

University of Peloponnese
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

**Department of Political Studies and International
Relations**

**Master Program in
Mediterranean Studies**

**The European Union Strategy about the Syrian
Regional Crisis.**

Author

DIPLARAS EVAGELOS

Corinth, November, 2018

Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	3
Abstract.....	4
Introduction.....	5
1) The EU: A Conventional or Civilian Power?.....	6
a) Conventional Power.....	6
b) Civilian Power.....	9
2) The EU and the Syrian Crisis from 2011 until 2018.....	12
a) Political Decisions.....	13
2011- 2015.....	13
2015- 2018.....	13
b) Actions and Humanitarian Crisis.....	14
2011- 2015.....	14
2015- 2018.....	18
3) France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the Syrian Crisis.....	23
a) France.....	23
b) Germany.....	28
c) The United Kingdom.....	32

4)	
Conclusions.....	36
5)	
Bibliography.....	39

Acronyms

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BMZ: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
(Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

BSOS: Building Stability Overseas Strategy

CFSP: Common Security and Defense Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defense Policy

ESDP: European Security and Defense Policy

E.U: European Union

EUTF: European Union Emergency Trust Fund

ISIS: Islamic State Iraq and Syria

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPCW: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

PYD: Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)

RAF: Royal Air Force

U.K: United Kingdom

U.S.A: United States of America

U.S: United States

U.N: United Nations

UNSCR: Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions

WEU: Western European Union

YPG: Yekineyen Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units)

Abstract

This dissertation examines the important issue of the European Union's (EU) strategy in Syrian regional crisis. In the introduction the dissertation is briefly explained. More specifically, the dissertation comprises of four chapters; in the first chapter, the dissertation examines the concepts of "Conventional Power" and "Civilian Power". The second chapter, analyzes "The EU and Syrian Crisis from 2011 until 2018", and presents to a great extent the regional conflict from 2011 until 2018. In the third chapter, three powerful countries, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom are thoroughly examined. The last part of the dissertation is occupied by the essential bibliography, used in its composition.

Introduction

This dissertation discusses an important issue of international relations. It will make use of Secondary data through a desktop analysis of the existent literature on “The EU strategy about the Syrian regional crisis”. It will make use of books and journals on the research subjects to point out topical issues related to the study objectives. The study will use secondary resources from scholarly works to analyze the facts presented through it. The first chapter of the dissertation examines the concepts of “Conventional Power” and “Civilian Power”. What is the character of the EU in the framework of security and defense? There are a lot of politicians or analysts who claim that the EU has the inclination to transform into a Conventional one. On the other hand, Civilian Power is a significant part of the EU’s identity. In this chapter, we shall examine the EU as “Conventional Power” and then as “Civilian Power”. This chapter summarizes that it is clear that the EU, and, more specifically, EU’s Foreign Policy, has gradually shifted to a state where the Civilian Power has progressively begun to embrace traditional power (Conventional Power) elements without this leading it to any spectacular change as far as the identity of EU’s foreign policy.

The second chapter analyzes that “The EU and Syrian Crisis from 2011 until 2018” and presents to a large extent this conflict from 2011 until 2018. The chapter initially examines the Political Decisions, and secondly the Actions of the EU as well as the humanitarian assistance provided by the EU. This chapter refers to two periods: The first is 2011 until 2015 and the second from 2015 until 2018. It is essential to refer to the fact that 2015 was not mentioned at random, as that year was very vital, because of the interference of a basic global player, namely the Russian Federation, resulting in the internationalization of the Syrian conflict and the intervention of the Turkish factor in Syria as well other powers, like Iran. To recapitulate, it is evident from this chapter that the EU, and in particular the European Union's Foreign Policy, has moved to the point where the Civilian Power has begun to adopt traditional power (Conventional Power) elements.

The third chapter analyzes three countries policy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom which play a meaningful role in defining the EU’s policy in the Syrian

crisis; we will analyze each country's policy on Syria's drama. Each of the three countries are examined according to the logic of "description" and "evaluation".

This dissertation leads us to some useful conclusions. The conclusions reached are that the E.U.'s Foreign Policy is based on "Civil Power", however basic steps are being made towards "Conventional Power". The final conclusion, toward which this dissertation is led, is that in order for the E.U. to progress, a mixture of both "soft" and "hard" power should be implemented.

1) The EU: A Conventional or Civilian Power?

In this part of the dissertation we will analyze the concepts of "Conventional Power" and "Civilian Power". What is the identity of the EU in the fields of security and defense? There are numerous analysts or politicians who claim that the EU has the tendency to become Conventional. On the other hand, Civilian Power is a key element of the EU's identity. In this chapter, we shall examine the EU as "Conventional Power" and then as "Civilian Power".

a) Conventional Power

In the middle of 2000's, the political scientist Michael Smith and Christopher Hill touched on the matter of whether the EU should according to Bertil Kilian's opinion "attempt to develop its capabilities according to conventional definitions of power, including the military element, when this might put at risk the very (irenic) basic principles which the EU has come to advocate in international relationships?" (Kilian, 2007: p. 2).

More specifically, it is useful to mention as Janne Haaland points out that "The "human security" basis for the use of force is being developed at the UN in the form of a "responsibility to protect". The EU's own security strategy adopts the concept and embeds it firmly in the international law and the UN system. The concept "weds" human rights to security, including military security". Therefore, militarization is necessary for the EU (Matlary, 2009: p. 205).

In respect to the issue of militarization, it would be an error to believe that the EU did not adopt more military policies following the debacle of the 1990s and the new hazards that emerged in the post - Cold War period. But that does not mean it developed as a military power. According to Andrew Cheetham “The new military-orientated areas of foreign policy had as much to do with civilian power as ever. Stavrides argues that “the military element was needed as a final act of a real civilian power, an international force for the promotion of democratic principles”. It is sensible then to examine what the alteration in the Foreign policy did to the EU’s military scenery and how these accompany civilian incentives (Cheetham, 2012). The EU is not militarily tenuous. The issue is that military resources are scattered across twenty seven member states, all with their respective particular policies (doctrines), cultures and infrastructures. Simple as the point may be, boosting the EU abilities is not about the formation of the EU force with European Union privates waiting in military camps outside Brussels (Per M. Norheim – Martinsen, 2007: p. 32). Under CFSP, the European Union has made its goals more ambitious and transparent, but ongoing simultaneously along its role as a “normative power”. The prototype recognition point for the interpretation of the EU’s power in the field of Foreign Policy comes from the now almost obsolescent WEU in its composition of the Petersberg Tasks^{1*} in 1992 (Cheetham, 2012).

Since the Petersberg Tasks in the mid-2010, conscious steps have been taken to militarize the EU. The fact which leads to the further militarization of the EU according to Manlio Dinucci is that “In 2015, General Ben Hodges, commander of the US ground forces in Europe (US Army Europe), called for the establishment of a “military Schengen Area” so that, in order to face “Russian aggression””, the USA military forces have the capability to move rapidly from one European state to another state, without being delayed by customs procedures and national regulations (Dinucci, 2018). This demand was adopted by NATO: the North Atlantic Council meeting on 11/8/2017 at the level of defense ministers, formally applied for the EU to enforce

^{1*}The Petersberg Tasks are a framework of security and military precedence incorporated within the European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. According to Gulnur Aybet, “For the European Union, both emerging threats and available capabilities have gone through many changes since the inception of the original Petersberg tasks in 1992” (Aybet, 2004: p. 1).

national regulations for the simplification of the passage of armed forces through the borderlines and, simultaneously, to “enhance civil amenities so that they are individualized to armed requirements”. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017) On 2/15/2018, the institution of North Atlantic Council at the framework of defense ministers declared the foundation of a new NATO Logistic Command to “ameliorate the transit of troop and basics military equipment in Europe” (Organisation du Traite de l’ Atlantique Nord, 2018). According to Manlio Dinucci “Just over a month later, the EU presented the Action Plan on Military Mobility, which exactly meets the requirements established by the Pentagon and NATO. It envisages “simplifying customs formalities for military operations and the transport of dangerous goods in the military domain”. In this way, the “military Schengen Area” is prepared, with the difference that circulate-free are not individuals but military material (Dinucci, 2018).

Therefore, Germany has successfully adopted the model of “civilian power”, however France and the United Kingdom implement the policy of “hard power”. However, even Germany is seen to have perceived the significance of military power. According to the view of Von der Leyen “As the demands on the Bundeswehr grow in variety and volume, the demands on its personnel will increase as well. The Bundeswehr needs the best possible equipment and sustainable funding in order to effectively meet challenges” (Von der Leyen, 2016: p. 8).

In the opposite direction, France and Britain were greater supporters of the use of force*² than Berlin is. For example “Britain and France would be able to marshal and sustain at least one battalion-size combined arms battle group within a few weeks, with Germany perhaps taking longer” (Shurkin, 2017: p. 1). Germany focuses on civilian crisis management tools, an approach strongly supported by nonaligned EU member states. Germany supports the model of the civilian power. This may be

² * It is necessary to mention the Franco–British Summit accomplished in St. Malo in the early December 1998 (CVCE, 2015: p. 1). According to three significant writers Grevi, Helly and Keohane “St. Malo which paved the political path for EU governments to launch the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999” (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009: p. 13). The leaders of the State of Government of France and the UK agree on the necessity to concede the EU the capacity for independent decision-making and movement, backed up by trustworthy military forces, in order to respond to international crises when the Atlantic Coalition is not interested (CVCE, 2015: p. 1).

attributed to Germany's traditional focus on civilian instruments, for instance developmental aid, diplomacy and developmental cooperation, its helping to dynamically boost sustainable peace. According to the Federal Government of Germany Guidelines "The White Paper also aims at realigning the task spectrum and resources of the Bundeswehr to meet the challenges and to make it adaptable and flexible" (Federal Foreign Office, 2017: pp. 3 & 40). In the words of Zimmermann, "In contrast to Germany and all other EU member states, Britain and France hold permanent seats in the UN Security Council and maintain their nuclear deterrents. These factors, together with Germany's economic, political and (considerable) military power, help to explain Berlin's leading role collectively with London and Paris in ESDP" (Zimmermann, 2009: pp. 85 & 86).

Finally, in the opinion of Michael Brzoska / Hans-Georg Ehrhart "The security situation in a crisis region influences the interests and conduct of all stakeholders. The military has a particularly strong interest in cooperating with civilian aid agencies if the security situation is poor" (Brzoska & Ehrhart, 2008: p.3).

b) Civilian Power

The importance of civilian power for the EU is apparent. It is necessary to give a definition about "civilian power" meaning a linking for tranquil, non-military clash resolution (Schweiger, 2007: p. 47). The political mainstream of Civilian Power, consisting of the promise to liberal and democratic rights, to the nonmilitary resolution of clash and to multilateralism, has already hinted at the primary significance of universal institutions. According to the view of Philipp Fluri & Miroslav Hadzic, "We are witnessing a thorough economic, social, political and security integration of the world community. There is a growing awareness of increasingly stronger interconnectedness and interdependence of people, states, regions and continents" (Fluri & Hadzic, 2004: p. 16). According to the analysis of Maull's as it is quoted by Tewes "The conclusions Maull draws from this analysis are two: First, classical realist concepts such as the autonomy of the nation state", the priority of armed security, stability-of-power politics and the sense of a closely defined "national interest" are difficult to represent the nature of universal politics totally. Therefore, they are neither suitable expedients for the prosecution of external policy, nor proper ideas for its study (Tewes, 2002: pp. 10 & 11). Secondly, it is not

difficult to infer that the current status globalization contributes to the existence of “Civilian Power”. “Civilian Power” can be developed in an ambience of interdependence, of reduced armed conflicts, and democracy, such as globalization. According to Mary Hall, “Globalization also creates a sense of interdependence among nations, which could create an imbalance of power among nations of differing economic strengths” (Hall, 2018). Henning Tewes believes that “Although nation states will persist as important loci of decision making, they will do so as a middle layer in between forms of international governance on the one hand, and domestic and transnational structures on the other”. The Civilian Power is the policy of innovative forms of universal authority, oriented towards an era in which the systems of “nation states” are not able unilaterally accomplish the duties which once preserved their existence (Tewes, 2002: p. 11).

It has been possible for nations to communicate within a supranational EU framework. According to Mario Telo, “The European construction has already tamed and “civilized” the state sovereignties of its members, transforming what were once an obstacle into a supporting part of its political existence. Notwithstanding its various ambiguities, the EU is already in fact a “civilian power””. This is the beginning point for every analysis, in spite of the, at times, intense flank that is aimed at specific EU structures and policies from the aspects of a normative thesis of international or democracy justice (Telo, 2006: p. 51).

The EU signed a meaningful treaty on the functioning of its foreign policy, and this was the Maastricht Treaty. As Christian Fritzemeier points out “The Maastricht Treaty^{3*} provided for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and as from 1998, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) came into being, entailing commitments that appear to counter the self-perception of a civilian power” (Fritzemeier, pp. 9 & 10). France, the UK and Germany, are significant players in the military field (GFP, 2018). According to Lars Zimmermann, “In other words, Britain and France occupy in many aspects the extreme ends of several spectrums vis-à-vis

³ * In Karen E. Smith view “Yet the impact of the end of the Cold War on the European Community was not to reinforce its civilian power image – quite the opposite. Instead, the new European Union (EU) established by the Maastricht Treaty has set about acquiring a “defense dimension”” (Smith, 2000: p. 11).

the other EU member states, whereas Germany often takes a more central or even the opposite position”. This opinion is usually very close to the average one in the EU and contributes to explain Germany’s influence in ESDP in spite of the insufficiency of military strength comparable to that of France and the United Kingdom (Zimmermann, 2009: pp.75 & 85). Several key factors in this regard should be noted.

a) Germany unlike the other the EU member states has no overseas lands under its possession, and no security arrangements with former colonies like, for instance, France (Kochenov, 2012: p. 686).

b) On the Europeanist-Atlanticist political views, Germany’s position is physically nearer to the Europeanist than to the extreme ends occupied by France and the United Kingdom (Coskun, 2007: pp. 78, 86 & 89). Germany was oft-cited as the foremost example of a civilian power (Smith, 2000: p.19).

On the other hand, France and UK follow defense and security policy agendas. According to Lars Zimmermann, “With a policy similar to that of Britain, France considers the use of force to be the last resort once all other measures have been actively exploited. Together with Britain, France is more prepared than Germany to use force” (Zimmermann, 2009: pp. v, 30 & 31).

The EU on the other hand built the CFSP because it desired to dispose of common security and foreign policy after the Balkan tragedy in the beginning of the 1990s. In this view, the EU’s quiescence in the Yugoslav mess*⁴ not only expresses a fundamental division in the interests of the three stronger member states (France, the UK, and Germany), but is also the logical ramification of the lack of military fortification, describing a European diplomacy “without teeth” (Faleg, 2017: p.16). According to Andrew Cheatham, “In 2010 the Council of Ministers reaffirmed the civilian orientation of CFSP identifying crucial aims such as; “promoting international

⁴* According to Ozgun Erler Bayir, “The choice of the EU as an organization is nearly always for soft power means. This is actually reasonable because the EU is geographically close to the Middle East and South Africa and wants to create stability and peace in its borders” (Bayir, 2016: p. 18). As Esther Ben-David mentioned, “The immigration from the Middle East and also radical movements in the region, affects the EU directly” (Esther, 2009).

cooperation, developing and consolidating, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”” (Cheatham, 2012). In general, in the opinion of Yonca Ozer “the EU does not seem to follow first and foremost geopolitical interests. Instead, it binds itself to international norms and promotes values it believes in (such as the protection of human rights and democracy, reducing the gap between the poor and rich countries, the protection of the environment and labour rights and so on)” (Ozer, 2012: p. 89). Jan Zielonka, in a powerful argument for a civilian power EU, has pointed out that “opting for a civilian power Europe would represent one of the basic strategic choices that could help the Union acquire a distinct profile – so important in terms of identity and legitimacy”. The EU military ability would represent the zenith of a “state-building” project (Smith, 2000: p. 27).

Consequently it is obvious that the EU, and in particular the EU’s Foreign Policy, has moved to a point where the Civilian Power has gradually begun to adopt traditional power (Conventional Power) elements.

2) The EU and the Syrian Crisis from 2011 until 2018

The second chapter presents to a large degree the Syrian conflict since 2011 until 2018 from the EU perspective. The chapter initially examines the political decisions taken by the EU, and secondly the actions pursued by the EU as well as the Humanitarian Aid provided.

The EU policy towards the Syrian crisis could be divided in two periods: the first is from 2011 until 2015 and the second from 2015 until 2018. It is necessary to emphasize that 2015 was not mentioned at random: That year was very important, since the intervention of an important global factor, namely the Russian Federation, resulted in the internationalization of the Syrian issue and the intervention of Turkey in the Syrian conflict as well as of other countries.

a) Political Decisions

2011-2015

In the early decade of 2010, the seismic events of the Arab Spring took place. These uprisings affected seriously the countries of MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) (Abdelsalam, 2015: pp. 121 & 122). The EU didn't remain idle: The view of the Official Journal of the EU is interesting: "Decision 2011/273/CFSP provides for an arms embargo, a ban on internal repression equipment, and restrictions on the admission to the Union, and the freezing of funds and economic resources, of certain persons and entities responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria" (Official Journal of the European Union, pp. 1 & 3). The issue of transition from authoritarian regimes towards consolidating democratic institutions in the Arab countries was of intense interest. According to Christopher Phillips who has broached on the crucial and sensitive issue of the transition, namely "The UN Security Council, including China and Russia, unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which endorsed the "Vienna statements" of 30 October and 14 November. As had been noted in both Vienna statements", Daesh and Al Nusra were to be isolated from any negotiations and transition. It is noteworthy that the resolution did not clarify whether Bashar Al Assad could participate in the political transition (Phillips, 2016: p. 225).

2015-2018

In 2018, the EU intensely dooms the suspected use of prohibited chemical weapons in an assault by the Bashar Al Assad regime which executed approximately 40 civilians in a suburb of the capital city of Damascus called Douma, in the Eastern Ghouta region. The EU has called for a direct response by the global community. (European Union External Action, 2018) It is essential to report the opinion of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. According to OPCW estimations, "Council Decision 2015/2215/CFSP complements the commitment of the EU and its Member States to the complete elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme", including the destruction of Damascus's stated chemical weapons

stockpile which the EU has immediately supported with 17 million euros (OPCW, 2016).

The leaders of the four nations Germany, France, Turkey, and the Russian Federation deliberated on a summit in Istanbul to discuss the Syrian issue. According to Reuters “Participants at a Syrian peace conference in Russia in January agreed to form the 150-member committee to rewrite the Syrian constitution, with a third chosen by the government, a third by opposition groups and a third by the United Nations”. The UN representative Steffan de Mistura mentioned at the Security Council that Syria now desires the United Nations to enable the composition of the constitution, but does not desire it to name one-third of the committee members (Tsvetkova & Sezer, 2018).

b) Actions and Humanitarian Crisis

2011^{5*}-2015

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the EU has been seen to have acted vigorously. More specifically:

Noteworthy is the event that “Since the beginning of the crisis, the EU has mobilized all political and humanitarian tools at its disposal in support of the Syrian people”. The EU undoubtedly is one of the main followers of the UN-led attempts to reach a solution in a political framework and the basic humanitarian donor for Syrian people, with over €10.8 billion mobilized jointly with EU Member States in humanitarian, stabilization assistance, economic development (European Commission, 2018: p. 1). According to the European Parliamentary Research Service

^{5*} According to “The Guardian”, “David Cameron, French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as the EU demanded that Assad immediately resigns” (McGreal & Chulov, 2011). In the opinion of Jean Dufourcq & Olivier Kempf, this was the first clear expression of a hard line against Assad, “President Assad, who is resorting to brutal military force against his own people and who is responsible for the situation, has lost all legitimacy and can no longer claim to lead the country. In the following years, France continued to harden its position on Syria” (Dufourcq & Kempf, 2016: pp. 13 & 14).

Blog, “since 2011, the EU’s collective assistance to Syrians and Syrian refugees has amounted to over €9.2 billion, including €3 billion pledged at the London “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference”. Since the conflict in the beginning of 2011, the EU has increased substantially its aid (European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 2017). More specifically, according to the European Parliamentary Research Service “In Lebanon, the European Commission’s assistance alone has reached almost €800 million, including more than €356 million from the humanitarian budget. In Jordan, Commission assistance amounts to some €657 million for Syrian refugees and host communities and is spent primarily on food aid and the provision of clean water and sanitation, as well as on health services and protection” (Pawlak, 2017: p. 10). A large part of the financial support is destined for assistance to Turkey (European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 2017). More specifically, the regions which are damaged are states which neighbor Syria and are heavily influenced. According to the European Commission “Lebanon, which is hosting almost 1.1 million Syrian refugees, and Jordan, which is hosting almost 660,000, has the largest per capita refugee population in the world. Turkey is currently hosting more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees, the largest number in any one country” (European Commission Press Release, 2016: p. 2). According to the EU External Action, “Most of them women and children, are aided through cash assistance, protection of vulnerable people, health and winterization programmes, among other activities” (European Commission, 2018). In order to better address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the EU Trust Fund was established.

Since its foundation in December 2014, a rising share of the EU’s non-humanitarian backing to Syria’s adjacency states is provided via the EU Trust Fund (European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, 2016). The EUTF pursues to attain a more completed and cohesive EU response to the Syrian mess by conglomerating various EU economical tools and sponsorships from Member States into one coherent flexible mechanism for immediate disbursement. In accordance with the European Commission, “The EUTF primarily addresses longer term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, as well as the hosting communities and their administrations”. (European Commission, pp. 4 & 5) The EU

has been deeply concerned with the financing of the neighboring countries with Syria, without ignoring the defense issues.

The “security matters” were of great significance as well: “In CSDP, although the December 2013 European Council underlined that “security matters”, the current level of ability and ambition goals are not adapted to the alteration of strategic setting, wedded external and internal security challenges, including hybrid threats, and the developing necessity for Europeans to hold the fort for their own security (Tocci, 2017: pp. 122 & 123). Some member states of the EU have jointly agreed to denounce the movements of the Syrian regime against opposition groups expense. Sanna Jarvinen considers that “The EU countries have also tried to get through the Syria – resolution in the United Nations Security Council, but as aforementioned Russian Federation and China have not agreed on terms of the interference” (Jarvinen, 2015: p. 26). Furthermore, they established a new Committee of trans-government cooperation in Brussels to provide the use of development assistance and security. According to Richard Young’s opinion, “In 2013, a “comprehensive strategy” was drawn up to broaden the approach toward the Syrian conflict—for many observers still a more dangerous geostrategic flash point even than Ukraine” (Youngs, 2014). The EU has also focused on the notorious issue of terrorism.

The EU also was concerned about the emergence of the ISIS and terrorism activity in the loci, for instance in the according Radka Havlova view, “Summary: 10/20/2014, Luxembourg – Council of the EU Foreign Affairs meeting conclusions on the ISIL/Da’esh crisis in Syria and Iraq”, and the “Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat” (Havlova, 2015: p. 81). The enforcement of the Internal Security Strategy and its reconsideration will also be one of the priorities, as well as the combat against terrorism, in its prevention and protection aspects, in particular with regard to terrorist activities conducted by lone actors and foreign combatants (Council of the European Union, 2014: p. 23).

However, the policy which the EU adopted on the sanctions issue imposed against the Syrian regime did not guide to political reforms in Syria and the elimination of brutalities, which led to a modification in the sanction policy of the EU. According to Radka Havlova’s opinion, “This was partly due to the fact that Russian

Federation and Iran did not apply sanctions to Syria and probably also enabled Syria to export its oil and other products via these countries” (Havlova, 2015: p. 82).

According to Sanna Jarvinen “the EU had failed in finding a resolution to the crisis in Syria. The member states of the Union did not expect the crisis to be so devastating and long lasting, arguably due to the similar happenings in the Middle East area in history”. Nevertheless, the EU has exerted numerous policy frameworks when it comes to developing the relationships with Damascus, such as the Union of the Mediterranean and the European Neighborhood Policy (Jarvinen, 2015: p. 43). However, the issue of sanctions must not be disregarded.

According to Rim Turkmani and Mustafa Haid, “Did the sanctions change the behaviour of the Syrian government accordingly? Did the EU fulfill the overall purpose of the sanctions? The answer is: despite the sanctions, the conflict in Syria continued and escalated”. The sanctions on Damascus did not manage to deter the Syrian regime from using chemical weapons against the non-combatant population in 2013 (Turkmani & Haid, 2016: p. 18).

These frameworks have been used in helping Syria to heal from the war, however they have not succeeded. The reasons for the unsuccessful interference can be analyzed as follows:

Initially, the EU has not had a common strategic planning towards the Syrian conflict and, as a consequence, decision-making has been indolent or even nonexistent. Although the member states have reciprocally agreed to condemn the facts of the Syrian statehood towards the opposition groups, it has not been sufficient to agree on the terms of the intervention (Havlova, 2015: p. 86).

The second reason, is the dispute of the opposition sects and groups. The deficiency of a clear tribune of the opposition has made it complicated to negotiate on the framework of peace when a certain individual is not representing all of the main views of the opposition (Sayigh, 2013: p. 1).

The third reason, refers to economic crisis in the EU. The financial crisis particularly in the South European member states was grim and it can be argued that there are more significant internal problems that need to be considered before international intervention. Moreover, according to Sanna Jarvinen, “the complexity of

the Common Foreign and Security Policy has slowed down the possible actions. Arguably, it might be more efficient if the CFSP would be under one EU umbrella where the Union would have the power to decide over foreign policy matters, not the member states” (Jarvinen, 2015: p. 43).

Political analysts and scientists who examine civil conflicts have pinpointed numerous key strategic fetters to peaceful resolution. James Fearon believes that “A look at Syria’s war reveals that the most common strategic obstacles are present in spades, rendering a stable negotiated settlement particularly unlikely” (Fearon, 2013). According to Sanna Jarvinen, “The longer the conflict continues the harder it is to find a peaceful solution to it. It is hard to say if and how the influence of radical Islamists will change the direction of the whole war. Nevertheless, it will have an impact to the future happenings” (Jarvinen, 2015: p. 44). Despite this, the ramifications of the whole Syrian mess need to pay heed to at some point, which repeatedly will most likely require support from the EU in whatever way possible. (Fandrich) It is obvious that we are entering a period of internationalization of the Syrian crisis with the most intense intervention of foreign factors.

2015^{6*}-2018

In 2015, two important events took place: The first was that Syria accepted support from Russia’s air strikes to impede the collapse of the Bashar Al Assad statehood in the civil war (Galeotti, 2017: p. 52). Anna Maria Dyner believes that “Russia will use its military success to actively engage in the Syrian peace process. Moreover, the Russian authorities will want to transfer control over all “de-

^{6*} The intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria in September 2015 actually altered the balance of the Syrian Civil Conflict (Casagrande & Weinberger, 2017: p. 1). It’s obvious that existed contradiction between France and Russian factor emerged. More specifically, France tried to condemn Bashar al Assad’s use of force. On the contrary, Russian Federation vividly supports avidly President Bashar al Assad (Phillips, 2016: p. 68). German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been very judgmental of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian mess and backs persisted EU penalty measures against Moscow. But Heiko Josef Maas is praised by her junior coalition collaborator, the Social Democrats, which has traditionally sought powerful bonds with the Russian factor. Berlin did not participate in the air strikes, According to Reuters “Angela Merkel backed them as a “necessary and appropriate” action to warn Syria against further use of chemical weapons” (Reuters Staff, 2018). During the first confrontation of powers such as Britain at the end of 2015, the Russian intervention was generally in line with that of Washington (Scott, 2015: p. 9).

escalation” zones to the Syrian military, which would be a first step to restoring the country’s territorial integrity”. The Russian Federation’s long-term aim is the reinstatement of political balance in the Syrian territory through the United Nations. However, the dispute with the U.S.A and different plans of the future of the Syrian peace procedure will most likely make the accomplishment of agreement within the United Nations Security Council (Dyner, 2018: p. 2).

This event created embarrassment in the EU and the USA. The second was, in the words of the European Commission, that “in Turkey there are over 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees, making Turkey the largest host of refugees in the world” (European Commission, 2018: p. 8). The European Commission contributes by economically backing Turkey about the refugee crisis: “The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey is the answer to the EU Member States call for significant additional funding to support refugees in the country, and manages a total of €6 billion (€3 billion for 2016-2017 and €3 billion for 2018-2019). The main focus areas are humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support” (European Commission, p. 1).

The EU and Turkey kept their debate against terrorism going. Turkey accedes the Russian Federation and Iran in Kazakhstan especially in Astana process with the Syrian issue. It continued to provide essential humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees. In early 2018, a new operation of the Turkish Army in Syrian territory, against the PYD/YPG in the Afrin area took place. “In January 2018, Turkey launched “Operation Olive Branch” in cooperation with the Free Syrian Army in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin, aiming to root out the Democratic Union Party/People’s Protection Units (PYD/YPG) which it regards as a terrorist organization linked to the PKK” (European Commission, p. 96).

In 2016, the USA and the Russian Federation have announced a framework for a “cessation of hostilities” in the area of Syria (BBC News, 2016). The EU allocated financing of €4.6 million to the Organization for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in March 2016. Special missions were sent to Damascus, including policies related to the OPCW Fact Finding Mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism (UNSCR 2235). In October 2016, the fourth JIM report was published. At the London Conference on “Supporting Syria and the region” (February 2016) the EU

allocated €2.39 billion for the Syria and the region for the biennium 2016 and 2017. In accordance with European Commission, “as part of the IcSP contribution, the EU has found in 2016 a Syria Peace Process Support Initiative in cooperation with Germany, to bring out underpin for the implementation of UNSCR 2254 and the UN-led Geneva peace process” (European Commission, pp. 2, 3 & 5).

In 2017, when approximately 500,000 Syrians non-combatant have returned to their home, the UN stated it as a “notable trend” (BBC, 2016). The European Commission estimates that “in March 2017, the EU delivered statements at the Interactive Dialogue with the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic during the Human Rights Council session” (EU-Syria relations, p. 1).

Warfare between the part of Syrian government forces and armed anti-government groups has been emphasized since November 2017 in northern Hama governorate, southern Aleppo governorate and southern Idlib governorate causing a wave of eradication. Approximately 212,000 individuals have been eradicated from their territories since 12/15/2018, the majority into central-north Idlib. The humanitarian situation in the pretended governorates is worsening, with continuing clashes, air campaigns, and shelling. The preponderance of IDPs lives in temporary settlements and report acute multi-sectoral needs (START NETWORK acaps, 2018: p. 1). The Syrian crisis is the world’s worst humanitarian disaster.

It is important to point out that the EU report “on 7/19/2017, the EU decided to provide €1.5 million to support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria”. The EU delivered a declaration in the OPCW on 3/7/2017 (reliefweb, 2017: pp. 1 & 2). According to the European Commission, “On 7/17/2017 and on 3/19/2018, the Council added 16 and 4 persons respectively to the list of those targeted by the EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons against the civilian population” (European Commission, p. 2). The EU can mention that it has had a notable action on the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

The EU is the leading donor in the international response to the crisis, with over €10.8 billion from the EU and Member States collectively contributing to the

humanitarian and development assistance since the beginning of the conflict (European Commission, p. 3).

“Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”, Breedlove said to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Deutsche Welle, 2016). And Andreas S. Hau pointed out that “in order to de-couple Putin’s military objectives in Syria from his political objectives in Europe, the EU must demonstrate its resolve by halting the refugee crisis”. Preventing the refugee crisis by creating safe shelters and tracking discontinuance to the Syrian conflict, removes one of Vladimir Putin’s noteworthy strategic distractions (Hau, 2016: p. 21). According to the estimation of “Council Decision 2015/2215/CFSP complements the commitment of the EU and its Member States to the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme, including the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile (to which the Union has already contributed 17 million euros)” (OPCW, 2016).

The EU will invest 1.5 million euro for war brutalities investigations in the sensitive region of Syria. The EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, declared on 7/19/2017 “Justice for the victims is key for an effective and inclusive reconciliation process in Syria. This is why those responsible for war crimes need to be held accountable and as soon as possible” (EU Neighbours South). According to Orient Net, “Accountability for war crimes, human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law is essential to ensure a meaningful political transition in Syria”. The EU will extend the process to insure that these infringements are faced, according to “the policy objectives of the EU Strategy for the Syria”, which was approved on 3/4/2017 (Orient Net, 2017). The European Commission - Press release points out that a need exists “to ensure that it would be able to start work as soon as possible and fulfill its mandate, in line with the principles of universality and at the highest level of professionalism” (European Commission - Press release, 2017).

Describing the EU’s behavior based on two points on political decisions, actions and the humanitarian crisis, since 2011 until 2018, it is easy to be led to the following conclusions:

During the period between 2011 and 2015, it is evident that the EU used humanitarian aid through funding and implemented sanctions. By 2015 is a milestone year for the Syrian crisis as the intervention of the Russian factor (an important military force on the world stage) strengthens Bashar Al Assad and creates embarrassment to the “Western powers”, which, in their majority, follow the “normative power” policy. It is significant to report that the same policy was followed in the next period, namely between 2015 and 2018, with the exception of the attitude of France and the United Kingdom, which made use of military power. If the rebels were defeating the Bashar Al Assad forces, it was considered that for the EU would be easier to play a role in ensuring that the transition in Syria heads towards democracy. Obviously, the forces of Bashar Al Assad will be tied to the Russian factor, which leaves no room for the EU. It is intriguing to analyze France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as three powerful European countries in regard to the Syrian Crisis.

3) France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Syrian Crisis.

In this chapter we shall attempt to examine the role France, Germany and the United Kingdom in formulating the EU's policy in the Syrian crisis; we will analyze each country's policy on Syria's conflict.

a) France

It has been underlined "since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, France has provided €243 million of assistance in response to the crisis (within Syria and in neighboring countries)" (France Diplomatie). According to Alassane Dembele, "however, when the Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011, Paris took a much different stance in comparison to the policy adopted of Nicola Sarkozy regarding Libya" (Dembele, 2016: p. 40). Since the beginning of 2012, Francois Hollande's government has begun to modify the French approach towards the rebellion in Syria and later became more aggressive against the illegal measures of the Syrian statehood, because of the fact that France began to recognize the Syrian National Coalition as the only legitimate representative of the Syrian populace in November 2012 (Strashun, 2013: p. 3).

Rachel Utley claims that "a turning point of sorts came with the chemical weapons attacks in the suburbs of Damascus on 21/8/2013". The intelligence service of France was rushed to put forward the liability of the Syrian regime, and Francois Hollande also motivated powerful action air strikes against Bashar Al Assad in "alliance" with the United States (Utley, 2016: p. 7). Nevertheless, one should consider that it is necessary to prove that the Bashar Al Assad regime was culpable for the assaults following the UN report while the UK, France, and the United States decided to establish a coalition in order to interfere towards Bashar Al-Assad military forces before the UN mentioned the issue. Francois Hollande declared France's readiness to join in such a military interference together with the United Kingdom and the US towards Syria during his address in front of the French Ambassadors in Paris on 8/27/2013 (Chatelot, 2013). The French armed interference was the topic of discussion. Hardly 39% of the French civilians were in support. The benefits of

committing French troops to the Syrian chaos were not clear to *vox populi* (Perrineau, 2016: pp. 228 & 229).

According to Alassane Dembele's opinion, "ultimately, Paris was not able to go forward once it became clear that the U.S and the United Kingdom would no longer bomb Assad forces" (Dembele, 2016: p. 40). The French government could have been completely neutral from the armed conflicts completely, but it felt the need to have a say in issues referring to its erstwhile colony just like it on a regular basis does in a neighboring continent, Africa (Benneyworth 2011). However, taking such risky decisions can have irreversible consequences for the nation when terrorist organizations like ISIS decide to retaliate. (Dembele, 2016: p. 40). On 9/19/2014, France carried out its first airstrikes against Jihadists positions in the territory of Iraq^{7*} (BBC News, 2014). As Alassane Dembele argued, "this operation, was named "Operation Chammal". This latest clash was a continuation of France's determination to eradicate extreme religious groups that threatened the security of their allies and their interests" (Dembele, 2016: p. 40).

Paris has constantly proclaimed the security of its home as the most important factor in its dispute against fundamentalism. France's weakness to totally assimilate its population of Africans or Muslims into their own, guided numerous French citizens to turn into foreign fighters for the Islamic State (Belkin, 2015: pp. 1 & 40). As Alassane Dembele mentions, "this situation has created a credible concern over potential homegrown terrorist activities as close to 1500 French citizens have either travelled to, or still remain inside Syria or Iraq" (Dembele, 2016: p. 40).

According to Jerome Legrand, "in 2015, following the terrorist attacks of 11/13/2015 in Paris,^{8*} the "mutual defense/assistance clause" of the Treaty of Lisbon^{9*} (article 42.7 TEU) was invoked for the first time by the EU Member State.

⁷ *In the struggle against the extreme Islamists, France is one of the basic promoters of the army action of the universal alliance against ISIS (RT America, 2015). In addition, it provides available guidance and training to Iraqis and particularly the "Arab-Kurdish" security forces.

⁸ * These attacks and attempted interconnection with refugee flows have already affected the political debate in key countries such as France and Germany.

⁹ *According to Sore Dosenrode, "The Lisbon Treaty was signed by the heads of state and government in December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009" (Dosenrode, 2012: p.17).

This tool is a “reactive”, intergovernmental instrument”.^{10*} Without particular enforcement arrangements, the text attributes no definitive role for EU institutions. Hence, any Member State appealing for the clause, maintains a vast leeway of maneuver for the prosecution of twofold negotiations with partners. Who has the ability to decide freely the scope and the type of their aid? (Legrand, 2015: p. 1) According to Annegret Bendiek, “Since the summer of 2016, France and Germany have been calling for closer cooperation not just in defense policy, but also in internal security. Both states advocate a “multi-speed Europe” to deepen the security and defense union” (Bendiek, 2017 p. 16).

According to the BBC, “French President Emmanuel Macron held a “frank exchange” with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in their first face-to-face talks on May 2017. The pair discussed “disagreements” in the meeting, held at the sumptuous Versailles palace near Paris”. But Emmanuel Macron stated that he desired to collaborate with the Russian Federation over the clash in Syrian territory in the dispute against fundamentalism and terrorism (BBC News, 2017). According to the BBC, “French President Emmanuel Macron has threatened to “strike” Syria if proof emerges that its government is using chemical weapons against civilians. “We will strike the place where these launches are made or where they are organized,”” he told journalists. But Emmanuel Macron stated that French intelligent services had hitherto found no evidence that prohibited chemical weapons had been used (BBC News, 2018).

After the chemical weapons assault on 4/4/2017 from Bashar Al Assad’s totalitarian regime in Khan Sheikhoun, Paris provided exigent humanitarian aid to the people affected by assault, and health care workers hospitalized them. According to France Diplomatie, “Mr Jean-Marc Ayrault, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, also presented the national assessment proving the use of sarin gas and the responsibility of the Syrian regime on 4/26/2017” (France Diplomatie). Furthermore, President Macron issued the following statement: “On

^{10*}The European countries and the European Union have increased more and more in recent years by the emergence of the ISIS fundamentalist groups, its ability to attract citizens from European countries to participate the combat in the flammable Iraqui-Syrian region, and its use of extremist rhetoric and propaganda to others (Congressional Research Service, 2017: p. 15).

Saturday 4/7/2018, in Douma, dozens of men, women and children were massacred with chemical weapons, in a total violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions” (Independent, 2018). It is needful to analyze the evaluation of the French position on Syrian crisis.

It is noteworthy that French foreign policy follows a special mixture of policies. More specifically, French foreign policy presents the following characteristics:

Initially, France is a proponent of the transition of Syria’s regime towards democratization. Paris has called for the creation of a multinational governing body before the incorporation of a new charter and then elections (According to the United Nations Security Council resolution 2254) (United Nations Security Council, 2015). Paris is underpinning the opposition party’s focus on High Negotiations Committee (HNC). France regarded that the regime’s supporters have to be held responsible by applying imposition in order to: a) implement the ceasefire; b) Support the enforcement of a political transition; c) Permit instant, safe and unimpeded humanitarian passage to perishable populations in need and stop assaults against noncombatants (United Nations Security Council, 2015).

Secondly, according to Bashar Youssef, “When Francois Hollande became France’s president in 2012, he sought to regain some influence in Syria independently from the US, and in direct confrontation with Russia: more punitive measures against the Syrian regime”. The unique legitimate representative of the Syrian people, hence recognized and supported the Syrian opposition (Youssef, 2017: p. 27).

Thirdly, Francois Hollande examined the embroilment decision as a part of the principles by which the universal community was obstructed in taking essential precaution measures. About this issue Selin Guler underlines that, “Francois Hollande tried to legitimate his decision with the words that although the public opinion was generally negative towards the intervention” (Guler, 2014: pp. 4 & 6). According to Bashar Youssef, “Syria’s geostrategic location made it a gateway for France to exert influence in a number of regional conflicts in the face of American and Russian hegemony”. Additionally he pointed out that “instead of acting alone, France could, for example, play the international community card” (Youssef, 2017: pp. 2 & 34). However, the pro-American French foreign policy formation was still impacting on

this serious matter. According to Selin Guler, “As the military intervention possibility was shelved, the organization of a conference that bunched together both parties remained vital for the resolution of the Syria crisis” (Guler, 2014: pp. 4 & 6).

Moreover, given ISIS vast amount of financial and military resources, these foreign nationals travelling to Syria and Iraq have been afforded the opportunity to receive military training amongst other things. As a consequence, by fighting ISIS, Paris is attempting to stop the appeal the terrorist group has on many of its citizens, while aspiring to address matters of terrorist activities on their own land (Dembale, 2016: p. 40).

Furthermore, according to Jerome Legrand, “Article 42.7 of the Treaty of EU was not the only clause France could have invoked to ask for assistance, but it was the least constraining. At a time when the country’s financial and military capabilities are increasingly stretched”. The simpler proviso was a reasonable option beyond the immediate ramifications Member States consensus for political corroboration and bilateral negotiations on aid – the action is possible to affect the broad debate about the EU’s CSDP (Legrand, 2015: p. 1). Although the conjure up of the Article 42.7 was consensus approved in a colloquium of EU defense ministers, there continue to be disagreements of view and interpretation among member states. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations view, “Among the smaller and/or newer member states, at least, there is a certain amount of head-scratching about what is and will be required of them. France will have to tackle this confusion by addressing its demands directly to its EU partners” (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

Eventually, the struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism, the Middle East Peace process, the peace operations in the Balkan Region, and the instability of the failed states Afghanistan, Syria and neighboring countries all challenge whether Paris has played a crucial role. In spite of this, many states either advocate or independently share the French ideas of greater universal involvement (Belkin, 2009: p. 3). It is necessary at this point to examine the role of the German factor.

b) Germany

According to NATO-EU strategic partnership, it is apparent that NATO and the CFSP involve the German Foreign Policy. More especially, the political decision at the end of 2002, the so-called “Berlin Plus”^{11*} arrangements, adopted on 3/17/2003, gives the basis for NATO-EU collaboration in crisis stewardship by permitting the EU to enter NATO’s collective advantages and abilities for EU-led operations. Essentially, they permit the Alliance to vouch for EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not involved (8th NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, p. 4).

Since the beginning of the Arab Rebellion in 2011, the responsible Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has escalated the evolution of its cooperation with four states, especially Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and generally collaboration with Syria in the framework of MENA (KfW Development bank, 2018). In the opinion of Gotkowska & Frymark, “Germany is also one of the main donors to the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN agency tasked with providing food assistance in refugee camps across the region; it has allocated a total of US \$1.2 billion for this purpose since 2011 (larger contributions were made by the USA, the United Kingdom and Canada). Germany has most frequently engaged in projects with Jordan (603 million euros in 2012–2015), Yemen (103 million euros in 2013) and Lebanon (275 million euros in 2012–2015). Germany has been the third largest donor of humanitarian aid for refugees in the Middle East. It earmarked US\$1.228 billion for this purpose between 2012 and 2015” (Gotkowska & Frymark, 2016: pp. 3 & 4). Within Europe, Germany hosts the largest number of refugees - at the end of 2015 approximately 1.0 million (Furtak, 2015: p. 1).

Is it significant to mention the opinion of Chappell: “For Germany, military operations have far-reaching political consequences: In each individual case, there must be a clear answer to the question of whether German interests and the related fulfillment of international responsibility require and justify an operation and what the

^{11*}Berlin Plus agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit (Waugh 2004 & 2009: p. 1).

consequences of non-action would be” (German Ministry of Defence, 2011: p. 4). German policy-specialists now mention German benefits in the defense policy framework, logic of the restraint. As Guido Westerwelle supports, “we want to shoulder international responsibilities. But we also want to continue our culture of military restraint”. Nevertheless, the extent to which Germans can stabilize these two seemingly contradictory views remains to be seen (Chappell, 2012: pp. 89 & 90).

According to Reuters, “German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been very critical of Russia’s involvement in both the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts and backs continued EU sanctions against Moscow”. Berlin did not participate in the air bombings, but Angela Merkel supported them as a “necessary and appropriate” action to warn Damascus against a large scale use of chemical weapons. The German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen mentions at “Bild am Sonntag” newspaper that the German military forces would have been able to participate in the bombings but added: “We weren’t asked this time” (Reuters, 2018). Ursula von der Leyen made this declaration in full knowledge of the fact that “On 6/28/2018, the Reference and Research Service of the German Bundestag stated that the war waged by the Anti-IS Coalition in Syria is at least of questionable international legality” (German -Foreign - Policy. Com, 2018).

Germany is considering of the foundation of a constant Bundeswehr base in the region of Middle East, the German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said during her contemporary visits to Iraq and Jordan (German -Foreign - Policy. Com, 2018). German Military Forces could be stationed at Jordan’s region Al Azraq military aircraft station (Busse, 2017) for a long-term period in relative closeness to Iraq compared to the USA Gulf bases. German Tornados take off from Al Azraq Airbase. According to German -Foreign - Policy. Com. “Their flights over Syria are possibly in violation of international law” (German -Foreign - Policy. Com, 2018). Berlin stated that it would boost the process of tactical retreat of its forces from an armed base in southern Turkey. According to Alison Smale’s view, “The government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to guarantee visits to forces there by German lawmakers, deepening a rift between the NATO allies” (Smale, 2017). It is essential to examine the evaluation of the German position on Syrian mess. According to Markus Kaim, the German policy toward the Syrian Crisis can be outlined two basic pillars:

Firstly, after Germany abstained from NATO's "Operation in Libya" for example, the traditional alliances expected that the German foreign policy would be characterized by the responsibility of Protect in international policy.

Secondly, the action of the German factor in the issue of the humanitarian crisis, the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), which consists the main doctrine of the German foreign policy, was necessary (Kaim, 2012: p. 4).

Furthermore, there are a lot of serious factors which we must take into consideration:

First of all, after World War II, Germany is much more cautious about its involvement in a conflict; it is visible that it is one of the most serious reasons for which it remains inactive in the military field.

Secondly, according to the new German doctrine, its foreign policy is heading towards the possession of more responsibility in the field of security policy internationally, as declared in the recently published "2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" (Maier & Schmidt-Feuerheerd, 2016: p. 30). For many years, during the post World War II period, Berlin possessed a dominant position in the economic sector, but it was powerless in the political sector, and reluctant to send troops to international warfares. Only in 1994 Germany's Supreme Court allowed the participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. However the international community expects Germany to take on a greater foreign and security policy role, and that demands "a turnaround," the German defense minister said. (Breitenbach, 2016) As Emmanuel Macron stated on 6/23/2017: "If France and Germany speak with one voice, then Europe can advance". In this logic, they should take an initiative towards wider European effect, by instituting a Franco-German Envoy for Syria (Koenig, 2017: p.16).

Moreover, Germany is a defender of the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the protection of existing conventions such as the ban on chemical and biological weapons (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018: pp. 4 & 6). However, when the Assad regime used chemicals in the city of Douma, Germany remained inactive. According to Dempsey, Merkel said: "We recognize and we support the fact that every effort is being made to signal that the use of chemical

weapons is unacceptable. Once the Western strikes had taken place” (Dempsey, 2018). Angela Merkel said that “the military response was successful and appropriate” (Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2018: pp. 1 & 2). Angela Merkel said that “Germany will not be militarily involved” (Dempsey, 2018).

Furthermore, the primary concern of the German foreign policy is the peaceful settlement of all disputes by maintaining channels of communication between the major powers. (US-Federal Republic of Russia) Germany undoubtedly is one of the United States most powerful and nearest allies in the continent of Europe. According to the opinion of U.S Department of State Diplomacy in Action, “U.S. relations with Germany are based on our close and vital relationship as friends, trading partners and allies, sharing common institutions” (U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action, 2018).

Additionally, enforcing reciprocally advantageous bilateral relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and other European states has essential significance in terms of boosting Russia’s national benefits in European and international affairs (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). That opinion, founded partly on the conviction that as an effect of its history, Germany has a moral obligation to lead an armed intervention to defend human rights if there is no different solution (Wright, 2011 p. 1). The Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle implemented the plan of “military restraint” on his foreign policy. He believed the principal duty of the Security Council is to be denouncing the violence of the Syrian regime and persuading Beijing and Moscow to modify their policies. His main argument against any military commitment was to avoid a “regional escalation”. It is useful to mention the opinion of Sebastian Maier & Bruno Schmidt-Feuerheerd: “Additionally, since Westerwelle’s liberal party fell in polls below the 5% threshold necessary to stay in the Bundestag in parliamentary elections in 2013, he refrained from changing his preferred policy approach of military restraint” (Maier & Schmidt-Feuerheerd, 2016: p. 12).

Finally, Ursula von der Leyen, the German defense minister, has pointed out that German surveillance airplanes were playing an important role against the ISIS. Not having them available for a time period of about two or three months during the

move, on the contrary, would have more symbolic impacts than practical impact, broaching NATO allies in public at odds, rather than cooperating united (Smale, 2017). The Bundeswehr started its mission at Al Azraq in the framework of a mission that was probably violating international law. Undoubtedly, Germany constitutes a “soft power force”, paying emphasis on economic and political measures. This fact does not mean, however, that it will completely ignore military power enforcement in the future, taking into account the fact that the EU has always been dependent on the United Kingdom too for its defense and security.

c) **The United Kingdom**

According to Ben Smith, “Since December 2010, the most profound process of change has affected the countries of the Arab world. The “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, which is being published sets out clear, achievable proposals for how we can improve the way we identify” (Smith, 2011: pp. 1 & 82). According to William Hague, Andrew Mitchell and Dr Liam Fox considers that “The purpose of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) is to address instability and conflict overseas because it is both morally right and in Britain’s national interest. We will do this by using all of our diplomatic, development, military and security tools, and drawing on our unique experience, relationships, reputation and values” (Hague, Mitchell & Fox 2011: p. 4). Furthermore, Ben Smith adds that “we will focus on activities on those sensitives and impinge on countries from conflicts where the hazards are high, our benefits are most at stake and where we know ramifications can occur” (Smith, 2011: pp. 1 & 82).

The British government supported the political down fall of Bashar Al Assad. As Jason Ralph, Jack Holland & Kalina Zhekova points out, “Given its unwillingness and inability to mobilize support for military intervention, or to tailor policy goals to match available means, government strategy arguably lacked credibility” (Ralph, Holland & Zhekova, 2017 p.1).

In the opinion of Jamie Merrill, “The UK has been at the forefront of the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, having pledged £700m, making UK the second largest bilateral donor”. This financing is creates available backing including medical care, nutrition, and relief items for more than a million

inhabitants impacted by the warfare in Syrian territory, also to refugees in the Hashemite Kingdom, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. (Merrill, 2014)

According to the international dialogue on peace-building and state-building which the British government has released “our collective vision is to end and prevent conflict and to contribute to the development of capable, accountable states that respond to the expectations and needs of their population, in particular the needs of vulnerable and excluded groups, women, youth and children. We recognize the centrality of state-society relations in supporting the development of capable, accountable and responsive states. This will require sustained efforts by all stakeholders to improve governance, strengthen economic and social development, and promote peace and security as outlined in the statement by the G7+”. (International dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding, p.7)

In the view of Scott Lucas, “The initial reaction of powers such as Britain, France, and Germany to the Russian intervention in Syria was generally in line with that of Washington” (Scott, 2015: p. 9). Malcolm Chalmers supports the view that “Yet the direct involvement of Russian armed forces in Syria may also strengthen the case for maintaining coalition military involvement in both Syria and Iraq” (Chalmers, 2015: p. 6).

However, Christian Schweiger points out that: “the public debate about greater British commitment towards Europe is still dominated by the notion that Britain’s cultural closeness to America makes it unsuitable to integrate into a Europe of continental states that do not have a history which is as globally orientated as that of Britain” (Schweiger, 2007: p. 37). The USA and Europe in this opinion offer notable prospects. The choices are not a unique one, due to the fact that the USA and Europe positions are not one-dimensional, but extremely complicated and diversified political spaces. According to David Baker & Pauline Schnapper, “Yet although Britain will always be part of both Europe and of Anglo-America, there remains a question of priority” (Baker & Schnapper, 2015: p. 163).

According to Andrew Glencross, “Michel Barnier recently indicated that he could not envisage senior British ministers or diplomats participating in CFSP institutions,

he has also previously stated his “firm belief is that the EU twenty seven and the UK working together on security and defense is better than working in parallel””. Both aspects evaluate value in establishing a more official role for the United Kingdom in the CFSP post-Brexit period, thus, paths can definitely be found to permit this (Wright, 2017: p. 41). “On 6/23/2016 the UK electorate voted to leave the EU” (Glencross, 2016: p. 1). The United Kingdom withdrawal would establish the Franco-German tandem once again the vital role of European incorporation. The Brexit could, actually, revitalize new reality into this unproductive alliance by creating the dynamic for a new EU enterprise as a show of defiance to British Euroscepticism (Erlanger, 2016).

According to Asley Cowburn’s view, “while many of the Tory MPs, who defied the party whip in 2013, then voted to back the offensive against ISIS in the region in 2015,” they are enough more separated with regard to unleashing an assault against Bashar AI Assad and the prospect of statehood alteration. Malcolm Chalmers believes that “The 2014 decision to limit air strikes to Iraq has not stopped the UK playing an important role in supporting US air strikes in Syria through extensive use of RAF aircrafts in command-and-control, surveillance and target-acquisition roles” (Chalmers, 2015: p. 3). Asley Cowburn said that “many believe an escalation in conflict could also lead to the UK stumbling into a proxy war with Russia as Vladimir Putin’s forces are supporting the Assad regime in its ongoing battle with the rebels”.

On 4/7/2017 a cataclysm of fifty nine “Tomahawk” missiles, launched from USA Navy ships finding the “Liquid Continent” bombarded the al-Shayrat air base close to Homs. It is rumored the air base was liable for launching the fatal chemical assault, which murdered numerous non-combatants in the Idlib region of the war-ravaged state (Cowburn, 2017).

According to Julian Borger & Peter Beaumont “In the middle of 2018, the US, UK and France have launched more than 100 missiles against what they say were Syrian chemical weapons facilities in response to a chemical weapons attack in Damascus” (Borger & Beaumont, 2018).

Overall, the United Kingdom policy elite has assessed its own contribution in the CFSP as beneficial in the Review of the Stability of Competences exercise undertaken

under the 2010 until 2015 Coalition government. The foreign policy report outlined the conclusive evidence that it received with the evaluation that it is in general powerfully in the United Kingdom's interests to work through the EU in external policy (Whitman, 2016: p. 513).

First of all, the United Kingdom was astonished by the eruption of the Arab Uprisings. The perception that the Damascus totalitarian regime was irrelevant from Libya and Iraq, led to the delayed British reaction to the violent suppression by Bashar Al Assad. According to Sarah Scott, "In the case of the Syrian crisis, it failed to take into account that for Bashar Al Assad and the regime, this really was about survival, or the strong ties between the regime leadership and significant elements of the security and military apparatus in Syria, as the crisis there was in its initial stages;" it displayed that even when the forces from Europe in NATO took the "head start" in a mission they could not act without USA logistical backing, so there would be no interference in Syrian territory without the USA support; (Scott, 2016: pp. 401, 402 & 403)

Secondly, the CFSP after UK withdrawal from the EU will lose one of its most important supporters, (Himmrich, 2016: p. 8) who is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto rights.

Thirdly, defense investment in the EU will be significantly reduced. Finally, what are the major implications of Brexit related to the creation of a common defense market in the EU? The defense industry of the UK is one of the most important in the European space. So withdrawal is almost certain to delay the consolidation process, because lengthy negotiations will be required to sign a cooperation agreement (Bakker, Drent & Zandee, 2017: pp. 1 & 2).

Fourth, it will require the reorganization of the CFSP governance model. So the question arises which country will be able to replace Britain at the heart of the EU's defense identity process? A possible solution could come from the reaction of a Franco-German "axis" which would be able to give a new impetus to the CFSP (Rittelmeyer, 2017: p. 4).

Fifth, the United Kingdom should focus on the Syrian policy in defending its own, and more specifically on its commitment for termination of the hardship of the Syrian

inhabitants immediately potential. It is a great necessity to use in any way possible the influence it has to convince the USA to maintain this line, and to keep going to refuse both the case that the West countries must now attend to behind a powerful Saudi Arabia, anti-Iran coalition, and the argument that it is important to caning ISIS, even if this means accepting Moscow and Tehran*¹² ascendancy over the Syria (Chalmers, 2015: p. 8).

4) Conclusions

The European Foreign Policy, mainly its the increasing willingness to plan, formulate and implement a “hard power” policies, may have altered the conception of Europe as a Civilian Power. The EU up to now was preferring to use soft power means as Brussels instruments. The EU as a symbol of a united Europe itself carries a good deal of soft power (Nye, 2004: p. 77). According to the opinion of Olli Rehn, “The EU has relied primarily on soft power, pursuing its objectives by influence rather than by force” (Rehn, 2008: p. 2). According to Ozgun Erler Bayır view, “The EU has no army although this is one of the areas where unity would bring obvious increase in efficiency and influence. The EU’s first choice in the Middle East is using soft power as the US’s is hard power. The US have been trying to reshape the Middle East in the context of a Greater Middle East Project after September 11. The EU stands out with crisis management, post-conflict stabilization as the US’s ambitions are more hegemonic, global, hence call for “expeditionary culture” in NATO” (Bayır, 2016: pp. 10 & 11). Also, the Russian Federation follows the Conventional model using military means (Stewart & Zhukov, 2009: p. 333). Ankara also gives emphasis on the military model conventional way of intervention in the Syrian conflict (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2011: p. 243).

There are strong indications however that the EU currently tries to combine its “soft” power with “hard” power. The main discourse of the EU is still of course of a civilian power which this discourse is uncritically reproduced in many comments from the side of the EU policymakers, but is also reproduced as well as from the

¹² * Malcolm Chalmers claims that “The coalition’s strategy also needs to take account of Iran’s role in Syria. The Bashar al Assad regime is now highly dependent on Iran for both financial and security assistance” (Chalmers, 2015: p. 6).

media. Bertil Kilian claims that “the “European way” of doing things in foreign policy, according to this discourse, is displayed as the peaceful and unique way of civilizing international relations. A stronger ESDP would, according to the results, lead to a greater influence of the EU in the world”. Overall, “outsiders” consider that the EU is not a “force power” or purely a military force. They assess the EU’s foreign behavior more “persuasive” than “forcing”. The civilian power of the EU is measurably moving in the direction of the other pole but is still at a distance from it (Kilian, 2007: p. 28). Therefore, the CFSP is an excellent framework for cooperation among the states on foreign affairs and the promotion of a multilateral co-operation system of the states.

In 2009, marked the first year of implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which brought foreign policy under a supranational control but supported intergovernmental cooperation. The new themes of the Lisbon Treaty have enriched the CFSP agenda, demonstrating the variety of issues currently under consideration by it. At the same time, this framework of cooperation seems to be dysfunctional in the sense that the three most powerful countries of the CFSP France, Germany, and the United Kingdom had not adopted common foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis. Of the three states, only Germany was a *per se* civil power, giving more emphasis on dealing with the crisis. On the other hand, the other two CFSP forces, France and the UK, followed an amalgam of “hard” and “soft” power, which gave emphasis also on the humanitarian crisis. On the same time they did not hesitate to proceed to military operations. Hence, we can mention that the CFSP principles are interpreted differently by each country and that these countries certainly have not been influenced by the general CFSP consideration as well as its tendencies of behaving like a soft power.

Having examined the CFSP and the three powerful military countries: it towards a particular case study – the Syrian conflict is obvious that France, Germany and the United Kingdom are included in the “club of the strong”, and for them it is not easy to adapt only to the principles of the CFSP especially those focusing on soft power means. With the Brexit, it is likely that the Common Foreign Policy will be easier to implement, as there is a better understanding between Germany and France. The CFSP itself does not have the power to influence the strong member states of the EU the powerful countries, but it is easier to influence the weaker and smallest ones countries (Clark, 2018).

It is possible that the European Union will be called a civilian power when it acts under the human security values in the areas of clash preclusion, crisis management and civil-military coordination matters. The requirement for the EU as a civilian power, to present itself as a security factor is to prioritize basic human rights.

According to Murat Necip Arman's opinion, "Euroosteoporosis connotes the foreign policy absence of the EU which is rooted from wrong political decisions and deepening economic problems after the global economic crisis" (Arman, 2012: p.12). On the contrary, it is not difficult to say, according to Ozgun Erler Bayır, that "The EU's soft power is not at the grade that the EU can lead and influence the Middle Eastern countries in the direction it wants. This is because EU has no clear position and common view about which instruments of soft power can be used in the region and its policies can't be evaluated as being effective enough" (Bayır, 2016: pp. 17 & 18). As a result, we can easily hypothesize that the European Union is unable to be considered only as a civilian power, although, during the 2000s it attempted to incorporate human security values into its security strategy agenda an effort to prove that it should be considered as a civilian power in the international arena. According Murat Necip Arman's opinion, "Due to the reason that the widening process could not be transformed to a deepening, and the effectiveness in the Arab Spring process, this claim became expressionless" (Arman, 2017: p. 12). This conclusion is half of the story. Despite the fact that the EU defines itself as civilian power nevertheless different issues arise that make this model weak as some of its strong member states, like France and the UK, as the Syrian case indicates, follow conventional methods of intervention which correspond more to a hard policy performance rather to a soft power one. Maybe, the ideal model for the EU foreign affairs is a "smart power", namely a combination of "hard power" and "soft power" (Nye, 2010: p.1). According to Federica Mogherini, "The idea that Europe is an exclusively "civilian power" does not do justice to an evolving reality for Europe, where "soft" and "hard power" go hand in hand" (Mogherini, p. 1).

5) Bibliography

1. Abdelsalam E. (2015), *The Arab spring: Its origins, evolution and consequences... four years on*, Intellectual Discourse, Vol 23, No 1, Available https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284181844_The_Arab_spring_Its_origins_evolution_and_consequences_four_years_on [Accessed 10/28/2018].
2. Arman M. N. (2017), *THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION CONDITIONALITY, Dogu Anadolu Sosyal Bilimlerde Egilimler Dergisi*, Available <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/355692> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
3. Aybet G. (2004), *ESDP AND NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES: HOW THE PETERSBERG TASKS HAVE COME A LONG WAY*, International Conflict Analysis, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, Available <http://turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPO2004-2-aybet.pdf> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
4. (2015), *Article 42.7: An explainer*, European Council on Foreign Relations, Available https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_article_427_an_explainer5019 [Accessed 10/7/2018].
5. Baker D. & Schnapper P. (2015), *Britain and the Crisis of the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Bakker A., Drent M., Zandee D. (2017), *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?*, Clingendael Report, Available https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf [Accessed 11/28/2018].
7. Bayır O. E (2016), *Challenges for EU in the Middle East: Use of Soft Power*, Studia Europejskie, Available https://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/2--2016_bayir.pdf [Accessed 10/19/2018].
8. Benneyworth I. (2011), *The Ongoing Relationship Between France and its Former African Colonies*, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS,

Available <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/11/the-ongoing-relationship-between-france-and-its-former-african-colonies/> [Accessed 10/11/2018].

9. Belkin P. (2015) *European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States*, Congressional Research Service, Available <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44003.pdf> [Accessed 10/28/2018].
10. Belkin P. (2009), *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations*, Congressional Research Service, Available <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500983.pdf> [Accessed 10/29/2018].
11. Breitenbach D. (2016), *Germany presents new 'military roadmap'*, Deutsche Welle, Available <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-presents-new-military-roadmap/a-19397153> [Accessed 11/10/2018].
12. Bendiek A. (2017), *A Paradigm Shift in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Available https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP11_bdk.pdf [Accessed 7/29/2018].
13. Busse M. (2017), *A very big move*, How Germany ticks Deutschland, Available <https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/a-very-big-move> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
14. Borger J. & Beaumont P. (2018), *Syria: US, UK and France launch strikes in response to chemical attack*, *The Guardian*, Available <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/syria-air-strikes-us-uk-and-france-launch-attack-on-assad-regime> [Accessed 9/25/2018].
15. Brzoska M. / Ehrhart H. G. (2008), *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction*, Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF)/ Development and Peace Foundation, Available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260410studyehrhart_/sede260410studyehrhart_en.pdf [Accessed 10/12/2018].
16. Casagrande G. & Weinberger K. (2017), *Putin's Real Syria Agenda*, Institute for the Security of War, Available

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/Putins-Real-Syria-Agenda.pdf> [Accessed 7/12/2018].

17. Chalmers M. (2015), *UK Air Strikes in Syria Time for a Decision?*, *Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies*, Available https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201511_bp_uk_air_strikes_in_syria.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018].
18. Chatelot C. (2013), *La France soutient l'option militaire contre Damas*, *Le Monde Proche-Orient*, Available https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/08/28/la-france-soutient-l-option-militaire-contre-damas_3467507_3218.html [Accessed 10/10/2018].
19. Chappell L. (2012), *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Converging Security and Defence, Perspectives in an Enlarged EU*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
20. Cheetham A. (2012) *The EU in Foreign Policy; a Military or Civilian Power?* E-International Relations Students, Available <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/the-eu-in-foreign-policy-a-military-or-civilian-power/> [Accessed 9/7/2018].
21. Clark R. (2018), *Anglo-French Defence Relations are Crucial for European Defence after Brexit*, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Available <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/anglo-french-defence-relations-are-crucial-for-european-defence-after-brexit/> [Accessed 9/27/2018].
22. Coskun B. B. (2007), *DOES "STRATEGIC CULTURE" MATTER? OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY, PERCEPTIONS*, Available <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/BezenCoskun.pdf> [Accessed 10/9/2018].
23. Cowburn A. (2017), *UK involvement in Syria: Would the Government or Labour back military intervention after US air strikes?*, INDEPENDENT, Available <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-syria-military-intervention-us-air-strikes-bashar-al-assad-labour-government-political-support-a7672736.html> [Accessed 9/25/2018].
24. (2018), *COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, Turkey 2018 Report, Accompanying the document*, European Commission, Available

<https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-turkey-report.pdf> [Accessed 11/4/2018].

25. (2011) *Defence Policy Guidelines Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together*, German Ministry of Defence, Available <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/16136/0c1b6d8d0c0e6ba0aed5f0feb0af81d8/g-03-110527-vpr-engl-data.pdf> [Accessed 10/29/2018].
26. (2011), *Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic*, CIDOB International Yearbook, Available file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/241-248_ANEXO_POLITICA+DEFENSA+DE+TURQUIA_ANG.pdf [Accessed 11/5/2018].
27. Dembele A. (2016), *The French Intervention in Syria*, Perspectives on Global Issues, Available <http://pgi.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Dembele-PGI-Spring2016.pdf> [Accessed 9/25/2018].
28. Dempsey J. (2018), *Germany's No-Go Foreign Policy*, Carnegie Europe, Available <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/76091> [Accessed 10/10/2018].
29. Dinucci M. (2018), *The Militarization of the European Union: Schengen Area Handed Over to US-NATO Forces*, Global Research, Available <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-militarization-of-the-european-union-schengen-area-handed-over-to-us-nato-forces/5634742> [Accessed 9/7/2018].
30. Dosenrode S. (2012), *The European Union after Lisbon*, Aalborg University, Denmark, Ashgate Publishing Company.
31. Dufourcq J. & Kempf O. (2016), *THE EVOLUTION OF FRANCE'S POLICY IN SYRIA*, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Available <https://www.lettrevigie.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-Evolution-of-Frances-Policy-in-Syria.pdf> [Accessed 6/25/2018].

32. Dyner A. M. (2018), *The Political and Military Consequences of Russia's Involvement in Syria*, PISM, Available https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=24057 [Accessed 10/28/2018].
33. (2016), *European Union donates €4.6 million to OPCW Special Missions and the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism*, OPCW, Available <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2016/03/european-union-donates-eu46-million-opcw-special-missions-and-un-opcw> [Accessed 10/6/2018].
34. European Union (2017), *EU-Syria Relations: EU Response to the Syria Crisis*, reliefweb, Available <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/eu-syria-relations-eu-response-syria-crisis> [Accessed 10/14/2018].
35. (2018), *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*, European Commission, Available [file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/syria_2018-09-10%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/syria_2018-09-10%20(1).pdf) [Accessed 10/5/2018].
36. (2018), *European Powers Ranked by Military Strength*, GFP, Available <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-europe.asp> [Accessed 9/7/2018].
37. (2017), *EU Member States' Contributors to the Madad Fund*, European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, Available https://epthinktank.eu/2017/03/24/mapping-the-future-of-syria-state-of-play-and-options/map_no-beneficiaries_gw/ [Accessed 9/7/2018].
38. (2016), *EU Regional Trust Fund Response to the Syrian Crisis*, European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, Available https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/madad_en/ [Accessed 10/9/2018].
39. (2017), *EU steps up support for investigations into war crimes and accountability in Syria*, EU Neighbours south, Available <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/news/eu-steps-support-investigations-war-crimes-and-accountability-syria> [Accessed 10/10/2018].
40. (2017), *EU to allocate 1.5 million euros for investigation of war crimes in Syria*, Orient Net, Available https://www.orient-news.net/en/news_show/138964/0/EU-

- [to-allocate-million-euros-for-investigation-of-war-crimes-in-Syria](#) [Accessed 10/10/2018].
41. *EU response to the Syrian crisis*, EU-Syria relations, Available https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/eu-syria_fact_sheet.pdf [Accessed 10/15/2018].
 42. European External Action Service (EEAS) (2015), *Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP and the CSDP - extracts from the debate*, [Online video] Available <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3-0WKP-bn8> [11/15/2018].
 43. Erlanger S. (2016), *Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down*, New York Times, Available <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-european-union-referendum.html> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
 44. Esther B. D. (2009), *Europe's Shifting Immigration Dynamic*, Middle East Forum, Volume 16, Number 2, Available <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2009/europe-s-shifting-immigration-dynamic> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
 45. Faleg G. (2017), *THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY*, Brussels, Belgium, Palgrave Macmillan.
 46. Fandrich C. *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Common EU Response Needed*, MIGRATION POLICY CENTER, Available <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/publication/the-syrian-refugee-crisis-a-common-eu-response-needed/> [Accessed 10/10/2018].
 47. Fearon J. (2013), *Obstacles to Ending Syria's Civil War*, THE MIDDLE EAST CHANNEL, Available <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-to-ending-syrias-civil-war/> [Accessed 10/9/2018].
 48. Federal Foreign Office (2017), *Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace*, Federal Government of Germany, Available <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/290648/057f794cd3593763ea556897972574fd/170614-leitlinien-krisenpraevention-konfliktbewaeltigung-friedensfoerderung-dl-data.pdf> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
 49. Fluri P & Hadzic M. (2004), *SOURCEBOOK ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM*, Geneva/Belgrade, Collection of Papers.

50. Furtak T. F. (2015), *The Refugee Crisis - A Challenge for Europe and the World*, Journal of Civil & Legal Sciences, Available <https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/the-refugee-crisis--a-challenge-for-europe-and-the-world-2169-0170-1000163.pdf> [Accessed 10/7/2018].
51. (2017), *France's Macron holds 'frank exchange' with Putin*, BBC News, Available <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40082346> [Accessed 9/23/2018].
52. (2018), *France's Macron threatens Syria strikes if chemical weapon use proven*, BBC News, Available <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43053617> [Accessed 9/23/2018].
53. Fritze C. *Role Concepts of German Foreign Policy in the Context of European Integration: A Europeanisation of Market Power and Military Restraint?*, Available https://research.kent.ac.uk/brusselsjournal/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/09/e56233_71c06910260a4ae090fda7c71c571725.pdf [Accessed 7/9/2018].
54. *France and Syria*, France Diplomatie, Available <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/syria/france-and-syria/> [Accessed 9/22/2018].
55. (2015), *Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)*, www.cvce.eu, Available https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf [Accessed 25/6/2018].
56. (2016), *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)*, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Available http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 [Accessed 10/8/2018].
57. Galeotti M. (2017), *The Modern Russian Army 1992-2016*, New York, Oxford, Osprey Publishing.
58. *Germany presents new 'military roadmap'*, Deutsche Welle, Available <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-presents-new-military-roadmap/a-19397153> [Access 9/23/2018].

59. (2018), *Germany's Global Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*, Deutscher Bundestag, Available <https://www.bundestag.de/blob/557668/d9de6462b82653652b18fbb914834e82/wd-2-044-18-pdf-data.pdf> [Accessed 11/12/2018].
60. (2018), German -Foreign - Policy. Com, Available <https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/news/detail/7710/> [Accessed 10/7/2018].
61. (2018), German -Foreign - Policy. Com, Available <https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/news/detail/7728/> [Accessed 10/7/2018].
62. Gotkowska J. & Frymark K. (2016), *Germany's engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Available https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195953/commentary_194.pdf [Accessed 6/25/2018].
63. Grevi G., Helly D. and Keohane D. (2009), *European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)*, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, Available https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ESDP_10-web_0.pdf [Accessed 9/22/2018].
64. Glencross A. (2016), *Why the UK Voted for Brexit David Cameron's Great Miscalculation*, Birmingham, United Kingdom, Palgrave Studies.
65. Guler S. (2014), *French Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Case of Syria*, Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM), Available http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-43-2014052043analyses_1131.pdf [Accessed 9/22/2018].
66. Havlova R. (2015), *THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CRISIS IN SYRIA*, SOUCASNA EVROPA, Available [file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/123%20\(3\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/123%20(3).pdf) [Accessed 10/5/2018].
67. Hau S. A. (2016), *A New Russian Strategy: "Why Putin is in Syria"*, Strategy Research Project, Available <http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/827.pdf> [Accessed 10/6/2018].
68. Hague W., Mitchell A. and Fox L. (2011), *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, Department for International Development, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Available https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach_data/file/20110727/130622main.pdf [Accessed 10/6/2018].

- [achment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf](#) [Accessed 10/19/2018].
69. Hall M. (2018), *What is the role of the nation-state in globalization?*, INVESTOPEDIA, Available <https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/022415/what-role-nationstate-globalization.asp> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
70. Himmrich J. (2016), *Britain as a Global actor after Brexit - LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe*, LSE, Available https://www.academia.edu/25986217/Britain_as_a_Global_actor_after_Brexit_-_LSE_Commission_on_the_Future_of_Britain_in_Europe [Accessed 10/29/2018].
71. Jarvinen S. (2015), *EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN SOLVING THE SYRIAN CRISIS – REASONS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL INTERFERENCE*, TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY School of Economics and Business Administration Department of International Relations Chair of European Studies, Available [file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Euroopa+Liit+S%C3%BC%C3%BCria+kriisi+i+lahendamisel%253A+nurjunud+sekkumise+p%C3%B5hused%20\(7\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Euroopa+Liit+S%C3%BC%C3%BCria+kriisi+i+lahendamisel%253A+nurjunud+sekkumise+p%C3%B5hused%20(7).pdf) [Accessed 10/4/2018].
72. Johan D. van der Vyver (2014), *MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH ALTERNATIVES AND THE RUSSIAN OPTION*, Available http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/news/2014/johan_vd_vyver_lecture_12march_2014_military_intervention_Syria.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018].
73. (2014), *Justice and Home Affairs*, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Available https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143119.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018].
74. Kilian B. (2007), *'Civilian Power' or Something Else? The European Union on its way beyond 'Civilian Power'*, LUND UNIVERSITY Department of

- Political Science, Available <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1321641&fileId=1321642> [Accessed 10/15/2018].
75. Kaim M. (2012), *Die Krise in Syrien – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen militärischen Eingreifens*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Available https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A11_kim.pdf [Accessed 8/20/2018].
76. Koenig N. (2017), *FRANCE AND GERMANY: SPEARHEADING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION?* Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, Available <https://dokumen.tips/documents/policy-paper-202-19-july-2017-france-and-and-germany-spearheading-a-european.html> [Accessed 9/23/2018].
77. Kochenov D. (2012), *THE APPLICATION OF EU LAW IN THE EU'S OVERSEAS REGIONS, COUNTRIES, AND TERRITORIES AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY OF LISBON*, The Application of EU Law, Available <https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=ilr> [Accessed 10/9/2018].
78. Legrand J. (2015), *IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS Will CSDP enjoy 'collateral gains' from France's invocation of the EU's 'mutual defence clause'?*, European Parliament, Available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570452/EXPO_IDA%282015%29570452_EN.pdf [Accessed 7/29/2018].
79. (2018), *Les ministres de la Defense des pays de l' OTAN prennent des decisions destinees a renforcer l'Alliance*, Organisation du Traite de l' Atlantique Nord, Available https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/news_152125.htm?selectedLocale=fr [Accessed 10/8/2018].
80. Matlary J. (2009), *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest*, New York, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
81. Maier S. & Schmidt-Feuerheerd B. (2016), *Dirasat, Germany's Foreign and Security Policy in Syria and Iraq, 2011-2016*, King Faisal Center for research

- and Islamic Studies, Available
<https://www.kfcris.com/pdf/60baeb7eca8a858cebea57461ebe52e45832d81a55c4e.pdf> [Accessed 10/7/2018].
82. McGreal C. & Chulov M. (2011), *Syria: Assad must resign, says Obama*, The Guardian, Available <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
83. Milton D. (2016). *Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Available <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Daniel%20Milton%20-%20Communication%20Breakdown.pdf> [Accessed 9/2/2018].
84. Mogherini F. *High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy Vice-President of the European Commission*, www.eeas.europa.eu, Available http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/foreword_hrvp_en.pdf [Accessed 10/19/2018].
85. Mountford S. (2012), *Brixit-Is Britain a Mid-Atlantic Island, or a Part of Europe?* GLOBELSCAN, Available <https://globescan.com/brixitis-britain-a-mid-atlantic-island-or-a-part-of-europe/> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
86. Merrill J. (2014), *Syria crisis: Britain's response to humanitarian disaster 'woefully inadequate', says coalition of leading charities in open letter to David Cameron*, INDEPENDENT, Available <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/syria-crisis-britain-s-response-to-humanitarian-disaster-is-shameful-say-coalition-of-leading-9885652.html> [Accessed 9/23/2018].
87. Nawaz S. (2018) *GERMANY: BETWEEN TWO COMPETING NARRATIVES*, INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ISLAMABAD, Available http://issi.org.pk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/IB_Shamsa_May_10_2018.pdf [10/31/2018].
88. (2016), *New EU package of more than €200 million to support one million refugees from Syria in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon*, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE, Available http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20160622_2_en.pdf [Accessed 10/9/2018].

89. (2018), *North Africa and Middle East*, KfW Development bank Available <https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-Development-Bank/Local-presence/North-Africa-and-Middle-East/index-2.html> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
90. Nye J. (2004), *SOFT POWER The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
91. Nye J. (2010), *Get Smart Combining Hard and Soft Power*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Published by the Council of Foreign Relations, Available <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Joseph%20Nye.%20-%20Get%20Smart%20Combining%20Hard%20and%20Soft%20Power%20.pdf> [Accessed 10/19/2018].
92. (2016), *NATO Commander: Russia uses Syrian refugees as 'weapon' against West*, Deutsche Welle, Available <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-commander-russia-uses-syrian-refugees-as-weapon-against-west/a-19086285> [Accessed 10/6/2018].
93. Ozer Y. (2012), *THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A CIVILIAN POWER: THE CASE OF THE EU'S TRADE POLICY*, MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES, Volume 20, Available <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/1310> [Accessed 9/7/2018].
94. Pawlak P. (2017), *Mapping the future of Syria State of play and options*, European Parliamentary Research Service, Available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599362/EPRS_BR I%282017%29599362_EN.pdf [Accessed 10/9/2018].
95. Perrineau P. (2016), *THE 2012 FRENCH ELECTION*, Paris, Palgrave Macmillan.
96. Per M. Norheim – Martinsen (2007), *European Strategic Culture Revisited: The Ends and Means of a Militarised European Union*, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Available https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99431/DSS_0307.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 10/21/2018].
97. *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges A SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS FROM SEVEN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS*, International dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding, Available

- https://www.pbsdialogue.org/media/filer_public/54/bb/54bb413c-f64d-481e-8ad1-d75bed08be34/a_synthesis_of_findings_from_seven_multi-stakeholder_consultations_en.pdf [Accessed 7/12/2018].
98. Phillips C. (2016), *THE BATTLE FOR SYRIA*, NEW HAVEN AND LONDON, YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
99. (2017), *Press conference: by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defense Ministers*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Available https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_148417.htm [Accessed 10/8/2018].
100. Ralph J., Holland J. and Zhekova K. (2017), *Before the vote. UK foreign policy discourse on Syria 2011-2013*, White Rose University of Consortium Universities of Leeds, Sheffield & York, Available <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/112062/3/Ralph%25252C%2520Holland%2520and%2520Zhekova%2520Before%2520the%2520vote%2520prepublication%2520version.pdf> [Accessed 7/12/2018].
101. Reuters Staff (2018), *German minister urges Russia to cooperate in solving Syria crisis*, Reuters, Available <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-germany/german-minister-urges-russia-to-cooperate-in-solving-syria-crisis-idUSKBN1HS00L> [Accessed 7/12/2018].
102. (2011), *REGULATIONS*, Official Journal of the European Union, Available <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:121:0001:0010:EN:PDF> [Accessed 10/5/2018].
103. Rehn O. (2008), *The EU – from civilian power to premier league security policy player?*, Forum of Heads of Mission, SPEECH/08/399 Available [file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/SPEECH-08-399_EN%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/SPEECH-08-399_EN%20(1).pdf) [Accessed 10/18/2018]
104. Rittelmeyer Y. S. (2017), *Will Brexit revive the Franco-German engine?*, EUROPEAN UNION CENTER, Available http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7379_brexitfranco-germanengine.pdf?doc_id=1816 [Accessed 10/12/2018].

105. RT America (2015), *France continues military strikes against ISIS in wake of Paris attack*, [Online video] Available <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sjKCNkfezSU> [10/15/2018].
106. Sayigh Y. (2013), *The Syrian Opposition's Leadership Problem*, CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER, Available https://carnegieendowment.org/files/syrian_leadership_problem.pdf [Accessed 10/9/2018].
107. Schweiger C. (2007), *Britain, Germany and the Future of the European Union*, University of Durham, UK, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
108. Scott L. (2015), *The effects of Russian intervention in the Syria crisis*, GSDRC, Available https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08991ed915d622c0002a7/D_FID-Russia-Syria.pdf [Accessed 7/12/2018].
109. Scott S. (2016), *BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA: ITS IMPORTANCE, ITS DISTINCTIVENESS AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE POLICY OF OTHER ACTORS IN THE REGION*, University of St Andrews, Available <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/9903/SarahScottPhDThesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y> [Accessed 10/31/2018].
110. (2015), *Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks*, United Nations Security Council, Available <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
111. Smale A. (2017), *Germany to Withdraw Forces From Incirlik Base in Turkey*, The New York Times, Available <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/europe/germany-turkey-air-base.html> [Accessed 10/8/2018].
112. Shurkin M. (2017), *The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics*, RAND Corporation, Available https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1629/RAND_RR1629.pdf [Accessed 9/10/2018].

113. Smith E. K. (2000), *The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?*, THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, VOLUME XXXV, Available <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126120/smith.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/2018].
114. Smith B. (2011), *The Arab uprisings*, HOUSE OF COMMON Library, Available <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/RP11-73.pdf> [Accessed 10/12/2018].
115. Strashun S. D. (2013), *The Recognition of the Syrian National Coalition under International Law: Whether the National Coalition Can Receive Arms*, Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law, Available https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.gr/&httpsredir=1&article=1312&context=student_scholarship [Accessed 10/12/2018].
116. Stewart B. M. and Zhukov Y. M. (2009), *Use of force and civil-military relations in Russia: an automated content analysis*, Routledge Taylor & Francis, Vol. 20, No. 2, Available https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/zhukov/files/2009_StewartZhukov_SWI.pdf [Accessed 11/5/2018].
117. (2018), *Syria: EU calls for accountability after yet another chemical attack*, European Union External Action, Available https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/42657/syria-eu-calls-accountability-after-yet-another-chemical-attack_en [Accessed 10/5/2018].
118. (2018), *SYRIA: Displacement in northwestern Syria*, START NETWORK acaps, Available https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20180122_acaps_briefing_note_displacement_in_northwestern_syria.pdf [Accessed 6/22/2018].
119. (2018), *Syria air strikes: Emmanuel Macron says Bashar al-Assad crossed 'red line' with attack on citizens*, Independent, Available <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/syria-air-strikes-latest->

- [emmanuel-macron-donald-trump-theresa-may-assad-douma-chemical-weapons-a8304371.html](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35642639) [Accessed 10/7/2018].
120. (2016), *Syria conflict: Truce, cessation or ceasefire?*, BBC News, Available <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35642639> [Accessed 5/10/2018].
121. Tewes H. (2002), *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe Enlarging Nato and the European Union*, New York, PALGRAVE.
122. (2018), *The EU and the crisis in Syria*, European Commission, Available https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018_04_16_syria_factsheet.pdf [Accessed 9/7/2018].
123. (2018), *THE EU FACILITY FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY*, European Commission, Available https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/frit_factsheet.pdf [Accessed 10/5/2018].
124. Turkmani R. & Haid M. (2016), *The role of the EU in the Syrian conflict*, FES, LSE, etc SIT, Available https://www.fes-europe.eu/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/events/Maerz_2016/FES_LSE_Syria_Turkmani_Haid_2016_02_23.pdf [Accessed 10/7/2018].
125. *The NATO-EU Strategic Partnership*, Available <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/006.pdf> [Accessed 6/25/2018].
126. (2017), *The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects*, Congressional Research Service, Available https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170227_R44249_adcab104d89bd3f2e67fd05dc3be3d11c933b66c.pdf [Accessed 10/7/2018].
127. Telo M. (2006), *Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order*, New York, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
128. Tocci N. (2017), *Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World*, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, Rome.

129. (2017), *The European Union steps up its support for investigations into war crimes and accountability in Syria*, European Commission - Press release, Available http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2069_en.htm [Accessed 10/6/2018].
130. Tsvetkova M. & Sezer C (2018), *Russia, Germany, France and Turkey call for lasting ceasefire, constitutional meeting for Syria*, REUTERS, Available <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/russia-germany-france-and-turkey-call-for-lasting-ceasefire-constitutional-meeting-for-syria-idUSKCN1N10HU> [Accessed 10/28/2018].
- 131.(2018), *U.S. Relations With Germany*, U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action, Available <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm> [Accessed 10/7/2018].
- 132.Utley R. (2016), *France, Syria and R2P: Challenge, Contention and Conflict*, School of History, University of Leeds, Available file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/BISA_2016_presentation_France,_Syria_and_R2P_Rachel_Utley.pdf [Accessed 10/7/2018].
- 133.Von der Leyen U. (2016), *WHITE PAPER: ON GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR*, The Federal Government, Available <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf> [Accessed 10/8/2018].
- 134.Waugh T. (2004 & 2009), *Berlin Plus agreement*, NATO, Available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus/_berlinplus_en.pdf [Accessed 10/7/2018].
135. Whitman G. Richard (2016), *Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Available https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_3_WhitmanOA.pdf [Accessed 6/25/2018].
- 136.Wright N. (2011), *GERMANY AND THE CFSP: THE ACCIDENTAL LEADER?*, School of Political, Social & International Studies University of

East

Anglia,

https://www.academia.edu/976168/Germany_and_the_CFSP_The_Accidental_Leader [Accessed 8/20/2018].

137. Wright N. (2017), *BREXIT & THE RE-MAKING OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY*, UCL EUROPEAN INSTITUTE, Available https://www.ucl.ac.uk/drupal/site_european-institute/sites/european-institute/files/working-paper-foreign-policy.pdf [Accessed 11/10/2018].

138. Youngs R. (2014), *The EU and International Conflicts*, CARNEGIE EUROPE, Available <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55341> [Accessed 10/7/2018].

139. Youssef B. (2017), *French role in the Syrian crisis: Escalation of the conflict with Russia*, Available https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324388924_French_role_in_the_Syrian_crisis_Escalation_of_the_conflict_with_Russia [Accessed 10/12/2018].

140. Zimmermann L. (2009), *BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY: PRIORITIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY*, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, Available <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514324.pdf> [Accessed 9/7/2018].