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Almost 50 years after Munich. The ever-increasing demands of risk management at mega-sporting events. The perspective of both athletes and officials

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SUMMARY

Nearly fifty years after the terrorist attack at the Munich Games of 1972, safety became a sensitive topic for the organizers, National Olympic Committees and athletes. Security measures were even more tightened after non sport-related attacks, such as 9/11, which have left their mark on the sport environment. The Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup, and Athletics Championships are among competitions which appeal to a large number of spectators and have an important presence in the international media. The significance of the media was recognized by terrorist groups, who became media savvy, using the exposure of the event to spread and highlight their ideas. The need to control large crowds, the nature of sport events, the introduction of new surveillance technologies became an important part of the bidding process for future candidates of mega -sporting events. The added security measures were seen by some groups as a violation, or abuse, of human rights. The welfare of the athletes, who are very susceptible to terrorism, is one of the major priorities for the organizers of Olympic Games. Therefore, in this research it will be investigated how the athletes, the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and organizers deal with the notion of terrorism, and to what extent the three groups rely on each other.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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List of Acronyms

CCTV - Closed-circuit television

DDoS - Distributed denial of Service

FBI - The Federal Bureau of Investigation

FIFA - Fédération Internationale de Football Association

FIFA WC - FIFA World Cup

IOC - The International Olympic Committee

MSE - Mega-sporting events

NOC - National Olympic Committee

OG - Olympic Games

Pan Am - The Pan American Games

SOG - Summer Olympic Games

UEFA - The Union of European Football Associations

UEFA EURO – UEFA European Championship

WC – World Cup

WG - Winter Games

1 INTRODUCTION

According to the American psychologist Abraham Maslow (1943), security is one of the five basic human needs. It is also one of the main concerns of the organizing committees of mega-sporting events (MSE). The need to control large crowds, the nature of sport events, the introduction of new surveillance technologies can be seen in the ever-growing budgets that forced the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to implement Agenda 2020[1] to reduce financial costs.

No event is one - hundred percent risk free. The Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup, and Athletics Championships are among competitions which appeal to a large number of spectators and have an important presence in the international media. The significance of the media was recognized by terrorist groups, who became media savvy, using the exposure of the event to spread and highlight their ideas. The media, as well, used that opportunity to negatively describe hosts of the Olympic Games which are not one of the western countries.

Strong securitization and surveillance measures were implemented by committees that organized the MSE in order to effectively mitigate threats. However, those endeavors had a much longer-term negative impact upon people's civil rights and liberties in the host countries. Not sport-related attacks have left their mark on the sport environment as well. The notion of risk was present not only during the event but long before it, thereby influencing spectators and governing bodies as well as athletes. The latter, being the main component of the sporting spectacle, need to be focused on giving their best performance, while the organizing team has to work behind the scenes to provide them an appropriate environment to do so.

The overall aim of this research is to discover to what extent the athletes, NOCs and organizers are familiar with the notion of terrorism, what NOCs are doing for the safety of

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[1] Agenda 2020 it is a document with 40 recommendations for the future of the Olympic Movement. One of the key areas addressed there is: reducing costs for bidding.

athletes, do they rely mostly on Organizing Committee, are athletes prone to the terrorist threats? Questions such as the following were asked of selected participants: Is terrorism spoken about during the Olympic cycle? To what extent does the elevated security have an impact on performance? How were the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) preparing athletes for the most important event in their career? How do they find the right balance between security of an athlete and their focus on the competition? A full list of questions can be found in the Appendix.

This emphasis on those actively involved in MSE is where my research differs from, and expands on, the works discussed in the Literary Review (below), There is comparatively little literature and research written on this topic and the one existing does not include asking athletes directly or Chefs de mission. This mutual interdependence is unmistakable one of the main factors which contribute to the final performance of an athlete.

After the most notorious example of terrorism in sport at the Munich Games of 1972, safety became a sensitive topic for the NOCs. In order to provide safety for their athletes, the Committees are not always willing to share information about their procedures, considering the security of their delegation to be of utmost importance. To some degree, this secrecy will also be a boundary for this paper. The limited access to the biggest delegations at the Summer and Winter Games may influence the outcome of this research.

1.1. Thesis overview

This thesis consists of five chapters, in addition to the Bibliography and Appendix. The chapters are structured as it follows:

Chapter 2 overlooks the relevant literature. It is divided into six subsections that outline relevant aspects of the topic of interest. It provides a basis for an understanding of the concept of security, risk management, security planning and threats connected with organization of mega-sporting events (MSE). It also briefly introduces the general comparison between the biggest sport events and their hosting countries in terms of security measures. In this chapter the impact of securitization on Human Rights in the host cities is also pointed out. The last section will focus on militarization of sport events and

connection between sport and terrorism as well as the big influence of the media and media relations with terrorism.

Chapter 3 describes the methodologies chosen for my research study and data collection, mainly based on semi-structured interviews and written data.

Chapter 4 provides the data analysis and findings. The profile of respondents and their answers are presented in reference to the main topic of the research.

Chapter 5 draws the main conclusions of the study, summarize and reflect on the research and also makes recommendations for future works and suggests interesting issue to be covered.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section is based on secondary sources. It provides the basis for understanding how security and safety is provided at mega-sporting events, what kind of risk is connected with it, which events influenced the way surveillance is introduced, what kind of threats it brings and what is the connection between sport, terrorism and the media.

2.1 Risk Management and Assessment

The increasing importance of risk management in sporting events has been growing for the past years due to the amount of conflicts, threats and terrorism. At the same time, there is a rapid increase in the number of candidates to host sporting events. This is connected with globalization and the resultant pressure on cities and countries to become players at the international level (Whitson & Macintosh, 1996).

2.1.1. Risk Management

Risk management as a concept was developed in the 1950s. It was connected with space programs and finance. Later on, it was applied to the insurance industry and other disciplines.

The International Organization for Standardization defines risk management as a coordinated activity regarding the supervision and direction of an organization in relation to risk, which includes the definition of context, risk assessment (identification, analysis and assessment of risk) and risk treatment (ISO 31000, 2018). Risk estimation is a necessary element to take mitigating actions while risk management itself is proactive, serving to control unforeseen events. This control of the impact that takes place within a project is seen by Getz (2005) and Wideman (1992) as the objective of risk management. It is both necessary and prudent to view sport management beyond the traditional view of managing sports (Toohey & Taylor, 2008). Thus, risk management has emerged as a key

consideration for those staging sport events, not only for safety purposes but also for generating positive legacy outcomes, including those servicing economic, social, environmental and health agendas (Hassan, 2013).

According to Chappelet (2001), the complexity, duration and cost of the event and the number of existing risks make the many areas of uncertainty inevitable. Hence, the Olympic Intelligence Center was created within the organizing committee to provide intelligence-based risk management and identify and prioritize all Games related risks. For Leopkey and Parent (2009), risk management involves assessment of all possible risks to the events and its stakeholders by strategically anticipating, preventing, minimizing, and planning responses to mitigate those identified risks (p. 199). They were the first ones to focus on stakeholders, before scholars mainly analyzed the risk from the host's perspective. The complexity of balancing risk management and the safety of patrons is firmly situated within legislation, contractual stipulations by event owners such as IOC, FIFA, F1, local regulations and resource considerations. Within this multifaceted milieu, sport event managers must make decisions that satisfy these various requirements as part of the growing expectations and needs of a range of stakeholders (Toohey & Taylor, 2008). In the Olympic context, a wide range of stakeholders are put "at risk" throughout the course of event planning, procurement, delivery and operations (cost over-runs, delays and shortfalls). Accordingly, institutions are highly attuned to risk given the potential for blame when things go wrong (Jennings, 2012).

Traditionally, risk management has been seen as a systematic and analytical process to manage threats that could endanger an asset, individual or facility and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequential financial and personal injury loss (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). However. since risk management is a proactive process it forces event managers to deal with the various risks by planning for every possible contingency, regardless of how remote (Boyle, Haggerty, 2009). Leopkey and Parent (2009) identified 15 risk issue categories: environment, financial, human resources,

infrastructure, interdependence, legacy, media, operations, organizing, participation, political, relationships, sport, threats, and visibility.

Herb Appenzeller, one of the first authors who connected risk management with sport, describes risk in his book Risk *management in sport,* as "an element of danger", and management as all "the strategies one can consider for dealing with such risk" (2005, p. 13). Scholars have noticed as well that risk should not be associated only with violent activities, as it also includes elements of financial risk associated with costs and revenues of the event, risk to property (i.e. venue and equipment), political risk, marketing and sponsorship and host/destination image (Chang & Singh, 1990). The sporting event adds to that some more aspects: ticket sales, sponsor services, athlete services, hospitality, operations, site management, concessions, finance, support services, advertising, promotions, media relations, insurance and unforeseeable events such as weather (Appenzeller, 2005; Leopkey & Parent, 2009). Therefore, as Klauser (2013) noticed, risk and security issues are not pregiven or value-free, but shaped by complex relationships and interactions bringing together various actors and interests. Risk management has become a crucial part of the sport program which includes budgeting, scheduling, insurance coverage, eligibility, equipment and facility management, contract, and other duties (Appenzeller, 2005).

Many MSE carry an intrinsic level of risk that can be increased by disaffected individuals and determined groups with external support. The risk, as mentioned above, is not only connected with threats and attacks. Johnson (2006) adds the delays in construction and planning place, significant limits on the number and range of drills that security teams can perform to test the effectiveness of their plans before the event takes place.

Key elements of risk management are strategy and tactics (Leopkey & Parent, 2009). They not only help to deal with the issues as they arise but also they are a course of action (Appenzeller, 2005). Since every event is unique and different, the strategies have to be

constantly reevaluated. There are 5 approaches identified by Berlonghi which are used to deal with risk in events: avoidance, reduction, prevention, separation/duplication, and transference (Leopkey & Parent, 2009). A good strategy should be identifiable and clear, unique, consistent with the organization's ability and available resources, have manageable levels of risk, and be appropriate (Andrews, 1987). There are two main steps in the building of a strategy: formulation and implementation. In the table below are presented various risk strategy categories and their specific subcomponents.

Descriptions of Risk Strategy Categories in Events by Organizing Committee Members and Other Stakeholders	
Risk Strategy Category	Specific Subcomponents
Reduction	Planning, clear organizational goals, training, staffing, controlling, test events, communication, education, facility management, previous experience, accreditation
Avoidance	Research and evaluation, individual event assessments, risk assessment
Reallocation	Transferring risk or responsibility for risk to somebody else
Diffusion	Spreading out of risk, creation of back-ups
Prevention	Rules and regulations, replacement, bans
Legal	Insurance, laws, contracts/agreements
Relationships	Negotiation, cooperation, meeting stakeholder needs, stakeholder engagement, partnerships

Table 1. Description of Risk Strategies in Events by Organizing Committee Members and other Stakeholders (source: Leopkey and Parent (2009).

2.1.2. Risk Assessment

The threats which are most likely to happen or which pose the greatest consequences will be addressed by the management team; however, the dynamic political and social context for various MSE makes it difficult to validate the findings of any security risk assessment therefore, the great uncertainty about the sufficiency of security measures for future events will always remain (Johnson, 2006).

The greatest change in sport management was influenced by the attacks of 9/11 in the USA. Many new methods and strategies used in risk management appeared after 2001. Since then, the security planning dilemma for the contemporary sport event manager is how to balance the legislative requirements of risk management, escalating security and surveillance expectations associated with planning for every contingency, irrespective of how remote, with that of realistic risk assessment and the individual sport event attendees' quality of experience (Jayawardhana, 2016).

Johnson (2006) identifies 3 stages which risk assessment consists of:

1.   rehearsals - range of security plans are being rehearsed, gradually refined over time

2.   focus on the hazard scenarios associated with different threats

3.   the likelihood of detection: consideration whether or not particular threats are more likely than others.

Another tool to use within risk management was developed by Christian Hood. It is called: NATO (nodality, authority, treasure and organization). The tools are chosen depending on the functional requirements and risk profile of the particular event (Jennings & Lodge 2011)

One of the methods that started to be used in events planning is called "Table topping". It involves planning for all possible scenarios, providing the potential solutions for unknown situations that can happen during an event (Smith, Bowers, Naquin, & Gillan, 2017). According to risk assessments produced by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, the threat posed by terrorist organizations was recognized as one of the main risks to the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games. In order to confront it, the Brazilian government was forced to seek original solutions appropriate for its domestic scenario and consistent with its own interagency dynamics. The nation's particularities suggested caution against merely incorporating foreign dogmas and precepts or adopting predefined solutions at the

risk of producing unrealistic expectations that would have been completely incongruous with the country's reality (Visacro, 2017).

Jennings and Lodge (2011) highlight the fact that there are, therefore, important differences in the security uncertainties and threats that confront the organizers of sporting mega-events which are influenced by geo-political conflicts and domestic or international terrorism making the risk assessment context- specific.

Before the London Olympic Games of 2012, a classified cross-government document was created. It incorporated expertise from a wide range of Government departments and agencies. In this document OSSSRA (The Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment) identified risks to the Games from five distinct areas:

• Terrorism;

• Serious and organized crime;

• Domestic extremism;

• Public disorder;

• Major accidents and natural events.

The Risk Identification and Mitigation Process which can be used by MSE organizers is tailored for the specific requirements of hosting the Games and it follows a three - stage approach:

●   Phase 1 – Identifying the Risks - identification, assessment, comparison of the risks;

●   Phase 2 – Mitigating the Risks - Strategic Design Requirements - reducing the likelihood of it occurring or reducing its impact should it occur;

●   Phase 3 – Understanding Residual Risk - risk reduction assessment (Home Office, 2011)

FIFA, however, stipulates that risk assessment of its events should include consideration

of and the preparation of contingency plans for the following factors (FIFA, 2013, pp. 21–22):

- Political tensions at national,

- local or team supporter level,

- Terrorist threats,

- Historical enmity between teams or their supporters,

- Crowd control,

- Emergency evacuation,

- Severe adverse weather,

- Natural disasters

The table below presents how various organizing committees handled risk management.

Olympiad	Institutional Management of Risk
1988 Calgary	Risk Management Committee responsible for the identification, analysis and mitigation of risk: focused on exposures relating to people, public and property. Maintained a central record of losses, undertook risk assessments and managed risk through risk financing (insurance) and loss control (hazard assessment, safety training, contingency planning).
1992 Albertville	Risk Management conducted within the insurance department of the organizing committee, focused on management of insurable risk. Processes built on risk assessment, risk minimalization (and mitigation) and risk transfer through insurance.
1992 Barcelona	Development of a risk management plan contracted out to an external consultant, with the risk management plan organized around risk assessment, mitigation and transfer.
1994 Lillehammer	No formal division focused on risk management within the organizing committee, exposure to risk dealt with in the terms of insurance against financial liabilities.
1996 Atlanta	Separate risk management division tasked with risk assessment, risk transfer (i.e. Insurance), risk mitigation (loss control, e.g. Safety training and compliance monitoring), and risk administration (i.e. Records management).
2000 Sydney	Risk management programme developed under the Finance Division of the organizing committee undertook risk assessment and analysis, risk transfer (insurance), and mitigation (contingency and safety planning).
2002 Salt Lake City	Separate risk management division tasked within the organizing committee responsible for management of financial risk, undertaken through development of a comprehensive insurance programme and liaison with external partners to develop loss controls (e.g. venue owners, state government).
2004 Athens	Risk management section created under the Financial Services division of the Athens organizing committee, responsible for insurance and health and safety and contingency planning.
2006 Turin	Risk management function of the organizing committee was responsible for risk assessment, design of insurance cover, loss controls and safety programmes.

2008 Beijing	Risk management conducted under the Project Management division of the organizing committee, taking the form of risk identification, development of a risk management system (ROMS) o map risk procurement and loss control (e.g. Safety inspections and emergency planning).
2010 Vancouver	Risk management was consolidated within the organizing committee, implementing the Enterprise Risk Management standard through a 'top-down' mandate, encompassing risk assessment, audit and assurance, risk transfer and mitigation, and loss controls (e.g. contingency planning).
2012 London	Risk management conducted under the Risk Committee of the organizing committee (with support from external consultants, Deloitte & Touche and KPMG), implementing a risk management framework for the identification of risk and conducting regular risk assurance (i.e. internal audit) (cf. LOCOG 2009:37). Management of procurement risks also undertaken through the ODA which maintains a risk management system combined with audit and assurance functions.

Table 2. Risk management by Olympic Organizing Committees 1988–2012 (source: Jennings 2012, p.19)

Risk management has always been infused with guesswork. The global profile of MSE has generated a precautionary mind-set of "high consequence aversion" or "worst case scenarios" that drive increasingly expensive, expansive and militarized security apparatuses designed to protect the event from all possible risks. The new calculus [of risk] is no longer focusing on the past: "What was"?, nor the present: "What is"? Instead, security assessments are directed by the question: "What if "?" (Boyle & Haggerty, 2012).

2.2. Surveillance, Crowd control, Human rights

A myriad written academic sources cover the topic of surveillance and security at MSE. Researchers have tried to investigate and analyze the deployment of surveillance technologies, law enforcement and human rights abuses, which were observed alongside the organization of MSE. In the following paragraphs the main findings will be presented.

2.2.1. Human Rights

Not all the security measures are human. Anti-terrorist strategies have an impact upon the civil liberties of citizens. MSE have the power and platform to promote human rights.

Over the years there have been many successful practices, however, across the life-cycle of a sport event, its planning and delivery. The organizing committee is facing challenges, which many times are leading to deployment of solutions and measures not in accordance with human rights.

The most common definition of human rights created by the United Nations states that all human beings are entitled to liberty and freedom of expression regardless of nationality, religion, sex or any other status. Major events, however, often provide a situation in which it is deemed justifiable to invoke more stringent restrictions than usual upon those rights (StateWatch, 2012). Yet, there were many cases which brought out the abuses of human rights and were related to the security of MSE.

In the report of the MSE Platform for Human Rights, challenges such as: the excessive use of force by the police, freedom of expression and protest, restrictive legislation, the use of land, exploitation of migrant workers were identified. Amis (2017), describing the *microcosm of the human rights* at MSE and the inherent risk it carries, lists also forced evictions, resettlement issues and housing rights abuses during land acquisition and development, and manufacture of assorted goods and services. Consequently, it may lead to negative diplomatic action such as to boycott the opening ceremony by world leaders in protest at a range of human rights issues (Houlihan & Giulianotti, 2012).

The tenets of democracy, tolerance for state intervention and respect for human rights are different in each host city. Athens, Beijing, Delhi or Sydney when compared vary significantly (Jayawardhana, 2016). During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the government was criticized for its human rights record. In response the establishment of "protest zones" was highlighted. However, protestors were required to take serious personal risks by applying in advance for the right to protest (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010). In the run-up to the London Olympics, the authorities considered "peaceful protests" – along with terrorism – as one of the biggest threats (StateWatch, 2012). Whereas in the Sochi

protests, demonstrations and rallies that are not part of Olympic activities were banned in Olympic spaces with the setting up of a so-called "forbidden zone" (or controlled zones), established by a presidential decree which argued they were essential to "guarantee security" (Coaffee, 2015). Houlihan and Giulianotti (2012) pointed out that the Olympic legislation of London 2012 may undermine human rights to political protest or self-expression and potentially undermine the government's ambition to use the Olympic Games to enhance the country's reputation for "values of tolerance, moderation and openness".

Athletes are also subject to human rights violations such as: discrimination—off and on the field of play or limitations on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Concerns about the protection of human rights of athletes have been raised after the selection of Sochi as WG and WC host. Possible restrictions that may violate human rights include intrusive electronic surveillance such as the monitoring of cell phone calls and Internet transactions; extensive video surveillance of movement into and out of Olympic sites (CRS Report, 2014).

2.2.2. Surveillance and crowd control

The crime that has happened, or is expected to happen, are among the reasons why surveillance technologies have become a central component of MSE. From the one side the security measures are unavoidable yet protective, on the other side they have been considered as repressive.

Surveillance has been an important part of the security system at MSE since the Summer Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976. There, surveillance cameras were used for the first time to monitor dangerous crowd density and to assist with the coordination of emergency responders. Since that event, technology has advanced together with the ambivalent interference into the lives of people attending the venue or simply living in the host city or

host country.

The advancement of crowd control strategy could be seen at Euro '96 and at events that followed (FIFA WC 2006, EURO 2008 and SOG 2012). The so-called "hoolivans" (anti-hooligan measures) were implemented as one of the policing strategies internationally, notably by mobile surveillance. Another technological innovation, highly criticized by some, was the use of Face Recognition. As at Super Bowl XXXV in 2001, where CCTV was used to scan the crowd. Three years later, the security system called "C4Isystem", used by the organizing committee of Athens in 2004, included thousands of computers, cameras equipped with automated behavior-recognition software and microphones, able to analyze dozens of languages (Klauser, 2007). Most mega-sporting events have used surveillance helicopters or unmanned aircrafts for surveillance of the public in the stadium and around the host city (Hassan, 2012). In London during the 2012 OG, advanced surveillance was used by the authorities to track suspects across the city including the system of Automatic Number Plate Recognition cameras (Fussey, 2007). Even at the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, biometric scanners were used to monitor atmospheric gamma radiation and FBI supplied communication systems.

After the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, the Olympic Games in Athens had to face the challenge of making secure one of the biggest sport spectacles. In order to give assurance to the rest of the world, the "panoptic fortress" was deployed (Samatas, 2011). Afterwards, Olympic Parks often were turned into fortified perimeters (Fussey, 2015).

The integrated surveillance started to control even behavior (Coaffee & Fussey 2010). As Klauser (2013) was focusing on analyzing how people and objects are mobilized, monitored and filtered between fortified places, Foucault (2007) was working on the way security operates to delineate "good" and "bad" flows as they circulate the city. It was connected with the process of circulation which gained more importance after the UEFA Euro 2008, where a wider urban setting of security practices was added to a key factor

alongside closing off and sanctifying certain territories (Coaffee & Fussey 2010).

The contingency of place is one of the main factors which shape and is shaped by security and surveillance practices (Klauser, 2013). For the duration of the event occasionally some host countries or cities suspend normal human rights' safeguards. The heterogeneity of the milieu of urban mega-event, the dynamic character of a place or its complexity make plans of territorial control and regimes of proscription impossible to realize. MSE organizers will not be able to please all stakeholders. Given its recent choices – Beijing, Sochi, and Qatar – it is unrealistic to expect that sports governing bodies will vote for or against future hosts solely on the grounds of human rights. Yet, there is mounting pressure to take human rights' concerns more systematically into account. Bennett and Haggerty (2011) notice that at the expense of human rights and civil liberties, the Games have been transformed into security and surveillance Games. This has led to a significant post-event legacy in regard to rights and freedoms, with wider implications for democracy (Samatas, 2011).

2.3. Security Planning/ Securitization/Cybersecurity

2.3.1. Security planning

Since the 1984 Winter Games in Sarajevo, the International Olympic Committee has taken a more active role in security planning (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012). Prior to the Munich Games of 1972, security generally meant crowd control, and fences around the Olympic Village erected essentially to keep the curious from bothering the athletes, not terrorists. For the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, security was so extensive that "the Olympic Village might well have been a prison camp" (Galily, Yarchi, Tamir, & Samuel-Azran, 2016). The after-effect of attacks in Munich made the Olympic Games a standard-setter for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism in society in

general (Selliaas, 2005). The measures required were much more strict. Logistics were more complex. Costs increased, and some effects for athletes, officials and spectators were Draconian (Toohey & Taylor, 2008). Security plans are typically based around a small number of scenarios, usually from the incidents that happened in the past events, in order to identify potential threats. In practice, organizers must consider a far broader range of incidents: Malicious, Benign, Individual or Group (Johnson, 2006). Security actions for ME include the coordination and planning of preventive operations and responses to risk/ threats/ incidents. (Greenwald, 2017). "Security planning for the Olympics means continuously updating elements connected to scenario dynamics" said the Minister of the Interior responsible for security matters during Turin 2006 (Vanolo, 2016).

Securing the sport spectacle from the human, infrastructural, economic, psychological and reputational impacts of terrorism has been of seminal importance to security planners (Coaffee & Johnston, 2007). Organizing security at MSE is considered an exceptional and uncertain endeavor for the hosts that, over time, has led to particular security orthodoxies prevailing. Often, those events involve a level of organization unmatched outside of wartime and planning that requires significant alterations to the governance of the host city or country (Johnson 2006). Many sporting mega-event security operations repeatedly seek to orientate their strategies around a few core principles: "command", "control", "co-ordination", "communications" and "intelligence" (Fussey & Coaffee).

2.3.2. Securitization

Although perceived by some as an unwanted, extraneous, even alien form that threatens to engulf the Games, walling the Games off from their normal surroundings, securitization nonetheless is warranted, given the threat "terrorism" poses to the Games (Bajc, 2016). The exoskeleton of securitization embraces and protects the vulnerable competitions in which all eyes are turned to athletes who themselves are entirely engrossed in attempting

to achieve maximum effort. Don Handelman argues that the implementation of security concerns and strategies, and increasing securitization inside the Olympic venues is somewhat misleading to the presentation of the Olympic Movement in the Olympic Charter, as a peace movement (Bajc, 2016).

The most characteristic element of the securitization of the Beijing Olympics, is the massive involvement of the citizenry. Beijing Organizing Committee President Lui Qi said "a safe and secure Olympics is like a "people's war", it needs the general population's support (Chong, 2016). Paul Amar, prior to Olympic Games in Brazil, used the term "humanized securitization" when talking about a new mode of governance which entails practices and discourses attempting to create subjects who "naturally" need greater security (Penglase, 2016). Johnson (2006) states that the securitization of the Games may also register a further milestone in the "security creep" that is occurring in wider society, in step with the normalization of public unease over security and the growing prevalence of "military urbanism" within everyday social settings. The topographies of the host cities are also having an impact on the securitization process (for instance: compact London and huge Beijing in terms of space). Architectures of "defensible space" often cleave host neighborhoods into geographies of access and entitlement (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012).

2.3.3. Knowledge transfer, security and legacy

An important part of security planning for MSE is the knowledge transfer on a global scale. Among all the different nations hosting sport events in the post-Munich era, a number of distinct approaches to security has emerged (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012). The knowledge transfer is somehow connected with the legacy that the security is leaving behind. It has always been an important feature of a key component of a security plan. The legacy should leave a safe and secure environment, reduce crime and the fear of crime. The Games should have long term legacy, visible in the security infrastructure embedded

within transformative urban regeneration programs, yet also implicated in redrawing lines of inclusion and disqualification (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009). Security legacies such as these highlight the ways in which the Olympics and other MSE contribute to the intensified securitization of public life at civic, national and international levels (Johnson 2016). As Roche (2000) argues, mega-events are short-term episodes, yet hold long-term consequences for their hosts. Securitized urban reconfigurations extend beyond the time and place of the event. Regarding the former, planners, architects, developers and designers, alongside security specialists, increasingly design-in counter-terrorism features for MSE facilities as a function of not just the supposed threats faced by specific venues but also to embed safety and security features within "legacy" community facilities.

2.3.4. Cybersecurity

For the last couple of years cybersecurity became one of the critical security issues for organizing committees of MSE. However, there is a concern that taking physical security very seriously may pose broader cybersecurity threats (Pritchard, 2009). Preparing security for events such as the OG, PanAm, WC more digitized than ever, comes with its own challenges: delivering systems ready for fixed debut as well as worrying about potential attacks (Solomon, 2015). Hence the threats can be such as: interfering with scoring, judging, retail transactions or home viewing experience (Cooper, Chen, Feist & Kapelke, 2017), direct attacks against the website, the electronic infrastructure supporting the event and sites linked to sponsors, cyberattacks on IT, communication and transport systems causing them to fail or enabling data to be exported, modified or deleted (Home Office, 2011). An increasing dependence on technology and a proliferation of adversary tools to exploit vulnerabilities in systems and networks with each successive MSE, signals a shift toward an unpredictable, complex, and contested cyber threat environment (WEF, 2018).

MSE are offering a global audience and opportune time which makes them an obvious target for online criminals (Stratfor Worldview, 2014). Single sport events such as the Football World Cup, Rugby Championship are less at risk than the global reach of the biggest sporting event in the world – Olympic Games. Hackers are searching for embarrassing information from athletes to organizers, or to manipulate scoring and lighting systems. This is why, according to researchers, the Olympic Games are ripe targets (Perlroth, 2018). "*The Olympics involve so many countries, and so many sports, many of which have their own infrastructure, that it has become a rich target environment for many adversaries*", said John Hultquist, director of threat intelligence at the security firm FireEye (Perlroth, 2018). What is so special about the Olympic Games is also the fact that they are operating 24/7 in a new territory every two years (ATOS, 2016).

Cyberattacks which are happening before and during MSE are directed towards various entities, such as: event organizers, governments, sport fans and event employees (Cyber Security at Major Sporting Events, 2016). Due to the growing concern for the security planners, past events are valuable lessons. London 2012 was described as the first truly connected Summer Games. However, by 2010, cyber-attacks were a common occurrence at most major sporting events (Cyber Security at Major Sporting Events, 2016). Cybersecurity threats have emerged as a concern for the Olympic Games already before 2004, however, the main targets at that time were: Olympic host, IOC and commercial sponsors. In Beijing, where the cybersecurity had to be seen in the context of the regime, control and command, the organizers had to deal with 11 to 12 million IT security alerts each day said David Blunkett (Pritchard, 2009), and 88 major IT security incidents happened in the lead up to and during the Toronto Pan Am / Para Pan Am Games (Solomon, 2015). For the London Games. the numbers were much bigger: over 11,000 malicious requests per second were received and 212 million malicious connection attempts blocked (Cyber Security at Major Sporting Events, 2016). For the World Cup 2014 in Brazil, the websites of organizers and corporate sponsors were most likely being

targeted (Stratfor Worldview, 2014), which caused the successful leak of data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the World Cup in South Africa, spam text messages and emails were a growing threat, and ahead of the 2015 Rugby World Cup, organized criminals plotted to hijack the ticket launch (Cyber Security at Major Sporting Events, 2016).

The intensity and variety of cybercrime grew further. The attacks occurred even while an International Olympic Committee disciplinary panel was preparing bans for dozens of Russian athletes caught doping in the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Russian hackers also targeted WADA two years later, after recommending that Russian athletes should be banned from the 2016 Rio Games because of doping (Perlroth, 2018).

In order to mitigate the risk of cyberattacks prior to and during the event it is fundamental to simulate different kinds of scenarios. There are plenty of events to drawn on from the past to avoid mistakes and bolster security as much as possible. The goal of security organizers is remarkably simple: "keep the information flowing at all costs" (Bradbury, 2010, p.22). As was highlighted at the World Economic Forum 2018 "a key characteristic of past Olympic cybersecurity planning efforts has been coordination and collaboration among a range of stakeholders, including the private sector" (WEF, 2018).

Since 2000 ATOS Origin has been responsible for handling the entire IT infrastructure for the Games. Over the years they have prepared a set of IT scenarios that could arise. Once the sporting event is in progress, the availability and integrity of the complete IT environment must be retained and incident response teams ready (Cyber Security at Major Sporting Events, 2016). In the playbook that the team of experts was using for the Vancouver Olympic Games approximately 600 different scenarios were listed. The Vancouver Olympic Committee had to conduct a full technical rehearsal for the Olympic Games. They attempted to break into computer networks, make systems fail, acting as the hand of God, would approach key personnel and strike them down with fictional illnesses,

forcing their teams to resort to contingency plans (Bradbury, 2010). Before the Pyeongchang Games in South Korea in 2018, experts from all around the world were monitoring threats from North Korean hackers probing networks that manage: finance, media, infrastructure systems (Perlroth, 2018). To protect the Olympics, South Korea mobilized tens of thousands of security personnel, including cybersecurity analysts and 50,000 soldiers, in what has been described as one of the most militarized security forces in Olympic history (Perlroth, 2018).

There are different classifications of attacks that might have occurred and are likely to impede MSE. Based on the degree to which they may interfere (physical harm, overshadowing the event, attacks on the integrity, disruption to the venue, decreased sense of trust – lasting impact on sport, financial effects, reputational loss), there are 4 main categories of incidents: (Cooper et al. 2017, p.4)

● the infiltration of sporting websites and IT systems;

● tickets-related scams - in 2015 hackers plotted to hijack Rugby World Cup online ticket sales;

● the hacking and release of sensitive athlete data - stealing data of leading cyclist Chris Froome in an attempt to discredit him, releasing data about Rio Olympians who had taken drugs normally not permitted;

● the risk of fans being hacked while attending an event - bodily harm for spectators, athletes, officials, or other attendees: very rare, rely on targeting physical infrastructure—security systems, transportation, medical devices, etc.—that are designed to protect human lives.

Another study defines eight key areas of risk that should get priority over others because of their low tolerability: Physical system hacks, Micro scoring hacks, Photo and video replay hacks, Athlete care hacks entry manipulation, Transportation hacks, Hacks to facilitate terrorism or kidnapping, Panic-inducing hacks (Home Office, 2011).

Cybersecurity at major sporting events is taken more serious nowadays by risk management. Some scholars call cybercriminals "cyberterrorists" (Pritchard, 2009), who are the main concern for Olympic security planners. For this reason, in addition to the physical security of the event venues, the cybersecurity of the IT event infrastructure should be protected in the same way (Prieto, Diaz, Romano, Rieke & Achemlal, 2011). MSE present opportunities for cyber threat by those looking to exploit the unique conditions such an event creates (MDR Cyber, 2018). In London 2012, Security Operations Centers were developed to detect threats to the IT infrastructure. Japan, preparing itself for 2020 Games, invited ethical hackers to test its government computer systems. Security planners must take into account the unique nature of the Games specifics; they have to protect key assets of Olympic ICT infrastructure and develop IC security framework in compliance with local laws/international standards (ATOS, 2016).

Before the Games in London, ThreatMetrix company had identified online threats for the event. The main ones were connected with devices: search engines, mobiles and tablets or phishing (Cooper et al. 2017). Dion-Schwarz, Ryan, Thompson, Silfverste, Giacomo (2018) mentioned the top 4 threats which should be prioritized in the run-up to Tokyo 2020: targeted acts, DDoS (*distributed denial of service*), ransomware attacks, cyberpropaganda or misinformation. In 2018 at the World Economic Forum. six types of threats with the potential to pose a risk to the Games in Japan were revealed: cyber criminals, insider threats, foreign intelligence services, hacktivists, cyberterrorists, and ticket scalpers (WEF,2018).

The WC 2018 in Russia attracted deliberate cyberattacks fueled by the current diplomatic situation (MDR Cyber, 2018). It may be also connected with the fact that previous editions of MSE were attractive for both on- and offline protests by individuals and groups wishing to draw attention to their causes and gain support. The WC in Rio de Janeiro in 2014 was a good platform for hacktivists to highlight corruption and inequality in the country. These kinds of attacks show that sophisticated attackers have the intent and

capability to disrupt large-scale events leaving a definitive political message and to create headlines (MDR Cyber, 2018).

As we have mentioned above, cyberattacks are a real threat for every MSE which attracts worldwide attention. They face infinite attack surfaces. Before the Olympic Games in Rio, there was an increase of 200% in the number of intrusion attempts in Brazil, indicating that more cybercriminals were attacking, probably because of the Games (Winter, 2016). Despite the fact that most hacks nowadays are focused on sport stadium IT (the integrity of the sporting event results, the core stadium operations), there are more areas which are sensitive to cyberattacks. The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) is changing the face of the cybersecurity of sports, adding digital dimensions where there were none before. That is why every individual involved with a MSE has a role to play in maintaining good cybersecurity hygiene—and everyone faces potential risks from the failure of digital systems.

One of the goals for risk managers is to mitigate threats with finite resources. It is clear that in a relatively short time span the frequency of cyberthreats targeting sport events has increased. The attacks are more sophisticated, they have more power and are aiming to cause bigger impacts. Hence, the consequences of a cyberattack are much more serious: resulting in financial losses, physical harm to participants and attendees, property damage, the compromise of personal information, and damage to the host country's reputation (WEF, 2018).

2.4. Private and public security sector/ Costs and budget/ Media relationship and influence

2.4.1. Costs

The Olympic Games have become one of the most profitable global media events (Prieto et al. 2012). Due to their symbolism, global reach and dimension they became an

attractive target together with other MSE. As a consequence, to protect the Games from unpredictable malicious actions the security has become a priority in the budget. For some stakeholders, the spiraling costs for venue security (in high-profile sporting events) also became valuable currency through which to exercise political and ideological agendas via violence (Schinke, et al. 2016).

Following the attacks in 2001 in the USA, Bali in 2002/2005, London in 2005 or Mumbai in 2008 not only event planning management shifted (Zekulin, 2009) but also financial burdens as a result of terrorism increased (Smith et al. 2017). Newly required security measures to stage sport events consist of expensive components. As noticed, expenses can start accumulating in a pre - planning stage (bid process) and escalate in a hosting period. Zekulin (2009, p. 4). underscores it is impossible to protect against every scenario therefore rational decision-making is needed in order to avoid escalating costs.

Despite the indications of burgeoning costs, the competition for event hosting has intensified (Schinke, et al. 2016). The graph below shows the costs of staging Olympic Games.


Table 3 The costs of staging Olympic Games (source: Jennings, 2012 p.10)

The cost of the Montreal Games doubled the amount of money spent on the Games in

Munich. A big part of the expenditures was security. Similar situations occurred in the host cities which were staging the biggest sporting events after the attacks in 1996 (bombing in Atlanta followed by the Games in Sydney), and in 2001 (the Games in Athens had to be a safe place to host all the athletes after the attacks of 9/11). The expenditure on securing the Athens games was almost four times greater than for Sydney in 2000. There were approximately twice as many security personnel available in 2004 compared to the summer games four years before (Johnson, 2006). Security budgets have mushroomed, while there has been a stronger political, public and media focus on terrorist threats and counter-terrorist strategies (Klauser, 2013, p. 294).

2.4.2. Private security

The rise in the costs of the MSE was associated with the security and the engagement of private security forces. Alongside the public security, private contractors were guarding the cities from the land, sea and air. Private security sector was deployed at Tokyo (1964), refined at Lake Placid and established on a grand scale at Los Angeles (1984). The Summer Games in Los Angeles marked a milestone in that area. The entire program was organized by the private sector and so was the security personnel, which have since become a key feature of mega-event security operations both sporting and non-sporting (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012). Vancouver 2010 marked another transition into an unparalleled era of Olympic security in terms of cross-national cooperation, planning, and spending (Prieto et al. 2012). The governments of hosting nations have realized that because of limited budgets they cannot do it all (Evans 2012). In the following MSE, not only private security was present but also private military companies. The presence of both entities is not only an Olympics phenomenon. Having a long history in Europe, the private security industry and its expansion has been substantial over past decades (Bajc, 2016).

The presence of private security is also reflected in the "legacy" of the event. As noticed, private security implications are indirect. The London Games developed a scheme

"Bridging the Gap", aimed at recruiting the shortfall in the required guards. The providers of security have also seen the opportunity to engage in new markets and develop opportunities with the public sector after the Games (Fussey & Coaffee 2012). Thanks to the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2014, Brazil inaugurated the integrated model of security. The concept of joint actions of private and public forces was later reintroduced at the Games in Rio de Janeiro (Korstanje, Tzanelli & Claytonet , 2014).

The growth of the Olympics was conducive to protection of the venues outside of the Olympic Park. The security extended beyond the mundane protection of competitors and spectators and adopted the requirements of supporting the needs of private capital and protecting sponsors' privileged access to the Olympic marketplace (Bajc 2016).

2.4.3. Media

The inherent part of MSE is the media coverage. The relationship between media, sport and terror is very powerful. Sport is no longer purely an arena that presupposes peace among competitors, as large-scale sporting events have become an advantageous target of terror attacks and serve as the playground for terrorism and their ideologies (Galily, Leitner, & Shimion, 2013). Thereto, the nature of sport events is attractive for both: media and terrorists; it provides them a platform.

MSE draw athletes and spectators from all over the world. Large numbers of people gather in a high-density area in one specially provided setting. (Spaaij & Hamm 2015). Media have such a powerful role that it highly depends on them how the event will be covered, which stories will be shown and which will be left on the cutting-room floor. They can portray increased security and surveillance and omit the impact on human rights or spectators' experience (Taylor & Toohey 2011). The narrative of the event is constructed by the media, which have the inherent power, to help overcome conflict—or alternately, choose not to support harmful behaviors (Schinke et al. 2016). The effect of the media can be indirect. The coverage gives people with preexisting violent tendencies an idea of how

to commit a crime and enjoy their moment of fame (Taylor & Toohey 2008).

Schinke (2016) explains that the media are an integral part of sport because they are like theater productions meant to captivate a large viewership. The drama is a good business for both terrorist groups and the media. However, other scholars argue that terrorists have learned how to hijack the screen and make a use out of the "puppet theatre" (Toohey & Taylor 2008).

Media can be also a partner or witness to terrorism; it can be in support of or against. The viewers or readers are drawn to the sport event by presenting it by media as a possible target for terrorism. The media are in charge of defining the risk (Johnson, 2006). The symbiosis which emerged from that partnership (media- terrorism) provides exposure of the intended attacks. The real weapons of a terrorist are not assault rifles or explosive devices but rather the television camera and the instant media coverage (Army University Press, 2017). Whereas the symbiotic relationship of sport and the media demonstrates they are able to provide each other with the necessary resources for development: capital, audiences, promotions and content (Taylor & Toohey 2011).

Media coverage can resonate with public feelings or mood, amplifying or attenuating risks (Taylor & Toohey 2011). It reports the negative impact of overzealous safety on spectators (Schinke et al. 2016). At the same time it underscores the global status of MSE which makes it susceptible to the heightened anticipation of threats and hazards leading to create extreme sensitivity of decision-makers to risk, given the potential for embarrassing and expensive failures or errors that cannot be rectified during the short time frame of the event and hyperbolizing risk and danger around major events (Toohey & Taylor 2008). Mega-sporting events that took place in the 2000s were framed by media as "zones of terror" and the coverage from those events played a key role in simulating international axes and alliances, some of them were hyperreal, or imaginary; yet somehow they stimulated the war on terrorism (Hassan, 2016).

2.5. Post Munich/Post 9/11 / Connection: sport and terrorism

2.5.1. Post Munich

The Black September attacks on the 1972 Munich Summer Games completely changed the perception of safety and security not only at Olympic Games but also at every MSE that followed. The events of 5 September 1972 in Munich made all concerned aware that the Olympics were now on the radar of international terrorist organizations (Sugden, 2012). There is a large volume of published studies describing the influence of Munich attack on safety management at sport events. Numerous scholars underline that those Games completely altered the management of safety (Johnson, 2006) but also catalyzed a new approach to Olympic security (Coaffee & Fussey, 2010). The security systems at sport events had significantly increased and improved (Hassan, 2012) and sport managers developed bigger awareness over security in sports (Jayawardhana 2016; Seliaas 2005). Major sport events now require far more sophisticated security planning. The International Olympic Committee has insisted that security should be comprehensive, yet unobtrusive (Thompson, 1999), and members of the ISU repeated the refrain that they were eager to ensure the Games were a "sporting event, not a security event" (Boyle et. 2014).

The Munich disaster became a standard-setter for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism in society in general (Selliaas, 2005). The attacks of the Black September group exported terrorism to the host nation (Fussey & Coaffee 2012). The 1972 Games fostered a new premise concerning the organization of the Olympic Games (Selliaas, 2005). It had become reasonable to anticipate that without effective anti-terrorist measures in relation to future Olympic Games, they would be a perfect target for future terrorist incidents. Since the Games in Munich, the security preparation required greater organizational complexity. From now on not only national but also international

forces were involved in security planning, which meant more complex logistics, some Draconian effects for athletes, officials, and spectators and of course increasing costs (Toohey & Taylor, 2008).

The organizers of the Games in Montreal had to reconsider not only the number of security staff but also the layout of the venues having in mind the conflict which arose between the need to protect the athletes and the public, ensuring the viability of Olympic Movement (Johnson, 2006). Following on the heels of this first worldwide exposure of sport events as a platform for terrorism the 1976 Games provided a scheme and basic "route map" for security operations at subsequent sport events (Hassan, 2013), and the breadth of political agendas has been profiled (Schinke et al. 2016). The security regime after 1972 has become increasingly standardized and globalized (Samatas, 2011). A new approach to Olympic security was catalyzed. The transfer of information on possible terrorists suspects and others in and around major sporting events has become broadly accepted and commonplace (Hassan, 2013). The impact of the attack affected organizers of the Games in the 1980s. From now on they focused on the potential threat from organized terrorism groups from the Middle East. There was a natural tendency to guard against the last major attack rather than future threats. Therefore, the domestic threats from the host nation were not considered an issue.

Whereas Munich organizers had consciously sought to have a "light" security touch, which was common for Olympic events in the past, authorities in Montreal wanted a robust and highly visible security presence (Boyle et al. 2014). The low-key security arrangements were supposed to present an image of friendly Games, devoid of any traces of association (Jayawardhana, 2016) and no comparisons with the 1936 "Nazi Olympics".

As a result, security focus had not been on preventing terrorism, rather it was based on averting demonstrations, such as had occurred at the 1968 Mexico Games (Toohey & Taylor 2008). The official slogan of the 1972 Games was ironically "the Carefree Games" (Boyle & Haggerty 2012).

The Games in Montreal in 1976 and every subsequent host city had to reconsider the staffing and layout of the venues (Johnson, 2006). Canadian authorities were forced to be the first to address wider apprehensions regarding the vulnerability of the Games and the international call for strong security measures that burgeoned in the wake of the Munich Games (Boyle, et al. 2014). Montreal Olympics marked a key turning point in Olympic history, not only because it was the first highly visible security operation, which has since become the norm, but because it articulated some of the nascent elements of what has become a standard that future Olympic hosts have built upon (Coaffee & Fussey 2010).

2.5.2. Terrorism and sport

MSE became a target for terrorists for various reasons. Over the past decades they were repeatedly in the crosshair of terrorist groups (Walton 2016), the risks of terrorism in sport contexts was not isolated to "one-off" events (Schinke et al. 2016). Besides the symbolic importance, which increases terrorist temptation (Bernhard, Martin, 2012) they also carry a significant economic, political, social interest. Therefore, MSE have more terrorist threats than regional and localized sport events. There is an entrenched belief that the size of the Olympic platform is directly proportional to terrorists' desire to attack it (Tulloch 2000, p. 230).

Munich offered a unique opportunity for terrorists. It gave them attention they needed to underline the cause they were fighting for. It was the first time the terrorist group

consciously used a sports event. Media was the conduit to worldwide exposure and used as currency (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Palestine rebels planned this act to get much media coverage and global attention to achieve their political objectives (Jayawardhana, 2016).

Sporting events, particularly those with considerable media coverage, with global appeal, have become "prime targets for terrorism" (Taylor & Toohey 2008; Galily et al. 2015). The size of the audience and the symbolic representation of values associated with the sport event help determine its "terrorism capital" (Toohey & Taylor, 2006). The Olympiad arouses the people's interest and attention more than anything else in the world. Hence its selection by terrorists is purely propagandistic (Galily et al. 2015). Certain terrorist groups may use sport as a recruitment tool to engage youth in a political cause that springboards into terrorist acts through which they sought to make political statements, right wrongs, resolve differences, and serve as a platform to heightened exposure and serve certain interests, while subordinating or subverting others (Schinke et al. 2016).

Many scholars mention that modern terrorism is highly aware of the power of the media and how it can be exploited (Taylor & Toohey, 2006). That is why one of the main motives to attack MSE was enormous media attention in the case of spectacular operations and the possibility to reach a global audience through the communication resources which were set up at the Games (Selliaas, 2005). What is more MSE are also highly symbolic of national prestige and power (Sugden, 2012).

"Mohammad Daoud Oudeh, who orchestrated the attack on the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, later admitted that: We recognized that sport is the modern religion of the Western world. We knew that the people in England and America would switch their television sets from any program about the plight of the Palestinians if there

was a sporting event on another channel. So we decided to use their Olympics, the most

sacred ceremony of this religion, to make the world pay attention to us. We offered up

human sacrifices to your gods of sport and television. And they answered our prayers.

From Munich onwards, nobody could ignore the Palestinians or their cause. The choice of

the Olympics, from the purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100% successful" (Galily,

Yarchi, Tamir, 2015).

The media attention works for both entities. In order to draw the reader's attention to next major event it is described as a possible target for terrorism, which by some scholars is being referred to as a form of theater that plays out in front of spectators (Galily et al. 2015).

The selection of major athletic celebrations as a target can also lead to negative effects on the reputation. Scholars write about sporting failure or attacks on athletic personalities or delegation which may undermine the authority of the state. Damaging the public image of the hosting country might lead to political destabilization (Korstanje, et al. 2014) and may engender major diplomatic problems among nations. The international attention achieved by the attack resonated beyond the sporting milieu (Johnson, 2006). Several researchers claim that conflicts and developments in sports reflect conflicts and developments in society in general (Jayawardhana 2016).

The infamous Olympic Games in Munich were also the cause why people started to combine sport with terrorism (Hassan, 2013; Samatas, 2011). The enduring link between sport and terrorism was very significant and evident. Nevertheless, despite the risk of terrorist attack, major sporting events, with a few exceptions have remained relatively untouched by international terrorism (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012; Samatas, 2011) compared

to attacks on other types of targets. Klausner and Gullianotti (2013) argued that more "common-sense" understandings of the connections between sport and terrorism would tend to focus on those occasions in which paramilitary forces that are opposed to particular, internationally recognized governments and nation-states, make violent interventions within the field of sport.

Even though there was no specific sport connection to the event itself the impact of 9/11 was undeniable and altered the situation. Since terrorism attacks in the United States, the concern of terrorism at mega-sporting events has been amplified (Toohey et al. 2003; Fussey & Coaffee 2012). For many, the terrorist attacks of September 11th confirmed the emergence of "the new terrorism", characterized by radical uncertainty, catastrophic destructiveness, and inevitability.

In the aftermath of 1972 safety and security have centered on the prevention of terrorism. (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012). At that time terrorism was seen as a matter of national concern, handled by local police and paramilitary units. In 1996, terrorism was of international concern, but handled by national security units, whereas by 2004 terrorism had become an issue of global concern, to be dealt with globally (Selliaas, 2005). Despite the disparities of security infrastructures and policing priorities of the different nations that have hosted MSE in the post-Munich era, a number of distinct approaches to security have emerged. The development of similar counter-terrorism strategies is based on knowledge transfer on a global scale. Sporting mega-event security planning processes intersect with a range of complex global and local processes and agendas (Fussey & Coaffee, 2012).

Selliaas (2005), in relation to the 1972 Munich Games, the 1996 Atlanta Games and the 2004 Athens Games, distinguishes three completely new organization structures –

nationally and globally – in the fight against terrorism:

● national anti-terrorism units in Europe after the 1972 Munich Games

● intra-institutional cooperation in the USA after the 1996 Atlanta Games

● a new global anti-terrorism cooperation network before and during the 2004 Athens Games.

The anti-terrorism measures undertaken in relation to these three distinct OG illustrates also the differing security environments and differing security logics of three separate eras: the Cold War era; the post-Cold War era and the post-9/11 era (Selliaas, 2005).

2.5.3. Post 9/11

Fussey and Coaffee (2012) write that security planning for MSE was dominated by threats of terrorism. In particular, in the post 9/11 world, securing what is seen as a "soft target" necessitates that major sporting events often proceed against the backdrop of a "lockdown", "total", "sanitized" or "exceptional" security (Coaffee, 2015). Terrorist activity around the Olympics has involved myriad forms: for example, threats from left-wing groups (Barcelona, 1992 and Athens, 2004), left-wing state proxies (Seoul, 1988), right-wing extremists (Atlanta, 1996), ethno-nationalist separatists (Calgary, 1988 and Barcelona, 1992), single-issue groups (Albertville, 1992 and Lillehammer, 1994), hostile states (Seoul, 1988) as well as violent Jihadi extremists (Sydney, 2000). After 11th September, 2001 the organizers of sporting events were forced to consider a range of hazards that previously were considered to be very unlikely (Johnson, 2006). The security plan for the 2002 Games was completely reevaluated (Boyle & Haggerty, 2012). Concerns over Olympic security were justified when the "Revolutionary Struggle" terrorist group

used explosives to destroy an Athens police station in 2004. The group justified their actions as a demonstration of the vulnerability of the Games and as a protest against business interests linked to them. These national and international events led the International Olympic Committee for the first time to insure against the partial or full cancellation of the Games. The £93 million policy covered terrorism, earthquakes, flooding and landslides (Johnson, 2006). In the following years, there have been a number of attacks on sport events all around the world, many events have also been canceled due to the threat of an attack and the number of spectators has decreased. Growing tides of terrorist groups applaud terrorism undertaken in visible and densely packed sport venues. Another issue is the fact the attacks are performed also by lone wolf operatives (Schinke et al. 2016).

The incidents which proved how vulnerable sport is to terrorist attacks did not take place only at MSE but also were targeting athletes. The New Zealand cricket team canceled its tour of Pakistan midway through, after a suicide bomber attacked (Galily et al. 2015). The chief of Iraq's Olympic Committee and 30 athletes and officials were kidnapped from a sports conference in Baghdad by 50 gunmen. The Iraqi taekwondo team of 15 was kidnapped while traveling for a competition in Jordan (the team was never found). The 2008 Dakar Rally off-road race was cancelled after the threat of an Al Qaeda attack, the first time in the 30-year history. A suicide bomber attacked the New Year marathon in Sri-Lanka in 2008. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) exploded a car bomb near the Santiago Bernabeu stadium before the Champions League semi-final in 2002. There was an attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team bus in Pakistan in 2009. In 2013, the bomb explosions at the Boston Marathon made headlines around the world (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015).

The security consultant for Athens 2004, Neil Fergus hailed the Games in Greece as "the greatest security operation since Alexander the Great marched through Persia". On the contrary the Beijing Games were supposed to be "the largest peacetime security operation in history", according to political scientist Ying Yu (Samatas, 2011). With more and more security measures after 9/11 the Summer Olympic Games were an exhibit of one of the world's largest security operations outside of war. The attacks in New York were the catalyst to change in the sport management industry. Event managers became more proactive in reducing the threat of a latent terrorist attack at high profile events such as Super Bowls, World Cups and Olympic Games (Bliss, 2010). Fussey and Coaffee (2012) argued that this situation has led to a progressive global standardization of MSE counter-terrorism strategies premised on experiences at both sport and non-sport mega-events. The organizers must also have in mind that they need to avoid fuelling terrorism while claiming to fight it (Samatas, 2011).

2.6. Militarization/ Urban Militarization

While preparing for the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, the security coordinator at that time described his task as "very much like preparing for war" (Cottrell, 2013, p.311). Bruce Kidd used a similar comparison talking about the Games in 1976 as the largest Canadian military operation since World War II (Kidd, 2016, p.178). In the past years protecting MSE, especially the Games, seemed more like an exercise in security rather than an athletic event. It was particularly apparent in relation to the Athens and Beijing Olympic security programs (Fussey & Coaffee 2012). Such heavy militarized sporting events were unthinkable before 9/11. Sudgen (2012) argues that militarization implies a condition whereby a nation is either at war or preparing for war and all possible resources – social, economic, political – are mobilized to reflect this condition (p. 419).

2.6.1. Bidding: arms race, mitigating risk

One of the priorities of the organizing team of mega-sporting events is to mitigate risk at every opportunity through high quality, robust and effective security, yet discreet. The security plan proposed by LOC already in a bid is tailored to the needs of the event. Hosting MSE, especially the Olympics, extends far beyond its Olympic Park. The scale of security operations has been translated into conceptualizations of monolithic repressive state–corporate coalitions of coercion (Sugden, 2012). For a successful bid to become realized, it has to be demonstrated that an event will be hold safely and securely. The concept of securing the event allows nations to engage in a virtual "arms race", a security beauty pageant of sorts, demonstrating to the world just how effective it is (Hassan, 2013). Major events are key moments to catalyze ongoing trends in urban militarization and policing (Molnar 2014). The corollary of this has been depicted by Fussey and Coaffee, two forms of militarism at MSE. The use of existing military personnel and related assets (technologies) being one of them and the application of military – type approaches to security the second.

2.6.2. Militarization

Fussey and Coaffee (2012) observed that temporary deployment of large numbers of military personnel into the host setting is significant for MSE. At the beginning, such observations were associated with single-party states (the capital of South Korea, Moscow and Beijing). However, the militarization of Olympic Games became also prominent in democratic societies and continued throughout the 1990s and the new millennium (Fussey & Coaffee 2012). The numbers of military personnel involved in the protection of the Games were immense: 10 000 troops in Atlanta, 4000 in Sydney, 8940 soldiers guarded the Olympic venues, hotels and transportation hubs in Montreal. Military personnel together with local police forces are responsible for controlling the outside areas of the

stadiums, surrounding streets, airports, ports of the host cities, surrounding municipalities: local tourist destinations and training facilities for the visiting delegations.

The Games and other MSE are now surrounded by an unmistakable militarization (Boyle, 2012). The security measures are exceptional: surface-to-air missiles mounted on residential accommodation, the use of voice analyzers, ground radar, night vision, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, similar to those deployed in Afghanistan, the construction of bunkers around the perimeter of the main Olympic Village and tanks situated at strategic locations in Barcelona (Coaffee & Fussey, 2010), military-style security approaches, roadblocks or car searches, sharpshooters placed at mountaintops or a 52-mile no-fly zone around the entire Games site in 2002 (Galily et al. 2015). US military supplemented venues in Los Angeles and Atlanta, whereas the Pentagon provided advanced perimeter security. Hassan (2013) only confirms that there has been an increasing militarization of sport facilities and major events, and sporting spaces are now witness to a level of militarization previously reserved for theatres of war and conflict settings.

Brazil before the Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 hosted the Pan-American Games and the FIFA World Cup. It helped to assure the international community that its biggest weakness – security – would not be an issue during the Olympics since it would be compensated for by extra military deployment also observed in previous events (Azzi, 2017).

Russia was also very determined to demonstrate its ability to host the Winter Olympics, at all costs. More than 50,000 police and soldiers were ready to secure the event without detraction from the atmosphere of the Games. Nevertheless, the unprecedented security measures did impact the experiences of athletes and spectators, to the point that they were even called by Ishaan Tharoor "the most anxiety-ridden and militarized Olympiad in recent memory" (Molnar, 2014).

2.6.3. Urban Militarization

As Samatas (2011) mentions, in conjunction with global and local factors, Olympic security may also include forms of urban militarization. Molnar (2014) adds there are direct and indirect trends of urban militarization in Olympic host cities. Since MSE are designated as a "high – risk" venues, everyday life of citizens during the period of the event renders the space prone to a stealthy, mission-based militarization (Graham 2010). That kind of security strategies undermine clear distinction between: civilian – military, internal – external security, war – law enforcement (Molnar, 2014). Day – to – day space is transformed to a new geopolitical frame, recoded as terrain upon which military operations, enhanced public (dis)order policies, and a spate of surveillance technologies are necessary preventative measures against terrorist attacks, political protest and rioting (Molnar, 2014). Graham (2010) characterizes such developments as a trend of "new military urbanism", where the urban sphere is the site of experimentation and application of martial techniques and technologies of control. Furthermore, some sport events are routinely used to field-test the latest military technology for both use in combat operations and for rolling out in subsequent sporting events (Fussey & Coaffee 2012). In the last decades, militarized security forces have become a familiar feature of MSE (Boykoff, 2013) making people accustomed to sporting spectacles merging with dystopian images of cities under siege (Coaffee, 2015).

All of these lead to the creation of, what Giorgio Agamben calls "state of exception", which is a space where constitutional rights can be diminished and where apparent huge numbers of visible state military offers comfort. This further leads to seeing host cities as "lockdown" sites (Fussey 2012)."

After 1972, not only today's Olympic Villages appear to be locked tight but also other venues. When hosting major sports events the total "lockdown" of the sporting sphere with its array of arenas and stadiums has virtually become the norm (Hassan, 2013). The

Montreal Olympics created a template of "lockdown security" that subsequent Olympic hosts have built upon (Boyle et al. 2014, p.112). The ongoing threat and the high volume of security staff are leading to an undercurrent of being cautious of one's surroundings.

Fussey (2015) compares lockdown venues to Kafka's depiction of The Castle –where despite an imposing appearance and seeming omniscience, it is unreachable and, on closer inspection, tenuously held together with elements flaking away – edifices of Olympic security do not always live up to their appearances of scale, cohesion and capacity.

The answer to a question how urban safety governance legacies unfold in post-Olympic contexts still requires analysis. However, undoubtedly Olympic security and policing legacies have the potential to be non-coherent, non-deterministic and yet indicative of the power for major sporting events to forge ongoing legacies of militarization in Olympic cities (Hassan 2013).

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1. Study design

The thesis was designed as an exploratory study in order to measure to what extent NOCs are providing safety for athletes and how safe athletes feel. In order to conduct this research, various strategies have been applied to analyze the topic. The approach employed has been qualitative, ranging from the use of primary sources (interviews) and secondary sources such as: reports, university research studies, scientific articles, reports in magazines, press articles and scholarly works. Most of the secondary sources were accessible at the IOA library in Olympia, Greece, and at CEO-UAB (The Olympic Studies Centre at the Autonomous University of Barcelona).

The research approach follows the technique of "triangulation" (Lapan et al. 2012), whereby the use of different methods allows them to complement each other and to investigate the topic more deeply. This helps to strengthen the credibility of the findings. We shall see to what extent these methods complement, or disagree with, each other.

Data collection of primary sources was done via in-depth semi-structured interviews. All the interviewees were deemed able to provide appropriate information and had the required knowledge for the topic of the research. In order to get the perspective of two different entities, the respondents were athletes who had competed in the Olympic Games and the Chefs de mission from various Olympic Committees. Due to the sensitivity of the issues, it was agreed that all the respondents would remain anonymous, and the data they provided would be kept as confidential as possible. All participants of the interviews had been involved in the Olympic Games from Sydney 2000 to PyeongChang 2018. Not all the chosen candidates were able to provide appropriate answers. Some of the officials excused themselves on the grounds that they feared that some answers could be detrimental to future planning in the Games, which in time could be picked up by the media. One of the athletes was asked not to provide answers. Only one country is represented by both: athlete and Chef de mission. All of the answers were obtained in English. The answers from the athletes were obtained between January 2019 and June

2019. Chefs de mission were interviewed between March 2020 and September 2020.

3.2. Interviewees

3.2.1. Chefs de mission

Originally, it was proposed that the interviewees would be only the Chefs de mission. However, to give additional value to the research several randomly chosen Olympians were asked to participate as well. It should be noted that of the delegations participating in the Olympic Games, 80% of them had fewer than 100 athletes. On average, the delegations at the Summer Games include about 50 athletes. Therefore, the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) which participated in this research had from 4 to 164 athletes in their team.

In total, fifty Chefs de Mission were contacted to answer the questionnaire, but only 10 of them actually responded. Three of them said the data were too confidential and they were not able to provide answers. Two of them did not provide enough in-depth answers for consideration. Suitable for the research were 5 questionnaires (see the Appendix). The respondents provided detailed answers which unravel, to some extent, the complexity of the research topic. The interviewees represented countries from Europe and Western Asia. In the results section, they will be referred to as: P - 1, P - 2 and so on.

3.2.2. The athletes

The athletes surveyed came from several different areas (from Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, North America, India, Australia and New Zealand). After explaining the purpose of the topic, the interviewees were asked 6 open-ended questions. Interviews were conducted through the Internet communication tools. Given limitations like time-zone, availability of the respondent, distance, it was not possible to conduct all interviews face-to-face. Thirty athletes were contacted. Ten of them provided answers within the given period of time (see the Appendix). The replies from athletes were brief however they helped to ensure the outcome of the research. In the results section, they will be referred to as: A - 1, A - 2 and so on.

After concluding the data collection, they were verified and reviewed in order to eliminate possible mistakes or incomplete questionnaires. Responses were analyzed and compared. Afterwards, the comments from the respondents from the two groups of officials and athletes were set together in order to see similarities and differences. All the results are presented in as much detail as confidentiality would allow in the following chapter.

4 RESULTS

In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate, in line with the literature, related reports and interviews, the findings of the research. Speaking about security one cannot forget athletes. It is clear that sport security differs from other forms of security. There is not a large volume of published studies which would cover the topic of safety of athletes and participating teams in general not only during but also before the Games. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate how NOCs care about the safety of athletes, what forms of preparation they provide in the Olympic cycle and how they care for Olympians during the competition. Do they rely only on the organizing committee or introduce additional restrictions or recommendations themselves? The aim was also to check if athletes themselves feel the need for risk management training or whether they focus only on competitions. Are athletes aware of the terrorist threat at the venue of the sports event? To what extent is the information that reaches them filtered?

The research carried out until now has focused mainly on security measures introduced by hosting countries influenced by the current political situation. The data were also collected on whether people who come to the competition as viewers/tourists feel safe. Therefore, this research provides new insight on the perception of safety from different perspectives. It considers the viewpoint of the ones who are the most important part of the MSE, namely the athletes who arouse emotions, who break the records, who sacrifice a lot in order to compete, without whom the competition would not exist. The thesis also considers the view of the Chefs de mission, as mentioned, who to some extent are also responsible for the athletes and their preparation.

4.1. Analysis of primary sources

4.1.1. The responses of the Chefs de mission

The scale of the Summer and Winter Olympics varies considerably. At the Summer Games, there are now over ten thousand athletes in the Olympic Village (i.e. Beijing 2008: 10,942, London 2012: 10,568, Rio de Janeiro 2016: 11,238[2]). Winter Olympic Games have to prepare security measures at all the venues for a much smaller group, which usually does not exceed three thousand athletes (i.e. Vancouver 2010: 2,566, Sochi 2014: 2,780, Pyeongchang 2018: 2,833[3]). Nevertheless, the nature of the Olympics makes it one of the most difficult events to secure. For the Chefs de mission who took part in the interview there was no difference in preparation of athletes regarding their safety between those two editions of MSE. The difference in preparations, however, is due to the location of the event and, as one of the participants highlighted, also other aspects. The comments below are reported verbatim:

"We do a preparation of a crisis team and depending on the location of the Games give advice to the team members (behaviours, do's / don'ts, list with emergency numbers). Location and other aspects such as (Youth Games or Olympic Games) might have an influence. Focus is on evaluation of risk management and not of Summer or Winter Games." (P-5)

A Chef de Mission from another country pointed out as well, that more important is the preparation of the whole team, not just athletes:

"From our point of view safety is a matter of preparation of our team (NOC), not athletes themselves." (P-3)

NOCs also check other aspects of safety in the host city:

"On the one hand there are some compulsory behaviour rules for all team members at all OGs. On the other hand proper factors at a host town location e. g. are criminality or health situation have also an impact on our recommendation or instructions on athletes." (P-1)

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[2]   https://www.olympic.org/
[3]   https://www.olympic.org/

An athlete should concentrate on their competition and achieving the best result. Management teams, on which participants mostly rely, should keep them safe and sound. Athletes have faith that they are doing their best in terms of safety. They trust not only the organizing committees but also their federations and NOCs, who are doing their best to provide undisturbed conditions for athletes and their coaches:

"In our team it is up to the Chef De Mission and the team leaders for each sport to focus on different topics. For the athletes and coaches, we need them to focus on the competition and no other topics. (...) There is never the right balance, but we try to include all topics in our plans. The main focus is to have the athletes ready to compete and enjoy the Games, and our work is to make that possible. (P-2)

"The delegates received proper info & instructions before the Games according to security issues. During the games we try to isolate them from this and we deal just in front of their coaches." (P-4)

"(...) We ask athletes to respect the stay in the Olympic security "bubble" and to concentrate on their performance." (P-3)

"First of all proper task forces guided by the NOC with several different stakeholders evaluating the security before the OG. During the OGs there are clear communication lines for critical situations including all stakeholders of interest. Communication to athletes must be reduced on a need-to-know level. Organisation and administrative tasks are communicated to the coaches and team leaders. In Games Time we use a communication application for basic information to the team members separated in different groups (e. g. management/coaches/all)." (P-1)

"*Our experience is that OCOGs do evaluation studies regarding safety and we have high confidence in their work. They organize special security workshops prior to the Games and our specialists (Security Liaison Officers) as well as the diplomatic representatives are taking part or are in close contact with the OCOGs. Normally Olympic Villages and venues have a very high security standard and we think security is more an issue when it comes to the time team members spend outside of the Olympic circle/bubble. We try to*

work in the background and not to confront the athletes with too many questions and information regarding the crisis management (this is handled by the management team and team captains but not the athletes). Athletes only have to know what are the most important rules that hove to be followed and who is their contact person/point in case there is a need of such (e.g. number of the Chief Medical Officer on a contact list, collect contact persons prior to the Games of all team members in case we need to contact them etc. But if we see that it is not safe to send a delegation to a country with high risk we need to discuss with our federations." (P-5)

The NOCs do not have extra restrictions for athletes regarding safety during the competition. The majority of the athletes are adults and could only be given recommendations and guidelines of how to act in case of threat. Depending on the location of the Games NOCs are briefing the athletes on how to behave in the places outside of the competition area and Olympic Village:

"That is usually different between Games and the location of the Games. (...) If we are far away from our country and the culture is very different to ours, then we have more rules. We tell our team that they can not go out of the village alone, they need to focus on what they eat and drink and if they are in crowded place they need to think about their security. We talk about these things before the Games and get recommendations from our foreign ministry/embassy or security personnel." (P-2)

"Restrictions/regulations/recommendations depend on the location (Question 1). In principle all adult team members are not patronized by the NOC. At regular OGs most rules are on behaviour. However for youth events and rare minors at the OG are proper restrictions/regulations/ recommendations (e. g. exit, alcohol)." (P-1)

"They have to inform where they are and they must follow the instructions." (P-4)

"So far, we have always issued only recommendations – stay in safe zones, stay in the Olympic security "bubble" and concentrate on your event and your performance as much as possible. In 2016, in Rio de Janeiro we have issued a strong recommendation not to go to the city." (P-3)

"Depends on the location of the Games. We had advices in Rio for example to always let someone know where an athlete goes if she/he goes out or advised that it is safer to travel by taxi than walk during night, or not to carry valuables etc. Advices you normally follow as well as a tourist in some parts of the world." (P-5)

It seems that terrorism is not as widely spoken about outside of the selected countries. There are NOCs which are trying to avoid this topic for the safety of the athletes. All the necessary information and training are provided to the team leaders or coaches. In some cases, even coaches are not informed, and the proactive information is given to the management of the delegation.

"It is always one of the topics that the Chef de Mission and the team leaders discuss. In the past Games there have been incidents in host cities, such as in London and Sochi. We try to avoid this topic for the athletes, but the top management speaks about this." (P-2)

"We do not talk about possible terrorism directly with athletes, we do not burden them with this. (...) it is the job of our team to be ready and informed. Therefore, we are in touch with relevant security authorities. If we travel to risky areas, we have an insurance for all members of our team (including athletes) that covers also potential danger of terrorism. If any athlete has questions regarding safety, we are ready to discuss it." (P-3)

"*Athletes at the Olympic Games are adults and the Games are not the only event they participate in. All of them are individuals and handle such topics differently. We are open for discussions if we know that an athlete is concerned and try to explain what precautions have been taken etc. But at the end it is the decision of an athlete if she/he for example attends an opening ceremony or not because she/he is afraid. We do have a psychologist in our team and this could be a person who can talk to an athlete if a coach/athlete etc. has the need. If someone is afraid it is a burden and then it is a must to talk about it - it can be prior or as well during the Games. In case it is an issue prior to the Games (e.g. conflict North and South Korea prior to PyeongChang) we have done regular information toward the federations and team members and of course let them know that for us their safety has highest priority. If we work together with federal police and they do recommendations and analysis of the situation and in case we think it is important we do*

proactive information (as we have done prior to PyeongChang) we can send out information through different channels." (P-5)

"*Within the task force all issues are evaluated. Since there has been no danger of terrorism at the recent or upcoming OGs terrorism hasn't been addressed to the athletes.*" (P-1)

According to all interviewees, the security measures at the Games were enough to protect the athletes.

"*(...) I feel that the current measurements are enough and I trust the IOC and the countries that we work with to find the correct balance. In general we are a very relaxed country regarding safety, as we live in one of the safest countries in the World. We do not have a military and violence is very low. That might also affect our vision towards these things.*" (P-2)

"*Athletes as well as all team members must be protected at the Games. Every OCOG has it own security policy which might be more or less strict depending on the specific situation. Athletes must not be affected by the level of security and security should work in the back. Recently we did not have major complaints on this topic.*" (P-1)

"*We consider current security measures at the Olympic Games adequate to potential dangers. We as an NOC always strive to explain to our athletes that these measures are necessary for the Olympic Games to be held successfully.*" (P-3)

"*We think it is important that an OCOG has high standards and that teams can feel safe and have confidence. If this is not guaranteed NOCs start to set-up own additional protection measures. We think the safety aspect depends as well on personality and maybe origin - we live in a quite safe territory and we might have other expectations and demands than teams coming from other regions that are less save. So far we never had discussions with team members that we did too much or had too much interference to their privacy.*" (P-5)

As one of the Chefs de mission said the amount of how much threats and terrorism will be spoken about depends on the location of the MSE (P-3). Two of the interviewees noticed that there was a change in topics spoken to athletes prior to the Games. It shifted from terrorism to health issues:

"Today the focus is definitely on health threats. Our participants are used to traveling and as we have a small team we can get good connection with everyone on the team and evaluate better what to prepare and discuss. For all Games the topic of security and safety is important, but the environment changes and the focus move from terrorism into health threats. I think this will always be an important topic to include in the management of the Olympic Team. We think about Risk management for all Games and the risks are different between Games." (P-2)

"(...) it is difficult to say if that has changed. Maybe attention from media has increased due to some incidents but maybe some years ago other aspects of safety have been raised (e.g. risk of health, food, driving, travelling, safety precautions in sport activities in general (first aid level) etc." (P-5)

"(...) I would say that every OG has its own challenges – some locations more as other ones.". (P-1)

4.1.2. The responses of athletes

The questions addressed to athletes focused on the substance of the research: risk management training, terrorism and the impact of the threats on athletes' preparation. The answers they have provided will be presented below and commented on in the next part of the research.

All of the interviewees agreed that athletes give little or even no attention to riskiness of being in a high-profile event. Three of them highlighted that they rely a lot on the organization team.

"If Management/Organization doesn't give attention to this then most likely I will not pay attention to it either." (A - 4)

"Mostly as an athlete you rely on the organization. You have faith that they are doing their best in terms of safety. Of course when you have a competition in a high risk area it crosses your mind. But in my experience all competitions held in high risk areas it all went well. When you experience how much precautions are taken you quickly forget about it. That is of course when you're in the official venues of the competition. If you plan to visit other sites then of course you think about it and get information on what is smart to do. Mostly when you do visit other sites it is after the competition. Before competition athletes like to focus on the job at hand." (A - 3)

"(...) For events such as the Olympics we are briefed on the safety precautions, and also advised what actions we can take to ensure our personal safety. There is always some thought in the back of our mind that a major sporting event can be a target, but we trust that the appropriate precautions and safety measures are in place." (A - 1)

Two of the athletes admits that the focus of participants is not on the riskiness:

"From the standpoint of athletes, they will usually focus more on their own training and physical conditions as their instinct is that once they have tried their very best to improve their technical skills and mental ability, they would perform up to normal standard and eventually win the competitions." (A-2)

"I think most athletes are very focused on their competitions and don't pay too much attention to security issues. My last Olympics was in 1998, so the awareness of risk likely has increased after 9/11." (A-10)

The majority of the athletes confirmed that they did not have risk management training before the event. Only two of the participants had it prior to the competition. One of them (A -7) comes from a country that is used to such standards; the second athlete (A - 2) prepared himself both: mentally and physically. However, his sport federation made sure to

update its athletes before MSE:

"(...) our sports association will also remind us of the political and security risk before going to some countries for competition in which mass demonstrations or even riots are in progress.

One mentioned (A-3) that such training takes place already in the host city, at a venue:

"For major sport event we do have risk management procedures in place. Most of the time these are logical things to take into account. Example during multi-sport events we are expected to be either at the village, competition venue or training venue. The moment you want to visit a different site there are protocols in place. You have to inform your coach and Chef de mission of your whereabouts. Under aged athletes are only allowed if they are supervised. This is national protocol. Next to that we are briefed by our NOC representative about the risks after they are briefed by the organizing committee."

Or, as other mentioned, in the Olympic Village:

"Not that I recall. Risk-related issues probably came up as part of the processing when the team arrived at the Olympic Village, but I don't remember that there was much focus on the issue." (A-10)

Whereas other participant underscore that the athletes are briefed by the NOC:

"We receive information and briefings from the security teams involved with the NOC as to what safety measures are in place, and how we can ensure our own personal safety." (A-1)

The majority of the respondents did not have the training for terrorism during the Olympic cycle. However, few of the participants mentioned that they had some parts of it.

A - 5 mentioned:

"We spoke rarely about terrorism during the Olympic cycle. Only at moments of terrorist attacks on the news or when passing heavy security."

A - 3 added:

Terrorism was spoken about. However, personally I did not do too much with the information. Guess living in Europe and growing up on an island tend to make us less precautious as terrorism is not something we experience. Most of the time when it is not close to home you tend to dismiss it more easily I think."

A - 1 confirms that:

"Terrorism was not specifically addressed in our Olympic preparations, but it is addressed in the safety briefings in direct lead-up to the Olympics. Although an act of terrorism would always be a risk for an Olympics, at the 2008 and 2012 Olympics I never felt concerned or feared for my personal safety. The security for the village and sporting venues is very high."

Athlete A - 2 stated:

"Yes, we will be well informed about the situation of terrorism or mass demonstration during the cycle of our Olympic preparation. Normally, we will be given a choice and freedom to choose whether to proceed taking part in the competition in those countries where terrorism is still ongoing or in contemplation."

Athletes were divided on the question of whether such training should be a regular part of the preparation agenda.

One of the athletes (A- 5) was against it:

"I think security is more important."

A - 4 was also not convinced with this idea and he added:

"I doubt this is encouraging for an athlete's sports performance."

Interviewee A - 6 was in favor for such training however:

"It should not be directly to the Athletes but the responsible person for their health and safety."

The same opinion was mentioned by athlete A-10:

I do think it's important for athletes to be aware of potential risks and to be aware of their surroundings while traveling and competing in various countries around the world. Perhaps training efforts should be focused on the support staff - coaches, managers, etc. - who are around the athletes and responsible (at least in part) for their safety.

The rest of the respondents agreed it was necessary. A - 3 added:

"Yes it is always good to inform athletes. Make sure they are aware of all the risks and also make sure the coaches are on top of it. Most of the times when athletes have to compete they tend to focus only on the sport. The coaches can help to provide better safety in that period. After competition it is good to inform athletes again on security issues. They tend to pay more attention then. It is important to have proper protocol in terms of what is allowed."

A - 2 was also in favor of such training underscoring the fact that athletes tend to focus on different things during their preparation:

"This training should be introduced as it is vital to the health and safety of the athletes. I think as athletes usually devote most of their efforts and time in their intense training and competition, they might have no idea on what is happening outside, especially before the preparation for the major competitions."

A - 1 highlights the role of NOC and IOC in that matter:

"I think that appropriate safety briefings for all athletes competing at major sporting events is very important. Every country and every sporting event is different, and the political climate is ever changing. Information about the situations need to be targeted for each particular event, in that particular location, at that particular time. This should be the responsibility of both the IOC and the NOCs."

Most of the athletes agreed they should be focused on competition not on the risk which may occur. Athlete A - 8 says: *"it could be"* unnecessary paranoia for an athlete. The same opinion has athlete A- 4, saying: *"Keep this stuff away from the athletes."*. A - 6 as well does not see the purpose of such training. However, he is in favor of providing athletes "*athletes wouldn't be interested in the training but they can have simple instructions*". Athlete A - 5 sees also a possibility of negative impact of this kind of training: "*Maybe some people would get distracted by training for terrorist attacks."*

Athlete A - 3 would rather inform the delegation about it not athletes themselves:

"I would inform them about the potential risks. But put the focus on the delegation members they should deal with most issues so athletes don't have to. So it is not useless. I think organization should include athletes more in information sharing. Maybe not organize too many obligatory sessions but do inform them. Not only on security but more topics."

Athlete A -1 says it is important to be aware of your surrounding and adds:

"I don't think it's unnecessary to be aware of the risks (…). However it is important for the IOC and NOCs to choose venues that are stable and safe, and to ensure that protocols are in place to protect athletes. Athletes should not be forced to make a decision not to compete because they feel it is unsafe, this would not be a fair situation."

Interviewee A-10 is also in favor of that:

"This is a bit of a challenge, as athletes do everything they can to stay focused on their competitions. The Olympic Games (and other large international events) are different logistically than any other competition, so athletes are already dealing with a variety of unavoidable distractions. I think some basic information/guidance for the athletes on risk management would not be overly burdensome (and perhaps the training/info sessions could start in advance the sporting event, so it's not an entirely new topic)."

None of the respondents thinks athletes would perform better if they were not aware of the risk:

"I really hope athletes are not stupid and pay no attention to the news about any form of threats. Hence, smart athletes are not kept in the dark, they should just rely on Management/Organization to keep them safe and sound." (A-4)

"In most cases I don't think silencing will result in better performance. However, in case of an actual threat we must be assured that the right precautions are taken." (A-5)

"Most athletes are not children. They should be able to cope with it even if they need help coping with it they can get it (Sport psychologist). If as a coach you know your athlete can't handle it. Make sure you take on the responsibility to be on top of what he or she is doing to ensure safety. Most of the time coaches will know whether these types of information have an effect on specific athletes. I think it differs not every athlete is mentally strong." (A-3).

"Care should be taken to make the athletes feel confident that they are safe and that the best is being done to ensure their safety." (A - 8)

"I think some guidance for athletes is important. We're all aware that there are certain risks associated with competing at a major event like the Olympic Games and I think athletes should be provided with relevant info." (A-10)

Two of the participants agree that athletes have the right to be informed about the threats:

"I think that specific terrorist threats should be dealt with appropriately by law enforcement. Athletes have as much a right to information as the general public. I think if the information is available for public consumption, then athletes also have a right to know. However they do not need to be given additional information above and beyond what the public knows. However security teams and organising committees need to be aware, to ensure appropriate safety measures, precautions and briefings can be done." *(A- 1)*

"(...) as an athlete, he or she has the basic right and entitlement to be informed of the news all around the world, whether good or bad, not to mention the terrorist threats in the city where the event is held will have direct or indirect impact on his own safety. All athletes should have the right and freedom to elect whether they still intend to take part in the event if terrorist threats exist in the host countries." (A-2)

4.2. Comments on responses

The studies showed that delegations have been treated as stakeholders (Leopkey & Parent, 2009). Notwithstanding, little research has been carried out on how the participating teams manage risks at MSE (Hanstad, 2012). The Munich Games illustrated the vulnerability of competitors in the face of determined and well-organized terrorist groups. The Games have to deal with a conflict between the need to protect athletes and the public whilst continuing to ensure the future viability of the Olympic movement. In 1972, inadequate preparations were followed by inflexible response as the authorities lost control of the situation. This ultimately led to the deaths of Israeli athletes and trainers (Johnson, 2006). The consequences of the Munich attack event brought significant changes for Israeli athletes, not only during the Olympic Games but also at other MSE. Israeli athletes do have special risk management training before sport competition and during an event itself they have security with them all the time. The security measures regarding the athletes are

decided by the government. The preparation has become part of what the athletes are introduced to throughout the Olympic cycle, in the lead up to the Olympics itself. At the Winter Olympic Games in 2018 the security delegation from Israel was among the largest (Perlroth, 2018). Coming from the state that must cope with terror attacks and military threats on a regular basis prepared athletes to manage themselves effectively and perform as usual (Lidor, Blumenstein, 2009, p.146). Hence, their risk training and awareness is different from athletes from other nations.

Both athletes and Chefs de mission confirmed that the origin do have an impact on perception of safety. Many of the athletes originate from places where terrorism is not considered to be a problem, other than as an entertainment piece in movies or the Internet. It is easier to dismiss threats when coming from safe areas and growing up there. Chefs de mission also stated that the perception of risk is different when coming from a safe country.

The negative outcomes of the attack, however unintended, were visible in the athletes' village which was turned into a lockdown area. Already at the Games in Montreal in 1976 the security had tightened not only for athletes but also for officials (Taylor & Toohey, 2005). It was so intrusive that the "Village might well have been a prison camp" (Mcintosh, 1984, p. 26). Accredited athletes and officials were subjected to much tighter security checks before entering Olympic venues, and individuals without accreditation were excluded (Toohey & Taylor, 2008). It has become a major problem for Olympic Village directors to keep together 200 or so delegations. For security reasons, some nations ask to be lodged near other countries. Others request to be away from certain nationalities. On occasion, for security reasons several delegations did not display their flags in the Olympic Village. The revival of the Games by Pierre de Coubertin had the intention of fostering peace between competing nations. Security measures are, therefore, sometimes resented as a reminder of the problems that the modern movement was established to address (Johnson, 2006).

As it was delineated in the interviews, very strict safety measures introduced in sports facilities mean that Chefs de mission are not afraid for athletes when they are in the so-

called "Olympic bubble" but only when they are outside of it. They give specific recommendations or completely dissuade staying in other places. Athletes are aware of this (as said in the interviews), but they are also (mostly) adults who make their own safety decisions. The biggest risks are busy public spaces where the targets are tourists rather than athletes.

Sporting failure or attacks on athletic personalities may seriously affect the reputation of political leadership, ultimately undermining the authority of the state (Korstanje, et al. 2014). Harming an athletic delegation may engender major diplomatic problems among nations (Paraskevas, 2008; Tarlow, 2006). *"The athletes are the VIP clients of the Games. They are the stars and they have to shine, so obviously we need to make sure that they have all the conditions to compete, and for that to happen we need to keep them safe,"* said Andrei Rodrigues, who was responsible for overseeing Brazil's security in special events (Azzoni, 2016). Various terrorist acts in the past few years (e.g., the Boston Marathon bombing, kidnapping of the Iraqi taekwondo team while traveling for a competition in Jordan (the team was never found), the ambush of the Sri Lanka cricket team, kidnapping of the chief of Iraq's Olympic Committee and 30 athletes from a sports conference in Baghdad) show that sport participants of all types (e.g., recreational, elite/high performance) can have their lives touched in various ways, with various effects resulting (Schinke, et al. 2016).

The results from the interviews indicate that the increasing focus on security and terrorism should be balanced by making everything possible in order to provide a safe environment for the athletes, delegations and all the participants taking part in the sport event. Athletes tend to set up their mind on their goals and not distract themselves, especially before the most important competition, with other aspects which in this case are threats, terrorism and riskiness of the area. Therefore, the role of the coaches and leaders of the delegation is so important in that matter. As highlighted by both athletes and Chefs de mission the information related to security should be minimized, however available. If athletes can trust the Federation, they can put less focus on the risk.

However, the risk might be encouraging awareness and/or action and serves as a double-

edged sword. On one side of the blade, awareness of how a sport context is being politically influenced will permit sport participants to choose whether they wish to continue to engage in their sport, and if they do, how they wish to navigate external agendas posed to them. Some scholars, however, do think that preparing an athlete or team for the threat of terrorism might be regarded as unnecessary paranoia and create unnecessary stress and upset for athletes when they are supposed to be mentally and psychologically focused (Schinke et al.2016). It was however argued by Chefs de mission and partially by athletes. The first ones do not think it is unnecessary, yet they would rather inform with more details the leaders, coaches and delegations rather than athletes. The latter prefer to be aware of the situation they might encounter, nevertheless the amount of information provided to them should be limited.

The management of MSE, such as the Olympics, focuses on prevention and handling of negative events but also on opportunities. The challenge is that almost any negative factor may undermine participants' capacity for optimal performance. There are often very small margins between the best athletes. This means that preparation must have a broad perspective and pay attention to small details that in many other settings would be considered insignificant (Hanstad, 2012, p.191). This is also what Chefs the mission are trying to do. Work behind the scenes so that athletes can be focused on giving their best performance. It is mutual interdependence which aims to provide the best conditions and achieve the best results.

Without the media's interest stories and updates relating to newly discovered threats of terrorism in sport villages and venues, there would be little to no exposure of these. Prevention, seen as the complete elimination of risk (Berlonghi, 1990) is very problematic. It is almost impossible to eliminate all the risk, hence the organizers must do their best and allow athletes and the whole team to work diligently on physical, technical and mental factors while leaving security to others (Hanstad, 2012). Athletes confirmed that they highly rely on their federations and NOCs. Chefs de mission after confronting OC, diplomatic representatives and specialists are making sure their athletes are in a safe environment.

In essence, security teams should not come into conflict with the expectations of athletes. Unfortunately, with such high security measures applied during the event sometimes they do. Competitors have diverse training and personal requirements that create potential risks, which they would not face during normal competitions. The continuing need to confirm their identity and to carry documentation can be difficult for individuals who are preoccupied with their personal performance. The same comments apply to national officials and to coaches. It is possible to identify common flashpoints where security conflicts with the participants' expectations (Johnson, 2006). Athletes and coaches have now grown accustomed to practically disrobing, or in some cases, literally doing so, to clear through securities when entering into their venues and villages, under the watchful eyes of the army and commandos (Schinke et al. 2016). The police and the army guard athletes as if they were the most senior political representatives (Šiljak, et al. 2016).

Some researchers tried to investigate athletes' retrospective understandings of terrorism and athlete readiness for terrorism in relation to adaptation and stressors, following an Olympic cycle. The future of MSE that pose terrorism risks and/or sensationalize terrorist threats could very well have profound psychological effects for high-performance amateur or professional athletes or team members (Schinke et al. 2016). It was underscored in the interviews that the NOCs are prepared to provide necessary help for the athletes who are not feeling safe, confident even if that would mean withdrawing from the competition.

The earlier security breaches have affected certain athletes and officials involved in the Games in more recent times. Following such events, some athletes made public decisions not to travel to events, and national teams withdrew from international competitions (Taylor & Toohey, 2005). It can be concluded that despite the ever-present reality of risk and danger in relation to major sport events the terrorism is barely spoken about to athletes. Only at moments of terrorist attacks on the news or when passing heavy security. Yet, when going to the Olympics the last comments the athletes often hear is "be safe" rather than "have a great time" (May 2012).

5 CONCLUSIONS

As the IOC has made it clear that the Olympics are an international sporting event not a security event, it is the responsibility of the host city to provide a safe milieu for all the participants of the Games with unobtrusive security. The Olympics, being a terrorist target with a high level of securitization, should not lose the spirit of the Games. The analysis of the literature confirmed that MSE have remained relatively untouched by international terrorism, with few exceptions. After the problems of 1972 and 1996 securing the Games became an increasingly difficult and costly mission. In addition, the attacks in 2001 resulted in a significant tightening of security measures during international sports events. However, sharing the knowledge gained from previous Games and lessons learned from organizers of various sport events all around the world the safety of the athletes has been well-secured.

The Munich attack took place over 49 years ago, Atlanta - 25 years ago. Security measures were even more tightened after the terrorist attack which happened 20 years ago. Yet the juxtaposition of the answers given by athletes and Chefs de mission shows that terrorism, with some exceptions, is not presented as the main risk for the athletes. The literature highlights that athletes are very susceptible to terrorism. Before the Olympic Games the media are showcasing the threats directed at the attendees of sport event and the concerns for the safety of the athletes. Still this topic seems to be overlooked by some of the NOCs. The welfare of the athletes is very important but their vulnerability to terrorism and their right to information should make the NOCs implement in their preparation some part of risk management program to the extent that best suits the needs of their athletes.

The analysis of primary and secondary allowed to draw the following conclusions: athletes do not focus on terrorism, they do not consider it a serious threat, however, they would like to be informed about it. They also prefer NOC and IOC to choose places where they can focus 100% on competitions and not on their safety, which may be threatened by local conditions or the geo-political situation country. Past editions of the Games have shown

that the security measures inside the Olympic venues were very high, and it was outside of the official venues were the biggest risk could be experienced, therefore some NOCs even advised their athletes not to leave the Olympic Village. The results indicate that the pressure put on organizers today to secure the event from terrorism threats shifted into cybersecurity threats and health issues. Till Athens 2004, IT threats were not mentioned in the literature, only after.

In terms of research methodology, the methods and analysis applied in this work were effective in achieving their findings. Open-ended questions in the questionnaire enabled data analysis. The selection of participants, despite the limitations, allowed a comparison of the views of the athlete and the NOCs from different countries (large and small).

Future studies could fruitfully explore this issue further by investigating the approach of NOCs when preparing athletes for the Youth Olympic Games. It will be important that future research focus on countries with bigger delegations. In addition, the above-mentioned health issue might be an important area for future investigation. It would be also interesting to compare athletes' sensation of safety depending on their discipline and gender.

How important for an athlete will be his/her safety regarding the threat of hard weather conditions, as typhoons/hurricanes and the like, and to a lesser extent possible excessive heat for marathon runners as in Japan). Some athletes withdrew from the Games in Rio being afraid of the Zika virus. Little did anyone think that the next Summer Games would be faced with an even more deadly pestilence that would lead to their postponement. A world-wide pandemic like COVID-19 adds a whole new dimension to Olympic security and provides a vast resource for future researchers.

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7 APPENDIX

7.1. Expert Interviewee Information

	Role of the Interviewee	Olympic Games	Method	Acronym
Chefs de mission	Chef de mission	2016-2018	in writing	P- 1
	Chef de mission	2008-2018	in writing	P- 2
	Chef de mission	2012-2018	in writing	P- 3
	Chef de mission	2018	in writing	P- 4
	Chef de mission	2008-2018	in writing	P- 5
Athletes	Athlete	2008, 2012	in writing	A - 1
	Athlete	2010	in writing	A - 2
	Athlete	2012, 2016	in writing	A - 3
	Athlete	2000	in writing	A - 4
	Athlete	2012	in writing	A - 5
	Athlete	2012	in writing	A - 6
	Athlete	2012	in writing	A - 7
	Athlete	2000, 2004	in writing	A - 8
	Athlete	2002	in writing	A - 9
	Athlete	1988 - 1998	in writing	A - 10
	Countries Represented: Australia (1), Switzerland (1), Iceland (1), Czech Republic (1), Netherlands (1), Caribbean Country (2), Egypt (1), Israel (2), Austria (1), Hong Kong (1), India (1), Canada (1), USA (1)			
	Demographic Breakdown: Male (9), Female (6)			

Table 4: Expert Interviewee Information

7.2. Research questions

7.2.1. Research questions to the Chefs de mission

Q.1. Does the preparation of athletes regarding their safety differ from the Winter and Summer Games and is it influenced by the location of the Games?

Q.2. How does the NOC/Head of the Delegation find the right balance between security of athletes and their focus on the competition?

Q.3. What are (if any) the special restrictions/regulations/recommendations from NOC/Head of the delegation for athletes for the time of their stay at the Games

Q.4. Is terrorism spoken about during the Olympic cycle? Is this precaution necessary for athletes? Or is it an unnecessary mental burden?

Q.5. Comparing earlier Games, has the topic of safety and security of athletes changed? Is the potential risk of terrorism, health threat more or less spoken about?

Q.6. Is the level of security and surveillance of athletes at the Games enough to protect them? Or is it too much interference to their privacy or to the standards of your NOC?

7.2.2. Research questions to athletes

Q.1. Is it true that athletes pay little/no attention to the riskiness of being in a high profile, thus targeted location?

Q.2. Did you prepare yourself for the major sport event through risk management training?

Q.3. Was terrorism spoken about in the cycle of your Olympic preparation?

Q.4. Do you think such training should be introduced? Is this kind of precaution necessary for athletes?

Q.5. Is it unnecessary paranoia for athletes that should be mentally focused?

Q.6. Is silencing the topic of danger and risk management performance enhancing decision?