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Σχολή Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών
Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Διεθνών Σχέσεων
Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών σπουδών
«Μεσογειακές Σπουδές»

«Κουρδικά: Lingua non grata»

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(Υπό την επίβλεψη του καθηγητή Μάνου Παπάζογλου)

Κόρινθος, Ακαδημαϊκό έτος 2014-2015



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DISSERTATION

“Kurdish: Lingua non grata”

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Corinth, Academic Year: 2014-2015

*Στη μάνα μου, την πυξίδα μου,
που με το βλέμμα της μου δείχνει τον βοριά κι έτσι ποτέ δε χάνομαι.*

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my Director, Professor Manos Papazoglou for being there every step of the way of this time and energy consuming effort. Without his kind support, his pedagogical framing and above all, his patience this paper would have only stayed on...paper.

Δάσκαλέ μου , σε ευχαριστώ.

«Κουρδικά: Lingua non grata»

Σημαντικοί όροι :[Τουρκία, Κούρδοι, μειονότητες, δικαιώματα των μειονοτήτων, γλώσσα, κουρδική γλώσσα, εθνικισμός, κεμαλισμός, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, Ερντογάν]

Περίληψη

Στόχος αυτής της διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι να αναδείξει τους περιορισμούς αναφορικά στα γλωσσικά δικαιώματα της Κουρδικής κοινότητας εκ μέρους του Τουρκικού κράτους.

Έπειτα από έρευνα και μελέτη δευτερογενών πηγών-κυρίως διεθνών συνθηκών (π.χ η Συνθήκη των Σεβρών και της Λωζάννης), εσωτερικού δικαίου (π.χ Τουρκικός Ποινικός Κώδικας, Διοικητική Νομοθεσία και Τουρκικά Συντάγματα) και τις Τακτικές Αναφορές Προόδου εκ μέρους της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής,- σκοπεύουμε στο να εξηγήσουμε την αλγεβρική σύνδεση μεταξύ του Τουρκικού εθνικισμού και των Κουρδικών αυτονομιστικών εξεγέρσεων και να αναδείξουμε τον περιορισμό της χρήσης και εκμάθησης της Κουρδικής γλώσσας ως μέρος του γενικότερου «Κουρδικού ζητήματος».

Αφού εξετάσουμε θεμελιώδη νοήματα σχετικά με τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, διεισδύουμε στην εκατονταετή πολιτική κι νομοθετική ιστορία της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας · ταυτοποιούμε ότι το αυταρχικό Κεμαλικό καθεστώς και τα διδάγματά του σχετικά με την εθνική ομοιογένεια οδήγησε τα κέντρα των αποφάσεων σε μια χάραξη ενός βίαιου αφομοιωτικού πρότζεκτ, παρά το στοιχείο της πολυπολιτισμικότητας των λαών των πρώην Οθωμανικών περιοχών που πλέον ζουν εντός της Τουρκίας.

Εστιάζοντας στις πολιτικές πρωτοβουλίες των Τούρκων ηγετών από τα δεκαετία του 1990 και έπειτα, και κυρίως καταδεικνύοντας τον ζωτικό ρόλο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης σχετικά με την αναγνώριση ορισμένων πολιτισμικών δικαιωμάτων στους Κούρδους, καταλήγουμε στην κοσμογονία της Συνόδου Κορυφής του Ελσίνκι: την αναγνώριση του στάτους του προς ένταξη κράτους-μέλους, παράμετροι οι οποίες ωθούν την εξέλιξη και την εκδημοκρατικοποίηση στην Τουρκία. Με το βλέμμα προς την Ε.Ε, η Τουρκία προχωρά σε γενικευμένες νομοθετικές μεταρρυθμίσεις και συνταγματικές τροποποιήσεις και παρά το γεγονός της προόδου, η πορεία της διαβλέπεται μακρά και εξεχόντως ακανθώδης.

“Kurdish: Lingua non grata”

Keywords: [Turkey, Kurds, minority rights, cultural rights, EU, Erdoğan, nationalism, kemalism, assimilation process, language, Kurdish, Kurdish issue, linguistic policy implementation]

Abstract

This dissertation involves at indicating the restriction in the Kurdish community’s linguistic rights from the Turkish state.

After the research and study of secondary sources –principally international treaties (e.g Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne) , domestic legislation(e.g Turkish Penal Code, Administrative legislation and Turkish Constitutions) and Regular Accession Progress Reports by the European Commission we aim at explaining the algebraic linkage between the Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish insurgency and to highlight the restriction of the use and the learning of the Kurdish language as a part of the “big picture”: the Kurdish issue.

After explaining fundamental notions over human rights, we dig into the centennial political and legislative history of the Republic; we will identify that the authoritarian Kemalic regime and its lessons for national homogeneity led the policy makers to the designation of a brutal assimilation project, despite the multicultural element of the peoples of the ex-Ottoman territories now leaving within Turkey.

Focusing on the political initiatives of Turkey’s politicians from the 1990’s onwards, and principally by presenting the pivotal role of the EU regarding the recognition of certain cultural rights towards the Kurds, we result in the cosmogony of the Helsinki Summit: the recognition of the membership status; parameters that boost the evolution and the democratization process in Turkey. Looking to the EU, Turkey proceeds into massive legislative reforms and constitutional amendments and although it has come a long way, it has even longer and more difficult way ahead.

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INTRODUCTION

*Not only me,
But all my fellow stateless ones
In our unknown country—
We say proudly
That whoever wants to know
Our bitter history,
Let them search—
It will not be fun.
All they will see
Is a dramatic tragedy,
A tear-filled calamity,
Of a homeless life's memory.*

Yassin Aref, "Memory".¹

Understanding "Kurdishness" as a clear-cut notion or identifying the Kurds as a homogeneous set of group of people, binding together with common qualities and ethno-cultural elements is the big trap, because this is not the case.

Actually, the ethno-social glue among the Kurdish clans – evolving in a vast geography of Upper Mesopotamia divided in four countries²- has always been Islam. Since they did not manage to give their own identification in the new confession, Kurds got subjugated by the Arab, Turkish and Iranian factor, everyone of which- having the Islam as a battering arm for their very interests- tried to coerce the Kurds into their own religious, ethnic and cultural patterns. This treatment had as an aftermath the Diaspora³ and the degeneration of the Kurdish nation⁴. The last one, in turn, constituted the main reasoning for the non-creation of a common, single Kurdish ethnic identity⁵, which would potentially have led the Kurds to claim a common homeland, especially after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

¹ Aref, Yassin, (1989), "Memory", in "Son of Mountains: My life as a Kurd and a Terror suspect".

² Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.

³ Many Kurds have fled to Europe as refugees or asylum seekers, mainly in Germany, which seems to be the cradle of the liberating Kurdish movement.

⁴ "Who Are the Kurds?", Washington Post, available on <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm>, retrieved on 20/11/2015,

⁵ Yavuz, Hakan, (1998), "A preamble to the Kurdish Question: The politics of Kurdish identity", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18, No.1, p.10.

Within the scattered multi-dimensional Kurdish cultural identity of multi optics, what is salient is that the Kurds constitute a distinctive nation⁶ in line with the classic Greeks where the term is identical to that of “*people*”⁷, let alone the contemporaneous one which articulates that “*a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one*”⁸.

In the *momentum*, when England, France and Russia divided the Middle East into spheres of influence, under the Sykes–Picot Agreement⁹, the formulation of a separate Kurdish state has been degraded into a sad leftover of WWI and WWII. After, also, the lost opportunity within the international upheaval of the collapse of bi-polarism and the fall of actually existing socialism in the post-Cold War era, a long standing cliché has been the so-called “Kurdish problem” or “Kurdish question”.

Indeed the scholars and the global politics choose to call a “problem” or “question” an existential fact: the Kurds are “the largest stateless people in the world”¹⁰, and as so, some kind of a “solution”, principally a political one, is needed. The historic reality though, poses another question: How a political solution¹¹ could be found after two centuries of rebellions and a centennial of Turkish oppression policy?

The “mother of Evil” is the combination of the Lausanne Treaty and who is legitimized to be granted with the minority status inside Turkey, along with the ideals of Atatürkism. The Kemalic regime, was developed into a controlling, illiberal, oppressive framework, and gave birth to the idea of nationalism; by placing the language as the conjoiner material of the new country in the position of the Islam, and

⁶ For the term “nation” which does not admit only one identification, we meet several definitions as early as the age of Homer. See, Zernatto, Guido and Mistretta, Alfonso, G., (1944) “Nation: the History of a Word”, *The Review of politics*, Cambridge University Press, Vol.6, No.3, p.351-366.

⁷ Henry, George, Liddell and Robert Scott, (2007), “Μέγα Λεξικόν της Ελληνικής Γλώσσης” (A Greek-English Lexicon), Sideris, I., Vol.2, p.22.

⁸ Watson-Seton, Hugh, (1977), “Nations and States: An enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism”, London, Methuen, p.5.

⁹ Nezan, Kendal, “A brief survey of the History of the Kurds”, Institut Kurds de Paris, retrieved on 20/11/2015, available on http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php

¹⁰ Ozsoy, Hisyar, (2013), “Introduction: The Kurds ordeal with Turkey in a transforming middle East”, *Dialect Anthropol*, Vol.37, p.103-111.

¹¹ Karagilan, Murat, (2012), “Η ανατομία του πολέμου του Κουρδιστάν. Το ιστορικό του 30ετούς εθνικοαπελευθερωτικού πολέμου των Κούρδων εναντίον του Τουρκικού Κράτους” (I anatomia tou polemou tou Kourdistan. To istoriko tou 30 etous ethnikoapeleutherotikou polemou ton Kourdon enantion tou Tourkikou Kratous), Athens, Pub. Infognomon.

by inaugurating a Kemalic cult trend, the civilians and their deputies went for an “ethnic homogenization” roller coaster through policies of brutal assimilation.

As long as the state’s minorities are labeled “*exclusively by religious affiliation*”¹², the Kurds do not constitute a minority and thus, there is no call for granting them certain rights, since they are part of the Muslim-faith Turkish nation.

Yeğen, highlights the paradox between the dawn of the Republic, when the Kurds were assumed as inseparable people of the Ottoman nation and Turkey “*was the homeland of Turks and Kurds*”¹³ and the decades afterwards when the Kurdish minority group has met the denial of its existence from the Turkish state; in turn, the Kurds were labeled as “*Mountain Turks*” who due to the mountainous geography and isolated environment have forgotten their Turkish ancestry¹⁴. At the same time, the Turkish policy has been engaged to an assimilation tactic having as final goal the “Turkification”¹⁵ of the populations by wiping out the Kurdish identity.

Language by being the factor that distinguishes one nation from another may become the tool of expressing separatist trends and it may as well be interpreted as a “paramount security threat”¹⁶. On that base, it gained prominent position in the Republic’s assimilation agenda.

The Turkish language policy is the outcome of a grid of psycho-sociological elements. Resting on the Kemalic ideology of nationalism, the Turkish state has proved throughout its history its obedience to the catchphrase of “national unity” and “national integrity”; hence, it has developed all the sensors needed so as to detect the potential threats coming against the country’s unity.¹⁷

The language policy-making since it rests in state hands and under the supervision and the impact of the policies followed, constitutes the cornerstone of the nation-formulation.

¹² Yildiz, Ilhan, (2007), “Minority Rights in Turkey”, *BYU Law Review*, Vol.2007, Issue 3, p.802.

¹³ Yeğen, Mesut, (1999), “Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu”*Istanbul İletişim Yayınları*, p. 116.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 120.

¹⁵ Emerson, Michael, (2004), “Has Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria?”, *CEPS Policy Brief*, No 48, p.1.

¹⁶ Cizre, Umit, (2003) “Demythologizing the national security concept: The case of Turkey”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.57, p.222.

For Tollefson ,

“[...] the effort by one language group to seek hegemony may contain within it the seeds of a cycle of resistance and repression. [...]The resulting struggle is not “ethnic conflict” grounded in linguistic or cultural differences, but rather a conflict over power and policy resulting from the effort of one group to establish hegemony over others”¹⁸.

Indeed, from the times of the House of Osman’s until nowadays, Kurdish - more or less- has never been a literary or official language; thus, there has been no educational provision - with the exception of the late legislative reforms implemented by the EU- , and it has always been a domestic speaking/learning mother tongue. Despite the lift of the 1980’s coup language ban in 1991, Kurdish use stays in close state scrutiny and, oftentimes, officially censored.

Having as starting thought the perception that in countries where coercive cultural uniformity is launched, citizens-users of minority languages leave a social ostracism and political blockade within the country. This dissertation aims to indicate in the initial stage the minority treatment from Turkey’s behalf, so as to proceed with the linguistic attack against the Kurdish cultural identity. The escalating suppression was the outcome of every coup that has left behind its remark; stricter measures against the Kurds, intensification of the separative policy, deeper denial of the Kurdish being; the outgrowth: a bigger and bigger gap with the Turkish society, terror and threats both sides.

After examining secondary sources, we aim at highlighting the causality of the language ban - as an aftermath of the Kemalic regime policy- and then, the strict scrutiny of the use of the Kurdish language as a part of a bigger picture: the Kurdish issue. Believing that Atatürk’s ideology of nationalism and state integrity is the alpha and omega of the Turkish Republic, we involve at presenting the linkage of the Kemalic nationalism with the Kurdish nationalism.

Last but not least we analyze the basic players in reference to the evolution of granting the Kurdish minority some kind of cultural rights; we argue that there are personal initiatives on the part of the Turks politicians but the last word belongs to the E.U via the negotiation process of the Turkish candidature.

¹⁸ Tollefson, W.,James, and Tsui, B.M., Amy, (2003),“Medium of Instruction Policies. Which Agenda?”, Mawhaw, Laurence Erlbraum, p.197-198.

We present the pioneering initiatives and the switch of policy of Turgut Özal and then the questionable leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who, if anything, has managed to fulfill the gap of a decade of silence, in the post-Özal era, when the previous Turks PMs and Presidents , displayed rather their indecision to deal properly with the Kurdish question. His political creation the AK Party , declaring its commitment to parliamentary democracy and Turkey's secular constitutional structure, portrays itself as a pro-Western party in the Turkish political arena that advocates the agenda of the Turkish membership in the EU. Nevertheless, it receives the severe criticism from the secularists' side along with their suspicion of retaining a secret agenda¹⁹ of transforming Turkey into an Islamic state, thus, they keep alert "*for the time when it would unveil its true face*"²⁰.

Turkey has had a rich history of poor human/minority rights preservation. Its restrictive approach violates the engagements following its incorporation within international bodies and their legislations. Provided that the human rights are included in the state legislature, the immediate application of the suitable legal norms is a *sine qua non* requirement of the new world order. The phase of the relations nowadays between the European Union (EU) and Turkey depicts a classic example of the above mentioned situation. We argue that, the problematic relation of the EU and Turkey, an aftermath of the breach of human rights inside the country, was the triggering event to mark positive developments and revolutionary alterations regarding the legislative framework, to the direction of harmonization with the international criteria.

Despite the great steps of improvement regarding the cultural rights' respect of the Kurdish population, due to the *quid pro quod* European tactic, the swift, has not been that drastic and thus, the plethora of impediments have not brought about deep improvements.

¹⁹ Soner, Ali, B. (2010) "The Justice and Development Party's policies towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No.1, p. 23-40.

²⁰ Akyol, Mustafa, (2007) "Turkey's veiled democracy", *The American interest*, p.92.

CHAPTER 1:

OVERVIEW OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS.

1.1 Human Rights, a general outlook.

One of the prominent characteristics of the post Cold War era is the expression of interest, by both states and international organizations, vis-à-vis human rights and democracy. That interest constitutes the base of the formulation and the conduct of foreign policy internationally.

The respect of human rights as a cornerstone of a liberal democratic state and as a primordial factor of state normality in an international level, it only counts a little longer of half-of-century life. The compliance with the international norms²¹ within the framework of the United Nations and the European codifications²² set a minimum application of the international standards, as far as human rights are concerned.

The democratic institutions, the rule of law implementation and the project of a liberal democratic state that ensures the prosperity to its citizens, formulate the triangle of human rights' preservation and presupposes the consensus between the states regarding their violation. Therefore, the question over the protection of human rights is impossible to be evaluated within the framework of the general principle of international law, also illustrated in the article 2§7 of the UN Charter, namely the non-intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction.²³ In other words, issues over human rights do not constitute a state's international agenda and so, they are exempted from any kind of state administration²⁴. Hence, the argument that human rights are part of

²¹ Namely, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1976.

²² The 1953 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) constitutes the most drastic text and a document of international stature.

²³ Watson, J., S., (1977) "Auto Interpretation, competence and the continuing validity of article 2§7 of the UN Charter", *AJIL*, p.60-82.

²⁴ Sudre, Frederic, (1997), "Droit européen et international des droits de l'homme", Paris, PUF, p.74.

the domestic policy of a state, is deprived of any legal base, since the international mechanisms monitor every case fact²⁵ with scrutiny.

Regarding the political practices towards the human rights, state authority does not have the right for an objection and, mostly, it is not legitimized to determine a “violation” or “non-violation”. The state has only one obligation: to apply the International Law. Since human rights are implemented according to the international legal demands and are not involved with the state domestic topics, the executive authority is limited to the point of internal administration issues decision-making; that is to say, the formation of human rights’ legal framework is the responsibility of the appropriate international body²⁶.

Hence, it has seemed inevitable for the human rights but to evolve into issues of external policy. The harmonization of the national law and the international legislation of a certain state with the international prerequisites for respect of the human rights is one of the positive impacts of the globalization.

More concretely, international policy conducted during the years of the Cold War, was playing down the human rights. On the contrary, the post Cold War era, the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the flourishing of liberal and democratic states, the compliance with the human rights has been all included into the international agenda of the most critical needs. Thus, every government which breaches the human rights is thought to breach the international legitimacy, violates the international rule of law and shall be penalized.

The international community neither accepts nor excuses human rights’ violation from countries claiming cultural or financial impediments. Since there is recognition of international standards²⁷ over human rights, it is unavoidable but to embrace their legal effects inside a country, concerning their protection along with their *erga omnes*

²⁵ Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, (1992), “Droit International Public”, Paris, Dalloz-Sirrey, p.147.

²⁶ Donnelly, Jack, (2003), “Universal human rights in theory and practice”, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

²⁷ For the notion of *jus cogens* in the International Law, see Virally, M. ,(1966) “Reflections sur le Jus Cogens”, *Annuaire Francais de Droit International*, p: 5, Weil, D. (1982), “Vers une Normativite Relative en Droit International”, *Revue Generale de Droit International Public*, p.6.

effect²⁸. The state responsibility vis-à-vis the preservation of human rights is, thus, a natural progression of the new balance of the international system²⁹.

Since the 1980s, the Turkish deficiency, in the field of human rights' protection, has built a block of obstacles towards the relations with the West, and thus, with the EEC. Later on, the EU, has followed a very specific and stable policy in its relations with third countries concerning the protection of human freedoms.

The incorporation to the European family is based on the financial stability of the candidate country and its dynamic progression towards democratization; akin, of great importance are the criteria of democratization along with the full application of the regulations which safeguard the human rights.

1.2 Defining the term “minority”.

As far as the identification of the term “minority” is concerned, in bibliographic references we meet a diversity of definitions. In general terms, though, there is not a solely accepted terminology, due to its complexity and multilevel political and social nature.

Initially, from a linguistic and philological dimension, by looking up in The Longman Dictionaries we shall define “minority” as either *“a small group of people or things within a much larger group”* or *“a group of people in a country who are different from the rest in race or religion”*³⁰. From a sociological point of view angle, Schafer argues that minority is *“a subordinate group whose members have significantly less control or power over their lives than members of a dominant or majority group”* or even *“a group that experiences a narrowing of opportunities (success, education, wealth etc) that is disproportionately low compared to their members in the society”*³¹.

Besides, Wirth identifies the minority as *“a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are signaled out from the others in the society in*

²⁸ See International Constitutional Law decision, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Corporation Ltd, (Belgique/Espagne), Recueil, 1970, p.32.

²⁹ Meron, Theodore, (1991), “Human Rights and Humanitarian Forms as Customary Law”, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.15.

³⁰ Longman Dictionaries, (2000), Edinburgh Gate, Harlow / Essex CM20 2JE, England, p.908.

³¹ Schaefer, R.T., (1993), “Racial and Ethnic Groups”, p.5-10.

which they live for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination”³².

After the minority agenda has been undertaken by the League of Nations, since 1945, it has been the UNs at the helm. Besides, in Article 1 of the UN Minority Declaration³³, we meet another definition over the term on the base of “*national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity and provides that States should protect their existence*”³⁴.

Nevertheless, the identification that wins the largest acknowledgement by the scholars, is the one provided by Francesco Capotorti; thus, a minority is considered as “*a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language*”³⁵.

1.3 Minority Rights. The Westphalian point of view.

Overall, within the states, minorities are the group of citizens who differ from the more populous and homogeneous groups of the rest of the citizens, as far as origin, language or religion are concerned; these minorities, have throughout time undergone persecutions, prosecutions and legislative degradations.

During the 17th century a new sociopolitical entity, namely the “*nation- state*”³⁶, emerged. The conceptualization was directly interwoven with the evolution of a new model of administration, an incoming category of states, namely the “*Westphalian system*”³⁷, as an aftermath of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The galvanization of the

³² Available on www.boundless.com, retrieved on 18/10/2015.

³³ Unanimously ratified in 1992.

³⁴ United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, minority Right: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, 2010, p.2.

³⁵ Capotorti, Francesco, (1991), “Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, Geneva, United Nations Center for Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7.

³⁶ Barbour, Stephen and Carmichael, Cathie, (2000), “Language and nationalism in Europe”, Oxford University Press.

³⁷ Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (1984), “The expansion of International Society”, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

French Revolution, the impetus of the Italian “*Risorgimento*” and with the “*Volkisch movement*”³⁸, the nation- state meets the ideological patronage and the philosophical confirmation of the movement of Romantic nationalism. Lead mouthpiece of the nationalistic concepts the French school, with Ernest Renan as main scholar, and the German tradition with Johann Gotlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder in the lead³⁹. The newly emerged nationalistic theories found an echo in the rest of the Europe⁴⁰.

Thus, in the 19th century we have states’ formulation from the remnants of ex multicultural empires⁴¹ or the blend of ex fiefs⁴², adopting as basic pillar of creation the fact that they shared common language and cultural heritage.

For Barbour, the linguistic similarity constituted the cell of creation and establishing the nationalistic ideology⁴³. Therefore, the creation of nation-states in Europe has highlighted the need of protection of the minority communities⁴⁴.

As early as 1878 after the Congress of Berlin, a set of international rules were drafted in order to protect the several minority groups within the European continent. Actually, the contribution of the Berlin Congress regarding the minority issue protection, is of that proportions that Macartney quotes that it was the “*most*

³⁸ A movement focused on the cultural identity of the German nation based on the language.

³⁹ With elementary question, rested in the lecture of Renan in Sorbonne in 1882, “*Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*” (Ernest, Renan, (1896), “*What is a nation?*”, in “*The poetry of the Celtic Races, and Other Essays*” London, The Walter Scott Publishing Co, p.61-8), the political scientists acknowledge the French tradition and the “civic nation” and the German one, under Fichte’s impact and the “ethnic nation” “*kulturnation*”. The ethnic nation type, as original descendant of the French Revolution, is conceptualized as the “*eager of a group of people that share common political virtues and common citizenship to live together*” (Alter, Peter, (1989), “Nationalism”, London, E. Arnold, p.14). The echo of the French revolution and before that the Age of Enlightenment introduces the formulation factor of the term “nation” into “*a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social and economic status, ethnic origin and religious beliefs*” (Alter, Peter, (1989), p.15).

⁴⁰ Smith, Anthony, D. (1971) “Theories of Nationalism”, Harper and Row, New York, p.17

⁴¹ See the case of the Kingdom of Greece.

⁴² See the case of Risorgimento in Italy.

⁴³ Barbour, Stephen and Carmichael, Cathy, (2000), p.14.

⁴⁴ Preece, Jackson, Jennifer, (1997), “Minority rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki”, Review of International Studies, Vol.23, p.76-78.

*important of all international bodies concerned with minority rights prior to 1919*⁴⁵; hence, the ensuing Treaty of Berlin by replacing the San Stefano Treaty, imposed rules which safeguarded and ensures the religious freedom of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Only after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the following peace Treaties namely, of Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Trianon, Sèvres – the latter, revised by the Treaty of Lausanne-, was adopted a system of international protection for the minorities

The League of Nations was the international body responsible to monitor the respect and compliance to the aforementioned system within the states with solid minority groups⁴⁶. The list of privileges granted involved the compulsory concession of civil and political rights equality to the ethnic, racial, linguistic or religious minorities as well as their particular features⁴⁷.

Still, the aforementioned obligations have been easily and quickly ignored, because solely individually the citizens could apply to the League of Nations, in case of a non-fulfillment, and not the minority community in its entirety. In turn, such cases and events have had as an aftermath an ambiance of antagonism, friction and it has been the spring of irredeemable trends, which in turn, have contributed to the outburst of the WWII.

Generally speaking, the minorities' issue, crucial in several regions of Asia and Africa, has faded out in Europe, after the shift of borders and the movement of populations as an aftermath of the war; in certain countries, such as Poland, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey the crisis has been solved in a drastic manner, via mutual population exchange for example the one between Greece and Turkey in 1923, in the wake of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Particularly in Europe, the matter has gained a new dimension mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the evolution of a neo-nationalistic trend, in the early

⁴⁵ Macartney, C.A., (1934), "National States and National Minorities", Oxford University Press, H., p.166.

⁴⁶ Such as, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Czechoslovakia.

⁴⁷ Preece, Jackson, Jennifer, (1997), p.81-84.

'90's until 2000, thus the question of minorities after almost 45 years of international silence, obtains a new perspective.

1.4 Minorities' treatment. The Turkish Republic's mantra.

The formulation of the Turkish state after the shoot of the Ottoman rule, used the paradigm of the central European nation- state philosophy. By looking up the minorities' treatment from Turkey's behalf through time, we will locate the actual roots of the problem, which, at the end of the day, they seat in an ideological-political rationale.

1.4.1 During the Ottoman Empire.

At the times of the Osmands House, the vast territory of the Empire incorporated a plethora of populations of different ethno cultural background. Thus, the ethnicity obtained solely a religious definition and the minority question was principally an issue of faith, lacking any political dimension. In that sense and under the loose "*millet*"⁴⁸ administrative construction, the Greeks were part of the Christian nation, the Turks of the Muslim⁴⁹ and so on and so forth.

With a label lacking of political concepts, the Turks identified their nationality through and because of the struggle of independence of other ethnicities⁵⁰ within the Empire, such as the Greeks in 1821, the Serbs in 1833 etc.

Akin to the European continent, under the Westphalian new world order, in Turkey the question of minorities, generally speaking, has always been a central issue since the late Ottoman era. In fact, under the sociopolitical thought of Ziya Gökalp⁵¹ and Yusuf Akçura⁵², disclaimers of Ottomanism and Islamism as ideological political social concepts and fathers of the political and cultural movement of "*Pan-Turkism*", aiming to unite all the populations of Turkish origin, the issue over the rights of the various minorities within the Turkish soil has gained a powerful dynamic.

1.4.2 From the Young Turks' movement, onwards.

⁴⁸ Yavuz, Hakan, (1998), "A preamble to the Kurdish Question: The politics of Kurdish identity", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol 18, No 1, p.11.

⁴⁹ Dogu, Ergil, (2000), "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.11.No.3, p.123.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ Taha, Parla, (1985), "The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924)", Leiden, Brill

⁵² Georgeon, Francois, (1980), "Aux origins du Nationalisme Turc- Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)", Paris.

The basis of non tolerance towards the minorities in a general framework is the structure of the Turkish state itself, which under the impact of the French tradition implied the notion of “*cultural nation*” in the “*spirit of [a] community based on objective characteristics [as] common heritage and language a distinct territory, shared religion, customs and history*”⁵³. In that context, the Turkish Republic, as early as the movement of Young Turks⁵⁴, which aimed at the genesis of a Turkish homeland, proclaimed a new concept: the “Turkishness”⁵⁵.

Taking advantage of the circumstances created during the WWI and after the Greko-Turkish War⁵⁶, they eliminated the Christian ethnic groups. On October 1922, the Turkish delegate, stipulated the truce terms: Immediate departure of the Greek troops from the Eastern Thrace and a Turkish restoration within 30 days. “*The mandatory Greek consensus is confirmed postmortem. The price of failure is bitter and beyond of every proposition for the balance of the interstate relations*”⁵⁷.

The Turkish nationalistic movement prevailed. With the combined action of certain factors, they breaded the abolition of the Empire and the transformation of a fully Islamized Orient, into the core of a successor state. The new state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, applied a political elimination strategy and expulsion tactics towards, principally, the Greek and the Kurdish element.

In order to demarcate the way the Turkish state treats every single minority within the Turkish territory, we ought to make a basic conceptual dichotomy: religious minorities and national minorities. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the ‘Holly Bible’ for the Turks over minority issues within the country only religious minorities are identified and thus, in Turkey there are no Muslim minorities.

It seems that the source of the whole minority conflict in Turkey is the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. The Treaty, which in its entirety constitutes a hymn for the victory of Turkey during the War of Independence,⁵⁸ resulted in the definition of the new

⁵³ Taras , Ray, (2002), “Liberal and Illeberal Nationalism”,New Yorls, Palgrave MacMillan ,p.40.

⁵⁴ In 1909.

⁵⁵ Dogu, Ergil, (2000), p.122-135.

⁵⁶ From 1919 to1922.

⁵⁷ Svolopoulos, Konstantinos (1992), “Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική.1900-1945”(I elliniki eksoteriki politiki.1900-1945),Vol.1 Vivliopoleio tis Estias, p.168 .

⁵⁸ Shaw, Stanford, J. and Shaw, Ezel, Kural, (1977), “History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey”, Vol.12, Cambridge University Press, p.365-368.

territorial figure of the broader geographical zone, which throughout centuries it has been under the Turkish dominance. Moreover, it was signed despite the grave difficulties derived from an inevitable inconsistency: Turkey, the defeated power in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, meets with the winners and confronts them from a seat of power after the victorious outcome of the War in Minor Asia.

A paradox effect of the Treaty is, that in spite of the total nullification of the preexisting Treaty of Sèvres⁵⁹ and the restoration of the Turkish factor, it brings Turkey in an advantage position offering the opportunity to play the role of a protagonist player in the Eastern Mediterranean area; the transmission, though, from a multicultural Empire to a homogenized, secular, nationalistic state is done without tolerance towards the diversity. In that sense, the Treaty proclaims that minorities in Turkey are the non-Muslim groups of people⁶⁰, namely the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews. *In hoc sensu*, this is the cornerstone for the Kurdish issue.

So, the Treaty has incorporated - up to a point- the minorities into the –not seldom- violent structure of the state which has used Ottoman mechanisms in order to build a homogeneous nation-state in line with the European standards. The military⁶¹ and the state bureaucracy were charged with the compliance of the fundamental principles of Kemalism.

In an ambiance of terror as a spillover of the Sèvres and the disintegration of the Empire's soil to the ex – subjects, namely the “*Sèvresphobia*”⁶², a national psychosis

⁵⁹ In 1919.

⁶⁰The article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne marks that “*All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals*”. Moreover, the article 39 protects the civil, political and religious rights of non-Muslim minorities who are Turkish nationals and the article 40 gives them “*the same treatment and security in law and fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein*”. The optimum protection of the Treaty is also expressed in the article 44 where there is a provision for the League of Nations to guarantee provisions affecting the “non-Moslem minorities” with reference of dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

⁶¹Heper, Metin, and Guney, Aylin, (1996), “The military and Democracy in the third Turkish Republic, Armed Forces and Society, Vol.22, p.619-642.

⁶²Aydin, Mustafa, (2003), “Security conceptualization in Turkey”, (eds) Gunter, Brauch, Hans, Liotta, P.,H., Marquina, Antonio, Rogers, Paul and Salim, El-Sayed ,Mohammed, in “Security and environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing security and environmental conflicts”, Berlin, Springer, p.347

emerges towards the minorities. The Republican history is marked with the fear of every community, ideology, religion different from the one of the Turkish model. The insignificant numbers of ethnic groups have been capable of shaking the normality of the state's rhythm. The minority issue, and thus, in turn, the Kurdish separatist trends, have always been on the top of the agenda of the national security discourse of all the Turkish governments. Karaosmanoglu argues that the “[...] *fear of loss of territory and the fear of abandonment became a major aspect of Turkish security culture in the Empire [...]. Inherited by the Republic, these fears continue to haunt [...]*”⁶³.

Baptizing the minority issue an issue of security ⁶⁴“*at the point where an audience “backs up” or acquiesces to that designation of threat, or at the point of which extraordinary measures are implemented*”⁶⁵, the Turkish state proceeds into drafting a set of laws so as to protect the national integrity. The non-Muslim minorities “*have been exposed to discrimination through law and court decisions*”⁶⁶; in the 1930s a variety of professions was unreachable for the minorities⁶⁷, in the 1940s the coercive military service for the minorities was imposed, the “*scandalous*”⁶⁸ Wealth Tax targeting the Greek privileged families of Istanbul⁶⁹ as well. The Turkish state launched the “*Citizen! Speak Turkish*” assimilation campaign⁷⁰ and it proceeded in a coordinated and intensified effort of enfeeblement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The organized anti-minority policy reached its top with the “*kristallnacht of Istanbul*”⁷¹ in 1955 and the organized pogrom against the Greek community⁷², along with the 1964 forced deportation of thousands of Greeks of Istanbul after the events of

⁶³ Karaosmanoglu, Ali, (2000), “The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey”, *Journal of International Affairs*, p.199-216.

⁶⁴ Acikmese, Akgul, Sinem,(2013), “EU conditionality and desecuritization nexus in Turkey”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.13, No.3,p.303-323.

⁶⁵ McDonald, Matt (2008), “Securitization and the construction of security», *European Journal of International relations*.p.575

⁶⁶ Karaosmanoglu, Kerem, (2010) , “Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the AKP”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.12,No.2,p.196.

⁶⁷ Grigoriadis, Ioannis, (2008), “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.13, No1, p.31.

⁶⁸ Zurcher,Eric, (1997),“Turkey a modern History”, London, IB Tauris,p.208.

⁶⁹ Aktar, Ayhan, (2000), *Varlik Vergisi ve Turklestirme Politikalari*, Istanbul, p.140-141.

⁷⁰ Aslan,S .(2007),“Citizen, Speak Turkish!”: A Nation in the Making”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*,Volume 13.

⁷¹ Hoffman, Tessie, (2002) “Armenians in Turkey”, Brussels, The EU Office of Armenian Associations of Europe, p.18.

⁷²For further information, see Maglinis, Ilias, “Πόλη 1955:Η ανατομία ενός πογκρόμ», 05/06/2005, available on <http://www.kathimerini.gr/219453/article/politismos/arxeio-politismoy/polh-1955-h-anatomia-enos-pogkrom>, retrieved on 5/10/2015.

Cyprus⁷³. Finally, the enforced closure of the Theological School of Halki in 1971 followed the abolition of the use of the Kurdish language as *effet immédiat* of the 1980 coup d'état.

In any case, a whole hysteria around the minority issue has been built, having most of the times two targets: the Greeks and the Kurds. Nowadays, after the drastic depopulation of the Greek factor, the only threat for the unity of the Turkish state is the-fighting-for- its-rights Kurdish movement.

CHAPTER 2:

“TALK, DRESS AND LIVE LIKE TURKS”⁷⁴ Vs THE KURDISH RADICALIZATION.

The linguistic rights of the Kurdish populations in Turkey, form a part from a general range of liberties; thus, the freedom of using and be taught the Kurdish language, that is the country's linguistic policy, constitutes a section of the grid of what is called the “Kurdish issue” and thus, they should be studied in parallel.

What is more, for a deeper insight of the question, a probe of the linkage between the “Turkish nationalism” and “Kurdish awakening” is needed. Therefore, we meet a peculiar connectivity between the two concepts, which its outcome was: the more the Turkish nationalism was intensified, the more the oppressive measures against the Kurds were increased; subsequently, the tyrannical strategy was triggering the “Kurdish nationalism”, which dictated recognition of rights in a political and cultural level. The recognition of a different ethnic identity, would implied the recognition of a different cultural identity and thus, the use and learning of the Kurdish language and vice versa.

⁷³For further information, see, “Απελάσεις Ελληνικών Διαβατηρίων από την Τουρκία το 1964 και μαζική φυγή Ελλήνων Κων/πολιτών”, available on <http://www.omogeneia-turkey.com/history/1964.html>, retrieved on 5/10/2015.

⁷⁴Ziya, Abdullah, (1933), “Koy Mimarisi”, Ulku 9, p.37-41.

2.1 Kurdish: A linguistic extinction *ante portas* .

In the academic circles we meet the argument that language forms the driving force of a civilization and at the same time, many scholars articulate their eagerness to preserve the minority languages, as languages in jeopardy. Within this framework, a growing awareness is stated regarding the “*mass extinction*” of “*the cultural heritage of many people*”⁷⁵ .In terms of linguistic survival, Green argues that “*ensuring preservation of vulnerable languages is implicit in the value assumption of nearly every linguistic demographer and sociolinguist*”⁷⁶.

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the occasion of the ethno-linguistic conflict in the ex-Yugoslavia⁷⁷, the linguists have used the notion of “*linguicide*”⁷⁸ focusing on the extinction of certain languages as an aftermath of the state’s enforcement to use or not to use a particular language. In response, the post Cold War enhanced declarations have had as a goal to show the road of Europeanization to the countries of the former Eastern Bloc; to wit, the new European framework⁷⁹ specifically addressed to the linguistic issue is attached to and dependent on the democratization process.

One of the slowly dying languages, exactly due to the policies of abolition by the Turkish central state, is Kurdish. Strongly related to Pharsi⁸⁰ and influenced by Arabic and Turkish, Kurdish is a family of languages. Indeed, it is not a uniform language⁸¹, but rather a set of several languages/dialects, such as Kurmanji and Zaza, spoken in

⁷⁵ Crystal, David, (2002), “Language Death”, Cambridge University Press, p.7-10.

⁷⁶Green, Leslie. (1987), “Are language rights fundamental?”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol.25, p.639–669.

⁷⁷ Singh, Inder, Anita , (2001), “Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-communist Europe”, Greenwood Publishing Group, p.19.

⁷⁸ Phillipson, Robert, (2000), “Rights to Language Equity. Power and Education”, Lawrence Earlbaum.

⁷⁹ Formulation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority languages, Framework Convention for the Protection of national Minorities, creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Oslo Recommendations of Linguistic Rights for National Minorities

⁸⁰ Soane, Ely, Bannister, (1909), “A southern Kurdish folksong in Kermanshahi Dialect”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, p.35-51.

⁸¹ Mirwaisi, Hamma and Bucklay, Alison, (2013), “Why a unified Kurdish Language?”, in Mirwaisi, Hamma and Bucklay, Alison, (eds), “Unified Kurdish Language: The Language of Zoroaster and Darius the Great”, p.8-9.

the southeastern Turkish provinces. According to the official state, Kurdish “*is not a distinct language but a border dialect*”⁸².

From the moment that language is a basic element of establishing “*hegemony over others*”⁸³ and reinforce the state sovereignty it may constitute a *casus belli*; thus, the language policy-design rests in state hands and serves the public interest. In that base, the one and common language serves the *ultimum* interest of the “national unity”. This is the case in Turkey.

2.2 Drafting the linguistic implementation policy in Turkey. A theoretical outline.

The language planning is structured from the state, and through this state initiative the political will of a certain country is expressed⁸⁴. Provided that the linguistic diversity has always been a factor for friction and conflict within a country⁸⁵, the language design process is characterized of a peculiar dualism: on the one hand, the language unifies the human communities, on the other, it tears them apart.

Additionally, as far as the policy-makers and the nation builders⁸⁶ (e.g Kemal Atatürk) are concerned, the convergence into one and common language, namely the official language, at the expense of minority tongues even by putting in danger its durability and sustainability, is totally excused, despite the conviction that “*it appears unreasonable not to provide some level state services and activities in [the] language*” of “*a relative large numbers of individuals [that] use a particular language in a given state*”⁸⁷.

⁸²Sengupta, Annita, (2014), “Myth and Rhetoric of the Turkish Model: Exploring Developmental Alternatives”, Springer,p.145.

⁸³ Tollefson, W.,James, et al., (2003), p.197.

⁸⁴ Zeydanlioglu Welat, (2013), “Repression or reform?: An analysis of the AKP’s Kurdish language policy”, in Gunes Cengiz and Zeydanlioglu Welat, (eds), “The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and Reconciliation”, Routledge, p.162-166.

⁸⁵ Chilton, Paul, (1998), “The Role of Language in Human Conflict: Prolegomena to the Investigation of Language as a factor in Conflict Causation and Resolution, in Wright, Sue (ed.), “Language and Conflict: A Neglected Relationship”, Multilingual Matters, p.2-12.

⁸⁶ Aslan, Senem, (2014), “Policies of “extreme make-over”: state-Kurdish relations in the early Turkish Republic”, in Aslan,Senem(ed.), “Nation Building in Turkey and Morocco. Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent”, Cambridge University Press, p.36-55.

⁸⁷ Kymlich, Will and Patten, Alan, (2003),“Language rights and Political Theory”, Oxford University Press,p.38.

Weber argues that the linguistic convergence is promoted by the state policy, but at the same time it may be the outcome of a state policy⁸⁸. Nonetheless, launching linguistic homogeneity may not rest at the sphere of unintentional, but to develop into a well drafted governmental plan, prioritizing the creation of language uniformity, extinction of every cultural variety and cultivation of a compact, common cultural identity. To achieve that, the state needs to choose a *lingua franca* as an official one, which is the one spoken by the majority, used in the public life⁸⁹ and serves the state function.

Millar endorses that the use of a language other than the official one, may lead to danger⁹⁰, in the basis that there is the potential of upheavals in the moment when the state attempts the enforcement of use and teach the official language as only spoken/only existing language.

Highlighting the link between language and nationality, in line with the nationalistic lessons of the 18th and 19th century, language constitutes criterion of separation and not homogenization; a conflict factor and not a power of peaceful stability.

Loyal to the Atatürk's pledge of allegiance, "*One language, one flag, one nation*"⁹¹ the Turkish educational policy, deeply affected by Renan's tradition, has conceived the method of integration into Turkishness through language.

Within the context of homogenization, as early as 1925 the use of expressions, namely "*peoples of Turkey*"⁹² has been considered as taboo; instead, the Turkish political leadership tried with the wrong modules to achieve the solidarity of the country; in lieu, it cultivated the national homogenization via and despite the cultural diversity. Without mutual compromise or bridge the differences through conflict

⁸⁸ Weber, Joseph, Eugen, (1976), "Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914", Stanford University Press.

⁸⁹ Varennes, De, Fernard, (1996), "Language, Minorities and Human Rights", Kluwer Law International, p.32.

⁹⁰ Millar, Mc Coll, Robert, (2005), "Language, Nation and Power. An introduction", Palgrave MacMillan, p.200.

⁹¹ Larrabee, F. , Stephen, and Tol, Gonul , (2011), "Turkey's Kurdish Challenge", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy , Vol. 53, No. 4, p.143-152

⁹² Menges, Karl, Heinrich, (1995), "The Turkic Languages and Peoples: An Introduction to Turkic Studies", Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.

management, it has adopted the mentality of “*uniformity*”⁹³ and created standards by promoting, teaching, advertising, legislatively establishing and legally inflicting the model of the “*good Turk*”⁹⁴. In that context, it is sensational the Atatürk’s emblematic phrase “*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*” (“How Happy is He Who Can Say He is a Turk”) reproduced by the republican propaganda⁹⁵.

Nevertheless, because of the geomorphology of the region and the mountainous character of the terrain, the Kurdish populations, isolated from the main corps of the rest of the country, have managed to stand tall vis-à-vis the integration policies.

2.3 Turkish nationalism as the cornerstone of the nation building. The correlation with the awareness of the Kurdish identity.

The roots of the Republic of Turkey have been seated in the conceptualization of the “nation building” and which founds ground via three critical parameters: 1) obedience towards the state’s orders, 2) secularism, 3) the notion of “Turkishness”, which implies a minimum of standards, along with the language, in order for someone to be called a “*Turk*”⁹⁶.

In that context, the ideology of Pan-Turkism, sometimes marginalized, some others reinforced, depending on the international circumstances, was used both by the late Ottoman and the Kemalic regime in order to discourage the democratization process of the political system. Thus, the conceptualization of the Pan-Turkism have never stopped to survive in the ideological reserve of the Turkish state, which has used it several times, so as to reproduce the balance of power inside the country and expand its political influence in the outside.

Despite the political metamorphosis and the official efforts to attribute responsibility in former regimes and political personalities, Pan-Turkism has never been ostracized. On the contrary, it has constituted a potential ideology ready to emerge and legitimize

⁹³ Ergil, Dogu, (2000), p.123

⁹⁴ White, Paul, Joseph and Jongerden, Joost, (2003), “Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview”, Brill, p.79

⁹⁵ Watts, Nicole (2006) ‘Activists in office: Pro-Kurdish contentious politics in Turkey’, in *Ethnopolitics*, Vol.5, No.2, p. 125-144.

⁹⁶ Dogu, Ergil, (2000), p.122-135.

the international imperial political position which the military, the bureaucracy and great part of the elite, wish to preserve for Turkey⁹⁷.

We have already seen that, during the Conference of Lausanne, their hegemonic profile provided the delegates of Ankara with the ability to impose their intentions vis-à-vis the Great Powers; with the closure of the Conference, the national Turkish State staked its claim of independence and achieved the satisfaction of its territorial assertion. With the Treaty of Lausanne - if not in every detail- the targets set by the Kemalists were all succeeded and the country that emerged would constitute a sovereign state⁹⁸.

The Republican ideology, promotes the virtue of uniformity and the concept of Atatürkism constitutes a hitch for the ethno-cultural differences⁹⁹, deemed as dangers, which are justified to be treated with extrajudicial oppressive measures¹⁰⁰. Its rhetoric presents the Turkish model as an undivided unity of people leaving in harmony, bound together in common history, culture, tradition, soil, mores, ancestors and language¹⁰¹.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the Republic incorporates a paradox in the basis that the Islam constitutes a connecting element of the creation of the new country, and simultaneously there is Kemalism, which within the framework of secularism objects to every form of confession. For the founding fathers of the Republic, Islam represented the monolithic past, the civilization deficiency and the backwardness. Within the framework of the modernization and Europeanization of the new state their first consideration was to marginalize the religious affiliation¹⁰².

⁹⁷ Ozdocan, Gunay, Goksu, (1994), «Dunya savasi yillarindaki Turk-Alman iliskilerinde ic ve dis politica araci olarak Pan-Turkizm», in Faruk Sonmezoglu, «Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi», Der Yaninlari, No.1 Beyazit-Istanbul.

⁹⁸ In that basis, the new state included Anatolia and the Eastern Thrace, while Armenia and Kurdistan were left outside the picture. See more in Zurcher, Eric, (2004), «Turkey a modern History», in Greek, Alexandria, Athens, p.223-226.

⁹⁹ Soner, Ali, B., (2010), «The Justice and Development Party's policies towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey», Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.12, No.0,p.23-40.

¹⁰⁰ Yavuz, Hakan, (2003), «Islamic identity in Turkey», Oxford University Press, p.239.

¹⁰¹ AK Parti Programi,(2004), Kalkinma ve Demokratiklesme Programi, p.4.

¹⁰² Glasner, Peter E.(1977), «The Sociology of Secularisation», London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

The nationalistic elites, who have derogated the Anatolian populations into the level of uncivilized, primitive communities¹⁰³, envisaged the new born state as the outcome of an “*Orientalist and Eurocentric reasoning*”¹⁰⁴; thus, their principal goal was to civilize and modernize the backward, undeveloped population of the Anatolia.

Indeed, in an Atatürk’s speech in 1925 in Akhisar, we meet the concept that the “*uncivilized people are doomed to be trodden under the feet of civilized people*”¹⁰⁵. Due to the lack of any other colonial power in the region, Turkey has been engaged with a messianic project of being the savior¹⁰⁶ of the uncivilized, using the mechanisms of assimilation in order to liberate the communities from the evil of regression and poverty, and thus achieve the homogenization of a multicultural great “*ethno-religious plurality*”¹⁰⁷ within the societal level.

Hence, within the framework of Turkification, which included forced assimilation tactics so as to guarantee the loyalty of the population and prevent the separatist allegations¹⁰⁸, every different element outside the authorized model of the Atatürkism’s values, is seeing as a potential threat against the national integrity. Nevertheless, the Turkish national identity is actually relied on the Muslim-related conceptualization. What is important is that the Islamic element “*was constitutive in the making of modern Turkish national identity and nationalism*”¹⁰⁹, hence every Muslim in Turkey automatically and without doubts gets identified as Turk.

In particular, taken the Occident’s paradigm and under the principal of secularism, as early as the 20’s, the Republic aiming at exterminating every hateful remnant of the Ottoman epoch¹¹⁰, drafts a set of laws targeting both the modernization and the

¹⁰³Zeydanlioglu, Welat (2008), «The White Turkish Man’s Burden: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey, in Rings, Guido, and Ife, Anne (eds), “Neo-Colonial Mentalities in Contemporary Europe? Language and Discourse in the Construction of Identities”, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p.5.

¹⁰⁴ Kahraman, Bullent,H.,(2002) “İcselleştirilmiş, Acic ve Gizli Oryantalizm ve Kemalizm”, Dogu/Bati 20, p.154-178.

¹⁰⁵ Atatürk,Mustafa,Kemal,(2006), “Atatürk’un Soylev ve Demeçleri”,Ankara, Atatürk Arastirma Merkezi,

¹⁰⁶ Akyol, Mustafa, “The Turkification of Turkey”, Hurriyet, available on <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/opinion/10397767.asp?scr=1>, retrieved on 20/11/2015,

¹⁰⁷ Bora, Tanil, (1998), “Turk Saginin Uc Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlik, Islamcilik”, Birikim Yayinlari, p.39-42.

¹⁰⁸ Zeydanlioglu, Welat (2008),p.6

¹⁰⁹Gurpinar,Dogan and Kenar, Ceren (2015)“ The Nation and its Sermons: Islam, Kemalism and the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies,p.15.

¹¹⁰ Yavuz, Hacan, (1998), p.11-12.

unification of the nation. The reforms meet the vigorous resistance of the people and the Courts play definitive role in the confrontation of the protests¹¹¹ and they proceed into arrests and executions.

- in 1923, even though Islam used to be the official religion of the Empire and the basic faith of the majority of the citizens, Atatürk proceeds into a wave of administrative reforms by abolishing the sultanate and caliphate, the Courts implementing the law of Shari' a, and the dervish orders.
- In 1924, the Law of Unification of Education is drafted, which achieved to create the foundations of religious unity by secularizing the schools, thus religious schools were abolished.
- In 1925, the Hat Law prohibits the veil for women and the fez for men.
- In 1926, the European calendar is adopted, along with the Suisse Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code; several bills for the reorganization of the banking sector become institutionalized and all titles of nobility such as *paşa* or *effendi*, get abolished¹¹².

The relation between the Turkish nationalism and the realization of the different Kurdish ethnic identity is that: as long as the nationalism was overgrowing, the illiberal policies of social integration and incorporation would go deeper and grow more intensive; in turn, the correlation of the two, lead, unavoidably, to the Kurdish growing belief of difference, the deepening empathy of their non common national identity.

What is more, the radical awakening to battle for their sociopolitical rights on the one hand, and the curtailing the human rights military regimes on the other, had as an aftermath the Kurdish uprisings.

2.4 Kurdish insurgency-Turkish nationalism. A chronicle of a fatal relationship.

Pivotal factor of the Kurdish realization of a separate cultural identity is the Turkish state's policy; the aforementioned transmission from the multicultural caliphate into a Republican model of nation-state. The politicization of the national identity begins

¹¹¹Tuncay, Mete, (1989), "T.C'de tek parti yönetiminin kurulması (1923-1931)", Istanbul, Cem, p.169.

¹¹²Zurcher, Eric, (2004), "Turkey a modern History», in Greek, Alexandria, Athens, p.237-238.

from the late 19th century when the imperial regime ended up in “*governing and not ruling*”¹¹³.

The, as above represented Atatürk project, had as an aftermath the genesis of a nationalistic Kurdish elite, which in combination with the regional discrepancy in economic terms, the inconsistency regarding the development of the area and the suppressive policies especially after every dictatorship were the explanation for the mobilization of the Kurdish community.

Given that, we identify two instrumental phases in the evolution of the Kurdish factor:

2.4.1 From the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the single-party era.

In this phase we meet the outcome of the political options of the already declining Ottoman Empire; the changeover from the regime of caliphate to the proclamation of Republic¹¹⁴, along with the socio-political makeovers as an aftermath of the Kemalic reforms and the transition from a lenient multi-ethnic state¹¹⁵ to an intolerant nation-state model¹¹⁶.

During the Ottoman Empire, the ethnic character had merely no political significance¹¹⁷ and minimal social spillover. In the twilight of the House of Osman's the Sultan used centralization policies in order to squash -at least monitor- the already revolted nations within his territory. In the late 19th century, the identification of the ethnic groups in the base of the religious factor, constituted the womb of a plethora of impediments especially as far as the recognition of the existence of the separate cultural entity of the Kurds.

¹¹³Held, David (1995), “The development of the Modern State”, in Hall, Stuart et al. (eds), “Modernity”, Cambridge Polity Press, p.55-69.

¹¹⁴ 1921 Constitution.

¹¹⁵ Sultan Abdul Medjid granted the Ottoman subjects with a charter of Fundamental liberties with the Tanzimat in 1839 and the Hatti- Humayun in 1856.

¹¹⁶ Robins, Kevin, (1996), “Interrupting identities: Turkey/Europe”, in Hall, Stuart and Gay,du Paul (eds), “The questions of cultural identity”,London,Sage,p.61-76.

¹¹⁷Yavuz, Hacan, (2001), “Five stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.7, No.3, p.5.

In effect, the Kurdish mobilization started in the large urban areas¹¹⁸ during the WWI and as the Young Turks movement was growing, as a counterblast to the imminent loss of the cosmopolitan profile of the state.

For Yavuz, the Sèvres Treaty was an A' class opportunity for the newborn Kemalist state *“to identify internal and external enemies”*¹¹⁹. Articles 62-64¹²⁰ incorporated a provision for a possibility *“of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas”*¹²¹ in the north of the province of Mosul; also, article 64 was granting the Kurds *“[...]within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty [...]”,* with the right to *“[...] address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations ”* and *“show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey”*¹²².

Despite the fact that the Treaty of Sèvres was doomed to die soon after its ratification and get replaced by the one of Lausanne, it remains alive in the collective memory of the Turks. Indeed, the Treaty retained a tiny state out of the vastness of the Ottoman region which included the Northern Minor Asia and Istanbul as capital.¹²³The multi breakdown and the partition of the ex potent Empire and the land attribution as credit to its former nations-subjects as allies of the Entente Cordiale, created a psychotic situation¹²⁴ and an ambiance of fear against every minority population, ever since.

Since then, and despite the positive outcome for the Turkish sovereignty of the Treaty of Lausanne, the preservation of the Turkish unity emerged as an existential slogan for the politicians.

¹¹⁸ Goldas, Ismail, (1991), “Kurdistan Teali Ceemiyeti”, Istanbul,Doz.

¹¹⁹ Yavuz, Hacan, (2001), p.6

¹²⁰Treaty of Sèvres, the whole text, available on <http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/>, retrieved on 21/11/2015.

¹²¹ Article 62.

¹²² Article 64.

¹²³ Zurcher, Eric, (2004), p.207-208.

¹²⁴ Akcam, Tener, (2004), “From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide”, London, Zed, p.54.

The ambiance between the two principal ethnic communities of Turkey has not always been strained; in fact, the solidarity¹²⁵ between the peoples is firstly introduced during the War of Independence¹²⁶, which its triumphant closure led to the rescission of the Treaty of Sèvres and its succession by the Lausanne Treaty “*which legitimized the territorial integrity and unitary nature*”¹²⁷ of the Republic.

The wise political option made by the educated elite of Kemalists to name the new state “*Republic of Turkey*”¹²⁸ and not for example “Republic of the Turks”, is the proof that at the time, there was the cognizance of the multicultural face of the country; thus, by the use of a certain geographical specification, the creators of the Republic built a new state with principal point of connection the Atatürk’s ideals, without highlighting as unique or primordial the Turkish nation. In the logic that the “Republic of Turkey” includes all the populations inside the Turkish borderline, akin the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”¹²⁹, is a Parliament for all the citizens and with MP’s of every ethnic group.

Sadly, these first positive actions quickly get replaced by policies of isolation and control; hence, the post the formulation of the Republic concepts of pluralism and cosmopolitanism fade out¹³⁰. Furthermore, the status of autonomy, already granted by the Empire in return for loyalty to the Sultans, got invaded and the aftermath was the 1st Kurdish uprising in 1925, which got choked harshly. In the wake of the retaliation, villages got torn down, coercive displacements of the Kurds from their ancestral land¹³¹, authoritarianism in administration and legislation¹³², negation of the different cultural identity and blocking the free opinion via strategies of prohibition wearing the

¹²⁵ About the contribution of the Kurds in the War of Independence fighting by the side of the Turks, see http://www.todayszaman.com/interviews_ergil-it-was-the-kurds-who-did-not-want-a-kurdish-state-in-the-treaty-of-lausanne_312525.html and <https://www.quora.com/What-role-did-Kurds-play-in-the-Turkish-War-of-Independence-against-Imperial-Great-Powers>, retrieved on 21/11/2015

¹²⁶ From 1919 to 1922, also known as the Greco-Turkish War.

¹²⁷ Ergil, Dogu, (2000), p.124.

¹²⁸ On 29th October 1923, see <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,31350/biography-of-ataaturk.html>, retrieved on 27/11/2015.

¹²⁹ Article 6, 1924 Constitution.

¹³⁰ Zurcher, Eric, (2004), p.236

¹³¹ Robins, Phillip (1993), “The overload state: Turkish policy and the Kurdish issue”, International Affairs, Vol.69.No.4, p.662.

¹³² Zurcher, Eric, (2004), p. 233-236.

traditional Kurdish clothes, Turkification of all the settlements in the south eastern region¹³³ in line with the Law 5442¹³⁴, restrictions in the use of the mother tongue¹³⁵.

In a general framework, that kind of suppression policies¹³⁶, lead undeniably to the human rights containment and the condition of basic liberties. The minority question, hence the Kurdish one, got labeled as issues of national security; in that sense the democratic prerequisites of the Kemalic references and the rule of law get sacrificed in the name “*of territorial integrity*”¹³⁷.

That authoritarianism did not remain without response of counterattack; thus, in 1930 and 1936 we meet the 2nd and 3rd Kurdish uprising¹³⁸. Both were nipped in the bud and the net round the Kurdish liberties began to tighten.

The three unfortunate seditions had an outcome of double meaning: on the one hand, they delivered to unite the Kurdish population in its entirety driven from the conscious of an independent, distinctive ethno-cultural identity¹³⁹, and on the other, they achieved to create the label of a primitive, behindhand, poor people of fundamentalists which oppose a rich, progressive, democrat, civilized, secular state.¹⁴⁰

With the single party period terminating in 1945, the multi-party’50’s - for Ozcan an era-milestone of the “*silent decades*”¹⁴¹- is characterized by a relative freedom of expression¹⁴². At that time, the Kurds were practicing the minimum of mobilization and thus, there was a peaceful time for the two peoples. But not for long. Ever since the coup of 1960, the political history of modern Turkey is characterized of a

¹³³ For example the major city of the Kurds Diyarbakir gets renamed into the most Turkish sounded Diyarbakir.

¹³⁴ Law 5442 stipulates that : ‘*Village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee*’.

¹³⁵ Op.cit.p.661.

¹³⁶ Aktar, Ayhan, (2009)“ ‘Turkification’ policies in the early Republican era”, in Dufft , Catharina (ed),“Turkish Literature and Cultural Memory: "multiculturalism" as a Literary Theme After 1980”, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.p.29-62.

¹³⁷ Uzer, Umut, (2010), “Identity and the Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus”, London-New York, I.B Tauris, p.157.

¹³⁸ Robins, Phillip (1993), (1993), “The overload state: Turkish policy and the Kurdish issue”, International Affairs, Vol.69.No.4, p.660.

¹³⁹ Nagel, J., (1980), “The conditions of ethnic separatism: The Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq”, Ethnicity, Vol.7.No.3,p.279-297.

¹⁴⁰ Yavuz, Hacan, (2001),p.8

¹⁴¹ Ozcan, Ali, Kemal, (2006), “Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan”,Rutledge, p.53-80

¹⁴² Barkey, Henri, J. and Fuller, E, Graham,(1998), “Turkey’s Kurdish Question”, Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield,p.14.

turbulent transition towards the multi-party nature of the Republic, with the military factor always present.

2.4.2 The sequential coup d'états period and the restoration of Democracy.

The peace of the democratic period is seized by the coup of 1960¹⁴³. The political instability, the corrupted government of Adnan Menderes, the shaking democratic institutions, the social commotion, and the political elite's abuse of political power, cultivated the soil for the first military coup of 1960 under Alparslan Türkeş. Another pretext for the coup has been the compromising stance of PM Menderes vis-à-vis the Kurdish question, which had as an aftermath the resurgence of the Kurdish irredentism. Hence, from day one the military officers proceeded in arrestments and exiles of members of the Kurdish community¹⁴⁴.

Among the first initiatives of the junta are listed the drafting of a new more liberal Constitution in line with the ECHR, as an action of “[...] exercising [...] the rights to resist the oppression of a political power which had deteriorated into a state of illegitimacy through behaviors and actions contrary to the rule of law [...]”¹⁴⁵. The liberal, humanistic, anti-war, trend of the Western civilization had a spillover in Turkey, in the sense that the evolution of this “anti-culture” boosted the concern over the human and civil rights’ protection and the fundamental liberties.

A plethora of liberties and civil rights were granted, thus, is stated that “Every individual is entitled, [...] to fundamental rights and freedoms...The State shall remove all political, economic and social obstacles that restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in such way as to be irreconcilable with the principles embodied in the rule of law [...] and social justice”¹⁴⁶. Besides that, there is the base for the future establishment of the social state, since article 2 includes the phrase “social state”¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴³Szyliowicz, Joseph, S.,(1963), “The 1961 Turkish Constitution-An analysis”, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Vol. 2, No. 3,p. 363-38.

¹⁴⁴Gunter, Michael, M, (1990),”Kurds in Turkey a political Dilemma”, Boulder, Colo: Westview D, p.15.

¹⁴⁵ Preamble, 1961 Constitution, available on <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf> , retrieved on 20/11/2015.

¹⁴⁶ Article 10, 1961 Constitution.

¹⁴⁷ Article 2, 1961 Constitution.

Despite the liberal western framework of a Constitution of deep innovations in the level of sociopolitical rights, the practice is not in line with theory. Thus, projects of extermination of the Kurdish language and strategies of Turkification are far from eliminated.

Within the catalogue of legislative actions proving the dual reality and the pharisaic profile of the Constitution we list:

1. After comparing the Constitutions of 1924¹⁴⁸ and 1961, the conceptualization of the term “Turk” becomes more descriptive. The 1924 Constitution provides that “*The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion*”¹⁴⁹ ; hence, the syntactic use of a word of legal terminology, namely “citizen”, suggests the legal grid between the person and the state. Nevertheless, in the 1961 Constitution the phrasal affirmation “*without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion*” is eliminated and develops into “*Every individual who is bound to the Turkish State by ties of citizenship is a Turk*”¹⁵⁰.
2. Activation of the state project of separation of Kurdish children from their families in order to be properly educated in boarding schools promoting the Turkish ideal and teach solely in Turkish¹⁵¹.

To conclude, the 1960s is developed round four axes:

1. The controversy regarding the constitutionally guaranteed rights and the everyday practice,
2. the elevation of left parties¹⁵², introducing a reflection over the Kurds¹⁵³,
3. the decade became the genesis container of authentic Kurdish organizations, as an aftermath of the failed mission of the above mentioned leftist parties¹⁵⁴ to communicate the “Eastern question” to the interest of the Kurdish people.

¹⁴⁸ Earle, Mead, Edward, (1925), “The New Constitution of Turkey”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 40, p.73-100.

¹⁴⁹ Article 88, 1924 Constitution.

¹⁵⁰ Article 54, 1961 Constitution.

¹⁵¹ Skutnabb- Kangas, Tove, (1987), “Bilingualism or Not: The Education of Minorities”, London: Multilingual Matters Limited, p.308-312.

¹⁵² For example, in the 1965 general elections, the left wing Turkish Workers Party (*TIP*), won 15 seats and soon after that it opens the debate over the “Eastern Question”.

¹⁵³ Since for the first time a Turkish political party acknowledges the existence of a Kurdish community inside the Turkish borders. See more in Gunter, Michael, M, (1990), p.16.

4. the washed out cosmopolitan character and an annihilated multiethnic perspective is indicated.

The May 1968 events in France inspired people in Turkey to go out in the streets and claim for more rights despite the national radicalization and the reinforcement of the dominant Turkish cultural sense.

In early '70's, Turkey experiences a volatile period of civil unrest , massive demonstrations, political instability and economic recession. A new dictatorship was *ante portas*.

The new junta, known as the "*Coup by Memorandum*"¹⁵⁵, opens a new cycle of freedom suppression actions and pursues political figures with the accusation of "*encouraging Kurdish separatist activities*"¹⁵⁶. Still, for Bozarslan, until the 70's, "*the demands were primarily concerned with civic and social rights than with the recognition of a specific national identity. They focused around issues such as being recognized as full citizens by the state and being given the same rights as other citizens; an active struggle against under-development...*"¹⁵⁷

In order to secure the Turkish national identity, the coup passes legislation concerning the "National Registration and the Ordinance on Family names", stipulating that "*Nobody can bear a name that is not in accordance with our national culture and Turkish traditions*"¹⁵⁸ ; actually persons' name with the unknown in the Turkish language letters of "q", "w", "x"¹⁵⁹, get Turkified and parents that proceeded in the use

¹⁵⁴ Criss, Nur, Bilge, (1995), "The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.18, No.1, p.18.

¹⁵⁵Usul, Ali, Resul, (2010), "Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Political Conditionality", Routledge, p.145, Rahimi,Sadeq (2015) "Old peoples, New Identities", in Rahimi, Sadeq (ed), "Meaning, Madness and Political Subjectivity: A Study of Schizophrenia and Culture in Turkey",Routledge,p.39

¹⁵⁶ Watts, Nicole,F.(1999), "Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics.1990-1994", Oxford University Press, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31.No.4, p. 651.

¹⁵⁷ Bozarslan, Hamit (1991), "Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary Turkey", in Kreyenbroek, Philip and Sperl, Stephan (eds), "The Kurds a Contemporary Overview", New York, Routledge, p.79.

¹⁵⁸ Yildiz, Kerim, (2004), "Kurtlerin Kulturel Ve Disel Haklarin", Istanbul, Belge Yayinlari, p.50.

¹⁵⁹ Actually, this is a re-introduce of a former legislation, namely the Law 1353 of 1928, which stipulated the 29 Latin letters and highlighting that 'old Arabic letters' –mostly used in Kurdish-as forbidden.

of Kurdish-sounded names were taxed with “*damaging the national culture and tradition*”¹⁶⁰.

The Kurdish cultural identity gets breaded, reinforced and crystallized as a result of a quartet of parameters:

1. the generalized democratic trend of the era,
2. the more liberal 1961 Constitutional provisions,
3. the systematization of the Turkification project via tyrannical policies, after the coup of the 1970s.,
4. the tribal leaders of the past are displaced and substituted by an group of intellectuals, consequently the political immaturity gives the reins to a sophisticated elite of young people, capable of articulating political arguments.¹⁶¹ Within that framework Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) found room to be born¹⁶² and in spite of the initial minor and sporadic action¹⁶³ triggered the reemerge of the Kurdish issue. Actually, the PKK is a primordial player of the “*political consciousness*”¹⁶⁴ empathy by reinforcing the Kurdish nationalism and the realization of the differentiation in the ethno-cultural character.

Under the evolution and the consolidation of the Kurdish nationalistic activism and the struggle for self-determination rights, the Kurdish population made determinant steps towards their ethnic awakening; a fact that it was used as pretext from Kenan Evren to overthrow the legal government in 1980¹⁶⁵.

From September 12th 1980, until November 7th 1982, were a new Constitution was put to Referendum, the Turkish state was repressively governed by the “*Milli*

¹⁶⁰ Ferhad, Ibrahim and Gurbey, Gulistan (2000), “Kurdish conflict in Turkey obstacles and chances for peace and democracy”, New York, LIT, St.Martin’s ,p.23.

¹⁶¹ Neurberger, Benyamin,(2014), “Kurdish Nationalism in Comparative Perspective”, in Bengio, Ofra (ed) , “Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland”, University of Texas Press, p.24.

¹⁶² In 1978.

¹⁶³ Robins, Phillip, (1993), p.662.

¹⁶⁴ Cetin, Emre, Berfin, (2015) “The Paramilitary Hero on Turkish Television: A case study on Valley of the Wolves”, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p.118.

¹⁶⁵ Sakallioğlu, Cizre, Umit, (1997) “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy” , Comparative Politics , Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 151-166.

Güvenlik Kurulu” (MGK)¹⁶⁶, the National Security Council, which along with the Turkish military forces would built a shield against “*communism and separatism*”¹⁶⁷. In that sense, with the aforementioned pretext the military forces proceed into establishing a junta, the abolishment of the Parliament, imposition of martial law to the whole of the country, dissolution of all kind of parties, putting out of force the 1960 Constitution, without, however, alienating from the Kemalic lessons of state secularism and national unity, in the name of which “*the Kurds featured prominently amongst those receiving the harshest treatment from the government*”¹⁶⁸. Indeed, effective immediately, the coup launches organized operations in the Southeast of the country and via a cleansing strategy, killings, arrestments, confinements and plethora of acts of tortures are witnessed¹⁶⁹.

At the end of the day, the intervention forced numbers of Kurds to flee either to Europe or Syria; under these circumstances not only the Kurdish issues was it degraded, on the contrary it was escalated from a mere domestic Turkish issue into an international problem. Nonetheless, the polarization within the Turkish society rang red alert.

What is more, the militaristic spirit of the time, penetrated in the political life, two ways, in administration (a) and in legislature (b).

- a. In an administrative level by inaugurating a system of policing the region via paramilitary militias¹⁷⁰. In a general specter, the Constitution of 1982 granted the administration with a centralized character, gathering the maximum of powers, by throwing the civil society to the back seat with the minimum room to flower. Hence, the civil rights, the social freedoms were dramatically restrained in all levels.

¹⁶⁶ The MGK is a mixed group of military and government members, namely the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey, the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers.

¹⁶⁷“Interview with General Kenan Evren”, Der Spiegel, 19-10-1981.

¹⁶⁸ Mc Dowall, David, (1996),“A modern History of the Kurds”, London: IB Tauris,p.413.

¹⁶⁹ Karabelias, Gerassimos, (1999), “The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980–95”, Middle Easter Studies, Vol.35, No.4, p. 130-151, Barkey, Henri, J. and Fuller, E, Graham,(1998), “Turkey’s Kurdish Question”, Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield,p133-156.

¹⁷⁰ Jongerden, Joost, (2007), “Soldiers and Settlements”, in Jongerden, Joost (ed), “The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War”, Brill, p.73

- b. -In a legislative level, primordially with the Constitution of 1982. The latter, prelude of authoritarianism, harsher than the previous of 1960, incorporates a set of articles aiming at the formulation of a society of military discipline.
- For the “*indivisible entity*”¹⁷¹ of the nation’s sake, the coup put the Kurdish “threat” on the top of its political agenda. Calling the minority as the number one enemy of the nation, Turkey does not just recycle the previous controlling linguistic policy; it moves to the next level with the Law 2932/1983¹⁷² which prohibited the use of “*languages prohibited by the law*” namely, the Kurdish one¹⁷³, and imposed the use of Turkish in public, since it is the “*mother tongue of Turkish citizens*”¹⁷⁴. Under the effect of the military centered ideology, Turkish is now identified as a “*mother tongue*”¹⁷⁵ replacing the term of “*official language*” used in the Constitution of 1960.
- Another legislative stroke, targeting the southeastern provinces, was the entry of the 1987 “*State of Emergency*”¹⁷⁶, which provided the every-four-months extension after Parliamentary vote.
- Moreover, policies of changing names of people and places get intensified, while the Penal Code -along with the Constitution- becomes the instrument of manipulation of the mob and in parallel the extinction tool of the Kurdish cultural identity.

The militaristic regime launched a full-face attack to the expression of every cultural differentiation, which it would potentially signal the promotion of a separate national identity, despite the indirect provision for the minorities that “...*every Turkish citizen...*”¹⁷⁷, that is “*all individuals*”¹⁷⁸, are “*equal without any discrimination*”

¹⁷¹ Article 3§1, 1982 Constitution.

¹⁷² On “Publication in Languages Other than Turkish”.

¹⁷³ Ozbudun, Ergun and Genckaya Faruk, Ömer , (2009), “Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-making in Turkey”, Central European University Press, p.54.

¹⁷⁴ Article 42§9, 1982 Constitution .

¹⁷⁵ Article 42, 1982 Constitution.

¹⁷⁶ Kurban, Dilek, (2013), “The Kurdish question. Law, Politics and the limits of Recognition”, in Rodriguez , Carmen ,Avalos, Antonio, Yilmaz Hakan , Planet Ana I. (eds), “Turkey's Democratization Process”, Routledge, p.347.

¹⁷⁷ Preamble, 1982 Constitution.

¹⁷⁸ Article10, 1982 Constitution.

irrespective of language, race, [...] ¹⁷⁹” “under the rule of law”¹⁸⁰ and “[...] through the exercise of the fundamental rights”¹⁸¹.

Thus, the legislative actions raise the homogeneity of the Turkish state into issue of vitality. The homogenization project in order to be successful needs legislative bedrock ; that it was given by the Evren junta openhanded: by passing bills and drafting acts, which on the one hand, promote the uniqueness of the Turkish language, on the other they do not just block the use but they criminalize the use of every other language, the deep Turkish state created a pseudo-moral sense that the individual who speaks other language than the “*mother tongue of all Turkish citizens*”, breaks the law, violates the Constitution and becomes a traitor of his homeland.

Following the illiberal policies of of the 1980s, in 1990 we mark an escalation of violence proving that the Kurdish issue in not a minor situation. The two factors that heighten the anomaly is the insisting resistance of the military forces and the public servants to serve the southeastern region¹⁸², for fear of their integrity and the level of violence there. Simultaneously, the PKK continues the unceasing recruitment, the Kurdish nationalism grows proportions and expands; in turn, throughout the country there is an explosion of strikes and protests. With a “*Kurdish indifada*”¹⁸³ ready to outburst, Turkey was on the verge of a potential harsh civil war.

The fall of Evren was succeeded by the wise political *manœuvres* of leading figures, such as Turgut Özal-that we will see shortly after- and thus, the tension gets burnt out.

Though not for long, bad political options, unfortunate set of circumstances and the ongoing military interventions challenge the region. Tragic closure of the army conflicts in the 90’s is listed as such:

- Many people dead or wounded both sides¹⁸⁴,
- Kurdish flee abroad that led to a deepening nationalistic trend and the reinforcement of the radicalization both sides,

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem,

¹⁸⁰ Op.cit, 103.

¹⁸¹ Op.cit 104.

¹⁸² Criss, Nur, Bilge, (1995), “The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , Vol.18, No.1, p.19-21.

¹⁸³ Robins, Phillip, (1993), p.665.

¹⁸⁴ Abramowitz, Morton I., (1993), “Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal”, Foreign Policy, No. 91, p. 164-181.

-Full-scale desolation of villages, at least depopulation, which led to a forced relocation of great numbers of people¹⁸⁵ and finally to the desertification of the rural area. In that sense, on the one hand, the massive installation in the major urban areas¹⁸⁶, principally, of the west, became the source of sociopolitical problems with growing rates of unemployment, poverty, violence, delinquency and multiple phenomena of racial segregation. In a deepening ambiance of “Kurdohpobia” the social tissue churns violently, the rule of law¹⁸⁷ and the humanitarian law is challenged¹⁸⁸.

On the other hand and in a financial perspective, the coercive abandonment of the primary agriculture sector had as an aftermath for Turkey to address to the foreign economies so as to manage the underproduction and the market needs. In turn, the on and on increasing imports and the growing macroeconomic instability led the country to an economic crisis and finally the intervention of IMF¹⁸⁹.

CHAPTER 3:

THE DRIVING FORCES FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE LINGUISTIC RIGHTS IN TURKEY.

Given the history of the Turkish Republic, we have identified a sort of inclination for military regimes every now and then and each coup d'état has left its fingerprint in the general conduct of policy of the country.

After the Coup of 1980, which has implemented an array of the severest of policies in the name of the preservation of the “national unity and indivisibility”, a cosmogony

¹⁸⁵ Bilgin, Fevzi and Sarihan Ali , (2013), “Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Issue”, Lexington Books p.31

¹⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch report (2002), “Displaced and Disregarded, Turkey’s Failing Village Return Program”

¹⁸⁷ Yavuz, Hacan, (2001), p.14.

¹⁸⁸ Kassimeris, Christos and Tsoumpanou, Lina , (2008), “The impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey’s EU Candidacy”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol12,No,3,p.337.

¹⁸⁹ Onis, Ziya, (2006) “Varieties and crisis of Neoliberal Globalization: Argentina, Turkey and the IMF”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No2, p: 239-263.

has emerged regarding the “Kurdish question” and by extension the Kurdish language.

Hence, the duo of catalysts that have become the levers to remodel the illiberal policy vis-à-vis the linguistic rights are: as internal activators, the political tactics of the post-Evren époque focalized on A) Turgut Özal, his successors and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and B) EU, outside the Turkish borders. The latter, has prompted the change via the stick and carrot¹⁹⁰ method, namely the membership process negotiations and thus, has managed to shake up from the regression mud the Turkish carriage, driving Turkey in a more European direction.

3.1 The Turks statesmen.

Always committed to the national security and integrity target, via unity and stability, the Turkish domestic policy has been specialized in the art of homogenization, which presupposed the assimilation in all cultural levels, accounting for language. Having as an objective the one and only nationality, multiculturalism and cultural diversity, both have been treated as threats against the survival of the state.

Throughout the aforementioned presented chronicle of violence and oppression A1)Turgut Özal and A3)Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, via their political decisions, have held a key role.

3.1.1 Alienating from the Kemalic monolithism. The political acts of Turgut Özal.

Succeeding the military junta of 1980, Özal has managed to restart the engines of the Turkish economy brilliantly, through a cascade of liberal policies implied, since his personal vision has been to turn Turkey into a “*little America*”¹⁹¹. Being a peculiar political blend, by achieving to gather round his image “*the most belligerent, conservative, traditional values of Ottoman origin with the outmost liberal Thatcherism conceptualization*”¹⁹² he managed to combine the element of tradition

¹⁹⁰ Tsakonas,Panayotis, (2005)“From 'perverse' to 'promising' institutionalism? NATO, EU and the Greek-Turkish conflict” in D. Bourantonis, K. Ifantis, P. Tsakonas (eds.), “Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization” ,London and New York, Routledge,p.223-246.

¹⁹¹ Anderson, Perry,(2008), “After Kemal”, Review, London Review of Books.

¹⁹²Giallouridis, Christodoulos,(1999), “Η Τουρκία σε μετάβαση» (I Tourkia se metavasi), I.Sideris, Athens ,p.122.

with that of innovation and thus, he had offered the “*Kemalic secular nationalism a global Muslim context*”¹⁹³.

Milestones of his presidency, which signify a shift of Turkish policy regarding the “Kurdish question”, are considered the following:

- In 1989, regarding the Kurdish treatment, Özal, publically states that “*In the first years of the Republic the state committed mistakes on this matter and it is necessary to recognize these*”¹⁹⁴.
- In 1991, Özal, under immense pressure and with the accusation of withdrawing himself from the Kemalist tradition¹⁹⁵, passes a bill that was giving the right to the population of the Kurdish minority of “*thirteen provinces, to speak but not write with their language*”¹⁹⁶. Actually, with this bill the prohibition established by the junta, namely the 1983 Language Ban Act, is abrogated. Despite that gesture of *bona fide* the Kurdish community has hustled to devalue the initiative, and classified it as a “*manœuvre politique*”¹⁹⁷, which reinforced the resilient, non-dogmatic political profile of Özal, who at the end of the day, was venturing for a peaceful resolution of the matter¹⁹⁸.

Factors which either had conduced Özal towards the aforementioned initiatives of quasi-recognition of the existence of the Kurdish community, or had consolidated his political options are considered the following:

- a. his Kurdish origin. Though with secondary import,
- b. his immense popularity as an outcome of the economic spring of the country at the time¹⁹⁹, and
- c. the already 10-year-old PKK is mature enough, with significant power inside the state and grand impact, via the Kurds immigrants abroad. Moreover, its action in now army and the conflict episodes between the PKK guerillas and

¹⁹³ Veremis,Thanos, (2000),“Οι ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1981-1990” (I ellinoturkikes sheseis 1981-1990),Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous, Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens,Vol.16,p.392.

¹⁹⁴ Gunter, Michael, (1990), “The Kurds in Turkey: A political dilemma:”, Perseuw Books,New York,p.126.

¹⁹⁵ Mc Dowall, David (1996), “A modern History of the Kurds”, IB Tauris, London, p.429.

¹⁹⁶ Reuters report from Ankara in “The Globe”, 8/10/1991.

¹⁹⁷ Le Monde, 30/01/1991.

¹⁹⁸ Robins, Phillip (1993), p.657-676.

¹⁹⁹ Cizre, Umit, and Erinc Yeldan, (2005), “The Turkish encounter with neo-liberalism: economics and politics in the 2000-2001 crises”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol.12, No.3, p. 387-408.

the military forces, sabotage the Kemalist axiom of the Turkish state's integrity.

In line with the Özal's affirmation that "*we cannot accomplish a solution with sticks, but only with dialogue, persuasion and civil rights*"²⁰⁰, we are given the perception that Özal was promoting a resolution of the Kurdish issue, through political tools and not with violence.

However, by passing the Anti-Terrorist Act No.3713, which included the definition of the term "*terrorism*", as "*any kind of action [...] with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic*"²⁰¹, although used by the Courts so as to convict Kurds²⁰², on the charge of spreading propaganda against "*the national unity and indivisibility of the Turkish Republic*"²⁰³, gives the impression that it was merely a flash in the pan, since the language ban was still remaining.

In spite of the deficiencies, the Özal's political activity is characterized under positive sign on the whole. Actually, he is the first politician who did not hesitate to articulate the infelicity of the Kemalic options and he fostered, as much as no one else at the time, a peaceful resolution of the issue. Furthermore, the Özal's policy has been labeled as positive as much as efficient, since it has met the responsiveness of the mighty PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan; thus, the proof of the cooperative ambience is the 1993 statement where Öcalan argued that "*there is no reason why we should not extend our ceasefire if the Turkish government is responsive*"²⁰⁴.

Özal died the day after the statement and his unexpected death constitutes one missed opportunity for a solution of wide consensus, since the positive ambience post the ceasefire would have probably led to a political debate. Besides that, for the majority of the Kurdish minority, Özal represented the most willing, moderate, pacifier politician, a President loyal to both the *pro bono* and *pro patria* values.

²⁰⁰ Dunder, Can, (2005) "Özal's solution to the Kurdish Problem", Milliyet Newspaper.

²⁰¹ Mc.Dowall, David, (1996),p.429.

²⁰² Such as the politician's Layla Zana case.

²⁰³ Ibidem.

²⁰⁴ Mc.Dowall, David, (1996), p.436.

3.1.2 Inexpedient Policies.

The November 1991 electoral defeat of the Motherland Party and its leader Mesut Yılmaz, was at first considered as a turning point in the Kurdish issue. Nevertheless, the replacement from Süleyman Demirel and his coalition with HEP²⁰⁵, initially, gave the impression of a potential optimistic situation, given the flexible and unified manifestations by Demirel. Sadly, and despite the promising start, Demirel revealed his determinant chauvinism²⁰⁶ on the issue, and withdrew his statement that Turkey had “*realized the reality of its Kurdish population*”²⁰⁷.

Along with the political figure of Demirel, a triplet of factors had acted upon the Kurdish issue and proved the inability of the post Özal era politicians to find a solution; namely, the disability to get on board all the members of the aforementioned coalition, the immaturity of the Kurdish politicians to grasp the momentum, profit from the swift on the political and social mobilization, and finally, the persistence of the hardliners, both sides, who managed to polarize the atmosphere²⁰⁸.

Despite the official acceptance from the mouth of the Vice President Erdal İnönü, namely “*the Kurdish citizens’ culture identity must be recognized in full*”²⁰⁹, the Kurdish recognition remained an unsolved issue, an existential challenge of the Turkish identity and the state’s integrity.

From time to time several politicians, included PM’s, have attempted, not successfully though, to address the question; in that sense, Mesut Yılmaz, in a European oriented optic, has highlighted the alienation of the two ethnic communities within the Turkish soil and stressed the vitality of a potential resolution by arguing that “*the road to Brussels passes through Diyarbakir*”²¹⁰, though without offering any concrete proposal.

On the other hand, in a rather oversimplified economic-dimension, Bülent Ecevit argued that the Kurdish question is an economic case and has its roots in the poverty, the retrograde society of the south eastern provinces. Besides, he proposed as a

²⁰⁵ A bloc of nationalists Kurdish politicians.

²⁰⁶ Burkay, Kemal, Leader of the TKSP (Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdish), FBIS, 17/09/1991.

²⁰⁷ BBC/SWB/ME, 11/12/1991.

²⁰⁸ Robins, Phillip (1993), p.657-676.

²⁰⁹ FBIS,17/12/1991.

²¹⁰ Dogu, Ergil, (2000), “The Kurdish Question in Turkey”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.11.No.3, p.132.

remedy, the financial reinforcement of the region, via channeled funds and the support of local industries²¹¹.

The Özal's *post mortem* epoch is identified by the waste of a great opportunity for peace and resolution, particularly having in mind that his successors have been proved incapable of seizing the opportunity and "harvest" the already seeded soil of peace. And all these, up to the time that Erdoğan would grasp the momentum and seize upon the positive circumstances.

3.1.3 A new millennium for the Kurdish language. A skillful political manoeuvring by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan .

The Justice and Development Party, "*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*" (AKP), is a conservative democrat²¹² political party, a hybrid of politicians and parties²¹³, "*known for its Islamic background, placed itself in the center-right in the political spectrum*"²¹⁴. It has developed from the tradition of Islamism, but has officially abandoned this concept in favor of conservative democracy²¹⁵, similar to the Western Christian democrats²¹⁶.

The rhetoric of AKP gathers the claim that it can continue "*the transformation of Turkey in a globalizing world*"²¹⁷ more effectively than the predecessor governments and the opposition parties and so, it has widened and deepened its societal support and its global legitimacy. Its innovative pro-western conceptualization with a touch of Islamism²¹⁸ and Erdoğan's charismatic nature are the two pillars that form the causality behind the reign of AKP in the Turkish political scene for so many years²¹⁹.

²¹¹ Ibidem.

²¹² Speech of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the first AKP's congress (AK Parti 1. Olağan Büyük Kongresi) on November 12 2003 in Ankara, available on, www.akparti.org.tr.

²¹³ The core of the party has been formed from the reformist faction of the Islamist Virtue Party and social conservative politicians of Turgut Özal's environment, round the hegemonic figure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

²¹⁴ Simsek, Sefa, (2013), "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.14, No.3, p. 429.

²¹⁵ Koru, Fehmi, (untitled comment), ISCD, 236 and Uyanık, " Bir Sosyal ve Siyasal Kimlik Tartışması", p.165-177.

²¹⁶ Hale, William, (2005) "Christian Democracy and the AKP: parallels and contrasts", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, p. 293-310.

²¹⁷ Bac - Muftuler, Meltem, and Keyman, Fuat, E., (2012) "Turkey under the AKP: The era of dominant-party politics", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p.90.

²¹⁸ AKP's policy rests in two axes:

- a. action as a "caring" government committed to the public demands and innovation in meeting popular needs, and

From the 14-year-old history of the AKP it is most evident, that the one who owns the credit, the emblematic figure, is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It actually seems that he himself is the AKP in its entirety; thus, he has been the one who is always on the spotlight and has dragged the attention of the media inside and outside the county.

Under the government of AKP a major progress is marked vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue; thus, as early as the day one of his PM's duty assumption, Erdoğan proclaims the entrance in a “*new democratic era*” for the Kurds²²⁰. In the wake of this commitment, it would have been impossible to see this new shift, remotely from certain drivers.

Firstly, the indubitable popularity of Erdoğan in the whole of the population, as an aftermath of the huge effort to restructure the financial sector, after the 2001 financial meltdown²²¹, to boost the international confidence and gain the foreign investors²²². The financial achievements²²³ have paid dividends at the ballot box as Erdoğan was voted by people indifferent over the AKP's Islamic-conservative orientation and who, at the end of the day, approved its material accomplishments²²⁴. Proof of all the aforementioned, the constantly rising percentages in every electoral battle, from the landslide victory of 2002, to the benchmark elections of 2007, when AKP managed to collect a bit less of the half of the votes of the country²²⁵.

Secondly, the ideological foundation of its policy: having as a cell the pro-Islamic agenda. Despite the foe voices, from the military circles and the elites that Erdoğan retreats from the Kemalic ideals of the westernization and the secular state, he

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- b. promotion of growth-oriented strategies, aiming at developing the Turkish economy on the basis of financial stability.

²¹⁹ Keyman, Fuat, E. (2007) “Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The case of Turkey”, *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol.24, p.215-234.

²²⁰ “Political landslide in Turkey?” *Bianet News*, 13/11/2002, available on www.bianet.org.

²²¹ Cizre, Umit, and Erinc Yeldan, (2005), p: 387-408

²²² Karafotakis, Evaggelos,(2002) “Η σύγχρονη Τουρκική οικονομία, Προβλήματα και Προοπτικές”(*I sughroni Tourkiki oikonomia, Provlimata kai Prooptikes*), in Veremis, Th. and Dokos, Th. “ Η σύγχρονη Τουρκία, Κοινωνία, Οικονομία και Εξωτερική Πολιτική”(*I sughroni Tourkia, Koinonia, Oikonomia kai Exoteriki Politiki*), Pub. Papazisi, p.45-79.

²²³ Liargovas, Panagiotis and Repousis, Christos,(2011) “Κρίση ,Δανεισμός και Χρεοκοπία.Ελληνικές και διεθνείς εμπειρίες”,(*Krisi, Daneismos kai Hreokopia. Ellinikes kai diethneis empeiries*), Pub. Papazisi, p: 50-62, 83-89.

²²⁴ Bac- Muftuler, Meltem, and Keyman, Fuat, E., (2012), “Turkey under the AKP: The era of dominant-party politics”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p.89.

²²⁵ “2007 Elections in Turkey”, 5/4/2007, available <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/2007-elections-turkey/article-163039>, retrieved on 4/12/2015.

succeeded in enfeebling the pro-Kurdish parties, since he has achieved to convince the masses and thus “steal” the vote even from the Kurdish-origin voters, by the premise of the common and undivided Muslim legacy and the resolution of the Kurdish matter in democratic methods.

The as long as “*Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria*”²²⁶ statement of European Council has been the kicking start for the newly elected AKP to launch a set of reforms in order to correspond to the EU accession process, namely the “*Harmonization Law Package*”.

In hoc sensu, after the electoral triumph of 65% in 2001, the party had all the power needed to pass quickly the reforms *ubi supra*, included the amendments of the 1982 Constitution and the Penal Code. Therefore, with the act No4709 the government strikes through the “*No language prohibited by law shall be used in expression and dissemination of thought*”²²⁷. The importance of this effacement is that, formerly, this provision constituted the pretext for the Kurdish language prohibition and its removal opens the road vis-à-vis free broadcasting in Kurdish.

In effect, Erdoğan with the carrot of European accession proceeded in numerous amendments and legislative reforms targeting the use and learning of Kurdish, that we will see in details through the Commission’s specter in the next section.

One of the top-priority reforms with an optimum effect in the European world, regarding its grand impact in the society, has been the limitation of the role of the 1960 military coup’s remnant, namely the National Security Council, “*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*” (MGK). With a national security agenda, the primordial concern for the MGK rests on the fact that its Constitutional incorporation²²⁸ and reinforcement²²⁹, has founded a peculiar duality in the Turkish model of government. In this basis, Sakallioğlu argues that the Turkish paradox engaged “*a double headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national security council*

²²⁶ Oran, Baskin, “Minority Legislation and its Implementation in Turkey”, 25/7/2007, available on <http://www.turquieuropeene.eu>

²²⁷ 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 26, available on www.ilo.org, retrieved on 15/10/2015.

²²⁸ Incorporated in the 1961 Constitution.

²²⁹ Reinforced under the militaristic spirit of the 1982 Constitution.

*on the executive level, and the military system of justice continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system."*²³⁰

Despite the fact that the above mentioned reforms constitute an actual landmark for the Turkish reality, there have been some voices of disappointment. Actually, the full of doubts impugners, consider AKP as a party of zero tolerance as far as the proximity of different cultural groups is concerned. Gaffney expresses his fear that Erdoğan would turn "the country into an Islamist-Fascist regime"²³¹, ruled by an ideological-political anathema regarding the minority rights protection.

What is remarkable with the AKP is that it has promised everything to everyone; it shows its European orientation by launching legislative reforms, but at the same time, it does not distance from the conservative pattern and the Islamist rhetoric²³²; it proclaims its respect over human liberties but simultaneously it has been hunting down the dissenters.

So, are all the aforementioned contradictory elements the only way to handle the critique coming from Europe on the one hand, and deal with the pressure from the opposition parties on the other? Are all these a battle of symbolisms, so as to maneuver the boiling social arena, the armed and ready military forces and the absolutist judicial sector?

Within this framework, the opposing anti-Erdoğan team is held by three main pillars: the military elites the judicial and, most certainly, the Kurdish community.

On the one hand, Erdoğan undergoes the pressure from the military forces, along with the accusation of receding from the concept of Atatürkism, namely the secular nation-building that leaves no room for political expression of minority groups²³³.

On the other, there is the legal system itself. For the government a big obstacle to overcome is the obsessive adhesion to the principles of the Republican state, which are indispensable part of the Turkish juridical conceptualization. The judiciary as

²³⁰Sakallioglu, Cizre, (1997), "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy", Comparative Politics, vol. 29, No. 2, p. 157-158.

²³¹ Gaffney, Frank, J., "'No' to Islamist Turkey", The Washington Times, 27/9/2005, available on <http://www.voltairenet.org/article130838.html> , retrieved on 7/12/2015.

²³² For example Erdoğan trumpets the revocation of the exclusion of wearing the head scarf in women.

²³³ Dogu, Ergil, (2000), "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", Journal of Democracy, Vol.11.No.3, p.133.

superior guardian of the nation's integrity sacrifices the law implementation²³⁴ and the democratic procedures on the altar of preserving the nation's unity. On the contrary, it cultivates a climate of terror and intolerance²³⁵, "*stubbing the nation from behind*"²³⁶.

From the Kurdish point of view, core of their negative stance and principal charge is the meretricious nature of the measures and the lack of depth within the reforms. In the momentum, for example, that the prominent "Harmonization Law package" is proclaimed, students and journalist get arrested and imprisoned with the accusation of "*separatist propaganda*"²³⁷.

On a personal level, high ambiguity raises the stance of the AKP's leading figure himself. For the European accession's sake, Erdoğan in Diyarbakir stated: "*What will we do with the Kurdish issue? This is before anyone else my problem as the Prime Minister of this country. We are a big state and we will resolve every single issue with more democracy, more law [...]. We don't deny any of the problems. We accept them all [...]*"²³⁸.

Later in 2009, Erdoğan comes to point his finger to the previous Turkish governments and the Turkish policy in general, by adjudging that excluding groups of different ethnic origin "*was the outcome of a fascist approach*"²³⁹.

Nevertheless, his critics point that all the aforementioned constitute grandstanding gestures and acts of law policy which only prove that Erdoğan's personal ambition is to become all things to all people; in that sense, he was accused of his pro-Kurdish speech before the city of Diyarbakir -also known as the capital of the Kurdish minority- during the 2007 electoral campaign and he was maligned, as well, from his political opponents for his presence on the Kurdish channel TRT6, prior to the 2009 general elections. With these "fool's mate moves" he managed to fish up the Kurdish votes both elections.

²³⁴ Akyol, Mustafa, "When the judiciary doesn't serve justice", Hurriyet, available on <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/opinion/11740109.asp>, retrieved on 20/11/2015,

²³⁵ Karaosmanoglu, Kerem, (2010), "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the AKP", Insight Turkey, Vol.12, No.2, p.207.

²³⁶ "Ermeni Conferansi Ertelendi", Milliyet, 25/5/2005.

²³⁷ Reporters sans frontières (RSF), Annual Report on Media, Paris, 2002.

²³⁸ Candar, Cengiz, "Turkey: Mr.Prime minister and Diyarbakir", Turquie Europeenne, 28/10/2008, available on www.turquieuropeenne.com.

²³⁹ Esayan, Markar, "Erdoğan'in "Tarihi" Konusması na Guzelleme", Taraf, 25/5/2009 and Roni Marguiles, "Fasizan Bir Yaklaşım", Taraf, 3/6/2009.

The thing is that either way, progress has been made. What if Erdoğan is a just a pharisaic “Sultan-to-be”, pro-Islamist, pro-European, neo-Ottoman, pro-Republican politician, according to his antagonists? The score is the element which defines the game; and the scoreboard shows loud and clear that Erdoğan is the only political leader that could succeed the Özalist kicking start of the Kurdish reality.

3.2 EU: a player promoting the respect for the Kurdish cultural identity.

Since 1963 and the Ankara Agreement²⁴⁰, Turkey has ventured to formulate a grid of communication and affiliation with Europe. Noted that in spite of the vague reference on the human rights factor in the Agreement, from the 1990’s onwards the philosophy gets differentiated and not only do we meet specific provisions but also restrictive formulations along with an explicit mandate to apply the provisions of human rights.

In order to research the grade of influence of EU in the Turkish policy regarding the protection of human rights and by extension the Kurdish linguistic rights we should have an overview of the triangular correlation of EU-human rights-Turkey. The punctuation is not accidental. Human rights either distance or bring together the two. And exactly that, is what the European Commission monitors through the Regular Accession Progress Reports

3.2.1 The correlation between EU and human rights.

It is rather astonishing that within the founding treaties of the EU, namely the Treaty of Paris²⁴¹ and the Treaty of Rome²⁴² there is no mention over the human rights. Indeed, before the 1990s the human rights’ protection was general and merely elementary.

After the ratification of the Treaty of EU²⁴³ the principles of democracy and human rights²⁴⁴ gain a new perspective. In the post Cold war era, the redefinition of the goal-

²⁴⁰ With the Ankara Agreement, Turkey became associate member of the EU. The Agreement was principally focalized on the customs union and the economic cooperation.

²⁴¹ In 1951.

²⁴² In 1957.

²⁴³ In 1992, widely known as the Maastricht Treaty.

²⁴⁴ Both in the Preamble and the article F§2.

setting of the economic and political integration²⁴⁵ has brought to the limelight the issue of the respect of human rights.

In line with their signed engagements²⁴⁶ the member-states, have repeatedly expressed their sensitivity over the safeguard of fundamental liberties. Therefore, it is obvious that human rights' respect have always played a determinant role to the relations between the EU and third countries or third parties.

Following the 1993 Copenhagen Summit²⁴⁷ and the definition of the prerequisites for the candidate countries, with the 1994 European Constitution²⁴⁸ human rights have received a new European corroboration.

3.2.2 The European impact .The “wait and see”²⁴⁹ policy delivers fruits.

After the coup d'état of 1980 in Turkey , the European Commission and the European Council in their Communications, reproduced their growing concern vis-à-vis the need of human rights preservation and the democratic institutions' restoration²⁵⁰.

Following a “dead” period of five years, the year 1986 signals the resumption of the relations EU-Turkey, while the parliamentary system recovers and the democratic institutions get normalized; thus, on April 14th 1987, Turkey submits a file for full integration in the European Economic Community. Among others, the minorities' treatment, the failure to provide a viable solution regarding the “Kurdish issue”, the judicial system, the democratic deficit and the outright involvement of the military in

²⁴⁵ Karakas, I.A., (1998), «Τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα ως πρόβλημα στις σχέσεις Τουρκίας-ΕΕ» (Τα anthropina dikaiomata os provlima stis sheseis Tourkias-EE), in Sonmezoglu, Faruk (ed) , «Ανάλυση της Τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Μύθος και πραγματικότητα»(Analisi tis Tourkikis eksoterikis politikis.Muthos kai pragmatikotita.), Vol. II, Athens, Pub. Infognomon, p. 374.

²⁴⁶ See, Buletin C.E 4/1978 where during the European Summit of Copenhagen in 1978, the European Community expressed its position regarding the relations with third countries that the respect for human rights from the member-states' behalf, vis-à-vis the moral values, the representative democracy, the international legitimacy and the compliance to the principles of personal rights, form basic components of the European identity.

²⁴⁷ Buletin, C.E 6/1993.

²⁴⁸ PV 59 II, 10/02/1994.

²⁴⁹ Kassimeris, Christos and Tsoumpanou, Lina, (2008), “The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU Candidacy”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 12, No. 3,p.335

²⁵⁰ See, “Relation between the European Economic Community and Turkey's Commission of the European Communities”, Brussels, December 1989.

the political decisions²⁵¹, were the obstacles in the Turkish candidacy as a member-state of the EEC in 1987²⁵².

After the formulation of the *sine qua non* criteria of Copenhagen²⁵³, “*the basis for the preparation*”²⁵⁴, the Kurdish question was prioritized in the agenda set for the state candidacy.²⁵⁵

In order to identify the European involvement vis-à-vis the Turkish policy for the minorities and thus the question of protection of the Kurdish cultural identity, we have chosen four - a)1998, b)2003, c)2009, and d)2014-, Regular Accession Progress Reports. The rationale is that via the comparison of four specific years we will highlight the development towards the linguistic rights of Kurds.

a) From the 1997 second slam on the face of the Luxembourg Council, when the EU re-stated that Turkey should respect minority rights and the protection of minorities²⁵⁶, Turkey has come a long way.

In fact, the EU Commission²⁵⁷ highlighted the denial of the “*existence of a Kurdish minority*” from the Turkish state, and thus, despite the fact that “*Kurdish is no longer banned in the context of cultural activities ... [it] cannot be used in ‘political communication’ or education.*” In that context, TV and radio broadcasting in Kurdish is forbidden, in spite of the revocation “*of the Law on Publications in languages other than Turkish*” under Özal’s initiative in 1991. The Commission presents sensitive regarding the fact that during the Yilmaz government “[...] *many schools have been shut, depriving a significant proportion of the school age group of the chance to study*”.

²⁵¹ Forsythe, David, (2000), “Human Rights in International Relations”, Cambridge University Press.

²⁵² See, “Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, Commission of the European Communities” SEC (89) 2290 final/2.

²⁵³ Commission of the European Communities, (2002), “Towards the Enlarged Union; Strategy Paper and the Report of the European Commission on the Progress toward accession by each of the candidate countries, Brussels, p.8-10.

²⁵⁴ Kassimeris, Christos and Tsoumpanou, Lina (2008), p.332

²⁵⁵ Emersin, Michael, (2004), “Has Turkey Fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria?”, CEPS Policy, Brief, No.48,p.1.

²⁵⁶ Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, (1997), “Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union”, Luxembourg.

²⁵⁷ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession, 1998.

In response to the bilateral conflict the Commission edits that “*the state of emergency [...] is still in force[...], and continues to be extended every four months*” and strongly suggests that Turkey “*will have to find a political and non-military solution to the problem of the south-east,[which] is hampering the regions’ s social and economic development.*”. Hence, the Commission encourages Turkey to work towards a political solution that “*could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism*”.

The enlargement has always been in the center of the European attention. It is in the nature of the European integration to overstep the division inside Europe and to contribute to the peaceful unification within the continent. From a political aspect, the enlargement has encouraged the fundamental changes, such as the collapse of communism, the fall of dictatorships and thus has assisted in the consolidation of democracy, the respect of human rights and the stability in the European continent²⁵⁸. One year before the “cosmogony” of the Helsinki Summit that confirmed “*the importance of the enlargement process launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity for the entire European continent*”²⁵⁹, the Commission praises the Turkish effort so far, but on the other hand expresses that “*the state of [...] civil and political rights is still giving cause for concern*”; on top of that, it insists that the subordination conflict between Turkish authorities and the PKK guerillas “*[..] has [...] damaged Turkey’s international image*”.

b) Since 1999, when Turkey was granted with the candidate member status, “*destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states*”, the Europeanization effort for Turkey has started .

In actu, the state launched a “National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis”, and via the immense impact of the “*conditional nature*”²⁶⁰ of the EU’s policy, Turkey proceeded in ratification of several international Conventions²⁶¹ of the human rights ,

²⁵⁸ Maraveyas, Napoleon and Tsinisizelis, Mihalis, (2007), «Νέα Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.Οργάνωση και πολιτικές, 50 χρόνια», (Nea Eypopaiki Enosi. Organosi kai Politikes, 50 hronia), Themelio.

²⁵⁹ European Parliament, available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm, retrieved on 4/12/2015.

²⁶⁰ Kaya , Nurcan and Baldwin, Calvin, (2004), “Minorities in Turkey: Submission to the European Union and the Government of Turkey”, Minority Rights Group International, p.3

²⁶¹ For example the UNs’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UNs’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

constitutional amendments and reform packages that “address a range of issues related to human rights and the protection of minorities”.

We have chosen the 2003 Regular Report in the rationale that there has been two years after the electoral triumph of Erdoğan and his pro-European rhetoric. In that basis we proceed into the comparison between the pre-Helsinki and the post-Helsinki period. The most important observations are listed as such:

- Regarding the freedom of expression.
 - *“A number of existing restrictions have been lifted”*²⁶² under the Act No 4928/2003²⁶³. Thus, *“propaganda against the indivisibility unity of the state”*²⁶⁴ was repealed.
- Language rights curtailments
 - Public/private TV –Radio emissions.

A Regulation issued in December 2002 permitting *“the state broadcasting corporation, TRT, to broadcast”* for *“four hours per week on radio and two [...] on television, on the subjects of news, culture and music”* *“in language and dialects traditionally used by the Turkish citizens”* as long as *“the broadcast cannot contravene the fundamental characteristics of the Republic and the indivisible integrity of the state”* delivered poor results. As for the private stations broadcastings, though there is a legislative provision²⁶⁵, the Report marks that *“there have not yet been broadcasts in languages other than Turkish”*. Besides, the Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK), Supreme Audio-Visual Board, is still engaged in imposing *“heavy penalties”*²⁶⁶ *“[...] upon private radio and television stations accused of [...] separatist propaganda and incitement to hatred”*.
 - Law of Associations

Via the fourth reform package the amended legislation enabled the *“associations to use any language in their non-official correspondence [...]”*
 - Names.

²⁶² *“As part of the seventh reform package, the minimum sentence under article 159 of the Penal Code²⁶² has been reduced from one year to six months”*. Though, *“there is still a tendency for prosecutors to use provisions of the Penal Code [articles 169 312] and of the Anti-Terror Law [article 8] to limit freedom of expression”*.

²⁶³ Namely the “sixth reform package”.

²⁶⁴ Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law .

²⁶⁵ In Law 4929.

²⁶⁶ Such as, suspension or cancellation of the broadcasting license.

The amendments in the Civil Registry Law permitted *“parents to name their children as they desire”* provided that the names would comply with *“moral values”* and do not offend the public. Nevertheless, the use of names including the letters “q” “w” and “x” commonly used in Kurdish is still banned.

o Culture and Education.

The Commission on the one hand reports that the *“use of language [...] other than Turkish in the areas of films, the arts, festivals, cultural events [...] is[...] still subject to legal restrictions and judicial prosecution”*, on the other, legal procedures and administrative sanctions have been dropped against *“petitioners for optional Kurdish language courses at university level”*. Moreover, Kurdish music bands participate in festivals and *“a wide range of religious book and cassettes in Kurdish have been provided by publishing companies”*.

A step back constitutes the provision on the *“learning of different languages [...] used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives”*, where applications to the course were rejected on the grounds that *“the curricula focus on the culture and history and not on the language»*.

In addition to these, the state of emergency was lifted²⁶⁷, which had a *“positive psychological impact in the region, despite the tension [...] in Iraq”*.

At the end of the day, after the legislative initiatives and the progress marked, it is only fair to say the EU *“welcomes the important steps by Turkey meeting the Copenhagen criteria, [...]”* and it *“acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish Government to take further steps on the path of reform [...]”*.

c) The option of the 2009 Report seats on the reasoning that on the one hand it is edited²⁶⁸ not far from the success story of the second victorious result for Erdoğan on July 22nd 2007, when AKP won 341 seat, that is 46, 58% of the votes; on the other, there is the question whether the Turkish government keeps up with the reforms and if the since as far back as 2005 put-on-hold negotiation talks, have affected the Europeanization engagement of the country. Of course it does not.

²⁶⁷ On 30th November 2002

²⁶⁸ Time of observation is from early October 2008 until mid September 2009.

The Commission itself documents that “*the enhanced political dialogue between the EU and Turkey has continued*». We quote the most significant comments:

- Language rights curtailments

- Public/private TV –Radio emissions.

Restrictions documented regarding the “[...] *Law of the RTÜK apply to private [...] TV and radio programs. Educational programs teaching the Kurdish language are not allowed. Political debates or general entertainment programs are [...] impossible*”.

- Culture and Education.

A Commission’s concern is expressed regarding the linguistic protection, the respect of culture and the fundamental rights where Turkey “*has yet to be fully achieved*”. Thus, limited efforts have been made to “*to enhance tolerance ... [and meet with] the European standards*” in the context that on 2009 the public broadcaster started a channel “*broadcasting in Kurdish 24 hours a day*”. Also a south eastern university²⁶⁹ was allowed²⁷⁰ to offer post-graduate studies in Kurdish. However, the Commission states that “*children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother tongue in the Turkish state school system*”.

- Language in everyday life.

The Commission emphasizes the problematic situation of the “*non-speakers of Turkish*”, in the sense that there is an actual impediment to use the public services²⁷¹. Though there is a legislative provision for interpretation, in practice it is difficult.

- Language in politics.

While political parties were using Kurdish in political rallies in the instance of regional election campaign, and despite the Law of Elections and Political Parties, which imposes the use of Turkish, “*in most [...] cases no legal action was launched*”. In contrast, the Report quotes that “*criminal convictions against DTP²⁷² members for using the Kurdish language in political life are pending*”.

²⁶⁹ The Atatürk University of Mardin.

²⁷⁰ Under the permission of the Higher Education’s Board.

²⁷¹ Pushing the argument forward, the Commission introduces a new issue the problematic situation in prisons due to the use of Kurdish.

²⁷² The DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*) is a Kurdish nationalistic party.

To summarize, the Commission welcomes the “*increasingly open and free debate[...]on issues traditionally perceived as sensitive*”, however the “*legal framework still fails to provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression and, as a result ,is often interpreted in a restrictive way by public prosecutors and judges.*”

Nevertheless, Turkey seems reluctant to grant more freedoms added to the existing ones under the mandate of the international organizations. *In sensu hoc*, Kassimeris et al., argue that “*Turkey does not seem to have fully understood the obligations that stem from EU membership and, consequently, Turkey’s high expectations have been disappointed many times by the ‘wait and see’ policy of the EU*”.²⁷³

d) The choice of the 2014 Report is justified on the basis that it is the most recent.

In the effort of researching for enhanced alterations within the Turkish state we meet paradoxes and inconsistencies. The Commission argues that, “*the implementation of reforms [...] has continued*” and Turkey continues to “*express its commitment to EU accession*”. In fact, by adopting the “*European Union Strategy*”²⁷⁴ and the “*Action Plan for Prevention of Violations of the ECHR*” represent its intention to “*re-invigorate its accession process*”. *An overview of the reforms reported:*

- Kurdish issue.

The Commission stresses that there have been “*efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue*”. In an effort to line with the Copenhagen criteria, the Parliament votes the Law to “*bring stronger legal foundation to the settlement process*” targeting the a peaceful resolution of the problem, entailing “*measures to eliminate terrorism, strengthen social inclusion, reintegrate those who leave the PKK [...], and prepare public opinion for the return of former fighters*”. On the contrary, remains to be amended the Article 314 of the Criminal Code on membership of an armed organization²⁷⁵. Overall, the Commission congratulates Turkey for a “*process of historical significance*”.

²⁷³ Kassimeris, Christos and Tsoumpanou, Lina, (2008), p.335.

²⁷⁴ The Strategy engages political reform, socio-economic transformation in the accession process and communication strategy.

²⁷⁵ The 2014 Report explains that this article was “used to prosecute left-wings or Kurdish journalists. Cases continued against writers, lawyers, academics, students and journalists writing and working on the Kurdish issue.

- Freedom of expression.
- Culture and education

Steady developments regarding the use of mother tongue and “*normalization of the use of Kurdish in public*”. Moreover the use of the letters “x”, “q”, “w”, is no longer banned. Kurdish can be freely taught in public schools as elective courses²⁷⁶. Universities of the south eastern provinces, the one after the other, introduce post-graduate departments in Kurdish. Finally, the work by “the state Turkish Language Institution” of great importance “*to prepare a Kurdish-Turkish and a Kurdish-Turkish dictionary*” is continued.

- Language in politics

The “*conduct of political activity*” during local or general elections is held without linguistic impediments.

²⁷⁶ The massive response made the Ministry of National Education to appoint “*17 teachers of Kurdish language as permanent staff*”.

CONCLUSION

By setting the Kurdish activism in new perspectives which have defined the interaction between the Kurdish population and the Turkish central state, the 1990s seem to have prepared a new era for the Kurdish issue within a European framework.

After a constant hunting all around Europe, Öcalan, most wanted by the Turkish MIT service, gets arrested in 1999, extradited in Turkey and within a spirit of collaboration and mutual conciliation²⁷⁷ makes the following statement: *“I really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother is Turkish. Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service of the Turkish state”*²⁷⁸. Along with his attendant statement to his comrades for ceasefire and his recommendation to turn into a problem-resolution with political means²⁷⁹, Öcalan casted off – at least for some years- the military part of the PKK; this has led to the abrogation of the activated in 1984, “State of Emergency”.

Despite the will for counterstrike, in the post arrest time, individual conflict incidents, limited in mere strokes do not manage to hurt the state significantly while the lack of dynamic and the absence of coordination are both more than obvious. More evidently than ever, the arrestment of Öcalan makes clear that the PKK lost his “first violin”, a charismatic *agent provocateur*, but mostly a spiritual inspiring leader.

Unique recourse, an act of necessity and not an act of free choice: the denunciation of the armed struggle and the shift into struggle via democratic procedures and instruments, so as to achieve the Europeanization of the Kurdish issue.

Prior the arrestment, in 1997²⁸⁰, the European Commission in the Announcement for the *“European Strategy for Turkey”* involved that the remake of some parts of the legislation would be an opportunity for further legislative reforms; adopt the *“acquis communautaire”* would be an element among the prerogatives for the pre-accession strategy for Turkey.

²⁷⁷ The authenticity, as well as the sincerity of the statement is mostly questioned, objections are raised and innuendos of violence performed, even sedation.

²⁷⁸ Gunter, Michael, (2000), “The continuing Kurdish problem in Turkey after Ocalan’s capture”, Third World Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, p.851.

²⁷⁹ “Öcalan an PKK Announce Ceasifire”, Aksam Newspaper, 3/4/2000, available on <http://arsiv.aksam.com.tr>

²⁸⁰ Available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm#enlarge, retrieved on 30/11/2015.

The EU Helsinki Summit granted Turkey as “candidate state”, but stressed that the negotiations would not start unless the Copenhagen criteria would be fulfilled²⁸¹. In the sense that the “membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities [...]”²⁸².

On the basis of the Europeanization and harmonization reforms, the Copenhagen criteria could serve as the tools, and the membership process as the power of intermediation between the Turks and the Kurds. It emerges clear that a potential perpetuation of the Kurdish issue would bombard the Turco-EU relations. What is more, within the framework of quid pro quod tactic of the EU, the European policy makers could use the recognition of cultural rights for the Kurds as key element to open a dialogue with Turkey.

Via the research needed for this dissertation we gain the impression that Turkey leaves a dual reality: one the one hand, there is the legislative modernization and the display of a face of a more democratic and pro- human rights western state, and on the other, there are the growing concerns of international human rights organizations and the vituperative annual reports of the Amnesty International²⁸³.

In other words, the in-all-level Kurdish Repression is not an isolated incident or the authoritarian exception to a liberal rule, but a common practice diligently covered under the veil of legal reforms.

What is vital for Turkey is the formulation of a new “*contrat social*” in line with the Rousseauian prototype; thus, EU might as well serve as paradigm, through its humanist ideology, the liberal lessons and its deep democratic heritage.

Within the context of moral philosophy, Turks and Kurds, hopefully with the EU as third player, ought to create this political contract that would constitute the bonding link and it would not split up the two communities. On the other hand, the new status

²⁸¹ Gialouridis, Xristodoulos, (2004), “Η Τουρκία στην Ανατολή του 21^{ου} αιώνα: Ο μακρύς δρόμος προς την Ευρώπη”(I Tourkia stin Anatoli tou 21ou aiona), Athens, Sideris.

²⁸² Available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm , retrieved on 30/11/2015.

²⁸³ Available on <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/> ,retrieved 7/12/2015

would not put in jeopardy the state's security, as the Kemalic legacy requires, but in parallel, it would not endangered the stability of democracy.

Finally, it is more than clear that the republican project in terms of human rights proved its monolithic character. Indeed, Selcuk argues that a more liberal justice via pluralism and a more democratic state would low down the impact of the "authoritarian" Kemalist ideology²⁸⁴.

From the "Arab spring" lesson we have every right to think that authoritarian policies are "dépassé" and they need to stay where they belong: in the past. The immediate need of Turkey is a full reestablishment of the system of values and to re-sculpt the moral pyramid through the reconstruction of the societal level, the democratization process, the intercultural dialogue, the reinforcement of the human liberties legislation, the freedom of speech and the enhanced democratic values despite the fact that the Syrian refugee flows seem to push the agenda forward by opening a new chapter in the Turco-European relations with major challenges and progress waiting for the future.

²⁸⁴ Selcuk, Sami, "Akilis Konusmasi", in Derya Demirler ve Mert Kayhan (eds), "Turkiye'de Azinlik Haklari Sorunu: Vatandaslik ve Demokrasi Eskenki Bir Yaklasim", Istanbul, TESEV, p.15-22.

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