type of domestic competitors.

Therefore, the lack of powerful opposition or the coalition with a powerful ally could theoretically enhance the ability of the group to be influential.

Therefore, the factors under question will be

- The political environment in hostland – A common element for all the groups under question, since they all mobilize in the United States
- The lack of powerful rivals
- The existence of powerful allies

2.3.B Factors under control of the group

The factors included in the second category lie within the ability of the group to either modify them or manipulated them to its benefit. Additionally, as mentioned before, the factors of the previous category may in a great extent be given and predetermined, their effective employment, however, depends on the group.

2.3.B.1 Leadership/organizational structure

As mentioned before, diaspora is a group that is mobilized and organized by its elites, who are, also, responsible for taking advantage and effectively deploying the resources available, utilizing them in the most influential and beneficial for the group way. Their role is, therefore, twofold. Initially, they have to mobilize the community and instill in them the urgency of the issue and the need for their action and consequently, once mobilized, they have to organize the effort and employ effectively all the resources available.

The approach for successful lobbying by an ethnic group is obvious in the words of the Director of International Affairs of AJC, who admits that in order to make a community have influence and political voice it has to be run as a business (Varghese, 2017).

The community even if it is willing to act to the benefit of the homeland, being a dispersed group lacks the ability to self-organize. Their massive mobilization, therefore, a prerequisite for the group to be influential, cannot be achieved without a central coordinator, either an influential individual or a central institution, that will undertake the responsibility to coordinate all efforts. Newland (2010:4), also, admits that the existence of such a central organization, authorized to represent the community is very important in negotiating with the policy makers, while for Adamson (2016:294) the effective efforts of one group form the base upon the others organize as well, with AIPAC being the model of all other groups.

The older generations may have stronger emotional connection with the homeland, the younger generations, however, raised in the United States and accustomed to the political system are more effective in promoting the issues of the community. Watanabe (2006:8), also, admits that the younger generations are more competent in lobbying the American political system, admitting that “paradoxical dynamic” with the interest waning and the capabilities for efficient lobbying expanding.

Another element that theoretically may assist the community to become influential is the internal cohesion within the group. Heindl (2013:465) admits that within the same diaspora, various sub-groups may compete to address their own interests, while Esman (1994:248) stresses the fact that such internal conflicts can prevent it from successful. Esman (2009:115) admits, however, that there are some core issues, such as threats to the homeland and the co-ethnics, that are undisputable and may unite the group. Still, even if all factions share the responsibility of addressing the issue, disputes may arise concerning the effective course of action. Therefore, should all the factions within the group act in a unified manner, being all in accordance concerning the issue under question, the possibilities of exerting influence are increasing.

Therefore, the factors under question will be

- Existence of central organization or powerful individual, authorized to represent the community
- Internal cohesion, lack of internal opposition

2.3.B.2 Strategies

As mentioned before, all groups under study are operating in the United States, attempting to exert influence on the American foreign policy decisions. Consequently, in theory, they all enjoy the same liberties to mobilize and promote their interests. Their effectiveness, therefore, mainly depends on the strategies they select to promote their issues. The group leadership selects the strategies based on the resources it possesses and their effective deployment could contribute to the successful influence of the group.

Saideman (2002:93) acknowledges that small groups are not hindered but rather aided by their size in exerting influence, since they are easier to organize, while their members are all focused on very specific issues, which most of the times the hostland's public opinion is either indifferent or even unfamiliar with them. Another benefit of their size is according to Saideman (2002:94) the fact that the leadership has an easier task in modifying a less effective strategy, adjusting it according to the external conditions.

The fact that the issue is more often than not predetermined and given does not mean that the group has absolutely no control over it. The group can exert efforts to

frame the issue in a positive way and consistent with the American interests, even as beneficial for the national foreign policy goals. Saideman (2002:102) also, finds of utmost importance the ability to communicate their issue in a way that would gain the support of both the policy makers, as well as the general public, underlying the role of the media. The leadership, therefore, as mentioned before, has to primarily effectively frame the issue as urgent to the members of the group in order to mobilize them and upon achieving their participation, leaders have to effectively frame the issue as beneficial to the American foreign policy goals, gaining also the support of both the policymakers and the public opinion.

Concerning the promotion of the issue to the members of the community, it has to be presented as urgent, and highly beneficial for homeland and its wellbeing, or even its safety, thus ensuring their engagement and mobilization.

In order to gain the support of the policy makers and the public, the group has to educate them on the beneficial character of the issue concerning the national interests, as well as the obligation to provide support based on the American democratic values and ideals.

Having successfully framed the issue, the selection of the effective strategies that could exert influence and lead to the policy makers' cooperation is crucial, determining in a great extent the result of their efforts. However, their selection is based on the resources available to the group, since a small group scattered around the country could not expect to exert influence utilizing the votes of its members, or a group whose members are not affluent cannot depend on their donations. As mentioned before, however, the availability of resources is not within the group's ability to alter or ameliorate. The numbers of the members of the community are given, especially those who are politically useful having voting rights, and their qualitative characteristics, as well as their resources are predetermined. It is, therefore, the leadership's responsibility to evaluate the resources available and exploit them to the maximum, taking advantage of the group's voting power available, as well as the financial resources in order to approach the policy makers, or have the ability to engage its people in grassroots activities. Consequently, concerning the engagement of the community, there can be selected a strategy that engages all the members of the community, organizing grassroots activities, if they lack the financial resources, or an elite approach, mobilizing mainly only the most affluent members of diaspora and taking advantage of their financial resources and social status to exert influence.

A crucial strategic decision of the leadership is, also, the selection of their main target, evaluating the significance of the policy makers, as well as their accessibility in order to determine who is more beneficial to lobby. Depending on the issue at hand, they should decide where their efforts, as well as the resources should be directed, in order to precisely target the policy makers whose support could act as a catalyst, maximizing their influence. The selection between the President or the members of the Congress depends on the issue under question and is mostly decided on an ad hoc basis. Newhouse (2009:2), also, admits their lobbying to be a five-dimensional chess game, including the Executive, the Legislative, the conflicts among the various agencies and the two leading parties. The Legislative, and especially the House of Representatives, is considered to be a more easily approachable target, since the lawmakers are elected every two years, consequently, the groups' votes, as well as its members' donations and campaign contributions are to them of utmost importance. Therefore, they tend to be particularly sensitive to the demands voiced by their constituents. Rubenzer (2011:106), also, admits that ethnic lobbies are more successful when trying to influence members of the Congress, while Thurber et al (2018:loc 364) depict the lawmakers to be in a constant tension between the national interest and their constituents' interests, at times mutually contradicted. Kirk (2008:280) also admits that Congress is more accessible to the influence of the group, claiming that the post-Vietnam expansion of the Congressional jurisdiction concerning foreign policy issues is what gave the ethnic groups the ability to exert influence. The President, on the other hand, is not so depended on certain constituencies and has to address multiple demands of interest groups. His electorate is nationwide, compared to the concentrated and limited one of the lawmakers, and the group, however strategically located, is not equally able to directly influence the President.

Zarifian (2014:504) also, admits that the President is much more immune than the Congress to the groups' pressure and demands. The group has to therefore apply pressure to the lawmakers utilizing their votes and donations available, constantly monitoring their stance. Monitoring is also important according to Cushman (2018: loc 844), who admits that it can act as a reminder to the lawmakers that their stance is being watched and registered by their constituents, thus the group being able to exert influence on them.

Additionally, members of the group that entered the Congress or members of the congressional caucuses created to promote the relations with certain countries

provide lobby from within. Both Cushman (2018: loc 814) and Thurber et al (2018: loc293) stress the importance of the Caucuses in indirectly lobbying their fellow lawmakers, while in most cases those Caucuses' core members are lawmakers, in whose constituencies many members of the group reside.

Therefore, the factors under question will be

- The successful framing of the issue
 - To the members of the community
 - To the policymakers
- The effective selection concerning the target of the lobbying
 - Executive
 - Legislative
- The effective resources deployment and the selection of the best strategies to influence their target
 - Electoral
 - Financial
 - Grassroots activities

The three case studies that follow are: A) The Indian American nuclear cooperation outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, initiated in 2005 and concluded in 2008 under the Bush Presidency, B) The maintenance of the Cuban embargo imposed in 1962 and still being in force despite both domestic and international demand for its lift, C) The failure of the Jewish lobby to prevent the conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran under the Obama Presidency. The first two case studies describe a successful campaign run by the respective ethnic groups, with the difference that in the Indian case the goal is specific and time limited, in the Cuban case the campaign is prolonged in order to maintain the embargo initiated in 1960's. On the contrary, the third case study refers to an unsuccessful campaign for a specific goal, undertaken by the powerful Jewish lobby.

The first part in every case study is introductory, providing a general presentation of the bilateral relations of the country under question with the United States. Focus is given on the period, when the lobbying campaign took place and the Presidencies that were involved.

The second part provides an overlook of the community in the United States, their size, a brief history of their presence in the country, as well as a presentation of their internal organization.

The third part focuses on the issue under question. The specific issue the group wants to either promote, or prevent in the Jewish case, lobbying the American political system, be it the Executive or the Legislative, is presented in detail, as well as the result of their effort. In the framework of each effort, the aforementioned factors are studied in order to determine their existence and importance to the final result.

Having established the fact that diasporas have become a political factor for both homeland and hostland, the Chapter examined the scholars' efforts to pinpoint the factors that may have a positive contribution on the efforts of influencing the hostland politics when diasporas are promoting their homeland related interests.

Those factors have, consequently, been divided in to two categories depending on the group's ability to manipulate them or alter them. The validity of those factors will be examined in relation to the three case studies in the three consequent chapters.

Chapter 3: Indian Americans

Introduction

The first case study concerns the nuclear cooperation between the United States and India that was concluded in 2008. Despite the fact that the initiative had been undertaken by the Bush Presidency, India's status as a non-signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, along with the nuclear tests conducted in the past attracting global disapproval as well as severe American sanctions, created many problems to the Administration in persuading the Congress, as well as the general public, on the beneficial character of the deal. The Congress had key role in the conclusion of the deal, since its approval was mandatory, and all efforts were concentrated in acquiring the lawmakers' consent.

The Chapter begins with a presentation of the bilateral relations between India and the United States and their transformation throughout the years. Emphasis is given to the nuclear program of India and the tests it had conducted, an issue that caused many problems to the bilateral rapprochement, with the Clinton Presidency having imposed severe economic sanctions. Under the Bush Presidency, however, a potential economic cooperation with India was perceived to be beneficial for the American interests and a nuclear cooperation, despite the fact that the country remained a non-signatory of the Treaty, was sought.

Having described the bilateral relations, focus is directed on the group and its qualitative, as well as its quantitative characteristics, also including a brief history of their migration to the United States, an overview of their organizational structure and their political, as well as social standing within the American society.

Consequently, the issue under question, namely the conclusion of the nuclear cooperation between the two countries, is presented. Initially, an overview of the international, as well as domestic legal framework is offered, since for the United States to be able to engage in such a cooperation with India on the sidelines of the Treaty, a series of both domestic as well as international laws had to be modified. The events from July 2005, when President Bush declared his intention to reach such a deal with India until October 2008, when he successfully signed it into law are then described, along with the two voting procedures to obtain the approval of the Congress.

Within the lengthy process to the final signature, the role and actions of diaspora are examined in connection with the factors under question.

1. Bilateral relations

The relations between the two countries have undergone various phases throughout the past, ranging from total indifference, to hostility, to reach the current stage of mutual recognition and strategic cooperation. The word most aptly characterizing the countries' bilateral relations in the past had been "suspicion" regarding each other's intentions (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:643, Van de Wetering, 2016:29) and this was the reason why an eventual rapprochement had been very problematic. Kirk (2008:275), however, considers this evolution of the bilateral relations as one of the most important developments of the decade for the American foreign policy.

Initially, the United States perceived India to be completely irrelevant to its geopolitical interests, attaching to it importance only in the framework of the Cold War reality (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:643). The degree of indifference was evident in the reasoning as to why the United States allowed the Russians to take the initiative of peace negotiations between India and Pakistan in Tashkent in 1966. The then secretary of State Dean Rusk bluntly admitted that the United States allowed the Soviet Union to get involved because they were convinced that they "had nothing to lose" (Van de Wetering, 2016:42). To demonstrate the degree of alienation between the two countries, Hathaway (2002:6) cites the words of the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the newly appointed American Ambassador to India William Saxbe, who advised him that the less he heard from him and from India, the better.

According to Malone and Mukherjee (2009:1058), the estrangement between the two countries initiated as an ideological difference and evolved to become a political and strategic gap between them, with Indian anti-imperialistic ideology and American anti-communistic stance prohibiting a close cooperation in the early years. Kapur and Ganguly (2007:643), also, agree that the mutual feelings of resentment and suspicion prevented any serious attempt for closer cooperation, while Hathaway (2001:23) admits that the Cold War mentality never allowed any bilateral cooperation.

Even in the pre-Cold War era and since its independence in 1947, India was not considered by the United States as part of its strategic interests and therefore was ignored. At some instances, such as the Sino Indian war in 1962, the United States supported India against China, however, India was never perceived to be an ally (Kapur, Ganguly, 2007:643).

During the Cold War, India refused to align with one of the two sides. Mansingh (2010:147), also, admits that after being under the British rule, the nonalignment policy was deemed by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as the best way to demonstrate the country's autonomy within a strongly bipolar world. This strategy, however, enraged the American side and was interpreted as support towards the Soviet Union. This led to the American alliance with Pakistan, which according to Loreng (2020:2189) was deemed the only option and India gradually turned to the Soviet Union. Particularly after 1970 the tilt towards the Soviet Union became more evident, for two sets of reasons according to Kapur and Ganguly (2007:644). The first set, the subjective one, was the ideological preference over the American free market capitalism and the second, the objective set of reasons, included the Soviet eagerness to offer India protection against its regional enemies, also by signing a treaty and formally accepting to assist in case of military threat.

Apart from the close relations to the Soviet Union, the fact that India was not economically attractive further led to alienation and American indifference towards it. On the contrary, Pakistan served the American strategic interests much better at the time, offering the military bases on its soil against the Soviets and therefore became an ally that received support, both financially and militarily (Kapur, Ganguly, 2007:645).

As Sharma (2017:119) admits, the change in the American perception of India had primarily been geopolitical, while Mishra (2009:112) also agrees that this approach could be achieved only after the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War affected both the Indian, as well as the American foreign policy objectives and at the same time removed the reasons for estrangement between the two countries. The enemy of the Cold War era that directed the foreign policy decisions had vanished, initiating a period of confusion concerning the foreign policy objectives (Watanabe, 2006:5), while Pakistan lost its strategic significance (Sharma, 2017:119). At the same time, the United States detached India from the Cold War prism and its connection with the Soviet Union, being henceforth perceived individually as a country (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:643).

Kapur and Ganguly (2007:647) perceive India's gradual turn to the United States as a natural strategy, being unable to rely on the Soviets any longer. Additionally, the economic crisis of 1991 led the new Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and the finance minister (and future Prime Minister) Manmohan Singh to proceed to reforms to address the structural problems of the Indian economy, as well as towards the opening of the Indian economy in order to stimulate the economic development (Mansingh, 2010:148, Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:648, Malone, Mukherjee, 2009:1060). At the same time, as Malone and Mukherjee (2009:1066) underline, the Indian diplomacy, also, progressed to become more pragmatic and focused. The abovementioned reforms led to the adoption of a market-oriented approach, making the Indian economy one of the strongest worldwide and the United States could no longer be indifferent to the prospect of a bilateral economic cooperation.

In this new international, as well as domestic, environment, therefore, the bilateral cooperation became not only possible, but also attractive for both countries.

The end of the Cold War and the liberalization of the Indian economy removed the two of the three obstacles inhibiting a close cooperation, with one more remaining obstacle, that being India's nuclear aspirations. Removing this obstacle was, therefore, the only way to reach a substantial cooperation (Mistry, 2013:720, Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:652, Mishra, 2009:112, Pant, 2007:457).

Indian Nuclear program

In 1974 India conducted in Pokhran the first nuclear test under the name "Smiling Buddha" employing American nuclear material provided for civilian purposes and Canadian reactor, also provided under the agreement to be used only for "peaceful purposes" (CTBTO, nd). Indian government's characterization of the test as "peaceful" did little to alleviate the worries on the status of the nonproliferation regime (Malone, Mukherjee, 2009:1059) and as Kirk (2008:282) admits, it further alienated the two countries. In response to the test, the United States enabled the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), passed by the Congress and signed by President Carter on March 10, 1978, establishing a set of criteria for nuclear cooperation with other countries (GAO, 1981).

On May 11, 1998, India conducted a second series of tests, known as Pokhran II, detonating underground nuclear devices. President Clinton claimed to be "deeply

disturbed” and recalled the American Ambassador, announcing that he will proceed to sanctions against India, warning at the same time Pakistan to demonstrate restraint (CNN, 1998). The fact that the testing took the CIA by surprise, in a “colossal failure” as the Chairman of the Senate admitted (Begleiter, 1998) further enraged the American side. President Clinton’s warning, however, was not heard by Pakistan, responding to India’s detonations, on May 28, 1998, with their own nuclear tests at the Chagai Hills, with Prime Minister Sharif declaring that “they have evened the score” and President Clinton announcing that the same sanctions with India will be applied to Pakistan, as well (The New York Times, 1998). The United Nations, also, condemned the tests through Resolution 1172, demanding the two countries to become members of the NPT and CTBT (United Nations, 1998).

The tests conducted by the two countries automatically generated sanctions under the enactment of the Sec. 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, more widely known as Glenn Amendment. The sanctions included the cessation of all aid, apart from humanitarian assistance, the prohibition of defense and military exports, as well as any financial assistance not only by American but also by international financial institutions willing to grant loans to these countries (United States Department of State, 2001).

According to Weiss (2007:431), India’s decision to proceed with the Pokhran II tests despite the knowledge that such an action would enact sanctions had been a calculated risk, since Pakistani retaliation was expected. The state of the Pakistani economy, which was much more vulnerable than the Indian, would not allow on behalf of the United States severe and prolonged sanctions since they would completely destroy it. At the same time, however, the sanctions were damaging the American economy, as well and especially the American farmers. Consequently, shortly after the sanctions were put into force, the Congress intervened passing the Agriculture Export Relief Act, signed into law on July 14, 1998, excluding the agricultural sector from the sanctions, since Pakistan had been a major wheat buyer (Rennack, 2003:3). The India - Pakistan Relief Act, known as Brownback Amendment, authorizing the President to lift for one year the sanctions related to foreign assistance and non-military transactions was entered into force on October 21, 1998, and in a less than a month, it was employed by the President to lift part of the restrictions (Rennack, 2003:3). In October 1999 the Brownback II Amendment gave the authority to the President to waive the sanctions and on October 27, 1999, President Clinton waived the majority of the sanctions for both countries (United States Department of State, 2000), while all the remaining were

lifted by President Bush on September 22, 2001 (United States Department of State, 2001).

Bill Clinton Presidency (20.1.1993-20.1.2001)

After the Cold War, there had been efforts to ameliorate the bilateral relations. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited the United States in 1994, initiating a new era of cooperation, especially in the economic sector. President Clinton's plan to visit India had been cancelled by the nuclear testing of 1998 (Hathaway, 2002:7) and it was in 2000, with the majority of the imposed sanctions already lifted, that the American President and the Indian Prime Minister exchanged visits and initiated cooperation in a wide range of issues, launching the United States-India Economic Dialogue (Kronstadt, 2005:13).

Kirk (2008:282), however, admits that despite the American interest, India's nuclear aspirations and its unwillingness to enter the international regime and sign the NPT and the CTBT, cornerstone of President Clinton's politics, did not allow for a close cooperation. However, Chatterjee (2015:53) attributes great importance to the Clinton presidency, claiming his visit in India to have been the first step in altering the bilateral alienation, a fact, that as he claims, was also acknowledged by the community, contributing to his campaign 1.2 million dollars, 350,000 just in one fundraiser, in 1992 and 1996.

Contrary to the past mentality, Clinton Presidency did not alienate India in the aftermath of the tests, on the contrary, high-level discussions were taking place despite the sanctions in force. The communication went on by the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh (Kirk, 2008:283). As Talbott (n.d.) acknowledges, his interlocutor allowed him to view the facts from the Indian point of view, Loreng (2020:2190) admits that this dialogue managed to alter the ill perceptions each country had against the other and Pant (2007:456), also, agrees on its contribution in reaching a mutual trust and understanding.

Still, as Kirk (2008:284) acknowledges, Congress throughout the Clinton Presidency remained ignorant of the area.

George W. Bush Presidency (20.1.2001-20.1.2009)

Despite the fact that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was claiming in the 2000 campaign that close cooperation with India had been within the Presidency's objectives (Rice, 2011:436), during his campaign, President Bush did not seem adequately informed. This became obvious by his inability to name the Indian Prime Minister, in a foreign policy quiz during an interview in the framework of his presidential campaign. The newspaper also emphasized the fact that the Indian Prime Minister Bush was unable to name was the same one who conducted the nuclear tests one year earlier and caused the US to apply sanctions (Johnson, 1999), with Secretary Rice admitting that during the presidency campaign, President Bush Achilles' heel had been his knowledge on foreign policy issues (Rice, 2011:3). The terrorist attacks of September 11 were perceived as the decisive event that led to a closer cooperation and paved the way for the nuclear deal (Freedman, 2009:14, Malone and Mukherjee, 2009:1064). Hathaway (2002:17) cites the former American Ambassador Robert Blackwill, who admits that without the events of September 11, the bilateral relations could not have improved so drastically and that it would take years to achieve the degree of cooperation the two countries reached within a few months. The unprecedented, according to Kronstadt (2006:2), step of India to allow full cooperation, offering its bases to the United States to fight terrorists improved drastically the relations, while the terrorist attack to the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, brought the countries even closer with the common aim of fighting terrorism (Malone and Mukherjee, 2009:1064, Sharma, 2017:212). 'Disaster diplomacy', following the Hurricane Katrina in 2005 with India sending planes and offering \$5,000,000 to the American Red Cross and the Tsunami in 2004 with the two countries cooperating in rescue and reconstruction missions, allowed the two countries to further consolidate cooperation and trust (Freedman, 2009:15). A few days after the attack, on September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted all the remaining sanctions, however, as Pant (2007:457) admits, Bush administration acknowledged that close cooperation could never be achieved unless Indian nuclear program outside the NPT is allowed. The willingness to engage to dialogue concerning the program is also demonstrated by the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative, where cooperation in three issues key for the Indian side, the trinity, as Kronstadt (2006:7) calls them, was sought. Those issues were the waiver on the restrictions to trade, the space and the civilian nuclear cooperation. The Next Steps

in Strategic Partnership initiative was completed in July 2005 (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2005).

2. Diaspora in United States

Demographics

According to the United Nations, India's diaspora of 18 million people of Indian origin living abroad is the most numerous worldwide, followed by the Mexican and the Russian diasporas, including 11 million people residing away from their homelands (The Economic Times, 2021).

Regarding their presence in the United States, in 2000 their population was 1,900,000 in 2015 it rose to 3,982,000 to reach the 4,606,000 in 2019 according to the Pew Research Center (Budiman, 2019).

Concerning their geographical distribution, the largest cluster resides in New York, with 711,000 people, followed by 238,000 in Chicago, 234,000 in San Francisco and 208,000 in Dallas. Significant numbers also reside in Washington, Los Angeles Houston, Atlanta and Philadelphia (Budiman, 2019).

However, what is important in the case of the specific community is not so much the quantity but the quality factor. Within the members of the community, the 32% holds a Bachelor's degree and the 43% a Postgrad degree, when within the American population, the holders of higher degrees are 20% and 13% respectively. Additionally, their annual household income in 2019 was \$119,000, when the respective average income of the other Asian families was \$85,800 (Budiman, 2019).

History of migration

Although the first immigrant to the United States, a maritime worker, can be traced back in 1790, the actual flow began more than a century later, with the first Indians to arrive in the United States through Canada mostly be agricultural workers (Jha, 2003:50), while according to Dossani (2009:3) they arrived grouped in five waves. The first Indians, arriving at the beginning of the 19th century had been mostly unskilled workers, were not particularly welcomed and faced racism and prejudice, also due to the negative image of India. The second wave, consisted of educated Indians, who migrated in the mid 1960's seeking opportunities the then socialist India could not offer.

Migrants of the third wave in 1970's were also skilled, had completed their studies in the United States and they no longer wished to return to their country. The fourth group arrived almost simultaneously and were mostly unskilled workers from poorer regions of India wishing for a better future. The final wave reached its peak at the 1990's and included highly trained engineers, previously employed in Indian IT sector, seeking professional progress.

Kirk (2008:286) perceives the Immigration and Nationality Act amendments of 1965 as the most important event for the Indian migration, since preference was given to educated migrants, while family members following the "family reunification" clause, were also accepted. Indians were particularly benefited, since they were educated, due to Nehru's effort to build better educational institutions, while the fact that many programs were conducted in English made them proficient in the language (Kirk, 2008:286). The numbers of incoming Indians demonstrate this trend, since in 1965, 582 Indian immigrants entered the United States while in 1970 more than 10,000. By 1980 the number of Indians was below 9,000 and two decades later in 2000 it had already reached the 1.7 million (Kirk, 2008:286).

According to Mansingh (2010:152) the decision to seek a closer cooperation with India can also be attributed to the Indian American community, who had grown in size and had gradually developed a more favorable image of their country in the United States.

Organization

Since the 1970's a great number of organizations was created focused on language, religion and regional themes, clearly demonstrating that the community was not homogenous (Kirk, 2008:287). Janardhanam (2013:23), also, agrees on the exclusive character of those organizations, while Hathaway (2004:2) cites the words of Prime Minister Vajpayee that there are more Indian organizations than Indian Americans. Mistry (2013:719) also agrees that all these organizations were based on different needs and backgrounds, professional, linguistic, cultural, their agendas were not identical, and their efforts were centered on their members' different needs.

Apart from this kind of local organizations and with massive incoming professionals, numerous business organizations were also created, with Kirk (2008:287) admitting that all efforts were centered to professional and social rights of

their members. All the aforementioned organizations were created to support the members of the community locally and issues of foreign policy were completely off their agenda (Mistry, 2013:719).

What led the community in the 1980's to mobilize and become politically active had been the discrimination they faced in both social and professional environment (Loreng, 2020:2192, Janardhanam, 2013:24, Sharma, 2017:101), while simultaneously the younger generation began also to organize, establishing associations within the universities (Loreng, 2020:2192). Of the organizations created in this era, others were very short-lived and responded to a single issue, others continue their operations until now (Janardhanam, 2013:24).

The creation of an Indian American Press was also a very important step towards the internal organization and mobilization of the group, its importance being stressed by both Loreng (2020:2192) and Kirk (2008:287). The "India Abroad" was created in New York in 1970 by Gopal Raju, it had been the first newspaper addressed to the community and soon gained nation-wide publicity, after going online and as Kirk (2008:287), apart from its contribution to the community identity preservation, was constantly urging to promote India. India also acknowledged its importance, bestowing in 2007, one year before his death, bestowing to Raju the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman, the award conferred to overseas Indians by the President of India (The Times of India, 2007).

Homogeneity

However, the main issue the otherwise affluent community faced in exerting political influence was their inability to attain homogeneity (Jha, 2003:64) and to speak with one voice (Kurien, 2007:778). According to Kurien (2007:763) in the 1990's the community approached and attempted to take part in the politics under the prism of two approaches, either adopting the Pan-Hindu or the secular identity. Although Kurien (2007:763) admits their difference more of an existential nature, Pan-Hindu group, perceiving Indian identity to be closely related to the Hinduism and secularist group perceiving India as a country where the different elements coexist, were often clashing, each one having its own agenda and different approach to different issues. Freedman (2009:8), also admits that the community divided in two groups was unable to exert any influence, while Chatterjee (2015:86) also perceives the group's lack unity to be the

only reason impeding it from being heard. Hathaway (2002:27), also, was finding the community to lack political maturity and unity in order to be active politically. The situation changed radically after the creation of the USINPAC that undertook the responsibility to unite the community and educate them politically in order to tackle the issue of non-participation.

Organizations

The National Federation of Indian American Associations (NFIA) was an umbrella organization created in 1980 with the aim of organizing the community and its organizations across the country. According to Sharma (2017:103), it was the organization that introduced the community to the lobbying game and initiated the political awareness and participation, by heavily mobilizing against the sales of the AWACS to Pakistan, while Janardhanam (2013:21) also accepts that its creation had been the response to the complaints that the various organizations could not organize and finetune their actions.

The Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE), also known as the Forum was created in 1982, with the aim of politically educating the community, remaining, according to Sharma (2017:102), bipartisan seeking cooperation with both executive and legislative and supporting favorable to the Indian view candidates.

The Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA) was created in 1993 by the publisher of “India Abroad” Gopal Raju, recognizing that the community that was thriving economically and professionally had no political influence. IACPA was created to educate the community and especially the younger members on participating in the American Politics through the Washington Leadership Program and the internships it offered to young Indian Americans to congressional offices. In 15 years, it had placed more than 170 students to the Congress, with Rep Frank Pallone (Pallone, 2008) praising its work on familiarizing the youth with the politics and Gottschlich (2008.1:162) admitting that most of these interns acquired leading posts within the group, also ensuring the close ties of the community with the decision makers.

Apart from the political oriented organizations, two powerful business organizations became also engaged in the last years in political lobbying.

The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), created in 1982 and representing more than 80,000 physicians and 40,000 medical students safeguards the professional rights of its members, while after the 2000's according to Kirk (2008:287), it started to gradually expand its activism and defend the rights of the whole community, while Sharma (2017:245) also agrees that it is the only business centered organization that is involved in lobbying, as well.

The Asian American Hotel Owners Association (AAHOA) was created in 1989 to defend the community against discrimination and became the largest American hotel owners' association with more than 19,500 members.

However, key in uniting and mobilizing the community in pursuing the nuclear deal has been the USINPAC.

U.S. - India Political Action Committee (USINPAC)

As mentioned before, the community in the past was fragmented in various subgroups, each one having its own perspective and different approach to different matters. USINPAC was created in order to address the differences that were debilitating the community in the political field, creating a single voice. Freedman (2009:11) and Kurien (2007:777) agree that USINPAC was created to address the division between the groups within the community that led to tensions and eventually to fragmentation. To achieve this, the USINPAC was focused on the problems of the community as a whole and attempted to exert political influence to the benefit of all Indian Americans.

However, as Kurien (2007:778) admits, this effort had not been accepted automatically, since Hindu groups were accusing USINPAC for not supporting Hinduism, while South Asian groups accused it for cooperating with Jewish groups, especially the AIPAC. Still, USINPAC became gradually accepted by all groups and managed even to unite the community in view of the passing of the nuclear deal (Kurien, 2007:778).

Another strategy followed by the USINPAC and leading to its organizational strength was the alliance with the powerful AIPAC. Sharma (2017:233) admits that the cooperation with the Jewish lobby was one of the most important strategic moves, while according to both Hathaway (2004:1) and Kamdar (2007) the advantages were since early evident in their exerting political influence. Chatterjee (2015:xiii) also perceives the similarities with the Jews and admits that they had been a role model.

The strength USINPAC acquired is also evident in events deemed as offensive against the community. An example is the case of Sen George Allen, who during his campaign called a young member of the community a “macaca”, with Kamdar (2007) admitting the contribution of USINPAC in ending his career. Another example was the case of Sen Obama, whose campaign members leaked a memo calling Hillary Clinton “D-Punjab” stressing her close relations with wealthy Indian Americans. USINPAC reacted immediately and Obama issued an official apology, addressing a letter to President of USINPAC personally (Kamdar, 2007). Concerning Dan Burton, a traditional Congressional enemy of India and the change of his stance, President Puri implied USINPAC involvement, asking “You haven’t heard a lot from him lately, right?” (Kamdar, 2007). Sharma (2017:105), also attributes the community’s political influence to USINPAC, while Newhouse (2009:6) admits it to be the only lobby with the potential to reach AIPAC’s influence, stressing that its organizational strength is comparable to that of AIPAC, and its wealthy members are supporting it. Kirk (2008:291), also, admits that its organizational evolution is evident in its manpower, since it grew from a box office to an office in the K-Street, where the majority of the lobbies are, occupying permanent staff.

The United States India Political Action Committee was founded in 2002 and is most commonly known as simply USINPAC, very similar to AIPAC, its model. As Janardhanam (2013:26) admits, before the formation of the USINPAC and the Congressional Caucuses, Indian government had to employ through its Embassy lobbying firms to promote its interests.

Political awareness, development

Despite the fact that an Indian American, Dalip Singh Saund, in 1956 became the first Asian to ever be elected in the Congress (Janardhanam, 2013:23), the community had since then been inactive politically until recently. Kirk (2008:280) quotes Khagram, Desai and Varughese, who in their research in 2001 on political organization characterize the community as “seen, rich, but unheard”, while for Gupta (2004:4) it was until recently an “invisible” community. Sanjay Puri admitted that he was forced to create the USINPAC in order to stop the Indian Americans from offering politicians money and being content by simply taking a photo with them (Kamdar, 2007), while according to Gupta (2004:6) the lawmakers were aware of their tendency.

Chand (2012:4), also, agrees that politically the community until recently had been inactive.

According to Sharma (2017:249) a combination of external and internal factors led the community to become successful in lobbying. The internal refer to the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the group, while the external to the amelioration of the bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era. Loreng (2020:2193), also agrees that those two factors complimented each other, admitting that if one element was missing the group could not exert influence, while Kirk (2008:281) also stresses the importance of the changing geopolitical decisions regarding the bilateral relations. Gupta (2004:7) underlines, also, the fact that the younger generation became accustomed to the American political system, while their technological skills enabled them to be directly connected to homeland. Kirk (2008:288) also agrees that in the 1990's the younger generation brought up in America and accustomed socially and politically resulted in qualitative changes to the group, while Mistry (2013:719) also agrees that they became more active politically than the previous generations.

However, despite the favorable conditions for the group, until recently they were not involved in lobbying. Hathaway (2001:23), also agrees that despite the favorable qualitative traits, the community until recently did not employ them to its benefit. One of the reasons for this inaction of the past was the fact that the community was not accustomed to the United States political system. As Gupta (2004:7) admits, the American political system, where lobbying is a normal venue of action was totally unfamiliar to Indian Americans. This lack of political awareness and maturity was acknowledged by the leaders of the community, who created organizations specifically with the aim of training the community to political participation and engagement.

However, as mentioned before, without a proper incentive, a group can remain dormant. According to Gupta (2004:6) the community acquired political awareness and success when it acquired specific goals to achieve. Sharma (2017:110) admits that what extracted diaspora from apathy, raised their political awareness and eventually led them to mobilize was a series of events affecting their homeland, such as relations with neighboring countries, the lifting of the sanctions and terrorist threats. However, Mishra (2009:116) stresses that apart from their wish to help their homeland, Indian Americans also wanted to establish themselves as a political force in the American politics. Their political involvement and the promotion of Indian political affairs ensures them greater degree of acceptance to the American society.

According to Mishra (2009:114) their first successful political intervention had been the successful campaign against the selling of AWACS planes to Pakistan in 1987, since not only have they managed to stop the sale, but the National Federation of Indian American Associations was also invited to present their views before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations. It was after this success, according to Mishra (2009:114) that the group became aware of their political power. Another instance when the community demonstrated its political power according to Hathaway (2001:24), was the massive email campaign that took place following the Pakistan attack to Kargil in 1999 organized by Indian American computer professionals and took the US politicians by surprise.

Political Affiliation

Kirk (2008:289) admits that the community is bipartisan, supporting lawmakers from both parties under the condition to be willing to promote their issues. Chatterjee (2015:86), also admits that the most effective way to achieve the goals is to remain impartial, supporting candidates from both parties, not allowing the vote to be perceived as a given by any party, straightforwardly admitting that they should support whoever supported the interests of the community.

The initial preference to Democrats was mitigated after the Republicans changed their stance and became more pro-Indian (Janardhanam, 2013:24). Gottschlich (2008:164), also notes this shift to the Republican party, with contributions and campaign donations to be distributed almost equally to both parties. Chand (2012:4), on the other hand, admits that despite a minority, Indian Americans' characteristics, being affluent, business-oriented, as well as more conservative with emphasis in families, would better fit the Republican party. Sharma (2017:91), also, admits that initially the group was more willing to support Democratic candidates, claiming that the shift came in 2004 after President Bush expressed his wish to cooperate with India (Sharma, 2017:95).

3. Issue Timeline

Legal Framework

In order for an American – Indian cooperation in the nuclear field to become possible, a series of laws, both domestic and international, had to be modified. India refused to accept the status of Nuclear-Weapon State being assumed only by the five states the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allows and denied ending its nuclear program to the benefit of the non-proliferation regime. Consequently, it became one of the three states that have not been signatories of the aforementioned Treaty. Additionally, the two nuclear tests and the sanctions that followed, deteriorated even more its nuclear record.

International Legal Framework

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

It consists the sole binding commitment reached worldwide in order to promote disarmament, it entered into force in 1970 and 190 States are members. Its aim is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies, adopting safeguards that are under the inspection of the IAEA (NPT, 2021)

According to the Treaty, the member states are separated in two categories, the Nuclear Weapon States, that is China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, and all the rest, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons and being allowed to employ nuclear technology for peaceful reasons only. India, Israel and Pakistan never signed the Treaty, while North Korea, initially a signatory, announced its withdrawal in 2003 (Arms Control Association, 2020).

Despite pressure by the international community India never joined an unacceptable, in their view, Treaty, according to which only a group of predetermined countries acquired the right to possess nuclear weaponry, while the rest of the world was denied this right. According to Goldschmidt (1980:80), this “nuclear Yalta”, as he characterizes the Treaty, was a major American and Soviet success, permanently separating the world in two categories, claiming, also, that events similar to the Indian tests are expected to occur.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

It was formed in 1957 based on President Eisenhower's visionary "Atoms for Peace" in an effort to prevent the danger world would face should the nuclear technology be employed in the form of weapons (IAEA, 1). President Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" address at the 470th United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, warned for the catastrophic consequences for the world the use of nuclear energy as a weapon could have and sought the cooperation of all nations establishing an Agency under the United Nations that would ensure the peaceful use of such technology (IAEA, 2).

The IAEA is responsible to guarantee the compliance of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to the NPT, ensuring that there is no use of nuclear material or technology for weapons production. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements that are concluded with the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the IAEA is responsible for controlling the use of all the nuclear material the state possesses, in order not to be used for militant reasons, while the Additional Protocol is a complementary tool to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguards (IAEA, 3).

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

It was created in 1974 as the answer to India's, namely a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, testing in Pokhran, aiming to prevent the transfer of material that could be employed for the production of the nuclear weapons. It sets a series of guidelines concerning the nuclear exports to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in order to ensure that the nonproliferation regime will be respected, and no material will be employed for non-peaceful aims (NSG, 1, NSG, 2).

Domestic Legal Framework

According to the federal law that regulates all issues concerning nuclear materials and facilities, the United States Atomic Energy Act, there can be no cooperation between the United States and a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, unless a series of prerequisites applies. More specifically, the Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act, titled "Cooperation with Other Nations" establishes the legal framework for nuclear cooperation, listing the conditions that have to apply. Part (a)

lists the nine requirements that have to do with the use of the nuclear transfers, their employment, as well as their security, demanding the compliance with the IAEA safeguards and not allowing the detonation of nuclear devices. Part (b) and (c) list the necessary documents and reports the President has to submit to the two Committees on Foreign Relations of the Congress. Part (d) specifies that the Congress has sixty days to deny the agreement (USAEA, 2021)

In order, therefore, for the United States to be able to sign an Agreement, India should have an Agreement with the IAEA, trade should be approved by the NSG and, domestically, Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act should be modified to allow the deal and the nuclear cooperation, in general.

Timeline

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in their Joint Statement in Washington announced their intention to enhance the bilateral cooperation of their countries in fields ranging from economy, energy, democracy, high technology and space, as well as non-proliferation and security. President Bush, acknowledging India's responsible behavior concerning the nuclear energy it possessed, announced his intention to work in order to "achieve full civil nuclear cooperation". In order to be able to engage in such cooperation, he also stated that he would seek agreement, domestically, from the Congress, as well as internationally, in order to modify the international laws and regimes and allow such a cooperation. The two leaders also announced the establishment of a competent working group to undertake the negotiations and arranged to review the progress during President Bush visit in India, due to take place the following year. The Indian side agreed to separate its civilian and military facilities and programs and place the first under the safeguards set by the IAEA, also signing an Additional Protocol, maintain the moratorium on nuclear tests, cooperate with the United States in order to reach a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, become part of the effort to constrain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies by refraining from exporting to countries that do not already possess them and secure nuclear material and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the guidelines set by the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (The White House, 2005, July 18).

On March 2, 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in New Delhi announced the successful completion of the negotiations on the separation plan, as agreed in their statement of July 18, 2005 (The White House, 2006, March 2). After the conclusion of the negotiations, the Administration prepared a proposed legislation that would grant the President the authority to lift the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act, thus enabling the deal with India. On March 9, 2006, H.R. 4974 was handed to Rep. Hyde and S. 2429 to Sen. Lugar in order to introduce them to the respective Chambers of the Congress. The legislation was requesting by the Congress to provide to the President the authority to exempt India from the requirements as stated at the 123 Section of the Atomic Energy Act.

However, and despite the wish of the Presidency to acquire from the Congress a direct approval, the Congress perceived this legislation as a request to abandon its institutional role, since the Congress would not vote to approve the final Agreement and as Mistry (2013:720) admits, the only way to block it would be to pass a resolution of disapproval, which could be vetoed by the President and his veto could only be bypassed by a supermajority of two thirds, a difficult quota to attain. Therefore, the Congress did not grant the President the authority to unilaterally modify the domestic laws in a fast-track procedure, leading to the adoption of a two-voting process, with the Congress providing its approval in two stages. Initially, it voted on an approval of the bilateral cooperation, and the second vote, after India acquired waiver from both the IAEA and the NSG, concerned the final bilateral Agreement.

Stage 1

The first stage of the process initiated on March 16, 2006, when Sen. Lugar, as sponsor, introduced the proposed legislation, co-sponsored by 10 Republican Senators. In his introductory remarks, Sen. Lugar informed that classified briefings by the Executive, as well as hearings from both pro and against the deal experts would be held in order for the lawmakers to reach the final decision (Lugar, 2005). Introducing Secretary Rice's address before the Committee on April 5, 2006, Sen. Lugar acknowledged the importance of the bilateral strategic relationship, voicing, however, concerns over the non-proliferation regime (Haniffa, 2006, April 5). In her opening remarks, Secretary Rice defended the initiative by underlying the importance such cooperation will have for the United States and attempted to alleviate lawmakers'

concerns on non-proliferation regime, stressing the fact that there is no comparison between India and Iran or North Korea. She also admitted that the existing regime has not been able to stop either India or Pakistan from detonating devices and the only result was an isolated India. To enhance her argument, she also added that even the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed El Baradei was in favor of the deal, as were major American allies, such as the United Kingdom, France and Russia (Rice, 2006, April 5). However, by the end of April 2006, the process was completely stalled at the House, leading to the adoption of the two-step process (Haniffa, 2006, April 26). Tom Lantos, ranking Democrat of the HIRC, also, suggested a compromise legislation, according to which only after the Congress had a clear image of both the 123 Agreement and the Agreement with the IAEA could they vote in a fast-track process (Haniffa, 2006, May 12).

On June 26, 2006, Rep Hyde introduced to the HFRC the H.R. 5682, which was passed one day later by 37-5 and was originally co-sponsored by 9 lawmakers, while by July 20, 2006, there were already 35 co-sponsors. According to Chairman Hyde, the bill was similar to the one proposed by the Administration, involving, however, changes that strengthened the role of the Congress, claiming the original bill to be unsatisfactory, since it was providing the President with full liberty, and was essentially requesting Congress to remove itself from the process and abandon its constitutional role. He also warned that the final approval was not guaranteed and urged the Presidency to be careful of the lawmakers' concerns. Rep Lantos, also, claimed that a priori consent by the Congress could not be given and the final vote could only be given after the agreement is finalized and the IAEA and the NSG have provided a waiver (Haniffa, 2006, June 28). On July 26, 2006, the H.R. 5682 "Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006" was passed by the House by 359 - 68, after introducing amendments that could not be qualified as "killer" ones for the deal (H.R.5682, Roll Call 411). Rep Brad Sherman's (D-CA) and Rep Howard Berman's Amendments H.Amdt 1194 and H.Amdt 1195, respectively, for further restrictions and control on the military program of India, were rejected, with Chairman Hyde and Rep Lantos hours before the debate addressing a letter to all their colleagues asking to vote down the Amendments that could end any prospect of a deal, stressing the fact that the Congress will have the opportunity to vote again upon finalization of the Agreement (Haniffa, 2006, July 26).

Concerning the Senate, on June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the S. 3709 by 16-2, with, according to Haniffa (2006, June 29) its members almost tripped over one another to co-sponsor it. The Senate bill was a different version of the House, including more strict non-proliferation provisions, but was put on hold until November 2006. Sen Lugar acknowledged the cooperation with his House counterparts, claiming that reconciling the two versions to be an easy task (Haniffa, 2006, June 30), while the extra Amendments, were, according to Sen Lugar, not “moving goal posts” comparing to the Joint Statement (Haniffa, 2006, August 3).

Meanwhile, concerns rose in India, with nuclear scientists addressing a letter to all legislators claiming that the deal would limit the country’s independence (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, August 14). Amid fierce opposition, Indian Prime Minister was repeatedly stating that any agreement reached will be based on the Joint Statement of 2015 and no additional requirements that could limit the country’s sovereignty would be accepted (Gopalakrishnan, 2006, August 22).

As mentioned before, differences between Democrats and Republicans stalled the Senate voting until lame-duck session in November. Both Sen Biden and Caucus Leader, Sen Harry Reid (D-NV) expressed their wish to pass the deal accusing the Republicans as responsible for the delay (Haniffa, 2006, October 6, Krishnaswami, 2006, November 9). The main disagreement was focused on the number of Amendments that would be permitted with Republicans eager to allow up to six and Democrats wishing to introduce many more (Krishnaswami, 2006, November 15). Finally, November 16, 2006, the Senate passed the bill by 85-12 (H.R. 5682 Roll Call) and 3 Senators not voting, permitting the introduction of 13 Amendments, of which the “killer” ones being voted down.

After the Senate voting, the bill was reconciled with the House one and on December 18, 2006, President Bush signed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. The bill was named after the name of Henry Hyde for his contribution with him being seriously ill and about to retire (Chatterjee, 2015:170).

In his statement during the signing of the Act, President Bush underlined the importance the legislation has for the bilateral relations, stating however, also that some of the sections are of an advisory character to the Executive (The White House, 2006, December 18). This statement enraged many legislators, mostly Democrats, who found

it “outraging” and “shameless”, as well as an “abuse of power” on behalf of the Executive (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, December 21).

Stage 2

On July 27, 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh issued a Joint Statement on the conclusion of the bilateral negotiations (U.S. Department of State, 2007, July 27). Consequently, in order to finalize the deal three more steps were left: a) Conclusion of an agreement between India and the IAEA on safeguards and on the Additional Protocol, b) Issuance of a waiver from the NSG and c) the conclusion of the second stage in the American Congress, voting for the approval of the final Agreement.

After the conclusion a period of negotiations in India followed, with the Indian Prime Minister facing difficulties in persuading its Parliament on the beneficial nature of deal, that it did not entail hidden agreements and that the country’s independence was not sold out. Despite that as Ghoshroy (2006:2), claims, the Indian opposition had mostly a partisan character rather than being meaningful, it resulted in a prolonged period of internal negotiations and disagreements, with the left parties fiercely opposing the deal and stalling the process for a year. However, the events in India are beyond the scope and they will not be analyzed.

The American Presidency in June 2008 was admitting that the deal was almost dead due to Indian domestic politics (Haniffa, 2008, June 16), also warning that time was running out for the deal, since its conclusion would be uncertain under another Presidency and would probably have to be renegotiated (Boese, n.d.). The deal passed by the Indian Parliament in August 2008, allowing the initiation of the following steps.

Meanwhile, the concern in the Congress was focused on the compatibility of the Agreement reached with the Hyde Act passed by the Congress. On October 4, 2007, Rep Berman (D-CA) introduced H.Res.711, cosponsored by 4 Democrats and 2 Republicans, requesting by the President to clarify the consistency of the final Agreement with the Hyde Act. According to Krishnaswami (2007, July 26), another 23 lawmakers headed by Edward Markey, expressed their concern that the agreement deviated from the Hyde Act, warning that if this is the case the deal would be in danger. In the same vein, on October 5, 2007, the Chairman of the HFRC Tom Lantos addressed a letter to the Administration inquiring technical details on the final Agreement to examine compatibility with the Hyde Act, with the State Department, on January 6,

2008, providing response to 45 questions. Although the correspondence was not classified, the Administration requested not to be made public, since at the time the domestic negotiations in India were ongoing and the opposition was fiercely opposing it.

On August 5, 2008, Chairman Berman in a letter addressed to Secretary Rice criticized the government for seeking an NSG waiver for India for an Agreement not fully consistent with the Hyde Act, warning that the congressional support would be in danger and claiming that the issue should be discussed by the next Congress due to inefficient time (Berman, 2008). On September 3, one day before the Vienna NSG meeting, Chairman Berman released the secret correspondence between his predecessor, Tom Lantos and the State Department, according to which, the United States had imposed stricter requirements to India than those they were requesting the NSG to impose. At the same time, and contrary to what Prime Minister Singh was stressing to the Indian Parliament, the potential conduct of another test could dissolve the deal. According to his spokesperson, Chairman Berman decided to make public this communication in order for the Congress to have all the adequate information for the impending voting (Kessler, 2008). Rep Berman denied having an ulterior motive in making public this secret correspondence in this specific time, claiming that the Administration had, anyway, no intention to keep this secret, hence, not been characterized as classified, and that there was an agreement with the Committee to eventually making it public. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Richard Boucher admitted the Administration's purpose to keep this correspondence secret in order not to make negotiations even more difficult in India, claimed, however that they would rather make the contents public after the NSG approval was given. Berman also denied cooperation with the nonproliferation lobby in order to kill the deal, stressing the fact that he had voted in favor of the Hyde Act (Haniffa, 2008, September 4).

IAEA Agreement

On August 1, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement on the civilian nuclear facilities of India. According to the Director General of the Agency, Mohamed El Baradei, the 14 civilian facilities would be under the IAEA safeguards by 2014, while the negotiations on an Additional Protocol were already in progress (IAEA, 2008).

NSG Waiver

On September 6, 2008, the extraordinary meeting of the NSG issued the Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India granting the waiver and allowing the trade of nuclear material and technology outside the framework of the NPT (NSG, 2008). According to Squassoni (2008), the positive for India result of the NSG was expected due to the American diplomatic pressure, as well as due to the fact that the biggest suppliers, including Russia and France, were also, for financial reasons, in favor of the deal.

Following the conclusion of the two steps on the international level, the remaining domestic one was left. On September 10, 2008, President Bush transmitted the Agreement to the Congress (Haniffa, 2008, September 11) and Secretary Rice met both with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as well as with the HIRC Chairman Berman. The time issue remained, since as mentioned before, the Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the President to hand the agreement to the Congress for at least 30-day consultation before providing its approval. Ed Markey, along with three Democrats, addressed a letter to Chairman Berman urging him not to accept a hurried voting (Krishnaswami, 2008, September 13). The circumvention of the obligatory 30-days consultation was announced by Sen Lugar during the testimony of William Burns on September 18 (Haniffa A. 2008, September 18) and the SFRC approved the S. 3548 on September 23, 2008, referring it to full Senate.

India, meanwhile, was not content with the bill, since it included provision that potential testing could end the transfers of nuclear materials. However, both the Administration as well as the Indian Americans found this acceptable, while Rep Ackerman characterized it as a psychological barrier, since India had already agreed not to conduct tests (Haniffa, 2008, September 24.1).

Berman introduced H.R. 7061, an identical bill, including extra provisions in case of a test, following a meeting with Secretary Rice, however, he was convinced to remove them, introducing a revised bill identical to the one that passed the senate, the H.R. 7081, making the reconciliation unproblematic (Haniffa, 2008, September 24.1). Following a heated debate on September 27, 2008, the House passed HR 7081 by 298-117 (H.R.7081, Roll Call 662). From Democrats 120 voted yes, 107 no, while 178

Republicans supported the bill and 10 voted against it. 17 Representatives (5 Democrats and 11 Republicans did not vote).

In the Senate the procedure was expected to be smoother, since it was already approved by the SFRC and unlike the House, where 2/3 majority was required, it could pass with a simple majority (Krishnaswami, 2008, September 30). On October 1, 2008, bypassing all killer amendments, that were characterized as “unnecessary”, the Senate passed the HR 7081 by 86-13, and 1 Senator not voting (H.R.7081. Roll Call Senate).

On October 8, 2008, President Bush signed the “United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act” converting it into law (The White House, 2008, October 8).

In the signing ceremony, attended by more than 100 members of the community, President Bush acknowledged their role, claiming to be impressed with the way the community promoted the deal to the Congress (Haniffa, 2008, October 9). Loreng (2020:2196) admits that despite the fact that the community was aided to successfully pass the deal, its influence in the American political system grew, making it one of the most powerful ethnic groups, Nicholas Burns characterized their campaign as the “coming-out party” to the American politics (Chatterjee, 2015:176) and Kirk (2008:276) finds their handling of the passage of the deal consolidated their lobby, making them an influential ethnic group. Gottschlich (2008:21), also, admits that the nuclear deal could never be reached without the Indian Americans.

Their contribution was also acknowledged by both American and Indian officials. Republican presidential nominee John McCain in a letter addressed to the Indian Americans congratulated the community for the bipartisan support the deal received in Congress (Krishnaswami, 2008, September 11), Sen Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) admitted their being more influential than their number suggested (Hathaway, 2001:24), and Ted Jones, the advocacy director of the CPI admitted the “impressive” bipartisan cooperation in every initiative and every effort to promote the deal (Haniffa, 2006, November 14). The Indian Minister for Science and Technology Kapil Sibal admitted the role of the Indian Americans as catalytic in persuading the congress, while the Indian Defense Minister, also, acknowledged their role in shaping public opinion in both countries (Haniffa, 2008, September 9) and the Indian Ambassador Ronen Sen invited the community leaders to thank them for their contribution (Haniffa, 2006, December 7).

A. Factors beyond control of the group

A.1 Issue

Congruence with hostland

It is widely accepted that the initiative for the nuclear cooperation with India belonged to the Executive (Kirk, 2008:275, McIntire, 2006, Mistry, 2013:717, Mishra, 2009:113 and Paul and Paul, 2009:195). Kapur and Ganguly (2007:652), also, admit that before the official announcement in July 2005, no one in the United States was informed, while for Malone and Mukherjee (2009:1065), Bush Presidency had no major successes to demonstrate in foreign policy field, and cooperation with India could become its foreign policy legacy. Sen Richard Lugar, also, accepted this deal as the most significant foreign policy initiative of the Bush Administration (Haniffa, 2006, June 30), while Pant (2007:466) admits the deal to have been a “rare” success in the field of foreign policy for Bush Presidency. Mistry (2013:720) and Paul and Paul (2009:195), admit that the aim of the Bush Administration had been mainly economic, as well as strategic, accepting to practically annul the Nonproliferation Treaty, with Secretary Rice, also, admitting that the Indian side had ascertained that in case of a nuclear cooperation they would purchase hardware from the United States, pointing that this was a great opportunity for the American defense industry (Rice, 2011:437).

Therefore, the deal undoubtedly had not been Indian American community’s initiative. Both Kirk (2008:285) and Mistry (2013:720) admit that the community had not been involved in the initial, negotiations’ stage of the deal, and, therefore, by no means can the initiative be attributed to them. Chatterjee (2014:249), also, agrees that the group had not set the agenda, but rather reacted and influenced as both a catalyst and a force multiplier, while according to Mishra (2009:115), the community became an important ally to President Bush in convincing the Congress. Kamdar (2007), also attributes to them the eagerness of the lawmakers of both parties to support the deal, despite the fact that for some, like Sen. Lugar, non-proliferation had been a core issue throughout their careers.

However, and despite the fact that the hostland government not only allowed, but actively sought their assistance, they maintained a cautious stance in order not to be accused as agents of their homeland. This cautiousness is evident in the words of the

President of the IAFPE (Chatterjee, 2015:54), who, when asked to participate to a meeting at the White House to prepare a briefing for the President's advisor team he declined an invitation by the Indian Ambassador beforehand, stressing the fact that they should not be perceived as agents of the Indian government, but as Americans, who will meet their own President (Chatterjee, 2015:54). Sharma (2017:113), also, admits that one of the main reasons of their success was their strict adherence by the American rules, while according to Mishra (2009:114) their political engagement demonstrates primarily the wish to help homeland and simultaneously their wish to ensure political space in hostland. Rather than act against the interests of their hostland, they perceived this as an opportunity to become more actively engaged and become more incorporated in the political system of their hostland (Mishra, 2009:108).

Congruence with homeland

In the case of the nuclear deal, both the Indian government, as well as the Indian Americans' opinions were aligned. They both perceived the deal to be important and beneficial for India and they cooperated in order to ensure its passage from the American Congress. Chatterjee (2015:139) admits that immediately after the announcement of the two countries' intention to reach a deal, he received a call from Indian Ambassador, Ronen Sen, requesting community's help in order to ensure the successful passage from the Congress.

However, as mentioned before, the community never acted as their homeland's agents. When the Indian side disagreed with the deal the Congress voted on the grounds of compromising its national sovereignty, the community, as Kirk (2008:278) admits, sided with the American lawmakers. Chatterjee (2015:194), also, admits that both Ambassador Sen and the Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee contacted him to intervene, he however insisted that the deal was final persuading them to accept it (Chatterjee, 2015:194). Additionally, many community leaders were stressing that the deal reached was the best possible and that India should accept it, therefore, lobbying for the deal on behalf of the United States government this time. The Chairman of the U.S. - India Forum Ashok Mago was also warning Indians that failure to sign the deal during the current Presidency might lead to the prolongation of India's nuclear isolation, also stressing the effort Indian Americans had put in order for the Congress to be willing to sponsor the bill (Kumar, 2008, March 11).

In the same vein, when, in 2008, the discord at the Indian Parliament was stalling the procedure, Chatterjee (2015:180) admits that Indian Americans were asked to interfere and contact their homeland. However, as he claims, despite expressing its disappointment, the community refrained from officially interfering (Chatterjee, 2015:179). Kirk (2008:279), also, stresses that the mobilization was the result of the group's internal organization, acting independently and was in no way organized by their homeland.

A.2 Resources

As mentioned before, their number is not sufficient to allow them to steer the American politics. Both Freedman (2009:27) and Mistry (2013:718) agree that the Indian American community can hardly be described as a voting bloc, since their population, as well as their and geographical placement, cannot ensure their being able to determine the voting result. Gottschlich (2006:20), also, admits that the community is not very benefitted from their placement, since they are geographically spread across the states, despite the fact that there are hubs in certain cities. Janardhanam (2013:28), too, admits that the community cannot set the agenda, mostly because it lacks decisive voting bloc.

However, what differentiates the community from the majority of the ethnic groups is its qualitative characteristics. As mentioned before, in their majority, Indian Americans have concluded higher education and this is also depicted in their higher incomes in comparison, not only with the other diasporas, but with the American families, as well. This characteristic could offset their small number, since they have the ability to donate large sums of money on a local level and exert, therefore, influence.

Sharma (2017:90), also, acknowledges the fact that Indian Americans are a small community, admits however, that their influence can grow beyond their size due to their ability to raise money, with the then executive director of the USINPAC, Supriya Christopher, also admitting that the voice of the community is huge, being one of the biggest contributors among the ethnic groups (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, June 27). Kurien (2007:762) and Friedman (2009:27) also acknowledge that despite their small numbers they can be described as a donor block, while Chatterjee (2015:xii) acknowledges that the qualitative characteristics can compensate for the community's small size and allow it to exert influence. However, according to Hathaway (2001:24)

their geographical dispersion across the country can also be positive, since in almost every district there are members of the community.

Therefore, the community although it lacked the sufficient size, as well as the favorable geographical concentration that would allow them to create an influential voting bloc, being an affluent group, was able to employ its wealth to influence through donations.

A.3 Political Opportunity Structure

Following the announcement of the deal two broad coalitions were created, one lobbying in favor of the deal, the other striving to prevent it from materializing.

The pro-deal lobby included the Indian American community, the Indian government, the business sectors of both countries through the lobbyists they had hired, experts in favor, as well as other groups that supported the deal and joined their efforts with the lobby. In the Congress, the main supporters from the beginning had been members of the Caucus.

On the other hand, the anti-deal lobby, was headed by the director of the Arms Control Association Daryl Kimball and included activists, experts against the deal, as well as influential press, such as the New York Times. In the Congress, Edward Markey (D-MA), co-chair of the

Task Force on Nonproliferation headed the opposition, with many lawmakers, also, attempting to include Amendments at various stages that could end any prospect of deal. As Mishra (2009:113) admits, within the American Congress there had been many lawmakers against rewarding India for not complying with the international rules.

Allies

Despite the fact that the Administration high ranking officials, especially Secretary Rice and Undersecretary N. Burns, were more prominent in promoting the deal in public, Ghoshroy (2006:3) admits that the most important battle was undertaken by the Indian lobby, a coalition including all the pro-deal groups and lobbying through a coordinated effort.

The Coalition for Partnership with India, as the pro-deal lobby was named, was created in order to engage all forces in a broad campaign that would educate and ultimately influence the lawmakers. According to the announcement of the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce (2006, January 19), the coalition also included academics, think tanks and associations and was headed by the Vice Chairman of International Affairs of the Chamber, Lt Gen. Dan Christman. The Coalition was formed to promote the deal specifically and was dissolved immediately afterwards (Mistry, 2013:726).

The degree of organization within the Coalition was such, that as the President of the United States-India Business Council (USIBC) Ron Somers acknowledged, the industry was responsible for the business part and the Indian Americans for the emotional - the voting, as well as the campaign contributions Kamdar adding - part (Kamdar, 2007). Mistry (2013:728) despite acknowledging that the community acted in tune with the other groups within the Coalition, stresses their particular contribution and approach, organizing events and fundraisers and getting in direct contact with the lawmakers. Kamdar (2007), also, attributes to the community's lobbying efforts the lawmakers' eagerness to support the deal, despite the fact that many of them had been ardent supporters of the non-proliferation efforts in the past.

Sharma (2017:225), Mistry (2013:724) and Kamdar (2007), also, admit that the coordination of efforts was key, with Mistry (2013:718) acknowledging that the group, initially, was not organized enough to sustain such a lobbying effort. Chatterjee (2015:148) admits the close cooperation with the United States - India Business Council, while the head of USINPAC, Puri, acknowledged that the community and the businesses were in 'full campaign mode' admitting this to be the first time they were engaged in such a campaign (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, April 9). The inexperience of the community to organize and sustain such an effort was also admitted by the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who, in April 2006 was acknowledging that the community was just starting mobilization, having been briefed by Under Secretary Burns and Robert Blackwill, the lobbyist the Indian government had hired (Haniffa, 2006, April 1). Ron Somers of the USIBC also admitted the co-organized efforts with the Indian American community to ensure the passage from the Congress (Haniffa, 2007, July 27), while the ability of the Coalition to pass the deal was also acknowledged by the Press. The Washington Times acknowledged the qualitative characteristics of the community that could enable them to pressure to the legislators, as well as the fact that they were aided by the US India Business Council, which includes more than 100 "Fortune 500" firms, as well as the lobbyists hired by the Indian government (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, April, 9).

Business Sector

The USIBC, although a business-focused organization that, according to its website, seeks to enhance the bilateral business ties between the two countries and is not directly engaged in political affairs, had been exceptionally active at the lobbying efforts and was one of the main partners of the Coalition. As Mistry (2013:725) admits, the USIBC was at the center of the business lobby and was forced to employ three lobbying firms to sustain such a campaign, being unprepared and understaffed for undertaking such an effort. Vickery International/Stonebridge was aiming to engage with the community, Patton Boggs aimed at the Capitol Hill and Litchfield Group was engaged in messaging (Mistry, 2013:725). At the same time, USIBC was also supported by American companies, mostly from the technological and defense sectors, that were interested in entering the Indian market (Mistry, 2013:725), with Freedman (2009:52) also stressing their role.

After the finalization of the negotiations and the introduction of the proposed legislation to the Congress in March 2006, the head of the pro-deal lobby, Lt Gen. Christman, announced the intention of the Coalition to engage in a massive grassroots campaign to promote the deal to the Congress, since, as he acknowledged, such a deal would mean \$100 billions of potential gain for the American businesses only from the energy sector (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2006, March 9).

The President of the US Chamber of Commerce, Tom Donohue, also, declared since the beginning his commitment in ensuring the passage of the deal from the Congress (Mozumder, 2006, May 12), addressing on March 20, 2006 a letter to all members of the Congress urging them to co-sponsor the HR 4974 and S. 2429, also stressing the benefits for the American economy and the new job posts it would create in the competent American sectors (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2006, March 20). The executive vice president for government affairs of the US Chamber of Commerce Bruce Josten on September 19, 2006, also addressed a similar letter to the Senators, requesting them to support the bill (United States Chamber of Commerce, 2006, September 19).

CEOs from major American companies, also, expressed overtly their backing to the deal, addressing, also, a letter to the lawmaker, referring to the deal as a historic opportunity that would benefit the American economy urging them to support it. Similar letters were, also, addressed to chairs and ranking members of both Foreign Affairs Committees before Secretary Rice's address in April 2006 (Krishnaswami,

2006, April 5). Similar efforts were undertaken during the second stage, as well, with the US Chamber of Commerce addressing letter to the lawmakers on September 21, 2008, urging them to support the deal, stressing that all non-proliferation issues were resolved following the approval obtained by both the IAEA and the NSG and stressing once again the economic benefits American industry will have (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2008, September 18).

Experts

Although the majority of the experts to testify were, according to Pant (2007:460), cautious against the deal and its impact on the regime, there were key experts overtly supporting it, with the most significant of them being the Director General of the IAEA, Mohammad El Baradei, who was urging the lawmakers to support it, claiming it to be a win-win for all sides involved (Krishnaswami, 2006, May 25). His stance was key in the efforts of the pro-deal lobby, strengthening their points, since his opinion was considered to have an exceptional gravity given the fact that he was presiding the international body that had to approve the deal.

El Baradei, in an article in Washington Post, defended the deal, claiming that treating the non-signatories of the NPT as outcasts by the international community will not force them to comply and that similar efforts should be exerted to reach a form of cooperation with all of them. Concerning India, he accepted that hosting the 1/6 of the world population implies an increased demand for energy and claimed that the deal would officially bind the country in some form of an agreement (El Baradei, 2006).

Experts in favor were also attempting to demonstrate the positive nature the deal for American interests by addressing letters to the lawmakers during both stages. In March 2006, 25 South Asia experts addressed a pro-deal letter to all lawmakers (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, March 13), at the second stage, before voting, experts from various institutions, think tanks, and academics also addressed a similar letter to the Chairman of the SFRC, Sen Biden (Haniffa, 2008, September 22), while they also cosigned letters with members of the community (Krishnaswami, 2006, September 16). Both the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the Heritage Foundation, also, published reports in favor of the deal, urging the lawmakers to support it (Haniffa, 2006, June 8, Haniffa, 2006, August 16).

Jewish Lobby

As mentioned before, the two communities have since the past been cooperating and the Jewish lobby also supported the efforts to promote the deal. Perhaps the most official statement on their role came from the American Ambassador to India, David Mulford, who claimed that the deal had been the result of intense lobbying on behalf of two ethnic groups: Indian Americans and Jews Americans (Phadnis, 2013). The AJC explicitly expressed its support to the deal addressing letters to key lawmakers and organizing numerous trips to India for lawmakers and staff (Ghoshroy, 2006:3). According to Choudhury (2006), the AJC followed a targeted approach, focusing its efforts to specific key members of the Congress that had a role in the Foreign Relations Committees, such as Rep Hyde, Chairman and Rep Tom Lantos, ranking Democrat, Sen Richard Lugar, Chairman and Sen Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat, while Inbar (2017:378) agrees that the role of the Jewish lobby had been very important. Sharma (2017:223), also, agrees on the importance of their support, since the Jewish lobby allowed the USINPAC to utilize their network, while they, also, organized events promoting the deal.

The Jewish lobby also contacted all the lawmakers to inform them on their support of the deal. On May 10, 2006, the AJC addressed a letter urging the lawmakers to vote in favor of the deal, which they called pragmatic, stressing the strategic and economic importance of a cooperation with India (NRI Pulse, 2006). At the second stage, as well, before the meeting of the Indian Prime Minister with President Bush on September 25, the AJC addressed another letter urging the lawmakers to support the legislation (Mozumder, 2008, September 24).

Indian Government

External lobbying firms and professional lobbyists were employed by the Indian government, via its Embassy, in order to promote the deal, as well. As Sharma (2017: 240) admits, the Indian government hired the Venable Law, as well as the Barbour, Griffith & Rogers, which was headed by Robert Blackwill, who had served in the past as the American Ambassador to India (Pant, 2007:461). Concerning the choice of the lobbying firms employed, Mistry (2013:726) admits that the Barbour Griffith & Rogers was leaning towards the Republicans and the Venable towards the Democrats, while Ghoshroy (2006:3) and McIntire (2006) claim that the Indian government in order to

hire those two firms spent 1.3 million dollars. TIME magazine, also, confirms those sums, clarifying that \$700,000 were spent to Barbour, Griffith & Rogers and \$600,000 to Venable (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, March 13.1). Sharma (2017:221), on the other hand, raises the total sum spent by the Indian government to about \$5 million in order to ensure the finalization of the deal.

According to Mistry (2013:734), Barbour, Griffith & Rogers, attended more than 150 meetings with presidency and 360 with congressional officials and lawmakers, while Venable, as well, centered its lobbying efforts to both Legislative and Executive in such a coordinated manner, that each firm was meeting different lawmakers. Chatterjee (2015:148), although admitting the cooperation with the professional lobbyists, insists that it had been the community that led the campaign.

Additionally, one of the most effective, yet quiet lobbying contribution had been made by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) according to both Rediff-India Abroad (2006, July 4) and the Economic Times (2006, July 4), which despite the fact that it was not officially registered as a lobby, it spent \$1 million in the period 2000 and 2005 mostly offering trips to India to lawmakers, as well as for lobbying activities in the Congress. CII Dep. Director General, Jayant Bhuyan, rejected the lobbying activities, accepted, however, the trips offered to lawmakers, claiming this to be a usual tactic employed to raise awareness. Sharma (2017:222) also admits the role of the CII for congressional travels, while Phadnis (2013) claims that the CII undertook a big amount of the lobbying, despite being registered as such only for the period of April 15 to September 30, 2005, when according to the official record (Center for Responsive Politics, 2005), through the Barbour Griffith & Rogers, it spent \$520,000. Narayanswamy and Knott (2006) in their research for companies sponsoring trips despite not being registered to lobby, also, include the CII in their list, admitting that it registered as lobby in 2005, after having already spent more than \$500,000 from 2000. They also acknowledge that the timeframe of its registration, from April 15 until September 30, 2005, coincides with the negotiations of the deal and admit that it acted as a catalyst having lobbied 6 federal agencies.

Rivals

Despite the fact that the Administration was supporting the deal, its materialization was not from the beginning a certain endeavor (Freedman, 2009:17, Kirk, 2008:285, McIntire, 2006, Mishra, 2009:113) due to the opponents that were lobbying with the same intensity against the conclusion of the deal. As Secretary Rice (2011:437), also, admitted, in 2006, both the American and the Indian governments were in great difficulty in passing the deal, due to the opposition they were facing by the Legislative. The opponents were perceiving the deal as a means of dissolution of the NPT, while in India, the opponents were in favor of keeping the nuclear program of their country private and not allow the IAEA to oversee the installations and invade the country's independency.

The antiproliferation lobby, headed by the Arms Control Association director, Daryl Kimball was organized worldwide and had also strong supporters inside the Congress. In his testimony before the HFRC on May 11, 2006, Kimball claimed that the deal cannot ensure that the nonproliferation regime will be preserved, and that India will not use the material provided for nuclear weapons asking the Congress to impose additional requirements to this end (Arms Control Association, 2006). Mistry (2013:722) admits that the antiproliferation lobby was very well organized and their view was more prominent in the public opinion, as well. The main point of the opposition was the annulation of the nonproliferation regime and the fact that such a deal with India, would become an example for other countries that defied the NPT to demand recognition for their nuclear programs, as well. Additionally, they claimed that India acquiring such technology would lead an arms race with both China and Pakistan, with grave international consequences (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007:651, Pant, 2007:459).

The nonproliferation lobby had initiated a very active campaign against the prospect of a deal long before it was actually reached, attempting to influence the members of the Congress against it. The fact that, initially, the Congress was already negatively predisposed, mainly, due to the fact that the Executive never consulted with them, acted also in their favor (Mishra, 2009:113).

Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) had been the main opposition in the Congress and was very active in attempting to block the deal from passing. One day before the finalization of the negotiations and the official announcement by President Bush and

Prime Minister Singh, Rep Markey was already declaring his intention to block any legislation that, as he claimed, is blowing a hole to the nonproliferation regime (Markey, 2006, March 2). Apart from his fellow lawmakers, he was also actively lobbying the Executive, addressing letters to both the President, as well as other high-level officials, against the deal. On November 18, 2015, in a letter addressed to President Bush, Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, he forwarded experts' letter warning against the deal, acknowledging that their points need to be critically addressed (Haniffa, 2005, December 2). On December 15, 2005, along with Rep Fred Upton (R-MI), he introduced H.Con.Res.318 Resolution to the HFRC, expressing their concern on a possible nuclear cooperation with India.

Similarly with the strategy of the pro-deal lobby, they were addressing letters, signed by experts to enhance their arguments, and urging the lawmakers to reject the deal.

Experts

Even before the announcement of the deal, the experts were divided. Of the experts that testified the vast majority was, however, according to Pant (2007:460), against the deal, warning that it could destroy the regime altogether. On November 18, 2005, a group of experts addressed a letter to the House, warning about the negative impact on the nonproliferation regime, claiming the separation of facilities to be purely symbolic and not able to prevent India from manufacturing nuclear weapons and asking them to reject it (Dutto, 2005). On March 27, 2006, the Federation of American Scientists in a petition addressed to all its members to sign, condemned the deal and urged its members to contact their local legislators (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, April 3), with 37 Nobel laureates, also, signing the letter in June (Haniffa, 2006, June 15).

The effort continued during the second stage, when, on September 17, 2008, a group of experts and academics addressed another letter to all members of the Congress titled “U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Bad Deal”. In this letter, they urged them to impose strict requirements that would strengthen the regime and address the flaws of the deal that was not identical to the Hyde Act (Arms Control Association, 2008). The experts were also lobbying internationally, pressing the countries around their world not to allow the international organizations to approve the deal. Even before the results from the IAEA and the NSG were published, more than 130 experts and

NGOs from 23 countries addressed an “international appeal” to the governments urging them not to grant a special nuclear status to India and put in danger the non-proliferation regime by setting additional requirements and restrictions to nuclear trade with India (Rediff-India Abroad, 2008, January 10).

Press/Public Opinion

The New York Times regularly expressed a very negative stance concerning the deal, having an influence in the American public opinion. In an article in February 2006, it criticized the Presidency as trying to make a bad deal that will place in danger the far nonproliferation regime (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, February 20), in March 2006, the criticism was even more stern, warning that the regime will be dissolved by the deal (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, March 8), while in July 2006, after the voting in the House, the New York Times criticized the result of the voting, as supporting a “bad deal” that could generate a nuclear arms race and enhance India’s nuclear weapons program (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, July 28). Concerning the 123 Agreement, it claimed that the United States took little in return and urged the Congress not to support it (Rediff-India Abroad, 2007, August 5), while after the successful issuance of the NSG waiver in September 2008, in an editorial, the New York Times insisted that the deal had been from its inception a “bad idea”, and that President Bush bullied the NSG countries to accept it the way he will bully the Congress to do the same in a very limited time (New York Times, 2008, September 9). Mistry (2013:722), also, admits that New York Times, had been overtly against the deal, constantly urging the lawmakers not to support it. The Worldwatch Institute in its “State of the World Report” of 2006, where reports on a year basis are presenting the most urgent environmental issues, also expressed serious concerns about the deal and the impact it will have to other states such as Iran and North Korea, encouraging them to pursue their nuclear aspirations, while at the same time limiting the ability of the US to enforce the international treaties (Krishnaswami, 2006, March 4).

The public opinion was not in favor of the deal, either. In November 2006, an opinion poll demonstrated that Americans were mostly against the deal with 71% being negative and only 24% finding the deal to be beneficial (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, November 29).

B. Factors under control of the group

B.1 Organization / Leadership

There were two main organizations that undertook the responsibility to organize the community and lobby to the benefit to the deal. Those were the U.S. - India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) and the U.S. - India Friendship Council, which was formed specifically in order to pass the deal and was dissolved afterwards. Chatterjee (2015:147) admits that under the United States-India Friendship Council many organizations, both business as well as politically oriented, joined forces, while USINPAC worked separately and in parallel. Freedman (2009:54), also, admits that the success can be attributed to the lobby's internal organization, which followed the advice of the founder of the House Caucus, Rep Pallone to prepare a "war room" to be able to address the issue of passing the Congress (Krishnaswami, 2006, April 7).

U.S. - India Political Action Committee (USINPAC)

Kurien (2007:775) admits its role in creating a unified community in view of passing the deal, while Mistry (2013:729) admits that they held a series of meetings with legislators bringing them in contact with the community on the matter. Thurber, Campbell and Dulio (2018:loc150) also stress the USINPAC contribution in passing the deal, since they reached all members of the community and managed to mobilize them in their campaigns, ensuring their donations, and contacting their legislators urging them to back the deal. Kirk (2008:294), also, admits that USINPAC played a decisive role in communicating the views of the community and educating the lawmakers, organizing events and fundraisers, being in contact and urging the members of the community to intervene and put pressure on their local lawmakers.

US-India Friendship Council (USIFC)

The US-India Friendship Council was employed as an umbrella organization created with the sole aim to lobby the Congress to pass the deal and was characterized by Swadesh Chatterjee, its coordinator, as a virtual organization created with a specific aim, not having a President or statutory laws (Haniffa, 2007, February 21).

Chatterjee (2015:139) admits that he proposed the creation of an organization instead of various working simultaneously, gathering a group of influential members of the community with different backgrounds and political views and along with the USINPAC, they undertook the responsibility to organize the community and coordinate the efforts with the rest of the coalition in order to promote the deal. However, all Indian American organizations were active in this cause. As Hathaway (2001:24) admits, within the community, even the organizations with a purely business character, were lobbying the lawmakers, hosting events with prominent legislators addressing them, while Mistry (2013:718) compares the lobby created with the Israeli, which does not only include ethnic, but also non-ethnic organizations, all striving for the same result. Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), also contacted its members through an urgent appeal addressed to all Indian Americans on March 20, 2006, signed by its President Inder Singh and calling them to contact their lawmakers to support the H.R. 4974 and the S. 2429 attaching a sample letter to sign (GOPIO, 2006, March). Additionally, during events organized by GOPIO, lawmakers were persuaded to support the deal. Example was Rep Steve Israel (D-NY), who during a GOPIO luncheon on June 25, 2006, announced his intention to support the deal and cosponsor it GOPIO (2006, July).

The recognition of the contribution the USIFC and its organizational capability made to the promotion of the deal is also demonstrated by the fact that its President in 2007 was awarded the “Community Leader Award” of the India Abroad (Chatterjee, 2015:198).

Leadership

In the Indian case there was not, a single key leader, but the activists heading both abovementioned lobbies were key in organizing the community on the campaign of the nuclear deal. Sharma (2017:246) also underlines the role of the group leadership in organizing the group. However, the role of the local activists, especially, in persuading the lawmakers was, however, equally extremely important, being narrowly targeted to certain areas and towards certain lawmakers and mostly based on personal relationships. Kirk (2008:295), also, characterizes those direct efforts by individual activists as decisive, while Chatterjee (2015:169), also, agrees that there had been cases where the support of the legislator was acquired by local activists and friends of Indian

origin. He admits that Sen John Kerry (D-MA) was convinced by his friend Ramesh Kapur, while Ashok Mago in Texas convinced Sen John Cornyn, Sampat Shivangi in Mississippi convinced Senators Trent Lott and Thad Cochran and Dr Bharat Barai in Indiana convinced Sen Evan Bayh (Chatterjee, 2015:169). Concerning Senate Minority Leader Sen Harry Reid, a key legislator for the promotion of their cause, Chatterjee (2015:169) and Haniffa (2006, July 7) acknowledge that he was convinced by a close friend, Dr R.D. Prahbu, who was also founder of the USIFC. Dr Prahbu, himself admitted that after several meetings with Sen Reid, he promised him to support the deal, despite his initial reservations. Krishnaswami, (2006, June 6), also underlines the activities of community leaders at a local level, stressing the importance of the activities of Dr Bharat Barai and Jatinder Singh Bedi, both active in Illinois, home of key legislators such as the House Speaker, Dennis Hastert and the Chair of the HFRC Rep. Hyde, who were heavily lobbied. Democrat lean activist Ramesh Kapur, also acknowledged that he, personally, lobbied high ranking Democrats in the framework of the Campaign Committees of the Democrats (Kirk, 2008:295).

The successful endeavor of the local activists is also demonstrated in the case of the Texas voting results, where, as the chairman of the US-India Forum A. K. Mago stressed, their activities resulted in 94% of the Dallas delegation voting in favor of the deal and 37% of the bill's cosponsors being from Texas (Haniffa, 2006, July 27.1). Sharma (2017:221), also admits that the fact that of the 45 Republican Senate cosponsors the 16 were from Texas can be attributed to the efforts of the local members of the community and their lobbying, while Janardhanam (2013:27), also agrees that Representatives from Texas due to numerous Indian Americans in their district were in favor of the deal. Haniffa (2008, October 2) also admits the crucial role Mago played, "delivering" all Texan legislators.

Homogeneity on the issue

Despite the fact that, as mentioned before, the community is diversified and fragmented, the pro deal campaign united them, responding as a unified group. Chatterjee (2015:136) admits that this "battle" matured the group and united it towards a common goal, Kirk (2008:294) agrees that the issue managed to mobilize, even unite the up-to-then fractured community, while Mishra (2009:115) also admits that the deal acted as a factor that unified the members of the diaspora and all organizations of both

Democratic and Republican orientation mobilized towards the common goal. Additionally, as both McIntire (2006) and Kumar (2008, March 11) admit, the community was united and mobilized to promote the deal, also due to the personal connotation its completion had to them, serving as their homeland's recognition as a global power. According to Chatterjee (2014:8) the nuclear deal is a good example of the role of diaspora in its promotion in Congress, despite the different voices and the anti-proliferation lobby.

According to Chatterjee (2015:172), however, there had been an instant when the group temporarily had given in to partisan division and this was at the first stage at the negotiations taking place in the Senate, when both parties via Senate Majority Bill Frist and Minority Harry Reid were blaming each other for the delay in voting. Although the official stance of the USIFC was not to take any side, thus avoiding any engagement in partisan politics, there were individual activists within the group who supported their party, while the Indian American Republican Council issued a statement accusing primarily Harry Reid and the Democrats as a whole, for trying to kill the bill since the beginning (Haniffa, 2006, September 29). Chatterjee (2015:172) admits that he, personally, contacted the aforementioned members and requested to stay away from partisan politics, a request that, as he admits, was heard and the group united approached the Senators to request them to stop partisan politics and do what is best for the country.

Additionally, the Indians residing in other countries were also involved in the issue, since they were approached by the community in advance of the NSG voting. The USINPAC requested all Indians residing to the 45 countries comprising the NSG to lobby their respective governments to support the deal (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, December 21.1).

B.2 Strategies

In a hostile environment in the Congress, due to the fact that the Executive never consulted with it, Chatterjee (2014:4) admits that both India and the American Administration perceived Indian Americans to be the most suitable vehicle to promote the deal. Ghoshroy (2006:3), also, admits that within the coalition created, the role of the Indian community had been of utmost importance, while both Mishra (2009:115) and Mistry (2013:720) admit that the group became the President's best ally. Carter (2007), also, acknowledged that in passing the deal with such a bipartisan acceptance, the Indian community's lobbying efforts – stressing also that it had been their first attempt of such scale - were important, while Mishra (2009:112), also, agrees that in this negatively predisposed Congress, the intervention of the American Indian diaspora was necessary.

The recognition of their vital importance is demonstrated first and foremost by the fact that Indian Americans were approached by lawmakers, such as Tom Lantos and Frank Pallone, who wished to employ them to push the deal. As Krishnaswami (2006, April 7) admits, Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat of the HFRC, warned the Indian representatives, as well as the Administration, that the dealing with the Congress needs exceptional caution and Pallone, founder of the Caucus on India and Indian Americans (henceforth Caucus), advised the community to prepare a “war room” to be able to address the issue (Krishnaswami, 2006, April 7).

Framing of the issue

Notwithstanding the fact that the deal was initiated by the Executive, perceived, therefore, to be in line with the American national interests, the group had to enhance the argument and convince the reluctant lawmakers on its beneficial for the country nature. Chatterjee (2015:143), also, admits that their first priority was to effectively frame the issue and the most efficient justification was deemed to be the strengthening of the bilateral relations and the economic benefits for both countries. He admits that despite the fact that many of the Indian Americans prioritized the fact that India would need the nuclear power to face threats, this statement, however, could not be employed as an argument (Chatterjee, 2015:144). Sharma (2017:247) also admits that success in influencing the lawmakers to support such a controversial deal was due to the fact that

they were stressing the importance such a deal would have for the US and the business sector, as well as the democratic nature of the country that would enhance the regime. Moreover, apart from the selection of the effective message, of equal importance was deemed its transmission in a coordinated and constant manner. As Mistry (2013:727) admits, all members of the coalition were aligned in conveying the same message, in line with the Executive, as well. Mistry (2013:727), also, underlines the coordinated promotion of the message during meetings with lawmakers, where representatives from all three groups of the Coalition were present: a prominent member of the community, a high-ranking CEO of a large corporation, describing the benefits the American economy could acquire and an expert, who reinforced their claims, downplaying the rival groups' claims. Loreng (2020:2196) and Kirk (2008:295) stress the contribution of the USINPAC in the promotion of the message to the lawmakers, while Thurber, Campbell and Dulio (2018:loc162) also attribute to the USINPAC the effective framing of the deal, in economic terms mostly.

The importance of the deal, however, had to be conveyed to the members of the community as well, whose support was crucial. The efforts of the USINPAC also concentrated on the effective framing to engage the community, presenting it as a prerequisite for India to achieve its global aspirations. Kirk (2008:297), also, acknowledges the role of USINPAC in promoting the deal to the members of the community, conveying to them the importance for India.

Focused Approach

Having realized since the beginning that all efforts should be directed to lawmakers of both Chambers and both parties, the efforts of the group had been very targeted and focused, while the approach of lawmakers was strategically chosen at every stage. Priority was given to key lawmakers whose support was essential in order for the deal to advance. According to Chatterjee (2015:160), the coalition's approach to effectively influence the Congress included three venues. The first, included the grassroots activities organized by the community, the second, was the cooperation with business groups, as well as with large companies, such as the General Electric and the Westinghouse, and the third included the efforts of the experts and the academic community. McIntire (2006), also, agrees that the lobbying of the community to promote the deal had been aggressive and focus driven. Before the voting, sources from

the Congress were reporting to the press (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, July 25) “unprecedented” lobbying efforts, Rep Jim Leach (R-Iowa) stated an “impressive organizational effort”, while Sen Obama admitted the extremely coordinated effort of the community to promote the deal, stating that all Indian Americans he knew contacted him before the voting to support the deal (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, July 25).

The first Stage had been more difficult, since the Congress, as mentioned before, was kept completely in the dark by the Presidency and was, therefore, negatively predisposed. Many members of the Congress were openly expressing their indignation, not only for not being informed, but also the request to abandon their constitutional role, leaving all authority to the President. Ghoshroy (2006:2), also, admits the negative initial reaction, even from Republican lawmakers. The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Rep Henry Hyde (R-IL) accused the Administration for not consulting with the Congress and warned that the deal could not progress as rapidly as the Executive wished, unless the Congress is thoroughly informed. Both Chairman Hyde, as well as Rep Lantos, stressed that the jurisdiction of the Legislative can by no means be bypassed and Sen Richard Lugar (R-IN), the Chair of the respective Senate Committee, in the same vein underlined the role of the Legislative in bilateral agreements. Kirk (2008:285) admits that the Presidency was ‘clumsy’ concerning the handling of the issue, while Rep Gary Ackerman (D-NY), chair of the Caucus, also criticized the Presidency having done a “horrendous job” in convincing the legislative (Haniffa, 2005, March 3). Additionally, deal itself was not very appealing either, since as Kronstadt (2005:1) admits, although the Joint Statement was the most direct recognition of the nuclear status of India, as Yusuf (2007:49) admits the benefits for the United States were not as immediate or concrete, aiming at a future cooperation, therefore making the Congress unwilling to immediately support the deal. Kirk (2008:291), also admits that the deal had mixed benefits and it was easy for the Congress to reject it on moral grounds. Indeed, both Democrat and Republican lawmakers were initially divided, as were the members of the Caucus. Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) remained silent despite co-chairing the Caucus, while her Republican counterpart, Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX), expressed in favor of the deal, also stressing the fact that the community had financially supported Clinton and expected her support (Haniffa, 2006, April 1). Chatterjee (2015:157), also, admitted that the fear that the Democrats would reject the deal for partisan reasons was constant. The Chairman of the U.S.-India Forum Ashok Mago, also, stressed the effort the community exerted,

since from 7 lawmakers eager to sponsor the Hyde Act in 2006, after 7 weeks of intense lobbying the number of the supporters had already risen, with 17 Democrats and 24 Republicans eager to sponsor it (Kumar, 2008, March 11).

Sharma (2017:220) admits that their first target had been the members of the Caucuses, who had been divided due to the nature of the issue, as well as due to the fact that in their vast majority the Caucus members were Democrats. Chatterjee (2015:149), also admits that their first target was to approach a traditional ally of the group and co-chair of the Caucus, Rep Gary Ackerman, who had, however, initially characterized the deal as “dead on arrival” having no chance to pass the Congress. Ensuring his support, was according to Chatterjee (2015:161) the first domino to fall and his contribution had been decisive in influencing his colleagues (Chatterjee, 2015:192). At the same time, they were also targeting the Chairs of the Foreign Relations Committees of the two Houses, that is Sen Richard Lugar and Rep Henry Hyde. The targeted approach of the community is also admitted by Chatterjee, who acknowledged that the initial aim of the community was to obtain a ‘champion’ in both House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, preferably a Democrat, who could boost the process along with the Committees’ Presidents, Rep. Hyde, and Sen Lugar (Krishnaswami, 2006, June 6). The focus was also geographically centered, identifying key areas that had to be given priority in lobbying efforts. McIntire (2006) and Sharma (2017:220) admit that New York had been in the center of their lobbying efforts, since it was the home of many of the members of the community, as well as the district of many influential lawmakers, including Sen Clinton (D-NY).

The lawmakers’ support at the second stage in the 110th Congress was not ensured either, despite their positive voting in the 109th Congress. The main issue at this stage was the deviation of the final negotiated agreement with the Hyde Act. Additionally, key players of the first stage, were not present at this stage. Undersecretary Nicholas Burns had decided to leave the State Department, with Chatterjee (2015:190) acknowledging his removal to have been a great loss, while both Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos had passed away. The Executive at this stage, too, sought the assistance of the community for approaching the lawmakers. As Krishnaswami (2008, September 14) admits, through a conference call the Administration contacted influential members and asked them to once again contact the lawmakers to support the deal.

Berman's letter of August 5, 2008 to Secretary Rice, even before the NSG meeting, criticizing the deal as inconsistent with the Hyde Act and requesting to be thoroughly examined by the next Congress surprised the community and as Chatterjee admits, it was received as a wakeup call, reminding them that they had to organize in advance to avoid such reactions (Haniffa, 2008, August 8), consequently, as he admits, even before the approval of international bodies, he had already begun to reactivate the USIFC and contacting lawmakers in view of the new voting (Chatterjee, 2015:188). The Chairman of the Indian Americans for Democrats, Sant Singh Chatwal, was also stressing the importance of maintaining constant pressure to the lawmakers and focused his efforts on meeting with key Democrats, such as the Speaker of the House N. Pelosi, the Chair of the SFRC J. Biden and H. Clinton, as well as the members of the Caucus Gary Ackerman, Joseph Crowley and Charles Schumer (Rediff-India Abroad, 2008, September 20).

Fundraisers/donations

The economic prosperity, characterizing a significant part of the community, was employed with numerous fundraisers organized for lawmakers of both parties with the aim of acquiring bipartisan support. McIntire (2006), also, admits that the inability of the Indian government to directly donate to lawmakers' campaigns was counterbalanced by the USINPAC, that was contributing to candidates' campaigns large sums of money. Only during the first semester of 2006, nine fund raising events were organized, raising tens of thousands to distribute to members of both Houses, with USIBC and the Indian American Friendship Council, as well as wealthy individuals of the community contributing (McIntire, 2006). Kirk (2008:294), also, underlines the decisive role USINPAC played in organizing those fundraisers, while Thurber, Campbell and Dulio (2018:loc150) also acknowledge the ability USINPAC demonstrated in ensuring donations.

In the voting cycle of 2006, within the 109th Congress, and according to the official data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics (2006), the total sum the USINPAC donated to candidates was \$122,499, of which 45% went to Democrats and the rest 55% to Republicans. Of the 41 candidates that received donations by the USINPAC, 25 supported the deal, 4 voted against it, while 2 abstained from the procedure. The remaining 9 were either not re-elected or did not participate to the

voting. In the Senate of the 9 Senators who received donations only 1 abstained from voting, all others voting in favor. In 2007-2008 cycle, the \$70,600 spent by the USINPAC went almost entirely to Democrats, with only \$9,000 to Republicans. The importance of Senate voting in the second stage was clearly depicted in the donations of USINPAC, since \$9,800 were given to 7 Democratic Senators (Center for Responsive Politics, 2008). Additionally, and apart from the USINPAC, significant sums for donations came as Sharma (2017:92) admits directly from Silicon Valley, dominated by Indian Americans, while all Indian American organizations, both politically and business oriented, were active in donating and organizing fundraisers to promote the deal.

The case of Sen Hillary Clinton was indicative of their effort in influencing legislators via donations and fundraisers. Sen Clinton, co-chair of the Caucus as mentioned before, caused great concern to the community, remaining silent initially and it was only after the deal passed the SFRC that her office made an official statement informing that she would vote in favor. She attributed the delay in taking stance to the fact that she was dissatisfied with the initial piece of legislation that was excluding the Congress, praising Lugar and Biden for bringing an ameliorated version that respected the role of the Congress. Her stance was criticized by both the members of the community, as well as the rest of the members of the Caucus. Chatterjee (2015:168) admits that Clinton's inactivity had enraged many within the community, John Cornyn, the Republican Caucus co-chair stated that he felt embarrassed that Clinton had not cosponsored the deal, while the chairman of the Indian American Republican Council, Dr R Vijayanagar warned that the community would not forget her lack of support (Haniffa, 2006, July 4). Still, as McIntire (2006) admits, her cooperation was deemed crucial in persuading other Democrats, and the USINPAC organized fundraisers. In retrospect, however, her political adversaries implied that her change of stance came as a result of donations. During Obama's presidential campaign a research memo written by his team and titled "Hillary Clinton's (D-Punjab) Personal Financial and Political Ties to India" was leaked and described the stocks the Clintons had in Indian companies, as well as her campaign fundraising from the community. The memo enraged the community addressing a letter to Obama and accusing him of using anti Indian American stereotyping and requesting his response (Smith, 2007), with Obama admitting, later, that its circulation had been a "dumb mistake" (CBS News, 2007), stressing his ties with the community. In his recently published "Promised Land",

Obama admits that he was “the angriest” during this incident (Scroll.in, 2020). Donald Trump at his presidential campaign in 2016, also, released a booklet against Hillary Clinton, where, among others, he claimed that the Clinton Foundation received funds between 1 to 5 million dollars from the leader of the Samajwadi Party, Amar Singh, who in 2008 visited Washington to lobby for the safe passage of the deal (The Indian Express, 2006, June 16).

The fundraising ability of the community had been a preferential technique employed by USINPAC to persuade lawmakers. However, as Mishra (2009:115) admits, not all the members of the community could equally contribute to this kind of elite mobilization, since as he admits (Mishra, 2009:118) this kind of lobbying can only involve the elite segments of the diaspora who are educated and wealthy enough to support the efforts.

Contact with lawmakers/source of information

Sharma (2017:99) underlines that, activities, entailing donations and economic benefits, should only be part of a wider strategy to create a comprehensive range of relationships with the legislators and not a narrow effort based on a specific issue. Aneesh Chopra, member of the advisory council of the Indian American Policy Institute, also, stresses the fact that fundraising activities should not be limited to reward the lawmakers but should be part of a wider strategy, otherwise the group could never approach non-friendly lawmakers (Sharma, 2017:99), while Chatterjee (2015:111) also stresses the fact that building relationships with the lawmakers is far more important than offering money. USINPAC head Sanjay Puri, also, acknowledges that the community’s main role is to raise awareness to legislators across the country and ‘getting the point on table’ (Rediff-India Abroad, 2006, June 27). The task, therefore, as a lobbyist admitted, was to create to the lawmakers the political will to pass the deal (Haniffa, 2008, August 6). Sharma (2017:99), also, agrees that the more effective technique of influencing in favor of the deal is not by financial but by political contributions, by educating the lawmakers on the importance India has and the benefits of the bilateral cooperation. Kirk (2008:294) admits that USINPAC played a decisive role in this aspect, communicating the views of the community and educating the lawmakers. There were also cases, where a fundraiser was even deemed an unsuitable method of approaching lawmakers, such as the case of Berman who was opposing the

deal during the second stage. Chatterjee (2015:192) rejected the prospect of holding a fundraiser for Berman in order to influence him to support the deal, since days before the hearing on the deal it would be inappropriate and unproductive. Instead, a private meeting with him, where all benefits of the deal were explained was preferred at the moment.

Grassroots Mobilization

Chatterjee (2015:149) admits that after the initial negative reaction even from the traditional friends of the Indian Americans, the effort had clearly to include the whole community, since a limited number of activists requesting to support the deal could not bear the same significance as the whole community being involved and contacting their lawmakers. To achieve an extensive grassroots campaign, Chatterjee (2015:150) admits that they distributed to all members of the community sample letters to be dispatched to the lawmakers, even hired an IT company to ensure that all members will have access to the material and this initiative was publicized to all Indian press. He admits that this was the first large scale grassroots activity, complementing the traditional approach of donations, while the participation was such, that the lawmakers admitted being bombarded by the community letters (Chatterjee, 2015:151). GOPIO President Inder Singh in an urgent appeal to the wider community in March 2006 was also urging them to contact their legislators and ask them to support the legislation and urging them to have a direct contact with their legislators (GOPIO, 2006).

“D.C. Chalo” (“Let’s go to D.C.”) campaign was proposed after the hearing of April 2006, although many, even within the USIFC, were hesitant concerning the ability of the group to mobilize and persuade its members to participate to the event. According to Chatterjee (2015:160) the purpose of the event was to convey to the lawmakers the message that behind the deal was the community, as a whole. Chatterjee (2015:158) admits that he contacted Brian McCormack, President’s special assistant requesting a meeting at the White House. A group of 200 influential Indian Americans from all sectors participated, with Rediff-India Abroad (2006, May 2) stressing the fact that the activists who participated were from all over the country and from different backgrounds and professional status. The participating community leaders were briefed by Karl Grove at the White House and subsequently joined a discussion at the Chamber of Commerce, co-organized by the USIFC and the USIBC (Krishnaswami, 2006, May

6). The briefing at the Chamber of Commerce premises, included officials and academics, such as Ashley Tellis in order to consequently lobby the Congress. Following the briefing, they were engaged in a “lobbying blitz” in Washington (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2006, May 2), with Chatterjee (2015:159) admitting the campaign to be a door-knocking event, where the community in groups of 3 or 4 persons, presented its arguments in favor of the deal. It was, as he characterizes it, an Indian American version of a march and he claims that after their visiting 247 Representatives and 46 Senators, the perception concerning the deal began to change, since before May 3, the bill was sponsored by 4, while after the campaign the cosponsors raised to 30 (Chatterjee, 2015:160). Krishnaswami (2006, May 6), also, admits that more than 32 lawmakers declared their support to the deal, while some of them even offered to co-sponsor it. Concerning this event, Mistry (2013:728), also, admits that this contact among the components of the Coalition enhanced the internal coordination with the different elements within the group and the lobbying that followed enhanced the bond of the wider community with the legislators. The President of the US-India Business Council, also, acknowledged that the final lobbying effort would be conducted by the Indian American community, during their visit in Capito Hill for the final push (Haniffa, 2006, November 14).

A similar “Advocacy Day” was organized by the community and the USIFC at the second stage, as well, on September 25, 2008, in order to intensify their final lobbying efforts to pass the deal. The day included an initial coordination meeting with the USIBC and then visits to members of the Congress. In the evening they also succeeded in organizing a reception at the House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting room (Haniffa, 2008, September 24.2). On the Day of Advocacy, the community paid for a full-page advertisement, to the Roll Call, the newspaper of the Capitol Hill, urging the lawmakers to support the deal along with 2.6 million Indian Americans (Kumar, 2008, September 24).

At all stages the community was contacting the legislators informing them about the fact that all Indian Americans were supporting the deal. Chatterjee (2015:152) admits that before the Secretary Rice’s hearing to the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs on April 5, it was deemed necessary to let the lawmakers know the stance of the community by paying for a full-page ad under the title “An appeal to the United States Congress”, in the Washington Post and other newspapers, spending \$110,000. He claims that they presented their main arguments and stressed the fact that

the whole community was supporting it, also including the names of several influential business and non-business organizations, to stress the fact that the whole community stands united. In parallel, a letter was sent to all members of the two committees a day before the hearing, while many members of the community were present at the hearing, demonstrating the interest of the community (Chatterjee, 2015:153). At the second stage, as well, after Berman's letter of August 5, 2008, to Secretary Rice, Chatterjee (2015:191) addressed to him a letter explaining the benefits of the deal, the imperative of a quick vote and again stressed the fact that the Indian American community stands behind this deal. Puri, as head of USINPAC, also addressed a letter to all members of Congress, requesting them to support the "historic agreement", also urging them to consider the views of the community (USINPAC, 2010, September 24).

Monitoring

Having explicitly articulated the wish of the whole community to pass the deal, lawmakers' stance was closely monitored by both the community, as well as their allies in the business sector, applying extra pressure. This activity could also be perceived as a warning to the lawmakers, who would decide to go against the clearly articulated wish of the Indian American community and their allies. Chatterjee (2015:150) admits that monitoring focused on key legislators was conducted every week by the USIFC, while Thurber, Campbell and Dulio (2018:loc150) admit that the USINPAC, also, had established a similar monitoring system, a method that allowed them to turn their efforts to specific lawmakers. The monitoring had been effective, since as Chatterjee (2015:173) admits through monitoring the community already knew the result of the voting at the first stage even before it was introduced in the Senate floor. Haniffa (2006, November 14), also, confirms this prior knowledge, admitting that the Coalition for Partnership with India had addressed a memo to all the activists' leaders before the voting, informing them about the bill having successfully acquired the votes needed.

Monitoring was also carried out by the business sector, with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also addressing on a regular basis letters to the legislators, stressing the economic benefits and issuing vote alerts on the eve of crucial voting. On September 19, 2006, the Chamber of Commerce (2006, September 19) issued a vote alert addressed to the Senators to support the S. 3709, stressing the economic benefits involving investments of more than 170 billion dollars and 27,000 jobs, also warning

that their votes might be included in the annual “How They Voted” scorecard. The lawmakers whose votes in key bills that are included in the How They Voted scorecard coincide with the Chamber’s opinions at a percentage of at least 70% are eligible to be awarded the US Chamber of Commerce Annual Spirit of Enterprise Award, an award received by Sen Lugar for the 110th Congress (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2008, September 30). The same warning about the scorecard was addressed to the lawmakers at the second stage, when in its letter of October 1, 2008, the Chamber of Commerce (2008, September 30:1) urged the lawmakers to support the HR 7081 without introducing any amendments.

Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans

Gottschlich (2008:166) acknowledges that the creation of the Caucus was a milestone for the political involvement of the group, Chatterjee (2014:4), too, admits that it had been one of the major mechanisms employed to exert influence, while Newhouse (2009:3), also, admits that the most influential lobbying groups for foreign governments are Congressional Caucuses. Janardhanam (2013:26), also, underlines the fact that such a populous Caucus could not be ignored, stressing that it was created without even an Indian American lawmaker.

Indian organizations, especially IAFPE, managed in 1993 to achieve the creation of such a Caucus aided by Rep. Frank Pallone (D-N.J.). Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA), also, acknowledged that the community played the basic part in launching the Caucus (Chatterjee, 2014:4), while Freedman (2009:49), Mistry (2013:719) and Kirk (2008:290) also stress the central role IAFPE played in forming the Caucus. Gottschlich (2006:20), Freedman (2009:49) and Kirk (2008:290) also agree that the formation of a Caucus was the most effective way to educate the members of the Congress, especially in an era when India was being constantly criticized by the State Department concerning the human rights condition in Kashmir. The Indian press, also contributed to urging all the members of the community to support the effort and contact their representatives to participate (Hathaway, 2001:27) and by the end of the first year already 40 lawmakers were members of the Caucus, while by 2008, it had reached the 176 members (Chatterjee, 2014:4).

The effectiveness of the Caucus was also evident in the so-called Burton Amendments. Rep Dan Burton (R- IN), was introducing on an annual basis legislation

to cut any financial assistance to India on grounds of human rights violation. Although the motions had never been transformed to law, in 1992 the House did accept his Amendment. However, by 1996 his Amendments were defeated by 169 votes and in 1997 by 342 votes. The power of the Caucus was also acknowledged by Burton himself, who as Hathaway (2001:29) cites he admitted that they would “beat him into the ground” if he continued introducing his Amendments. Janardhanam (2013:27) also finds Burton to be among the first who experienced the strength of the Caucus, since after the defeat in 1996 and 1997 he stopped introducing Amendments, Sharma (2017:123), also agrees that Burton’s defeat would “impress even the most cynical lobbyist”, while Chatterjee (2014:4), too, claims their blocking as a great achievement.

The Senate Caucus was named Friends of India and was created in 2004 by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Hillary Clinton (D-NY), with senior Senators becoming members to the first country-focused Caucus of the Senate (NBR, 2004). Hathaway (2001:29) also admits that the fact that the Senate lacked such a Caucus significantly limited the effectiveness of the House Caucus, due to the fact that the responsibility to ratify all treaties in order to become United States law belonged to the Senate. As also mentioned before, the Executive took advantage of this absence and introduced laws directly to the Senate bypassing the House and the powerful Caucus.

The role of the community in the creation of the Senate Caucus, as well, had been instrumental. According to Shourie (2004), the announcement of the Senators’ intention to form a Caucus was made by the President of the AAPI Sharad Lakhpal in a letter he addressed to the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, Sen. John Cornyn declared during the 2004 annual dinner of AAPI his decision to create such a Caucus, while the Indian Ambassador Lalit Mansingh stressed the role of the community in materializing the first country specific Caucus in the Senate (Hanifa, 2004, March 31).

The Caucus mobilized early in 2005, immediately after the announcement of the Presidency’s announcement lobbying an as mentioned before negatively predisposed Congress from within.

The Caucus chair and senior member of the House Foreign Relations Committee Rep Gary Ackerman (D-NY) defended the deal, focusing on the positive aspects (Rediff-India Abroad, 2005, October 27) admitting that despite the differences with the Republican President Bush in the issue of the deal there was congruence (Haniffa, 2005, March 3). Rep Gary Ackerman had, also, several meetings with the President in order to coordinate their actions in passing the deal (Freedman, 2009:50).

Rep Joe Wilson (R, SC), member of the Caucus was also very active in promoting the deal, addressing letters to his colleagues (Wilson, 2006 March, April, May) and targeting the main opponent Ed Markey (D-MA). Rep Joe Crawley (D-NY), also former co-chair of the Caucus was also very active in lobbying for the deal. He was also addressing letters to his fellow legislators warning them against the introduction of killer Amendments that would jeopardize the bilateral relations (Haniffa, 2006, July 27.2) and was also co-author of the letter requesting the quick passage of the final deal to the benefit of both countries (The Economic Times, 2008, September 17). The role of the Caucuses in promoting the deal was also underlined by the Executive, with Secretary Rice admitting at her address at a luncheon hosted by the Association of American Physicians of Indian Origin and the Asian American Hotel Owners Association the close cooperation with their members to ensure the passage from both Houses (Rice, 2006, July 10), while President Bush in his remarks after signing of the Hyde Act in December 2006 acknowledged the contribution of the members of the Caucus, as well (The White House, 2006, December 21). Sharma (2006:155), also, underlines the important role the Senate Caucus played in achieving approval of more than two thirds of the Chamber.

Chapter 4: Cuban Americans

Introduction

Chapter 4 describes the second case study and the Cuban diaspora's efforts throughout the years and the different Presidencies in order to maintain the American embargo imposed on Cuba, efforts that so far have been successful despite increasing domestic and international demands for its lift. The difference of this case study in comparison with the other two is the prolonged character of the diasporic effort and mobilization, since the target is not to succeed in attaining a specific and time-limited outcome, but in order to maintain the embargo a constant and a prolonged effort is required. The group has, therefore, to be constantly alert, and the stages as described before of latency and activity in diaspora mobilization are more blurred, at least for the leadership and the most active part of the group.

The structure of the previous chapter is followed in the second case study, as well. The chapter begins with a presentation of the bilateral relations between the United States and Cuba, as well as a brief history on how the embargo was imposed, along with the efforts of the various Presidents across the years to either strengthen or relax it. Consequently, the main legislative pieces that led to the codification of the embargo, henceforth depriving the President the ability to end it and placing the Congress in the central role for its future are described.

Cuban American diaspora is, then, presented, as well as its quantitative traits and its organizational structure, along with a brief history of their migration to the United States.

The factors are, consequently, examined in the framework of the group's efforts to sustain the embargo along the different Administrations. This case study, where the same diaspora strives for the same issue thought the years could more aptly demonstrate the importance of certain factors, since different Presidents were at different degrees in favor or even against the embargo, different diaspora leaders followed different approaches to mobilize the group and the progression of generations gradually introduced new opinions and new perspectives on the issue.

1. Bilateral relations

Fisk (2000:93) acknowledges the unique relationship between the United States and Cuba, while Barrios (2011:2) finds the American foreign policy towards Cuba remarkable, accepting it to be the result of the Cold War era (Barrios, 2011:4). Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:203), on the other hand, admit that already in the 1990's, the American stance towards Cuba had become a combination of a domestic and an international issue, characterizing it as "intermestic" politics, with the main domestic aspect, being the involvement of the Congress. Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:204) also admit that the President in his decision-making regarding Cuba has to satisfy both the domestic and the international actors, which are neither unified nor share common interests, thus making the issue particularly complex. However, as they admit, the American efforts to isolate Cuba led to its own isolation internationally (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:202).

Embargo

On January 1, 1959, Castro took control of the country, ousting Fulgencio Batista and within his first priorities was to remove the country's national production from foreign powers. To this end, a large amount of land was confiscated in the framework of the land reform. Consequently, under the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1959 land owned by non-Cubans was expropriated and was either conveyed to Cubans, or became agricultural cooperatives run by the Cuban National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Smugula, 1995:69).

Despite the American claims for compensations already put forth since June 1959, the confiscations continued, and became even more intense after Cuba signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland and China (Smugula, 1995:72). On October 13, 1960, President Eisenhower under the Export Control Act imposed a prohibition of American exports to Cuba, with the exception of medicines and Cuba proceeded to the confiscation of all remaining properties owned by Americans (Smugula, 1995:75).

Bilateral diplomatic relations were severed on January 3, 1961, after the deadline of 48 hours set by the Cuban government to the United States to limit the Embassy's staff to 18 persons, while the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro's

declaration to always be a Marxist-Leninist and the expropriation of American owned property led to the break of bilateral trade relations, as well (Rennack, Sullivan, 1996:2). As Bell (1993:81) admits, although not officially declared, the embargo was already in force, since July 1960, when the Eisenhower presidency cancelled the remaining 700,000 tons of sugar in Cuba's quota, essentially ending all bilateral trade.

President Kennedy in 1962 exercising the right of the President to impose an embargo based on the Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, initiated the embargo on bilateral trade. The Cuban Import Regulations issued by the Treasury Department in 1962 prohibited all imports from the island and was replaced the following year by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act. CACR remains the main body of the embargo and has been since its establishment amended to either strengthen or relax the restrictions (Sullivan, 2020:21).

Smugula (1995:102) claims that there are three views in approaching the embargo. The liberal, perceiving it to be a remnant of the Cold War era and therefore claiming that it should be lifted, the free trade view, perceiving it as hindering the political change, which could be reached only by entering great investments in the Cuban economy and the isolationist view, justifying the existence of the embargo and rejecting any prospect of its being lifted until Cuba is willing to proceed to changes towards democracy and free trade. All the above-mentioned approaches, however, according to Smugula (1995:102) ignore the main reason the embargo was originally imposed, that is the confiscations of land without any compensations, violating the private property rights. The number of claims that was registered to the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission was \$1,851,057,358 and by 1995 the compensable value had already reached the \$13,051,845,500 (Smugula, 1995:68). Fisk (2000:94), also, agrees that the reason that initially forced the American side to employ the embargo as a means to isolate Cuba had been the confiscation of American properties, as well as the country's approach to the Soviet Union within the Cold War mentality.

Sullivan (2020:20) admits that the aim in dealing with Cuba since the 1960's had been to isolate it. The missile crisis in 1962 with Russia wishing to install nuclear missiles in Cuba, and the support on behalf of Cuba to various guerilla movements against the governments worldwide further hindered a bilateral rapprochement. The efforts for a normalization of the bilateral relations initiated in the 1970's was stopped

by the Cuban involvement in the African insurgencies, supporting the revolutionary movements (Sullivan, 1994:2).

The need for flow of information in order to promote the freedom in Cuba was stressed by the Congress and this led to the creation of the Radio Marti on May 20, 1985. In 1990 the Congress authorized the creation of a TV, as well, which started broadcasting in March of the same year on a testing mode and regularly in August, after the approval by President Bush was given (Sullivan, 1994:2). The American broadcasting to Cuba had been since its conception a controversial issue. The supporters claimed that it could provide an independent source of information to the Cuban people that would be beyond the governmental control, while its critics considered it to be useless since its content has a more entertaining character, while based on the International Telecommunications Convention, the station could not interfere with the national broadcasts, hence it was allowed to broadcast from 03.30 to 06.00 in the morning, a timeslot with very few viewers (Sullivan, 1994:8). This very low viewership along with the jamming caused by the Cuban government, led the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in 1991 and 1993 to propose the shutdown of the station not being considered cost-effective and the use of the resources in more productive activities instead (Sullivan, 1994:7). According to Sullivan (2020:41), since 1984 Congress has appropriated 911 million dollars for the broadcasting program to Cuba.

The maintenance or not of the embargo has been a controversial issue even within the Administration, where, as Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:201) admit within the State Department and the competent Office of Cuban Affairs and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs conflicts concerning the issue were usual. The proponents of lifting the sanctions and follow an approach of engagement with Cuba claim that only by coming into contact through travel, trade and dialogue will the democratic values be instilled to the country, leading them to seek a peaceful change from the current political regime. They also stress the danger of a massive flee of people to the United States and add that there has to be followed a pragmatic policy, since the regime despite the embargo has not been abandoned for the last sixty years, adding that it is not probable that the measures will be effective now. At the same time, they add that all those years there had been numerous opportunities missed by the American business sector (Sullivan, 2020:32).

The proponents of maintaining, even strengthening the existing policy towards Cuba, stress the fact that isolating the regime and at the same time supporting the people is the best tactic to follow. They also stress the fact that under LIBERTAD the United States will support Cuba in case certain initiatives are taken, and the relaxation of the restrictions will follow. Should the United States lift the restrictions without any changes from the Cuban side, this would only strengthen the current regime and no change will be possible. They also stress the close relationship between Cuba and the Maduro regime in Venezuela as another element that cannot allow easing of the restrictions (Sullivan, 2020:33)

George H.W. Bush Presidency (20.1.1989-20.1.1993)

The first piece of Cuban related legislation after the end of the Cold War, the CDA of 1992 strengthened the embargo and was signed by President Bush in the last days of this tenure.

In October 1992 Cuban Democracy Act was passed by the Congress imposing even stricter sanctions, prohibiting subsidiaries of American companies to have trade relations with Cuba and even restricting ships that are coming from Cuba from entering the United States, also not including, however, as Smugula (1995:105) points out, any provision for any compensations to the Americans. Fisk (2000:94) attributes the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to the inactivity of the Bush presidency on the issue and the sense of frustration by the Congress, led by Democrats.

President Bush, on October 23, 1992, signed the CDA in Miami, admitting that its main goal is to overthrow Castro (Bush, 1992).

The international community reacted to the Act due to the fact that the American subsidiaries, also, are prohibited under legal penalties to trade with Cuba, while ships stopping in Cuban ports cannot enter the American ports for six months (Prial, 1992), while this reaction was also officially demonstrated in November 1992, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a Resolution to end the embargo (Prial, 1992).

Bill Clinton Presidency (20.1.1993-20.1.2001)

Brenner and Kornbluh (1995:33) admit that despite the fact that President Clinton had the opportunity, due to historical circumstances during his tenure, to normalize the bilateral relations, he let it pass, and allowed the foreign policy towards Cuba remain tied to two domestic factors, that is money and votes. Fisk (2000:95), on the other hand, rejects the stance that Clinton Presidency lacked a coherent policy towards Cuba, claiming that the first priority was to ensure the political stability on the island, therefore avoiding direct consequences this instability could generate for the United States and most importantly massive flows of incoming migrants. On the contrary, he claims that the Congressional actions had different focus and objectives and were aiming at overthrowing the regime rather than ensure the stability (Fisk, 2000:95).

The migration crisis that erupted in August 1994 led President Clinton to announce on August 19, 1994, that the incoming immigrants would be forwarded to Guantanamo Bay, instead of being allowed to stay in the United States, receiving a permanent resident status after a year (Rennack, Sullivan, 1996:4). According to Barrios (2011:7) more than 33,000 Cubans were transferred temporarily to the Guantanamo Bay.

The numbers of the incoming migrants, however, forced the American government to enter in negotiations with the Cuban government in order to avert a migration crisis similar to the one in the 1980's. The result of the negotiations was the Agreement of September 9, 1994, according to which the United States accepted to receive 20,000 Cubans annually and would henceforth not permit entrance to those intercepted at seas, since they would be forwarded to third countries. The Cuban side, also, agreed to take measures to deter migrants' flows towards the United States (Barrios, 2011:8). The issue of the 33,000 Cubans that were already at Guantanamo Base was not resolved in the Agreement and the negotiations continued. In order to avert a crisis at the Guantanamo Base, on April 17, 1995, the Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff had to meet in utmost secrecy, as Brenner and Kornbluh (1995:33) claim, with the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada. They cite Tarnoff admitting that even key experts within the Administration were unaware of the meeting to prevent any leakage of information and that President Clinton had given his "total approval" regarding his actions (Brenner and Kornbluh, 1995:33). The

second Agreement was concluded on May 2, 1995, and it was decided that the Guantanamo based Cubans would be admitted in the United States, but the intercepted Cubans would no longer be forwarded to third countries, instead, they would be sent back to Cuba, in case they are not eligible to be granted an asylum (Barrios, 2011:8). This policy to repatriate those intercepted at sea and grant permanent residence status to those being able to reach the United States became known as Wet-Foot Dry-Foot Policy.

During President Clinton's tenure, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act passed by the Congress, under which, the embargo becomes, henceforth, an American law and the President can no longer end it without the consent of the Congress.

Pope John Paul II trip to Cuba in January 1998 and the condemnation of the embargo had an impact also within the American society and especially the Catholics, while the Cuban response by releasing political prisoners and allowing travels to priests and church broadcasts further isolated the United States internationally (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:202). In the aftermath of the visit, on March 20, 1998, President Clinton announced his intention to support the Cuban people. He announced the establishment of direct humanitarian flights, the resumption of sending humanitarian remittances and the sale of medicines and medical equipment (The White House, 1998). The following year, on January 5, 1999, President Clinton announced further expansion of allowed remittances, and permission for exchanges in academic, scientific, and athletic fields, in order to promote the personal contacts, sale of food and agricultural products to non-governmental buyers, charter flights to more cities and efforts to establish direct mail between the two countries (The White House, 1999). However, as Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:200) admit, all the efforts of the Administration to relax the restrictions after the signing of LIBERTAD, were mainly aiming at regaining the Executive's lost institutional role on the issue.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, allowed the sale of food and medicine to the countries on the terrorist list, however, in the Cuban case the trade could only be carried out in cash, therefore practically excluding all small businesses.

George W. Bush Presidency (20.1.2001-20.1.2009)

The Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba was announced by President Bush in 2013 and included experts from the government to ensure the country's democratic transition (The White House, 2003). The Commission issued its first report on May 6, 2004 and proposed the limitation of travels and the remittances (The White House, 2004).

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the designation of Cuba as a terrorist aiding state temporarily seized the cooperation and the efforts to weaken the embargo. Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:197) admit that members of the Congress avoided any mention of lifting the embargo, fearing that such a proposal would have a political cost and that they would be accused as promoting terrorism. However, already by the end of the month there were voices demanding Cuba to be removed from the terrorists list (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:197)

The Michelle hurricane that hit Cuba in November contributed to the renewal of bilateral communication, with the United States offering relief assistance that was, however, denied by the Cuban government. Cuban government requested instead, the ability of buying food, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The Bush Presidency authorized the sale, under pressure of the international community and the United Nations General Assembly that voted against the embargo with 167-3 (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:197). According to Sullivan and Taft-Morales (2003:16) until 2003 the American food sales in agricultural products to Cuba rose to over \$100 million.

Barrack Obama Presidency (20.1.2009-20.1.2017)

The Obama administration was the one that deviated the most from the policy of alienation of Cuba and the enforcement of strict measures towards the policy of engagement.

On December 17, 2014, President Obama issued a statement announcing his Administration's shift in the American policy towards Cuba, from an approach he characterized as outdated and incapable of promoting the American national interests. He announced the initiation of a dialogue to reopen an Embassy in Havana, which had been closed in 1961, as well as initiation of a high-level discussion in a variety of issues. He, also, announced his intention to review the status of the country as a state sponsor

of terrorism and the adoption of initiatives to limit restrictions concerning travel, communication and remittances, stressing that those decisions lie within his prerogative, since the embargo is codified (The White House, 2014). The new approach was materialized in three steps: a) dropping of designation of state sponsor of terrorism in May 2015 (the country was designated as such in 1982), b) diplomatic relations, cut off since January 1961, were resumed in July 2015 by reopening the respective Embassies in Washington and Havana and c) there had been efforts to gradually increase the flow of people and information towards the island (Sullivan, 2020:23). In order to specifically materialize the third step, the Treasury and the Commerce Departments proceeded to various amendments to their existing regulations, even allowing certain American companies to have physical presence in Cuba. As Sullivan (2021:23) admits, within one year only, the competent Treasury Department (CACR) and the Commerce Department (Export Administration Regulations) had to issue five sets of Amendments in order to allow the relaxations to the restrictions as announced by the President.

In March 2016, President Obama visited Cuba and met President Raul Castro, while on October 14, 2016, President Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive on the “United States-Cuba Normalization”, according to which, six medium-term goals were identified. Those goals included the bilateral interaction at the executive level, the interaction among the people, the promotion of commerce relations, the support of further economic reforms in Cuba, the promotion of the human rights and the promotion of Cuba internationally (The White House, 2016).

On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced the termination of the wet foot/dry foot policy, acknowledging the fact that it was established in different historical circumstances. Henceforth, all Cubans attempting to enter the United States and are not in need of applying for asylum, will be treated equally with all the other incoming immigrants (The White House, 2017).

However, and despite the will of President Obama to normalize the foreign policy against Cuba employing his presidential prerogative in order to achieve it, his range of actions was very limited because of the Helms Burton Act and Title II which prevents President from acting unilaterally on the Cuban issue (Badella, 2014:42). Although the President could within his jurisdiction promote a closer bilateral cooperation, concerning the core issue, that of the embargo, he had little authority to make any change (Badella, 2014:42).

Donald Trump Presidency (20.1.2017-20.1.2021)

President Trump's foreign policy towards Cuba gradually annulled all efforts towards a normalization of bilateral relations as pursued by his predecessor, President Obama. Since 2017, additional restrictions were enforced, which were further intensified by 2019, while, literally, at the final days of his tenure President Trump adopted further sanctions against Cuba.

On October 20, 2017, President Trump issued the "Strengthening the Policy of the United States toward Cuba" National Security Presidential Memorandum, providing guidelines for the new policy to be implemented addressed to all the agencies involved. The policy included the end of transactions with military entities, the ban of tourism, support of the embargo, efforts to support the people but not the government (Federal Register, 2017). The Directive was signed in Miami with President Trump announcing that he would no longer pursue the "terrible and misguided deal" his predecessor had with Cuba and that he was determined to reverse it (Holland, 2017). In 2017 a list of "restricted entities" was issued by the State Department prohibiting any transactions with American companies. This list was updated on a regular basis and by January 2021 the list already included 231 entities (Sullivan, 2021:28).

However, some of the policies of the previous Presidency, such as the operation of an Embassy in Havana, as well as the end of the wet foot dry foot policy remained in force.

Another incident in 2017 that alienated further the countries during the Trump Presidency had been the injuries of the employees of the American Embassy, who suffered unexplained symptoms resulting to losing hearing and having cognitive problems. The issue led to the expulsion of two Cuban diplomats and the maintenance of the minimum number of employees at the American Embassy in Havana, resulting to the suspension of the visa functions (Meneghini, 2017).

Gradually from 2019 until the end of his tenure, President Trump added, as mentioned before, even more restrictions, while on January 12, 2021, only days before leaving office, President Trump reinstated Cuba in the sponsor of terrorism list, taken off by President Obama in 2015, along with Iran, North Korea and Syria (Gámez Torres, Wilner, 2021). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo justified this action by Cuba's support to international terrorism (Picheta, Hansler, 2021), while Pompeo, also, claimed this to be a means of transmitting a message to Cuba to end this support (Gámez Torres,

Wilner, 2021), and President Trump was threatening to impose a total embargo should this support continue (Sullivan, 2020:26).

2. Diaspora in the United States

Demographics

In 1993 the Cuban Americans were 1.1 million (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995:46), in 2007 their number had reached the 1.6 million (Pew Research Center, 2006), in 2010, the 1.9 million (Motel, Patten, 2012) and in 2017, 2.3 million Cuban Americans lived in the United States (Noe-Bustamante, Flores, Shah, 2019).

History of migration

By 1959 there was a small number of Cubans in South Florida, which became, however, the main point of arrival for the majority of the Cubans fleeing after the overthrow of the Batista regime. By 2007 the 69.4% of the Cuban Americans was residing in Florida (Bishin, Klofstad, 2011:3), with the 54% being concentrated in the Miami Dade County, forming the “Cuban American enclave” (Cervera, 2016:154), while Pedraza (2016:273), also, admits the Cuban exiles to have become another country with Miami being its capital.

The arrival of Cubans in the United States occurred in waves, as described by Pedraza (2016:273-275), initiating in 1959. The older, pre-1959 flows of Cubans, and especially from 1896 until 1910, had been mostly as Bauzon (2007:87) admits intellectuals.

The first wave is chronologically situated between 1959-1962. During the first phase of this wave, which ends with the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion in the spring of 1961, the Cuban elite left the country wishing to flee from the unfriendly economic environment that was gradually prevailing. To them, their flee was temporary, since they expected the American intervention to overthrow the Castro regime and themselves to be able to eventually return to their country. Eckstein (2004:131), also, agrees that the upper class of this first wave, despite the fact that they perceived their flee as a political act, they actually fled for economic reasons and although they were

against Castro, they were unrelated to the revolution, as well. The second phase of the wave includes the flee of middle-class Cubans, who wished to escape the political disorder that was dominant in the country, while the confession on behalf of Castro that he had always been and will always be a Marxist-Leninist further increased the number of the Cubans wishing to escape.

The second wave includes the Cubans from the 1965 boat exodus, with boats heading from Miami to Camarioca to transfer relatives of Cuban Americans to the United States, leading the two governments to reach an agreement and secure the transfer with the “freedom flights” which lasted until 1974.

The third wave includes the Marielitos of 1980, when more than 125,000 people, mostly belonging to the working class and of younger ages, reached the United States from Mariel Harbor, unhindered by the Cuban government.

The fourth wave, the Balseros, is chronologically situated between 1985 and 1993, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic situation in Cuba severely deteriorated and this led to a new exodus of its population. In 1994, the situation rapidly worsened with 34,000 people leaving Cuba, again practically unobstructed by the Cuban government. As Barrios (2011:7) admits, the number of balseros attempting to reach the United States by the sea rose dramatically during the Clinton Administration, with the rescued Cubans rising from 2,200 in 1991, to 3,656 in 1993, and to over 21,000 in 1994. During this wave, the American stance also changed, with the Attorney General declaring them illegal aliens attempting to enter American soil, while as Wasem (2009:2), admits, before 1995 all incoming Cubans remained. Those people were not allowed to enter the country and were held in Guantanamo base and their settlement in the United States was, as mentioned before, the result of a bilateral agreement.

As Bauzon (2007:87) admits, in the framework of the Cold War reality, Cuban immigrants not only were not deterred, but were rather encouraged to enter the United States. Barrios (2011:5), on the other hand, justifies this special, comparing to the other migrants, American stance towards the Cubans to the fact that their existence was perceived by the State Department as the proof of the failure of the communism.

The legislation regulating the migration waves in the United States includes the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, the two aforementioned bilateral agreements under Clinton Presidency reached in 1994 and 1995, as well as the Special Cuban Migration Lottery. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 allowed the incoming Cubans to stay in

the United States and after two years to apply for the permanent resident status, granted by the Attorney General. According to a provision added by the Congress in 1996, the Act will cease to exist following the democratization of the country (Wasem, 2009:2). However, the two bilateral agreements in 1994 and 1995 altered the migration policy as mentioned before, and the United States no longer allows Cubans to become permanent residents, henceforth being treated as the rest of the illegal migrants. As for the Special Cuban Migration Lottery, which was in the framework of the 1994 Agreement, the United States agreed to accept 20,000 Cubans annually, according to Bruno (2020:11), however, it was conducted for three years (1994, 1996 and 1998) and since 1998 Cuba has not allowed its residents to participate to it.

Since the 1980's the Cuban Americans had already been established within the American society, and possessed numerous representatives at the local level, especially in Miami, where according to Eckstein (2004:132) one third of the administrative positions were occupied by Cuban Americans, and in 2004 they elected four Representatives and one Senator, all from Miami except from Robert Menendez.

Homogeneity

The fact that the Cubans reached the States in different waves and in different eras (also with different political and economic circumstances prevailing), they were of different ages and of different socioeconomic status never allowed them to be perceived as a monolithic community. They consist of a very heterogeneous group, with different experiences and different backgrounds.

Bishin, Klofstad (2011:1) acknowledge that the Cubans who entered after the Mariel boatlift, that is after the 1980, were different from the Cubans already residing in the United States. The older flow left Cuba immediately after the accession of the Castro regime for political reasons and the majority had been persecuted or ousted by the regime and this experience led them to support the Republican party and become fierce opponents of Castro and pro-embargo supporters. Additionally, they possessed higher positions and they were economically well off.

On the contrary, the post Mariel incoming Cubans were grown in the Castro regime and they had little experience with the pre-Castro era, so they had no personal traumatic experience to become fierce Castro opponents. This is also proved by the fact that they maintained contacts with their families on the island. They were forced to

leave due to economic reasons and they were not as well off as the previous flows, who were also more educated. This is also proved by the fact that the post 1980 Cubans earned more than 50 per cent less money than the previous generation (Bishin, Klofstad, 2011:4). Cervera (2016:153) also underlines the qualitative differences of the exile immigrants who left because of the Castro regime and those who came after the 1980's and especially after the 1994 Agreements. Eckstein (2004:131) also agrees that the Cubans who arrived after the 1980's had been part of another Cuba, mostly workers, while the ones arriving after 1990's were also different, since they have lived within the Castro period and they left the country solely for economic opportunities (Eckstein, 2004:131).

Organizations

Despite the fact that, as mentioned before, the group is not homogenous due to their time of arrival at different timeframes and the simultaneous existence of different generations, the most prominent group that voices its demands more effectively is the pro-embargo one. Although, as Leogrande (2000:38) admits, many members of the community were in favor of easing some of the restrictions, such as the travel in order to be able to see families and the remittances, the rigid stance of the pro-embargo lobby prevailed.

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF)

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) was founded in 1981. According to the CANF website, it was created by Jorge Mas Canosa along with a group of fellow Cuban Americans, although its creation is contested until today.

Haney and Vanderbush (1999:348) admit that there are two different versions on the initiative to create the CANF. According to the first version, as Mas Canosa claimed, the initiative belonged exclusively to the community and the Reagan administration played no role in it. According to Mas Canosa, the creation of the CANF had been his idea, and it was carried out with the help of his fellow Cuban Americans, Pepe Hernandez, Raul Masdival and Carlos Salmon. However, Raul Masdival, confirms the second version, according to which the initiative belonged to Richard Allen, President Reagan's National Security Adviser, who suggested to the community to employ the example of Jewish AIPAC and create a similar organization in order to

lobby the government and the Congress. He also admitted that such a lobby would further popularize Reagan Presidency's views on the issue and that its creation was important to the presidency as well. Allen after many years, also, admitted that the initial idea belonged to him, but claims that it was simply a suggestion on how to become as a group more influential, nevertheless, accepting the importance such a lobby would have for the Presidency.

As Haney and Vanderbush (1999:346) claim, in order for President Reagan to achieve his goal, and persuade the Democratic Congress and the general public on the danger the situation in Latin America posed and the Cuban role in it, an ally, domestically, that would validate his stance was crucial, attributing therefore the creation of the CANF more to the efforts of the Executive to "privatize" foreign policy and create allies domestically (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:358). Cervera (2016:156), also admits that its creation had not been a spontaneous act on behalf of the community, but the Reagan administration's initiative to annul the rapprochement attempted by Carter Presidency. Indeed, the relation between CANF and the Presidency during the Reagan Administration is characterized by Haney and Vanderbush (1999:350) as unique and privileged, to the point of nearly becoming coexecutor of the policy (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:341).

Concerning its structure, CANF thoroughly copied the model of the AIPAC in organization, creating different entities within the group in order to be able to employ the resources available for both lobbying and tax-exempt educational activities. There were also reports that AIPAC members trained the CANF in tactics on how to convert a foreign policy related issue into a domestic one and an AIPAC related lawyer was consulting Mas Canosa on how to copy the structures of AIPAC. In order to also be able to approach the members of the community locally, branches were created to approach members of the community locally, who on turn approach their lawmakers and have them support their views (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:349)

According to the aforementioned distinction of entities, the Free Cuba PAC was responsible for donations and contributions to the lawmakers, while the lobbying activities were conducted by the CANF (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:350). Both the CANF and its Free Cuba PAC lobbied for maintaining and hardening the embargo, as well as for introducing members of the community to the Congress and other high-profile posts.

The funds CANF had in its possession to distribute were large, since its members donated big sums. Mas Canosa, alone, offered to the Foundation 200,000 shares of his own company's stock, Mas Tech, which was one of the two most important companies owned by members of the community (Eckstein, 2004:134). From 2000, the 170 associates of the foundation donated on an annual basis from \$1,000 to even more than \$6,500, while about 55,000 of its members donated \$100 per year (Eckstein, 2004:134). Those funds were employed by the Free Cuba PAC to donate to campaign contributions and lawmakers and be able to exert influence. Eckstein (2009:127) admits that the Free Cuba PAC had the absolute control of the contributions, accepting almost \$1.7 million and donating in campaigns almost \$1.3 million.

Although it was perceived to be the most effective lobby for the 1997, and second to AIPAC, it began afterwards to lose its power. This was the result of factors in both countries as well as the community, while the growing demands of the farming states to be able to be involved in trade with Cuba, introduced the business sector in the equation (Eckstein, 2004:135).

One of the early successes of the CANF had been the creation of Radio Martí, that started broadcasting in Cuba in 1985, followed by TV Martí in 1990. Domínguez (2006:23) agrees that its accomplishment in 1985 is attributed to the efficient lobbying of the Congress as carried out by the CANF. The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba was created by executive order upon assumption of the Reagan presidency, while as a foreign service officer admitted, Radio Martí project had been “fathered intellectually” by CANF with Mas Canosa occupying the leading role (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:351). His appointment as Chair of the Advisory Board had been equally controversial, with many – among them the Director of the Station, Ernesto Betancourt – accusing him that he employed the station for exile politics and propaganda in favor of the views of the CANF (Sullivan, 1994:4). Betancourt ultimately resigned, claiming the control of the station had been “abdicated to an exile group” (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:351). However, and despite the controversy, Mas Canosa retained his post until 1997.

The criticism was also directed towards the necessity of the project on the grounds of spending taxpayers' money to an exile propaganda program, and the National Association of Broadcasters lobbying the Congress against its operation (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:352).

The leadership of Mas Canosa is widely accepted to be of utmost importance for the success of the group. Haney and Vanderbush (1999:355) admit that Mas Canosa had been an exceptional personality in organizing fundraising and lobbying, while Booth (1992) admits that many times the ways he employ are that of intimidation to his opponents, like in the case of the Miami Herald, which issued a different position against the embargo with Mas launching a campaign against it causing such a rage that even calls against the paper for bombs were noticed. The influence of Mas Canosa was evident by the fact that Secretary of State informed him personally on the immigration policy of the United States (Lewisthe, 1997).

His death in 1997 debilitated the lobby that lost significant part of its influence (Cervera, 2016:156), with Leogrande (2000:39) also admitting this death being a decisive blow for the CANF, since no successor of equal capabilities existed. The successor of Mas Canosa, Jorge Mas Santos, his son, was according to Leogrande (2000:39) more suitable as a businessman rather than a leader. He was also not a supporter of the rigid stance followed by his father and this became obvious after admitting that he would be willing to meet with high level Cuban officials, except from the Castros (Eckstein, 2004:136).

Mas Santos choice to support the organization of the Latin Grammy Awards in Miami was equally severely criticized since it was deemed that it could give voice to the Cuban artists that would also participate (Canedy, 2001). Eckstein (2004:137) admits that this proposal enraged the members of the CANF and led to the resignation of twenty of the leaders, who were accusing Mas Santos as straying from the traditional views of the group (Voice of America, 2001).

Following these internal divisions, CANF had to face serious financial problems, as well, since many of the members that had abandoned it were also a source of contributions, while its main financial source, the stocks of MasTech, had lost half of their value. By 2003 CANF sought to sell properties, closed its offices in Washington and fired personnel (Eckstein, 2004:137).

Cuba Liberty Council (CLC)

Following the fragmentation of the CANF, a group initially pertaining to the CANF created the Cuba Liberty Council in 2001, headed by Mauricio Claver-Carone and became the new pro embargo lobby. Its members, former high level and influential

members of the CANF, maintained the rigid stance against the island (Eckstein, 2004:136). The CANF by then was practically nonexistent and the newly formed CLC managed to cluster other first-generation members and lobby for more measures (Eckstein, 2004:137).

The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC was created in 2003, again following the model of AIPAC, as well as the successful example of the CANF in the past. Claver Carone also admitted that the Jewish community served as their example (Bachelet, 2005). As Eckstein (2009:131) admits, by 2004 the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC had raised \$500,000 and had already become one of the largest American PACs, while by 2005 it had raised \$750,000 (Bachelet, 2005). The same year the Free Cuba PAC pertaining to CANF had only gathered \$5,000.

Political Affiliation

Traditionally, the community supports the Republicans over the Democrats and according to Bishin, Klofstad (2011:1) this preference distinguishes the group from the rest of the Latin American groups. According to the Pew Research, in 2002 64% were claiming to be Republicans, compared to 22% identifying themselves as Democrats, in 2006 the percentage of Republicans fell to 56% and the Democrats rose to 36%, while in 2013 the result was almost in par, with 47% being self-identified as Republicans and 44% as Democrats (Krogstad, 2014). In 2020, however, the 58% of the Cuban Americans eligible for voting were identified as Republicans (Krogstad, 2020).

The massive political participation of the community can be traced back during the Carter Presidency, when they perceived his policy as friendly to the Castro regime and wished to promote Reagan who had promised a rigid stance against Cuba. The group perceived the participation in the American elections as an instrument to provide assistance to their country and oust the Castro regime (Domínguez, 2006:22).

The community used to support, however, as Eckstein (2009:125) admits, the Democratic party until then. Mike Abrams (2020), head of the Dade Democratic Party in the 70's also admitted that until the end of the 1970's the community in its majority belonged to Democrats and Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) also participated in the elections with the Democrats.

Abrams also admitted that his party's approach to the Hispanic voters consists of a systemic problem, since the effort to approach them is not on a constant basis, but

only before the elections, claiming that President Trump gained Florida due to his constant contact with the community (Abrams, 2020).

3. Issue Timeline

Sullivan (2020:1) admits that the Congress has played an important role in the American foreign policy concerning Cuba. This role is demonstrated through the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, both Acts strengthening the measures against Cuba, while at the same time indicating that their ending will be based on political and economic developments in Cuba. Fisk (2000:94), also, admits that Congress became the main player in the foreign policy field, with Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:205) attributing this role to the new environment shaped also by the Watergate scandal, the Vietnam war, as well as the Civil Rights movement.

Cuban Democracy Act (CDA)

The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 had been the first piece of legislation related to Cuba that was adopted after the end of the Cold War, but, as Bell (1993:129) admits, within the Cold War mentality. The H.R. 5323, the CDA, was introduced by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) at the 102nd Congress and was cosponsored by 18 Republicans and 16 Democrats, while Sen Bob Graham introduced it in the Senate.

It was passed on September 24, 1992, and President Bush signed it into law in Miami on October 23, 1992.

The policy adopted and described by the CDA was two-track. On the one hand, the Cuban people would be approached by allowing the expedition of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, however, more pressure would be applied to the government by strengthening the embargo and the sanctions, prohibiting all American subsidiaries from engaging to trade relations with the island, as well as not allowing the entrance on American soil to any vessel for 180 days after handling freight to a Cuban port (Fisk, 2000:94).

Sen Connie Mack (R-FL) already on July 20, 1989, had introduced an Amendment in order to forbid trade of American companies and their subsidiaries with Cuba. Mack Amendment was blocked then by President Bush, who issued a Memorandum of Disapproval, since its provisions would cause problem with the United States allies internationally and therefore was perceived to be against the American economic and foreign policy interests (Bell, 1993:95). Indeed, international community, especially Canada and the United Kingdom, were strongly opposed to this Amendment, with Canada declaring it an intrusion to its sovereignty and ordering its business sector not to comply with it (Bell, 1993:95).

However, in 1992 the Mack Amendment was signed as law by President Bush, embedded within the CDA.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD)

Fisk (2000:94) claims that Clinton Administration's policy concerning Cuba was perceived to be either nonexistent or leaning towards the normalization of the bilateral relations, giving the Congress the chance to take the initiative and play the leading part.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as Helms-Burton Act, was, like the CDA, pursued by the Congress, only Republican this time, not trusting the American President and his foreign policy toward Cuba (Fisk, 2000:95), with Sen Helms admitting that the aim of the bill was to render the embargo "Clinton Proof" (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:200). The Helms-Burton Act sought to expand the sanctions to all parties that maintained business relations with Cuba, both domestic and international, as well (Fisk, 2000:95), at the same time surrendering a great part of the presidential prerogative over the issue to the Legislative.

It was introduced by Rep Dan Burton (R-IN) and Sen Jesse Helms (R-NC) in the 104th Congress. The Act was divided in four Titles. Title I was strengthening the sanctions and codified the embargo and Title II was referring to the American assistance that would be provided to a future free Cuba. According to Title III, and in order to compensate the Americans who had lost their land being confiscated, it gives them the ability to henceforth direct lawsuit against any person that was "trafficking" their confiscated land. Title IV allows the State Department to ban the entrance to any person, who has either confiscated, or has "trafficked" confiscated property. (U.S.

Department of State, 1996). The final two titles, Title III and Title IV were since the beginning problematic since they were involving also foreign entities and individuals.

Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:194) describe in detail the passage of the Act from the Congress until its being signed by President Clinton. The Act was passed by the House on September 21, 1995, with 294-130. In the Senate, the Act failed to reach voting twice until October 1995, with President Clinton organizing the business lobby against it and the lawmakers' support fading in the Congress. In order to proceed, Title III and IV were removed, however, the two versions reached by the House and the Senate would be very difficult to reconcile upon reaching the Conference Committee.

On February 24, 1996, the MiGs of the Cuban Airforce shot down two civilian airplanes belonging to the "Brothers to the Rescue" group that was routinely dropping anti-Castro leaflets on the island. President Clinton condemned the attack and ended air travel with Cuba, declaring at the same time his willingness to reach an agreement with the Congress concerning the Act. Titles III and IV were reintroduced, while Rep Diaz Balart (R-FL) insisted on adding the codification of the embargo into American law. In an executive-congressional joint meeting on February 28, 1996, the Executive insisted on including the option of a waiver for the Title III, available for the President to employ it for "national security" reasons and there were not particularly fierce objections to the codification of the embargo.

According to Kiger (1998:13) the compromise was offered by Sen Menendez, also a Democrat, who provided the waiver to the President to suspend the Title III of the Act, and at the end, the Executive obtained the waiver it wished for a six-month period, and the Legislative gained the codification. The Senate passed the Act on October 19, 1996 and it was signed by President Clinton on March 12, 1996, a few days after the Conference Committee report was voted on March 6, 1996.

Domínguez (2006:26) and Badella (2014:42) admit that the Presidency after the shootdown had no alternative but to support the Helms-Burton Act, in order to be able to punish Cuba, but at the same time avoiding a military conflict. Kiger (1998:13) also agrees that the Clinton Administration was forced to accept the Act, admits, however, that their main concern was focused on lifting the two problematic titles that were creating problems with the international community. Sullivan (2020:21), also, admits that the most important part of this legislation lies to the codification of the embargo,

since henceforth it is converted to public law and the President loses the authority to lift it without the consent of the Congress.

Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA)

It was passed in the 106th Congress in the framework of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001 (Title IX, H.R.4461) and was signed by the President on October 28, 2000. CANF leaders admitted their opposing with the business sector, parallelizing their struggle as David against Goliath, the powerful farmers and business lobby being the latter (Marquis, 2000).

The Act approved the sales of agricultural and medical products to Cuba, along with the other countries belonging in the terrorist lists of the US, namely Iran, Libya, Sudan and North Korea. In the case of Cuba, however, the TSRA banned any financing on behalf of the United States for proceeding to such exports and therefore the only way to engage in the trade would be either by cash or via another country. Eckstein (2009:136) admits that the extra requirement for Cuba had been the “consolation prize” to the lobby for allowing the sales of food and medicines.

In his Food and Medicine for the World Act (H.R. 3140) introduced in the 106th Congress, Rep George Nethercutt (R-WA) was requesting for the unconditional opening of the market of the countries in the terrorists list (Cuba included) for trade of food and medicines. Sen John Ashcroft (R-MO) introduced a similar bill in the Senate (S.1771). After pressure from the businesses, the Republicans were forced to partially accept it. As Barrett (2000) admits, however, the two pro-embargo lawmakers, Diaz Balart and Ros-Lehtinen debilitated the bill in such a degree to be more or less symbolic, since they succeeded in placing extra restrictions, only for the case of Cuba, to conduct all trade in cash. Radelat (2000, October:3), also attributes the restrictions imposed on Cuba, only, to the Republican leadership in the Congress and the Cuban American lawmakers, who opposed any effort from normalization. Alvarez (2000), also, agrees that, essentially, the bill as voted had little practical value for Cuban trade, since only the large agriculture and medical corporations would be able to engage in trade under such terms, since the smaller farmers generally lack access in international financing to be able to engage in trade.

However, as Alvarez (2000) admits, the fact that the Republicans supported the bill had also to do with the upcoming elections, since their majority was precarious and Rep Nethercutt was seeking reelection in a swing state, therefore his success would benefit the party. At the same time, the community was also not enraged, since apart from the extra restrictions imposed on Cuba, the travel restrictions were henceforth also codified. Barrett (2000), also, agrees on the political calculations on behalf of the Republican leadership leading them to support a relatively pro-Cuba bill and Marquis (2000) admits, too that the majority of the unwilling Republicans was forced to vote it under pressure by their colleagues in agricultural states. However, Cuba, also, accused the United States of strengthening the economic war instead of easing it with such a provision imposed on the Cuban case, only, and refused to buy any American products (Radelat, 2000, October:3). After Hurricane Michelle in November 2001, Cuba declined the humanitarian assistance offered by the American government, declaring instead its willingness to buy food and medicine from the United States despite the restrictions of the TSRA and as Sullivan (2020:22) admits, via the TSRA the United States was converted to Cuba's biggest supplier of agricultural products.

A. Factors beyond control of the group

A.1 Issue

Congruence with hostland

As mentioned before, since the enactment of the embargo not all Presidencies had the same stance on the policy the United States should follow against Cuba, as well as on the issue of the maintenance or lifting of the embargo. There were Administrations, overly in favor of the normalization, as well as Presidencies against any effort of rapprochement. Therefore, the pro-embargo diaspora (being the most active and most vocal part of the group) was in congruence with some Administrations and completely opposed with others.

During the Obama Presidency, the most pro normalization presidency, the Executive was eager to normalize the bilateral relations and attempted to relax the restrictions, despite the very limited frame of action allowed due to the codification of the embargo by the LIBERTAD and the reluctance on behalf of the Congress to lift the embargo. The pro embargo group was against the Presidency's stance, hindering its actions and targeting the Congress to promote their views.

On the other hand, the most hostile government against Cuba was this of President Trump, when more restrictions were introduced and all the normalization efforts of his predecessor, President Obama were reversed. The community was totally in line with the actions of the Presidency, and they were viewed as allies.

Therefore, during some Presidencies, such as the Trump or the Bush, the Cuban Americans wishing for the continuation of the embargo were in congruence with the Executive, while during others, like the Clinton and Obama Presidencies, their pro-embargo efforts were an obstacle.

At all times, however, the Legislative appeared to be diaspora's ally, not only not voting in favor of relaxing the sanctions, but strengthening them not even discussing lifting the embargo, which lies within their jurisdiction.

Congruence with homeland

The Cuban Americans are, at least the most vocal and active part, against the Castro regime. As mentioned before, many of them were forced to abandon their country for political reasons and this segment became the most hostile against the

regime. Although the younger generations and those who migrated to the United States for better economic opportunities and no due to personal trauma or prosecution are not hostile, the most hardcore segment of the diaspora has prevailed. The group wishes for the democratic transition of their homeland, wishing its wellbeing. Therefore, until such a democratic transition occurs, the Indian Americans are against their homeland.

A.2 Resources

The numbers of the Cuban Americans, only, as in the previous case study that of Indians, could not guarantee their influence in the American foreign policy. However, the combination of their wealth, their strategical geographical placement and their determination in promoting their cause is according to Leogrande (2000:36) the reason they are able to exert influence.

As mentioned above, in 1993, 1.1 million Cuban Americans were residing in the United States (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995:46), while in 2017 the number of those who claim having Cuban origin has reached the 2.3 million (Noe-Bustamante, Flores, Shah, 2019).

Concerning the voting power, Florida in 2020 remains the Cuban Americans' stronghold, since they are the largest Hispanic voting group reaching the 29%, followed by the Puerto Ricans with 27% and Mexicans with 10% (Noe-Bustamante, 2020). Eckstein (2004:134) agrees, that despite the fact that nationwide their numbers are negligible, they have taken advantage of their ideal geographical positioning employing it in lobbying, as well as in placing their own representatives in posts at all levels and thus acquired influence. The fact that the community is eligible to vote has created a voting bloc (Eckstein, 2009:125).

Additionally, Florida is extremely important during the elections, categorized as a “swing or battleground” state, where the electoral result is not predetermined, but totally unpredictable. Despite the fact that there are states that traditionally vote for one of the two parties and the electoral result is much or less anticipated, Florida has been won by both Democrats like Clinton and Obama, as well as Republicans like Bush and Trump. The distribution of the electoral votes also acts in favor of the group, since Florida, along with New York are allotted 29 votes, scoring third after California and Texas (National Archives, 2020). Therefore, the fact that it possesses one of the largest

numbers of electoral votes makes it an extremely important state for the presidential candidates to win and reach the needed 270 votes.

The most striking electoral event demonstrating Florida's electoral importance took place at the 2000 presidential elections, where the difference between the two candidates, George Bush and Al Gore was so slight that the country was uncertain of its next President for days. Both Agresti and Presnell (2002:436) and Cervera (2016:157) underline the electoral importance Florida carries and justify the attention it receives by both Republicans and Democrats.

Consequently, as Eckstein (2009:142) admits, the pre-election periods provide exceptional opportunities to the groups to exert influence. During these times, particularly, and in view of the upcoming elections, politicians tend to comply with the requests of the group, since they are a very strong voting bloc in a very important state.

Even Democrats, including Obama, who referred to lifting some of the restrictions, clearly underlined that embargo would not be lifted, since as Vagnoux (2009:11), admits, claiming the opposite would be a political suicide in Florida.

Therefore, the group may not be numerous, but due to its concentration in a key state, Florida, it can effectively act as a voting bloc. Additionally, their wealth is also an element employed to influence the policy makers.

A.3 Political Opportunity Structure

Allies

The group does not have any powerful allies except from the Legislative, as well as the Executive, the latter not a constant ally, however, since different Presidencies were, as mentioned before, at different degrees in line with the group's demands, with some being totally opposed. The Legislative, on the other hand had been a steady ally, proven by the fact that the embargo, its lifting being in the jurisdiction of the Congress, is still in force, with no serious efforts to be ended.

Rivals

Despite the fact that there is no other ethnic group directly opposing the Cuban Americans, the opposition comes from other domestic groups, mainly related to the

business sector, with American companies wishing to be able to engage in business relations with Cuba, as well, an option available to their international competitors. Haney and Vanderbush (1999:353), also, agree that the opposition to the group has a wider character and derives from different actors. Indeed, apart from the business sector, various advocacy groups are in favor of ending the embargo, wishing for the normalization of the bilateral relations, as well as more liberal groups within the community.

As Rubenzer (2011:112) admits, the opposing lobby is very powerful, since it is headed by the Chamber of Commerce and it entails large corporations. However, and despite its power, the fact that unlike the community, the issue of the embargo is not among the most urgent priorities, does not allow the anti-embargo business lobby to be equally effective and influential with the Cuban Americans, whose main reason for mobilization is the maintenance of the lobby. Rubenzer (2011:112), also, admits that the Cuban lobby possesses a significant comparative advantage over the rival business lobby, due to their dedication and focus exclusively to the maintenance of the embargo, while the rivals consist of a combination of groups, dealing with many different interests and many issues simultaneously and lifting the embargo is not perceived as a central issue (Rubenzer, 2011:112). Feldman (2014), also, agrees that the exclusivity the group demonstrates to the issue has attributed to its success, while the opposing lobby, has very diffused interests. Vogel and Parti (2014), also, acknowledge that despite their wish to lift the restrictions, the opposing groups are not willing to spend large sums of money to promote this cause, which is not their primary.

Additionally, the anti-embargo lobby in order to be successful and lift the embargo had to convince the Congress. The difficulty of this task was obvious during the Obama Presidency, when the circumstances for lifting the embargo were ideal, with a Presidency overly eager as mentioned before, to alter the policy towards Cuba, not being as dependent on the lobby as previous Administrations. Still, the American policy towards Cuba had not altered drastically. Claver-Carone of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC despite acknowledging the favorable for the opposition circumstances during the Obama presidency, as well as their attempts to take advantage of the momentum created by the Presidency's initiatives, he was arguing that they will not succeed since only Congress can bring an actual change in the policy, which is on the group's side (Ho, 2015).

Business sector

Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:197) admit that despite the fact that by the end of 2001 the American foreign policy towards Cuba had not shifted radically, the base of a future shift had been laid, since there have appeared new players, pursuing new interests and opposing the Cuban lobby that thus far faced no competition.

Until 1989, Cuba was conducting the 70% of its trade transactions with the Soviet Union, and the 15% with the countries of the Eastern Europe. Therefore, the dissolution of its main business partner destroyed its economy, and this led to the gradual change of the laws that were practically prohibiting any foreign investments, with the aim of attracting foreign investors to enter the market (Leogrande, 2000:37). In the past, the relatively small size of the market, combined with the unfriendly, almost restrictive, to foreign investors business environment, led the American business sector to ignore the country therefore exhibiting no interest whether the embargo in force. However, as Leogrande (2000:40) admits, many foreign, non-American, entities took advantage of the efforts of the Cuban government to open its economy and engaged in trade, an option that due to the restrictions was not available for the American companies. In this changing environment, the American business sector, especially the agricultural, demonstrated interest to compete in the Cuban market, and their interest was also supported by the shift in framing of the embargo from a national security issue to a trade and business one (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:199).

Fisk (2000:93), Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:198), Eckstein (2004:135) and Cervera (2016:159) also admit that the new element in the previously CANF-dominated foreign policy towards Cuba was the involvement of more actors, challenging the Cuban lobby and appearing to alter the environment posing a serious competition. The business lobby, apart from funds, also had electoral power, since lawmakers from farm states, both Republicans and Democrats, were contacted by their constituents, who were interested in selling their products in a new market. In this new environment, the permission of sales of food and medicines in 2000, although not unrestricted and very limited in scope, initiated a new era for the foreign policy direction, since it was supported, for electoral reasons as mentioned above, even by a very reluctant Republican leadership.

The Obama Presidency demonstrating since the beginning willingness to normalize the bilateral relations had spurred the activity of the anti-embargo groups,

that were attempting to take advantage of the Administration's initiatives towards normalization. At the same time, one of the largest lobbying firms in the United States initiated a new specialized section to support their clients in entering and making business in Cuba (Ho, 2015). The pro-normalization business group was lobbying the Executive, as well, since 12 trade associations addressed a letter to the President elect Obama, requesting resumption of trade relations, followed by a similar letter by 21 agriculture groups. (Kindelan, 2009, Werner, 2014:2). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce had played a central role in almost all efforts. The U.S.-Cuba Business Council was created by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 2015 in the framework of the positive initiatives of the Obama Presidency with the aim of removing the restrictions and allow the bilateral business and trade relations with Cuba. Wilson and Needham (2016) admit that its creation had been very positively accepted by the United States business sector.

Individual business sectors, also, contributed to the effort, such as the American Hotel and Lodging Association, which in the first quarter of 2010 lobbied both the Congress and the Executive spending \$305,000 (Cuba News, 2010, June:5). The business community was also addressing letters on a regular basis to the members of the Congress expressing their support to all the pro-normalization bills that were introduced to Congress.

Advocacy groups / Business groups

Throughout the years, a variety of organizations and PACs was created in order to lobby towards lifting the embargo, most of them were, however, extremely short lived. The majority of them included different elements from business groups to advocacy and humanitarian groups. Cambio Cubano was formed in 1993, supported the bilateral negotiations and the end of the embargo and Cuban Committee for Democracy, whose members included businessmen and academics, was very active attempting to block the Helms-Burton bill from passing the Congress (Elliston, 2007). The Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba was formed in January 1998 and included former state officials, as well as business leaders (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:198). The group also included advocacy groups and human rights supporters, lobbying for the sale of medicines and foods in Cuba, with Leogrande (2000:41) accepting its "unusual" character and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) characterizing it as an "unholy alliance" (Leogrande, 2000:41).

USA Engage was created in 1997 with more than 600 businesses participating and aiming to relax the restrictions and allow the bilateral trade (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush, 2002:198). According to its statement of purpose, the focus of the group was to inform the policy makers on the detrimental effects the sanctions and restrictions against Cuba have for the American economy. Fisk (2000:96) admits that it was created as an answer to the Helms Burton Act and in cooperation with the US Chamber of Commerce initiated anti-embargo lobbying, focusing on grassroots activities and engaging local businesses instead of simply employing lobbyists.

Engage Cuba was created in 2015 to end the travel and trade embargo with Cuba, while in the coalition leading companies, such as P&G, Viacom and Choice Hotels are included (Engage Cuba, 2020, Neuhaus, 2017). Apart from the business sector, like-minded advocacy groups also participated (Engage Cuba, 2020). The affiliated Foundation is responsible for educating leaders and the public on the negative effects the embargo has for the American interests (Engage Cuba Foundation, 2020). Ho (2015) admits that the Engage Cuba was involved in a focused lobbying, targeting the states with large producers of agriculture products, having, therefore direct interest in lifting the restrictions and engage in bilateral trade, therefore, also, lobbying their lawmakers towards this end. Taking advantage of the favorable environment the Obama initiatives had created, the Engage Cuba seized the momentum and lobbied even harder for Obama's initiatives to materialize setting up a PAC, the New Cuba PAC to be able to lobby the Congress (Wilson, Needham, 2016). As Tau (2016) admits, the new anti-embargo New Cuba PAC focused all efforts on Florida and its congressional candidates, being traditionally the fiercest embargo supporters in Congress, raising \$486,000 in the 2015-2016 period and remained active in donating, raising, however, significantly less amounts of money (Open Secrets, 2016:4).

Other PACs created to oppose the embargo were the New Cuban American Majority PAC active according to the Center of Responsive Politics only in the election cycle of 2009-2010, raising about \$87,500 and disappearing afterwards (Open Secrets, 2010). The same pattern followed the United States Cuba Now PAC, which according to the Center of Responsive Politics was active in the election cycle of 2011-2012, donating \$7,496 (Open Secrets, 2012). Its Treasury Antonio Martínez, attributed the failure of the previous attempt, that of the New Cuban American Majority PAC, to the fact that it was focused exclusively on the Cuban Americans, claiming that the Cuba Now PAC would focus on all Americans (Luxner, 2011, May:6).

Still, his effort was equally unsuccessful.

International community

The international community has been since the beginning against the American embargo imposed on Cuba. The issue was first introduced in the agenda of the 46th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1991, following the request of the Permanent Representative of the island to the United Nations. Since then, and on an annual basis, a Resolution condemning the embargo is being issued, supported almost unanimously by all the members of the United Nations. The American side, traditionally opposing the Resolution, during the Obama Presidency, decided to abstain, demonstrating the opposition of the Administration to the issue (Kennedy, 2016). However, the subsequent Administration of President Trump, condemned the annual Resolution issued on November 2017, voting against it along with Israel, in a procedure characterized by the American Ambassador to the Institution as a “political theater” with President Trump accusing Cuba for harming the American diplomats in incidents Havana claimed to be “science fiction” (Campos, 2017).

International influence, however, against the embargo dates back in the Pontifices visit to Cuba in 1998. Fisk (2000:96) and Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:198) admit that the condemnation on behalf of Pope John Paul II, who visited Cuba in 1998 had a great influence in the American approach to Cuba and led many Cuban Americans to express their anti-embargo opinions, while Wise (2014) admits that this visit could be even more influential, if the Lewinsky scandal had not come into light on the very day of his arrival.

Congress

In all Congresses there were also lawmakers against the embargo, although a minority, attempting to introduce legislation that would normalize the relations and ease some of the restrictions. The majority of those legislators, was, as mentioned before, from farming states with dire interest to lift the embargo and allow the business relations.

The pro-normalization lawmakers in an effort to oppose their Cuban American colleagues attempted to also organize. The House Cuba Working Group was created by 22 Republicans and 22 Democrats with the aim of opposing the Republican leadership

that was derailing any effort to ease the restrictions (Cuba News, 2002, December:2). Similar group was created in the Senate in March 2003 admitting in a letter addressed to the Senate Leadership that the ineffective embargo creates problem to the American companies that are in disadvantage internationally, being excluded by the Cuban market and unable to engage in trade (Cuba News, 2003, April:1). Following the resignation of Fidel Castro and the assumption of his duties from his brother Raúl, anti-embargo lawmakers from both Houses addressed letters to Condoleezza Rice underlying the opportunities that this change can create for the United States and its foreign policy (Palmer, 2008)

However, and despite the fact that the 110th Congress had the most auspicious preconditions to pass an anti-embargo legislation and ease some of the restrictions, since both the House and the Senate was ruled by Democrats and President Obama had expressed his intention to alter the American policy towards Cuba, no legislation passed.

B Factors under control of the group

B.1 Organization / Leadership

Despite the competitive advantage the community's geographical concentration does offer, without the coordinated efforts and the effective internal organization, the group would not have been equally successful and influential. Eckstein (2004:134), also, underlines the importance of their organization in becoming successful, while Cervera (2016:155) stresses that the group became influential due to its ability in becoming engaged within the political system and mobilizing its members, as far as concerns both their votes, as well as their donations.

As already mentioned, the hardliners wishing to primarily maintain embargo and even tighten the restrictions were represented initially by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), while after the demise of its leader, Mas Canosa, and the internal problems that led many of its members to exit, by the U.S. - Cuba Democracy PAC, which filled the gap. Therefore, we study the organization in two periods, the CANF and the post-CANF stage.

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF)

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) copied the already successful model of the Jewish AIPAC, also acquiring different entities in order to be able to employ the resources available for both donating, as well as for tax-exempt lobbying activities. There were also reports that the cooperation between the two lobbies had been even closer, with members of the AIPAC training the newly created lobby in converting a foreign policy related issue into a domestic one, while one of their lawyers was consulting Mas Canosa on how to effectively apply the organizational structure of the AIPAC (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:349). Kiger (1998:29), also, admits that this division of entities within the same lobby, enabled it to effectively and in accordance with the United States law system perform its lobbying activities. CANF, Cuban American Foundation and Free Cuba PAC, thus, were employed in educating the public, in lobbying and in raising and distributing donations respectively. Additionally, in order to, also, be more effective in approaching all members of the community, local branches were created in various states, organizing the Cuban Americans nationwide and urging them to come in contact with their lawmakers and support their views (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:349). Both the CANF and its Free Cuba PAC lobbied primarily for maintaining and hardening the embargo, as well as for introducing members of the community to the Congress and other influential posts.

Bell (1993:94) underlines the importance the CANF had exerted in passing the CDA, admitting that without its influence, the CDA would never have materialized, while Domínguez (2006:29), also, admits that in the case of CDA, the group's will overrode the Presidency's will. Vagnoux (2009:5), also, admits that CANF and their allies in Congress had been instrumental in passing the CDA and the Helms-Burton Act.

According to the aforementioned distinction of entities, the Free Cuba PAC was responsible for donations and contributions to the lawmakers, while the lobbying activities were conducted by the CANF (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:350), with Eckstein (2009:127) admitting that the Free Cuba PAC had the absolute control of the contributions, accepting almost \$1.7 million and donating in campaigns almost \$1.3 million. The significant funds the CANF had in its possession to manage were coming from its affluent and generous grassroots base and were distributed by the Free Cuba

PAC to political campaigns and lawmakers in the form of donations, with the aim of being able to exert influence.

Leadership

Its head, Jorge Mas Canosa was central in the success CANF managed to reach, since his effective leadership led the group to exert influence on the American foreign policy and play an important role in shaping American attitude towards Cuba. Haney (2018:loc16) admits that he had been a charismatic individual, Griffin and Danvers (2018:loc1178), also stress the importance of his leadership in succeeding in organizing the community, as well as shaping the policy towards the island, Haney and Vanderbush (1999:355) admit that he had been an exceptional personality in organizing fundraising and lobbying, Booth (1992) admits that his influence was acknowledged beyond Miami and the United States, while Eckstein (2009:127) attributes, also, to the ability of Mas Canosa the willingness of the group's members to offer donations, since he was able to convince the wealthy members of the community to contribute to the lobby and their cause.

Mas Canosa was respected by the community, as well as by the American policy makers, with both Lewisthe (1997) and Kiger (1998:3) attributing to the influence of Mas Canosa the change of attitude of Rep Torricelli, from being a supporter of relaxation of the restrictions in 1989, to ultimately becoming the sponsor of CDA in 1992. At his speech during the signing ceremony, President Bush, also, officially declared Mas Canosa to be the driving force behind the passing of the legislation (Bush, 1992). Leogrande (2000:38), as well, admits that the access Mas Canosa had to both Congress and the White House demonstrates the influence of the CANF.

The group and especially its leader Mas Canosa was especially active in disqualifying all opposition (Lunan, 1992), but was also feared by his opponents, who were targeted, with Booth (1992) admitting that on many occasions the tactics he employed were that of intimidation against his opponents. An example was his fight with the Commissioner Joe Carollo, who accused him of employing his status to win a multimillion city contract and Mas Canosa challenged him to duel (Miami Herald, 1997). An editorial in "The Herald" condemning the CDA as being harmful for both the American interests and for Cuba, urging to "leave things as they are" enraged Mas Canosa, leading to a conflict with the publisher David Lawrence (Lunan, 1992). Mas

Canosa even demanded the resignation of the paper leadership, while the editorials that followed further deteriorated the relations and incited a campaign against the “The Herald” that ended with its executives receiving death threats and the newspaper property being vandalized (Miami Herald, 1997). Rep Torricelli also supported the group, by stating in his speech before 2,600 members of the community that he is the lawmaker “The Herald” loves to hate, enraging the community even more (Lunan, 1992). After a four-month boycott imposed by Mas Canosa to “The Herald”, Mas Canosa himself at a fundraising event, where Lawrence was also present, announced the end of the controversy, since, as he claimed, the group managed to make “The Herald” more sensitive to the community (LA Times, 1992).

The fact that after Mas Canosa’s death in 1997 the CANF, which in the 1997 was declared to be the nation’s most effective lobby, began to debilitate, facing serious internal issues in such a degree to gradually lose its influence, further demonstrates his contribution to the success and his effective and successful leadership. According to Eckstein (2009:143), the case of the Cuban Americans demonstrates the fragility of a group’s influence in case the leadership or the unity of the group disappear. Cervera (2016:156) acknowledges that his death had led to the group debilitation, while Leogrande (2000:39) also agrees that his death had been a decisive blow for the CANF. Eckstein (2004:135) admits that the reason for its debilitation was a combination of factors both within as well as external to the CANF, including the growing demands of the farming states to allow the trade with Cuba, introducing henceforth the business sector in the equation, with Leogrande (2000:39) also agreeing that the emergence of external factors that coincided with the death of Mas Canosa and the lack of a successor of equal capabilities to respond effectively to them led to the CANF fall.

The years after the death of Mas Canosa and the debilitation of the CANF, with its members leaving, as mentioned before, due to the leadership of Mas Santos and the complete ideological transformation of the group’s stance, the anti-embargo supporters took advantage of the situation and managed to allow the sales of food and medicine to Cuba via the TSRA. Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush (2002:197) also admit that the debilitation and disagreements within the group led its opponents to be able to pass such a legislation.

Indicative of the CANF progressive transformation under Mas Santos was the fact that in a press release issued on March 13, 2009, CANF not only refrained from accusing President Obama’s stance of easing the restrictions imposed during the Bush

presidency, on the contrary he perceived it as a positive step (Whatley, 2009). The President of the CANF, also, criticized the stance of the Republican candidate Mitt Romney, who admitted that he would follow the lead of the hardliners in Congress rolling back Obama's policy, claiming that this would be "very, very unfortunate" (Radelat, 2012, February:3). Rep Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), too, admitted that CANF was a remnant of the lobby it used to be in the past, being no longer by the pro-embargo side (Luxner, 2003, September:3).

In 2003 the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, headed by Mauricio Claver-Carone, was created in a period when the CANF was already losing its core members and the voices for normalization were rising. However, as Haney (2018:loc3702) admits, the entrance of the Cuban Americans in the Congress, also, marked the end of the lobby, since the group had acquired their own representatives who were lobbying within. The CANF could not be equally effective as the Cuban American lawmakers in lobbying and influencing their colleagues and the legislative procedure. Still, Cuban American lawmakers, despite becoming the ones that were steering the American policy against Cuba, needed an external lobby for ensuring campaign donations, and the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC was created to fill the gap the CANF had left. Claver-Carone admitted that his PAC's organizational difference from the CANF's Free Cuba PAC lied in the fact that it did not rely on large sums a few powerful donors donated, instead they depended on a large number of smaller contributions (Radelat, 2007, November).

Homogeneity on Issue

As mentioned above, the qualitative differences among the waves have resulted to a much more fragmented community than depicted. Although the most vocal and active group among them remains the pro-embargo one, which is also the best organized, the actual majority of the community is in favor of the bilateral normalization of relations. Pedraza (2016:278), also, acknowledges that despite the fact that the media tend to portray the community as united and pro-embargo, it is in fact deeply divided, while the most vocal group, the pro-embargo one, is more apparent. Bishin, Klofstad (2011:4) and Domínguez (2006:26), also agree that the community has become more moderate in their opinions concerning the bilateral relations.

The younger generation, born and grown in the United States and instilled the American way of life is more progressive in their views, while that they have experienced no traumatic events leaving their country to justify a very strong opposition to the efforts of normalization of the bilateral relations. Bishin, Klofstad (2011:5) also agree that the younger generation by not having first-hand experience of the political reasons that led their forefathers to flee Cuba are much more moderate.

The older generations' waves that arrived in the United States after the 1980's were also not strongly affected by the Castro regime in order to ardently wish its overthrow, while they have maintained contacts with families on the island and they wish to have the opportunity to be able to visit them and send them remittances. Therefore, within the community the efforts of allowing the traveling and the remittances are not perceived negatively. Leogrande (2000:38), also, admits that the younger generations having families in Cuba are concerned of their wellbeing and therefore in favor of being able to visit them and send remittances.

The fact that the community has gradually become more moderate in their stance against Cuba is also demonstrated by the research conducted by the Cuban Research Institute in the Florida International University (Grenier, 2018). In the aforementioned research, that was conducted in the Miami-Dade County where the bulk of the community resides, the community is divided in three groups based on their time of arrival - pre-1980, between 1980 and 1994, and post-1994 - in order to observe the differences in the views of the different waves (Grenier, 2018:5). The opinion of the community concerning the lifting of the embargo is equally divided with 51% opposing the lifting and 49% wishing for its to end. The qualitative data demonstrates, however, that the older generations, that is those arriving before 1980, are in favor of maintaining the embargo, with 68%, while the 58% of those arriving between 1980 and 1994 support the continuation of the embargo. On the contrary, the 60% of those arriving after 1995 wish for the embargo to be lifted (Grenier, 2018:10). Concerning the reestablishment of the bilateral diplomatic relations, only those arriving before 1980 are against by 59% and the two other groups, those arriving between 1980 and 1994 and those arriving after 1995 are in favor by 55% and 75% respectively (Grenier, 2018:14). Similarly, apart from the first group (pre-1980) who wish by 55% to break any bilateral business relation, the two other groups by 40% and 55% wish for the expansion of the existing relations in the field (Grenier, 2018:11). The fact that the community with the passage of time became closer to their hostland rather than their

homeland, is also demonstrated by their answers in the question on the important issues that are taken into consideration when voting. Economy and jobs, healthcare and gun control are the top three issues that influence the community's votes, while the stance of the candidate against Cuba ranks in the final place (Grenier, 2018:28).

However, in comparison with the previous respective research, and especially with this of 2016, the percentage of those who support the embargo has increased. In 2016, the 37% was in favor of the embargo and in 2018 the percentage rose to 51%. Grenier (2018:32) claims that a possible explanation for the resurgence of the members of the community being in favor of the embargo could be the different narrative between the cooperative Obama Presidency and the rigid Trump Administration. However, he accepts that if this is the case the community is no longer actively shaping foreign policy towards Cuba rather than reflecting the presidency's actions. The fact that when voting the candidate's stance against Cuba ranks last could also enhance this view. Pedraza (2016:279), also, admits that despite the fact that the old generation that supports the rigid stance consists the best organized part of the community and is represented by the majority of the Cuban American lawmakers, new, more moderate, generations become also involved politically, while, eventually, the old generations will have to abandon their posts and pass their organizations to the next generation, who are Americans and in their majority in favor of normalization of bilateral relations.

This changing trend could not leave the lobby untouched, as well. This attitude was particularly evident after the demise of Mas Canosa and the assumption of his post by his son, representative of the younger generation. Vagnoux (2009:16), also, admits the group's ideological progression, along with the community's, gradually abandoning the hardline attitude. Canedy (2001) admits that the division within the CANF was caused by the generational gap, while its President Francisco Hernandez, admitted that they, too, had to adapt to the new circumstances and the new era (Cave, 2009).

B.2 Strategies

Leogrande (2000:36) attributes the anachronistic, as he claims, American policy of maintaining the embargo in the influence of the Cuban Americans, since the embargo had already lost its legitimacy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the threat of communism, while Cervera (2016:155), also, agrees that the community has become an essential part of the American policy towards the island.

According to Eckstein (2009:127), too, the American foreign policy towards Cuba until 2008 has to be understood in the context of the community lobbying activities, while Leogrande (2013) accepts that due to the influence it acquired, the lobby managed to block a sensible policy towards Cuba. Domínguez (2006:36), also, admits that within the Latin Americans, Cuban Americans, only, have the ability to exert political influence, while Vagnoux (2009:16) claims that the embargo will end when it seizes to be employed to maintain the community's status quo as political exiles. Terry (2005:7), also claims that along with the Jews, the Cuban diaspora lobby on a permanent basis and proactively in order to exert influence rather than reacting to certain events.

Framing of the issue

Although in the first years the CANF was created, the Executive was not merely in favor of its efforts, but practically its ally, the consequent Presidencies were at different degrees in favor of the embargo, with some even against it, as was the case during the Obama Presidency. Additionally, especially during the first years, a reluctant Congress needed also to be persuaded, and progressively with the introduction of rival anti-embargo domestic groups the community had to constantly justify the importance of withholding the embargo and the strict restrictions.

Haney and Vanderbush (1999:355) admit that the community managed to successfully frame their cause as an effort aiming to achieve "freedom", an ideal that could not be rejected. Rep Albio Sires, also, admitted the successful strategy to focus on human rights and freedom of expression in Cuba, a message that would appeal especially to a democratic Congress (Bachelet, 2007), while Vagnoux (2009:6) agrees, stressing, also, the fact in both key pieces of legislation, that is in both the CDA and the LIBERTAD, the key word is "democracy", and the island's transition to a democratic regime becomes a prerequisite in order for all the restrictions to be lifted.

Justifying the hard stance against Cuba as a means of overthrowing a nondemocratic regime finds bipartisan appeal to the American lawmakers and the society, being totally in line with the American ideals. The perception that all their efforts should be under the American political and ethical system was perceived very early from Mas Canosa, who despite the fact that in the early years he had been member of an extreme group to overthrow Castro, he realized that such efforts that promote violence could not have any effect within the United States and that it could be possible

to win “without shooting a bullet” by respecting and playing by the American rules (Miami Herald, 1997).

Aligning the embargo with the American ideals and presenting their cause in line with the American interests was, therefore, a prerequisite in being successful in influencing the foreign policy decisions.

Electoral strategies

The fact that, as mentioned before, the group is geographically concentrated in one specific and highly influential state, Florida, has been an extremely significant advantage in promoting their views, especially during the election years. This was evident in the core legislations the group managed to pass, with both the CDA and the LIBERTAD being signed reluctantly by Presidents Bush and Clinton respectively, and being led by electoral reasons rather than the President’s approval of their content.

The fact that the passage of the CDA had been in large part due to electoral interests is also obvious by the stance the Executive demonstrated. Since 1989 and until 1992, when it became part of the CDA, Sen Connie Mack (R-FL) was introducing a legislation that was banning American subsidiaries from trading with Cuba. Bush Presidency was rejecting such an option on the grounds that it would create problems with the international community and the bilateral relations with the country’s allies (Vanderbush, Haney, 1999:393). In 1990, when Sen Mack’s legislation, in the form of an Amendment to the Omnibus Export Amendments Act, was approaching the Congress, President Bush even issued a Memorandum of Disapproval preventing it from being signed (Bell, 1993:96). According to Vanderbush and Haney (1999:394), following President Bush’s initial negative stance on the CDA, Mas Canosa approached the other presidential candidate’s, Bill Clinton’s, advisers and negotiated his support concerning the aforementioned Act. Clinton’s benefits from accepting the CDA would be considerable, since on the one hand his campaign would receive generous contributions from the Cuban American community, while at the same time he would gain votes that would enable him to compete electorally with President Bush in Florida. Bell (1993:96), also, admits that Clinton perceived this a great opportunity to be able to compete electorally with his rival in Florida, where in the last elections he had received more than 85% of the Cuban votes. Rep Torricelli, being a Democrat, along with Mas Canosa, also, contributed in influencing Clinton in accepting the CDA

(Domínguez, 2006:24) and during a speech in Miami before the members of the community, Clinton announced that he “read the CDA and liked it”, receiving that day, only, \$275,000 from the Cuban Americans (Vanderbush, Haney, 1999:394, Eckstein, 2009:130). Eckstein (2009:133), also, admits that most probably had Clinton not supported the CDA, President Bush would not change his stance, either, and he would not have accepted the Mack Amendment, but, in an electoral year, and in view of his re-election, the community and their support (both electoral and financial) was deemed more important than the international allies’ concerns over the Mack Amendment. Bell (1993:97), also, attributes President Bush’s shift on the issue from his initial disapproval to electoral politics, stressing the fact that this shift was demonstrated only days after Clinton’s speech in Miami, who was accusing him for not supporting an Act that would put pressure on Castro. However, President Bush’s choice to shift his stance on the CDA was proven effective, since he received the majority of the votes of the community, winning Florida (Eckstein, 2009:134). Even the signing event, according to Bell (1993:97), acquired a partisan character, since, despite the fact that the CDA had been introduced by two Democrats, President Bush signed it in Miami in the framework of one his campaign events, with Clinton accusing him for “cheap politics”.

In 1996, and under similar circumstances with the passing of CDA, President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act. He, like his predecessor, President Bush in the case of the CDA, initially opposed it on the grounds of enraging the international community with the extraterritorial claims it included. However, on the eve of his re-election, and, as mentioned before, forced also by the shootdown of the civilian planes by the Cuban air force, he signed the Act, again in Florida, as in the case of the CDA, in the presence of the community members. Eckstein (2009:135) admits that President Clinton’s decision to ultimately sign the Act resulted in his being reelected, while Leogrande (2000:36), also, attributes his electoral results in the state of Florida in his decision to sign the Act. President Clinton himself admitted, later, that his decision to support the Act had been a reasonable and effective tactic within the framework of an election year, it impeded, however, any chance of normalizing the bilateral relations and lifting the embargo in the course of his second tenure (Eckstein, 2009:135). Additionally, the electoral character of President Clinton’s decision is also proved, according to Eckstein (2009:135), by the fact that despite signing the Act, he never activated the controversial, extraterritorial claims it involved.

Donations

According to Kiger (1998:2) and Lewisthe (1997) from 1979 until 1998 of the \$4.4 million that had been directed to the American political system with the aim of influencing the country's policy towards Cuba, the \$3.2 million were originating from the CANF, with Bell (1993:94), also, admitting that the group's ability to finance campaigns had been its most effective strategy. Through its PAC, the Free Cuba PAC, the CANF spent more than \$1 million to Congress candidates. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in the "Foreign Policy" list, comprising of groups lobbying to exert influence on the American policy towards another country (Pro-Israeli lobbies, though, are a separate list and therefore not included), the Free Cuba PAC had been ranked second in contributions for the years 1989-1992 (Center for Responsive Politics, 1990).

In 1992 alone, of the \$200,000 directed to campaign financing, Rep Robert Torricelli, the sponsor of the CDA, received \$26,750 (Bell, 1993:94), while, only two years before, in 1989, Rep Torricelli was in favor of normalizing the relations, cosponsoring the H.R.1853 that was suggesting allowing the exports of medicines and medical equipment to the island. Leogrande (2013) claims that Rep Torricelli was seduced by the donations of the group, while Lewisthe (1997) and Kiger (1998:3), also, admit that the group's donations played an important part in his ultimately supporting a pro-embargo legislation, claiming that he received more than \$120,000 from the CANF. Eckstein (2009:129) also links the lawmaker's behavioral transformation with the fact that despite being a non-Cuban and residing in New Jersey rather than Florida, between 1979 and 2000, he became the second in the list of recipients of the group donations.

However, President Bush, also, was rewarded for accepting the Act and ultimately signing it, since in 1992 President Bush received the 5th largest sum of donations by the community (Eckstein, 2009:130). President Clinton, whose support had been catalytic for the passage of the Act, since only after his public support did President Bush support it, received as mentioned before, in one day, only, \$275,000 from the Cubans in fundraisers (Vanderbush, Haney, 1999:394).

In the pre-LIBERTAD era, the Free Cuba PAC ranked first in the Foreign Policy area interest groups contributions, mostly aiming at Democrats (Center for Responsive Politics, 1994). In 1996 the sponsors of the LIBERTAD, Rep Dan Burton (R-IN) and

Sen Jesse Helms (R-NC), received large donations during the time of its passing from the Congress. According to Eckstein (2009:130), Rep Burton, was not a traditional recipient of the donations of the group, since before the 1990's, when he received \$61,000, he had never received any donation by the group. Sen Helms, on the other hand, to ensure his reelection after the passage of the LIBERTAD, received from the group \$76,000 in one year only, from 1995 to 1996. However, and in order to ensure the passage of the LIBERTAD, the lobby donated large sums to lawmakers nationwide, in a targeted approach, while from the recipients, as Eckstein (2009:130) admits, only a few voted against the Act.

As mentioned before, following the death of Mas Canosa and the fragmentation of the CANF, the Cuba Liberty Council and its PAC, the U.S.- Cuba Democracy PAC, became the hardliners against Cuba and the main force seeking to maintain the embargo and the restrictions. By 2004 it had raised \$500,000, becoming one of the largest American PACs, while in the same year the Free Cuba PAC had only gathered \$5,000 (Eckstein, 2009:131). By 2005 it ranked first on the top contributors list in the "Foreign Policy" field of the Center for Responsive Politics (2008), reaching its peak in contributions in 2008 with \$767,825, almost equally divided between Democrats (59.28%) and Republicans (40.72%).

Both Leogrande (2013) and Eckstein (2009:131) admit, however, that the donations of the group were distributed not only to reward the group's allies, but were also employed to punish those opposing them, at the same time sending a warming message to the other lawmakers concerning their strength. Bachelet (2005) also admits that the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC contributed to killing initiatives that would lax restrictions on travel and trade in the Congress, reminding the Mas Canosa days of the lobby. This was the case with Sen Chris Dodd (D-Conn) and Rep Jose Serrano (D-NY), who were sponsoring legislation against the travel restrictions. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC organized an online campaign to ensure funds of \$100,000 and run advertisements against their reelection, with the head of CLC, Claver-Carone, accusing Rep Serrano of fooling his fellow lawmakers concerning his intentions, also openly admitting that the group would support Sen Dodd's opponent, whoever that might be (Kindelan, Palmer, 2009).

Rubenzer (2011:112) in his study of the effect the group donations have on the stance of the lawmakers, studied the voting of the same Amendment filed in two subsequent years. Rep Jim Davis (D-FL), introduced in 2004 and in 2005 H.Amdt 769

and H.Amdt. 420, respectively, in order to lax the restrictions of the embargo. In 2004, his Amendment passed the House by 225-174, although it never reached the Senate, while, in 2005, the House voted against it by 208-211. In his research concerning the donations received by lawmakers, he admits that the Representatives that in 2004 received the largest amounts voted against both Amendments. The three Democrats who received the biggest annual increase in donations switched their vote from the one Congress to the next, as did the Republicans, who also received increased donations by the group (Rubenzer, 2011:112).

A study by the non-profit Public Campaign, also, links the donations with the stance the lawmakers adopted for Cuba, finding 18 lawmakers reversing their stance after receiving donations from the pro-embargo PACs. More precisely, among the lawmakers they underline the fact that Rep Mike McIntyre, who was a supporter of the lax of restrictions, after receiving \$14,500 from the PAC altered his vote in 2004, as did Rep Dennis Cardoza and John Shimkus (Wides-Munoz, 2009). The aforementioned lawmakers admitted that they changed their stance, a fact unrelated, as they claimed, though, with the money they received, with McIntyre claiming that it was his fellow colleague Diaz-Balart's personal experience what drove him to reconsider his stance (Wides-Munoz, 2009). On the other hand, Claver-Carone, not denying the fact, he admitted that the group was acting according to the constitutional right it possessed and not unlike any other interest group within the American political system that wanted to exert influence (Wides-Munoz, 2009).

The importance the strategy of donations has for the community is perceived by all its members. This is evident by the community reaction following the announcement of President Obama of his intent to normalize the bilateral relations easing the restrictions on December 17, 2014. In response of this announcement, wealthy members of the community were offering donations to the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC as its director Claver-Carone admits (Vogel, Parti, 2014). Choma (2015) also confirms the validity of this claim, stressing the fact that U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, from November 25 until December 14, had raised \$17,200, from December 15 until December 22, in just a few days, had raised \$55,000, while on December 23, only, it raised \$47,675. Choma (2014), however, claims that President Obama and in general the Democrats, were not receiving as many donations as the Republicans by the Cuban Americans in comparison with the past, therefore, the decision for normalization would not have a dire economic impact on them. The Center for Responsive Politics also

confirms this claim, since in cycles 2007-2008 and 2009-2010, the 59.28% and the 69.49% respectively was donated to Democrats, with the quotas changing since 2011, when 37.83% in 2011-2012, 33.84% in 2013-2014 and 16.68% in 2015-2016 was directed to Democrats (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016).

The former Presidential Candidate and Senator George McGovern, who since his early career in 1963 was claiming that the United States are being obsessed with Castro and follow the wrong policy, also, admitted the role of the U.S. - Cuba Democracy PAC in defeating Rangel's Amendment (H.Amdt. 707) in 2007 in the 110th Congress to lift the financial restrictions concerning the sales of American agricultural products in Cuba. Referring to his fellow Democrats lawmakers, he admitted that of the 66 Democrats who voted against their fellow Democrat lawmaker, the 58 had received donation by the PAC and attributed the defeat in this influence. He admitted that despite the fact that trade with Cuba would benefit their states' farmers, those lawmakers decided to vote against their constituents' interests and attributed their stance in the PAC donations and influence (Luxner, 2007, November:8). The Latin America Working Group, also, issued a press release admitting that despite the fact that there were lawmakers, who were consistently supporting the anti-embargo efforts to relax the restrictions, following the creation of the U.S. – Cuba Democracy PAC and having been offered donations, in 2005 they changed their stance. In the list there were included lawmakers who in the past systematically endorsed the anti-embargo legislation and in 2005 voted against them after receiving donations. The list of those lawmakers consisted of 12 lawmakers, while there were also another 14 who reversed their stance for at least one Amendment (Cuba News, 2005, December:2).

Cuban Americans in the Congress

Since early among the key efforts of the community was to place their own representatives in the Congress and in influential posts, therefore, being able to influence the American politics from within. Already since the 1980's they managed to elect their Representatives locally, while in Miami – Dade as Eckstein (2004:132) admits one third of the administrative positions were occupied by Cuban Americans. Domínguez (2006:28), also, stresses their strategy to place their own representatives in the Congress and other political posts from where they could exert influence.

The first Cuban American to enter Congress had been Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) in 1989 in an election with a strong ethnic character, with the Hispanics supporting Ros-Lehtinen and the Jews supporting Jewish American Gerald Richman (New York Times, 1989). Ros-Lehtinen was being reelected continuously until she retired in 2008, while by 2004, the community had already four Representatives and one Senator in the Congress, with Sen Robert Menéndez (D-NJ), only, residing to another district than Florida (Eckstein, 2004:132).

The importance and the contribution of the Congressional wing of the lobby had been most evident during a Presidency that was not a supporter of the embargo, that of President Obama. During this Administration, with President Obama being, as mentioned before, mostly immune from the community and its donations, the activity of exerting influence had been focused on the Congress and the Cuban American lawmakers, whose efforts were concentrated in averting the congressional approval of any attempt of the Executive towards the normalization of the relations. Therefore, and despite the aforementioned changes that were relaxing the restrictions under the Obama Presidency, the Congress remained divided and no legislation was passed despite the favorable for the opponents of the embargo circumstances (Sullivan, 2020:1). In any case, and despite the wish and the efforts of the Obama Administration, the embargo was not in danger of being removed, being beyond the President's jurisdiction to decide it, such a decision belonging exclusively to the Congress. The Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) during the 122nd and 113th Congresses, also, accused President Obama for establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba and guaranteed that the embargo would not be lifted unless Cuba was able to demonstrate substantial progress (Dennis, 2015, Dumain, 2015:2).

Indeed, President Obama's main opposition came from the Congress rather than the community and its organizations, with Cuban American lawmakers, among them Sen Menéndez, also, who despite a Democrat he sided with the rest of Cuban Americans lawmakers against his President's initiatives. Badella (2014:41), also, agrees that President Obama's main opposition originated from the Congressional wing of the lobby, while Vagnoux (2009:14) admits that despite the fact that the majority of the members of the community was not against a reproachment, the Congressional wing still adopted the hard stance of the older generations and prevailed. Leogrande (2013), also, agrees that in the Obama era, with a President not close to the group, the lobby was relied to its congressional arm and especially Sen Menéndez, both a Democrat and

Chairman of the SFRC, supporting their stance and accusing the anti-embargo supporters as paying more attention to money than the human rights (Lesniewski, 2015).

Despite being a Democrat, Sen Menéndez was as critical and as stern in his criticism against President Obama as his Republican Cuban American colleagues in the Congress. Menéndez had opposed a Democratic President in the past, as well, also opposing President Clinton's efforts to improve the bilateral relations via the baseball diplomacy (Eckstein, 2009:129). Following the Obama announcement for his upcoming visit to Cuba, Sen Menéndez criticized him, claiming that this would equal a rewarding towards a dictator (Cruz, 2016), also stressing that his approach was being based on hope and not reality (Cruz, 2015), since despite the acts of good will on behalf of the American side, the Cuban policy remained the same in the human rights field and a visit could only strengthen the regime (Cruz, 2016). Menéndez (2016), also, accused President Obama as sacrificing the American values to the economic short-term interests by visiting a dictator, an action nine Presidents before him abstained from, while, concerning the resumption of the bilateral diplomatic relations, he admitted being "deeply disappointed" in him (Salant, 2014).

The other Cuban American lawmakers were equally vocal against President Obama's actions and were opposing every attempt towards normalization. Sen Rubio was referring to him as the worst negotiator, offering to the Cuban side everything, without actually obtaining anything in return in the field of democracy and human rights, also announcing his intention in his capacity as member of the SFRC to attempt to stop the normalization process as well as the funding for reestablishing an Embassy (Sanchez, 2014). Sen Rubio (2015), also, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State John Kerry concerning Cuba's removal from the list of the states sponsoring terrorism and the Presidency's intention of reestablishing full diplomatic relations urging him to ensure certain progress is made by Cuba before proceeding to opening an Embassy. Reps Mario and Lincoln Diaz-Balart, also, condemned Obama's intention to lift the travel restrictions and allow the remittances sending, claiming that Americans will finance Castro (Kucinich, 2009), while the Legislature of Florida, as well, expressed its "profound disagreement" to Obama's intention to normalize the relations with Cuba and opposed the United States diplomatic representation on the island (NBC, 2015).

Sen Rubio and Menéndez even doubted the State Department Report on Trafficking in persons, demonstrating an ameliorated situation in Cuba, with Sen

Menéndez accusing the Presidency of issuing a politicized report without having achieved any actual progress or amelioration (Fleming, 2015).

Sen Mario Rubio was especially influential during the Trump Presidency, with the New York Times referring to him as a virtual Secretary of State for Latin America (Baker, Wong, 2019). President Trump perceived the cooperation with Sen Rubio as a prerequisite in order to win Florida and upon assumption of his duties, as Augustin (2020) admits, his instruction concerning the handling of Cuban related issues was to “make Rubio happy”.

The Congressional bicameral Cuba Democracy Caucus was created in 2004 by the pro embargo lawmakers with the aim of educating their fellow lawmakers on the violations of the human rights and the regime in Cuba (Martinez, 2005). As Bachelet (2007) admits, the Caucus directed its focus to the freshmen lawmakers, who were approached systematically in order to obtain their support, while the members of the caucus were acknowledging their commitment in killing any the anti-embargo legislation introduced. Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), in 2005, in her capacity as whip of the Caucus managed through lobbying to influence “several” of the 42 freshmen in Congress according to her spokesman (Bachelet, 2005). Badella (2014:41) also admits that its members were constantly introducing bills to harden the sanctions or were filibustering bills that could ease them. The cooperation with the community was also close, since the Caucus was also closely linked, as Bachelet (2005) admits, with the Cuba Liberty Council and its President Claver-Carone and as a result of their coordinated efforts, by June 2005, four initiatives to ease restrictions introduced in House were rejected. The Caucus was particularly active during the Obama presidency, with its members addressing letter to President Obama expressing the views of the vast majority of the community, as they claimed, on the foreign policy towards Cuba, stressing the oppressive character of the Castro regime and rejecting any re-evaluation of the sanctions without a democratization (Diaz-Balart, 2009). The Hispanic caucus, on the other hand, had not been equally influential, since it was more focused on domestic issues facing the community as well as on issues of migration (Domínguez, 2006:36)

Focused approach on Congress

Another strategy, employed mainly by the U.S. – Cuba Democracy PAC and was proven very effective was the promotion and support of new generations of lawmakers, who upon entering the Congress supported the views of the group. Claver-Carone admitted that even in the prime of its existence, CANF's Free Cuba PAC had not exploited to the full its potential contrary to his PAC that chose to employ a more sophisticated strategy, treating its operation as a campaign (Radelat, 2006, June:6). Radelat (2010, October:7) admits that the strategy followed by the U.S. – Cuba Democracy PAC to focus its efforts on freshmen, promote their campaigns and acquiring, in turn, their support after they have entered the Congress had been highly successful and managed to maintain the group's Congressional supporters, since the friendly lawmakers, who were not reelected were constantly substituted. Claver-Carone admitted that his strategy is to maintain to the Congress all the like-minded lawmakers (Radelat, 2007, November:4). Eckstein (2009:131) also admits the success of this strategy, since of the 75 candidates that were supported, only four failed to be elected and the result had been obvious in the Congress during 2005, when all efforts to ease the restrictions failed. Executing this strategy, investing in freshmen and ensuring their entrance in Congress, the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC spent more than \$320,000 in the first half of 2007, being also very effective since those freshmen aided in defeating all the anti-embargo efforts. The defeat in July of the Rangel Amendment seeking to end the financial restrictions in sales of agricultural products by 182-245 was attributed to a great extend in the votes of these freshmen, with Rangel himself also admitting being “blindsided” by the vote (Radelat, 2007, November). Sen George McGovern, as mentioned before, also admitted the role of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC in defeating the Amendment (Luxner, 2007, November), while the Latin America Working Group, also, attributed to the PAC's strategy the influence on previously anti-embargo lawmakers (Cuba News, 2005, December:2). Radelat (2010, February:2) also admits that the ability of the pro-embargo supporters to kill any pro normalization legislation can also be attributed to the PAC's targeted strategy that ensured friendly freshmen's entrance in the Congress, many belonging to Democrats.

Chapter 5: Jewish Americans

Introduction

The final case study refers to the efforts of the Jewish diaspora to prevent the conclusion of the American nuclear deal with Iran, which took place during the Obama Presidency. In contrast with the previous two case studies, this effort was unsuccessful, despite the fact that the Jewish lobby is considered to be one of the most influential in the United States and its organizational structure has been copied by all the other American based ethnic diasporas, including the ones of the two previous case studies.

The Chapter, following the pattern of the previous two, begins with a brief description of the bilateral relations and the particularly close cooperation between the United States and Israel, focusing, however, on the Obama Presidency, when the issue under question took place. The Jewish diaspora in the United States is subsequently presented, focusing on their qualitative, quantitative as well as organizational characteristics.

Consequently, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the American deal with Iran, and the legislative process that led to its conclusion is examined. In the framework of diaspora's efforts to prevent the deal, the factors under question are examined.

1 Bilateral relations

The relations between the United States and Israel have traditionally been so close to the point of being characterized as unique (Mearsheimer, Walt, 2006:32) or as unusual and exceptional (Waxman, 2007:97), many claim that they affect the shaping of the American foreign policy in the region (Lindsay, 2002:38, McCormick, 2012:71), even that they are unjustified by means of the American strategic national interests (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006:32). Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had addressed the Congress three times, a record for a foreign leader previously held only by Winston Churchill (U.S. House of Representatives, 2015, March 3), while the Congressional support is also evident during his visits, with many influential Congressmen from both parties requesting to meet with him (Allen, Sherman, 2012).

The close bilateral relationship is clearly evident by the American support, both financial, as well as military, Israel has and continues to be receiving. The United States has, since the founding of the Israeli state, provided assistance in the amount of \$146 billion, while it has undertaken the responsibility to maintain the country's qualitative military edge (QME), its military supremacy, over the neighboring countries. Therefore, not only Israel is the first country to have access to any new American military technology, but in case the United States decide to sell weapons to neighboring states, it will have to simultaneously compensate Israel, in order to ensure that its QME and its military superiority is preserved (Sharp, 2020:5). This obligation concerning the maintenance of the Israeli QME over its neighboring states had also been codified by the American Congress. In 2008, in the framework of the 110th Congress, the term of "qualitative military edge" was officially defined, the commitment of a four-year assessment was introduced, and the United States had formally, henceforth, the obligation to ensure that any arms sale to neighbors will not have a negative impact on Israel's QME (Sharp, 2020:5).

On the other hand, the bilateral financial assistance is on a regular basis provided in the form of Memoranda of Understanding, covering a ten-year span, with the first of them being signed in 1999. The ongoing one was signed in 2016 under the Obama Presidency, it refers to the period of 2019-2028, and it obliges the United States to provide to Israel economic assistance of \$38 billion (Sharp, 2020:6).

Barrack Obama Presidency (20.1.2009-20.1.2017)

The coexistence of President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu had been challenging since the beginning. Upon acquiring the presidency, Obama Administration's attempt to approach the Arab countries brought him in direct opposition with the Israeli Prime Minister. At their first meeting in 2009, President Obama straightforwardly requested Prime Minister Netanyahu to stop the construction of settlements, while President Obama's attempts to approach the Arabs by traveling to the Middle East and during his trip not visiting Israel, further deteriorated the bilateral relations (Parsons, Mitnick, 2016). The then special envoy in Middle East Sen George Mitchell, also, admitted later that it had been a mistake on behalf of the Administration not to visit Israel during the aforementioned trip in the Middle East (Baker, Rudoren, 2015).

In March 2010, during the then Vice President Biden's visit to Israel, the Israeli side announced additional settlements constructions, enraging the American side (Frumin, 2013). Later in the same month, during a meeting at the White House, President Obama demanded from the Israeli Prime Minister concrete actions with the aim of being able to renew the peace process, chief among them perceived to be the halt of all settlements. The tension was evident since, according to the Israeli side, no photographers were allowed during the meeting, while President Obama left Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli delegation in a meeting room to have dinner with his family (Blomfield, 2010). There was a second meeting later in the same day, however, no conclusion was reached. According to the New York Magazine and the White House, however, President Obama never went to have dinner with his family, since they were in New York that evening (Amira, 2010). Still, although the course of events during the meeting was not clear, the strained relations between the two leaders were evident.

In his speech on the Middle East in May 2011 (Politico, 19.5.2011), President Obama admitted that despite the efforts of his Administration the conflict had not been resolved and suggested that the negotiations should start based on the borders of the 1967 lines (The White House, 2011). The next day, at a meeting in the White House in the presence of journalists, Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected President Obama's suggestion, claiming that the 1967 borders are indefensible for Israel and gave, what the media called, a history lecture to President Obama (Crowley, 2015, Benac, 2015), with President Obama acknowledging the differences and claiming that this can happen between friends (Benac, 2015). The video from the aforementioned meeting and his response to President Obama was used later, in 2019, by Prime Minister Netanyahu as part of his electoral campaign (Heller, 2019). A few days after President Obama's suggestion, and after fierce reactions on behalf of both Israel, as well as the Jewish American community, President Obama attempted to pacify the reactions during a speech at the AIPAC conference, receiving, however, cool, as Politico admits, reactions from the participants, contrary to his fellow Democrat Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), who adopted the Israeli stance admitting that this borderline could lead to non-defensible borders for Israel and attracted an enthusiastic applause (Vogel, 2011). Other high-ranking Democrats, as well, such as the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev), also, defended Israel disagreeing with President Obama's suggestion (Gerstein, 2011).

The strained personal relations became officially and publicly evident in November 2011 during the G20 Summit in France, when the open microphone exposed the dialogue between French President Sarkozy and President Obama, with the first admitting that he “cannot stand” the Israeli Prime Minister and the second responding that he is the one that has to deal with him on a daily basis (Frumin, 2013).

However, the major rift between the two leaders came with the Iran deal. Baker (2016), also, calls the deal as the breaking point for their relations, with the hefty package of \$38 billion that, as mentioned before, was signed in 2016 under the Obama presidency, not being enough to ameliorate the situation. The cold relations are also evident by the fact that in 2015 the keynote speaker to the J Street conference, a liberal, progressive group within the community and rival to the powerful mainstream AIPAC, was the White House Chief of Staff, Debus McDonough, while at the respective AIPAC conference, Administration officials of lower rank were sent to address the participants (Lerner, 2015).

At the final days of the Obama Presidency, another incident further deteriorated the relations. The United States decided to abstain from the United Nations Security Council vote on a Resolution that was demanding Israel to stop the construction of settlements, when traditionally, all the previous years the American side used to veto similar Resolutions that were on a regular basis introduced. Prime Minister Netanyahu accused President Obama of an anti-Israel ploy (Khan, 2016), with Israel claiming to have “iron-clad” information on the American involvement on the drafting of the Resolution (Beaumont, 2016) and the White House denying it. However, according to the Reuters and western officials, it had been the intention of the American government to allow the passage of the Resolution by abstaining from voting (Nichols, Wroughton, 2016). All Republicans condemned the decision, President-elect Trump called for vetoing the Resolution and ensured the community that during his tenure “things will be different”, with Prime Minister Netanyahu admitting “looking forward” to working with the new President (Bertrand, 2016). However, not only Republicans, but Democrats, as well, criticized President Obama’s decision not to support Israel internationally. High ranking Democrats claimed that the United Nations is not the appropriate site for the United States to promote and negotiate the peace process, with the Sen Minority Leader, Chuck Schumer (D-NY) referring to the decision as frustrating and disappointing (Berke, 2016). AIPAC expressed its “deep disturbance” over Obama’s decision and thanked President-elect Trump for his intervention, along

with both the Republicans and the Democrats in the Congress who voiced their opposition against this decision (Beaumont, 2016, 23 December). J Street, on the other hand, welcomed the action as a means of achieving the two-state solution (Bertrand, 2016), while there were also Democrats who supported their President's decision, such as Sen Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who also claimed this to be a move towards a two-state solution (Fabian, 2016).

President-elect Trump twitted that after assuming his duties, things will be different in the United Nations (Fabian, 2016), while after the assumption of her duties, the new United Nations Ambassador, Nikki Haley, addressing the AIPAC Conference, confirmed the change from the Obama Administration, claiming that there is “new sheriff in town” (Gehrke, 2017). Fabian (2016) admits, however, that in case the Democrats and Hillary Clinton had won the elections, President Obama would most certainly not abstain from the United Nations vote and would veto the Resolution, as all previous Presidents did.

Donald Trump Presidency (20.1.2017-20.1.2021)

President Trump may not have been perceived by the majority of the American Jews, who prioritize the domestic issues, as the best choice, but for those, whose top priority is the American support towards Israel, President Trump had been the best option, having, as Eden and Sales (2020) claim, a “near spotless record” during his tenure.

According to the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Jerusalem Embassy Act, 1995), which was passed by both Chambers of the Congress during the 104th Congress and became law in November 1995, the United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and requested the relocation of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to be carried out by the end of May of 1999, ensuring, also, the appropriate funding. However, at the same time, it provided the President with the right to postpone it, making use of a six-month waiver, should he deem that there are national security reasons that are impeding him from proceeding to the relocation. This option was employed by all American Presidents until President Trump. On December 6, 2017, President Trump announced, contrary to both domestic and international warnings, his intention to materialize the aforementioned relocation of the American Embassy, claiming it to be a recognition of reality and the right thing to do (Financial Times,

2017, Dec. 6), with the Economist (2017), however, admitting this decision to have been reached based on domestic factors and interests. AJC (2017, Dec. 6) via its head, David Harris, spoke of a historic decision that put paid to a long-term anomaly, while AIPAC, also, admitted being grateful to President Trump, as did Prime Minister Netanyahu (Nelson, Nussbaum, 2017). Jeremy Ben-Ami of the J Street, on the other hand, was against the move of the Embassy, warning that this would change the so far American policy on the issue of Jerusalem, and this would be a “profound mistake” (Bennett, 2017).

The relocation was concluded on May 14, 2018, with Prime Minister Netanyahu referring to it as a glorious day, despite the protests taking place a few miles further and claiming the lives of more than 40 Palestinians (Goldman, Smith, 2018). President Trump’s decision for the Embassy’s relocation had supporters in both the Republican, as well as the Democratic party, with high-ranking Democrats, also, applauding the Republican President’s decision. Sen Chuck Schumer (D-NY), issued a press release agreeing on the long overdue character of the relocation and reminding that he had co-sponsored the initial legislation two decades ago (Schumer, 2018), also stressing his denial to vote the Iran deal under the Obama Presidency (Lesniewski, 2018). The current American President Biden, after assuming his duties, claimed that the Embassy will remain in Jerusalem, there will be, however, a separate Consulate in Jerusalem dealing with Palestinian issues, since after the relocation the Consulate was incorporated within the Embassy, creating a Palestinian Affairs Unit (Zanotti, 2021:1).

Despite the close cooperation with Prime Minister Netanyahu and the clear pro-Israeli attitude, President Trump’s relations with the community had not always been harmonious. Before he was elected President there were instances when he had been accused by the community for antisemitism and was perceived as being against the interests of Israel, with some members of the community even attempting to boycott him. The first of these instances was during his 2016 presidential campaign, when in a tweet he accused Hillary Clinton, his Democratic rival, as the most corrupt nominee, an accusation written in a six-sided star that was related to the Jewish Star of David, leading many Jews to accuse him of antisemitism and the tweet to be withdrawn within hours (Lartey, 2016).

Also, during his presidential campaign, he claimed that concerning the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians he will be the “neutral guy” (Scott, 2016). Those remarks enraged many members of the community and led many

of the participants of the AIPAC Conference to be hesitant against him, even asking to boycott him from addressing the Conference (Bowman, Rahman, 2016). His Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, seizing the opportunity, stressed at the AIPAC conference that there cannot be a neutral and ambiguous President on the issue (Bowman, 2016) and his Republican opponent, Ted Cruz, also, promised the group not to be impartial, but openly pro-Israeli, ending the deal with Iran (Glueck, 2016). However, and despite the initial reservations, he addressed the crowd at the AIPAC Conference, and he was warmly applauded after announcing his intention to relocate the American Embassy to Jerusalem (Bowman, Rahman, 2016).

2. Diaspora in the United States

Demographics

In 2021 the total Jewish population around the world is estimated to be 15,166,200 people, with the 7,300,000 of them, the 48.1% in percentage, living in the United States (Jewish Virtual Library, 2021). In the United States, therefore, in their total number, they represent the 2.2% of the American population (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020).

Concerning their distribution across the States, New York, the destination of many Jewish migrants of the past, remains the most heavily populated region with approximately 2 million Jews, reaching the 11% of the state's population. Miami, also, has a dense population, with more than 530,000 Jews, approximately the 8.3% of its inhabitants, followed by Philadelphia (6.9% of its population), Boston (5.3% of its population), San Francisco (5.2% of its population) and Los Angeles and Washington (4.7% of their population). Other states, also, have significant, although smaller, numbers of Jews (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020).

History of migration

According to the Library of the Congress (2004), the first Jews that settled on American soil were 23 refugees from Brazil, who arrived in 1654 in New Amsterdam (that was later renamed to New York). By 1700 the total Jewish population was not more than 300 people and by 1800 their number had reached the 2,500.

The first massive wave, including the Jews from Germany, gradually began to enter in 1820 and by 1880 their population had reached a number between 230,000 and 300,000 people (Library of Congress, 2004). The Jews of this first wave that entered during the first half of the 19th century, mostly settled in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore (Library of Congress, 2004.1).

In 1881, the second massive wave from East Europe began, in an era of persecutions in Russia following the assassination of Czar Alexander the second. In 1900 their population had already exceeded the one million and by 1920 it had reached approximately the 3.5 million (Library of Congress, 2004). The second, and final, massive wave lasted until 1924, when the Immigration Act was introduced, henceforth restricting the numbers of migrants entering the United States (Library of Congress, 2004.1). However, by 1970 the American Jewish population had already reached the 6 million people (Library of Congress, 2004).

Homogeneity

Although the community, similarly with any other ethnic group, is not a monolithic and homogenous entity, the American Jews traditionally are unanimous on the importance of supporting Israel, a priority that stands beyond political parties, having a totally bipartisan character. Key in their political success and the influence the community has managed to exert within the American political system has been this unanimity on the issue of their support towards their homeland (Rossinow, 2018). Wald and Williams (2006:207), also, agree that among all the ethnic groups American Jews are renowned for their devotion to their homeland, who, despite the fact that in their majority they no longer have a direct link with it, they still perceive themselves to be members of diaspora and strive for the wellbeing of Israel. Marcus (1990:546), also, admits that the power of the Jewish lobby depends on the unity its members will be able to achieve and maintain.

The community, however, became gradually less unified in their unquestioned support of Israel as was in the past. The progression of the generations and the introduction to the political field of the younger generations with more liberal views, certain actions on behalf of the community that have breached the bipartisan character of their efforts, as well as the increasing influence of more liberal groups within the community have resulted in dividing its members concerning its total support to Israel,

endangering, at the same time, its influence. Horowitz (2019) admits the internal divisions the introduction of the new generation of Jews has created, while Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:40), also, acknowledge that many members of the community do not share the hard-liners' stance as promoted by the mainstream organizations, such as the AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations.

The strained relations between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu that divided the Democrats, obliging them to take sides and to have to select whether they will support the community or their President brought the first major division and broke the bipartisan agreement in the Congress. The Trump presidency's unilateral stance, although overtly pro-Israel, as mentioned before, with 42% of American Jews admitting it, as well (Smith, 2019), further polarized and divided the community at the same time accentuating their differences, eventually also harming the bipartisan character the activists were traditionally striving to maintain. President Trump's rhetoric that those American Jews who will vote in favor of the Democratic party are disloyal to Israel, as well as his campaign against the Democrats, who accused the AIPAC further divided the community (Sullivan, 2019) and outraged many Jewish groups (Flynn, 2019). His stance to support the Israeli decision to prohibit their entering the country of two Muslim women Representatives, who were critical of Israel and AIPAC, also outraged the lawmakers and divided the community (Sullivan, 2019). The overall stance of his Presidency, at the end, despite pro-Israeli amplified the already existing differences within the community (Green, 2019).

Additionally, the creation of groups with more liberal and progressive character within the community, headed by the J Street, also further divided the Jewish Americans and the support to Israel lost its uncritical character of the past (Waxman, 2019). Since early, however, there were voices indicating that the cohesion of the community was beginning to breach, with the more progressive J Street appearing and challenging the powerful AIPAC (Roth, 2010).

Organizations

The pro-Israel group headed by the AIPAC is one of the most organized and influential groups active within the American political environment. There are many organizations operating nationwide with the aim of organizing the American Jews

politically, culturally and religiously. The most influential and the most active in lobbying activities are the AIPAC, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the American Jewish Committee, and the more recent J Street, different from the rest, however, with a more liberal, as mentioned before, character and opposing the mainstream lobbies. In their websites they all claim to share the same mission, that is to preserve the bipartisan support for Israel and to support the community.

AIPAC

As mentioned before, among the pro-Israeli lobbies the most powerful is the AIPAC and its organizational structure has been copied by other similar groups that wish to exert influence to the American politics. In 1997, it was rated by the Fortune Magazine as the second more powerful lobby in the United States, measuring its ability to “deliver votes” (JTA, 1997), Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:43) cite the former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, admitting that the best way to help Israel is by helping the AIPAC, while Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in the same vein, thanked God for its existence (Frankel, 2006). Rossinow (2018) admits that it became a huge factor in the American foreign policy, while President Obama in his memoirs by the title “A promised Land”, written after the end of his tenure, claimed that despite being supported by the American Jews, it was the AIPAC that distrusted him (TRT, 2020).

AIPAC was created in the 1950’s by I.L. Kenen, but under the leadership of his successor, Morris Amitay, who took over in 1974, it managed to become powerful (Frankel, 2006). As Rossinow (2018) claims, until 1974 the AIPAC practically was Kenen, while Bard (nd), also, admits that under the leadership of his creator it consisted of a one-man operation. However, it was under Amitay that the staff and its available funds tripled, while the decision to transfer its headquarters to a very close proximity of the Capitol Hill was deemed strategic (Frankel, 2006). His decision for this relocation of the group’s headquarters relied on the fact that he perceived the Administration more hostile and the Congress to be the group’s natural ally, while on the other hand within the Administration only the President and the Vice-President are elected, while in the Congress there are 535 members striving to be elected (Frankel, 2006). Bard (nd), also, admits that the AIPAC was created with the aim of lobbying directly the Congress.

AIPAC's growth both in size and power continued, also, after Thomas Dine took over from Amitay in 1980 (Frankel, 2006).

The power of AIPAC was evident in various instances. In 2002, President Bush demanded from Israel to withdraw its forces from the West Bank, sending Colin Powell to negotiate. AIPAC lobbied the Congress, which resulted in passing in both Chambers, by remarkable margins (352-21 and 94-2), as well, pro-Israeli Resolutions, while at the same time it organized a "Stand Up for Israel" event in Washington, attracting thousands of participants (Frankel, 2006). The result of their efforts was that within four days President Bush was calling Prime Minister Sharon a "man of peace" and Powel returned without any engaging in any negotiation whatsoever (Frankel, 2006).

Its power is also evident by the fact that it has the ability to punish lawmakers whose stance is deemed to be anti-Israeli. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:42), also, admit that the lawmakers' support is the result of the AIPAC's strategy of rewarding friends and punishing opponents, Sen Charles Mathias admitted that lawmakers who, according to the group, fail to deliver have to face political sanctions (Constas, Platias, 1993:16), while President Obama in his book claimed to have been the recipient of a "whisper campaign" depicting him as unsupportive, even hostile to Israel during his 2008 campaign (Kornbluh, 2020). Rep Paul Findley (R-II) having failed to be reelected after 22 years and 11 terms in Congress, directly accused AIPAC's head Thomas Dine as the main source of the 90% of the donations that were directed to his opponents in order to defeat him, since he was considered to be an enemy of Israel (Findley, 1985:110). As Frankel (2006) admits, Rep Findley was perceived by the group to be hostile to Israel after meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and claiming him to be a champion of human rights, while he also published a book titled: "they dare to Speak Out" on the influence of the lobby and the tactics it employs to achieve its goal within the American political system (Findley, 1985:104). In the case of Rep Charles Percy, pro-Israeli groups had directed \$1,8 million to his opponent, with Percy also accusing AIPAC's head, Morris Amitay, for his failure to be reelected (Frankel, 2006).

Frankel (2006) admits that such cases, like the campaigns against the above-mentioned lawmakers, consist a direct threat against the lawmakers, with the group transmitting a clear message to them that any action against Israel and its interests will be at their own peril, with Rep. Findley (1985:108) claiming that the characterization of anti-Semitic is employed by the group as a form of intimidation against the policy makers who wish to support a legislation against Israel.

The power of the AIPAC is also evident by the importance all politicians, at both Presidential and Congressional level, attribute to its annual Conference. The lawmakers in their majority participate and strive to please the participants, who have come from all over the country, while important messages are relayed through it.

President Obama selected its Conference in 2012 to reassure Israel that it has the full support of his Administration, ensuring the participants that he is ready to take all measures possible, even military action, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (Gerstein, 2012). Vice President Biden, also, reassured American Jews at the AIPAC Conference in 2013 that President Obama wishes to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weaponry (Gerstein, 2013). President Trump preferred to participate to the AIPAC conference in 2016 rather than his own party's debate, which was ultimately cancelled, in an effort to mitigate the impact of his declaration that he will keep a neutral stance between Israelis and Palestinians (Byrnes, 2016), while candidate Rick Santorum (R-PA) despite being on a Super Tuesday, when the majority of the States hold their primary elections for presidential elections, he left his campaign to participate to the Conference (Schultheis, 2012).

According to its website, its mission is to persuade the American government to maintain its close alliance with Israel.

J Street

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:62) in 2006 were admitting, however, that AIPAC being so successful is also attributed to the fact that it essentially lacked a serious competition, which came in 2008 with the creation of another pro-Israel group with more progressive views, the J Street. Tom Dine also admitted having been approached in order to form an anti-AIPAC group with a more liberal stance and it was in the framework of these efforts that the J Street was created (Traub, 2009).

According to Ben-Ami, its founder, who had experience in the American political system, having served the Executive during the Clinton presidency, being critical to Israel and at the same time pro-Israel is not mutually exclusive (Traub, 2009). The first 41 lawmakers that were supported by J Street in 2008, had been in their majority not of Jewish origin and the biggest part of the funds employed to endorse them proceeded by internet donations (Traub, 2009).

In July 2009, only one year after the creation of the J Street, President Obama invited its head, Ben Ami, to a meeting with the heads of the Jewish organizations, with many of the established groups being against his presence, due to the different ideological stance from the rest (Traub, 2009). Traub (2009) stresses, however, that the fact that J Street shared the Administration's views mostly contributed to Ben Ami's being invited to the meeting.

Despite being well established within the community, J Street has not reached AIPAC in both financial capabilities as well as influence, while especially at the beginning, lawmakers were extremely hesitant in participating in J Street activities therefore defying AIPAC. Rep Steve Cohen (D-Tn) had admitted that many attempted to dissuade him from participating at a J Street video, while he confirms that after participating, many AIPAC supporters stopped from attending his fund-raising events (Traub, 2009). However, and despite the vast difference of their available budget and resources, J Street views have attracted the younger generations of the community, who share their more liberal views.

Political affiliation

American Jews traditionally tend to vote for Democrats. On average since 1968 the American Jewish population in a percentage of 71% has chosen Democratic presidential candidates over the Republicans (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020.1).

During the more hostile to the group Presidency, this of President Obama, according to polls, the approval on the actions of President Obama in the Jewish American community fell from 65% in the period between July and December of 2012 to 54% in the same period of 2015. However, the more liberal and educated parts of the community continued to approve President Obama, contrary to the conservative part, who disapproved. According to the poll, the 85% of the liberal part of the group approved his actions, while from the conservatives only the 12% had been in favour (Norman, 2015).

3. Issue Timeline

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly referred to as the Iran deal, was reached after negotiations of the United States and the European Union, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom with Iran. On July 14, 2015, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union Federica Mogherini and the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif issued a Joint Statement, announcing the finalization of the agreement (Mogherini, Zarif, 2015).

According to the deal, Iran will have to reduce its stash of enriched uranium by 98%, remove the two thirds of its centrifuges, limiting its nuclear activities and accept international supervision of its program, while the international community will, in exchange, lift the sanctions that have been imposed due to its nuclear program.

The Implementation Plan (Annex V), described in detail the actions that would follow the Finalization Day and the end of the negotiations. The final negotiated deal had, also, to be submitted to the United Nations for endorsement, a procedure that was concluded on July 20, with the issuance of the Resolution 2231. According to the Plan, 90 days after the endorsement, on October 18, the Adoption Day, the deal came into effect, while the sanctions that were imposed to Iran due to its nuclear program were lifted on January 19, 2016, the Implementation Day, remaining in force however, certain prohibitions concerning the transfer and proliferation of specific sensitive material. At the Transition Day, 8 years after the Adoption Day, and on the condition that Iran has respected the provisions of the deal, the remaining proliferation related restrictions will be lifted, while at the Termination Day, 10 years after the Adoption of the deal, all the remaining restrictions will be lifted, as well.

The Presidency in a dedicated to the deal webpage informed on its importance, as well as for the benefits for the United States and for the rest of the international community, claiming that the deal on the one hand blocks the access to material that could be employed for the construction of nuclear weapons and on the other hand, the Iranian side accepts the international inspection of its facilities conducted by the IAEA, in order to ensure the compliance with the deal (The White House, 2015).

According to President Obama, the deal was based on verification and not trust, claiming that under its provisions, Iran will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons, thus

serving the American national interests. Therefore, and to protect the national interests, he openly declared his intention to veto any congressional attempt to derail the implementation of the deal (Obama, 2015). In the case the Congress insisted and the President employed the veto power, in order for the Congress to be able to override it, it would require a supermajority of two thirds in both Chambers.

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015

According to the Congressional Research Service, an agreement with a foreign country in the form of a Treaty can only enter into force upon receiving advice and a two third consent by the Senate. On the other hand, an Executive Agreement or a Political Commitment does not require any voting by the Senate and can enter into force directly by the President (Mulligan, 2018:2). As Mulligan (2018:21) admits, due to the fact that the deal did not include any binding obligations, it was perceived by the Presidency as a Political Commitment.

The Congress, even before the conclusion of the deal, had addressed letters to President Obama requesting a role in a potential agreement with Iran. Both the House and the Senate letters, signed by both Majority and Minority leaders, thus having a bipartisan character, requested information on the progress and underlined the role of the Congress on the issue (Pecquet, 2014). The fact, however, that the deal was not characterized as a Treaty, therefore avoiding being submitted to the Congress for its approval, had enraged many lawmakers, even Democrats (Collinson, 2015.1).

On February 27, 2015, Sen Bob Corker (R-TN) introduced the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act and on March 3, Rep Lou Barletta introduced the respective H.R. 1191 bill in the House, requesting by the President to provide to the Congress the adequate information on the deal. The legislation, which passed the House on March 17 and the Senate on May 7, required by the President to hand over the final deal to the Congress for examination. Additionally, the President was not allowed to lift any sanctions during the 60 days the Congress has at its disposal to examine the deal and approve it or disapprove it.

Despite President Obama's initial warning that he would veto any Congressional attempt to block the deal, on May 22, he signed the Act and on July 19 he handed the requested material to the Congress, thus initiating the 60-day period for evaluation and action. Additionally, and according to the provisions of the Act, as

mentioned before, by September 17 the Presidency was banned from lifting any sanctions.

According to experts, however, even without the cooperation of the Congress, President Obama could unilaterally lift many of the sanctions that were imposed directly by the Executive without the involvement of the legislative, but this would probably lead to the adoption of even more sanctions imposed by the Congress and it was deemed better to avoid such a confrontation by signing the Act (Crowley, 2015.1). Collinson (2015.1), also, admits that President Obama could up to a point bypass the Congress and lift certain sanctions, he did not, however, have the power to lift those imposed by the Congress, which were the heaviest.

Meanwhile, on March 9, a group of 47 Senators, all Republicans, led by Sen Tom Cotton (R-Ark) in a letter addressed to the Iranian leaders, they warned them that the American Constitution provides an active role to the Congress in approving Treaties the President has reached with other countries and, therefore, the deal could easily seize to exist once the current President's tenure ends (Bloomberg, 2015). This initiative caused many reactions, even from their fellow Republican Senators, who claimed this letter to be not only unnecessary, but also possibly counterproductive, since it could cluster the Democrats in support of their President, when their votes are necessary to override the Presidential veto and stop the deal. Democrats, also, were against this Republican initiative, with Vice President Biden claiming that to be the first letter of advice written by American lawmakers and addressed directly to the leadership of a foreign state (Everett, Crowley, 2015). Still, Sen Rand Paul (R-KY), cosignatory of the letter, admitted its recipient to be the American President rather than the Iranian leadership, since he attempted to bypass the Congress in reaching such a deal (Collinson, 2015.1).

Legislative process

The House and the Senate, both Republican led, adopted different methods in order to proceed with the legislation after receiving the material by the Presidency.

In the Senate, three attempts for a cloture motion to disapprove the deal failed, filibustered by the Democrats by 58-42, 56-42 and 56-42 (S.Amdt.2640 to H.J.Res.61).

In the House, and after the failed attempts to block the deal in the Senate, instead of voting in order to disapprove the deal, it was decided to proceed by voting on three

separate bills (Kerr, Katzman, 2018:21). Additionally, with the Republicans convinced that the President had kept form the Congress “side deals”, this three-stage approach in voting was also an effort to stall the process, with Sen Ted Cruz (R-TX), even officially and in writing requesting by the Speaker to delay the vote (Everett, Kim, 2015). Dumain (2015.1), also, admits, that the initial strategy of obtaining a disapproval, as followed by Senate, changed in the House into voting on a resolution of approval, with the aim of officially registering the lawmakers’ stance on the issue. The result was a symbolic (Dumain, 2015.1) and anticlimactic (French, 2015) vote to approve the deal, with the aim, according to Speaker Boehner, of making the lawmakers accountable for their votes (Siddiqui, 2015.1).

The first bill, H.R. 3461, was introduced in order to approve the deal. It failed to pass with 269 votes against and 162 in favor of the deal (Roll Call 493). All Republicans were against the bill, along with 25 Democrats. The second bill, H.Res. 411, accusing President Obama that he did not comply with the requirements of the Act passed with the 245 Republican votes. All Democrats apart from 2, who did not vote, were against it (Roll Call 492). The third legislation, the H.R. 3460, restricting the President from lifting sanctions before January 2017, passed again with the 245 Republican votes along with those of 2 Democrats, while the remaining 186 Democrats voted against it (Roll Call 494).

Therefore, the 60 days period passed, and the Congress voted no Resolution, either approving or disapproving the deal. Despite the fact that even after the voting the Republicans were claiming to employ any measure to prevent the deal from entering into force no action was taken (Steinhauer, 2015).

BBC, the New York Times and the Reuters refer to a major victory for President Obama (BBC, 2015, Steinhauer, 2015, Zengerle, 2015), while CNN refers to the deal as President Obama’s most far-reaching achievement in the international relations field during his tenure (Raju, 2015). Financial Times (2015), however, admits that the Presidency was in a more privileged position on the issue, since the two thirds of the lawmakers that were needed in order to override the President’s veto was difficult to reach, with Reuters, also, admitting the difficulty for the Republicans to ensure those votes (Zengerle, 2015).

A. Factors beyond control of the group

A.1 Issue

Congruence with hostland

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:30) admit that the degree of influence the community has reached to enjoy within the American political system lies in the fact that the community has generated the impression that their goals are in total congruence with the American national interests. Additionally, and equally important, is the fact that the American public opinion, also, is sympathetic and consistently supports Israel. This is obvious by a recent poll conducted in 2018, according to which, 74% of the Americans view Israel more favorably, compared to the 21% of them, who favor the Palestinians (Saad, 2018).

However, on the issue under question, the prevailing and most vocal part of the diaspora that was against the deal, came in direct opposition with the Obama Administration, which perceived the conclusion of the deal with Iran as a priority in the foreign policy field. Therefore, the group was against the Administration and both sides' lobbying target had been the Congress - essentially the Democrats, since the Republicans were en masse against the deal - in order to promote their stance.

Regarding the American public opinion, on the issue of the deal, it is obvious that their stance had not been definitive. Four different polls demonstrated the rather confusing results of the Americans' opinion concerning the deal. The one of the Pew Research Center found that 48% were against the deal and 38% approved it, the one conducted by YouGov found that 43% supported and 30% were against the deal, the poll of PPP found that 54% approved and 38% were rejecting the deal and according to the one conducted by Washington Post/ABC, the 56% was in favor and the 37% against the deal (Beauchamp, 2015). Despite the fact that the exact question asked at each poll may have an impact on the answer and the final product of the research in general, this difference in the results among the polls demonstrates that the American public opinion was confused and without a certain and firm stance on whether they were in favor or against the deal. This uncertainty on the issue led to partisanship, something that, as Beauchamp (2015) claims, was helpful for President Obama, whose task was to essentially promote the deal to the lawmakers of his own party.

The partisan character the issue had acquired became also evident by another poll concerning the handling of the issue by the Congress. In a poll, conducted by CNN/ORC, 52% of the Americans wished for the Congress to turn down the deal, with 44% wishing for it to be approved, while concerning the qualitative characteristics of the poll, the 66% of the Republicans' opinion was that the Congress should reject the deal and the 61% of the Democrats that it should approve it (Agiesta, 2015).

However, regarding the Republican's initiative to invite the Israeli Prime Minister, ignoring the protocol and the President, the majority of the Americans, according to a poll conducted by the Wall Street Journal and the NBC, by 48% disapproved the initiative, with 30% not deeming it wrong and the 22% refusing to take a stance on the issue, claiming not to know the procedure according to the protocol in order to be able to judge. Again, the partisan mentality was present, since 47% of the Republicans approved the action, against only 12% of the Democrats (Jaffe, 2015, March 2).

Congruence with homeland

On the issue of the conclusion of a deal with Iran, the efforts of the AIPAC and the most established organizations, since there were as mentioned before more liberal groups such as the J Street against it, were in total agreement with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Israel, both opposing it.

Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to the deal with Iran as a "historic mistake" (Kershner, 2015) and a "bad" deal (Thomas, 2015), ultimately being unable from preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, therefore placing both Israel and the international community in danger.

The most obvious incident that proves the congruence, as well as the cooperation between the group and the homeland had been the invitation arranged by Speaker Boehner to the Prime Minister Netanyahu for him to address the Congress and inform directly the American lawmakers on his stance on the issue. The most important part was that the invitation was sent and arranged without the prior consent or even notification of the Presidency by the Republican leadership of the Congress.

The Israeli Ambassador in the United States, Ron Dermer also lobbied against the deal visiting lawmakers (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015), while according to POLITICO, the Administration was so infuriated with his role in organizing the address

to the Congress, that was on the verge of ousting him (Crowley, 2015). The result of this close cooperation with the homeland and against the President brought the Democrats in difficult position and created rift not only in the Congress, but within the community, as well, since the bipartisan character of the past efforts was lost. The bad relations between the American President and the Israeli Prime Minister further deteriorated the relations within the group, as well, since they too were obliged to select a side and support one of them to support.

A.2 Resources

As mentioned before, the Jews represent the 2.2% of the American population, a small total number, situated, however, in key States for the electoral procedure. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:44), also, admit that American Jews tend to massively be taking part in voting procedures and their being concentrated in key states that are deemed crucial electorally, such as California or New York, has enabled them to effectively exert influence. Helmreich (2001), also, attributes their ability to exert influence primarily to be the result of their favorable geographical placement in key, swing, states stressing, also, the fact that they are “uniquely swayable” as a group, being eager to switch their votes from one party to another depending on their stance towards Israel, although, as he admits, as a group they tend to vote for Democrats.

This ability for massive voting was evident when President Bush Sr refused to authorize a \$10 billion loan to Israel without in advance receiving the Israeli assurance that the building of settlements would seize. The result of his decision was evident in the following elections of 1992, when he lost the Jewish votes, who overwhelmingly and by 80% voted for Bill Clinton, with only 11% voting for Bush, when in 1988 the Jews chose him by a percentage of 35% (Elsner, 2018). Helmreich (2001), also, characterizes the presidential elections of 1992, as the most indicative case of the swayable nature of the Jewish vote, stressing the fact that at the same time when the Jews were massively voting against the Republican Presidential candidate, the then President of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Seymour Reich was urging the New York based community to vote in favor of the Republican Senator Alfonse Damato over his Democratic rival as a reward for his stance and as a means of sending a message to the legislators on the voting power and importance the community has.

Terry (2005:10) cites the words of President Ford's advisor, Robert Goldwin, who admitted that although the Jews account for less than the 3% of the American population, they account for between 4 and 5% of the American votes, contrasting those numbers with the black population, who although they consist the 11% of the American population, they only account for 5% of the American votes. President Carter's advisor, Hamilton Jordan, also, admitted their massive participation in the elections and their importance as voters, in "staggering" as he claimed contrast with the other voting groups (Terry, 2005:11).

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:43) admit that despite their small population in total numbers within the American population, the group has the resources and the ability to contribute to political campaigns in a bipartisan character and therefore acquire support from both parties. Frankel (2006), also, admits that the biggest asset the AIPAC has is its members, both in terms of quantity, as well as in terms of quality, since they are primarily numerous enough and at the same time eager to mobilize to the events organized by the group, while on the other hand, a great part of them is affluent and can, therefore, contribute financially to sustain the lobbying efforts.

The amount of money donated to candidates since 1989 by all the pro-Israel groups, according to the Center for Responsive Politics is, \$176,015,561, of which \$107,052,302 was given to Democrats and \$66,912,108 to Republicans (Open Secrets, 2020). Bard (nd) admits, however, that it is difficult to calculate the number of all the existing pro-Israeli PACs, since many of them cannot be identified by their name, but still belong to the category, making donations, while according to Beattie (2018:loc1624) this list of PACs is long. On the other hand, the AIPAC, despite its name, is not registered as a PAC (Political Action Committee), and is not allowed to directly donate to lawmakers, but is engaged in broader lobbying activities, instead.

The competition to the AIPAC comes from within the community, from the liberal J Street, since the pro-Arab groups cannot compete with the pro-Israeli ones financially. In 2016 the pro-Israeli PACs distributed in campaigns more than \$7,000,000, when the pro-Arab groups about \$86,000. The difference is even more vast in total sums, with the pro-Israeli groups spending since 1992 more than \$75,000,000 and the rival ethnic group, the Arabs, only \$1,500,000 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2018). Since its inception in 2008, according to the Open Secrets (2020.2) the J Street has contributed \$14,926,295, almost exclusively to Democrats (98.5%).

In the period of the deal, in the cycle 2015-2016, the total amount spent by the pro-Israeli groups to members of the Congress and congressional candidates reached the \$15,473,287, with \$8,236,656 going to Democrats and \$7,236,631 to Republicans (Open Secrets, 2016). In the same period, J Street was on the top of the list of the pro-Israeli donors, distributing a little over \$3,000,000, all to Democrats, with second on the list the NorPAC with about \$1,300,000, also the biggest part, that is approximately \$922,000, going to Democrats (Open Secrets, 2020.1).

In 2015 and 2016 the Republican Jewish Coalition, the main ally of the AIPAC in lobbying against the deal, spent \$80,000 in lobbying per year (Open Secrets, 2016.2).

As mentioned before, AIPAC is prohibited from directly donating to lawmakers, it spent, however, in 2016, more than \$3,600,000 in lobbying activities, while in 2015 more than \$3,388,000 (Open Secrets, 2015), when in 2016 J Street spent \$400,000 in respective lobbying activities (Open Secrets, 2016.3).

A.3 Political Opportunity Structure

Allies

The main ally of the anti-deal group, headed by the AIPAC and including the majority of the mainstream Jewish organizations was the Republican party, also opposing the deal introduced by the Obama Administration and also lobbying the Congress from within, targeting their Democrat fellow lawmakers to oppose it. AJC (2015, Aug. 5) in August and after a period of examining the deal and meeting with government officials announced their opposition with the deal and called the members of the Congress to oppose it as well, while the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations announced that only the 10% of its members was on favor of the deal (Times of Israel, 2015).

Financial Times (2015), also, admits that the main organizations leading the opposition to the deal were along with the AIPAC, the Republican Jewish Coalition, as well, both spending millions on advertising campaigns. The Republican Jewish Coalition also heavily mobilized to stop the deal, and as its spokesman Mark McNulty openly admitted their big donors would support financially their efforts to cancel the deal, “spending heavily” (Palmer, Parti, 2015). Both in 2015 and in 2016, as mentioned

before, the Republican Jewish Coalition, spent \$80,000 per year to sustain the lobbying activities (Open Secrets, 2016.2).

Christians United for Israel Action Fund, also against the deal, although it lacked the economic capabilities of the AIPAC, it possessed, however, an even greater grassroots base with 2.2 million members and 1,500 pastors, who were also mobilized and active in lobbying against the deal (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015). The President of Christians United for Israel, Gary Bauer, also admitted that upon announcing the deal, all members were notified by email in order to contact their lawmakers and more than 100,000 emails were sent to lawmakers against the deal (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015).

Rivals

The anti-deal group headed by the AIPAC had to confront a very serious opposition, on the one hand by the Obama Administration and the President himself, who was lobbying in favor of the deal, targeting his own party's sceptic lawmakers and on the other hand, and most significantly, internal competition from the also pro-Israel group, J Street.

The efforts of the Administration to promote the deal had started even before it was finalized, from the stage of the negotiations. In March 2015, President Obama had invited the leaders of the more prominent Jewish organizations, along with a group of Democrats, consisting also by supporters and donors, with the aim of informing them on the course of the negotiations and to lobby in advance in favor of the final deal and its importance (Fabian, 2015).

During the 60-days period the Congress had in order to reach a decision, as Siddiqui (2015, August 20) points out, the lawmakers were approached and lobbied by the President himself, with CNN, also, referring to the lobbying campaign undertaken by the Obama presidency towards his party lawmakers as the most aggressive of his tenure (Raju, 2015).

President Obama, during a speech at the American University, even appealed to the American people requesting them to contact their lawmakers in order to support the deal, an unusual public request deriving from a President (Hirschfeld, 2015.1). Almost every national security official was employed on the promotion of the deal (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015), while all lobbying efforts undertaken by the President

personally, were targeting his own lawmakers, completely ignoring the Republicans, who were as a whole against the deal (Liptak, 2015, August 5). The Administration employed the social media as the main venue to respond to all criticism addressed against the deal, in an effort to persuade the indecisive lawmakers and ensure their votes (Liptak, Walsh, Acosta, 2015), while a government official admitted that this flow of information against the opposition of the deal had been a tactic employed by the government to simultaneously inform the American citizens on the importance of the deal and also respond to any attempt of misinformation (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015). President Obama also publicly adopted a hard stance, openly accusing the anti-deal group as “lobbyists” that spend millions of dollars, without referring to AIPAC by name, however, and the Administration press secretary Josh Earnest was admitting that their efforts were certainly outspent by the opposing, anti-deal group (Hirschfeld Davis, 2015, August 7). President Obama also accused the anti-deal group as being the very same lobbyists arguing for the war in Iraq, receiving response from the AIPAC that the group never adopted a position on the issue and underlying that they lobby for the amelioration of the deal reached and not in favor of a war with Iran (Hirschfeld Davis, 2015, August 7).

The main opposition, however, against the AIPAC did not stem from the President, but from the Jews in the United States, who despite the fact that they traditionally and on a permanent basis support Israel, they don’t necessarily accept the hard stance the AIPAC is promoting as Bishara (2014) admits.

According to a poll of the LA Jewish Journal, 49% of the American Jews claimed to be in favor of the deal, with 31% opposing it (Beauchamp, 2015), while more than 340 rabbis addressed a letter to the Congress lobbying in favor of the deal, acknowledging that not supporting it would be more harmful, while they also rejected the claim that all the Jewish leadership is against the deal (Wong, 2015). Labott, Walsh and Serfaty (2015), also, stress the importance J Street had for President Obama on promoting the deal, referring to it as a tool in his arsenal, while as Broder (2015) admits, the fact that many lawmakers were eager to defy the wish of the AIPAC is attributed to the effective fundraising on behalf of J Street.

However, the Congress played a key role in passing the deal and Obama’s success is attributed not only in the Executive determination, but to the Congressional Democratic leadership efforts and their coordination. Bresnahan and Everett (2015) attribute the success to the coordinated efforts of Democratic Senate and House

leadership Sen Reid and Rep Pelosi with President Obama, while key is also deemed the role of the Senate Democrat leader, Senator Harry Reid (Raju, 2015, Barrett, Raju, Walsh, LoBianco, 2015)

B. Factors under control of the group

B.1 Organization / Leadership

As mentioned before, AIPAC has served as a model for most ethnic groups in the United States, striving to achieve an effective organizational structure, including the groups of the previous two case studies, namely Indians and Cubans, since its organizational strength is acknowledged as having contributed to its success in becoming influential.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:40) admit that the lobby does not consist solely of Jewish organizations but is a wider coalition including both individuals and groups that wish to defend the Israeli interests, while Bard (nd), also, claims that it is more accurate to refer to pro-Israel rather than Jewish lobby, since within the group there are many non-Jewish elements, with the common, however, aim of promoting the pro-Israeli affairs. Waxman (2010:7) admits that the term pro-Israel lobby has become almost synonymous with the AIPAC, agreeing however that this is far from accurate, since AIPAC is only one of the pro-Israeli lobbies operating in the United States. Beattie (2018: loc 1465) admits that the organizational capabilities of the Jewish Americans in promoting their interests in the Congress has made them pioneers and model for the other ethnic groups and despite their relatively small number as a community, they have managed to exert influence and their voice is always heard in the United States (Beattie, 2018: loc 1481). Marcus (1990:550) points out, that AIPAC is so familiar with the American political system that no Israeli diplomat could ever replace it, while both Horowitz (2019) and Waxman (2019) find key to success its ability to employ its grassroots reserves and mobilize its people nationwide to contact their lawmakers.

Organization

AIPAC undertook the main responsibility of organizing all groups' efforts and lobbying against the deal. In view of the voting concerning the Iran deal, AIPAC

director Howard Kohr had ordered all the group employees to cancel their vacations in view of the upcoming vote (Kampeas, 2015). All the groups' grassroots capabilities were employed in lobbying the lawmakers' offices with emails and calls in order to persuade them not to support the deal, while according to AIPAC 100,000 of its members arranged meetings with lawmakers in Washington and across the States (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015).

Even President Obama admitted the fierce and well-organized effort of the opposing lobby, headed by the AIPAC, lobbying the Congress (Liptak, Krieger, 2015), admitting, also, the pressure the group exerted to the lawmakers to side with them against the deal (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015).

In the annual AIPAC Conference in March 2015 a record number of participants, 16,000, was reached (Jaffe, 2015, March 3) and the issue of the deal was central.

Homogeneity on the issue

As mentioned before, the main opponent of AIPAC had been from within the community, the efforts of another pro-Israeli lobby, the liberal J Street. Despite the vast difference in both their size, as well as their available resources, J Street's mere existence and opposition did not allow the community to speak in a single voice. Additionally, the fact that, as mentioned before, the Jewish community had progressed and the newer generations evolved to become more liberal, created a momentum for J Street.

The Guardian also admitted that the AIPAC on this issue did not echo the views of the Jews Americans, who were not adamantly against the deal, rather the opposite according to polls (Borger, 2015). According to a survey conducted for the J Street (2015, July 28) in the American Jewish population, 60% are in favor of the deal. Concerning the opinion of the community regarding the stance Congress should keep, 53% of the American Jews, according to a poll conducted by the Jewish Journal, wished for the Congress to approve the deal against a 35% who wished for it to reject it (Liptak, Krieger, 2015). These results are contrary to the American public opinion, where 52% of the Americans wished for the Congress to reject the deal against 44% claiming that it should be approved by it (Liptak, Krieger, 2015).

On the other hand, the issue acquired a partisan character, leading the lawmakers to cluster to their parties' views, with the Republicans being all against the deal, and the Democrats seeking to defend their President. Additionally, events that had extremely partisan character further polarized the two sides and did not allow for homogeneity. Top among these, had been the speech of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Congress, arranged by the Republican Speaker, without the President having any information.

Therefore, neither the community was unanimous in rejecting the deal, nor the lawmakers were successfully influenced in order to follow the lobby's wish against the wish of their President, while the close relation and the active involvement and cooperation with the Republicans alienated the Democrats and the issue acquired a partisan character.

B.2 Strategies

The Jewish lobby achieved to become successful to the point of leading many to claim that it can steer the American foreign policy in the area, by creating unanimity, especially in the Congress, concerning the American national interest to protect Israel.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:29), also, admit that Jewish lobby's core strategy that successfully managed to influence the American foreign policy had been the effective framing of their issue, persuading both the lawmakers, as well as the general public, that it is totally in line with the American interests and that the United States has to support them. This led, according to them, not simply in influencing the American foreign policy decision making, but to divert it from the actual national interests. According to Horowitz (2019) its success lies to the fact that the American public opinion towards Israel is positive and supportive, while Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:42) also agree that key strategy is to maintain a positive image on both the lawmakers and the American public opinion concerning Israel. Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the congruence with the American foreign policy was focused on the fact that both countries had to face the same enemy and were equally threatened by terrorism (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006:32), while Frankel (2006), also, admits that having the "right enemies" also contributed to its success and influence, as well as the public opinion's perception that it is an ally.

Terry (2005:36) admits that their organizational structure, as well as their personal relations with policy makers at different levels, provides them with direct access to almost all points of the American political system. Congress may consist the lobby's most important ally, but as Terry (2005:37) admits, the close contacts with the presidential staff enables them to have access to the Executive, as well, a fact confirmed by Josh Block, AIPAC's spokesperson, that was admitting that dealing with the American Administration is like pushing an open door (Frankel, 2006).

According to AIPAC, the mobilization against the Iran deal was perceived to be one of the most important in the group's history (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015).

Framing of the issue

As mentioned before, framing of the issue has traditionally been a core and successful strategy in promoting the group's aims. Concerning the deal, the main argument that was employed was the fact that the deal was not ensuring the safety of Israel, as well as that of the international community, and that it was a bad deal as Prime Minister Netanyahu, also, claimed. The focus, thus, primarily was on Israel and its safety, since as it was underlined, the deal was not able to ensure that Iran would not be able to acquire nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the deal was framed as an issue of national security for both an American ally, Israel, as well as for the safety of the international community.

Focused Approach

In order to lobby against the deal more effectively, apart from employing the traditional methods of lobbyists and activists contacting the lawmakers requesting them to vote against the deal, a specific vehicle, the Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, was created. The Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran was supported by AIPAC and was founded as a 501(c)(4) having, therefore, the ability to raise and distribute money with limited obligations for disclosure (Bolton, 2015). The focused approach towards the Democrats is also obvious by the group's Advisory Committee, which included several Democrats and former Democratic lawmakers, with the aim of lobbying their fellow Democrats (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015). According to its spokesman, Patrick Dorton, the group was created in order to educate the Americans on the harmful nature of the deal (Bolton, 2015) and to this end, it paid for TV advertisements to be aired in 23 states, spending

more than \$1 million in four states only. At the same time, the opposing J Street announced a total budget of \$5 million for its lobbying efforts (Bresnahan, Palmer, 2015). The difference in financial capabilities of the two groups was also obvious by the fact that J Street according to its budget was able to focus its advertisement campaign in five States, while the AIPAC in 23 (Chang, 2015).

Apart from the focused approach of the “Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran” the main target of the group was the Congress, where about 1,000 activists from the AIPAC were lobbying lawmakers to oppose the deal, cooperating with the Republicans and even meeting with the Majority Leader, Sen Mitch McConnel (R-Ky) in order to coordinate their efforts for the cloture motion (Bresnahan, Everett, 2015). Since the announcement of the deal, J Street held more than 125 meetings with lawmakers, while according to AIPAC 400 meetings in lawmakers’ offices were held in the course of one week, only (Chang, 2015).

The close cooperation with the Republican leadership of the Congress is also evident by the fact that House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) unilaterally and without the knowledge of the Executive invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to directly lobby the lawmakers. On January 21, 2015, Speaker Boehner (R-Ohio) announced his invitation to the Israeli Prime Minister to address the Congress one day after the President’s declaration to veto any attempt on behalf of the Congress to introduce more sanctions against Iran and to stop the deal (Moe, Dann, 2015). The Executive claimed this invitation to be a “departure” from the protocol (Diamond, 2015, January 22.1), while President Boehner claimed that it is within the Congress jurisdiction to extend such an invitation to a foreign leader (Zengerle, Rampton, 2015). The speech took place on March 3, 2015, with Prime Minister Netanyahu underlying the fact that the deal is bad not only for Israel but for the international security, as well, claiming, that it would ultimately not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama referring to the speech, he admitted that there was “nothing new” and White House officials, also in a strong wording, criticized the address as “rhetoric” and entailing “nothing in essence” (Collinson, 2015).

Specific lawmakers with close relations with the community were also targeted in order to be persuaded, primarily to reject the deal and, consequently, to lobby their fellow lawmakers. The highest ranking Democratic Jewish Sen Chuck Schumer (D-NY) refused to endorse it (Liptak, Krieger, 2015), while an AIPAC activist was characterizing his vote the “lynchpin” of their efforts (Labott, Walsh, Serfaty, 2015),

since as Chang (2015) admits he has been, traditionally, an AIPAC ally. Siddiqui (2015, August 20), also stresses the close relation with the AIPAC of both Senators Chuck Schumer and Bob Menendez, who since the beginning openly declared their disapproval of the deal, while according to CNN their lack of approval clearly demonstrates that the President can never have a total control over his party (Raju, 2015).

Congressional support

According to Waxman (2019), only NRA's reputation is more fearsome than AIPAC's concerning its ability to influence the Congress, the two lobbies' difference, however, as Beinart (2018) underlines, lies to the fact that, contrary to the NRA, which has a heavily partisan character, polarization can diminish AIPAC's influence, since support by both parties is essential in order to succeed. Nierman (2020), also, admits that Israel and the bilateral relation have traditionally been the only issue both Democrats and Republicans agreed on, characterizing the issue as sacrosanct and immune to partisan politics, while Mearsheimer and Walt (2006:42) admit that Israel is almost immune from any kind of criticism within the Congress. Zanotti (2012:1), also, confirms the great congressional support, with the Legislative frequently accusing the Executive for not being supportive enough and granting even more funds than the Executive requests. Lawmakers from both parties, also, admit that their devotion to Israel is bipartisan, with Rep Steny Hoyer (D-Md), admitting that Israel bonds the two parties in a common cause (Hattem, 2016), while the participation of lawmakers from both parties to the annual AIPAC conference is massive and a proof of the bipartisan support. Waxman (2019) also stresses the importance of the bipartisan character the congressional support traditionally has and agrees that the polarization is a threat to the group's effectiveness.

The issue of the deal, following the, in general, tensed bilateral relations during the Obama presidency as described before, had created a rift among the various components of the lobby, as well as between the Democrats in the Congress, who were split between Israel and the wish of their President. Many Jews were warning that this war between the anti-deal Jewish organizations and President Obama would eventually harm the community as a whole (Liptak, Krieger, 2015).

The speech of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Congress in the way it was organized, breaking the protocol and without the prior knowledge of the Executive, further polarized the issue and alienated the Democrats, while both Baker (2015) and Davis (2015), stress the timing the invitation was extended, one day after the President's State of the Union address, perceived as an effort of the Republican congressional leadership to defy the President. Democratic lawmakers were, also, since the beginning warning Prime Minister Netanyahu that his speech could breach the bipartisan character of American politics towards Israel (McGreal, 2015). The address obviously converted the issue into a partisan matter and as a result, 58 lawmakers, all Democrats, 8 Senators and 50 Representatives were not present at the Session (Jaffe, 2015, March 3.1). The partisan character is also obvious by the statements following the address. The then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Sen Bob Corker (R-TN) claimed that it was President's irresponsible stance against the legislative that led Speaker Boehner to bypass him and directly invite Prime Minister Netanyahu (Diamond, 2015, January 22). Speaker Boehner accused President Obama of expressing animosity against Prime Minister Netanyahu (Bradner, 2015).

The fact that AIPAC lost its totally bipartisan character is according to Beinart (2015) one of the main reasons why it lost the battle with President Obama on the issue of the Iran deal, Dumain (2015.1), also, admits that the debate in the House over the deal had a partisan character.

Fundraisers/donations

Despite the fact that as mentioned before, AIPAC is not a political action committee and cannot therefore directly offer donations to lawmakers' campaigns, it organizes and directs the other pro-Israeli PACs to distribute their donations effectively (Frankel, 2006). Politico also stresses that the influence Israel has in the Congress is very powerful with the pro-Israel donors having achieved to make it one of the most influential issues (Allen, Sherman, 2011). Beattie (2018:loc1617), also, agrees that its inability to distribute money directly does not prevent AIPAC from hosting events and indicate the appropriate candidates the individuals or those organization that are allowed to fund raise will support them.

Concerning the issue of the deal, both the AIPAC as well as the Republican Jewish Coalition had at their disposal about \$40 million for anti-deal advertising

campaigns, while J Street could hardly employ \$5 million (Borger, 2015). According to Ho (2015:1) only three mega-donors have offered \$13 million since 2010 against the deal, while on the other hand smaller donors donated about \$68,500 to the pro-deal groups. Ho (2015:1) admits that the Republican Jewish Coalition lobbied its members nationwide to contact their lawmakers to oppose the deal and that its affiliated super PAC, the Republican Jewish Coalition Victory Fund only in 2012 received donation of \$2 million by Adelson.

Trips

The American Israel Education Foundation (AIEF), affiliated with AIPAC and in the form of 501(c)(3), by 2013 had spent more than \$4.8 million for organizing lawmakers' trips to Israel according to Cooper (2013). Bard (nd), also, claims that those trips are very effective in educating the lawmakers and make them more sympathetic, while Beattie (2018:loc1661) claims that the most visited country by the lawmakers is Israel, with the AIEF mostly targeting the freshmen in order to acquire a first-hand experience of the region and the arguments of the AIPAC. An anti-war group named Codepink, recently, even filed a claim against the AIEF with the Office of Congressional Ethics, claiming that those trips lack transparency (Bowden, 2019). According to the travel disclosures, one trip, only, that of Rep Palazzo (R-Minn) in August 2011 costed more than \$30,500 with AIPAC, in a rare comment on the issue, accepting that the cost might be occasionally elevated due to external conditions such as the Hurricane Irene on this specific trip (Becker, 2011).

J Street, also, organizes trips to Israel, though not with the participation the AIEF trips have, with 37 lawmakers having participated since 2009 (J Street, 2017, July 10). In 2017, seven lawmakers participated to the trip to Israel and West Bank organized by the J Street Education Fund, the 8th and most populous trip, where they met with Israelis and Palestinians (J Street, 2017, July 10).

Those regular trips to Israel were also employed as a means to influence the lawmakers against the deal. In view of the deal, in 2015 the trip to Israel was held before the voting, while for the first time both Democrats and Republicans were participating at the same time, even for one day. The bipartisan delegation was headed by the House minority and the House Majority leader, issuing also a joint statement, while Dumain

(2015), also stresses the timing of the aforementioned visit to Israel before the crucial voting.

Chapter 6: Comparative findings - Conclusions

As already mentioned before, diasporic activity as well as the intensity of their members' mobilization depends on the issue the group wishes to promote, therefore success or failure in promoting a specific issue, only, does not necessarily qualify the group as influential or not. This is, also, demonstrated by the Jewish American case study and their failed effort to block the American deal with Iran. Jewish diaspora is perceived to be one of the better organized interest groups in the United States and the most influential among the American based ethnic lobbies, having, thus, served as the organizational archetype for all the rest. However, as described above, it failed to block President Obama from passing the deal with Iran. Indian Americans, previously completely unaccustomed to running large scale foreign policy related lobbying campaigns in hostland, were successful in promoting the nuclear cooperation with their homeland, while the Cuban Americans have managed to maintain the embargo until today, despite increasing voices, both nationally and internationally, for the opposite. Therefore, the main question remains why different diasporas or even different efforts of the same diaspora are successful, while others not, and what are the factors present in some instances that could contribute to the successful diasporic political influence in hostland. The current thesis attempted to answer this topic by employing the case study method to test the existing theory on diasporic influence and through the in-depth study of three cases to identify factors that contributed to the final success of the effort. Additionally, the method was selected due to the importance it attributes to the context of the case, since as mentioned before, the elements that contribute to the successful influence are not only group related, but case related, as well, therefore, varying from case to case.

It should, however, be underlined that diaspora is not a monolithic entity, with all of its members at all times sharing the same views concerning the necessity of promoting a certain homeland related issue or the optimal approach to pursue it. Therefore, when we refer to "diaspora" stance regarding a certain issue, we refer to its mainstream and more vocal part. This, however, does not mean that the group in its entirety supports the leadership's handling of the topic, since there may be individuals or other groups within the community supportive in varying degrees, or even opposing

the issue or acknowledging the importance of the issue, disagreeing, however, with the approach the leadership adopted to pursue it.

Additionally, having maintained the hostland as a constant, all three diasporas were operating within the same, the American, political system, it is, thus, ensured that the opportunities, and the limitations posed by the external environment concerning the mobilization are common for all three.

Despite the fact that the cooperation with other groups is cited as a factor that could positively contribute to the diasporic influence, the degree and the quality of the cooperation of the Indian Americans with their allies was extraordinary. This cooperation appeared to have a dire consequence on the Indian Americans' success, since the group was totally unaccustomed in engaging in campaigns of such scale and was even acknowledged to be an invisible community within the American political system. The coordination of the efforts and the distribution of the lobbying efforts to the groups within the coalition according to their abilities and the audience they had more influence to was key. The existence of allies, although not guaranteed in all diasporic efforts, in the case of Indian Americans was clearly perceived by the group leadership as a resource that had to be tapped and their experience and resources were employed strategically. This alliance not merely supported the effort, but its importance is evident in the transformation of the group, which from an invisible community became one of the most powerful ethnic groups with Nicholas Burns, even referring to the effort as the "coming-out party" to the American politics (Chatterjee, 2015:176). The second element that was not underlined by the existing theory was the importance the country dedicated Caucuses can assume and the support they can provide to the diaspora, when effectively mobilized and employed to the benefit of the effort. The contribution of the Caucus was more evident in the Indian Americans' case, where the Congressional Caucuses on India and Indian Americans counterbalanced the lack of Indian Americans within the Congress and their members cooperated closely with the community, promoting the issue and lobbying their colleagues from within. The Congressional bicameral Cuba Democracy Caucus also contributed in promoting the group's issue, along with the elected Cuban Americans. The Caucuses, therefore, should be perceived as an important and valuable vehicle for the group within the Congress and their creation and enforcement should be a conscious strategy. In this line, and with the aim of maintaining a constant base of supporters within the Congress, the Cuban Americans' strategy of supporting new lawmakers' campaigns, who upon

entering the Congress supported the group was also key, since along with the members of the Caucus and the elected members of the community were lobbying within. Key, therefore, seems to be a conscious and coordinated strategy to acquire and maintain supporters within the Congress, either elected members of the community or close to the group lawmakers.

Finally, the loss of partisanship in promoting an issue can have a negative impact, debilitating the diasporic effort. This was evident in the Jewish case study, where the close cooperation of the leadership with the Republicans divided both the legislators, as well as the community. The Jewish Americans were no longer speaking with one voice, the aim was no longer common, therefore, the lawmakers could support their President without the past fear of opposing a unified and determined community.

A. Factors beyond control of the group

A.1 Issue

Congruence with hostland

Ahrari (1987:156), particularly, underlines the importance of congruence of interests between the issue diaspora needs to promote and the hostland national interest, closely related to what Haney and Vanderbush (1999:344) refer to an “open door” element. However, it should be noted that in the United States politics, given the elevated role the Congress has acquired in the foreign policy decision making, the President can no longer alone decide on the national interest, omitting the Legislative’s opinion. Therefore, the compatibility with the American national interest is not an issue that President, only, can decide. Congress has a crucial part, as well, in determining the congruence of the foreign policy related issues with the American national interests. Consequently, although in the research the compatibility is primarily examined in relation with the Executive, it has to be underlined that the Congress became a coexecutor of the foreign policy decision making and has to be taken under consideration, as well, hence, in all three cases the main lobbying target of the groups were the legislators.

In the case study of the Indian Americans and the promotion of the bilateral nuclear cooperation with India, the relation between the group and the hostland was completely synergetic. The Executive not merely supported the effort, but rather requested and took advantage of the Indian Americans' assistance in order to lobby an initially negative Congress in favor of the deal.

Concerning the Cuban Americans, due to the fact that the issue has a prolonged character, with the group striving not only to maintain the embargo, but also to reinforce the sanctions against Cuba, the degree of congruence with each Administration varies. Not all Presidencies were equally pro-embargo, with some, as already described above, being even eager to completely normalize the bilateral relations with Cuba and lift the embargo and all sanctions. Therefore, for some Administrations, the group had been an ally, totally in line with their stance on the issue, while for others it had been an obstacle in achieving their desired normalization of the American relations with Cuba. However, following the codification of the embargo under the LIBERTAD, the Administration lost the prerogative and can only to a certain extent intervene, relaxing certain type of the sanctions, while the Congress that acquired the authority to lift the embargo remains until now the major ally of the pro-embargo group. Therefore, despite certain Administrations' opinion that normalizing the bilateral relations with Cuba and lifting the embargo would be in the best American national interests, diaspora managed to successfully uphold it, aided by the Congress, which thought otherwise.

In the case of the Jewish diaspora and the issue of the American deal with Iran, the traditional congruence between the group and the American Administration was lost. The direct opponent of the group was the President himself, who personally lobbied his Democratic lawmakers and accused the AIPAC and their lobbying techniques as being directed against him, personally. This explicit enmity between the group leadership and the President, also, divided the Democrats in the Congress, leading them to face a dilemma between supporting the AIPAC or their own President.

Summarizing, concerning the factor of congruence of the issue diaspora wishes to promote with the American national interest, as the Executive perceives it, it is a factor that applies in the Indian American effort, and in several of the Presidencies during the prolonged Cuban American effort, while it does not apply in the Jewish Americans' effort. However, as already mentioned, the compatibility of a foreign policy related issue with the American interests can no longer be determined by the Administration, only, and the Congress has acquired an active and crucial role, as well.

Therefore, the factor of the congruence of the diasporic issue with the national interests is more complex, at least within the American political system, and further case studies should be examined to determine the factor's influence on the success of the group. A President in favor of the issue the group wishes to promote could more easily persuade a Congress led by its party and, therefore, the chances of success of the diaspora would be better. On the contrary, the President would probably have greater difficulty in persuading a Congress led by the opposite party and the issue could acquire a partisan character. Therefore, in order to determine the influence the factor could have on the success of the diasporic effort, more research would be required, with cases including different party combinations between President and Congress leadership.

Congruence with homeland

As mentioned before, diasporas mobilize in order to ensure their homeland wellbeing or to promote their homeland interests, as they perceive them. Therefore, their perception could be different from their homeland leadership, and this could lead the group to directly oppose it. Therefore, the diasporas' actions in hostland could either be in line or against their homeland leadership, should they perceive that their homeland government's decisions harm their country and their co-ethnics' wellbeing. It should be noted, however, that even in cases when the diaspora opposes its homeland, within the group there might be no absolute unanimity and different subgroups could be in line with the homeland actions. Still, as mentioned before, the study refers to the mainstream and more active parts of the group and their stance.

The Indian Americans were in line with their homeland's government, both in favor of the conclusion of the bilateral nuclear deal, despite the fact that in India the internal opposition was fierce, and this stalled the conclusion of the deal for years. The Indian government, through the American based professional lobbyists it had employed, was also lobbying the Congress and those lobbyists were closely cooperating and educating the community on how to effectively promote the deal. However, it has to be noted that when the community was divided between hostland and homeland, with India rejecting the version of the deal the American Congress adopted and requesting the Indian Americans' intervention in order to modify it, the group sided

with the hostland and persuaded India to accept the deal as adopted by the American Congress.

In the case of the Cuban Americans, the group's lobbying efforts in hostland are obviously directed against its homeland, rejecting any prospect of normalization of the bilateral relations with the United States. Perceiving the Cuban leadership as detrimental for the homeland's interests and the wellbeing of its people, the American based diaspora maintains a rigid stance, setting as a prerequisite the country's democratic transition in order to accept the end of the embargo and all the sanctions imposed by the United States.

Jewish diaspora was completely aligned with the Israeli leadership, both opposing the prospect of an American deal with Iran, on the grounds that it would pose a danger to the security of Israel, and both closely cooperating and coordinating their efforts, lobbying the Congress against the deal. This close, however, cooperation between the group and the homeland directed against the American President, himself, could also have led to the ultimate failure of their effort, since the traditionally bipartisan character the support for Israel has within the American Congress was lost for this issue.

Therefore, the congruence of the issue diaspora wishes to promote in hostland with their homeland does not seem to have an influence on the successful endeavor of the group, since Cuban Americans are effective in maintaining the embargo against their homeland, while, on the contrary, the absolute support and the close cooperation of the American based Jewish diaspora with their homeland not only proved to be futile, but rather undermined their entire effort.

A.2 Resources

Most scholars acknowledge the importance of the available to the group resources, admitting that both the size of the group, as well as its geographical distribution across the States could have a direct impact on its ability to exert influence and successfully promote an issue. A densely concentrated group in a key electoral State could have an elevated ability to exert influence following a certain voting pattern, while the bigger the group the most influential it could in theory become. Paul and Paul (2009:102) underline that the financial capabilities of the group directly impact its ability to promote its interests, thus being able to run campaigns and engage in various

activities of mobilization. Esman (1994:32), on the other hand, underlines the importance of the qualitative resources, as well, since the qualitative traits of the group can also define the mobilization strategy it will employ.

The Indian Americans are considered a relatively small community and the fact that they are scattered across the States rather than being concentrated in certain key States, could not allow them to act as a significant voting bloc, and be, therefore, able to exert influence through employing a coordinated voting pattern in certain key States. However, their qualitative characteristics and their high incomes allow them to act as generous donors, thus compensating their small numbers and become able to approach the lawmakers and exert influence through their donations. On the other hand, they took advantage of their multi-State presence and with effective mobilization of all members, they approached lawmakers from many States.

The number of Cuban Americans, also, is insufficient to ensure their being influential in the electoral result on a national scale. However, and contrary to the Indian Americans, they are favorably geographically concentrated in one key state, Florida, an element that can be employed to their benefit. Additionally, the importance the State of Florida has for the national electoral result, being a swing state that has 29 electoral votes, makes the community a target for candidates of both parties, who attribute exceptional weight to them and their requests. Finally, the qualitative characteristics of the community are, also, advantageous for their successful activism, since they are, like the Indian Americans, an affluent group that has the ability to donate in campaigns and, therefore, exert influence.

American Jews may also in total number be unable to have an impact on the electoral result on a nationwide scale, they are, however, like the Cuban Americans, also favored concerning their geographical distribution across the States. They are concentrated in certain, key for the electoral result, States, a fact that enables them to exert influence by employing the coordinated votes of the community locally. Additionally, their massive participation to the elections and the fact that despite the preference they traditionally demonstrate towards the Democrats, they are eager to sway their votes, when necessary, makes them a very important target group for candidates of both parties. Moreover, the pro-Israeli PACs, that are able to offer donations to the lawmakers under the American law, are numerous, extremely organized, and affluent, being, therefore, able to effectively employ the group's

donations and distribute them to the more suitable, according to the issue they wish to promote, lawmakers and candidates.

Therefore, the fact that in total numbers none of the groups could act as an influential voting bloc in the nationwide level did not seem to be an obstacle to their being successful in exerting influence and promoting their desired issue. Additionally, in all three case studies the group resources, both qualitative and quantitative, appeared to have a direct influence on their ability to exert influence and to promote their cause. Although the resources belong to the factors of the first category, which are given to the group and the leadership cannot control or alter them, they are closely related and dependent on the factors of the second category, which are under the group's control. The mere existence of resources, both quantitative and qualitative would probably be of no effect concerning the ability of the group to exert influences if not effectively mobilized (members of the group) and utilized (financial resources) by the group leadership. Consequently, the resources seem to have a direct impact on the ability of the group to exert influence on the condition that the group consciously mobilizes and effectively utilizes them to promote the desired issue.

A.3 Political Opportunity Structure

As mentioned before, the American political system is open to groups' influences, with the right to lobby the Government to be institutionally protected by the American Constitution. Ethnic groups, similarly, with all other domestic non ethnic groups, enjoy this right and they are free to mobilize, either to promote the community's interests or to ensure the wellbeing of their former homeland. Therefore, all three groups under study shared equal liberty in exercising their lobbying activities within the American political system. Consequently, within this open to influences political environment they were free to ally with other same minded actors and groups, while, at the same time, other groups, nonethnic or other diasporas, were equally free to counter lobby against the group.

Concerning the Indian Americans' case study, both the allies, as well as the rivals of the group were equally powerful. Key, however, had been the unusual degree of cooperation of the diaspora with the allies and the effective and coordinated coalition that was created specifically in order to promote the issue. This coalition of powers contained, apart from the diaspora, other domestic, non-ethnic, interest groups that had

vast experience in running such lobbying campaigns and provided assistance to the inexperienced community, educating them. Those allies included business groups, experts that were providing legitimization to the effort and were assisting in promoting an effective message, as well as professional lobbyists hired by the homeland. Key, however, had been the degree of cooperation among the different in nature groups and the internal organization within the members of the coalition, with the community undertaking a completely distinct role compared to that of its allies, approaching the lawmakers, being, however, harmoniously and to the detail coordinated with the other elements of the coalition.

However, equally strong, experienced, and internationally influential was the Indian Americans' rival group, as well, not involving another competing diaspora group, but formed by activists and experts who were lobbying against the deal. The anti-deal coalition had also supporters inside the Congress, who were lobbying from within, constantly introducing legislation to block the effort, while their lobbying campaign was also run internationally, since foreign governments' consent was a prerequisite for the conclusion of the deal. Additionally, and equally important and problematic for the overall effort, was the fact that influential American press was also opposing the deal and the majority of the American public opinion viewed it negatively, as well.

As far as regards the Cuban Americans, the diaspora had no other domestic group in hostland, either ethnic or nonethnic that could be considered as an ally to their effort. Their most important and stable partner has been the Legislative branch, the support of which is considered indispensable since the maintenance of the embargo depends, after the signing of LIBERTAD, on the Congress. Additionally, since their effort is, timewise, extensive, Presidencies, at times, have also been an ally of the group. The Executive, however, cannot be considered a constant or certain ally like the Congress, since, as mentioned before, there were periods, like during the Obama Presidency, that the Executive was completely opposing the embargo and, consequently, the group.

On the other hand, the Cuban Americans' rival group, mainly consisting of representatives from the business sector and lawmakers from the farm States, as well as activist groups, was considered to be a powerful rival. The business sector, especially its agricultural segment, would directly benefit from a potential end of the embargo and the imposed restrictions to Cuba, while the passing of the TSRA, although weakened

due to the intervention of the pro-embargo lawmakers, had been the result of their efforts. Most of the anti-embargo groups that were created throughout this extensive period were mixed, including both business groups, as well as advocacy groups seeking to lift the embargo on humanitarian principles, and this mixed character seemed to have been an obstacle to their effective coordination. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the majority of those groups that were created to counter the pro-embargo group had been exceptionally short-lived, as well. Additionally, even the rival groups consisting of exclusively representatives of the business sector and operating under the Chamber of Commerce, were not sufficiently organized, or determined to oppose the pro-embargo group. Those groups' efforts were not directed exclusively on lifting the embargo but were simultaneously attempting to address various issues their members faced. Therefore, they could not effectively compete the efforts of the pro-embargo diaspora, whose core issue was the maintenance of the embargo, and all of the group's efforts and resources were being devoted to this end. The opposition to the pro-embargo group derived, also, by the international community, with the United Nations on a regular basis issuing resolutions against the embargo, with a rather symbolic than a substantial character, nevertheless.

Concerning the Jewish diaspora efforts to block the American deal with Iran, Jewish lobby's major ally had been the Republican party, whose donors were also mobilized in order to support the campaign. However, this support resulted to be a mixed blessing for the group, since the issue acquired a strongly partisan character and the Democrats in Congress had, henceforth, greater difficulty in supporting the group over their President, who was facing opposition not only by the group, but, most significantly, by the Republicans, as well.

The opposition in this case study, as well, was equally powerful, since the Executive, and the President personally, had undertaken a very aggressive counter lobbying effort against the AIPAC, heavily employing the social media, while, at the same time, the Congressional leadership was internally lobbying the Democratic lawmakers. On the other hand, and most importantly, the anti-deal lobby had an internal opposition, as well, with the, also, pro-Israeli J Street being actively engaged in making donations and, in line with the Administration, attempting to influence the lawmakers in favor of the deal.

Although the Cuban Americans maintained the embargo without having assistance from any powerful allies, the contribution of such allies in the Indian

Americans' case was catalytic, since the group, completely unaccustomed in running such campaigns, immensely benefited from their allies' experience and support. The allies were obviously wisely perceived by the Indian Americans as a resource that could be effectively employed in order to reach the final goal and, therefore, the support they could offer was fully exploited by the diaspora. Key element in the effort had been the exceptional degree of cooperation with the different in nature allies within the coalition. The internal organization and the effective distribution of responsibilities within the parts of the coalition seemed to have had an influence on the final result, since the effort had been centrally led and coordinated, while the responsibilities and the lobbying targets of each element were distributed according to their ability to effectively approach and exert influence. The message, also, was coordinated and common to all the elements, primarily underlying the beneficial for the American economy nature of the issue, while the experts within the coalition were providing the scientific legitimization to the cause, as well. Therefore, the uniqueness of this effort concerning the degree of the cooperation and coordination of powers within the allies should be noted, since as mentioned before, it is not easy for groups of different nature to effectively cooperate and organize their efforts. Again, although the presence of allies is an element that could not be controlled by the group, thus pertaining to the first category of factors, the effective cooperation and organization of efforts depends on the group and its ability to perceive them as a resource to be tapped. Therefore, although the factor applies to one case study, only, that of the Indian Americans, its contribution demonstrates that the allies, when effectively employed, could be a valuable resource and have an impact on the successful result of the effort.

Concerning the opposition, they had to face when promoting the issue, all three diasporas had powerful and influential rivals when promoting their cause. Despite the strong competition, however, two of the groups managed to effectively reach their goal and exert influence (Indian and Cuban Americans), while the third group's failure cannot be attributed to a significant opposition by other domestic groups. Additionally, as mentioned before, the rival groups could face obstacles in effectively opposing the group, since, although powerful and influential, they may be not equally focused with the diaspora on promoting the issue, while at the same time, the inherent difficulty of groups of different nature to coordinate their efforts does not allow them to be equally effective. Therefore, the factor of the group competition does not seem to impede the diaspora from successfully promoting its goal. However, it has to be noted that in all

three case studies the opposing groups have not been other ethnic diasporas, but non ethnic domestic groups. The factor of rival groups opposing the effort of the diaspora could be more important in case the opposition derives from another ethnic group, which would also focus on the issue and, therefore, would not have to face the obstacles that face the other rival non ethnic groups when opposing the diaspora. Therefore, more case studies including opposition from other diasporas should be studied in order to determine the contribution of the factor in the group's final success and influence.

B. Factors under control of the group

B.1 Organization / Leadership

Esman (1994:32) places particular focus on the leadership of the group and their contribution in the diaspora achieving their final goal. His emphasis is placed on the organizational structure of the group, as well as on the group elites that mobilize and run the campaigns.

In the case of Indian diaspora, the internal organization both within the community, as well as within the broader coalition of pro-deal forces that was created, had been instrumental in their final success. Within the community, there was a centralized organization structure, as well, with two main groups undertaking the task to unite all other smaller groups as well as the Indian American community, and to coordinate the diaspora's efforts with the respective efforts of the other elements of the coalition. However, and in parallel with this centralized organization undertaken by the USINPAC and the U.S. - India Friendship Council, which were heading the lobbying efforts, local activists were mobilized, as well, organizing the groups' members locally, and taking advantage of their personal connections with the local lawmakers in persuading them to support the deal. The degree of the internal organization within the community when pursuing the issue was, also, evident by the creation of the U.S. - India Friendship Council, a structure with the sole responsibility to lobby for the deal and dissolve afterwards, while the USINPAC, which was already more experienced in such activities, was closely following the organizational pattern of its model, the AIPAC.

In the case of the Cuban embargo, due to the prolonged effort of the group that spans many Presidencies, the consequences the effective leadership and organization can have on the diasporic effort become more evident. During the CANF era, a lobby with a very rigid organizational structure, also closely following the model of the Jewish AIPAC, the diaspora managed to effectively employ all its available resources and exert influence. Additionally, the concentration of all power in one charismatic leader within the diaspora, Mas Canosa, who organized all the efforts of the community, was also a key element during this period. His leadership capabilities and his ability to exert influence on both the Executive and Legislative, as well as his effectiveness in mobilizing the members of the community and receiving donations to advance the diasporic issue, has admittedly led the CANF in becoming one of the most influential lobbies nationwide. The dissolution of the powerful CANF after the death of Mas Canosa and the assumption of his duties by a not equally charismatic successor, further confirms the importance and the contribution of his effective leadership, and of leadership in general. The lack of an efficient leadership was also identified, as mentioned before, as one of the main reasons why the TSRA was passed by the Congress. Taking advantage of the absence of the powerful pro-embargo group, TSRA, a legislative piece that was perceived as victory for the pro-normalization lobby, even a small one due to the intervention of the pro-embargo lawmakers, was passed by the Congress, demonstrating the impact of the diasporic organization. The creation of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which filled the void the absence of the CANF had created, also further proves the importance of a powerful and influential central diasporic organization in running such an effort. Despite the fact that the community has already acquired representatives within the Congress, with the pro-embargo Cuban American lawmakers lobbying from within their fellow lawmakers and having become the driving force of the pro-embargo campaign, the existence of community organizations is still considered essential in order to support those representatives, approach and exert influence on the legislators, locally, mobilize all members of the community and effectively distribute the community's donations.

Concerning the Jewish diasporic case, the group's organizational strength is commonly recognized and accepted to be the most effective among the American based diasporas. As mentioned before, most of the other American based ethnic groups, including the diasporas of the other two case studies, followed closely its organizational structure in order to create their own lobbies. The lobby consists of many groups and

organizations, not all of them Jews, however, all prioritizing the Israeli wellbeing and interests. In the case of the American nuclear deal with Iran, the AIPAC had assumed the central role in organizing the smaller groups and the American based Jewish community, as well as lobbying the Congress. Despite, however, the rigid organizational structure and the vast experience AIPAC has in organizing and running such campaigns, it failed to block the deal with Iran. Still, the group's organizational structure does not appear to be at fault, since the campaign was successfully sustained to the point that an ethnic group managed to invite their homeland leader to address the Congress without even consulting the American President and the session was even attended by Democrats, as well.

The organizational structure and the targeted, business-like approach of the campaign seems to be a key element to all three case studies, with the Cuban American diaspora's prolonged effort, as mentioned before, more aptly demonstrating the importance of an effective organizational structure, as well as the leadership.

Homogeneity

The lack of homogeneity within the group regarding the desired goal could, according to Ahrari (1987:156), have a direct impact on the ultimate success of the group to exert influence. A potential dispute within the community and especially within the group leadership could divide the efforts and therefore, have a negative impact on their ability to exert influence and achieve their final goal. A rift in leadership could, also, debilitate the message or the importance of the goal, failing to transmit to the less active members of the community the need to mobilize. Partisan politics within the framework of the group's campaign, on the other hand, could also divide the community and undermine their entire effort.

Concerning the Indian American case study, the prospect of an American deal with their homeland clustered together the otherwise diversified and at times fragmented Indian American community and all the subgroups within the leadership, as well as all simple members of the community were unanimously supporting its completion. All Indian Americans perceived the deal to be beneficial for their homeland, its security, as well as its elevated worldwide status and this common desire allowed them to act as a unified group, avoiding partisan politics that could debilitate

their efforts, and operating all under the coordination of the aforementioned diasporic groups.

The Cuban American case study, which extends over a long period clearly demonstrates the successive periods of latency and activity within the diaspora involvement, as well as the evolution of their stance along with the progression of the generations. The younger Cuban Americans gradually became more liberal in their views concerning the bilateral relations with Cuba, while the fact that they have no personal traumatic experience enables them to be less opposed to a bilateral rapprochement. However, within the community and despite the prevalence of more liberal views, a consensus against the embargo has not been reached, while during the Trump Presidency the percentage of the Cuban Americans who wished for the embargo to remain even increased. Therefore, and despite the fact that gradually increasing voices within the community appear wish for the relaxation of some of the travel, mostly, restrictions, there is still not serious opposition, requesting to lift the embargo and the pro-embargo group still prevails.

As mentioned before, homogeneity was an element that was missing in the case of the Jewish American campaign against the American deal with Iran. The main opponent of the AIPAC was proceeding from within the community, from the also Jewish and pro-Israeli J Street, which, in congruence with the Executive, was lobbying in favor of the completion of the deal. Additionally, the Jewish American community was not adamantly against the deal, either, having gradually become more progressive in their stance and less supportive of the hardline approach sought by the AIPAC. Despite the fact that in both influence, as well as in available resources the difference between the AIPAC and the J Street was vast, J Street's mere existence and influence, demonstrates the discord within the community. Additionally, the lawmakers were, henceforth, able to defy the stance promoted by the AIPAC without fear of appearing hostile to Israel, since J Street also presents itself as a pro-Israeli group. Therefore, within the community and, most significantly, within the diasporic leadership, there was no unanimity concerning the necessity of objecting to the President's promoted deal with Iran and thus, within the Congress the bipartisan support of the past was lost, as well.

B.2 Strategies

As mentioned before, the existence of both material and qualitative resources does not necessarily or automatically transform the group into successful and influential. The mere availability of those resources without their effective allocation and deployment by the group, could offer nothing in terms of influence. Each one of the three groups employed different strategies, or the same strategies at varying degrees, according to their available resources, as well as the nature of the issue they wished to promote. However, common for all three of them and closely linked with the structure of the American political system, is the focus directed on the Congress and all three groups' efforts to exert influence on the lawmakers.

Indian Americans

Effective Framing: The initiative for the nuclear cooperation did not stem from the Indian American community, but was sought by the Presidency, therefore, congruence with the American interests, as perceived by the Administration, was given. However, due to the fact that nonproliferation had been a traditionally sensitive matter, with many longstanding supporters in the Congress, the community had to effectively frame the issue in order for those lawmakers to be able to support it without contradicting their past views on the topic. Concerning the framing of the issue, the focus was directed on the two countries' future unobstructed bilateral cooperation that would benefit both of them, especially in the economic sector. Being a part of a wider coalition of forces created in order to promote the deal domestically, the community was, as mentioned before, conveying the message in a coordinated with the rest of their allies manner and in line with the Administration. Also, and despite the fact that the majority of the Indian Americans supported the deal primarily as a means of protection of their homeland against its neighbors, as well as a long-awaited recognition of its worldwide status, those arguments were never officially employed in the campaign, since they would not effectively persuade the lawmakers to adopt a positive stance and support it. Therefore, all members of the coalition were delivering to the lawmakers a common message regarding the American, economic mostly, benefits the deal would bring, with the aim of gaining their support.

Congress, Focused Approach: Having realized that their main target is the Congress and the lawmakers of both parties, the community's efforts were, thus, concentrated on exerting influence on them. In both stages of their campaign, the community members were in constant contact with all the lawmakers, while since the beginning of their effort the approach of the lawmakers was conducted in a targeted and focused manner. Their primary lobbying targets were chosen strategically, based on their ability to either push the deal in their specific legislative capacity (members of the congressional Leadership or the Foreign Affairs Committees), or based on their easiness to be approached (members of the Caucuses of both Houses). The prioritization and selection of the key lawmakers to approach was performed, also, geographically, by primarily identifying key States with a significant presence of community members, where the efforts were undertaken by the local activists and the members of the community through their personal connections with the local lawmakers. Once their lobbying targets were identified, the community's approach was massive and aggressive, a fact admitted by the lawmakers themselves.

Donations: The fact that the group is affluent was a resource that was employed effectively by the diaspora leadership in order to promote their goal and exert influence. The USINPAC employed its funds and directed in a targeted, as mentioned before, way, the donations to lawmakers of both parties, though mostly Democrats, who were more difficult to influence, while fundraisers were also organized, locally, at many States for various selected legislators. The ties with the traditional friends of the groups were also maintained, since although their support was guaranteed, the members of the Caucuses were recipients of the group's donations, as well, and fundraisers were also organized by the community to their benefit. The targeted, therefore, approach of the lawmakers is also evident by the distribution of the group's donations, with key lawmakers receiving donations by the group in order to ensure their support.

Grassroots Mobilization: Despite the fact that the efforts on behalf of the community were, as mentioned before, centrally organized, the task of approaching and exerting influence on the lawmakers was not undertaken by the leaders of the community, only, but all the Indian Americans and their organizations nationwide, politically or business focused were also included in the effort and mobilized. Various community organizations were contacting their members, mobilizing them and instructing them to approach their local lawmakers and request their support in passing the deal, while Advocacy Days, where many members of the community leadership were lobbying

simultaneously the members of the Congress, were organized at crucial for the legislative process points. Therefore, although the leadership of the two main diasporic organizations assumed the central and most crucial role in the effort, all Indian Americans were mobilized and were participating in the effort locally.

Pressure from Monitoring: Fully recognizing the fact the crucial role of the Congress in achieving their goal, the group closely monitored the lawmakers and the stance they kept at all times. All groups were closely following the stance of the lawmakers, therefore being able to adjust their lobbying targets accordingly. At the same time, this strategy also, applied an extra pressure to the lawmakers, being conscious that the group is constantly registering their views. The organizational approach of the effort is evident by this tactic as well, while the same monitoring of the lawmakers' stance was conducted by the other elements of the coalition, as well.

Congressional Caucuses: As mentioned before, the Indian American community was relatively new in running wide scale political campaigns in favor of their homeland and at the same time they had no representatives of the group elected in the Congress. Therefore, there were no lawmakers closely related to the diaspora that could lobby their fellow lawmakers from within. This absence was, however, perceived by the group and the void was successfully fulfilled by the members of the Caucuses, who in close cooperation with the group were lobbying from within their fellow legislators. The members of the aforementioned Caucuses in both the House and the Senate were compensating the lack of Indian American lawmakers and were in close cooperation with the community, pressing and influencing their colleagues. Their contribution in the successful promotion of the deal was also unanimously acknowledged, while the bipartisan character of the effort that the community managed to maintain, allowed the Caucus members to approach their colleagues from both parties.

Cuban Americans

Effective Framing: The Cuban Americans' effort to maintain the embargo, contrary to the other two case studies, entails a campaign that is until today constantly ongoing, notwithstanding the party in power or the majority within the Congress. Therefore, the issue since the beginning had to be framed and justified in terms that both the political world, as well as the American society would accept and could not question. Consequently, the community justified their effort to maintain the embargo against

Cuba under the prism of the democratic transition of the island and the protection of the human rights, ideals that traditionally find appeal both within the American political system, as well as within the American society and are values above partisanship politics. They achieved, therefore, to employ an argument that is difficult to be contested or rejected by the group's rivals notwithstanding the prevailing political environment or the political distribution of power.

Electoral strategies: An important resource available to the Cuban Americans has always been their geographical concentration in a key State, Florida, a state extremely significant electorally. Fully conscious of the strategic advantage the community's ideal geographical concentration can offer, the leadership effectively employed the Cuban Americans' votes as a means of exerting influence. Both key for the embargo legislative pieces were introduced during the electoral periods, and both were signed, reluctantly, by the Presidents, who, weighing the importance of voicing their disagreement with the content of the Bills against the prospect of their being reelected, they opted for the second. And, indeed, by not opposing them, both succeeded in gaining the votes of the community in Florida. The community leadership was perceptive enough to enhance the efforts on the electoral periods, when they could exert the most influence, employing all means available, donations, as well as the votes of the group. This strategy, of course, although effective, could be employed only by a group fortunate enough to be ideally situated and heavily concentrated in a highly influential for the national electoral results State. Still, as mentioned before, the perception on behalf of the community of the strategic advantage it possesses and its employment to the group's benefit is key in being able to exert influence.

Donations: Cuban Americans, similarly with the two other groups of the present study were fortunate to include affluent members, therefore significant financial resources were available to be employed. The distribution of the members' donations has traditionally been an important strategy for the group and the resources were employed in a targeted manner in order to either promote pro-embargo lawmakers or prevent anti-embargo lawmakers from being reelected. As mentioned before, the community target is not only the Congress and the legislators, but the presidential candidates, as well. Cuban Americans, also, seem to have perceived the importance their donations have for the promotion of their interests and their being translated into political influence, a fact that was obvious by the spike of incoming sums to the pro-embargo PAC during the Obama announcement stating his intention to approach Cuba.

Congressional Wing: The group since early had perceived the importance of being directly represented within the American political system and managed to acquire representation at all political levels, but most importantly within the Congress. Given the fact that the jurisdiction of maintaining or lifting the embargo since the passing of the LIBERTAD belongs to the Congress, the focus of their efforts in influencing its members became a reasonable strategy. Apart from aiming at influencing the incumbent lawmakers, therefore, the tactic of acquiring their own Representatives, who would be able to lobby from within and also being in constant and close cooperation with the community and its organizations became key in their success. The importance and the effectiveness of their strategy became mostly evident during the Obama Presidency, when the Administration was opposing the group wishing to end the embargo and the role of the Cuban American lawmakers, among them one Democrat, as well, was key. In the same vein and in order to influence even more of their colleagues, the Cuban American lawmakers created a dedicated to Cuba Caucus, promoting their views to their fellow lawmakers, also closely allied with the pro-embargo lobby. Again, the wider and organized stance of the group, as well as the long-term approach of their target is evident by their efforts to include members of the community in the Congress, as well.

Congress, Focused Approach: The difference between the issue the Cuban Americans wish to promote comparing to the other two case studies of the research lies in the fact that the maintenance of the embargo is a more or less permanent issue and, therefore, a long-term strategy to address it is required. Additionally, with the Congress having acquired the jurisdiction concerning the maintenance or the end of the embargo, the lawmakers became the community's main lobbying targets. Apart from placing Cuban Americans within the Congress, another key strategy, also with the aim of influencing the Congress, was the targeted approach of the lawmakers and the maintenance of a constant number of allies within each Congress. Therefore, the community targeted especially the freshmen, or supported new candidates, who, upon entering the Congress, were automatically becoming the group's allies. This technique was employed consciously and systematically by the U.S. - Cuba Democracy PAC, with freshmen's campaigns being consistently supported in order to ensure, in return, their support once they get elected in the Congress. This strategy of constantly investing in new lawmakers also addresses the problem of the group's friendly lawmakers losing their seats or being retired by the Congress, thus avoiding the gradual diminishing of

the base of their supporters. Employing this strategy, new lawmakers are in a systematic manner replacing the ones leaving the Congress and the support to the group remains steadfast. This tactic, also, demonstrates the strategical approach of the group, and the long-term character their actions have.

Jewish Americans

Effective Framing: The argument employed by the group in order to prevent the American deal with Iran was by depicting it as a deeply flawed one, a deal that could ultimately not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a deal would be placing, therefore, at risk primarily Israel, a key American ally in the region, but also the entire international community. The main reason of the group's opposition, therefore, was presented to be an issue of both national and international security, an argument whose importance could not be downplayed by any of the rival groups and would find appeal to both the American lawmakers, as well as the American society.

Congress, Focused Approach: Since the beginning the main target of the group's lobbying campaign was identified to be the Democratic legislators in both Houses, therefore all the efforts were directed on influencing them. The community approach was targeted, primarily aiming to influence key lawmakers with an institutional capacity that could promote the deal from within, as well as traditional friends of the group from key States. At the same time, all groups' activists were, in an organized manner, visiting their constituencies' lawmakers exerting pressure on the local level. The effort of the group to block the deal has been narrowly focused, and a specific vehicle, the Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, was created in order to organize all efforts for opposing the deal and influencing both the lawmakers, as well as the American public opinion, focusing its efforts on the advertising campaign. Its establishment had also been accomplished in a targeted and focused manner, including many prestigious Democrats in its Advisory Board, who could in turn exert influence on their fellow Democrats. The cooperation of the group leadership with the Republicans in the Congress was very close and their actions were co-organized in order to influence the Democrats. The Republican donors were also engaged and in cooperation with the group were supporting financially the effort, allowing the group to have access to a more extensive source of assets. However, this cooperation with the Republican

leadership, especially evident after the invitation extended to the Israeli Prime Minister to address the Congress without prior knowledge of the President, resulted in mixed blessing. The issue acquired an intense partisan character, and the Democratic lawmakers were no longer able to support the group without providing their support to the Republican party, as well, against their own President.

Congressional support: As mentioned before, the Congress has traditionally acted as the Jewish American diaspora's more constant and important ally. Key in the group's overall success throughout the years has been this willingness on behalf of the lawmakers to support it, notwithstanding the fact that they might be even opposing their President's wish. The bipartisan character of the Congressional support is deemed, therefore, traditionally, as key in the diaspora's success. In this particular case, however, this bipartisan support, as described above, was lost, and the issue acquired a highly partisan nature, with the Democrats feeling the need to support and defend their President against not only the diaspora, but most importantly against its close ally, the Republican party, as well. The constant attack on behalf of the Republicans, as well as the speech of the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu organized by the group and the Republican leadership without any prior knowledge of the President, further polarized the Congress and the issue lost the bipartisan character and support.

Donations, campaigns: The extensive financial capabilities of the members of the community are traditionally employed particularly effectively by the lobby in order to reach the desired goals. In this case also, the group's competitive advantage of extensive available resources has been employed, while the available budget for the campaign amplified even more due to the coordination of the AIPAC with the Republican Jewish Coalition, as well as their donors. This cooperation provided the anti-deal group with a significant budget to employ in a campaign against the deal and in targeting the Democrats. The difference between the financial resources of the two pro-Israeli lobbies, namely the AIPAC and the J Street, was vast, with J Street having available only \$5 million and running a campaign to only 4 States, comparing to the AIPAC's \$40 million to run the anti-deal campaign to 23 States.

Trips: the group realizing the importance the Congress has for the promotion of its interests and perceiving the importance of the close cooperation with the legislators, systematically seeks to approach them and at the same time to transmit to them the nature of their arguments. The frequent educational trips to Israel have been a traditional strategy employed by the group in order to familiarize the lawmakers,

especially the freshmen, with Israel and consequently, with the views of the group. During those trips that are conducted on a year basis, the lawmakers are instilled the arguments of the group and their legitimization. This vehicle was also employed in order to exert influence against the deal with Iran. In 2015, before the crucial voting, the annual trip to Israel included for the first time both Democratic and Republican lawmakers and was led by the House leadership in an effort to influence the participating lawmakers against the deal.

Further Study

The present research includes the study of three diasporas' efforts, only, in attempting to determine which factors could have a positive contribution in their exerting political influence and ultimately allow them to successfully promote their homeland related foreign policy interests. Additionally, in those three specific cases the aforementioned factors were further divided in order to determine whether some groups, only, which share certain elements could become successful, or whether factors that can be effectively manipulated by the group are more important in the final success. The study of more case studies, including efforts of different American based ethnic groups, and most importantly, different efforts of the same group, successful and unsuccessful, would more accurately determine the significance of each factor, inherent to the group or relevant to the specific effort, in the final result. The comparison of different efforts of the same diaspora, successful and failed, could be even more effective in demonstrating the importance of some factors, internal or external, since the core and permanent characteristics of the group would be in general similar.

As mentioned before, all three case studies were operating within the American political system, democratic and particularly open to pressure groups and lobbies, where the Congress plays key role in foreign policy decision making. Therefore, the findings of the research apply to a specific political system with certain characteristics, and they cannot be generalized, since it is doubtful that they would equally apply to another either less open or simply differently organized political system. Hostland's political system is key in the strategy the groups will choose in order to achieve their goal and factors that are important when attempting to exert influence within the American political system might not bear the same importance in a differently organized political framework. Congress plays central role in the American foreign policy decision making, while lawmakers are easier to approach, therefore the majority of the groups' efforts were directed in influencing them. The centrality of the Congress, therefore, dictates the strategy that should be followed. In another political system, where the Legislative may not have such a central role in foreign policy decision making, this approach on behalf of diaspora would not be equally effective and other means of exerting influence should be sought, depending on the structure of the political environment of their hostland. It would be interesting, therefore, to study efforts of

diasporas in different hostlands, with different political systems and different political environments, not necessarily less open, but differently organized in order to determine which factors are common and what is the allocation of factors in the two categories, manageable by the group or permanent and unchangeable.

Moreover, as already mentioned, another common element to all three case studies lies in the fact that all three groups faced no competition in promoting their issues from other rival diasporas. In cases where two rival ethnic groups pursue their interests against each other, the importance of the factors would be further accentuated, and it would be more evident which of them is more important.

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H.Amdt.769 to Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005, H.R. 5025, 108th Congress (2004)

<https://www.congress.gov/amendment/108th-congress/house-amendment/769>

H.Amdt.420 to Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 109th Congress (2005)

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Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001, H.R.4461, 106th Congress (2000).

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Jewish Americans

Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Public Law, No 104–45, 109 Stat. 398 (1995)

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H.R. 1191. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. 114th Congress (2015).

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H.R. 3461. To approve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, relating to the nuclear program of Iran. 114th Congress (2015).

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3461>

H.R. 3461. Roll Call 493. Clerk. House of Representatives.

<https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2015493>

H.Res.411. Finding that the President has not complied with section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. 114th Congress (2015).

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/411/all-actions>

H.Res.411. Roll Call 492. Clerk. House of Representatives.

<https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2015492>

H.R.3460. To suspend until January 21, 2017, the authority of the President to waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran. 114th Congress (2015).

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H.R.3460. Roll Call 494. Clerk. House of Representatives.

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