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"OLYMPIC STUDIES, OLYMPIC EDUCATION, ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT OF OLYMPIC EVENTS"

**The Olympic Idea as a Vehicle for Transformation: 1988-2012**

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# Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my mother Rachel Elizabeth, and my late father, James Ambrose Hendricks. I hope that this achievement will fulfill the dream you had for me.

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**Introduction:  Remarks on the current state of the Olympic Games**

The popularity of the Olympic Games since 1988 has been great amongst the global population. The spectacle of the Games featuring the top athletes in diverse sports and the accompanying atmosphere of this mega-event finds interest to many citizens of the world. Criticism however has also been part and parcel of the Olympic Games, it being the social phenomenon it is. From 1988 till 2012 there has seen much criticism being directed at this sporting spectacle, least from the boycotts that proceeded this era, which in this proposal will mainly find favor toward the seven Summer Olympic Games.

Since 1988 the accumulation of various statements and articles about the future of the Olympic Games has been prevalent. With political foundations being important in the establishment and maintenance of the Games, the role of politics is integral to the Games survival.

It was as a result of politics that the founder of the Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, initiated the revival of the modern Olympic Games. During this era (1988 to 2012) the use of political interference in the form of boycotts was minimal, but the manipulation of the Games to acquire political influence and status was an important tool.
The media from various parts of the globe has given their reasons for or against the revival of the modern Olympic Games. Still the Games continue to transform to keep in touch with the ideals it was founded on and to meet the demands of a new generation. The guiding document of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Olympic Charter, has been amended to keep the Olympic Movement relevant to the changes in the global sport industry. The amendments to this Charter in 1981, transformed the Olympic idea from that envisaged by its founding father, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, from a social or humanitarian movement. The values de Coubertin promoted in the Olympic program such as education and culture is perceived as lacking in the twenty-first century.

The Olympic Charter has been amended to keep the function and purpose of the Olympic Movement relevant to the era it finds itself in. It has transformed the Olympic symbol into an income-generating unit that has left behind de Coubertin's ideals. However, it is this flexibility and emphasis that has allowed the IOC to be in touch with the needs of a growing sport industry. Furthermore, the longevity of the IOC is due to it changing with the current state of the world.

The ongoing political initiatives and transformation of the Olympic Idea undertaken by President Juan Antionio Samaranch during his tenure over the IOC has been vital in the growth and development of the Olympic Games. The initiatives of Jacques Rogge (IOC President 2001-2013) have been instrumental in the continued growth and development of the Olympic Games during 1988 to 2012. The fluid belief system that Olympism has become through these two leaders of the Olympic movement still draws on de Coubertin's vision. With the various cities that have hosted the Olympics during the period 1988 to 2012, it also showed the world how these nations are organized and what values it ought to protect, be it in the areas of sport, culture or education.

Andrew Jennings, investigative reporter on the IOC reports in Lords of the Rings (Simson and Jennings, 1992) on the power, money and drugs in the modern Olympics and particularly the era under investigation. Andrew Jennings gives the explanation of sport in this era being driven by corrupt business interests. A compelling and controversial comparison with the traditional concept of the Olympic Movement as outlined by other authors (eg. MacAloon, Müller and others).

The past twenty-five years has seen the usual accumulation of pessimistic statements and disillusionment of the Olympic Games. These stem from the international sporting spectacles committee (i.e. International Olympic Committee) that is unable to deal with the social realities of globalization. The global issues mirrored in the Olympic Games include illegal performance enhancing drugs (doping), commercialization, intense national rivalry, corruption and the competitive advantage of highly developed and emerging economies. It

may be that the sports industries that surround the Olympics in this era may be the limiting factor in any meaningful realization of the goals of Olympism, due to the emphasis on commercializing the Olympic symbol (Milton-Smith, 2002).

There are also the optimistic opinions of the era under investigation being participated in by a diverse group of global citizens. The athletes, officials, media and billions of viewers who are tuned into the Olympic idea, through the staging of the Olympic Games, bears testimony to its growing popularity. The hosting of the Olympics also has the unique capacity to be a catalyst for changes that otherwise may have been impossible to achieve. For example, the Seoul games were an exceptional success and the Olympics was the catalyst to the harmony within humanity that the world witnessed. Furthermore South Korea attributed its sound international standing (through improved diplomatic relations and trade) directly to the Olympic Games (Palenski, 1988). Though some parts of society will be frustrated due to its hosting, and others will thrive, shows that the Games are an inherently divisive entity.

The link with the media in the era mentioned above has resulted in the Olympic Games being able to be a real political player. Rather than be influenced by politics that negatively affected its objective to be a universal spectacle prior to 1988. More nations have taken part in the Summer Olympic Games since 1988 to 2012 than any other era in the modern Olympic Games more than one hundred year history. The Olympic history during this era may be seen as a negotiation of the ideals and their implementation by the multiple host nations with which some of the ideals have conflicted.

It is therefore evident that the link between the Olympic Games, political economy and the media cannot be separated and is an important formula in the continued success of this mega-event. The link between the Olympic idea and the aspects of politics, economics and media will be expanded on in the chapters to follow.

**Investigation Process**

The process into the investigation of the change in the Olympic idea is as follows:

The working definition of the "Olympic idea" will be established, as formulated by Baron Pierre de Coubertin. Based on his goals and values of the Olympic idea, which will be investigated for changes since 1988, particularly due to the impact of the political economy and media in the past twenty-five years.

This study will use qualitative methodology which includes interviews, newspaper articles, books, journals and other publications.

Structure of individual chapters will be as follows:

Chapter I:    Gives an overview of the development of the Olympic Games and its founder Baron Pierre de Coubertin. It describes what de Coubertin understood by the Olympic idea and what values and goals he had set for it. Based on a contemporary comparison, the discrepancy between expectations and the reality of these ideals will be shown.

Chapter II:    The Olympic reality will be highlighted, meaning the examination of the causes that resulted in the changes of the Olympic idea. The trends and results of political economy and the media will be looked at.

Chapter III:    The difficulties that occur in achieving the Olympic idea for the Olympic Movement currently, especially the growing political economy and media influence. It also shows proposals and future perspectives to the Olympic idea for the IOC.

**Chapter I:** Gives an overview of the development of the Olympic Games and its founder Baron Pierre de Coubertin. It describes what de Coubertin understood by the Olympic idea and what values and goals he had set for it. Based on a contemporary comparison the discrepancy between expectations and the reality of these ideals will be shown.

**Chapter I: Pierre de Coubertin and the Modern Olympic Games**

**1.1.** **Pierre de Coubertin and the origins of the Olympic Games**

Inspired by the Olympics of antiquity, Baron Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937) revived the Olympic Games by forming the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The idea Coubertin had was to develop educational practices that incorporated learning and athletics. Having attempted to reform his native France with these ideas, he turned to resurrect the Olympic Games via international relations with European and other Western countries. The transformation Coubertin wanted to achieve was the ideals of physical, mental and spiritual excellence of the ancient Olympic Games.

The Olympic Idea was a synthesis of ideas from various personalities in the Western world of the 1800's. Baron de Coubertin molded these ideas together and translated them into the Olympic idea as scripted in the drafting of the Olympic Charter, the guiding document of the organizers of the Olympic Games, the IOC. Olympic idea appears in the Olympic Charter, this charter having been changed numerous times to meet the needs of an ever changing sporting world. The idea may be interpreted in the first two principles of the Olympism (IOC, 2013, 11)

1. Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.

2. The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.

Earlier attempts to revive the Olympic Games took place in England since 1849 by William P. Brookes in Much-Wenlock. In Germany, through Johann Guts Muths and Friedrich 'Turnvater' Jahn. In Greece, through Evanghelos Zappas, and in Sweden through Gustav Schartau in the 1830's. However, all these individuals could only organize on a local, regional and national level in the form of a scheduled event. The Olympic Games had to evolve from national level in these respective individuals countries to international events.

The international level of competition for the Olympic Games was the desired idea of Baron Pierre de Coubertin who aimed for the internationalism, meaning patriotism, peace and understanding amongst participating nation states.

The idea of the first modern Olympic Games was introduced in 1892 at a meeting of the Athletics Sports Union at Sorbonne, Paris on November 25th. Coubertin publically said, "*Let us export oarsman, runners, fencers: there is free trade of the future – and on the day when it shall take place among the customs of Europe the cause of peace will have received a new and powerful support*."

## 1.2. The Foundation congress and its results

In 1894 Coubertin assembled an international congress for the purpose of studying not just the question of amateurism but also added the point to the agenda concerning the revival of the Olympic Games.

With official delegates from France, England, USA, Greece, Russia, Sweden, Belgium, Italy and Spain being present, the International Olympic Committee was formed on June 23rd 1894 to revive the Olympic Games and look after its development and well-being.

In 1896, Greece celebrated in the rebuilt Panatheniac stadium of Athens, the first modern Olympic Games and to date the world's greatest athletics spectacle.

Pierre de Coubertin spoke these words,

"*Peace would be furthered by the Olympic Games, but peace could be the product only of a better world: a better world could be brought about only by better individuals; and better individuals could be developed only by the give and take, the buffeting and battering, the stress and strain of fierce competition…*"

The idea of the revival of the Olympic Games is thus a gesture of peace. The Olympic Games may then be perceived as a peace movement in the making since the turn of the 20th century. It is part of many international movements that took shape during this period such as the International Red Cross (1863), the Esperanto Movement (1887), and the Scouting Movement (1908).

This idea persists till today, with the Olympic Movement being involved in social issues that arise throughout the world, and with its relations with the United Nations deals with humanitarian issues across the world.

**Chapter II: The Olympic Idea – goals and reality**

The longevity of the any organization is dependent on how flexible it is in the vision it upholds. The IOC has recognized this and therefore it has survived in the marathon of providing a sporting spectacle. Since its foundation more than one hundred and twenty years ago it has adapted to promising developments that has made it the institution it is today. The hosting of the Summer Olympics twenty-seven times bears testimony to the need for the spectacle as a social phenomenon. The popularity of the Summer Olympic Games since 1988 to 2012 has visibly increased, as depicted in Table 1.

**Table 1: Figures depicting the rising popularity of the Olympic Games from 1988-2012**

| Year of the Summer Games | Host City (date) | Participating nations | Number of Sports | Number of Events | Males | Females | Total Participants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1988 | Seoul 17.9.-2.10. | 159 | 23 | 237 | 6242 | 2197 | 8439 |
| 1992 | Barcelona 25.7.-9.8. | 169 | 25 | 257 | 6668 | 2707 | 9365 |
| 1996 | Atlanta 19.7.-4.8. | 197 | 26 | 271 | 6797 | 3513 | 10310 |
| 2000 | Sydney 15.9.-1.10. | 199 | 28 | 300 | 6581 | 4069 | 10650 |
| 2004 | Athens 13-29.8. | 201 | 28 | 301 | 6296 | 4329 | 10625 |
| 2008 | Beijing 8-24.9. | 204 | 28 | 302 | 6305 | 4637 | 10942 |
| 2012 | London 27.7.-12.8. | 204 | 28 | 302 | 5892 | 4676 | 10568 |

The Olympic Idea is unique in that athletes and spectators are fascinated by the competition like no other event. What makes this mega-event so unique may be the idealistic qualities it was founded on. The qualities of peace, equality, respect and tolerance between competing nations assisted the Games quadrennial occurrence as a universal celebration of youth that is like no other sporting event over this era.

The success of the Olympic Games over this era also made it vulnerable to abuse, specifically corruption and political in nature. What is the situation with the Olympic Idea in our contemporary society? Does the Olympic idea still exist in its original form as de Coubertin intended it to be or has it changed with the times? These questions will be analysed in greater detail in the following writing.

## 2.1. The definition of the "Olympic Idea"

Baron Pierre de Coubertin lays the founding definition of the Olympic Idea. Derived from the ancient Greek Olympic Games, he wanted the idea of cease-fire, equality of opportunities and understanding to prevail during the modern Olympic Games. Although diverse in his definition of the Olympic idea, de Coubertin offers much scope for interpretation of these ideas to contemporary beings (Keim, 1987). Idea as defined in the Collins Dictionary is a plan or thought formed in the mind, a belief or opinion. This definition finds favour with those offered by individuals like de Coubertin and also more contemporary authors.

De Coubertin was a product of late nineteenth-century liberalism, and emphasised the values of equality, fairness, justice, respect for persons, rationality and understanding, autonomy, and excellence. These are values which span nearly 3000 years of Olympic history, although some of them may be differently interpreted at different times. De Coubertin said:

> "*But now Olympia ... has been rebuilt or rather renovated*
> *under forms which are different because modern, yet steeped in a kindred*

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*atmosphere.*" (1906, p. 16).

The Olympic Idea may therefore be described as a social philosophy which emphasizes the role of sport in global development, international understanding, peaceful co-existence, and social and moral education.

An anthropometrical philosophy approach by Parry (1988), sees the Olympic idea as its focus of interest not just the elite athlete, but everyone; not just a short truce period, but the whole of life; not just competition and winning, but also the values of participation and co-operation; not just sport as an activity, but also as a formative and developmental influence contributing to desirable characteristics of individual personality and social life (Parry, 1988).

According to Lenk (1982a, p. 166) the Olympic Idea emphasises the centrality of action and achievement:

> "*The Olympic athlete thus illustrates the Herculean myth of culturally exceptional achievement, i.e. of action essentially unnecessary for life's sustenance that is nevertheless highly valued and arises from complete devotion to striving to attain a difficult goal.*"

Therefore an emphasis on the competition in the Olympic Games is the ideal of the athlete to realize his or her best result through years of consistent and progressive training.

In Nissiotis (1984, p. 64),

"*... the Olympic Ideal is what qualifies sport exercise in general as a means for educating the whole man as a conscious citizen of the world ... The Olympic Idea is that exemplary principle which expresses the deeper essence of sport as an authentic educative process through a continuous struggle to create healthy and virtuous man in the highest possible way ('kalosk'agathos') in the image of the Olympic winner and athlete.*"

## 2.2 The original aims of the Olympic Idea

The first words of the Olympic Charter (2013) state simply the nature and goals of Olympism:

Fundamental Principle 1 (p. 11) says:

'Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.'

Fundamental Principle 3 (p. 11) says:

'The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.'

Additional excerpts from articles in the Olympic Charter also displays the diverse interpretation of the guiding document of the IOC and its aligned members. In referring to this goal, the President of the IOC, JA Samaranche, appeals to six 'basic elements' of Olympic ethics (1995, p. 3):

• tolerance

• generosity

• solidarity

• friendship

• non-discrimination

• respect for others

Later in the same editorial he says that the principles which inspire the Olympic Movement are based on,

• justice

• democracy

• equality

• tolerance

Several authors have their own important views of what the Olympic Idea is. These ideas have also been developing over the era 1988-2012.

### 2.3. The Original Idea of the Olympic Idea according to Pierre de Coubertin

The elite of his nation needed to interact with other nations as a demonstration of their leadership and strength at the Olympic Games. In so doing de Coubertin had very different goals for the Olympic Games in his time. The ideals that de Coubertin strove for namely:

- Ceasefire
- International understanding
- Equality of opportunity

These ideals up until today are what has brought about the recurrence every four years of the Olympic Games.

According to the writings of Hans Lenk (1972) a total of six main goals can be drawn from de Coubertin:

- The religious bond
- Human perfection
- Humanistic and educational values
- Social encounters and international understanding
- Independence of the Olympic Movement
- Conformity of antique and modern features (Lenk, 1972, p282).

These goals will be explained in greater detail about the founder's idea of the Olympic Games in his era.

### 2.3.1. The Religious Bond

The link with religion between the athlete of antiquity and the modern athlete was emphasized by the founder of Olympism in the term "a *religio athletae*" (Coubertin, 1966, p150), a religious idea of sport.

Loland (1995) states that de Coubertin was hoping that the "new aristocracy" of top level

athletes in the Olympic Games could encourage more sport activity and morally uplift all layers of society. Thus suggesting a new humanistic religion for the 20th Century, a cult so to say and what de Coubertin called a *religio athletae*.

With the religious bond Coubertin associated the swearing of the Olympic Oath. The athletes of antiquity took *"…the oath of fairness and pecuniary altruism, and above all, to strive for strict compliance*" (quoted by Ulrich, 1982, p.57). This oath in the modern Olympic Games is undertaken by the athlete of the host country on behalf of all competing athletes: "*In the name of all the competitors, I swear that we will take part in these Olympic Games in loyal competition, respecting and abiding by the rules which govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for the glory of sport and the honour of our team*."

It is this 'spirit of religious reverence' that de Courbetin draws a parallel between athletes and soldiers, between sport and war.
"*In sport all the same qualities flourish which serve for warfare: indifference towards one's own well-being, courage, readiness for the unforeseen…*"
He ventures as a far as to say that a young sportsman's training better prepares him for war than an 'untrained' youth (quoted by Kruger, 1993, p.93).

The Olympic Oath, as symbolic language of Olympism, is but one of the many symbols de Coubertin used to show a modern religious idea. Furthermore, the opening and closing ceremonies, the athletes' parade or march of nations, Olympic symbols such as the Olympic flag and the lighting of the flame at the ancient archeological site of Olympia, Greece, are also symbols of a modern religious idea.
Some will argue that de Coubertin's "*religio athletae*" was a philosophical and moral system, not a religion, and was therefore different to the religious observances honoured during the Olympic Games of antiquity (Koulouri, 2009). However, that de Coubertin intended religion to be the common ground between 'the athletes of antiquity' and 'the athletes of modern times' is evident in the following quote cited in Naul,

"*The primary, fundamental characteristic of ancient Olympism, and of modern Olympism as well, is that it is a **religion**.*"        (de Coubertin, 2000, p.580 cited in Naul, 2008)

### 2.3.2. Human perfection

In 1956 de Coubertin wrote,

"*On the day when a nation exists in which each young man possesses sufficient taste for athletic exercises to make him practice them regularly, either alone or with his comrades, seeking in wholesome sports an admirable means to perfect his health and increase his strength, then on that day humanity – or a section of it, at least – will have realized perfection.*"

According to de Coubertin, humans are composed of three parts:

"*Body, mind and character: the character shaping is done by the mind, but especially with the help of the body.*"

(Rauball, 1972, p.10)

Thus de Coubertin wanted moral perfection by way of developing the body through a program of sport (Loland, 1995). The Olympic Games' educational values and physical performance equaled what de Courbertin meant by human perfection.

### 2.3.3. Humanistic-educational goals

As a reformer, at the forefront of de Coubertin's interest was to improve the educational model in France and enhance the intellect of French youth. As a patriot he longed for the resurgence of France.

In addition, the idea impressed upon de Coubertin - that education through sport could be a preparation for life in a democratic society and a shaping of moral character – was inspired by the physical education models of England and North America.

Among those who influenced de Coubertin, Thomas Arnold, the English educator, had a profound influence upon him. Focusing on sport he visited English schools and colleges, including Eton, Oxford and Cambridge and later published on the subject of English education. De Coubertin strived to integrate physical education into French education. (Loland, 1995).

By official government commission, de Coubertin later set out to investigate the North

American educational models. He favoured sports and physical education and took a liking to the sporting culture of the Americans (MacAloon, 2007).

De Coubertin's ideology of Olympism had strong roots in education through sport.

De Coubertin wanted Olympic education to contribute to the inner goodwill of individuals, that moral, responsible attitude of athletes (Müller, 2010). It is through athletic education of youth that de Coubertin envisioned education for peace,

*"Peacefulness and confidence are essential functions for the youthful civilization of tomorrow…"*

<div align="right">(quoted in Mestre, 2013)</div>

### 2.3.4. Social encounter and international understanding

*"Healthy democracy, wise and peaceful internationalism will make their way into the new stadium… and enable athletes to help in tasks…of social peace..."*

*Pierre de Coubertin, 1986 (quoted by Loland, 1995)*

In the 1880s Paris was at the centre of a peace movement, attracting peace activists and pacifists with whom de Coubertin communicated, and from whom he drew inspiration for organizational models, internationalism, and education to promote Olympic ideology (Loland, 1995).

Similarly, Mestre (2013) states that de Coubertin lived in a period of war and peace, and socially moved in circles of notable individuals and peace organizations, from whom he gained influences. He quotes from the Ode to Sport,

*"O Sport, you are Peace!*

*You forge happy bonds between the peoples by drawing them together in reverence for strength which is controlled, organized and self-disciplined. Through you the young of all the world learn to respect one another, and thus the diversity of national traits becomes a source of generous and peaceful emulation."*

Ode to Sport

      Georges Hohrod and M. Eschbach (Coubertin's pseudonym), 1912

      (Quoted from Mestre, 2013)

De Coubertin's neo-Olympism was an ideology that pursued peace and international understanding through intercultural sport. Spaaij (2012) describes de Coubertin's peacemaking vision. The modern Olympic Games, de Coubertin hoped, would characterize human progress, enlightened internationalism and world peace. De Coubertin's suggestion that the youth have a '*happy and brotherly encounter*' would lead to mutual respect and understanding needed for the peacemaking ideals he sought. The Olympic Games were a contact point, a interplay between nations which served to disable ignorance and enhance cross-cultural knowledge and human solidarity.

### 2.3.5. Independence of the Olympic Movement

When asked why he wanted to restore the Olympic Games, de Coubertin said

"..*To ennoble and strengthen sports, to ensure their independence and duration, and thus to enable them better to fulfil the educational role incumbent upon them in the modern world.*"

(Quoted in IOC, 2015)

Early on in the history of the modern Olympic Games, there is evidence of Greek Nationalist claims to the Olympic Games. This occurred after Greece held the first successful games in 1896 and Greek nobility warmed to the idea of hosting the modern games in Greece on a permanent basis. De Coubertin regarded this as a threat to the 'perennial nature' and 'international character' of the group formed by the IOC, and therefore strongly opposed the Greek's notion (Chatziefstathiou, 2012)….

### 2.3.6. Harmony with regard to ancient and modern structures

De Coubertin's motto for the modern Olympic Games, "*citrus, altius, fortius*" was rooted in its Greek heritage. According to Müller and Schantz (1991), de Coubertin used the framework of the Olympic Games of Antiquity as a lean to, to create something new, rather than revive an historical image.

There are two schools of thought regarding the link between the ancient, and modern games (i.e. that which was revived in 1896). Koulouri (2009) argues that a 'discontinuity' is a more fitting description of the relation between the two games. She attributes this due to

Western society's great changes of the eighteenth century, in terms of economy, social structures, ideology and culture.

In marking the differences between the ancient and modern games, Koulouri points to their religious character, element of amateurism, records of performance, the position of women, sporting events, and the national/ international standing at the games.

However, one cannot argue that there *are* similarities, and thus harmony between the ancient and modern structures. Historians like Dennis Young insist on the games being a 'continuity' "...*restoring the grandeur of antiquity*." (Young, 2004).

Earlier on, Loland (1995) presented the basic ideas from the ancient games that de Coubertin leaned on to revive the Modern Olympic Games. These are idealization of the ancient scholar-athlete, including elements of arts and beauty, using a framework of ceremonies and rituals, and the sacred truce.

To further substantiate this claim, Mestre (2013) states that the Olympic Games of Antiquity had a peace message – Ekecheiria – or Olympic Truce. While no Olympic Truce is documented in the revival of the Olympic Games, de Coubertin wanted the '*holy truce*' (or '*scared truce*') to be honoured through the rhythm of the four-year recurrence of the Olympic Games. While its meaning may have been different, de Coubertin managed to give the modern games the peace security of an ancient era (Mestre, 2013). The truce was also the earliest connection between sport and peacemaking (Spaaij, 2012).

**Chapter III.   The Reality**

**3.1. Olympia and Politics**

The establishment of the modern Olympics by Baron Pierre de Coubertin in 1894 was political in nature. Coubertin wanted the French citizen to take their place among the power nations of his era.  In creating the Olympic Games, the youth of France could interact with countries that were amongst the leaders in the world environment.  The motto "Faster, Higher, Stronger" would reinforce the association Coubertin wanted with his reformist movement of French society through sport and internationalism. The need to change the youth of his era for the better was at the forefront of Coubertin's idea.

The ideals emphasized by the founding father were an avenue for political gain from the beginning. The Olympic Games were founded on the ideals of fair play, gentlemanly conduct, and formation of character. However de Coubertin had a political agenda, he was looking to put France back on the map and legitimize its standing as a power house nation (Chalkley, 1999).

As years passed these ideals have been assimilated by other nations in their participation in this sporting spectacle which does its round every four years, that is the Summer Olympic version.

The Olympic Charter states in Rule 51.3  'no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or areas' which establishes a principle that has been in the Olympic Charter for more than 50 years in order to preserve the universality of the Games. The application of this rule is common sense and without this rule, Olympic competitions and ceremonies could be used as a stage for all different kinds of political statements about armed conflicts, regional differences of all kind, religious disputes and many others. This was the case especially during the era 1972 to 1984 that the Olympic Games were used as a political platform.

The history of the modern Games dates from 1896 Athens to the forthcoming Rio 2016 Games. During this time, the scope of the summer Olympics has endured profound changes with regard to the connection between political economy and media.

### 3.2. De Coubertin's idea of the political reality of his era

It can be argued that the Olympic Games were always political since de Coubertin used it as an instrument of international reconciliation and open to athletes of all or any race, religion, ethnicity and ideology (Guttmann, 1988). Most importantly for the development of the Olympic idea, de Coubertin advocated staunch internationalism. De Coubertin founded the Olympic movement with a doctrine of 'universalism', which as it appears in the Olympic Charter is described as 'any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.'

But as John Hoberman writes in The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order:

What this has meant in practice is that the IOC has turned a blind eye to any sort of political crime committed by a member of the Olympic movement. In September 1978, the President of the IOC Lord Killanin, made this claim:

'I am not for one moment saying we have any right to tell what governments should do in the interests of their own country...'

Such a disclaimer is made to preserve the 'universality' of the movement. What is thereby forgotten is that another side of universality is the failure to discriminate.It is this failure to discriminate that led the Olympic movement to proclaim its support for 'universal fundamental ethical principles' while at the same time throwing its support behind the three largest dictatorships of the twentieth century-Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Certainly, this is slightly unfair to China-in 2008 its human rights record was poor, but is markedly better than it was during the years before the Games was awarded to them-but the country is still a dictatorship with thousands of domestic political prisoners. This would, however, have been fine by de Coubertin, who dismissed ethical questions with a trite affirmation of moral equivalence. In an interview during the 1936 Berlin Games, he argued that:

"*It is good that each nation of the world be granted the honour of putting on the Games and of celebrating them in their own manner, in accordance with its own creative powers and by its own means. In France they are disturbed by the fact that the Games of 1936 were illuminated by a Hitlerian force and discipline. How could it have been otherwise?*"

This doctrine of 'universality' above all other considerations was also the lynchpin upon which the Soviet bloc was able to hang their claims that the communist world was being unreasonably ignored by the IOC.

After all, for de Coubertin, a nation's political system is merely a reflection of its culture. For the Olympic movement, totalitarianism is not an aberration, but an accepted part of the international cultural patchwork.

As a consequence, there is very little in the Olympics' doctrine of universalism that suggests any allegiance to 'fundamental ethical principles'

The spirit of the Modern Games is respectable in theory, yet the ideals emphasized by the founders were an avenue for political gain and corruption from the beginning. The Olympic Games were founded on the ideals of fair play, gentlemanly conduct, and formation of character, however de Coubertin had a political agenda: he was looking to put France back on the map and legitimize its standing as a power house nation (Chalkley, 1999). De Coubertin was the first politician, in a long line, to use the Olympic stage for political gain. Seoul Games, through which South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan sought to solidify Korea's position as a dominant nation in Olympic sized fashion is a more recent example of the era under discussion.

### 3.2.1. The Cold War

The Cold War began in February 1945 and ended in December 1991. During the period between 1979 and 1985 two world superpowers used the Olympics as a platform for political purposes. As Robert Edelman, Professor of Russian History and the History of Sport at the University of California, San Diego, points out - the Soviets were "shrewd and clever" to use the Olympics "as a centerpiece for their struggle with capitalism" (Wagg and Andrews, 2012 ).

In that period two summer Olympic Games occurred - in 1980 in Moscow, USSR and in 1984 in Los Angeles, U.S.A. There had been long standing political tensions between the East and the West dating back to the infancy of the Cold War. This purpose, as well as for security measures (post Cuban Missile Crisis) culminated in various treaties being signed between the USSR and the U.S. Most notably were the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in 1972 (SALT I) and 1979 (SALT II) (U.S. State Department). However, relations began to disintegrate following events of December, 1979 which led the USSR and US to use the Olympic Games to express their ideology on an international stage. It was communism versus capitalism, facing off in the realm of sports.  Their expression was in the form of a boycott, the U.S. exercised its boycott at the 1980 Moscow games, and the USSR at the 1984 Los Angeles games, respectively.

Known as the Second Cold War, Philip D'Agati who wrote *The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games* (2013) has preferred to call it the Soviet-American Surrogate War. They used sport and competitions in a bloodless non-lethal version of warfare, since, D'Agati argues, in a surrogate war there is no loss of infrastructure or life. He provides evidence why the Soviet boycott of the Olympic Games was not a 'petty vengeance' or tit for tat in retaliation to the American boycott of the games in Moscow – as several authors proclaim.

On 28 December, 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Radio Moscow reported that the government in Kabul asked the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan (Guttmann, 1992). In other words, according to the Soviets they were salvaging the Islamic State.  The president of the U.S.A., Jimmy Carter, was infuriated.

"*This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in the Southwest Asia and also because such aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.*" (Hoberman, 2008)

He subsequently pulled the SALT II treaty from consideration in protest against the action (U.S. State Department). Furthermore he called for world nations to impose sanctions on the USSR, and boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow unless the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, saying,

"*I…urge the US Olympic Committee, in cooperation with other national Olympic Committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee that is Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will.*" (Quoted in Guttmann, 1988)

The United States Olympic Committee's charter reads,

'No member of the USOC may deny, or threaten to deny any amateur athlete the opportunity to compete in the Olympic Games'. (Article 9 cited in Guttmann, 1992)

Despite USOC's reluctance to support the boycott, and the response from disillusioned athletes and their coaches, they surrendered to the threats of President Carter. Pentathlete Jane Frederick said,

"*Whichever way it goes this time, I must escape the inescapable conclusion: I am a pawn.*" (Guttmann, 1988 p.561)

Allied to the US, Britain and Australia initially supported the boycott even though both were defied by their respective national Olympic Committees. The latter enabled athletes to travel to the Moscow games, and compete under the Olympic Flag. Eventually sixty-two countries joined the boycott, including West Germany, Canada, Japan, China, and Israel. However the Moscow games were a success, with eighty-one nations attending. The absence of the US led the USSR and East Germany to rack up an impressive medal tally.

Four years later, a meeting between American and Soviet officials, was hosted by the IOC and held in Lausanne. The president of the IOC at the time, Juan Antonio Samaranch said this,

"*We may say that the black clouds that accumulated in the Olympic sky have vanished or are very soon going to vanish.*"

However, despite his efforts the IOC was unable to avert another East-West boycott of the games. The following month, the boycott of the Los Angeles (Olympic) Games was initiated by the Soviet Union. The USSR claimed non-participation and never used the term boycott. The Russian National Olympic Committee issued the following statement on May 8, 1984:

"*Chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria are being whipped up in the United States. Extremist organizations and groupings of all sorts, openly aiming to create 'unbearable conditions' for the stay of the Soviet delegation and performance by Soviet athletes, have sharply stepped up their activities…Washington has made assurances of late of the readiness to observe the rules of the Olympic charter. The practical deeds by the American side, however, show that it does not intend to ensure the security of all athletes, respect their rights and human dignity and create normal conditions for holding the games…In these conditions, the national Olympic Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in the Games is impossible.*" (Quoted in Guttmann, 1992)

The Soviets claimed to protest against the organization of the Los Angeles Games, specifically the security measures, and discrimination (visa applications and differences in East-West foreign policy and sport). The Soviet's main reason was that they feared for the safety of their Russian athletes, in an antagonistic, anti-socialist environment in the US. Los Angeles was considered dangerous and featured as such in Soviet media. They claimed that the "chauvinistic nature" breeds "anti-Soviet organizations which support the US politics of enhancing anti-Soviet hysteria" (Mertin, 2007).

As mentioned above, D'Agati (2013) argues that the Soviet Union's boycott of the Games was not retaliation (to the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games). Firstly, he argues that the Soviet's boycott was not due to the cold war tensions, because clearly they attended Western-hosted games such as the 1972 Munich Games, and 1976 Montreal Games. Secondly, the boycott could not be due to American-Soviet differences, since the Soviet

Union attended the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics. The reason for the boycott he says is more grounded in sixty years of Soviet sports policy, in particular – international sports participation.

To affirm that their reasons for non-participation were not politically driven or anti-Olympic for that matter, they stated that they did not "demand any kind of political concession from the Americans, or threaten any sanctions" (Mertin, 2007). Clearly they had a stronger standpoint. They were revealing the (insincere) motive of the American boycott in 1980 by directly referring to the US military occupation of Grenada, in which the Soviets did not interfere. The hostility created by the Americans towards socialist nations was grounds for the East's non-participation.

In the end the Soviet Union and sixteen of its allies did not partake in the 1984 Los Angeles Games.  One hundred and forty nations (or teams) competed, including Romania, the only socialist nation present at the games, who were enthusiastically welcomed by spectators (Guttmann, 1992).

The state of political and military tension of the Cold War began to fade in the late 1980s, after nearly four decades. Central in this was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by the US and USSR, for the destruction of their nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev could not afford the arms race. He later withdrew from Afghanistan. His reforms introduced competition in business, or 'perestroika' and freedom, or 'glasnost'. The USSR collapsed as a political system. Revolutions in Eastern Europe led to the fall of the Berlin wall (1989), and in 1990 East and West Germany became a single and unified non-communist state.

### 3.2.2.  Seoul Games, 1988

The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games' opening ceremony theme, "Toward One World, Beyond All Barriers" was poignant and powerful for a country divided by the Cold War. As the East-West divide was waning, South Korea's military dictatorship of the cold war era changed to a liberal, democratic government.  The Olympic Games were seen as a means to

tackle the remnants of the Cold War, hence South Korea wanted to address national division, counter North Korea's propaganda, and reduce the state of confrontation with the north (Larson and Park, 1993).

Due to the exposure to world politics in the 1980s, the International Olympic Movement underwent profound changes during this era with its new President Juan Antonio Samaranch. It subsequently engaged in global marketing for its survival. The selection of Seoul to host the 1988 Summer Olympics Games raised the possibility of a fourth consecutive boycott (the first being the 1976 Montreal games where 25 African countries boycotted in protest against New Zealand's sporting links with apartheid-ruled South Africa (BBC)). A fourth major boycott could have undermined the Olympic Movement and the Games' mission as an instrument for international understanding, peace and goodwill.

In 1988, the last of the dictatorships under President Chun Doo Hwan, attempted to neutralize ideals and displays of democracy from the citizens of Korea, whose focus was on a radical political struggle (Larson & Park, 1993). At the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korea was had a powerful footing in the economy of the Asian continent, and its leaders sought to summon the political currency of sport to boost Korea's standing on the global stage. The Seoul Games proved that an interconnection exists between sport (The Olympic Games), politics and the media. As the press chief Jae-won Lee noted, the Games were a gateway to communication for South Korea establishing sporting relations that would lead to diplomatic ties (Palenski, 1998).

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the hosting of the 24th Olympiad to Seoul, South Korea at its IOC session in Baden-Baden in 1981. The selection of Seoul confirmed Korea's socioeconomic transformation, and to a great extent the city is enveloped by Western influences (Kang, 2009).  This selection was fundamental to the IOC's own advancement and difficulties it experienced with the threats of boycotts. The appeal in hosting the 24th Olympiad was limited to a few cities, with the Japanese city of Nagoya being the firm favorite.  However, protest action by Japanese citizens *against*

Nagoya, and a desire to spread the Olympic Idea swayed the voting amongst IOC members in favor of Seoul over Nagoya, by 52-27 votes.

At the time, the central political reality in Korea was its' division by Western Powers after World War 2. There was a continued presence of Western military forces in South Korea – an obvious remnant of the remains of the cold war (Larsen and Park, 1993). The evidence of the aggressive western marketing of the Olympics in the country by the International Olympic Committee could be traced back to the South Korea's patron of military dictatorship - the U.S.

The awarding of the 24th Olympiad and the politics of military dictatorship awakened the whole question of elections and constitutional reform prior to the Seoul Olympics. The protest of growing numbers of middle-class citizens, students and opposition forces towards the existing governing system was more and more urgent.

In a speech President Chun stated "It will be the consistent hope of not only myself but also you, the people, that we should carry out successfully by every means the continuous economic development, the peaceful transition of government, and the 1988 Seoul Olympics which will be the golden opportunity for national prosperity, thereby placing the country on the road towards becoming an advanced country."  This reflects de Courbertin's objective for the French nation (BBC, 1987).

The deputy secretary-general of the Seoul Olympics Organising Committee, Chyun Sang Jim pointed out at the end of June 1987 how imperative the Olympics were in the decision for political change. He said, "Certainly they were a great factor in making the decision. President Chun and Mr. Roh were both very involved in getting the Olympic Games into Seoul. They both have a very strong personal commitment, obligation and attachment to hosting the Olympics."(LA Times, July 2, 1987).

The awarding of the Olympic Games to Seoul, South Korea transformed the country's development, national pride, and the development and popularization of sport. South Korea wanted the same experience, economic growth and enhanced stature that its neighbour in the Asia Pacific region, Japan, had in 1964 with the Tokyo Olympics.  (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2013).

Through South Korea's remarkable economic growth, and the Japanese experience with the Olympics, it could be a model for Korea. Also through the hosting of the Olympics and what it stood for, the Koreans thought of seizing this practical opportunity to terminate the state of confrontation it had with North Korea. South Korea's hosting the Summer Olympics would, according to state officials, rank the country among the advanced nations (Larson and Park, 1993).

North Korea responded to the news of Seoul hosing the Olympics by seeking support for the opposition from their communist allies. *Rodong Sinmun* mocked the South by proclaiming, "Recently South Korean military fascists have been mobilizing high ranking officials and related staff of the puppet government as well as pro-government trumpeters to raise a ridiculous hullabaloo every day about the Olympics, which are said to be going to be held in Seoul in 1988. Now the puppets of South Korea are approaching diplomatic and official relations in order to have their 'state' recognized as a legitimate one." Threats of a possible boycott by North Korea and its allies followed. In particular, Cuba played a role in attempting to convince the IOC to change the venue first, and later proposing a shared Olympics between North and South Korea, with Pyongyang co-hosting. (Carlin and Oberdorfer, 2013 Armstrong, 2013). IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch offered North Korea a chance to host five games, namely archery, table tennis, women's volleyball, 100-km cycling and qualification rounds for soccer). The offer displeased North Korea who wanted equal share in hosting, but the South rejected their demands, which led North Korea boycotting the games. The only other socialist country to boycott the games was Cuba (Guttmann, 1992, Kleiner, 2001).

South Korean leaders wanted to emulate Japan's success of the 1964 Olympics, but with a distinctive Korean feel. The President of South Korea at the time, Park Chung Hee approved of the idea to host (shortly before his death in 1979) after being persuaded by the President of the Korean Olympic Committee, Park Jong-kyue. The former's key objectives for hosting were "to demonstrate Korea's economic growth and national power" and "to create favourable conditions for diplomatic relations with both communist and non-aligned nations" (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2013).

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The Park government's decision to bid for the Olympics involved high ranking officials and the sports community, in a top-down approach. Though a developing country, doubts whether South Korea could afford such an effort was evident. Having forfeited the hosting of the 1976 Asia Games because of cost implications, officials involved in discussions for the 1988 Olympic Games were realistic (Larson and Park, 1993).

Moving forward, the economic, political, and ideological campaigns of the Korean President Chun Doo Hwan are forever present in the history of the 1988 summer Games. The years leading up to the Games was layered with numerous mass campaigns to further various political and development goals in South Korea. The goal to use the Olympic spectacle as a booster for national development was adapted to the previously planned and ongoing development projects of the country. This therefore avoided the large costings on infrastructure and taxpayers for the Games that could not be used later.

Due to the progressive preparation of the 10th Asiad in 1986 being the first international sporting event leading up to the 24th Olympiad, the government took a key interest in it. Other stakeholders such as the private sector and citizens organisations also supported the effort.

Government support came in the form of infrastructure related to the future hosting of multi-discipline mega-events such as the Olympics. Effort to support Korea's Olympic athletes, advance Olympics sports and develop mass participation in Korea was also prioritized by the government (Larson and Park, 1993).

South Korea initiated several programs in the field of public relations, education and environmental improvement to raise the population's consciousness about the Olympic Games and thus the Olympic idea. The various projects and campaigns leading up to the Seoul Olympics by the government displayed the scope and pervasive character of the national mobilization, despite the fact that South Korea was at the time was a military-run government.

Comments in the local media at the time also spoke of the enthusiasm and eagerness of the public about the Games, be it the wishful thinking of the planners and organisers in government and business. Although for the ordinary people the Games received quite negative to lukewarm reactions (due to President Chun Doo Hwan's involvement), the

successive campaigns and mobilizations virtually touched every citizen of South Korea in the run-up to the Summer Olympic Games.

According to Kleiner (2001), the success of the Seoul Olympics established South Korea as a player in world politics. Diplomatic relations were established with many socialist countries in Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet Union. The Seoul Games went on with little interruption, and their success represented a major milestone on the journey from dictatorship to democracy for South Korea. This may serve as an example of the purpose of the Games to globally spread democratic values, its birthplace being in Greece.

The transformation of the Olympic Idea and it being able to transform politics and media is illustrated in the Games hosting by Seoul, South Korea. The application of politics, diplomacy, economics and societal customs and practice are shown in this historical perspective of the Seoul Summer Olympics. An example of the societal custom and practice is the making of the Olympic flag from pure Korean raw silk and the needlework by the hands of women skilled in Korea's traditional methods. This legacy of the 'new' Olympic flag and its hoisting at Games cities in this era and the future shows the impact of Seoul, Korea both literally and figuratively (Palenski, 1998).

### 3.2.3. Barcelona, 1992

Barcelona 1992 Barcelona stands out from the list of the Olympic cities. Barcelona is considered as an etalon when it comes to the Olympic legacy and the quality of event planning and management. A number of studies have pointed out that the Barcelona'92 Games have made a great contribution to the economic performance and overall development of Barcelona (London East Research Institute, 2007; Brunet, 2005; Brunet, 1995; Duran, 2005).

At the same times the evidence that points at shortcomings in the way the event was planned and organised is rather limited, particularly compared to the other Olympic Games.

Barcelona is the city that throughout its history has been facing the need to facilitate economic activity to support a vast metropolitan area, while lacking the benefits of being a

political centre of the country. Hosting Mega-events has been chosen as a response to this challenge on multiple occasions. In the last 150 years Barcelona has hosted 8 mega-events including The Universal Exhibitions of 1888 and 1929. (Brunet, 1995; Duran, 2005).

Yet there is no doubt, that the 1992 Summer Olympics were by far the biggest and the most impactful of them all. The success of the Barcelona Olympic Games is often attributed to the unique circumstances that came together when the decision to bid for the Games was made. Firstly, in 1975 Spain went through political transition, which marked the end of the Franco regime. The newly re-established democratic principles were valued particularly high at that point, which meant that the civic movements did have significant influence (Monclus, 2003). At the same time the city, was suffering the decline of the industrial core, rapid sub-urbanization, diminishing population, the poor quality of infrastructure and amenities (Monclus, 2007; Brunet, 1995). All of these factors led to the creation of a coalition around the Summer Olympic bid driven by city authorities and backed at the state and the regional levels, and supported by the public, which agreed that the Games could bring the needed change to the city.

The Games had achieved a unique level of consent by the public (Brunet, 1995; Monclus, 2007). In 1987, 61,4% of the citizens questioned were expecting the Summer Olympic Games bringing change to the city. Half a year before the Games in 1992, 87% of population thought that Barcelona would host the event successfully. The average grade given to the Games after the Games was 8.78 out of 10. (Brunet, 1995) In the circumstances described the identification of the "backward linkages" in a political sense is of little use, as the political motivation for the Games (urban renovation and general revitalisation of the city) hasn't contradicted the way they have been communicated to the public. There is little use for the urban regime approach as well. Participation of private sector was significant, as OCOG (Organising Committee of Olympic Games) was run as a public private partnership. (Brunet, 1995). Yet the public sector role was more significant in terms of responsibility, risk, and investment (Preuss, 2000). The interests of the business elite even though considered, were never dominant.

The relationships between three levels of public administration were regulated through an inter-institutional agreement, which helped to avoid major conflicts (Brunet, 2005). The developments in the urban planning field at the time are also important for the analysis of

the Barcelona Olympic legacy. After a period when planning regulations were very inefficient (Franco period) (Monclus, 2003) change was needed. The first step was made with the adoption of the Plan General Metropolita (PGA) in 1976. The document was developed during the Franco period, when participatory mechanisms were non-existent. Still it was a professionally prepared document of high standard that introduced basic principles of zoning and priority given to public space (McDonogh, 1991). The PGA also included plans to host several international festivals, and can be seen as the point of re-introduction of mega-event strategy in Barcelona (Cahyadi and TenBrink, 2004). In the early 80s after the democratisation of municipal governance a party representing "the left" principles took control of the municipality, which coincided with the change of the mainstream paradigm in urban planning. The European cities were not growing as fast as they used to and planning was for the first time seen as a tool for facilitating growth rather than accommodating it (Monclus, 2003).

Maragall, the mayor of Barcelona saw public spaces as a potential tool for solving the economic and social problems of the city. In the condition of the economic slump of the early 80s the emphasis in Barcelona was made on small-scale public space regeneration projects, which characterised planning policy in 1982-86, and were a successful contribution to the urban environment and the city's administrative capacity (Monclus, 2007; 2003). During this period planning was depoliticised and has developed a fundamental R&D basis. (McDonogh, 1991) The success of the Olympic bid and the change of the economic conditions allowed the city to continue the same policy but increase the scale of the projects it entailed. So the success of the Olympic redevelopment has to be attributed to the events of the previous decade .

All the Games related spending was broken down into the organizational costs and the investment with lasting impact – "legacy costs". All the spending related decisions were guided by the aim to minimize organizational costs and maximize the "legacy costs" (Brunet, 1995), which in the end accounted for 85.5% of the Olympic budget. Barcelona was very successful both in attracting money from private sponsors and generating income. The Organising Committee of the Olympics Games (OCOG) reported revenue of $1530 Million, which exceeded the organizational costs of $1364 Million. Thirty percent of this came from the broadcasting rights sales.

The total revenue exceeded that of Seoul by 50% to become the greatest in history at the time. The private sector contributed 28% to the total budget, and combined with the contribution of the state owned companies accounted for 40% of the budget, which equalled the total contribution from the public budgets of different level.

The administration and management of the Games, was run by a joint venture with public and private participation. Two separate bodies were responsible for the Games-related investment programme and the organisation of the event itself .This turned out to be an innovation that helped overcome the conflict between the short-term and the long-term objectives (Brunet, 1995).

The other innovations included decentralized decision making process, staffing policy that featured use of highly motivated recent graduates and volunteers, and restructuring of the OCOG for the operational period 6 months before the Games (Botella, 1995).

One of the factors that ensured the high quality of planning and management of the Barcelona Olympics can be found in the simplicity of the objectives: "organisational excellence and urban impact", which emphasised both importance of the Games and their intermediate status in relation to the long term development ambition for the city. (Brunet, 2005)

Olympic idea and transformation on the political front was evident in the IOC President J.A. Samaranch support for the hosting of the Games of the 25[th]Olympiad in Barcelona. A native of the region, Samaranch was instrumental in getting the Olympic Games to this region of Spain, so doing a major transformation in the city's image and status.

Mr. Samaranch, according to John J. MacAloon (2010), a historian of the Olympics and a professor at the University of Chicago say that no Olympics leader, aside from de Coubertin, was more significant. Professor MacAloon said. "His major achievement was to give the I.O.C. a political competence, an ability to deal with states and the United Nations in a way that earned both interest and respect."

He helped end the boycott era, after Africans, Americans and Soviets hobbled the Olympics from the mid-1970s through the mid-'80s by withholding participation on political grounds and ideology.

The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games marked the end of the Cold War. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia fielded separate teams, while the rest of the former Soviet Union competed as

the "Unified Team". Germany competed under one flag for the first time since 1964, while post-apartheid South Africa was invited after a 32-year ban.

Still, Mr. Pound, an IOC delegate from Montreal, Canada, said on the passing of Mr. Samaranch, that his legacy would endure.

"He took a very badly fragmented, disorganized and impecunious organization and built it into a universal, united and financially and politically independent organization that has credibility, not only in the world of sport, but also in political circles,"(The Associated Press, 2010)

"That's an enormous achievement to accomplish in 20 years."(NY Times, 2010). The article details the impact that Juan Antonio Samaranch had in transforming the Olympic Idea into relevance during the era of his presidency. He transformed the IOC into an institution that vastly did not mirror the idea of founding father, Baron Pierre de Coubertin. He specifically did away with amateurism, gained profit through marketing and branding the Olympic rings and other symbols. This made the IOC and Olympic Movement more independent to face any political interference with greater surety of coming out on top.

"We have saved the city as a cultural concept" (Maragall, 1992 cited in Montgomery, 2008, p. 1). This famous quote by the mayor of Barcelona, written after the city had hosted the 1992 Summer Olympic Games is very symbolic of the level of expectation that is assigned to the Olympics today. Montgomery uses the quote to show that Barcelona Olympics became a symbol of revival of the post-industrial city. Even though the Games were not the only reason for Barcelona's revival their contribution was crucial. The 1992 Olympics showed the world that an event of an Olympic scale can transform the city and for good or evil that is what the world chose to believe ever since.

### 3.2.4. South Africa emerging from isolation: post-apartheid

"Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement (IOC 2013)."

The commentary related to the above-mentioned principle has bearing as early as the start of the modern Olympics in the case of South Africa. However, the era of institutionalized

racist and political rule began in 1946 and its demise, that of minority rule only ended in 1994. Though many factors contributed to the maintenance of the status quo with regards to minority South Africa belonging to the Olympic Movement up until 1970, the reasons for can be explored in terms of the multi-disciplinary field of international relations theory. There is no greater example of how transformation occurred as a direct influence by the Olympic Movement – as that of South Africa's Sport History. Sports sanctions, sport-based protests and sports diplomacy were some of the most important tools used to affect policy, and campaign the political plight of disadvantaged Black, Coloured and Indian South Africans.

The apartheid was the system of white supremacy introduced in South Africa, in a post-World War 2 political climate that was very against racial discrimination. South Africa introduced an institutionalized form of racism that applied in the field of sport as much as in all other walks of life (SADET 2004; Mermelstein 1987). In South Africa, both the sports administrators and the Government had jointly taken measures to deliberately exclude non-white South Africans from participating in representative sport. This amounted to discrimination in the case of South Africa on the grounds of race and politics for the majority of citizens from the so-called Black, Coloured and Indian communities. The imposition of apartheid in South African sport effectively meant that no 'mixed' sport was permitted under the auspices of the official organizations which were accorded international recognition and custodianship for selecting representative teams for international competitions (Corrigall 1971).

As early as 1946 division in sport was already engrained in South Africa, before apartheid made it policy.  In that year black South African athletes protested at being excluded from Olympic participation. Grant Jarvie (1985) indicates, "By the time the National Party came into power in 1948 and the apartheid policy emerged, a degree of segregation and inequality of opportunity between white and non-white athletes had evolved already in South African sport. There was little need, therefore, to impose a policy of apartheid upon specific sporting relations since social differentiation already existed. Furthermore, the general laws of apartheid rule rendered multiracial sport impossible in that it was illegal for

black and white athletes to mix openly in competition, as it was for black and white people to mix socially in society." (quoted in Desai and Veriava, 2010).

The international action against discriminating sport relations in South Africa started in the mid 1950's and really began to have effect in the 1960s. The situation regarding segregated sport was highlighted by those directly affected by the South African policy. The non-white majority sportsmen began to campaign for a break in relations with white minority South Africa, who also refused to play any non-white team, in favour of relations with non-racial teams. An important decision towards changing relations was taken by the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF). In 1947 the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board (SATTB) became a provisional affiliate of ITTF. In 1956 ITTF decided to stop links with the all-white South African Table Tennis Union (SATTY) in favour of ties with SATTB. ITTF's refusal to affiliate with the white South African Table Tennis Union (SATTU), and the subsequent ban of a British athlete who competed with members of SATTU, began to affect relations internationally (Corrigall, 1971, Keech, 2001).

This was however not the case for the non-racial South African Soccer Federation who represented more than twice the membership of the white body, the Football Association of South Africa, and had made representations to the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) in 1955. Due to the large number of friends of the all-white Association who held influence in FIFA, it was not until 1961 that FASA was first suspended (Corrigall, 1971).

In 1959 the South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed as a non-racial organization to secure the rights of those players in the international field. This organization (SASA) first attempted to get recognition by working together with the white organizations, but realized in 1962 that this was not going to be achieved and approached the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It asked for the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Games for their racial policy. South Africa received a warning from its Western supporters on the IOC who threatened it with suspension in 1963 if no changes in policy were forthcoming.

But this led to even more concerted efforts on the part of these supporters to reinstate the offending member, in this case the all-white Football Association of South Africa. The device chosen was to send a FIFA commission to investigate the situation in South Africa. Sir Stanley Rous of Britain, President of FIFA, and Mr. James McGuire of the United States constituted the mission. During their visit to South Africa in January 1963, the Johannesburg Star newspaper of January 9, 1963, reported Sir Stanley as having said that no provision in the FIFA constitution required its members to apply the principle of multi-racialism, if South Africa applied segregation in soccer that was its concern. The report to FIFA recommended the reinstatement of the racial body and this was done in 1963. This decision met with widespread opposition in Afro-Asian countries with the result that the suspension was re-imposed at the 1964 Tokyo congress of FIFA (Corrigall 1971).

The brief account of developments in the field of soccer reveals a pattern of behaviour which was repeated in other battles to eliminate racism from sport. In numerous cases the most important and senior officials of international sport bodies worked desperately to maintain the status quo and retain the all-white bodies as full members. The South African racist organisations were, therefore, very well placed to receive high level advice about ways of retaining membership, as well as support for their position. The fact that more Afro-Asian members were present at only important international sport meetings where the Olympic Movement deliberated issues, because of the high cost of international travel, allowed the majority of members to voice their opposition to apartheid sport (Corrigall 1971). The Cold War and the Olympic anti-apartheid campaign interrelated closely with the process of state-building in the post-independent African states, who were key protagonists against apartheid South Africa's membership in the Olympic Movement from the late 1960s. Through a well-crafted discourse of post-colonialist, anti-imperialism and anti-racism, these African states, along with allies in the Communist block practiced a politics of internationalism that had among it targets the dismantling of apartheid (Cornelissen, 2013).

As apartheid in SA sport gained momentum, so did resistance to it locally and the international arena. What followed was a sport practice called, 'the white man's domain', and SA's first sport policy. It opposed inter-racial sport and enabled separate (sport)

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development based on race. Furthermore, a black federation would be obliged to work through white organisations for international affiliation, and passports would be withheld if athletes did not obey traditional racial divisions. The National Party controlled government subsequently confiscated the passports and placed banning orders on those players and officials from non-racial sport organisations, preventing them from participating in the respective international sport. After this decisive scenario other sports slowly began to follow, although there was often a problem as the top ranking officials in the international federation's resisted change and did not want confrontation. This led to the changes being slow in most sports in the Olympic Movement (Reddy, 2012).

The president of the IOC from 1952 to 1972, American Avery Brundage, was a firm supporter of the South African government. In the 1950s and 1960s his loyalty to the Pretoria regime and tolerance of racial policy, deferred action on the issue of racial inequality practiced by white South Africans (Landry et al, 1990). Brundage pointed out, "It is not our job to change the political situation in any state. If participation in a sport event were to be threatened each time human rights were violated, then international sports competitions would not exist." This attitude afforded the support to the perpetuation of apartheid due to the influence of western powers, especially the United States of America, United Kingdom and other European countries. This realist perspective to international relations through the IOC and Olympic Movement leadership almost put pay to the idealist principles of the Olympic Charter principles (Hulme, 1984).

Mounting international complaints were communicated to the IOC, and sports-based protests began rising. In 1958, Norway – due to host the `1960 Winter Games in Oslo - informed Brundage that the country would be willing to exclude an all-white South African team. Again Brundage deflected with this statement, "Sooner or later the subject will be on our agenda and there can only be one answer, unless changes are made." (Guttmann, 1992)

The subject was subsequently raised the next year when Reginald Honet (a Johannesburg lawyer and member of the IOC), and a Soviet delegate argued over the merit of South African team selection and it's the South African National Olympic Committee's (SANOC)

support of apartheid in sport. The Soviet firmly laid accusations against SANOC for its lack of action against apartheid policy (Keech, 2001, Guttmann, 1992). As a result, a motion was tabled to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Movement. However, Brundage did not acknowledge SANOC's infringement of the Olympic Charter, and therefore did not make South Africa fully comply in 1959.

Public announcements were made in the 1960s which did not help South Africa's cause to continue ('whites only') participation in the Olympics. Under the new republic which was formed in1962, Minister Jan de Klerk's press statement reiterated the sport policy of South Africa and affirmed the South African 'custom' if whites and non-whites separate sport practice. There was great local resistance by blacks, coloureds and Indians to the government's sport policy. The South African Sport Association (SASA) was dismissed by SANOC. With changes being introduced to policy and under the leadership of Dennis Brutus, in January 1963 SASA became the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC). There months later the South African government banned Brutus from attending any meetings where three or more people were present, and as a result he was later arrested. Problems persisted and the Anti-Apartheid Movements continued to campaign for the exclusion of apartheid South Africa. When SANOC did not suspend the practice of apartheid in sport, the IOC suspended it in January 1964, and Team South Africa was excluded from the Tokyo Olympic Games. However, SANROC was not acknowledged or allowed to send a team to the 1964 Games in Tokyo. Dennis Brutus managed to escape to London where he set up SANROC, after it was banned in 1965 in South Africa (Reddy, 1986, Guttmann, 1992). In 1966 the architect of apartheid, Hendrik Vervoed was assassinated. The new prime minister, Jan Vorster aspired to gain readmission into the Olympic Games. In 1967 he slightly modified the existing sports policy, and allowed New Zealand's rugby team to include Maoris on its forthcoming tour to SA, giving Maoris 'honorary white status'. New Zealand's anti-racism protests organisations demanded that New Zealand stay away and even flew in Dennis Brutus to speak against sporting contact with SA (Nauright, 1993).

The developments after the Baden-Baden meeting with the adoption of the 1963 resolution on South Africa's future participation in the Olympic Movement did not deter supporters. They almost succeeded in having the suspension withdrawn and enabling South Africa to participate in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games. It became evident that as long as South Africa remained a member of the International Olympic Committee it would move from suspension to membership and vice versa depending on whether South Africa's supporters where in the majority present at any particular meeting. It was the action of the Afro-Asian countries which resulted in the Mexican organizing committee not inviting team South Africa rather than face a boycott from a large number of national Olympic committees. In May 1970 the International Olympic Committee took the inevitable decision of expelling apartheid South Africa from the Olympic Movement altogether (Cornelissen 2013; Espy 1979; Corrigall 1971).

Lord Killanin, IOC President (1972-1980) quoted as saying, "Ninety-five percent of my problems as President of the IOC involved national and international politics." The separation of politics and sport is idealism no longer possible in today's complicated political world (Vinokur, 1984). In fact sport has always been used in the past and in contemporary times as a vehicle for diplomacy, ideology, nation building, access into the international arena and commercial gain (Ndlovu 2010; Qobo 2010, Habib 2009; Höglund & Sunberg 2008).

International Olympic Committee President Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980-2001) used his experience as a diplomat to his advantage in negotiating South Africa back into the Olympic fold after thirty years of isolation. Believing in Africa to resolve its own problems, the negotiations between the various sport organizations within the anti-apartheid movement and political parties in the run up to South Africa's first democratic election took place. The participation of team South Africa under the Olympic flag at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games was as a result of it preceding the county's first democratically elected government in 1994. This achievement was as a result of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, comprising of a collective body at both domestic and international spheres of politics that brought about the demise of apartheid. International Olympic Committee President Jacques

Rogge (2001-2012) has continued this reciprocal influence of leadership in the new global environment (Jackson & Haigh, 2008).

"The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity (IOC 2013)." Now fully embracing the above ethos, South Africa was re-admitted into the Olympic Movement. The era from 1992 up until 2012 demonstrate how international relations theories highlight the impact Olympism in the newly democratic environment of the past twenty years in South Africa has had.

The two fundamental principles, the role and mission of the IOC are detailed in the Olympic Charter and are as follows:

•     Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of a good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (IOC 2013).


These fundamental statements are the role and mission of the IOC stating that it is:

• To encourage and support initiatives blending sport with culture and education;

• To encourage and support the activities of the International Olympic Academy ("IOA") and other institutions which dedicate themselves to Olympism/Education (IOC 2013).

Therefore, the primary aim hinges on the International Olympic Committee and Movement to be a promoter of educational reform to foster this Olympism. What follow is the relations between collectives, in other words, nations, states, regions and other transnational or international groups or organizations (Cornelissen 2013; Freund 2006; Beacom 2000). This collective body differs across a range of issues, in particular their interpretation as to who are the key actors in realizing the role and mission for Olympism or educational reform and the Olympic Games. The characteristics of power relations, the role of the state and the relationship between domestic and international spheres of politics will be elaborated on in this essay regarding the necessary educational reforms and participation at the Olympic Games and Movement in the case of South Africa.

Contemporary factories of achieving Olympism lie within especially the primary, secondary and tertiary education systems of the world's nation-states. The IOC prides itself

in having more than two hundred member nation-states. The distribution network of Olympic educational projects are therefore possible, and its universal application in the context of different cultural interpretations and manifestations practical through national education systems and the regional manifestations of National Olympic Committees projects.

This approach is core to the promotion of instilling Olympism, Olympic Games and Olympic Movement information to citizens. This is a long-term process that ideally happens during primary and secondary education, through movement literacy. The use of movement education is the objective of the curriculum development of the Olympic Education project. But studies has shown  especially in Africa that the status of physical education as a core subject is lacking and specifically in South Africa who has a shortage of both human and physical resources to instill Olympism or physical education curriculums in developing communities (Hardman 2008). The call for physical activity levels amongst the world's population to increase, especially developed and developing communities has also been highlighted and therefore the importance of movement literacy/education by the nation states and governments (Ng & Popkin 2012).

The Experience (social) orientated approach "employs encounters both inside and outside the school at games, sports, art and music festivals" (Naul, 2008). The experiential approach emphasizes participation by children, youth and adults in school "Olympic" festivals and competitions, international school cooperation and communication, and special emphasis on teaching fair play and cultural understanding (Binder 2012, 2001).

In South Africa sport has had the power to bring people of different cultures together, after apartheid, through the hosting of major events (i.e. Rugby World Cup 1995, FIFA World Cup 2010). This can and has been duplicated at various developed and developing community levels in the primary, secondary and tertiary education sports events. The unifying of one educational system under a democratically elected government in 1994 is also evidence of this in South Africa. The promotion of cultural understanding in especially primary schools and fair play projects to drive this has bearing on the education system in the country. Values education and especially respect for everyone has had great example set by a famous statesman in the form of Nelson Mandela, may his legacy live on (Cornelissen 2013; Binder 2012).

The country's first multi-racial team, representing the new democracy that would be formerly ushered in with the country's first free elections in 1994, took part in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. This act once again realised the goal of Olympism for the majority of South Africans in terms of a peaceful transition and a right to vote in a true democracy. In 2012, after six Olympic Games attendance since re-admission, Team South Africa placed twenty-third (23rd) on the medal standings, its best position to date, and exercised its power relations in terms of sports such as athletics, canoeing, rowing and swimming (South Africa Info 2012).

In the case of South Africa, the bearing of the Olympic principles discussed has had especially sport contribute significantly to social issues such as international negotiation, reconciliation, nation-building and state development, power relations, the actions and activities of non-governmental organisations, aid development and transnational organization and alignment. Through international relations South Africa has once again taken its place in the Olympic Movement.

### 3.2.5. Atlanta Games, 1996 and Commercialisation

The Atlanta Games were the first to be held without any governmental support. This led to a commercialisation of the Games that disappointed many. In addition, a pipe bomb exploded in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park killing two people and injuring a further 110. Although the incident was referred to as a terrorist bomb, the motive or group responsible was never determined. Approximately 10,000 athletes participated in Atlanta, representing 197 countries (including Hong Kong and the Palestinian Authority).

Consistent with his reverence toward capitalism as a solution, Mayor Andrew Young, as Mayor Maynard Jackson's first-term successor saw the potential in the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Games to revitalize Atlanta economically and, possibly, solve the concentrated poverty problem within the public housing complexes, such as Techwood Homes or Clark Howell Homes (Newman, 2002). What was created through racism would be redefined through classism. Urban renewal within the downtown Atlanta core and concentrations of poverty and crime within the African-American public housing complexes were considerations for Mayor Maynard Jackson to revitalize in the 1970s and

early 1980s. However, this time Jackson's suggested solutions rested with policies such as affirmative action. With President Reagan's 1984 elimination of several federal aid programs geared toward urban policy, cities were required to look elsewhere for funding and, for Atlanta, the Games provided the perfect economic impetus to focus on the revitalisation of downtown Atlanta. Contemporary public policy strategies include the promotion of tourism to "justify" local development and mega-events such as the Olympics provided such a promotional outlet, reaching a broader audience than otherwise possible (Burbank et al, 2002 ).

In voicing his support of the development of the Georgia Dome as an opportunity to retain the Atlanta Falcons and for hosting future events, one member of the Atlanta Games Regime who dominated the Games planning, Billy Payne, stated that, "the Olympics eventually comes down to money." ("Supplement," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 17, 1988, D: 42). Succumbing to economic bullying by sports franchises who threaten to leave and hosting sporting events of the caliber of the Olympics both served to promote an image of a "major league city" or "international city" with relatively small immediate returns (Burbank et al, 2002). While the financial cost of pursuing such events was considerable, the recognition and marketing attained served as justification for entering the race. During the planning process of the Games, then Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young summed up his philosophy on public policy toward this mega-event: "the commercialization of sport is the democratization of sport."(quoted in Hill, 1996).

Atlanta only built a few sports facilities while maximizing the use of existing infrastructure. Their basic maxim was maximizing short-term profit or avoiding a deficit (Preuss, 2004). Over time, and especially during the era 1988-2012, the financing sources for the Olympic Games had become global. In other words the financing of the Games was mainly done by consumers from all over the world. The USA still played a key role due to the fact that 70% of The Olympic Partner Programme (TOP) sponsors and 55% of the TV-rights came from that country (Preuss, 2004).

**Table 2: Games costs in relation to national accounts**

| Olympic Games | Costs in US$m 6 years prior Games | in % of GDP (6 years period) | in % of government consumption (6 years period) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atlanta 1996 | 2021 | 0,006 | 0,026 |
| Sydney 2000 | 3438 | 0,102 | 0,553 |

Source: Preuss (2001); International Monetary Fund (2000)

Table 2 shows that Olympic Games have no important economic dimension in relation to national accounts. A country can finance Olympic Games easily, while the same dimension is huge for a city. For the 1976 Olympics, Canada did not give the city of Montreal a financial guarantee. Because of a "written guarantee that the federal government would not be called upon to absorb the deficit nor to assume interim financing for organisation" (OCOG Montreal 1976: 55) the OCOG had to stage the Games by completely financing them itself, with the sole support of the city. In the end, the private revenues of the OCOG amounted to a mere 5% of the funds required. The remaining 95% were provided by special financing means and the public sector. When including the interest paid on the debt over the years and the additional $537 million that was required to complete the facilities after the Games, the Olympic debt totalled $2.729 billion (Levesque, 2001). The burden of the debt has been absorbed by municipal and provincial tax dollars with final payment scheduled for the financial year 2005/2006.

### 3.2.6. Sydney Games, 2000

The Sydney 2000 Olympic Games were much more controversial than Barcelona in terms of the way academics have reacted to them. It seems like there has been a significant contradiction between the glossy image of the Games, that communicated environmental values and respect for indigenous aboriginal culture, and a number of concerns about the way the Games were prepared and the legacy they've created. (Lenskyj, 2002) For the purposes of this paper the case of the Sydney Olympics is interesting because it used a different approach. Unlike in Barcelona lower priority was given to urban regeneration and the main focus was on marketing, promotion and creating opportunities for local businesses

A peculiar thing about Australia is that it is probably the country with the closest connections with the Olympic movement. Australia is only one of the two countries that participated in all of the modern Olympics. Australians are passionate about sport and they have a certain appreciation for the Olympics engraved in the national culture (Haynes, 2001; Garcia, 2007). Before the Games came to Sydney, Australia had been bidding for the Olympics since the 1988 campaign, but bids from Melbourne and Brisbane were unsuccessful. Sydney considered applying for the Games in 1972 and 1988 before the idea to bring the Olympics to the country's leading economic nod finally prevailed. Actually the bid for 2000 Olympics was prepared even before Melbourne lost in the run for 1996 Games (Jobling, 2000; SOCOG, 2001). The Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the Government of New South Wales simultaneously considered the bid opportunity for Sydney (SOCOG, 2001). The initiative didn't originate at the city level, and there is no evidence of business interest groups playing a part. This also explains why the legacy ambitions of the Sydney Games were largely of a national rather than city scale. Sydney's bidding experience was interesting due to the difference in messages that the organisers were communicating to different audiences: On the international stage the promotion messages of the Games included the depth of the Olympic tradition in Australia, economic and political stability, and perfect conditions created for the athletes (Jobling, 2000). But the greatest emphasis was given to the environmental agenda (Sydney Olympics are still known as the first "Green games") and the message of great respect to the Australian aboriginal culture. (SOCOG, 2001) • Within Australia the following benefits of the Games were used for promotion:

- A boost to the city and national economies, through increasing international tourism and reaching out to the Asian markets for business services (London East Research Institute, 2007).

- An improved international profile of the city, establishing the image of a young dynamic entrepreneurial society.

- The regeneration of a former wasteland site for future use, development of a new residential suburb (the Olympic Village) (Jobling, 2000).

Promotion of the bid locally within Sydney was based on the notion of Olympic Spirit. The success of this strategy can be related to aforementioned Australian connection with the Olympic values. The overall support for the Games was rather high.

The Sydney Games were the largest yet, with 10,651 athletes competing in 300 events. Despite its size, the event was well organised and renewed faith in the Olympic movement after the 1996 Atlanta bombing. The Australians chose Aboriginal athlete and national hero Cathy Freeman to light the Olympic torch.

Throughout the Olympic cycle multiple issues aroused. Lenskyj (2002) claims, that the public appreciation of the games was so high that some protest groups devalued their position significantly, by trying to oppose certain developments related to the Olympics.

In Sydney the regional (not city) government was the major initiator of the Games. Urban and national authorities were involved through an agreement between three levels of public administration similar to that used in Barcelona (SOCOG, 2001). Several purpose built entities were established including: SOCOG – responsible for programming, operating and managing the Games, Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) – responsible for design and construction of the Olympic facilities and the Olympic Road and Transport Authority (ORTA). The City of Sydney Council was responsible for beautification of the Central Business District and the cultural festivals (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007). Even though all the key managing bodies represented the public sector, involvement of the private sector was significant particularly in terms of funding. The operational costs of the Sydney Games reached US$ 2,04 Billion and were covered by the revenues of SOCOG. The overall cost of the Games came up to US$ 3.825 billion, which was much less than the Barcelona'92 budget. Preuss (2000) estimates that 70% of funding came from the private sources.


### 3.2.7. Athens Games, 2004

The Olympic Games returned to its origins when Athens hosted the XXVIII Olympiad. Greece was the birth place of the ancient Olympic Games more than 2,000 years ago, and Athens staged the first modern Olympic Games in 1896.

Although Greece is officially part of the Global North, the "Core" and the European Union, it can be viewed in modern times as being on the fringes of OECD nations and thus at least

semi-peripheral in a global economic sense. Like many other nations, Greece attempts to position itself globally as a desirable destination for tourism and business. Greece has an advantage in being one of the "cradles of civilization", yet almost everyone would agree that Greece's "glory days" were in the far distant past. Thus, the specter of hosting one of the two leading events in terms of global awareness, and one that is indelibly tied to Greek history, was alluring both to most Greeks and for the IOC. Despite this "allure", hosting the Olympic Games is a high risk venture where some, most notably Montreal in 1976, have failed to deliver projected economic and social benefits, while others have been successful economically (Los Angeles 1984) or in terms of legacies for the cities and citizens (Barcelona 1992; Sydney 2000).

 Academic research to demonstrate the positive economic and positive economic growth of Olympic Games has been inconclusive at best; and it seems very difficult to measure the impact of the Olympics as a whole. Previously there had never been an Olympic Games that has broken even – let alone made a profit. For cities such as Montreal it took more than a quarter of a century to pay off its debt.  Atlanta was the first host city to profit from the Games in 1996. Although the Greek Government was keen to heavily subsidise the Athens Olympics and promote the economic benefits of hosting the Olympic Games long-term benefits did not materialise. For a country such as China, which is wealthy with an economy large enough to absorb losses and also has a command economy, the situation was very different. For China the economic impact was significant at the regional level although for Greece's economy the negative effect of heavy loans was at the national level. What made the Athens Olympic Games so different from 2000 Sydney and 2008 Beijing Games was that Greece, while a flourishing democracy, was not as wealthy or large as Australia or China to absorb losses on Games. Most of the countries which hosted the Games were at the time economic powerhouses (for example1936 Berlin; 1984 Los Angeles; even 1996 Atlanta) and not developing countries such as Greece. For a developed country if the Olympic Games 'blow out financially', then its economy is big enough and strong enough to absorb overall losses. For smaller developing economies, such as Greece, this is not the case.

Financial benefit of hosting Olympic Games espoused by proponents The Pasok Government claimed that hosting the Games would create jobs and new industries but

would also show-case Athens and Greece to the rest of the world as a tourist destination. The same rhetoric came from advocates of the Sydney Olympic Games. Thus far there is very little evidence to support this. As the example of Athens has shown, hosting mega sporting evidence may have the opposite effect (WTTC, 2011). Sydney also had a drop in tourism after the 2004 Olympic Games.

Greece may have gambled and won on producing a wonderful Olympics; although the gamble on subsequent use of Olympic assets was lost. The legacy of Olympics should include viable long-term considerations. By January 2012 many of the Athens Olympic venues were not only idle but in a state of disrepair despite the fact that maintenance costs alone run into millions of dollars.

In the current European press discourses Greece is sometimes referred to as 'the scarecrow'. European policy makers and politicians in order to get their reforms through parliament and a suspicious public hold Greece up like a scarecrow and threaten that if the following policies are not implemented 'you will have the same fate' as Greece. The analogy of the scarecrow can also be used for prospective cities and countries (especially developing ones) thinking of hosting a mega sporting event like the Olympic Games. If you want to receive the same fate as Greece, take on the Summer Olympic Games. While there are now publications that are determining the causes of the Greek debt crisis, the role played by hosting the 2004 Olympic Games should be central to all discussions and serve as a cautionary lesson to smaller economies/nations who wish to bid for an Olympic Games or other global mega event.

### 3.2.8. China emerging (Human Rights) and the Beijing Olympics, 2008

The 2008 Games, staged in Beijing, provoked outrage from human rights groups who said allowing China to host the Games legitimised its repressive regime. Protestors also claimed China would use the Games as a propaganda tool. Supporters argued the Olympics would accelerate the progress of social liberalization. Taiwan government officials strongly

supported the Beijing Games, believing that the event would reduce the risk of China using force against its neighbour. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan it provoked a boycott of the Moscow Games the following year.

The hosting of the Olympic Games by nations focuses largely on the economic incentives of hosting this mega-event. Not so much the case for China, as it largely spent lots of money on hosting a showcase for political gain. Though the economic incentives include a hosts countries gains from tourism and investment (Chen, 2008), this was not the main reason or motivation for hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The political motivation of the host is also to showcase national culture and raise its international profile (Hall, 1992; Zhou & John, 2009). The hosting of the Olympic Games is also used to fast-track infrastructure improvements (Preuss, 2007).

The transformation of China's image in the international politics was the main reason for the hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, and so to enhance its international legitimacy (Xu, 2009; Zhou & John, 2008).

The Chinese bid sparked a heated global debate over the role of the Olympics in promoting universal human rights and values. Human rights groups pressured the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to reject the Chinese bid for its failure to adequately address its human rights record (Students, 2009; Preuss and Alfs, 2009). The IOC president at the time, Jacques Rogge, had repeatedly asserted that the IOC is a 'Sports body' and rejects claims to 'politicize' the IOC agenda and has explicitly stated that the site selection processes should not be used as an incentive or punitive measure against bidding nations (Chang, 2001).

However, the numerous historical precedents of the IOC acting as a political body (including those noted above) stand in contrast to Rogge's statements. Despite claiming that the IOC does not incorporate political sensitivity into its bid evaluations, China's human rights record was perceived to be a stumbling block in its bid to host the 2000 Olympics. The IOC selected host cities using the 'Single Transferable Vote' (STV) system. The lowest ranked city is eliminated in successive rounds of voting by over 100 IOC representatives. Table 3 shows the voting distribution across the four rounds of the 2000 bid (International, 2013).

**Table 3. Voting distribution, 2000 bid**

| 2000 Olympic Candidate City | National Guarantor | ROUND1 | RND 2 | RND 3 | RND4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sydney | Australia | 30 | 30 | 37 | 45 |
| Beijing | China | 32 | 37 | 40 | 43 |
| Manchester | Great Britain | 11 | 13 | 11 | 0 |
| Berlin | German | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Istanbul | Turkey | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

In the lead up to the final bid presentations, human rights organizations continued protesting Beijing's bid (Brownell, 2012), but China remained the top candidate through the first three rounds and only narrowly lost in the final round. Bartholdi and James (1991) argue that the STV voting model is a deterrent to strategic voting, but like all electoral designs, Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility theorem remains largely unchallenged. Arrow's theorem implies that all voting systems are susceptible to strategic voting and inefficient electoral outcomes (Bartholdi and James, 1991; Shepsle, 1997; Baade & Allen, 2012). The vote distributions in Table 1 hint at the existence of strategic voting. A large proportion of votes from Manchester and Berlin were transferred to Sydney. In response to mounting protests, it is plausible that a group of IOC delegates strategically voted against their least desired outcome (China) to prevent further damage to the IOC's reputation (Baade & Allen, 2012).

Opposition from human rights groups continued to plague China's second attempt at hosting the games. However this time the bid was a success (Li 2005). Beijing led the first round by a significant margin and was announced as the official host in 2 rounds; see Table 4 (International,2013): China's 2008 bid presentation represented a distinct departure from previous statements (Brownell, 2012). Again, sincere voting preferences are unobservable and speculation on why China succeeded in 2008 but not 2000 relies on public statements by Chinese and IOC officials. Building up to the 2008 bid, China made public promises of protecting media freedoms and providing unrestricted access to foreign journalists. Wang Wei (Secretary General of the Beijing bid committee) used the final presentation to formally address criticisms of China's human rights record. Wei argued that the Beijing games would be an opportunity to improve China's human rights record (Reporters, 2007).

This was a significant shift from the 2000 bid strategy where China refused to talk about human rights (Brownell, 2012; Sev, 2008). The IOC echoed Beijing's claims, predicting the Olympics would herald a new era of openness in China and bring about meaningful progress on human rights (Anderson, 2008).

Human rights activists heavily criticised the 2008 Olympic city announcement, saying that selecting Beijing was as rewarding China for conforming to "international norms" while sweeping its abysmal human rights record under the carpet (Toohey, 2001). IOC supporters responded that the Olympics would not reward, but create an incentive for China to change (Anderson, 2008).

**Table 4. Voting distribution, 2008 bid**

| 2008 Olympic Candidate City | National Guarantor | ROUND1 | ROUND 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beijing | China | 44 | 56 |
| Toronto | Canada | 20 | 22 |
| Paris | France | 15 | 18 |
| Istanbul | Turkey | 17 | 9 |
| Osaka | Japan | 6 | 0 |

They interpreted China's bid presentation as a public signal of commitment to improve domestic human rights.

### 3.2.9. London Games, 2012

The London Games had been heavily overseen by politicians from bid to delivery. Politicians wanted to claim credit for anything good that happened, particularly if the British team won plenty of gold medals (large amounts of public money had been spent to ensure this). Likewise, it is the politicians who would be held responsible if something went wrong, at least until they could find a suitable scapegoat.

But did that mean London 2012 would be more political than London 1908 or 1948? Perhaps, if measured by the involvement of politicians. Yet in another sense, these games reflected the way vast sporting events have come to squeeze out political argument. The Olympics have become a vehicle for conformity, not disagreement. There is little sense that sport is an extension of politics. It is a vast business with a life of its own.

Take the bid itself, to which Tony Blair's government committed so much time, money and political capital. Partly the reason there was so little political opposition to the 2012 bid is that the process demands there is none. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is looking for unanimity of political and public opinion. The official bid document for London 2012 stated:

Support is unanimous among the major parties at both national and city level. The governing Labour Party said: 'The whole Government has backed this bid... (and)

everyone, from the Prime Minister down, will be working hard to make it happen.' The opposition Conservative Party said: 'We strongly believe that a London Olympic Games will bring incalculable benefits to this country in terms of investment, tourism, regeneration and, most of all, British sport'.

The unelected IOC set the agenda; the elected politicians do what they are told. But above all it is the scale of London 2012 that makes it different from 1908 and 1948. What is involved politically to get the Olympics and to deliver them makes it almost impossible to question whether they are worth it or what they are for. "We are pretty broke now, as we were in 1948. But the costs in 1948 were so tiny that it was still possible to have a political argument about them. Now the figures are so huge it is difficult to know where to start".

## 3.3. The Political Economy of the Olympic Games

The Modern Olympic Games have since their inception and especially during the era under investigation been closely associated with an ideology of social and technical progress. In particular, the revival and different eras of the Olympic Games have been used as a tool for expressing national goals and political agendas (Espy, 1979; Hill, 1996; Lenskyj, 2000). Added to this, the economic value of the Summer Olympic Games has increased dramatically over time, largely because of the telecommunications revolution and the increased amounts paid for national and international broadcast rights (Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, 2002; Larson and Park, 1993).

Table 5 shows the increased revenues from television broadcast rights from 1988 to the 2012 Summer Games. With these increased revenues came greater commercialization of the Olympic Games (Magdalinski, Schimmel, and Chandler, 2005; Tomlinson, 2005), and with greater resources and the need to control their brand, the International Olympic Committee adapted as a transnational organization (Guttmann, 1994; Houlihan, 2005). Cities, too, began to respond to the greater prominence of the Olympic Games, and the competition to host the Games intensified (Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying, 2001; Shoval, 2002). In turn, the increased visibility of the Olympic Games and its resultant association with product marketing during the era under investigation meant that various movements, both social and sport-related, have been co-opted into the Olympic family or

have become a source of resistance (Burbank, Heying, and Andranovich, 2000; Kidd, 2005; Lenskyj, 2000; Schaffer and Smith, 2000).

**Table 5. Olympic global broadcast revenues**

| Summer Olympic Games | Host city | Broadcast revenue in million US dollars |
|---|---|---|
| 1988 | Seoul | 402.6 |
| 1992 | Barcelona | 636.0 |
| 1996 | Atlanta | 898.2 |
| 2000 | Sydney | 1,331.5 |
| 2004 | Athens | 1,496.0 |
| 2008 | Beijing | 1,737.0 |
| 2012 | London | 2,569 |

*Source: Statista 2015*

Among assessments of the political economy of the Summer Olympic Games during 1988 to 2012, one topic that deserves particular scrutiny is the economic impact of the Games on their host cities. Kasimati (2003),examined studies of the economic impact of hosting the Olympics and found that before the 1984 Games, no impact studies had been conducted. Since then, a variety of cities have conducted impact studies during the bidding phase and after the Games ended.

Kasimati concluded that the rosy picture painted by studies produced during the bidding phase was "not confirmed by ex-post analyses and this therefore prompts the need for improved theory" (Kasimati, 2003, p. 442). Preuss (2000, 2002), who has conducted extensive analysis of the economics of the Games, suggested that since the 1980s, two things can almost be guaranteed about hosting the Games:

1.      The local organizing committees can almost be certain that there will be a financial surplus after the Games, largely because of the IOC's negotiation of international sponsorship and television contracts.

2.      The Games have expanded to the point where huge sport facilities and new infrastructure for athletes, tourists, and the media are required. This gigantism is evidenced in the number of ticket sales and the fact that media representatives outnumber athletes at the Olympic Games two to one (Preuss, 2002, p. 15). The size of the Olympics also

increases the opportunity that cities have to use the Games as a basis for wide-scale redevelopment as Barcelona did for the 1992 Games and as Beijing did for the 2008 Games (Broudehoux, 2007; Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Such extensive redevelopment of cities, however, raises the question of whose interests are being served by the redevelopment because the new sport infrastructure is often at odds with the needs of residents.

The growth of the Olympics has resulted in another challenge for policy makers: the opportunity costs of hosting the Games. Essex and Chalkley (2003) identify crucial questions that local policy makers need to address:

1.    Are local funds being diverted from service and education needs to support Olympic Games infrastructure?

2.    Are local taxes being increased to pay for the new infrastructure?

3.    Will the Olympics displace poor people or disrupt their neighborhoods?

4.    If the cost of staging the Games continues to grow, will cities in developing nations ever be able to host the Games?

Essex and Chalkley (2003, p. 14) noted that the IOC's Olympic Games Study Commission examined the issue of gigantism and concluded that it was time to manage the growth of the Games to preserve their attractiveness. All of this is part of the broader context for understanding the political economy of the Olympics.

Cities pursue the Olympic Games for three important reasons:

1. Tourism,

2.  Image, and

3. Regeneration (Heying, Burbank, and Andranovich, 2007).

The rise of tourism, and the response to it by nations, is a clear indication that the global economy has changed. The pursuit of leisure, both for its own reward and as part of business travel, is a growth sector of the new global economy, and the development of an "infrastructure of play" is often the result (Judd, 2003). In 2005, for example, the Travel Industry Association of America (2006) reported that domestic and international travel added $650 billion to the U.S. economy, generating 8 million jobs, $171 billion in payroll income, and $105 billion in federal, state, and local tax revenues. It is no wonder that cities, states, and the federal government encourage tourism development. At the city level, policy

makers attempt to attract travelers through the branding of places and by focusing regeneration strategies to attract investment funds and human capital (Smith, 2007). Although discussion of the Olympics is often couched solely in terms of potential economic benefit, any analysis of the political economy of the Olympic Games needs to be situated in the context of the broader issues of the politics and cultural imagination, as well as the economics, of these events. The Olympic Games are not just another one-off event; the bid period, the organizing period for the host city, and the open-ended legacy period following the Closing Ceremonies provide cities with a decade-long planning period and an infinite legacy horizon that can be oriented toward the values of the Olympic Games and idea. The Olympics are a critical opportunity either for development or for exploitation, and the choice is made in policy decisions. The political economy of the Summer Olympics during the era 1988 to 2012 will be discussed, characterizing each host city according to the three modes of allocating resources: namely the market, the state, and civil society. Each mode illustrates different pressures and contextual influences, and we believe that this exercise demonstrates the importance of using political economy as an analytical frame and not just accepting the idea of hosting the Games as an inevitable, or even a desirable, policy outcome (Charles Santo, Gerard Mildner (2010).

### 3.4.    The competition of the systems and the location of the Olympic Games

The greatest mystery in the era is that even though there is a lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on the actual impact of the Olympics (Bayliss et. al. 2004, Hiller, 1998) there is definitely a universal belief in the Games as being for the greater good to the host city and nation, which can be proven by the rapidly growing number of cities that choose to bid for the privilege to host the Olympics. (Gold & Gold, 2006; Chalkley& Essex, 1999). The selection of a host city for the Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reflects the political economic character of the event. The IOC must project an objectivity and fairness in making its selection, the political dimension, while pursuing the ―production of wealth characteristic of all monopolists, the economic dimension. The political economy that defines the IOC behavior as it relates to the selection process can be illuminated through a case study *of an Olympic Games that occurred in the era under investigation.*

Voting members of the IOC ultimately select the host city for the Summer Olympic Games. A candidate city's chances of successfully bidding for the Games are enhanced through obtaining information and understanding the criteria, to include strategic interests and concerns that guide the IOC selection process. The strategic response of a National Olympic Committee (NOC) to its perception of the IOC's evaluative process is amenable to game-theory analysis. A logical predicate to that analysis is to consider IOC motivations in choosing a host. The IOC, as noted in the introduction, must give the impression of objectivity and transparency if it is going to maintain its authority. The IOC must represent the wishes and desires of the international community, and as those evolve so must the IOC. Maintaining transparency can be advanced through following a standard selection process; an articulation of a set of criteria that govern the selection of a host city; and assembling an IOC membership involved in the selection process that represents the world. An analysis of each of these items follows. The selection process has been codified in the Olympic Charter, which is subject to periodic revision. The Charter currently in force is Olympic Charter: In Force as from 09 September 2013. This 105-page document codifies everything from the ―Composition and General Organization of the Olympic Movement‖ (Chapter 1, Section 1), to ―Rights over the Olympic Games and Olympic Properties(Chapter 1, Section 7), as well as the words that must be used by the host nation's Head of State to proclaim an opening of the Games of the Olympiad (Chapter 5, Section 55.3). One key to understanding the IOC selection process is to understand the composition and general organization of the ―Olympic Movement. The Olympic Charter identifies the three main constituents as: ―the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and the National Olympic Committees. The Charter makes clear where ultimate authority resides: The Olympic Movement is the concerted, organized, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism.

Under the supreme authority of the International Olympic Committee, the Olympic Movement encompasses organizations, athletes and other persons who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter… Any person or organization belonging in any capacity

whatsoever to the Olympic Movement is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the decisions of the IOC. The Charter makes absolutely clear the organizational hierarchy; the IOC is the supreme authority, and the National Olympic Committees must play by the rules articulated and agree to accept IOC rulings on all matters relating to the conduct of the Olympic Games. The values that the IOC embraces and promotes through the Games, the —Fundamental Principles of Olympism, are clearly articulated as well. To wit:

Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.

The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.

**Chapter IV**

**Conclusion and way forward**

There is no doubt that the Olympic Idea is a vehicle for transformation. From the onset Baron Pierre de Coubertin had a well thought-through and researched ideology for the revived modern Games. He was interested in achieving human greatness and possibility, and goodwill to mankind. He vehemently wanted to do this through education through sport, and education for peace. He was a passionate scholar, reformer, and peace ambassador. His mission was to promote international relations, social and cultural understanding and peace.

The vehicle was the Olympic Movement which he resurrected in 1894 through the founding of the International Olympic Committee. De Coubertin surrounded himself with select individuals, those at the forefront of the peace movement in France, from whose efforts arose the *Bureau Francais de la Paix*. As a result, at the IOC's founding congress in Sorbonne (1984), five of the members of the peace movement who were present later won Nobel Peace Prizes (Quanz, 1993 cited in Loland, 1995 and Mestre, 2013). This was the caliber of humanity in whose circles de Coubertin roamed and drew inspiration from.

Since the rebirth of the Modern Olympic Games, the IOC has weathered decades of controversy, political unrest, acts of terror, wars, boycotts, and drug use by athletes. It has also transformed itself. Becoming increasing successful, the IOC has merged into an entity that has wielded its power to, for example,

- facilitate reconciliation between nations (The American- Soviet dichotomy),
- empower nations to improve trade and diplomatic relations (Seoul, 1988),
- eliminate racial barriers (South Africa),
- be a catalyst for infrastructure revitalization (Barcelona),
- promote social upliftment (Atlanta, 1996),
- map out legacies for its citizens (Sydney, 2000),
- revisit history (Athens, 2004),
- create incentives for change human rights practice (China, 2008), and

- spark social reform (London, 2012).

De Coubertin, like many after him, used the Olympic stage for a political agenda, to put France back on the map and improve its international standing. So too has the revival and different eras of the Olympic Games been used as an instrument for expressing national goals and political agendas (Lenskyj, 2000).

In the era under discussion (1988-2012), the Seoul Games, through which South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan sought to summon the political currency of sport (in Olympic sized fashion) to solidify Korea's position as a dominant nation. South Korea wanted to rid itself of the remnants of the Cold War by reducing confrontation with the north. South Korea gained immensely from the Olympic Games. The transformation of a once-military dictatorship to a liberal democracy assisted South Korea to establish itself, when the time was ripe, as a player in world politics. The Olympic Games was a catalyst for the improved diplomatic relations South Korea experienced with many socialist countries.

In 1970 the IOC sealed South Africa's fate as an expelled nation in the Olympics by withdrawing its recognition until apartheid was abolished. After thirty years of isolation, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980-2001), using his diplomatic experience, negotiated South Africa back into the Olympic fold. He sent a delegation to South Africa who met with the late African National Congress (ANC) President Nelson Mandela and other senior officials to assess South Africa's sport position. Believing in Africa to resolve its own problems, the negotiations between the various sport organizations within the anti-apartheid movement and political parties in the run up to South Africa's first democratic election took place. The IOC urged all the race groups to from united sports federations in South Africa, and was the first international organization to do so. The participation of team South Africa under the Olympic flag at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games greatly assisted in uniting the once divided racial groups. The country held its first democratic elections in 1994. IOC President Jacques Rogge (2001-2012) continued this reciprocal influence of leadership in the new international environment (Jackson & Haigh, 2008), and the impact of Olympism is evident in this young democratic environment of South Africa.

The Olympics assisted Barcelona to showcase to the world that it could host a memorable international event. The most notable legacy was in infrastructure upgrade as neglected buildings were revitalized and the city's image enhanced, accomplishing in six years what would have taken fifty (Maloney, 1996).

Atlanta's objectives were to revive the city's economy, and possibly solve the social issue of the public housing complexes. According to the chief operating officer for the Atlanta Organising Committee, Atlanta benefited more than any other city in the history of the Games by having no debt after the Games and the addition of privately funded structures (IOC, 2012).

Although hosting a spectacular Olympics in 2000, Sydney failed to attract more tourists after the Olympics. However, the Olympic Spirit was high and public appreciation spilled out into a legacy for citizens in the wake of the Games. Similarly, the anticipation of hosting one of the two leading events in terms of international awareness, and one that is forever tied to Greek history, was appealing both to most Greek citizens and for the IOC with regard to the Athens, 2004 Games. However, here the legacy was not as sweet. The proposed rise in tourism failed to materialize post-Olympics as with Sydney. The most expensive games until that point, Greek's debt spiraled. There are those who argue that the consecutive governments steadfastly refused to capitalize on Greek's Olympic legacy.

The Olympic bid enabled China (Beijing 2008) to 'open up' to talks relating to its human rights record, a significant shift from the 2000 bid when it did not entertain the topic. Like Atlanta, England wanted to uplift East London's community by hosting the London, 2012 Games. It did so successfully but many other legacies have failed to hit the mark.

The above nations' examples showcase the indelible legacy of the Olympic Movement, and they are noble. In each case the Olympic heritage boldly upholds the ideals of Baron de Courbertin. The challenges of the 21st century are to curtail the cancer of commercialism. Already the IOC, under the leadership of Thomas Bach, has promised to overhaul and reform the bidding process making it more cost-effective. Criticism of the IOC's demands

from Oslo and 3 other cities who pulled out of the 2022 Winter Games bid (awarded to Beijing) was an incentive for this move. Furthermore recently Boston rescinded on its bid for the 2024 Summer Olympics after citizens opposed the bid (The Guardian, 2014, 2015). A legacy has to be more than just buildings. Transformation according to Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus means '*change the shape or character of*', and for the IOC to continue to achieve transformation it must curb the cost of preparing for the staging of the Olympic Games. It could prevent over-flooding of the Olympic programme, reducing demands to host cities. Furthermore goodwill and commerce could be balanced when hosting the future Games.

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## Official Statement

**With knowledge of my personal responsibility taking legal consequences into account according to the provisions of the article 11 paragraph 2 (Process of deleting from students' records) of the Regulation of Postgraduate Study Programme I hereby declare that during completion of the thesis under the title "The Olympic Idea as a Vehicle for Transformation: 1988-2012" I did not use all or part of another author's work or his/her ideas and beliefs without reference to the relevant source (book, newspaper or magazine article, website etc..).**

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